Border Patrol
Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance Gao ID: GAO-05-435 July 22, 2005The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally enter the United States between official ports of entry, including potential terrorists, aliens, and contraband smugglers, thereby deterring or stopping illegal activity. The Patrol operates permanent and tactical (temporary) interior traffic checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as part of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of interior checkpoints in the Patrol's strategy; (2) what is known about checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are evaluated and what performance measures indicate regarding their effectiveness.
The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent traffic checkpoints in 8 of its 9 sectors in the southwest border states, supported by tactical checkpoints. While permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure, tactical ones have the mobility to block routes used to evade permanent ones and to respond to intelligence on illegal activity. A third type of checkpoint operates in the Tucson, Ariz., sector, where the Patrol has been legislatively prohibited from funding construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. This restriction has prevented checkpoint construction. The Patrol also began closing or relocating checkpoints in the sector every 7 days at the instruction of congressional staff in June 2002, and was legislatively required to relocate checkpoints on the same schedule in FY 2003 and 2004, and an average of once every 14 days in FY 2005. Three of six checkpoints in the sector had to close for 7/14 days, as safety considerations made it too hazardous to relocate them. Local law enforcement and business and community leaders we interviewed from communities near interior traffic checkpoints said that benefits resulting from checkpoint operations included reductions in crime and vandalism. Although a few cited traffic delays, most were supportive of checkpoint operations. However, some others were concerned about the impact of the checkpoints on traffic congestion and quality of life in their communities. The Border Patrol does not routinely evaluate the effectiveness of checkpoint operations, or their costs. The Patrol includes limited traditional performance measures in its Performance and Annual Report, such as apprehensions and contraband seized. GAO developed an apprehension per agent work year measure to assess performance. The data suggest that the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints dropped starting in FY 2002, and more in FY 2003, after the Border Patrol began relocating or closing them on a regular basis. Three other sectors we visited that did not have to relocate or close checkpoints experienced no comparable decrease in apprehensions per agent work year during the same time period. Other factors not measured or accounted for might also have contributed to these outcomes, but the Border Patrol's limited measures do not capture or assess them. A broader range of performance measures, when considered with other indicators, could be useful to CBP and the Congress as they consider ways to improve the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints and border security efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-435, Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2005:
Border Patrol:
Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector
Performance:
GAO-05-435:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-435, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally enter the United States
between official ports of entry, including potential terrorists,
aliens, and contraband smugglers, thereby deterring or stopping illegal
activity. The Patrol operates permanent and tactical (temporary)
interior traffic checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly
in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as
part of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension
of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of interior
checkpoints in the Patrol‘s strategy; (2) what is known about
checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are evaluated
and what performance measures indicate regarding their effectiveness.
What GAO Found:
The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent traffic checkpoints in 8 of its
9 sectors in the southwest border states, supported by tactical
checkpoints. While permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical
infrastructure, tactical ones have the mobility to block routes used to
evade permanent ones and to respond to intelligence on illegal
activity. A third type of checkpoint operates in the Tucson, Ariz.,
sector, where the Patrol has been legislatively prohibited from funding
construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. This restriction
has prevented checkpoint construction. The Patrol also began closing or
relocating checkpoints in the sector every 7 days at the instruction of
congressional staff in June 2002, and was legislatively required to
relocate checkpoints on the same schedule in FY 2003 and 2004, and an
average of once every 14 days in FY 2005. Three of six checkpoints in
the sector had to close for 7/14 days, as safety considerations made it
too hazardous to relocate them.
Local law enforcement and business and community leaders we interviewed
from communities near interior traffic checkpoints said that benefits
resulting from checkpoint operations included reductions in crime and
vandalism. Although a few cited traffic delays, most were supportive of
checkpoint operations. However, some others were concerned about the
impact of the checkpoints on traffic congestion and quality of life in
their communities.
The Border Patrol does not routinely evaluate the effectiveness of
checkpoint operations, or their costs. The Patrol includes limited
traditional performance measures in its Performance and Annual Report,
such as apprehensions and contraband seized. GAO developed an
apprehension per agent work year measure to assess performance. The
data suggest that the performance of the Tucson sector interior
checkpoints dropped starting in FY 2002, and more in FY 2003, after the
Border Patrol began relocating or closing them on a regular basis.
Three other sectors we visited that did not have to relocate or close
checkpoints experienced no comparable decrease in apprehensions per
agent work year during the same time period. Other factors not measured
or accounted for might also have contributed to these outcomes, but the
Border Patrol‘s limited measures do not capture or assess them. A
broader range of performance measures, when considered with other
indicators, could be useful to CBP and the Congress as they consider
ways to improve the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints and
border security efforts.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, GAO recommends
that the CBP Commissioner (1) develop additional performance measures
for productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, and (2)
include data on checkpoint performance, and improvements that might be
made, in CBP‘s Performance and Annual Report. DHS concurred with the
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-435.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202)
512-8777 or StanaR@GAO.GOV.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Have Different but Complementary
Roles in the Border Patrol Strategy:
Benefits and Costs of Traffic Checkpoints Are Difficult to Quantify,
but Some Examples Are Available:
The Lack of Systematic Evaluation Limits the Border Patrol's Ability to
Allocate Resources Based on Need:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile:
Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile:
Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile:
Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoints Schedule to Conform to
Legislative Language:
Figures:
Figure 1: Topography and Road Systems along the Southwest Border:
Figure 2: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Immigrants at All Locations in
Each Southwest Border Patrol Sector in Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
Figure 3: IAFIS Fingerprint Reading Machine at the I-5 San Clemente,
California, Checkpoint:
Figure 4: VACIS Machine Examining a Vehicle at the I-15 Temecula,
California, Checkpoint:
Figure 5: VACIS Monitor Display, I-5 Checkpoint, Temecula, California:
Figure 6: Vehicle Lift at the I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas:
Figure 7: Tactical Checkpoint near Temecula, California:
Figure 8: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint at KP 42 on I-19, Near
Tubac, Arizona:
Figure 9: Apprehensions per Agent Work Year in the Tucson, San Diego,
Laredo and McAllen Sectors, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
Figure 10: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the San Diego Sector:
Figure 11: Permanent Checkpoint on I-5, South of San Clemente:
Figure 12: Aerial Photo of Checkpoint on I-5 South of San Clemente:
Figure 13: Tactical Checkpoint at Sandia Creek Road:
Figure 14: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the Tucson Sector:
Figure 15: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint on I-19 near KP 42:
Figure 16: Nonpermanent Checkpoint on State Highway 85 near Ajo,
Arizona:
Figure 17: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the Laredo Sector:
Figure 18: Permanent Checkpoint North of Laredo, Texas, on I-35:
Figure 19: Permanent Checkpoint on State Highway 359 Near Hebbronville,
Texas:
Figure 20: Aerial View of Highway 359 Checkpoint, Texas:
Figure 21: Architectural Drawing of the New I-35, Texas, Permanent
Checkpoint:
Figure 22: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the McAllen, Texas
Sector:
Figure 23: Checkpoint Inspection Area, U.S. Highway 281, near
Falfurrias, Texas:
Abbreviations:
ATV: all-terrain vehicle:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
IAFIS: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
KP: kilometer post:
PAL: pre-enrolled access lane:
SR: state route:
VACIS: Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 22, 2005:
The Honorable Christopher Cox:
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ken Calvert:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Darrell Issa:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jim Kolbe:
House of Representatives:
The U.S. Border Patrol, now part of the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, has
as its primary mission the detection and apprehension of terrorists and
their weapons, and a traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens
and contraband smugglers from entering the United States, both at the
land borders between ports of entry and inside the United States.
According to the Border Patrol, its operations are intended to
apprehend illegal entrants; deter potential illegal immigration,
smuggling, or terrorism, through such apprehensions; and present a high-
profile presence along our nation's borders. On the southwest border,
where the majority of illegal immigration into the United States
occurs, the Border Patrol aims to accomplish its mission through what
it describes as an integrated, multilayered border enforcement
strategy. Along the border, between official ports of entry,[Footnote
1] are the first two layers, consisting of a first called line watch
and a second, called line patrol. Together, these are where the
majority of the nation's 10,800 U.S. Border Patrol agents are deployed,
with agents positioned along the border line or somewhat farther back
but still generally in visible proximity to the border, primarily in
well-marked four-wheel-drive vehicles, to maintain a high profile to
deter, turn back, or arrest anyone attempting to illegally enter the
country. The line patrol layer consists of smaller contingents of
agents deployed behind the line watch units to provide direct support
of the line watch units. Given the 1,950-mile U.S.-Mexican border, the
Border Patrol states that it does not have the personnel to patrol all
of it simultaneously and therefore allocates personnel based on a
combination of intelligence information about potential threats from
terrorists and contraband smugglers, as well as on the estimated volume
of illegal entries. In addition, a third layer of enforcement is
composed of interior traffic checkpoints at which Border Patrol agents
monitor and stop vehicles at checkpoints--both permanent and tactical
(temporary)--on major U.S. highways and secondary roads that are
generally 25 to 75 miles inland from the border. This permits them to
be far enough inland to detect and apprehend potential terrorists and
illegal aliens attempting to travel farther into the interior of the
United States after evading detection at the border, but that are close
enough to the border to potentially control access to major population
centers. The permanent interior traffic checkpoints are locations that
generally have large, tollbooth-like structures at which agents may
stop vehicles for visual inspection, and to decide whether a more
thorough inspection of the vehicle and its occupants is warranted.
There are 33 such permanent interior traffic checkpoints in the
southwest border states, and one in northern New York state. The
tactical checkpoints, the number and location of which may change
daily, respond to intelligence on changes in illegal activity routes
and generally consist of a few vehicles, portable water tanks, traffic
cones and signs, and a mobile trailer. The permanent checkpoints are
intended to apprehend illegal entrants and contraband, and through the
perception of potential apprehension, to deter illegal entrants from
using major highways or roads. Permanent checkpoints have supporting
infrastructure and procedures intended to reduce the ability of illegal
entrants from circumventing the checkpoints; these include remote video
surveillance, electronic sensors, and agent patrols.
With permanent checkpoints on major routes, the Border Patrol seeks to
cause illegal entrants to use less traveled secondary roads on which
they are more visible, and where less traffic permits stopping a much
higher percentage of transiting vehicles than on interstates, as well
as questioning vehicle occupants, adding to the costs of smuggling or
transit time, as well as to the likelihood of being detected and
apprehended.
In addition to the use of agents to maintain surveillance along the
border between official ports of entry, and inland at the interior
checkpoints, the Border Patrol carries out its mission by responding to
electronic sensor alarms and aircraft sightings, interpreting and
following tracks, and patrolling in a wide variety of modes, including
using horses, helicopters, small aircraft, patrol boats, off-road all-
terrain vehicles (ATVs), and mountain bikes. These agents and their
modes of operation are deployed as an integrated strategy in which
agents can be shifted daily among line watch, line patrol, and interior
checkpoint operations, as well as other duties, to respond to changes
detected in the tactics and routes of those attempting to enter the
United States illegally.
With the continued influx of illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexican
border, contraband smuggling, and ongoing threats of terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction potentially entering the country, you
expressed interest about the operations of the Border Patrol's
permanent and tactical traffic checkpoints in the southwest border
states within the context of overall border security. To address your
interests, this report focuses on:
* how the Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in the
southwest border states as part of its strategy to detect and apprehend
potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and contraband smugglers, and
to deter potential future violators through the likelihood of
apprehension, as well as to cause them to avoid permanent checkpoints
on major routes and take less traveled secondary roads on which they
would more likely be apprehended at tactical checkpoints;
* what is known about the costs and benefits of interior traffic
checkpoint operations, including their impact on local law enforcement
and local communities, as well as in terms of the amount of contraband
seized and illegal entrants and potential terrorists apprehended; and:
* what data and performance measures are used by the Border Patrol to
evaluate interior traffic checkpoint operations, in terms of their
overall effectiveness in meeting agency mission goals and how might
Border Patrol data be used to develop additional measures of
productivity and effectiveness.
However, this report does not address some of the larger issues
surrounding illegal immigration into the United States, such as the
disparities in average daily wages between Mexico and the United
States, and the incentives created by these disparities for illegal
immigration, as well as the difficulties of neutralizing such
disparities through work site enforcement. We have elsewhere addressed
some of these issues.[Footnote 2] In addition, although deterring
illegal immigration through the likelihood of detection and
apprehension is a goal of the Border Patrol, we did not attempt to
measure the deterrent effect of the Border Patrol's operations, as this
would have required, among other things, opinion surveys of Mexican
citizens and potential contraband smugglers.
To address these objectives, we reviewed Border Patrol documents,
reports, manuals, and guidance concerning border strategy and
checkpoint operations, as well as CBP's annual performance
reports.[Footnote 3] We interviewed Border Patrol officials at CBP
headquarters in Washington, DC. We also interviewed Border Patrol
sector headquarter officials and observed operations at checkpoints in
the San Diego, California; Tucson, Arizona; Laredo, Texas; and McAllen,
Texas, Border Patrol sectors. (The other 5 southwest border sectors are
El Centro, California; Yuma, Arizona; El Paso, Texas; Marfa, Texas; and
Del Rio, Texas. In addition to these 9 southwest sectors, the remainder
of the country is divided into 11 additional sectors by the Border
Patrol.)
The 4 sectors we visited were selected to provide a substantial range
in the size and types of interior checkpoint operations; estimated
volume of illegal annual immigration; volume of vehicular traffic
transiting checkpoints; topography and density of road networks;
presence or absence of large urban areas on or near the border, on both
the U.S. and Mexican sides; and types of checkpoints (permanent and
tactical).[Footnote 4] Since we were unable to observe all operating
conditions at all times, the conditions we describe are therefore based
on available documentation and observations from our site visits only.
(See app. I for further discussion of the range of conditions among
these sectors.)
We also interviewed local law enforcement, business, and community
leaders in communities near interior traffic checkpoints with regard to
the impact of the checkpoints. Because these places were selected using
a nonprobabilistic method, the results from our site visits cannot be
generalized to other locations and checkpoints. To assess the
reliability of the Border Patrol's data, we talked with agency
officials at both Washington, D.C., headquarters and at some Border
Patrol stations in the field about data quality control procedures,
including methods by which data are checked and reviewed internally for
accuracy and consistency. We determined that the Border Patrol utilizes
processes and checks that provide reasonable assurance that the data
recorded on apprehensions, work hours, and contraband seizures are
accurate and sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We
conducted our work from September 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Additional details on
our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. Detailed
information on the four Border Patrol sectors that we visited can be
found in appendixes II through V.
Results in Brief:
Interior traffic checkpoints function as part of the Border Patrol's
multilayered enforcement strategy, to increase the likelihood of
detecting potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and smugglers who
have crossed the border and evaded patrols at and near the border. By
increasing the possibility of apprehension, the Border Patrol seeks to
enhance national security and to enforce existing immigration and
contraband smuggling laws, thereby deterring potential future illegal
entrants from crossing the border. The Border Patrol operates 33
permanent interior traffic checkpoints in 8 of its 9 sectors along the
southwest border. In all sectors except Tucson, permanent checkpoints
are supported by additional tactical checkpoints. Permanent checkpoints
may operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with their infrastructure
supporting access to computers and technology, buildings with detention
facilities, shade and water for canines, paved shoulder areas with
sufficient space for vehicle lift equipment essential to inspecting
underneath vehicles, as well as the space required for gamma-ray
machines that examine other vehicles. The number and location of
tactical checkpoints can change on a daily basis, depending on a
combination of available resources and intelligence about illegal
entrants' routes, which the Border Patrol uses to decide where to set
up tactical checkpoints.
In the Tucson sector, however, Congress has prohibited the construction
of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. Since the sector had no
permanent checkpoints prior to the prohibition--and used portable
equipment to establish checkpoints that moved infrequently, but that
also had no permanent structures[Footnote 5]--the effect of the
legislative language was to prevent construction of permanent
checkpoints. Moreover, starting in June 2002, at the instruction of
congressional staff, and beginning in fiscal year 2003 to comply with
legislative language, the Border Patrol has been relocating or closing
checkpoints in the Tucson sector on a regular basis--at least once
every 7 days in the last quarter of fiscal year 2002, and in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004. In fiscal year 2005, the legislative language was
less restrictive, requiring relocating Tucson sector checkpoints "at
least an average of once every14 days." The Border Patrol has
implemented that language by keeping one checkpoint in the sector open
for 14 days, closed for 8 hours, and then reopened for 14 days, while
other checkpoints are maintained on varying schedules that the Patrol
believes to be in conformity with the law. The result of these
legislative restrictions in the Tucson sector has been that the Border
Patrol operates what we refer to as nonpermanent checkpoints that are
hybrids of permanent and tactical but that lack the logistical,
communication, and other capabilities provided by the physical
infrastructure of permanent checkpoints or the flexibility of tactical
checkpoints. In the Tucson sector, according to Border Patrol
officials, the lack of permanent infrastructure, in combination with
the mandated relocation on a regular basis, results in closure at 3 of
6 sector checkpoints because of an inability to find an alternate
location that meets safety requirements for adequate shoulder areas and
advance notice to vehicles that they are approaching a checkpoint. To
support these nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector operates
tactical checkpoints periodically, as occurs in other sectors with
permanent checkpoints.
Some benefits of interior traffic checkpoints are more easily
quantified than others, but a lack of data makes it difficult to
estimate both the direct costs of interior traffic checkpoints,
resulting from labor and overhead, or indirect costs, such as delays
caused to commuters or commercial shippers. Quantifiable benefit data
include such measures as apprehensions of persons in violation of
immigration laws and the detection and seizure of illegal drugs and
other contraband. For example, in fiscal year 2004, interior
checkpoints in the 9 southwest sectors, with about 10 percent of total
Border Patrol personnel in those sectors assigned to these checkpoints,
accounted for the detection and apprehension of over 96,000 illegal
aliens, about 8 percent of the total apprehensions by the Border Patrol
that year. In addition, interior traffic checkpoint operations in the 9
southwest sectors seized 418,102 pounds of marijuana and 10,853 pounds
of cocaine in fiscal year 2004, or about 31 percent of the marijuana
and about 74 percent of the cocaine seized nationally by the Border
Patrol. Less quantifiable were the benefits cited by most local law
enforcement, business, and community leaders we interviewed, who spoke
positively of reductions in crime and vandalism by smugglers and
illegal aliens. As for the cost of checkpoint operations, the Border
Patrol did not maintain the costs of checkpoints, either individually
or collectively, in readily accessible databases.[Footnote 6] Data were
also not available on some indirect costs, such as those associated
with traffic delays and congestion. For example, professional
organizations that monitor traffic, such as the Automobile Club of
Southern California, American Trucking Associations, the California
Highway Patrol, and the California Department of Transportation, do not
report problems for commuters, commercial shippers, or tourists
resulting from interior checkpoints on major traffic arteries in the
sectors we visited. Literature searches and information requests did
not produce data, studies, or reports on traffic, business costs, or
crime rates that reported or systematically analyzed either benefits or
adverse effects. Traffic congestion and backups do occur at some of the
checkpoints on major highways, but at several we visited we observed
that traffic is monitored, with operations ceasing and traffic
"flushed" to normal flows whenever agents determined wait time to be
excessive. For example, the Temecula, California, I-15 checkpoint
guidance states that agents should not permit a backup exceeding a
certain approximate distance and certain approximate number of minutes'
wait.[Footnote 7] The costs to commuters and commercial traffic that
may occur from delays at the checkpoints could not be calculated, since
no data are available on the number of commuters delayed annually at
the 33 permanent southwest checkpoints, the length of the delays, the
salaries of those delayed, or economic losses to commerce that may have
resulted from traffic delays. Furthermore, costs are difficult to
calculate since the Border Patrol does not routinely maintain data on
the costs of operating checkpoints.
Performance measures of how well a government agency carries out its
mission are essential to annual assessment and improvement, not least
because such measures help management identify problems and allocate
resources to solve them. However, we found that the Border Patrol does
not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of interior checkpoint
operations. CBP annually prepares and sends to the Congress a
Performance and Annual Report. In these reports, CBP uses traditional
measures of law enforcement performance--including numbers of
apprehensions and amount and type of contraband seized--to report on
Border Patrol performance. In the two most recent annual reports, no
data or analysis are cited with regard to the performance of interior
checkpoints. These reports would be more useful to CBP and the Congress
if they included additional measures to compare interior checkpoints'
effectiveness with that of line watch and line patrol operations. This
could help to ascertain whether the personnel and equipment resources
allocated to differing layers in the multilayered strategy are right-
sized. Traditional measures do not take into account inputs such as
labor and overhead costs, thereby making it difficult to determine if
one sector, or type of checkpoint, is more cost effective than others.
For example, knowing that more illegal immigrants are apprehended in
one sector than in another does not tell managers if that is a result
of having more agents on the line or at more interior checkpoints in
that sector compared with others. Alternatively, it does not provide
information on whether the apparent success in apprehensions is more a
function of a large volume of attempted entries than better agent work
or positioning of checkpoints, relative to other sectors.
Using available data, we developed two performance measures to
supplement the traditional law enforcement measures used by the Border
Patrol. These two measures alone do not exhaust the potential ways in
which checkpoint operations could be assessed, and should not be
considered in isolation from the broader context of the multilayered
strategy, as well other factors that could affect checkpoint and line
watch/line patrol operations, such as the volume of illegal immigration
into a sector. With these caveats in mind, we compared data on the
performance of interior checkpoints in the Tucson sector with those in
the three other sectors we visited in terms of apprehensions per agent
work year, and costs per apprehension, based on an average work year
cost.[Footnote 8] We found that while checkpoint performance, as
measured by apprehensions per agent work year, varied among sectors and
by fiscal years, a substantial drop started in the Tucson sector in
fiscal year 2002, when the Border Patrol began to routinely relocate or
close its checkpoints every 7 days, starting in June 2002, with another
substantial drop in fiscal year 2003, when statutory language went into
effect. In contrast, comparable decreases in checkpoint performance
data did not occur in the 3 other sectors we visited, which were not
required to relocate or close checkpoints every 7 days in the last
quarter of fiscal year 2002, or in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 (14 days
on average in fiscal year 2005). At the same time, it is important to
recognize that there may be other factors that affected this
performance measure that we were unable to measure or of which we were
unaware. While the two performance measures we developed are some of
many possibilities to assess effectiveness, Border Patrol officials
told us that they found the two measures potentially useful as tools
for making allocation decisions, in conjunction with other data and
information.
To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, and in order to
more effectively manage and allocate resources, we are recommending
that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection develop
performance measures for the Border Patrol in addition to its
traditional ones, of the productivity and effectiveness of interior
checkpoints. We are also recommending that the Commissioner include in
CBP's Performance and Annual Report, data and analysis provided by the
additional performance measures on the performance of interior
checkpoints and what might be done to improve their effectiveness. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the
recommendations and stated that CBP is taking steps to implement them.
Background:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a component of the Department of
Homeland Security, has the primary responsibility for securing the
nation's borders. The U.S. Border Patrol is the uniformed enforcement
division of CBP responsible for border security between designated
official ports of entry into the country. According to the Border
Patrol, its priority mission since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, has been to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States between official ports of entry. In
addition, the Border Patrol has a traditional mission of preventing
illegal aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from
entering the country, as these activities directly affect the safety
and security of the United States. Border Patrol agents generally
report to Border Patrol stations and substations in each of these
sectors at the start and end of their workdays; these stations function
much as police stations do for police personnel around the country. The
number of stations and substations varies widely by sector.[Footnote 9]
The Border Patrol's fiscal year 2005 budget was about $1.4 billion. As
of March 2005, the Border Patrol had 10,817 agents nationwide; 6,129
(57 percent) were located in the 9 Border Patrol sectors along the
southwest border. About 10 percent of the Border Patrol's agents
nationwide are assigned to interior traffic checkpoints in the
southwest border sectors, according to the Border Patrol.
Permanent and tactical interior traffic checkpoints are generally
located on major and secondary roads, usually 25 to 75 miles inland
from the border. These interior checkpoint locations are chosen by the
Border Patrol to maximize the likelihood that illegal entrants who have
managed to evade border defenses and patrols will have to pass through
the checkpoints in order to get to major U.S. population centers.
Although tactical checkpoints are mobile and may move daily or weekly,
as needed, they must provide adequate advance notice to motorists that
a checkpoint has been set up and is in operation. This is typically
done by using orange traffic cones and large, visible signs positioned
in advance of the checkpoint location. Permanent checkpoints, by virtue
of their permanence and large traffic signs, meet these criteria for
advance notice and visibility.
Figure 1 shows the topography, interstate highways, and some major
secondary roads along the southwest border.
Figure 1: Topography and Road Systems along the Southwest Border:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The U.S.-Mexican border is denoted by the black line that starts
at the far left in San Diego, California, and that moves to the far
right, ending at Brownsville, Texas.
[End of figure]
The legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Border Patrol
began implementing a strategy called Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993,
to incrementally increase control of the Southwest border in four
phases by making it so difficult and costly for aliens to attempt
illegal entry that fewer individuals would try.[Footnote 10] The four-
phased approach involved adding resources along the Southwest border,
starting with the areas that had the highest known levels of illegal
alien activity, which at that time were the San Diego, California; El
Paso, Texas; and McAllen, Texas, regions.[Footnote 11] Although INS
accomplished its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away from these
areas, the shift was achieved at a cost to both illegal aliens and
INS.[Footnote 12] In particular, rather than being deterred from
attempting some illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury
and death by trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers, primarily
in Arizona and in particular in the Tucson sector. These conditions,
which the Border Patrol said continue to the present day, prompted INS
and now CBP to warn aliens about the dangers of crossing illegally, as
well as to establish search-and-rescue units.
In effect, and contrary to the expectations of INS, the strategy led to
a significant increase in illegal immigration through the Tucson
sector, despite its topography and climate, as indirectly measured by
total apprehensions, which increased nearly sevenfold in this sector
over the period of fiscal years 1993 to 2000. In contrast, during the
same period, total apprehensions for the eight other southwest sectors
combined decreased by about 28 percent. The largest single decrease was
in the San Diego sector, where apprehensions fell by almost three-
fourths over 1993-2000.
Nationwide, Border Patrol apprehensions at all locations (including on
the border, near the border, and at interior checkpoints) of illegal
aliens over the last 4 years have varied from about 1.3 million in
fiscal year 2001, to 955,000 in fiscal year 2002, 931,000 in fiscal
year 2003, and over 1.1 million in fiscal year 2004. Figure 2 shows the
total annual apprehensions of illegal immigrants at all locations in
each of the 9 southwest Border Patrol sectors reported for fiscal years
2001 to 2004.
Figure 2: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Immigrants at All Locations in
Each Southwest Border Patrol Sector in Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As shown, the Tucson sector has had the largest numbers of
apprehensions since fiscal year 2001, which Border Patrol officials
attribute in part to the legacy INS's strategy to deter illegal entry
between the official ports of entry in the sectors that had the highest
estimated illegal immigration in the early and mid-1990s, the San
Diego, California, and the Texas sectors of El Paso and
McAllen.[Footnote 13] It is apparent that in recent years far more
apprehensions of illegal aliens have occurred in the Tucson sector than
in the 8 other sectors.
When establishing checkpoints, the Border Patrol must take into account
court decisions ruling on the parameters of immigration officers'
authority to conduct inquiries concerning illegal aliens. The legal
authority of immigration officials to establish permanent checkpoints
and stop vehicles transiting through them has been confirmed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.[Footnote 14] The
Supreme Court ruled that government officials may stop vehicles at
permanent interior checkpoints for brief questioning of the driver and
passengers without reasonable suspicion. The Court held that it was
constitutional for the Border Patrol, after routinely stopping or
slowing automobiles at a permanent checkpoint, to refer motorists
selectively to a secondary inspection area for questions about
citizenship and immigration status on the basis of criteria that would
not sustain a roving patrol stop.[Footnote 15] The Court determined
that the constitutional interests of motorists at these checkpoints
were not violated, for a number of reasons. It found that the
checkpoints, with flashing lights and warning signs, provided advance
notice to motorists of an official roadblock that was applicable to all
motorists.[Footnote 16] Motorists were not taken by surprise, as they
knew, or could find out, the location of the checkpoints. Furthermore,
the Court concluded that the regular manner in which established
checkpoints were operated was visible evidence that the stops were duly
authorized.[Footnote 17]
An organization that specializes in immigration issues has estimated
that the number of people who have successfully entered the United
States illegally has averaged roughly half a million per year since
1990 and that the number of illegal aliens residing in the United
States has grown in recent years from about 8.4 million in April 2000
to about 11 million in March 2005.[Footnote 18]
Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Have Different but Complementary
Roles in the Border Patrol Strategy:
The Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in 8 of its 9
southwest sectors as part of a multilayered enforcement strategy to
deter and defend against potential terrorists and their weapons,
contraband smugglers, and persons who have entered the country
illegally.[Footnote 19] Corresponding to their different roles in the
Border Patrol's enforcement strategy, permanent and tactical
checkpoints have different capabilities. Permanent checkpoints have the
advantage of physical infrastructure, which provides a wide range of
logistical, communication, suspect questioning and detention, and
equipment deployment and storage capabilities, as well as adequate
shade and cages for canines. Tactical checkpoints have the advantage of
mobility, which gives the Border Patrol the capability to respond
quickly to emerging trends, intelligence, or national security threats.
According to the Border Patrol, permanent checkpoints are most
effective when supplemented by tactical checkpoints, which are
generally used on secondary roads to cut off access to those seeking to
evade permanent checkpoints on major arteries.
This is not the case in the Tucson sector, where legislative language
has prohibited the construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999.
Moreover, starting in mid-2002, and through fiscal year 2004, the
Border Patrol relocated or closed checkpoints in the Tucson sector on a
regular basis, such as at least once every 7 days. The result has been
a sector of nonpermanent checkpoints that lack the advantages of either
permanent or tactical checkpoints, and which the Border Patrol states
have degraded the Border Patrol's ability to fulfill its mission in the
Tucson sector.
Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Each Have a Role in the Border
Enforcement Strategy:
The Border Patrol uses interior traffic checkpoints as a third layer of
defense and deterrence against potential terrorists and their weapons,
contraband smugglers, and persons who have entered the country
illegally. According to the Border Patrol, permanent and tactical
checkpoints are part of an integrated, multilayered enforcement
strategy intended to achieve two key law enforcement objectives: (1) to
increase the likelihood of detection and apprehension of illegal
entrants of all types, and thereby to deter other potential illegal
entrants from attempting to enter the country, who might otherwise
believe that successfully crossing the border would mean that there
were no further barriers to them, and (2) to deter illegal entrants
from transiting through permanent checkpoints on major roadways,
through fear of detection, and thereby to cause them to use less
traveled secondary roads on which the Border Patrol is able to stop all
or almost all vehicles (because of much lower traffic volume), making
illegal entrants more visible and easier to detect and
apprehend.[Footnote 20]
Procedures at both permanent and tactical checkpoints involve slowing
or stopping traffic as vehicles proceed through the checkpoint. As
traffic slows, Border Patrol agents use visual cues and canines trained
to locate drugs and hidden persons to determine whether to wave the
vehicle through, or stop the vehicle, question the occupant(s), and
determine whether a more thorough secondary inspection is required.
Role of Permanent Checkpoints:
Permanent checkpoints are placed at locations that are intended to
maximize the chances to detect illegal immigrants and smugglers who
have crossed the border illegally and who are seeking to reach large
population centers, such as Los Angeles, California, or Phoenix,
Arizona. Where possible, according to the Border Patrol, permanent
checkpoints are placed after several highways or roads join, so that
anyone intending to exit the area into the interior of the country must
transit them. Permanent checkpoints' physical infrastructure gives them
different capabilities than tactical checkpoints. For example,
permanent checkpoints facilities are equipped with technology and
computers connected to national law enforcement databases to help
identify suspects, research criminal histories, and cross check
terrorist watch lists. They also offer greater physical safety to those
working at them, by virtue of better signage, lighting, and larger
shoulder areas to stand out of the way of traffic, and many of them are
paved and have protective concrete barriers. In addition, permanent
checkpoints have supporting infrastructure and procedures intended to
reduce the ability of illegal entrants from circumventing the
checkpoints. These include remote video surveillance, electronic
sensors, and agent patrols in the vicinity of the checkpoints.
Among the resources that are generally found at permanent checkpoints
are:
* Computers hardwired into national law enforcement databases, such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) system, to provide identity
checks. Figure 3 shows a fingerprint reading machine at a permanent
checkpoint as it scans a fingerprint and then transmits the information
to a centralized database via high-speed communications primarily
available through a hardwired, secure line.[Footnote 21]
Figure 3: IAFIS Fingerprint Reading Machine at the I-5 San Clemente,
California, Checkpoint:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) machines that use gamma-
ray technology to examine the contents of vehicles, including trucks.
As figure 4 shows, this equipment is substantial in size and requires
an off-road area sufficient to permit its safe operation without
interfering with traffic flow. The VACIS truck moves its arm over the
subject vehicle, producing a color display of the interior that is
visible on a color monitor inside the truck. Figure 5 shows how a car
appeared on the monitor; the actual display is in color.
Figure 4: VACIS Machine Examining a Vehicle at the I-15 Temecula,
California, Checkpoint:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 5: VACIS Monitor Display, I-5 Checkpoint, Temecula, California:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Electrical and water utilities:
* Permanent tollbooth-like structures that provide cover from the
weather, including shade for agents and canines:
* Buildings with room for processing and detention of persons suspected
of smuggling or other illegal activity:
* Permanent, large communication towers that permit radio communication
to other Border Patrol facilities and national law enforcement
authorities:
* Permanent lighting for night and poor weather conditions:
* Vehicle lifts to raise vehicles to inspect under them, and the area
required for the lifts, as shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: Vehicle Lift at the I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Role of Tactical Checkpoints:
Tactical checkpoints are intended to supplement permanent ones by
monitoring and inspecting traffic on secondary roads that can be used
to evade the permanent checkpoints. For example, the Temecula permanent
checkpoint in the San Diego sector maintains up to eight tactical
checkpoints to inspect vehicles traveling on back roads in the hills
around the permanent checkpoint on I-15. Tactical checkpoints are
intended to be mobile and set up for short-term use only. They are
relocated by the Border Patrol in order to respond to intelligence on
changing patterns of contraband smuggling and routes being used by
illegal aliens. According to the Border Patrol, the combination of
permanent and supplemental tactical checkpoints is intended to both
detect persons who have entered the country illegally and to increase
the chances of detecting and apprehending contraband smugglers and
illegal aliens who seek to avoid permanent checkpoints and instead use
less traveled routes. On these less traveled routes, with comparatively
low traffic volume of as little as a few hundred vehicles daily, the
Border Patrol is able to stop every car and closely observe the
occupants, as well as question them.[Footnote 22] This increases the
likelihood of detecting illegal entrants, while on heavily traveled
highways, only a small percentage of vehicles can be subjected to this
level of inspection, in order to avoid creating large traffic delays.
In contrast to the resources that are typically deployed at permanent
checkpoints, tactical ones, by virtue of their mobility, do not have
large fixed facilities or hardwired communications. They do, however,
offer the element of flexibility, by virtue of their mobility. Tactical
checkpoints generally consist of a few Border Patrol vehicles, used by
agents to drive to the location; orange cones to slow down and direct
traffic; portable water supply; a cage for canines (if deployed with
the checkpoint); portable rest facilities; and warning signs. Some may
also have portable lighting, if operated at dusk or night. If persons
are detained at a tactical checkpoint, some of the agents must leave
the checkpoint to transport them back to a Border Patrol station for
positive identification. Our observations of tactical checkpoints
showed that most equipment has to be towed or carried to the checkpoint
for it to operate, and then has to be removed when it relocates.
According to the Border Patrol, this increases wear and tear on the
equipment and absorbs time to hitch up, tow, set up, dismantle, and tow
the equipment back to a Border Patrol station or to an alternate
tactical checkpoint. Figure 7 shows a tactical checkpoint in a rural
area near Temecula, California, that was used to supplement the
permanent checkpoint on I-15.
Figure 7: Tactical Checkpoint near Temecula, California:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While the changing locations of tactical checkpoints would appear to
offer the potential element of surprise, we were told by the Border
Patrol that the smugglers of aliens and contraband could use cell
phones and communications networks to alert confederates of the
presence of checkpoints within minutes of their being relocated. The
Border Patrol provided us with information that confirmed that
smugglers of aliens and contraband observed some checkpoints and
reported on their activities to their confederates. According to the
Border Patrol, smugglers know within minutes about the closure of a
checkpoint.
Legislative Restrictions on the Tucson Sector:
For fiscal years 1999-2004, annual appropriations acts made no funds
"available for the site acquisition, design, or construction" of any
Border Patrol checkpoint in the Tucson sector.[Footnote 23] Since the
Tucson sector had no permanent checkpoints at the time the prohibition
was first imposed, the effect of this restriction was that no permanent
checkpoints could be planned or constructed in this sector. According
to the Border Patrol, it used a combination of roving patrols and
temporary checkpoints in the sector that remained at the same location
for long periods but did not have permanent infrastructure. This
arrangement was adequate, the Border Patrol stated, until the late
1990s, when the volume of illegal entrants into the sector increased
substantially as its overall strategy to greatly reinforce the border
in urbanized areas took effect in San Diego, California; El Paso,
Texas; and McAllen, Texas.
The fiscal year 2003 and 2004 Appropriations Acts also added a
provision requiring that the checkpoints in the Tucson sector be
relocated "at least once every 7 days in a manner designed to prevent
persons subject to inspection from predicting" their location. Since
permanent checkpoints could not be built under these restrictions, and
temporary ones had to be relocated at least once every 7 days, the
checkpoints functioned as hybrids, or what we refer to as nonpermanent
checkpoints that had neither the advantages of the physical
infrastructure typical of permanent ones nor the flexibility of
tactical checkpoints to respond to intelligence information.[Footnote
24] Such checkpoints do not have permanent infrastructure and hence
lack the multiplicity of capabilities typically associated with
permanent checkpoints in other sectors. At the same time, they also do
not have tactical flexibility because they are generally kept at the
same locations, which have been chosen by the Border Patrol in part for
both safety and legal considerations. The checkpoint locations need to
have adequate shoulder space on which to place the equipment needed to
maintain the checkpoint, such as a small trailer, water tanks, portable
lights and generators, as well as space to conduct secondary
inspections of vehicles ordered to pull over. The locations also need
to have sufficient space to place signs in advance of the checkpoint to
notify vehicles of the checkpoint's location (to comply with legal
decisions) and cannot be placed after or around sharp curves that might
force vehicles to come to a sudden stop upon notice of the checkpoint.
In addition, the checkpoint locations are chosen by the Border Patrol
to maximize the likelihood that illegal entrants would have to transit
through them in order to move northward. Depending on the criticality
of their original location in terms of road networks and smuggling
routes, relocating these checkpoints can reduce their effectiveness in
monitoring vehicular traffic. (See app. III, fig. 14, for a map of the
sector and its checkpoints.) To support these nonpermanent checkpoints,
the Tucson sector operates tactical checkpoints periodically, as occurs
in other sectors with permanent checkpoints.
The fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act limited the funding prohibition
to only construction, thus allowing the use of funds for site
acquisition and design. Further, this act directed CBP to conduct a
study of locations for proposed permanent checkpoints within the Tucson
sector.[Footnote 25] In addition, the 2005 Act changed the requirement
to relocate checkpoints to "at least an average of once every 14 days."
According to the Border Patrol, the phrase "an average" gave it more
flexibility in determining checkpoint operating schedules than the
previous years' requirement of "at least once every 7 days." As a
result, in fiscal year 2005, the Patrol operates the checkpoint on I-19
for 14 days, closes it for 8 hours, and then reopens it for 14 days. In
addition, the Patrol has kept the checkpoint at the more northern
kilometer post (KP) 42 location, because, it stated, moving it south to
the KP 25 location every 7 days had permitted illegal immigrants to
wait until KP 42 closed, and to then move north. At other checkpoints
in the Tucson sector, the Patrol has maintained varying opening and
closing schedules, which it stated were in conformity, in its view,
with the "average of once every 14 days" language.[Footnote 26]
However, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, the fiscal
year 2006 appropriations bill would restore the 7-day relocation
requirement. Also, it provides that no funds may be used for site
acquisition, design, or construction of permanent checkpoints in this
sector.[Footnote 27]
The Tucson Sector's Nonpermanent Checkpoints Have Additional
Limitations:
Prior to the implementation of INS's southwest border strategy in 1993,
the Tucson sector had a smaller volume of illegal alien traffic
relative to the San Diego and El Paso sectors, as indirectly measured
by apprehensions. In fiscal year 1993, the Tucson sector had less than
one-fifth as many apprehensions as the San Diego sector, and less than
one-third those in the El Paso sector. As the strategy unfolded, the
San Diego and El Paso sectors became more difficult for illegal aliens
to cross, while the volume of illegal traffic in the Tucson sector
increased nearly sevenfold over the period of fiscal years 1993-2000,
as measured indirectly by sectorwide apprehensions. This increase in
illegal activity, as well as a general increase in legitimate vehicular
traffic, led the Border Patrol to consider a more permanent presence
for checkpoints in the Tucson sector, where it had previously operated
only tactical checkpoints, to provide the range of facilities offered
by permanent checkpoints.
The Border Patrol started implementing the 7-day relocation requirement
in June 2002, as noted above. Patrol officials told us that where
feasible, taking safety and operational strategy into account, they
alternated the sites of nonpermanent checkpoints along the same route
in the Tucson sector. The Border Patrol was able to establish
nonpermanent checkpoints among alternate sites on two such routes.
However, for 3 of the 6 checkpoints in the sector, safety factors
precluded use of other locations on the same route, and the Border
Patrol closed the checkpoints for 7 days. (One checkpoint of the 6
closes each night and is replaced with roving vehicle patrols, because
of the very sparse population of the region in which it is
located.)[Footnote 28] The 7-day relocation rule was changed to "at
least an average of once every 14 days" in fiscal year 2005
appropriations legislation.[Footnote 29]
The Border Patrol told us that it did not seek to evade compliance with
the intent of the relocation rule by opening an alternative checkpoint
just a short distance from the first one, or by closing for just a few
hours. It did attempt to close and open for a few days at a time, they
said, to try to confuse illegal aliens and contraband smugglers.
However, officials stated that this was not productive, as the
smugglers monitored the checkpoint activities so closely. According to
Border Patrol officials, the funding prohibition on constructing
checkpoints in the Tucson sector, in combination with the mandated
relocation on a regular basis, allows smugglers and illegal aliens to
further their entry into the United States with reduced interdiction
risk. Table 1 shows the variations followed by the Border Patrol in
operating the nonpermanent checkpoints in the Tucson sector.
Table 1: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoints Schedule to Conform to
Legislative Language:
Checkpoint: A;
Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
Language: Opens when port of entry south of location is open and closes
every night.
Checkpoint: B;
Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
Language: Opens and closes for periods of time to comply with
legislative language; Does not relocate because there is no safe
alternate location.
Checkpoint: C;
Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
Language: Opens and closes for periods of time to comply with
legislative language; Does not relocate because there is no safe
alternate location.
Checkpoint: D;
Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
Language: Checkpoint alternates between KP 42 and KP 25.
Checkpoint: E;
Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
Language: Checkpoint alternates among 3 identified locations along
state route (SR) 82 or SR 83.
Checkpoint: F;
Open, Closure, and Relocation Schedule to Conform to Legislative
Language: Opens and closes for periods of time to comply with
legislative language; Does not relocate because there is no safe
alternate location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of table]
According to Border Patrol officials, contraband smugglers and illegal
aliens typically wait until they learn from confederates that a
checkpoint is in the process of being relocated or has been closed, and
then use this downtime to further their illegal entry. Border Patrol
officials told us that in today's environment, they are up against
increasingly sophisticated smugglers who use radios, cell phones,
global positioning systems, and other high-technology equipment to
watch agents' movements and alert each other when checkpoints are moved
or closed.
On highway I-19, the interstate highway that runs from Nogales,
Arizona, on the border, directly north to Tucson, the Border Patrol
alternated between two locations for nonpermanent checkpoints, at KP 42
and at KP 25, at congressional staff direction (for the last quarter of
fiscal year 2002), and then in conformity with the legislative
restrictions for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. When the northern one (KP
42) was open, however, the Border Patrol told us that illegal aliens
and smugglers who had made it over the border then waited in
communities south of it, but north of KP 25. (See app. III, fig. 14 for
a sector map that shows these locations.) When the checkpoint at KP 42
closed and moved down to KP 25, the illegal entrants who waited north
of KP 25 (but south of KP 42 while open) were able to move with reduced
interdiction risk, because there was no longer a checkpoint north of
them. In fiscal year 2005, as noted above, the Border Patrol has
maintained the checkpoint at the more northern KP 42 location, to
reduce the potential for illegal entrants taking advantage of the
relocation that occurred in previous years. In addition, the checkpoint
is kept open for 14 days, then closed for 8 hours, and then reopened
for 14 days. The Border Patrol stated that it believes that this
schedule conforms to the fiscal year legislative language that requires
that Tucson sector checkpoints be relocated an average of at least once
every 14 days.
Border Patrol officials told us that without the infrastructure typical
of the Patrol's permanent checkpoints in others sectors, the Tucson
sector cannot perform the full range of enforcement functions. For
example, without access to national databases, suspects detained at the
sector's nonpermanent checkpoints cannot be readily identified and must
be transported by an agent or agents to a Border Patrol station with
database access, in order to determine if the persons should be
detained. Further, the nonpermanent Tucson checkpoints lack paved,
adequately large, level, off-road shoulder areas to deploy vehicle
lifts or VACIS trucks required to examine underneath and inside
vehicles. According to the Border Patrol, because detention facilities
at these checkpoints are small rooms in mobile trailers, with weak
internal doors and locks, they can be insufficient in size and
security. (See photo in fig. 8.) Upon apprehension of a suspect or
suspects, Border Patrol agents from the checkpoint must transport them
to a station with adequate facilities for detention and processing, as
would be found at typical permanent checkpoints elsewhere. The Border
Patrol stated that sending an agent or agents to a station with
suspects is an inefficient use of personnel and can cause the
nonpermanent checkpoint to close because of personnel shortages.
Figure 8 shows photographs of the nonpermanent checkpoint operated on I-
19 in the Tucson sector at KP 42, with limited facilities, located
under an overpass to provide shelter from sun and weather, and lacking
a paved shoulder for vehicles pulled over for further inspection.
Figure 8: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint at KP 42 on I-19, Near
Tubac, Arizona:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Benefits and Costs of Traffic Checkpoints Are Difficult to Quantify,
but Some Examples Are Available:
Although total apprehensions and contraband seizure data are available
for interior checkpoints, some of the benefits--such as deterrence of
potential contraband smugglers or of persons contemplating illegal
entry into the United States--and costs of traffic checkpoints are
difficult to quantify because deterrence is difficult to measure and
cost data are not maintained separately by the Border Patrol for
permanent or tactical checkpoints. Studies or reports on checkpoint
benefits and costs have also not been performed by the Border Patrol.
Of the less quantifiable benefits that can be described, we were told
that intelligence debriefings of apprehended aliens and smugglers
testify to the deterrent effects of interior checkpoints. In addition,
local citizens and community groups with whom we met who live near or
in the vicinity of interior checkpoints are generally supportive.
However, this support is not universal.
Apprehensions and Drug Seizure Benefits:
The most readily available data on the benefits of interior checkpoints
are the drug seizure and apprehension data recorded by the Border
Patrol on a daily basis at its checkpoints and stations. In fiscal year
2004, for example, the Border Patrol reported that the southwest
interior checkpoints, which were staffed by about 10 percent of Border
Patrol agents in those sectors, were responsible for 96,000 illegal
alien apprehensions, or 8 percent of all Border Patrol apprehensions,
and for seizure of 418,102 pounds of marijuana and 10,853 pounds of
cocaine in fiscal year 2004, or about 31 percent of the marijuana and
about 74 percent of the cocaine seized nationally by the Border Patrol.
In addition to the benefits of seizing contraband, and mitigating the
smuggling of humans, there were at least six incidents reported to us
where individuals with suspected ties to terrorism were identified when
transiting a Border Patrol interior checkpoint and appropriate actions
were coordinated with the FBI.[Footnote 30]
Deterrence and Some Other Potential Benefits of Traffic Checkpoints are
Difficult to Quantify:
Intelligence debriefings of smugglers and illegal aliens and reports of
increased smuggling costs provide some evidence of checkpoints'
deterrent effect. Information from debriefings suggests that interior
checkpoints deter some persons from attempting to go through them, and
also push them into rural areas that are more difficult to transit and
where they are more easily identifiable among a lower volume of
traffic. In addition, the presence of effective checkpoints can
contribute to increased smuggling costs, also possibly serving as a
deterrent, according to the Border Patrol. In the San Diego sector, for
example, we were told by the Border Patrol that smuggling fees charged
to Mexicans and others had increased fivefold in recent years (to about
$1,500 per person), because of the perceived difficulty of breaching
border defenses and of transiting through interior checkpoints
undetected. It is difficult, however, to separate out the contribution
to deterring potential illegal entrants from entering the United States
of increases in smuggling fees that are due to better line watch and
line patrol border operations versus those cost increases that could be
attributed to vigilance at interior checkpoints. (We did not validate
the Border Patrol's statements with regard to increased smuggling
fees.)
Evidence for the deterrent effects of checkpoints was reported in a
1995 INS study which found that that smugglers and illegal aliens
adjust their transit routes because they are well aware when
checkpoints are open and closed.[Footnote 31] The 1995 study reported
on a test of interior checkpoint operations in which the permanent
checkpoint on I-5, near San Clemente, California, was closed several
times, in order to determine the impact of the checkpoint on I-15, near
Temecula, California. The latter is located inland on a parallel major
north-south highway, and about as far north of the border as the
checkpoint on I-5. (See app. II, fig. 10, for a map of this sector that
shows the location of these checkpoints.) The study reported that when
the I-5, San Clemente checkpoint was closed, apprehensions at the I-15
Temecula checkpoint fell sharply--there was a 50 percent decline in 1
month. According to the study, this demonstrated that illegal entrants
became aware of the closure and therefore chose the I-5 San Clemente
route with no checkpoint, while avoiding the I-15 Temecula route with
an operating checkpoint. The Border Patrol told us that this
demonstrated the interdependence of various checkpoints operations and
that illegal entrants were, in fact, deterred from transiting routes
with checkpoints when unmonitored alternatives are available. This
study, however, did not address whether the checkpoints completely
deter any aliens from entering the country.
As additional illustrations of the potential effects of interior
checkpoints, Temecula station officials described the following
operations that in their view appeared to confirm that illegal aliens
had changed their intended routes in order to avoid the checkpoints at
Temecula and San Clemente:[Footnote 32]
* San Diego sector intelligence analysts determined that illegal alien
smugglers were avoiding the permanent Border Patrol interior
checkpoints on the highways at San Clemente (I-5) and Temecula (I-15).
Instead, they were taking a circuitous route from the San Diego area to
eastern California and western Arizona, and then turning north on
secondary highways without checkpoints to make their way to Los
Angeles. In response to this intelligence, the Temecula station set up
an August 2004 3-day traffic observation operation along I-10 between
Los Angeles and Arizona. During the operation, Border Patrol agents
stopped 30 suspect vehicles, and apprehended 134 illegal aliens. Border
Patrol officials confirmed the earlier intelligence that illegal aliens
were utilizing the I-10 route, without checkpoints, to avoid
checkpoints on I-5 and I-15. The officials believe that this
demonstrated the effectiveness of the permanent I-5 and I-15 interior
checkpoints as deterrents that cause illegal entrants to seek out less
traveled, unmonitored alternative routes, even if longer in distance
and time required to reach major U.S. cities.
* On May 3, 2004, three vans ran (transited without stopping despite
orders to do so) the Otay Mesa port of entry near San Diego, and two
vans proceeded north on I-15 (one was stopped near the port of entry).
Temecula station officials were alerted to the fleeing vans and were
notified that to avoid the checkpoint on I-15, the vans had turned onto
a secondary road that roughly paralleled the interstate. Four tactical
checkpoints were operating in the area, and the vans were stopped by
agents at two of these checkpoints. A total of 48 illegal aliens were
arrested. According to Temecula station officials, this incident showed
that (1) illegal alien smugglers know that the permanent checkpoints
such as the one on I-15 are to be avoided if possible, and (2) tactical
checkpoints on secondary roads are valuable and effective for
apprehending aliens attempting to circumvent checkpoints on major
highways.
* Temecula station officials described another operation as an example
of checkpoint deterrence effectiveness. On the basis of intelligence,
Temecula station intelligence analysts concluded that smugglers of
illegal aliens had altered their entry routes to avoid the significant
Border Patrol presence in the San Diego sector. These altered entry
routes included the use of I-40 westbound to enter the greater Los
Angeles area; the Border Patrol did not have checkpoints or a constant
presence on westbound I-40. In response to this intelligence, the
Temecula station conducted a traffic observation operation with
multiple marked patrol vehicles on I-40 over a period of 3 days in
November 2004, to interdict alien smugglers using the westbound I-40
corridor to circumvent the permanent checkpoints on I-5 and I-15. The I-
40 operation was conducted shortly after a Border Patrol I-10 operation
with the expectation that smugglers would use I-40 to avoid I-10. The
Border Patrol operation found 7 vehicles with 77 illegal aliens. Of
these, 60 had entered the country east of the San Diego sector,
circumventing the I-5 and I-15 checkpoints. According to Temecula
station officials, this confirmed that I-40 is a major smuggling route
and that the permanent checkpoints on I-5 and on I-15 serve as
deterrents to at least some illegal traffic, as intended.
Most Local Community Leaders We Contacted See Traffic Checkpoints as
Benefiting their Communities:
Local law enforcement, business, and community leaders near interior
traffic checkpoints in Temecula, California, in the San Diego sector,
and Nogales, Arizona, in the Tucson sector, that we interviewed told us
that in their view, the checkpoints and the presence of Border Patrol
agents were of considerable benefit to their communities. However, in
the small community of Tubac, Arizona, we found local criticism of
interior traffic checkpoints.[Footnote 33] Since we did not conduct a
comprehensive survey of all communities in the vicinity of all 33
permanent checkpoints in the southwest border states, our findings are
limited to the views of the local citizens and law enforcement
officials with whom we met in the communities we visited, as well as
statements by the Border Patrol with regard to their relationships with
local communities near checkpoints. We did not confirm the views
expressed by these citizens and officials, as little data were
available relating directly to their statements.
Officials representing the city of Temecula, California, the Temecula
Police Department, and the Chamber of Commerce, for example, all said
that the nearby I-15 traffic checkpoint and Border Patrol presence
benefit their community.[Footnote 34] The checkpoint has the second
greatest average daily volume of vehicular traffic among the Border
Patrol's checkpoints, with about 122,000 vehicles passing through the
checkpoint location daily. City and police officials said that having
the checkpoint in operation means that illegal aliens and drug
smugglers are intercepted and taken off the streets, reducing crime and
vandalism. One city official also said that traffic problems with the
checkpoint have been minimal, and that the city has received very few
calls complaining about the checkpoint and what amount to minimal
delays when the checkpoint is operating and checking traffic. The
official said that the majority of the calls that the city received
were before September 11, 2001, and very few calls had been received
since then. The President of the Temecula Chamber of Commerce conducted
an informal survey of member businesses, and only one business
mentioned that some employees said that the checkpoint operations
occasionally delayed their commute to or from work. Overall, the
Chamber President concluded that the checkpoint is not a concern to the
community.
The Santa Cruz County Attorney from Nogales, Arizona, told us that the
Border Patrol and its checkpoints were among the best protections for
fighting illegal alien traffic and local crime, with a side benefit of
detecting drunk drivers on their way back from Mexico. According to
this official, the I-19 checkpoint between Nogales and Tucson was a
major benefit to the community because it was saving lives,
apprehending illegal aliens, and arresting drug smugglers. The official
also stated that, in her opinion, the checkpoints are effective in
apprehending drug violators out of proportion to the resources deployed
at the checkpoints and voiced the view that permanent checkpoints were
better than tactical ones.
In contrast to the generally positive view of the benefits resulting
from the Border Patrol checkpoints from others that we interviewed, the
president of a local civic association from Tubac, Arizona (population
949), located between Nogales and Tucson near the I-19 nonpermanent
Tucson sector checkpoint at KP 42, told us that he believed the
checkpoint was disruptive to the community and was not effective
because illegal aliens were circumventing the checkpoint and passing
through the community. He said that the checkpoint had affected home
sales and housing values, and that most local residents were strongly
opposed to having a permanent checkpoint built near them on I-19,
because of fears about the impact on traffic congestion and overall
quality of life. We were also told by congressional staff that the
overwhelming majority present at April and July 2005 community meetings
in Tubac had voiced opposition to the possibility of a permanent
checkpoint on I-19 near Tubac.
Traffic Congestion at Checkpoints Does Not Appear to Be a Large Problem
but May Involve Some Costs:
The Border Patrol Handbook states that checkpoint operations should be
suspended if there is "too much traffic congestion" and does not
further define this. However, some sector checkpoints have more precise
guidance pertaining to a specific distance or length of time traffic
will be permitted to back up. Agents said they know from experience the
amount of wait time that is created by how far back from the checkpoint
the lines of vehicles extend. The maximum delays that we observed
appeared not to exceed the restrictions defined by the checkpoint
guidance prepared by certain sectors.[Footnote 35] This was the case,
for example, at I-5 near San Clemente, which has the single greatest
daily volume of traffic in the country (about 144,000 vehicles per day)
among interior Border Patrol checkpoints, and at I-15 near Temecula,
the next highest, with about 122,000 vehicles daily. At the times we
visited, at both locations, we observed that the agents temporarily
stopped checkpoint inspections when estimated delays exceeded
guidelines. Traffic was then "flushed" and permitted to flow through
until there was no line of waiting vehicles. Screening operations were
then resumed. We also observed during our visit to the San Clemente
checkpoint, traffic flow in the opposite southerly direction, where
there is no checkpoint, sometimes was heavier and slower than on the
side with the ongoing checkpoint operation.
Moreover, of the more than 400 statewide cameras maintained by the
California Department of Transportation to monitor traffic, none are at
either the Temecula or San Clemente checkpoints, according to the
department. In response to our questions, the department stated that it
had not received reports in recent years on congestion or related
problems at either the I-5 or I-15 checkpoints, and it had not
conducted studies of the checkpoints.
We contacted several other organizations that monitor traffic
congestion as part of their work, such as the Automobile Club of
Southern California, and the California Highway Patrol, to ask if they
had received complaints about the San Clemente or Temecula checkpoints
in California, or had observed actual traffic backups at these
checkpoints. We also asked the American Trucking Associations if it had
received complaints from commercial shippers about checkpoints in the
southwestern states. None of these organizations cited complaints in
recent years about these checkpoints.
In addition, an official of an organization that promotes economic
development in Laredo, Texas, and who is active in monitoring the
impact on traffic of the checkpoint on I-35 north of Laredo, stated
that traffic delays were minimal even at the I-35 checkpoint, and that
anyone living on or near the border is familiar with the checkpoints as
a fact of life. He believed that commercial truckers build in potential
travel delays, which are longer for commercial vehicles than for cars,
into their cost of doing business and transit times. He noted that even
during rush hours, he believed that trucks did not wait more than an
average of about 20 minutes maximum, based on what he had observed in
recent years. Cars are delayed considerably less, averaging perhaps a 5-
minute delay in rush hour, he stated. We observed this checkpoint, and
delays appeared not to exceed 5 minutes at the time we visited, based
on the time that it took for cars at the back of the line to transit
through the checkpoint.
At the tactical checkpoint on I-19 between Nogales and Tucson, Arizona,
we saw minor traffic backups of not more than about a half dozen
vehicles at any time over the course of about 1 hour. We were told that
this was typical for this time of year; delays did not last more than 2
or 3 minutes for vehicles transiting the checkpoint during our site
visit. However, the Border Patrol also told us that when truck traffic
is particularly heavy during the spring harvest season, pulling trucks
over to the side of the road to inspect them can create backups that
cause safety problems and delays for the truck drivers.
We also observed traffic patterns at permanent checkpoints on I-35
north of Laredo and on U.S. highway 281 at Falfurrias, Texas, both
major highways, and at a permanent checkpoint at Hebbronville, Texas,
on a secondary road between Falfurrias and Laredo. Although traffic
backups occurred on occasion at these locations, we were told that they
generally did not last more than a few minutes, as additional agents or
lanes are added to reduce delays. During our visit, Border Patrol
agents appeared to be monitoring the amount of traffic waiting in line,
which caused less than about 5 minutes' wait time, and usually less.
Agents told us that if traffic backs up, they add extra agents to the
inspection lanes, and may open additional lanes as well.[Footnote 36]
At some holiday periods, however, we were told delays can reach 20 to
30 minutes. The volume of traffic at the Texas checkpoints we observed
was much lower than that on I-5 and I-15 in California, permitting what
amounts to a near 100 percent check of transiting vehicles, according
to the Border Patrol. This is feasible when average daily traffic
volume is about 13,700 vehicles, as is the case at the Laredo, Texas,
checkpoint, compared with more than 120,000 at I-15, near Temecula,
California, or over 140,000 at I-5, near San Clemente, California.
Costs of Operating Checkpoints are Not Routinely Maintained:
Border Patrol officials told us that costs of operating the permanent
and tactical checkpoints are not routinely or systematically maintained
or reported because checkpoints are integral and interdependent parts
of the multilayered enforcement strategy. As such, permanent and
tactical checkpoints are supported with facilities, personnel,
equipment, and canines, for example, and by their associated stations,
which in turn are supported by the sector as a whole. Tactical
checkpoints in particular are often set up specifically to support the
permanent ones, often on a changing daily basis. Agent manpower levels
may also vary at both the permanent and the tactical checkpoints,
depending on how the Border Patrol decides on a given day to best
allocate personnel resources, in response to traffic volume,
intelligence on illegal entrant routes, and other factors, such as
weather. For example, the permanent checkpoint at I-15 Temecula is
supported by up to eight tactical checkpoints that are set up as
needed, based on intelligence data on illegal alien traffic on the
sector's secondary roads.
The costs of one tactical checkpoint versus another are not readily
separable, except perhaps the personnel costs, and even then, those
could vary over a period of hours, according to Border Patrol
officials. A question that the Border Patrol officials asked and which
has no easy or standard answer was "If an agent must transport arrested
aliens or smugglers to a station headquarters, should his/her salary be
counted as part of the roadside checkpoint, or the station headquarters
support?"
Even considering these obstacles to checkpoint cost comparisons, we
asked Border Patrol officials whether they could supply us with
individual checkpoint operating costs to include facilities, equipment,
personnel, and any other costs. Border Patrol officials queried the
sectors and stations at the locations we visited and asked whether cost
data could be assembled. The sectors and stations responded with what
cost data they could locate, but it was not possible to obtain similar
data from each location, and the data provided would not be reliable
enough to present any meaningful statistics concerning costs of
operating interior traffic checkpoints.
The Lack of Systematic Evaluation Limits the Border Patrol's Ability to
Allocate Resources Based on Need:
In reviewing Border Patrol reports, and in discussions with Border
Patrol officials, we found that the Border Patrol has not
systematically evaluated the effectiveness of interior checkpoint
operations. The Border Patrol does gather and report traditional law
enforcement data, including the number of apprehensions, historical
apprehension trends, and weight and type of contraband seized, but
could not provide us with reports or analyses that assessed the
performance of one sector compared to another, or of interior
checkpoints compared with line operations. Thus, the Border Patrol does
not have analyses based on inputs (costs), such as agent work years,
divided into outputs, such as apprehensions or contraband seized, that
could help measure effectiveness or productivity and that could
therefore also be used in making decisions about how best to allocate
resources. The Border Patrol stated that it has not evaluated the
effectiveness of its interior checkpoints largely because checkpoints
are part of a multilayered enforcement strategy and cannot be easily
separated for evaluation purposes. Furthermore, officials stated that
because such outcomes as deterrence are difficult to measure (i.e.,
estimating how many crimes or illegal entries were deterred before they
happened), the Border Patrol has chosen to rely on the types of data
cited above to gauge effectiveness.
A key component to assessing unit operations is the development of
performance measures. We have previously reported on the need for
federal agencies to develop performance measures of their programs and
to use such measures to improve their performance, as well as to be in
compliance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA).[Footnote 37] As we noted, under the act, "every major federal
agency must now ask itself some basic questions: What is our mission?
What are our goals and how will we achieve them? How can we measure our
performance? How will we use that information to make improvements?"
GPRA forces a shift in the focus of federal agencies--away from such
traditional concerns as staffing and activity levels and toward a
single overriding issue: results. GPRA requires agencies to set goals,
measure performance, and report on their accomplishments."[Footnote 38]
Organizations use performance measures to help demonstrate the level of
progress in achieving results, to inform decision makers, and to hold
managers accountable. To better articulate a results orientation,
organizations create a set of performance goals and measures that
address important dimensions of program performance. Establishing and
using performance measures for checkpoint operations and other strategy
components would allow the Border Patrol to help assess the comparative
success of each checkpoint in addressing program goals as well as
checkpoints generally in comparison with line and patrol operations. A
comparison of the effectiveness of each sector, using performance
measures, would permit the Border Patrol to more meaningfully assess
the success of its overall strategy than does a count of total
apprehensions or contraband seizures. Without knowing how much effort
produced an outcome--in this case, apprehensions or contraband
seizures--it is difficult to know if one sector or region is performing
better than another (on a per input basis). With such knowledge, more
effective management strategies can be devised, if needed, to better
allocate agency resources, in conjunction with other data and
information.
We acknowledge that developing performance measures applied to all
checkpoints can be challenging for the reasons stated by Border Patrol
officials. Nevertheless, it is important that the Border Patrol develop
performance measures to gauge success in meeting strategic goals and
that these measures go beyond the traditional output data it currently
uses to indicate the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts.
Available Data Suggest That Legislative Restrictions on the Tucson
Sector Reduced the Performance of Its Interior Checkpoints:
Although the Border Patrol told us that the legislative restrictions on
funding for construction of checkpoints in the Tucson sector, combined
with the requirement to relocate checkpoints on a 7-or 14-day schedule,
had reduced their effectiveness, it did not have a data-based analysis
to support these statements. It did have data, by sector, on
apprehensions of illegal entrants at interior checkpoints and for line
watch/line patrol, as well as for work hours charged at interior
checkpoints and line watch/line patrol. (Agent work hour data have not
been maintained by the Border Patrol for tactical checkpoints versus
permanent ones and were therefore not available.) To test the
feasibility of developing additional measures of performance that would
address these concerns, we used Border Patrol data to measure
apprehensions per agent work year and cost of apprehensions per agent
work year. Such measures might help to determine if the available data
support the Border Patrol's statements on the impact of the legislative
restrictions on the Tucson sector's interior checkpoints effectiveness.
In applying the apprehension per agent work year measure,[Footnote 39]
we compared the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints
over the period of fiscal years 2001-2004 with those of the interior
checkpoints in the three other sectors we visited. We limited the
comparison to these four sectors because a considerable amount of the
work hour data had to be collected by the Border Patrol through data
calls, which placed a time burden on those collecting the data for us.
We examined the data starting with fiscal year 2001, the last year for
which the impact of the terror attacks of September 11 were largely not
felt on illegal immigration,[Footnote 40] through fiscal year 2004, the
last year for which data were available at the time of this report.
Throughout this period as well, no funding had been permitted for
construction of checkpoints in the Tucson sector.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data suggest that, as measured in
apprehensions per agent work year, the restrictions in the Tucson
sector may have had a negative impact on the performance of its
interior checkpoints, starting at about the time the sector implemented
direction from congressional staff to relocate checkpoints every 7
days, in comparison with the three other sectors we visited, where no
comparable decline in effectiveness occurred during the same time
period. [Footnote 41] According to the Border Patrol, its records show
that it began relocating the Tucson sector's checkpoints every 7 days
in June 2002, which meant closing some of them, as explained
previously.
Figure 9 shows the apprehensions per agent work year at interior
checkpoints for each of the four sectors we visited, for fiscal years
2001-2004, and the apprehensions per agent work year for line
patrol/line watch along the border.
Figure 9: Apprehensions per Agent Work Year in the Tucson, San Diego,
Laredo and McAllen Sectors, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Notes: Line/Patrol refers to line watch and line patrol Border Patrol
operations, based on agent work hours charged by Border Patrol agents
to those activities. Interior Checkpoint refers to work hours charged
by agents for work at interior checkpoints--permanent and tactical in
the San Diego, McAllen, and Laredo sectors; and nonpermanent in the
Tucson, Arizona, sector.
[End of figure]
Figure 9 shows that apprehensions per agent work year at the Tucson
sector interior checkpoints fell 48 percent from fiscal year 2001 to
fiscal year 2002, when the 7-day relocation procedures were put into
effect, with about 4 months remaining in the fiscal year. This was
followed by a 77 percent decrease from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year
2003, when the 7-day relocation requirement was in effect for the
entire fiscal year. The overall decrease from fiscal year 2001 to
fiscal year 2003 was about 88 percent, in the Tucson sector.
Apprehensions per agent work year rose from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal
year 2004, but the 2004 level was 77 percent below the fiscal year 2001
level. In contrast to these performance measures for the Tucson sector
interior checkpoints, apprehensions per agent work year for same period
at the interior checkpoints in the three other southwest sectors (San
Diego, California; Laredo, Texas; and McAllen, Texas) we visited--that
were not subject to the funding restrictions or the relocation
requirements--either stayed at about the same level over this period or
increased somewhat.[Footnote 42]
During fiscal year 2001 to 2002, when Tucson apprehensions per agent
work year fell 48 percent, apprehensions per agent work year fell less
than 2 percent in the San Diego sector, decreased about 19 percent in
the Laredo sector, and decreased about 12 percent in the McAllen
sector. The Border Patrol attributed the drop in apprehensions in these
and other sectors in this period to a general decrease in illegal
border crossings after September 11 but attributed the greater decline
in the Tucson sector to relocating the Tucson checkpoints on a regular
7-day basis, starting in June 2002. Border Patrol officials told us
that they were not aware of any other changes or factors that would
have caused the reduction in Tucson compared with other sectors other
than the combination of the funding restrictions and the 7-day
relocation requirement.
Moreover, apprehensions per agent work year at interior checkpoints in
the Tucson sector fell by about 77 percent from fiscal year 2002 to
fiscal year 2003, while they either remained about the same or
increased (more than doubling in San Diego) in that period in the other
three sectors. In the San Diego sector, interior checkpoint
apprehensions per agent year increased about 60 percent from 2003 to
2004 and were almost four times the 2002 level (versus Tucson, where
the 2004 level was 55 percent below the 2002 level). In the McAllen and
Laredo sectors, there was almost no difference in checkpoint
apprehension rates between 2003 and 2004. The Border Patrol believes
that the differences between the Tucson sector and others with regard
to interior checkpoint performance are in large part the result of the
requirement to relocate checkpoints every 7 days at that time. Border
Patrol officials stated that the smugglers can easily determine when
the tactical or nonpermanent checkpoints in any location must relocate
or close and are therefore able to evade them by waiting until they
move or close, and a potential vulnerability in border security has
been created.
It is important to note that we did not evaluate all the factors that
might have contributed to the differing performance results between
Tucson interior checkpoints and those in the other three sectors. There
could have been other factors beyond the restrictions on construction
of checkpoints and the requirement to relocate every 7 days that
affected checkpoint performance, such as the unknown number of persons
attempting entry into a sector, varying topographic conditions and road
networks, and the fees charged by smugglers to smuggle illegal
immigrants into the United States. Nevertheless, while there may have
been other factors that affected the performance of interior
checkpoints in the four sectors, the data in figure 9 should not be
overlooked when considering the results or impacts of policy or
management directives.
In the second performance measure, we converted the apprehensions per
agent work year into costs of apprehensions per work year, or cost per
apprehension.[Footnote 43] We then compared interior checkpoints cost
per apprehension (per work year) with costs per apprehension (per work
year) for line watch and line patrol operations. We were unable to
develop costs per apprehension at permanent versus tactical checkpoints
because individual checkpoint cost data are not maintained by the
Border Patrol. In addition, this measure is based on agent labor costs
at interior checkpoints and line watch/line patrol and does not include
overhead costs, such as those for equipment, training, buildings,
canines, and so forth. Converting the fiscal year 2004 apprehension
data into cost per apprehension (per work year), apprehensions in the
San Diego sector at the border (line watch/line patrol) cost $384 per
apprehension, and about $277 per apprehension at the interior
checkpoints (both permanent and tactical). In the Tucson sector, for
the same fiscal year, border apprehensions cost $126 each per work
year, and interior checkpoint apprehensions cost $445 each.
These ranges of cost per apprehension (per work year) are not, however,
necessarily reflective of agents at one checkpoint or in one sector
working harder or more effectively than those in another sector and
must be considered in the context of the Border Patrol's integrated,
multilayered strategy, which seeks to deter illegal entrants through
the perceived risk of apprehension. Thus, a permanent checkpoint with a
substantial infrastructure may have many agents, such as at I-5 near
San Clemente (with about 100 agents assigned to the location) but may
have comparatively few apprehensions--because it has successfully
deterred potential illegal entrants. In Temecula, California, agents
are required to monitor alternative routes through the hills around the
I-15 permanent checkpoint. Again, many agents may be required, but few
apprehensions may occur, if illegal entrants are deterred to
alternative routes, such as the circuitous I-10 route previously
described. In contrast, a sector with many illegal entrants, such as
Tucson, may effect many apprehensions because of the volume of illegal
entrants, seemingly showing border cost per apprehension to be much
lower than in San Diego. Yet the reality is that the long-term legacy
INS and now CBP strategy of closing off the easiest routes (in San
Diego, El Paso, and McAllen), has led to the high volume in the Tucson
sector. Therefore, cost per apprehension or any other single
performance measure cannot be used without taking into account the
overall strategy.
While a performance measure such as cost per apprehension can provide
some information on cost-effectiveness, several additional caveats
exist. First, regarding the output measured in the denominator (i.e.,
the number of apprehensions per agent work year, such as 191 for San
Diego in fiscal year 2004), some apprehensions may be considered more
important to the agency than others. For instance, apprehending a drug
smuggler or a terrorist might be considered more important than
apprehending an illegal alien job seeker. Second, regarding the cost of
inputs measured in the numerator (e.g., the $53,000 annual average
agent nationwide salary), numerous cost measures can exist. The most
easily applied is often the variable cost of labor that is used above
and which may require estimation. Other input costs may exist but may
be difficult to assign to a given apprehension, since not only are
indirect overhead costs involved (e.g., training, equipment,
infrastructure, canines), but also such costs as the differing salaries
of multiple agents, if more than one was involved in the apprehension;
the time used up by each different agent; and the processing costs,
which can vary by suspect, depending on whether the person is already
in a national database or cannot be identified.
Additional Performance Measures Could Help Guide Management Decision
Making:
The two performance measures we developed would not alone fully assess
or explain relative success among sectors, and in developing
performance measures for checkpoints, a number of factors would need to
be considered. For example, in comparing the apprehensions per agent
work year and cost per apprehension for the adjacent McAllen and Laredo
sectors, considerable differences appear, with McAllen checkpoints
apprehending far more illegal aliens per agent work year than Laredo.
Converted into cost per apprehension, these data show that for fiscal
year 2004, in the Laredo sector, the cost per apprehension for line
watch/line patrol was $411, while the cost per apprehension at
checkpoints was $930 each. For McAllen, the cost per apprehension at
line/patrol was $609, while the cost at the checkpoints was $195 per
apprehension.
Taken alone, and without additional information about conditions in
these sectors, these costs per apprehension are not necessarily a
useful guide to management decisions about resource allocation. As
Border Patrol officials told us, several factors are believed to
contribute to the differences in apprehension patterns between McAllen
and Laredo sectors. These include the topography, availability of
egress routes, staff deployment, and varying expedited removal
programs. Further, the McAllen sector includes two major Mexican cities
adjacent to its border with a combined population of about 2 million
people and an infrastructure that facilitates potential illegal
entrants. These factors provide context to the analysis and underscore
the importance of the Border Patrol developing a range of performance
measures that can adequately account for differences among sectors and
provide decision makers with reliable indicators of success.
The usefulness of these measures notwithstanding, other performance
measures and relevant factors would also be useful in assessing the
effectiveness of checkpoints relative to other elements of the
multilayered strategy. Some available information, beyond apprehensions
and contraband seized, could help the Border Patrol make more informed
decisions about where its operations are most effective and how best to
allocate resources to make needed improvements. For example, the Border
Patrol could consider the cost of smuggling charged to illegal
immigrants as a measure of its overall effectiveness. Additionally, the
Border Patrol could consider the number of apprehensions or contraband
seizures per the number of vehicles sent to secondary inspection as a
measure of effectiveness. There are likely other measures that could
use existing or easily gathered data to help measure effectiveness
across the range of Border Patrol line watch, line patrol, and interior
traffic checkpoint activities. These kinds of performance measures can
aid in making resource allocation decisions, provided again that such
decisions are made with reasonable knowledge of other conditions
present in a given sector or region.
Conclusions:
It is unlikely that either the first two lines of border defense, line
watch and line patrol, or the interior traffic checkpoints, another
layer of defense, will ever be 100 percent effective in catching all
smugglers or aliens illegally entering the United States. This is the
case given the 1,950 mile southwest border, the number of personnel and
the cost required to cover all of this area, the continuing
sophistication of smugglers using modern technology to observe and
evade the Border Patrol's enforcement efforts, and the differences in
wages, job opportunities, and perceived life opportunities between
Mexico and the United States. However, the Border Patrol's interior
traffic checkpoints--both permanent and tactical--have distinct
functions in its integrated, multilayered strategy intended to detect
and deter potential terrorists, illegal immigration, and contraband
smuggling into the United States. While the permanent checkpoints are
the anchors of this part of the strategy, the tactical checkpoints
reinforce the permanent ones at those locations where smugglers,
illegal aliens, or terrorists can use secondary roads to avoid the
permanent checkpoints, and when intelligence can help direct
redeployment of tactical checkpoints to counter new infiltration
routes. Working in tandem, the interior checkpoints combine the high-
technology capabilities and detention, processing, and inspection
facilities of the permanent checkpoints with the element of flexibility
that tactical checkpoints can offer.
Trying to measure the effectiveness of its border enforcement
deterrence strategy has been a long-standing challenge for legacy INS
and now CBP and the Border Patrol. As many illegal aliens and
contraband smugglers continue to evade the border defenses, the need to
measure effectiveness and allocate scarce resources grows in
significance. In its Performance and Annual Report, CBP uses
traditional law enforcement effectiveness measures, such as numbers of
apprehensions and contraband seizures to describe the Border Patrol's
performance. While these measures serve as worthwhile indicators, the
annual reports do not compare the effectiveness of line watch and line
patrol with the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints. These
traditional measures also do not delineate the performance of
permanent, tactical, and nonpermanent checkpoints. In contrast,
performance measures that take inputs and outputs into account, such as
agent work years divided by apprehensions, provide a basis for helping
make decisions about how best to allocate agency resources, in
conjunction with other information and data. Such measures can also
help identify trends that might otherwise not be apparent using
traditional data, as shown by our analysis of the data on performance
of the Tucson sector nonpermanent interior checkpoints compared with
the performance of other sectors. Apprehension data alone would not
have shown the trend of the decrease in apprehensions per agent work
year that occurred at the Tucson sector checkpoints, starting at about
the same time the 7-day relocation requirement went into effect, while
no comparable decrease occurred in the three other sectors without the
requirement.
Moreover, apprehensions per agent work year, and the cost per
apprehension, along with information on many other relevant factors,
could provide useful trend information on the relative cost efficiency
of these components of the multilayered enforcement strategy. Other
measures of performance and effectiveness might also be developed using
existing or easily gathered information to assess checkpoint operations
and performance, as well as other border enforcement activities. This
information could also be useful to the Congress as it considers ways
to improve the effectiveness of checkpoints and border security
efforts.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, we recommend
that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection:
* develop additional performance measures for the Border Patrol for the
productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, such as
apprehensions per agent work year and cost per apprehension, and:
* include in CBP's Performance and Annual Report data and analysis
provided by the additional performance measures on the performance of
interior checkpoints and what might be done to improve their
effectiveness.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security. In its response, DHS said the report is factually
correct, agreed with our recommendations, and stated that CBP is taking
steps to implement them. With regard to our first recommendation, that
the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection develop performance
measures for the Border Patrol in addition to its traditional ones, for
the productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, DHS stated
that CBP is in the process of developing such measures for the Border
Patrol for fiscal year 2006 and that one or more of the performance
measures will gauge the effectiveness of checkpoints. DHS stated that
CBP will consider our suggestions when developing these measures. With
regard to our second recommendation, that CBP include in its
Performance and Annual Report data and analysis provided by the
additional performance measures on the performance of interior
checkpoints, and what might be done to improve their effectiveness, DHS
stated that once the performance measures for fiscal year 2006 for the
Border Patrol are implemented and the data are tracked, CBP will
publish the information in its Performance and Annual Report.
DHS's comments are reprinted in appendix VI. DHS also offered technical
comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely,
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we examined and analyzed Border Patrol
documents, reports, manuals, and guidance concerning border strategy
and checkpoint operations. We interviewed cognizant Border Patrol
officials at Washington, D.C. headquarters, officials in four sector
offices, and personnel at selected permanent and tactical checkpoints.
We visited sector headquarters, stations, and interior traffic
checkpoints in four Border Patrol sectors--San Diego, California and
Tucson, Arizona, and two in southeastern Texas, Laredo and McAllen. In
total, we visited three sector headquarter offices, seven stations,
five permanent checkpoints, and three tactical checkpoints. Sector
offices and interior checkpoints we visited had one or more of the
following characteristics:
* offices that oversee permanent or tactical checkpoints, or both, to
obtain information about both types,
* permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical checkpoints with high, medium
or low vehicular traffic volume,
* permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical checkpoints with high, medium
or low estimated smuggling volume (either aliens or contraband, or
both), and:
* checkpoints that varied in terrain, with some situated with little
peripheral area to evade the checkpoint and others situated so that
patrols must be set up to prevent end runs.
We visited and observed operations at the following Border Patrol
sectors, which were selected to provide a range in type and size of
operation:
* Border Patrol stations and checkpoints in the Tucson, Arizona, sector
where only nonpermanent checkpoints are permitted under current law,
and because that sector has the most annual apprehensions of illegal
immigrants. Also, we wanted to compare the operations of the Tucson
sector interior checkpoints with the operations of tactical and
permanent ones elsewhere.
* Permanent and tactical checkpoints in the San Diego, California,
sector because it contains two permanent ones with high volume--
Temecula and San Clemente--and two requesters asked that these be
included in a broader study of the effectiveness of all interior
traffic checkpoints.
* Permanent checkpoints in Texas at Falfurrias and Hebbronville, and on
I-35, north of Laredo, as well as Border Patrol stations in Falfurrias
and Hebbronville. The former is in the McAllen sector, while the latter
is in the Laredo sector.
* Ports of entry at San Diego, California; Douglas, Arizona; and
Laredo, Texas. We did so in order to better understand the differences
between the operations of these ports of entry at the international
border and the operations of the interior traffic checkpoints.
* Via helicopter, we observed the terrain and Border Patrol activities
along a 60-mile section of the international border, from San Diego
inland and along approximately 200 miles of the border in the Tucson
sector, from Ajo to Douglas, Arizona.
The four sectors we visited were selected to provide a substantial
range in the size and types of interior checkpoint operations;
estimated volume of illegal annual immigration; volume of vehicular
traffic transiting checkpoints; topography and density of road
networks; presence or absence of large urban areas on or near the
border, both on the U.S. and Mexican sides; and types of checkpoints
(permanent, nonpermanent, and tactical). As we were told by the Border
Patrol in deciding which sectors and checkpoints to visit, and as we
found during our site visits, these four sectors contained a wide
variety of operating conditions. For example, the San Diego sector's
permanent checkpoint near San Clemente on I-5 has the highest volume of
average daily vehicle traffic among the Border Patrol's 33 permanent
checkpoints on the southwest border, while those north of Laredo,
Texas, and at Falfurrias, Texas, average daily traffic volume about one-
tenth that amount. Some of the tactical checkpoints we visited have
average daily traffic volume that is only about one-hundredth that of
San Clemente/I-5--that is, 1,500 vehicles or less daily, according to
the Border Patrol and based on our observations during site visits.
Similarly, there were substantial variations in the estimated numbers
of illegal immigrants entering these sectors over the last several
years, and wide differences in topography, with some being
comparatively mountainous and others being comparatively flat. The
Laredo and McAllen sectors have the Rio Grande as a natural barrier
during the winter months to illegal immigration, while the Tucson
sector has a flat desert at the border that is easily crossed. Some
sectors have permanent checkpoints, such as at Temecula, California,
that must be supplemented with tactical checkpoints, because of
substantial secondary road networks around the permanent checkpoint.
Others, such as McAllen, have no alternative secondary roads available
to evade the permanent checkpoints on the limited north-south highways.
Some sectors, such as San Diego and Laredo, have large U.S. and Mexican
urban areas on or very near the international border, while others,
such as Tucson, have only a few much smaller cities on either side at
the border.[Footnote 44] In choosing these sectors, which are located
in three of the four southwest border states (California, Arizona and
Texas, but not New Mexico) we sought and found a wide range of
conditions that appear to reasonably represent the range of operating
conditions faced by the Border Patrol across the Southwest. However, it
is also the case that we were unable to observe all operating
conditions at all times and that the conditions we describe are
therefore based on available documentation and observations at our site
visits only.
We also interviewed selected officials in communities near some of the
interior checkpoints, including local law enforcement and community
officials, selected community leaders, citizens, and owners of local
businesses. These included the communities of Temecula, California;
Nogales, Arizona; Laredo, Texas, and the small town of Tubac, between
Nogales and Tucson, Arizona. Because these places and persons were
selected using a nonprobabilistic method, the results from our site
visits cannot be generalized to other locations, checkpoints, local
officials, or citizens.
We contacted organizations that could be expected to monitor traffic
congestion as part of their work, including the Automobile Club of
Southern California, the American Trucking Associations, the California
Department of Transportation, and the California Highway Patrol. We
asked these organizations for reports, studies, or information on
traffic congestion at selected interior traffic checkpoints we had
visited, in particular those with high daily vehicle volume.
To assess the reliability of the Border Patrol's data on apprehensions,
contraband seizures, and work hours, we talked with agency officials at
both Washington, D.C., headquarters and some Border Patrol stations in
the field about data quality control procedures, including methods by
which data are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy and
consistency. We also obtained and reviewed relevant documentation. We
determined the data on apprehensions, contraband seizures, and work
hours were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
However, we agreed with Border Patrol officials that the data on costs
of checkpoints were not sufficiently reliable to be used.
To determine whether available Border Patrol data could be used to
measure the performance of interior checkpoints compared with the
performance of operations on the border (line patrol and line watch),
both within and among Border Patrol sectors, we developed two measures
of performance--apprehensions per agent work year and cost of
apprehensions per agent work year. We chose to do this because the
Border Patrol uses only traditional law enforcement measures to report
on its performance, including apprehensions and amount and type of
contraband seized. These are not assessed relative to the inputs (agent
labor, overhead costs) that went into achieving them and therefore do
not provide a guide on how to better allocate agency resources.
To develop our first performance measure, apprehensions per agent work
year, we obtained data from the Border Patrol for each of the four
sectors we visited on the total number of agent work hours recorded as
charged by agents who work at interior checkpoint operations, and for
line watch and line patrol. (Line watch and line patrol operate very
closely together on the border, and data are not recorded separately
for them by the Border Patrol.) We were unable to perform an
apprehensions per agent work year analysis for permanent or tactical
checkpoints because data on agent hours charged to individual
checkpoints are not recorded. That is, while work records are kept for
hours charged by agents at interior checkpoints, the records do not
distinguish between hours charged at permanent checkpoints versus those
charged to tactical checkpoints in the same sector.
Using the data charged to interior checkpoints and line watch/line
patrol for each sector, we then divided these total hours by 2,080,
which is the total number of hours in a standard work year of 52 weeks,
and 40 work hours per week. (The Border Patrol work year is the same as
that of the rest of the U.S. government.) The total agent work hours at
checkpoints in a given sector, divided by 2,080, produced a data point
that we called agent work years. Thus, if 2,080,000 hours were charged,
the work year total would have been 1,000 work years--2,080,000 divided
by 2,080.
To calculate what we term apprehensions per agent work, we then took
the data we had obtained on the number of apprehensions that occurred
at interior checkpoints in each sector in a given fiscal year and
divided that number by the agent work year calculation. For example, if
10,000 apprehensions occurred at interior checkpoints in a sector, and
2,000 agent work years had been recorded as having been worked at those
checkpoints, the apprehensions per agent work year were 5 (10,000
apprehensions divided by 2,000 work years). Of course, this did not
include the work of support personnel that contribute indirectly to the
outcome of apprehensions.
Our second measure was cost per apprehension, with apprehension
actually being apprehension per work year, to control for the known
input of agent work years.
We chose this measure because a question that is frequently, if not
almost universally, asked about government programs, is, "What is known
about their cost effectiveness?"[Footnote 45] One potential measure of
such cost effectiveness for the Border Patrol would be how much did it
cost to apprehend a single person in one sector, compared with other
sectors? While this measure and others should not be taken in isolation
as further guides to management decisions, knowledge of the basic costs
of an agency's key outcomes (such as apprehensions of illegal entrants)
per unit of input (agent labor costs) can be part of the basis for
improved allocation of resources. Of course, it would be even better if
the full costs of all the inputs were known, such as infrastructure
overhead, but these were not available. Therefore, we used data that
were available as a method of illustrating how cost effectiveness
measures could be more fully developed by the Border Patrol.
To calculate cost per apprehension per agent work year, we divided the
outputs by the inputs--in this case, the data on apprehensions per work
year (e.g., 521 in Tucson in fiscal year 2001) divided by the average
cost of an agent work year in fiscal year 2004, which the Border Patrol
stated was $53,000, or the nationwide average for the GS-11, step 2,
rank. This was described as the national average for Border Patrol
agents; of course, it is an average for all agents, and does not
reflect variations in cost of living adjustments, or for the true wider
range of all Border Patrol salaries. We used the $53,000 average work
year cost for all calculations for the period covering fiscal years
2001-2004 and did not adjust the work year cost for inflation. Our goal
was again to show what the approximate cost per apprehension had been
and how this measure could serve as a resource allocation tool, along
with other information and data.
We conducted our work from September 2004 to May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: San Diego Sector Profile:
Geography of the Sector:
The San Diego sector's area of responsibility includes all of San Diego
County and substantial portions of Orange and Riverside counties in
California, covering more than 7,000 square miles and 60 miles of
international border with Mexico. The San Diego sector encompasses
coastal beaches and expansive mesas to coastal and inland mountains,
rugged canyons, and high desert. Over half of the border in this sector
consists of mountains, but there are also lesser amounts of rolling
brushland, urban hilly terrain, canyons, farmland, flat desert, and
flat urban terrain. Directly to the south of San Diego lie the Mexican
cities of Tijuana and Tecate, Baja California--with a combined
population of more than 2 million. For decades, this area was the
preferred corridor for illegal immigration because of the highly
populated neighborhoods north and south of the border.
Organizational Structure of the Sector:
At the time of our September and December 2004 visits, the sector was
headed by a chief patrol agent, had seven Border Patrol stations, and
1,634 agents on duty. The sector used four-wheel-drive vehicles, police
sedans, and vans to patrol between two parallel fences that were
constructed along the border, stretching about 16 miles inland from the
Pacific Ocean. In addition, the sector uses all-terrain vehicles
(ATVs), helicopters, mountain bikes, and horses to patrol border areas.
Seismic sensors are also used to identify where smugglers and illegal
aliens are attempting to cross the border between the official ports of
entry.
The sector has 4 permanent interior traffic checkpoints and up to 11
tactical checkpoints, which are operated on an as-needed basis (see
fig. 10). The two busiest permanent checkpoints in the sector are the
ones located (1) on northbound I-5, south of San Clemente, about 68
miles from the border, and (2) on northbound I-15, near Temecula, also
located about 68 miles from the border.
Most of the tactical checkpoints in the San Diego sector are operated
by the Temecula station, which can field up to 8 tactical checkpoints
located on a network of secondary state highways leading roughly
northwest from the eastern San Diego area toward Los Angeles, and
paralleling or intersecting the major I-15 interstate highway.
According to Border Patrol officials, secondary roads make it possible
for smugglers and illegal aliens to try to circumvent the I-15 Temecula
checkpoint by taking side roads, unlike the San Clemente I-5
checkpoint, which has no surrounding secondary roads. Figure 10 shows
the approximate location of the permanent checkpoints, on I-5 (San
Clemente) and on I-15 (Temecula), as well as some of the approximate
locations used for tactical checkpoints, not all of which operate
simultaneously.
Figure 10: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the San Diego Sector:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Overview of Checkpoint Operations:
We observed that the operations and physical layout of the two
permanent checkpoints at San Clemente and Temecula were largely
similar, and although the local geography differs somewhat, both
checkpoints are situated at locations with high surrounding hills or
other barriers (e.g., the ocean at the I-5 checkpoint), making it
difficult to simply drive around the checkpoints.
The I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente has four traffic lanes, and
Border Patrol agents stand between the lanes to screen traffic (see
fig. 11). Trucks pass through the adjoining weigh station, where they
too are screened.
Figure 11: Permanent Checkpoint on I-5, South of San Clemente:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The I-15 checkpoint near Temecula is similar to the one south of San
Clemente, in terms of the Border Patrol agents having to monitor
multiple lanes of traffic on a very busy highway. A major difference is
that secondary roads south of the checkpoint offer alternative routes
for persons to try to evade the I-15 Temecula checkpoint.
According to Border Patrol officials, it is difficult for smugglers and
illegal aliens to avoid the San Clemente I-5 traffic checkpoint because
it is located in a physically constricted area between high hills on
the right (facing north) and the ocean on the left, with no readily
accessible side roads for miles prior to the checkpoint, because the
Marine Corps' Camp Pendleton borders it on the east. To circumvent the
checkpoint, smugglers and illegal aliens must either go through a state
park, where there are state park police, or through the hilly terrain
of Camp Pendleton, where there are military police, according to the
Border Patrol officials. Vehicles are observable for at least a mile
south from cameras at the checkpoint, so that those attempting to
improperly enter Camp Pendleton would be visible to the Border Patrol.
Figure 12 shows an aerial photo of the I-5 checkpoint, with the hills
in Camp Pendleton on the side of the checkpoint area to the upper
right, and the ocean to the lower left of the checkpoint, making
evasions of the checkpoint difficult.
Figure 12: Aerial Photo of Checkpoint on I-5 South of San Clemente:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As of November 2004, the San Clemente station was staffed with a patrol-
agent-in-charge and approximately 100 Border Patrol agents. The
Temecula station was also staffed by a patrol-agent-in-charge and had
approximately 127 agents.
During our visit to the I-5 checkpoint, we observed agents performing
traffic checks (i.e., screening vehicles) by staffing positions on the
highway. We observed two agents standing between the lanes of the
northbound I-5 traffic; each was responsible for screening vehicles
that approached him or her.
We were told that agents look for visual clues that could indicate drug
or alien smuggling, as occurred in an incident we observed. During our
visit, an agent told us that on the basis of such visual clues, he sent
a vehicle to secondary inspection, where all passengers were later
identified as illegal aliens:
In another lane, closest to the center of the freeway, was a Pre-
Enrolled Access Lane (PAL) which permitted vehicles to use an
electronic transponder to move through more quickly than the normal
traffic lanes. (Obtaining a transponder requires passing a background
investigation; San Clemente is the only U.S. checkpoint with such a
lane.) However, an agent was also positioned at the PAL lane, and
during the period we were there, a vehicle that attempted to go through
it without a transponder was ordered into secondary inspection, where
it was determined that the occupants were illegal aliens.
The I-5 checkpoint also performs checks on buses, which are to stop at
the checkpoint, and on trucks, which are to transit the adjoining weigh
station. The Border Patrol also screens trucks at that point, at times
using the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) machines, which
use gamma-ray technology to examine the contents of vehicles.
At the checkpoints, all suspected smugglers or illegal aliens are
fingerprinted using the Automated Biometric Identification system and a
law enforcement check is run on their fingerprints through the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). If
persons are determined to be undocumented aliens or are wanted for
other offenses, detention facilities are available at the checkpoints.
Border Patrol officials said that having the ability to perform
fingerprint and law enforcement checks at the checkpoints enables them
to quickly determine if detained persons are illegal aliens or have
outstanding criminal complaints pending against them. Border Patrol
officials told us that they had been conducting a project to identify
the numbers of illegal aliens with criminal records that had been
apprehended in areas around the Temecula and San Clemente checkpoints.
For example, after matching fingerprints with IAFIS during a 6-week
period from August to September 2004, they found that 157 illegal
aliens with criminal records had been apprehended by Temecula Border
Patrol agents. These illegal aliens had criminal records that included
assault, burglary, and immigration offenses. Overall, during the 6-week
period, 28 percent of Temecula's and 22 percent of San Clemente's
apprehensions were illegal aliens with criminal records.
Traffic Impact:
The Border Patrol regards the I-5 and I-15 checkpoints as 24-hour
checkpoints, closing them generally only for safety reasons. However,
as we observed when we visited the two checkpoints, heavy traffic
volume may preclude screening every northbound vehicle. As noted above,
the I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente is the busiest interior
traffic checkpoint in the nation, with approximately 144,000 vehicles
passing through daily, while the Temecula I-15 checkpoint ranks second,
with approximately 122,000 vehicles daily. However, as we observed, and
as San Clemente and Temecula checkpoint officials told us, when traffic
backs up, the traffic checks are suspended and traffic is "flushed"
through the checkpoint.
Agents said that they know from experience how long a wait period
traffic backups are likely to produce, and that they keep a close watch
on how long the line has become. During our visit, we observed that
Border Patrol agents monitored traffic and took action to avoid
creating major traffic delays at these checkpoints.
Since the Border Patrol agents may suspend their operations to avoid
creating lengthy traffic delays, actual time that the agents stand out
on the highway lanes and visually inspect traffic varies. Checkpoint
records showed that at the I-5 checkpoint south of San Clemente,
traffic was screened only about 36 percent of the time in fiscal year
2004, a reduction from about 57 percent in fiscal year 2003 and about
63 percent in fiscal year 2002. Temecula checkpoint traffic was
screened only about 42 percent of the time in fiscal year 2004, down
from about 63 percent of the time in fiscal year 2003. Border Patrol
officials attributed these declines to a combination of insufficient
staffing levels at the stations and the need to avoid imposing long
traffic waits on the public. According to Temecula station officials at
the time of our September 2004 visit, they had received no complaints
for at least several months about traffic delays.
Checkpoint Capabilities:
We observed that the permanent checkpoints at San Clemente and Temecula
had a range of capabilities to monitor and inspect vehicles and their
occupants. These included:
* concrete side aprons off the highway to permit more intensive
secondary inspections,
* cages and shade for canines,
* surveillance cameras for monitoring activities at the checkpoint and
traffic backup,
* computers with hardline communications,
* detention facilities for holding smugglers and illegal aliens, and:
* concrete side aprons with their own traffic lane to permit trucks to
line up for VACIS gamma-ray inspections.
Tactical Checkpoints Supplement Permanent Ones:
In addition to manning the permanent checkpoints, the Border Patrol
routinely sets up tactical checkpoints to reduce the chances of persons
evading the permanent ones by using secondary roads. In particular, the
Temecula checkpoint has eight locations where tactical checkpoints are
established as needed based on intelligence on illegal immigration or
related activity. We observed a tactical checkpoint on Sandia Creek
road, south and west of the I-15 checkpoint, in a back hill rural area
that had little traffic, but where the secondary road network could
allow for evading checkpoints on the main highway (see fig. 13). At
this tactical checkpoint, agents stopped each vehicle and talked to
drivers and passengers; in contrast, at permanent checkpoints with
heavy traffic volume, most vehicles are not stopped but are observed as
they move slowly through the checkpoint lanes.
Figure 13: Tactical Checkpoint at Sandia Creek Road:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Tucson Sector Profile:
Geography and Organization of the Sector:
The Tucson, Arizona, sector's area of responsibility runs 261 miles
along the U.S.-Mexico border from New Mexico to the Yuma County,
Arizona, line; it is 90,530 square miles in area. The sector
encompasses national parkland and parts of the Tohono O'odham Indian
reservation, and its environment is like that of much of the southwest
border--the terrain is inhospitable, consisting of mountains, flat
desert, rolling brushland, and canyons. Summer temperatures can reach
an average daily high of 100 to 110 degrees, and lack of shade for vast
stretches of the border and inland areas can pose severe health hazards
to those attempting to walk across the area.
Most of the border in this sector is delineated by cattle fences and
border markers, with little effective fencing of any kind, according to
Border Patrol officials. Cattle fences can prevent cattle from crossing
the border, but they are not designed or intended to prevent people
from doing so, as they are essentially strands of wire with large gaps
between them and are easily pushed apart, according to the officials.
Agents patrol the border by truck, aircraft, horseback, ATVs, and
bicycles and on foot; maintain traffic checkpoints along highways
leading from border areas; and conduct antismuggling investigations.
At the time of our October 2004 visit, the sector was headed by a chief
patrol agent and staffed by 2,100 Border Patrol agents deployed
throughout the sector from eight Border Patrol stations.
Overview of Sector Operations:
Border Patrol operations in the Tucson sector have been the subject of
legislative direction since fiscal year 1999; this direction applied to
no other Border Patrol sector. For fiscal years 1999-2004, annual
appropriations acts made no funds "available for the site acquisition,
design, or construction" of any Border Patrol checkpoint in the Tucson
sector.[Footnote 46] Since the Tucson sector had no permanent
checkpoints in fiscal year 1999 (or before), the effect of this
legislative language was that no permanent checkpoints could be planned
or constructed in this sector.[Footnote 47]
To comply with the congressional ban on funding for permanent
checkpoints, and the congressional requirement to relocate checkpoints
after a specified period of days, the Border Patrol told us that the
sector maintains what we term nonpermanent checkpoints that, when open,
are generally at the same locations, with the exception of one on I-19,
from June 2002 through fiscal year 2004, and another on state highway
83. On I-19, a major north-south interstate highway that runs from
Nogales on the border north to Tucson, about 70 miles away,
nonpermanent checkpoints were alternated between KP 42 and KP 25, 17
kilometers further south, from June 2002 through the end of fiscal year
2004. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Border Patrol kept the
checkpoint at the KP 42 location to preclude illegal entrants from
taking advantage of its being moved southward to KP 25, as had
regularly occurred. The checkpoint is kept open for 14 days, closed for
8 hours, then reopened for 14 days, and so forth, according to the
Border Patrol. The Border Patrol states that it believes that this
schedule conforms to the fiscal year 2005 legislative language
requiring that Tucson sector checkpoints relocate "at least an average
of once every 14 days." Other checkpoints in the sector have been
opened and closed on varying schedules in fiscal year 2005, but those
schedules also conform to the law, according to the Border Patrol. To
support these nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector operates
tactical checkpoints periodically, as occurs in other sectors with
permanent checkpoints. The tactical checkpoints function the same way
as tactical ones in other sectors with permanent checkpoints.
Figure 14 shows the sector and the approximate locations at which
nonpermanent checkpoints may be located when open.
Figure 14: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the Tucson Sector:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to the Border Patrol, it also alternates among three sites
for checkpoints on state highway 83. (The approximate locations are
shown as 83C MP54, 83C, and 82 in fig. 14). Because of safety issues,
the nonpermanent checkpoints designated as SR 90, 80C and highway 191
do not have alternative sites. They are kept open for the legislatively
permitted length of time, and then closed, according to the Border
Patrol. Another checkpoint is open and closed about the same hours as a
port of entry south of it on the border. However, the Border Patrol
monitors sector night traffic with various means, such as roving
patrols; these are sufficient, they told us, given the very light
traffic in the sector at night.
Checkpoint Operations:
We observed the operations of the nonpermanent checkpoint on I-19, the
north-south interstate highway that runs from Nogales on the border
north to Tucson, about 70 miles away. According to Border Patrol
officials, only limited routes are available to circumvent the I-19
checkpoint, primarily by driving or walking across countryside that can
make smugglers or aliens relatively visible, because of vehicles
raising dust in their wake. In fiscal year 2003, an average of over
15,000 vehicles passed through the I-19 checkpoint daily, including
many commercial trucks, especially during produce season, according to
the officials.
The I-19 nonpermanent checkpoint consisted of a trailer, portable
generators, water, and rest room facilities that were towed in; traffic
warning signs; and orange traffic cones to designate the checkpoint
area and to slow vehicles down to be inspected. At the time of our
visit, the I-19 checkpoint was located next to an overpass to provide
some protection from the elements, since there was no canopy as is
typically found at permanent checkpoints we visited in other sectors.
Border Patrol officials also said that only two locations along I-19
are appropriate for checkpoint operations because of space and safety
considerations. From June 2002 through the end of fiscal year 2004, the
I-19 checkpoint was alternated between these two locations, at KP 42
and KP 25, relocating every 7 days. During fiscal year 2005, the
checkpoint location has been maintained only at the northern location,
as noted above, and is open for 14 days, then closed for 8 hours, and
then reopened for 14 days.
At the I-19 checkpoint locations, the Border Patrol has three lanes of
northbound traffic to screen--two highway lanes and an off-ramp. The
operation, consisting of Border Patrol agents and canines, was run out
of a trailer, with a small detention room inside it, and a stand-alone
computer not connected externally. There was no hardwired computer
access to databases to check fingerprints or to validate identities
through other law enforcement databases. Therefore, according to Border
Patrol agents, they can process some reports on the computer but have
to save information to a diskette and take it back to the station for
further processing. Similarly, processing and fingerprinting of
suspects must wait until the suspects are transported to a Border
Patrol station with hardwired computers.
During summer months, we were told, the temperature can reach about 130
degrees on the heated tarmac of the highway; as a result, canine
performance and endurance are limited.
According to the Border Patrol, equipment that must be relocated when
the I-19 and other checkpoints are moved includes a minimum of 3 light
generator plants; 1 generator; 1 portable toilet; 20-100 traffic cones;
and 5 or more signs, showing "Stop," "Checkpoint Ahead," "Reduce
Speed," and similar warnings. In addition, the standard minimum
deployment would be one processing trailer and detention area, two or
more marked vehicles and a water trailer.
The I-19 checkpoint at KP 42 had little area off-road to conduct
secondary inspections, and that area consisted of dirt along the side
of the highway. Border Patrol officials told us that to comply with
legislative restrictions, they were unable to install anything that
could be considered to create a permanent infrastructure, such as water
lines, electricity, buried communication lines or towers, and
buildings. Figure 15 shows the I-19 nonpermanent checkpoint near KP 42.
Figure 15: Tucson Sector Nonpermanent Checkpoint on I-19 near KP 42:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Checkpoint on State Highway 85 Near Ajo,
Arizona:
We also observed the nonpermanent checkpoint on state highway 85, near
Ajo, Arizona. According to Border Patrol officials, this checkpoint is
located just south of where state highways 85 and 86 merge, both coming
from the south, in order to ensure that all vehicles traveling north
must go through the checkpoint. Only about 1,100 vehicles transit this
checkpoint daily, we were told. As with the I-19 checkpoint, there were
only limited portable equipment capabilities at the Ajo checkpoint.
There was no overpass to provide shade. The Ajo checkpoint is shown in
figure 16.
Figure 16: Nonpermanent Checkpoint on State Highway 85 near Ajo,
Arizona:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Laredo Sector Profile:
Geography of the Sector:
The Laredo, Texas, Border Patrol sector covers 110,000 square miles,
116 counties or parts of counties extending north to the Oklahoma
border, and approximately 171 river miles of common border with Mexico.
The sector's eastern border is the McAllen sector, its southern border
is the Rio Grande, and its western border is the Del Rio sector. The
sector's international border represents about 10.6 percent of the
southwest border, and includes the International Falcon Reservoir,
sometimes called Falcon Lake, a 120-square-mile body of water that was
formed by damming the Rio Grande in 1953. The southwestern side of the
lake is controlled by Mexico, the northeastern side by the United
States, with the international border running down an imaginary line
through the middle.
The sector's diverse economic base includes portions of the Rio Grande
Valley, with large, privately owned cattle ranches, other agribusiness,
and a large volume of goods from Mexico that are trucked through the
Laredo ports of entry into the United States, and which are then stored
in warehouses while awaiting inspection and transfer into trucks for
transport to the rest of the United States. According to Border Patrol
officials, Laredo is one of the busiest commercial ports of entry in
the United States. The sector landscape generally consists of rolling
brushland, reservoirs, farmland, and urban flatland, with the more
rural sections being fairly flat but also having dense undergrowth that
can impede persons such as smugglers or illegal aliens attempting to
walk off-road, according to Border Patrol officials.
Organizational Structure of the Laredo Sector:
At the time of our January 2005 visit, the sector was headed by a chief
patrol agent and staffed with 981 Border Patrol agents, deployed
throughout the sector from eight Border Patrol stations. The sector had
ATVs, helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and patrol boats; the last are
used to patrol the International Falcon Reservoir. The patrol boats are
not used for Rio Grande patrol, but jet skis are used for swift water
river rescues, according to Border Patrol officials. Approximately 80
canines are also assigned to traffic screening operations at the
sector's checkpoints.
The sector has five permanent checkpoints that screen traffic 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, generally closing only for safety reasons, and
utilizes up to six tactical checkpoints that are opened on an as-needed
basis, according to Border Patrol officials. We visited two permanent
checkpoints in the sector, on two-lane state highway 351, in the
vicinity of Hebbronville, and on I-35, the major north-south interstate
highway leading to and from Laredo and San Antonio. We also visited the
construction site of a new, replacement permanent checkpoint for the
existing one on I-35, about 10 miles north of the current location.
That new checkpoint is scheduled to open in August 2005, according to
Border Patrol officials.
There are more secondary roads in the Laredo sector than in the
neighboring McAllen sector; as a result, the Border Patrol maintains
more permanent checkpoints and also utilizes tactical checkpoints.
According to Border Patrol officials, tactical checkpoints are used
during certain times of the year, depending on factors such as
increases in traffic on secondary roads, and local, state, or national
events being conducted in the area. The sector's permanent and tactical
checkpoints are strategically placed on roads and highways and at
junctions that permit monitoring and inspection of vehicles leaving the
border area, according to the officials (see fig. 17).
Figure 17: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the Laredo Sector:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The location shown on highway 83 is a proposed checkpoint;
therefore, there are five current permanent checkpoints.
[End of figure]
According to the Border Patrol, traffic checkpoint operations are
generally supported by local ranchers, who permit the Border Patrol to
enter their fenced property. The ranchers also permit the Border Patrol
to place sensors at locations that could be favored by smugglers,
according to Border Patrol officials.
Checkpoint Operations:
We observed the operations of two permanent checkpoints in the Laredo
sector; on I-35, about 15 miles north of Laredo, and another on state
highway 359 between Falfurrias in the McAllen sector and Laredo. As was
the case with other checkpoints we visited in this and the McAllen
sector, the checkpoints had a tollbooth-like area with at least two
traffic lanes, one reserved for passenger cars and trucks, and the
other for commercial trucks and buses (see fig. 18).
Figure 18: Permanent Checkpoint North of Laredo, Texas, on I-35:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the time of our visit, the I-35 checkpoint was staffed with one
supervisor, six agents, and canines. The facility consisted of a
trailer that contained IAFIS fingerprinting equipment, three holding
areas for apprehended illegal aliens, and video cameras (including
infrared for nighttime use) to monitor activities in and around the
checkpoint. Border Patrol agents told us that I-35 vehicle traffic wait
time has not been more than 20 to 30 minutes, and generally takes place
around 2:00 p.m. We observed a lift that could be used to inspect under
vehicles, but did not observe trucks being examined by gamma ray
equipment. We asked whether VACIS equipment was available to screen
trucks with gamma ray as we had seen at other checkpoints, and the
agents told us that VACIS trucks were not permanently located at the
checkpoint but are made available periodically by the official port of
entry if they are requested.
As was the case for checkpoints in the McAllen sector, those in the
Laredo sector are directed to inspect every vehicle that is proceeding
northward, according to Border Patrol officials. Because there are few
north-south roads in the sector, an absence of secondary roads to go
around the checkpoints, and manageable volume of traffic, it is
possible to screen all vehicles transiting the checkpoints, according
to Border Patrol officials. As we observed, each vehicle was sniffed by
a canine, and occupants were questioned by a Border Patrol agent. We
were told that the agents are able to process a vehicle on average in
about 9 seconds. The checkpoint at I-35 averages about 13,600
transiting vehicles daily, according to the Texas Department of
Transportation; of these, about 36 percent are trucks.
Border Patrol agents at the highway 359 checkpoint outside of
Hebbronville (see fig. 19) told us that they had recently apprehended a
number of "brush walkers," illegal aliens who had been walking through
the brush surrounding the checkpoint to evade apprehension at the
checkpoint. The agents said that smugglers will drop off a load of
aliens just short of the checkpoint so that they can attempt to walk
around to a point where they would be picked up again. However, the
agents said that it is very difficult terrain to traverse, even along
ranch and pipeline trails, which are monitored by several means,
including electronic surveillance. The agents further stated that local
ranchers are very supportive of the Border Patrol activities in the
area and have provided keys to their ranches for access when intrusions
are detected, or when the ranchers themselves call to notify agents
that suspected illegal aliens are on the property. Figures 19 and 20
show two checkpoints in the sector.
Figure 19: Permanent Checkpoint on State Highway 359 Near Hebbronville,
Texas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 20: Aerial View of Highway 359 Checkpoint, Texas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Checkpoint Capabilities:
The Laredo checkpoints we observed had a wide range of capabilities to
screen vehicles and their occupants. These included:
* permanent tollboth-like structures that provide cover from the
weather, including shade for agents and canines;
* lifts to permit inspection of undersides of vehicles;
* computers with hardwired communications and databases to permit
investigation into those detained;
* detention facilities; and:
* concrete side aprons with their own traffic lanes to permit trucks to
line up with off highway room for inspections.
As noted, a new I-35 checkpoint is scheduled to open in August 2005,
about 10 miles north of the current location. Border Patrol officials
told us that one major advantage of the new location is that it will
not be within sight of warehouses or other structures, which they said
currently provide cover for smugglers to observe the operations at the
existing I-35 checkpoint. The new checkpoint, which will cost about $12
million to construct, will be able to accommodate six lanes of
vehicles, with separate lanes for passenger vehicles and trucks, along
with a large area for inspecting and unloading trucks, if necessary
(see fig. 21).
Figure 21: Architectural Drawing of the New I-35, Texas, Permanent
Checkpoint:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: McAllen Sector Profile:
Geography of the Sector:
The McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol sector covers 18,584 square miles, 19
counties, and approximately 316 river miles of common border with
Mexico. According to Border Patrol officials, the sector's area of
responsibility runs from the mouth of the Rio Grande at the Gulf of
Mexico to the Zapata/Starr county line, where it meets the Laredo
sector. The sector's international border represents about 9.4 percent
of the southwest border; its southern edge follows the Rio Grande
through Brownsville, emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. Large parts of
the sector, which includes a portion of the Rio Grande Valley, are
privately owned ranches, including the well-known King Ranch, which is
approximately 800,000 acres in size.
Although the land in the sector is fairly flat, it receives sufficient
precipitation to permit growth of dense sage, scrub brush, and cacti.
This has created an inhospitable environment for persons such as
smugglers or illegal aliens attempting to walk off-road, as the brush
is so thick that it can actually block foot traffic or can severely
injure persons trying to negotiate it, according to Border Patrol
officials.
Organizational Structure of the Sector:
At the time of our February 2005 visit, the sector was headed by a
chief patrol agent and staffed with 1,465 Border Patrol agents,
deployed throughout the sector from nine Border Patrol stations. The
sector had ATVs, helicopters, patrol boats, and fixed wing aircraft.
The sector also utilizes bicycle patrols around the ports of entry and
downtown areas, and video monitors and electronic sensors placed along
the border to detect people or vehicles attempting to enter the country
illegally.
Only two major north-south highways in the sector lead away from the
border: U.S. highways 281 and 77. The Border Patrol has permanent
checkpoints on both, at Falfurrias and Sarita, respectively. Both
checkpoints are approximately 80 miles inland from the international
border and are roughly parallel to each other, although about 25 miles
apart (see fig. 22). Border Patrol officials told us that the
combination of only two north-south highways and the absence of
secondary roads make it unnecessary to establish tactical checkpoints
in support of the permanent ones. The checkpoints at Falfurrias and
Sarita cannot be easily evaded by walking or driving around them, given
the terrain, fenced private ranches, detection sensors, and lack of
secondary roads, Border Patrol officials stated.
Figure 22: Road Infrastructure and Checkpoints in the McAllen, Texas
Sector:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Much of the land near the Border Patrol checkpoints on U.S. highways
281 and 77 is private ranch land that is both heavily fenced and
actively patrolled by private security forces, according to Border
Patrol officials. As in the Laredo sector, checkpoint operations are
supported by the local ranchers, according to the Border Patrol, who
permit the Border Patrol to enter their fenced property to apprehend
illegal entrants.
Checkpoint Operations:
We observed the operations of the Falfurrias permanent checkpoint on
U.S. highway 281, a major north-south highway that runs from McAllen on
the border north toward San Antonio, Texas (see fig. 22). This
checkpoint (and the one on U.S. highway 77, which we did not visit) had
a tollbooth-like area with at least two traffic lanes, one reserved for
passenger cars and trucks, while the other is for commercial trucks and
buses. At both checkpoints, Border Patrol agents are to stop and screen
every vehicle that is proceeding northward. As we observed, each
vehicle was sniffed by a canine, and its occupants were questioned by a
Border Patrol agent. We also observed a bus being searched, after a
canine got a "hit," indicating possible drugs. The agents found three
30-pound packages of marijuana in the engine compartment.
According to Border Patrol officials, the agents process a vehicle in
about 9 seconds and average about 14,900 vehicles--about 40 percent
trucks--a day transiting the checkpoints. This volume of traffic allows
for agents to stop and question occupants of each vehicle, compared
with the 144,000 vehicles daily going through the California checkpoint
on I-5 south of San Clemente.
There is little need to use tactical checkpoints in support of the
permanent ones in the McAllen sector, according to Border Patrol
officials, because a lack of secondary roads and geography that is not
easily traversed force smugglers and illegal aliens to attempt to
proceed through the checkpoints on U.S. highways 281 and 77. This
situation is in contrast to the Tucson and San Diego sector operations,
where tactical checkpoints on secondary roads are constantly being used
to support the permanent checkpoints because of the many different
routes leading away from the border that are available to smugglers and
illegal aliens.
Checkpoint Capabilities:
The permanent checkpoints on U.S. highways 281 and 77 had a wide range
of capabilities and facilities to screen vehicles and their occupants.
These included:
* permanent tollbooth-like structures that provide cover from the
weather, including shade for agents and canines;
* lifts to permit inspection of undersides of vehicles;
* computers with hardwired communications and databases to provide
identity checks;
* detention facilities; and:
* concrete side aprons away from main traffic lanes that permit trucks
to safely line up with sufficient room for a VACIS gamma-ray vehicle to
pass over and inspect them.
Figure 23 shows several photos of the checkpoint on U.S. highway 281,
near Falfurrias, Texas.
Figure 23: Checkpoint Inspection Area, U.S. Highway 281, near
Falfurrias, Texas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 8, 2005:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
RE: Draft Report GAO-05-435, Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior
Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance: (GAO Job Code
440348):
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's draft
report. The report supports U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP's) position that national security could be strengthened if
permanent checkpoints are used in all sectors in conjunction with
tactical traffic checkpoints.
In general, while the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report is
factually correct, it should be emphasized that CBP employs a multi-
layered enforcement strategy that consists of permanent and tactical
checkpoints in eight of the nine southwest sectors with noticeable
results. However, the ability of CBP to enhance security by deterring
illegal immigration that includes the entry of potential terrorists,
their weapons and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband, is
limited because legislation has effectively barred permanent
checkpoints in the Tucson sector. Furthermore, under existing
legislation, the lack of a permanent checkpoint combined with the
requirement to relocate temporary checkpoints every seven to fourteen
days has negative security consequences. Specifically, nonpermanent
checkpoints used in the Tucson sector do not have the advantages of the
physical infrastructure typical of permanent checkpoints, or the
flexibility of tactical checkpoints to respond to intelligence
information.
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of CBP (1) develop additional
performance measures for the productivity and effectiveness of interior
checkpoints and (2) include data and analysis provided by the
additional performance measures in CBP's Performance and Annual Report.
CBP agrees with the recommendations and will take the following steps
to implement them.
Recommendation #1:
Develop additional performance measures for the productivity and
effectiveness of interior checkpoints, such as apprehensions per agent
work year and cost per apprehension.
Corrective Action:
CBP is in the process of developing performance measures for the Border
Patrol for Fiscal Year 2006. One or more of the performance measures
will gauge the effectiveness of checkpoints. CBP will consider the
suggestions contained within the audit report when developing these
measures.
Recommendation #2:
Include in CBP's Performance and Annual Report, data and analysis
provided by the additional performance measures on the performance of
interior checkpoints, and what might be done to improve their
effectiveness.
Corrective Action:
Once the performance measures for Fiscal Year 2006 are implemented and
the data is tracked, CBP will publish the information in the
Performance and Annual Report.
We are providing technical comments to your office under separate
cover.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard Stana (202) 512-8777:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Leo Barbour, Katherine Davis,
Darryl W. Dutton, Ann H. Finley, Lemuel N. Jackson, James R. Russell,
and Jonathan R. Tumin made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Ports of entry are those official locations along the international
border, as well as at U.S. international airports and seaports, where
persons seeking entry into the United States go through passport
control and customs inspection. The Office of Field Operations of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection operates the nation's 317 ports of entry.
The Border Patrol is responsible for border security between the ports
of entry. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2004, p.11 and p.12.
[2] See, for example, GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Addressing
Management Challenges That Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies, GAO-
05-664T (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2005). See also GAO, Immigration
Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration Enforcement Objectives
and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements, GAO-05-66 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).
[3] For example, see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance
and Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2004, and the same for fiscal year 2003.
[4] The Tucson sector has checkpoints that are neither permanent nor
tactical as operated by the Border Patrol in other sectors, because of
varying legislative restrictions that started in fiscal year 1999.
These differences are explained in greater detail below.
[5] According to the Border Patrol, it used a combination of roving
patrols and temporary checkpoints that remained at the same location
for long periods but that did not have permanent infrastructure. The
Border Patrol stated that it was not until the late 1990s that traffic
volume and illegal immigration reached a level where it felt that
permanent checkpoints were necessary to address the sector's needs.
[6] Cost data we obtained on interior checkpoints had to be collected
through data requests to each sector, and were not available for
permanent versus tactical checkpoints.
[7] Because of the sensitivity of some operational guidance, the Border
Patrol requested that we not provide precise numbers.
[8] Work years are total hours charged by agents to work at a given
location, divided by 2080 (a 40-hour week times 52 weeks). Costs of
apprehensions per agent work year were calculated by dividing the
average nationwide fiscal year 2004 salary of a Border Patrol agent
($53,000) by the number of apprehensions per work year reported for
checkpoints, such as 191 apprehensions per work year in fiscal year
2004 at interior checkpoints in the San Diego sector. In this instance,
$53,000 divided by 191 produced a cost per apprehension of $277.
[9] According to the Border Patrol, Border Patrol stations are
responsible for a specific geographic area within a sector. Substations
are responsible for a geographic area within a station's area of
responsibility. Stations are composed of a minimum of one patrol-agent-
in-charge, one or more supervisory Border Patrol agents, numerous
Border Patrol agents and support staff and associated equipment
required to carry out their duties. Substations report to the parent
station. Stations, in turn, report to the sector chief patrol agent.
[10] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report,
Fiscal Year 2003, p. 43
[11] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report,
Fiscal Year 2003, p. 42 and p. 43.
[12] GAO, INS' Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues
Remain after Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001).
[13] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Performance and Annual Report,
Fiscal Year 2003, p. 43.
[14] 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
[15] A roving patrol stop is a stop by an agent who patrols in a
vehicle but who is not assigned to a particular location.
[16] One of the checkpoints was functional only about 70 percent of the
time because of personnel shortages. 428 U.S. 543, 554.
[17] There are a number of court decisions concerning the use of
permanent and temporary checkpoints, as well as roving patrols. In
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Supreme Court
ruled that under the Fourth Amendment, except at the border or its
functional equivalents, officers on roving patrols may stop vehicles
only if "specific articulable facts" give rise to suspicion.
[18] Pew Hispanic Center, Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of
the Undocumented Population, February 21, 2005. Given that these
estimates are provided for background purposes, we did not assess their
reliability.
[19] As noted previously, varying legislative restrictions since fiscal
year 1999 on the Tucson sector have affected funding and operations of
its checkpoints.
[20] The Border Patrol refers to both these intended effects as
deterrence--that is, deterrence of illegal entry into the United States
from Mexico, and deterrence of illegal entrants from using high-volume
highways where they can more easily blend into thousands of vehicles
transiting permanent checkpoints. We have chosen to use this
terminology as the Border Patrol uses it.
[21] According to the Border Patrol, it is seeking to field a vehicle
that carries equipment capable of securely transmitting data. However,
the high cost of the vehicles, at about $114,000 each, and
technological difficulties have slowed this program. In addition to the
initial purchase cost, there is also a recurring expense for satellite
time that is estimated at $12,000 per month per link. In comparison,
the average cost of installing permanent hard-line database access in a
facility is $30,000, with an estimated recurring monthly expense of
$3,000 for T-1 line access.
[22] For example, a daily average of 122,000 vehicles go through the I-
15 checkpoint near Temecula, California, while Border Patrol data for
the 8 tactical checkpoints that support the permanent one on I-15 show
average daily volume ranging from about 100 to about 800 vehicles.
[23] Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999, P.L. 105-277 (1998); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000,
P.L. 106-113 (1999); Appropriations for the District of Columbia, 2001,
P.L. 106-553 (2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, P.L. 107-77
(2001); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, P.L. 108-7
(2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L.
108-90 (2003); and Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2005, P.L. 108-334 (2004).
[24] The rest of this report refers to these hybrid checkpoints in the
Tucson sector as nonpermanent checkpoints.
[25] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-
334 (2004). The act calls for a plan for expenditure that includes
location, design, costs, and benefits of each proposed permanent
checkpoint. This study was submitted by CBP to the committee in April
2005.
[26] We did not verify whether these schedules are carried out as
stated. However, we did obtain copies of the records maintained by the
Tucson sector that record the times that the I-19 and other Tucson
checkpoints have been opened and closed.
[27] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, H.R.
2360, 109th Cong. (Reported out of the House Appropriations Committee
May 13, 2005.)
[28] Because we made site visits to checkpoints only at specific times
during one trip to this sector, and did not remain at these locations
for days or longer, we did not verify whether the Border Patrol did, in
fact, relocate or close its checkpoints on the schedule described to
us.
[29] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-
334 (2004).
[30] Border Patrol personnel informed us that the term "appropriate
actions" is intentionally vague because of the sensitive nature of this
information.
[31] Office of Policy and Planning, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Evaluation of Traffic Checkpoints
at San Clemente and Temecula, June 1995.
[32] We did not confirm these operational results or the benefits
claimed by officials.
[33] The interior checkpoint near Temecula is the one on I-15. The
interior checkpoint near Tubac and Nogales, Arizona, is the one that
alternated between a road location designated as KP 25 and KP 42 on I-
19. Tubac is located just off I-19, near KP 42. According to the Border
Patrol, the KP designations stem from a time when the metric system was
being proposed as an alternative to the English system of measurement.
[34] Temecula, California had an estimated 2004 population of about
82,000. It is in Riverside county, the fifth most populous in
California, with 1.87 million persons in 2004. These and other
population data were obtained from the U.S. Census, 2000, or later
updates on the U.S. Census Web site, if available.
[35] According to the Border Patrol, sectors do not issue or direct
specific traffic control policy for individual checkpoints other than
the national "general" policy. Most sectors have required stations to
develop specific traffic control guidelines for each checkpoint. These
guidelines are often in the traffic control plan of the checkpoint
permit or memo form. The rationale, according to the Border Patrol, is
that every checkpoint is different and requires different guidelines.
[36] At all three of these permanent checkpoints in Texas, there are
paved shoulder areas with multiple lanes to funnel traffic away from
the actual highways. This not only permits separating the commercial
trucks from passenger vehicles, but also makes the entire inspection
process safer for everyone, as there are fewer backups onto the
highways, according to Border Patrol officials.
[37] P.L. 103-62.
[38] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996), p. 1. See also, Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies
Measure or Explain Program Performance GAO/GGD-00-204 (Washington,
D.C.: September 2000).
[39] As noted above, work years are total hours divided by 2,080 (a 40-
hour week times 52 weeks). Apprehensions per work year were calculated
by dividing the number of agent hours at interior checkpoints and at
line watch/line patrol work by 2,080. The resulting calculation of work
years was then divided by the number of apprehensions attributed to
line watch/line patrol and interior checkpoints, to calculate
apprehensions per work year.
[40] According to the Border Patrol, all southwest sectors experienced
varying declines in illegal entries after the attacks of September 11
as a result of fears about enhanced U.S. security. However, since less
than 3 weeks remained in fiscal year 2001 after the attacks, most of
the impact would appear in fiscal year 2002 data, which started October
1, 2001.
[41] We used the measure of apprehensions per agent work year in order
to control for the number of hours worked. This meant, for example,
that if a sector had 100 agent work years charged in a given year and
100 apprehensions, that the level of productivity or cost effectiveness
was the same as in another sector with 10 agent work years charged, and
10 apprehensions.
[42] GAO did not validate the data provided by the Border Patrol on
apprehensions, drug seizures, or vehicle counts. However, we did
determine that the Border Patrol utilizes processes and checks that
provide reasonable assurance that the data recorded for apprehensions
and drug seizures are accurate.
[43] Costs of apprehensions per work year were calculated by dividing
the average cost of an agent work year in fiscal year 2004, $53,000, by
the number of apprehensions per work year reported for checkpoints,
such as 191 apprehensions per work year in fiscal year 2004 at interior
checkpoints in the San Diego sector. In this instance, $53,000 divided
by 191 produced a cost per apprehension per work year of $277.
[44] For example, according to the U.S. Census, the city of San Diego,
California, had an estimated population of 1.26 million in 2004, while
San Diego County had an estimated population of 2.9 million in 2004.
The city of Tijuana, Mexico, on the Mexican side of the border from San
Diego, had an estimated population in 2000 of 1.2 million. In contrast,
the city of Nogales, Arizona, which is located on the border with
Mexico in the Tucson sector, had an estimated population of 21,000, and
the county in which it is located had an estimated 41,000. Directly
opposite Nogales, Arizona, the city of Nogales, Mexico, had an
estimated population of 159,000 in 2000. The Mexican city of Nuevo
Laredo, opposite the city of Laredo, Texas, had an estimated population
of more than 650,000.
[45] See, for example, GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the
Base of the Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP, (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
2005) p.15. Cost-effectiveness may be defined as achievement of a
particular objective at the least cost. A cost-effectiveness approach
is useful where there is a specific required outcome but that outcome
cannot be quantified in monetary terms whereas costs can be estimated.
Average cost is consistent with information for Border Patrol
checkpoints, where the costs of labor (inputs) are available, and one
of the outcomes, apprehensions, is not readily quantifiable in monetary
terms.
[46] Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999, P.L. 105-277 (1998); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000,
P.L. 106-113 (1999); Appropriations for the District of Columbia, 2001,
P.L. 106-553 (2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, P.L. 107-77
(2001); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, P.L. 108-7
(2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, P.L.
108-90 (2003); and Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2005, P.L. 108-334 (2004).
[47] According to the Border Patrol, it used a combination of roving
patrols and temporary checkpoints that remained at the same location
for long periods but did not have permanent infrastructure.
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