Border Security
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program Gao ID: GAO-05-801 July 29, 2005The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required that the Department of Homeland Security's on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review all visa applications. The act also authorized the expansion of the Visa Security Program to other embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and training to consular officers, among other things. Given the congressional interest in effective implementation of the Visa Security Program, we assessed (1) the Visa Security Officers' activities in Saudi Arabia, and (2) DHS's plans to expand its Visa Security Program to other consular posts overseas.
Visa Security Officers (VSO) assigned to Saudi Arabia review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by consular officers, and assist consular officers with interviews and fraud prevention; however, no comprehensive data exists to demonstrate the VSOs' impact. According to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief of mission, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah strengthen visa security because of their law enforcement and immigration experience, as well as their ability to access and use information from law enforcement databases not immediately available, by law, to consular officers. Furthermore, the requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia limits the VSOs' ability to provide additional training and other services to consular officers, such as assisting with interviews. Moreover, security concerns in Saudi Arabia limit staffing levels at these posts. DHS has not developed a strategic plan outlining the Visa Security Program's mission, activities, program goals, and intended results for operations in Saudi Arabia or the planned expansion posts. Chiefs of mission at the five posts chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 delayed approving DHS's requests for the assignment of VSOs until DHS answered specific questions regarding the program's goals and objectives, staffing requirements, and plans to coordinate with existing staff and law enforcement and border security programs at post. DHS's development of a strategic plan may address outstanding questions from chiefs of mission and other embassy officials and help DHS expand the program.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-801, Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program
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Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2005:
Border Security:
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland
Security's Visa Security Program:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-801]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-801, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required that the Department of
Homeland Security‘s on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review all visa
applications. The act also authorized the expansion of the Visa
Security Program to other embassies and consulates to provide expert
advice and training to consular officers, among other things. Given
the congressional interest in effective implementation of the Visa
Security Program, we assessed (1) the Visa Security Officers‘
activities in Saudi Arabia, and (2) DHS‘s plans to expand its Visa
Security Program to other consular posts overseas.
What GAO Found:
Visa Security Officers (VSO) assigned to Saudi Arabia review all visa
applications prior to final adjudication by consular officers, and
assist consular officers with interviews and fraud prevention; however,
no comprehensive data exists to demonstrate the VSOs‘ impact.
According to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief of
mission, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials in Saudi
Arabia, the VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah strengthen visa security because
of their law enforcement and immigration experience, as well as their
ability to access and use information from law enforcement databases
not immediately available, by law, to consular officers. Furthermore,
the requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia limits
the VSOs‘ ability to provide additional training and other services to
consular officers, such as assisting with interviews. Moreover,
security concerns in Saudi Arabia limit staffing levels at these posts.
DHS has not developed a strategic plan outlining the Visa Security
Program‘s mission, activities, program goals, and intended results for
operations in Saudi Arabia or the planned expansion posts. Chiefs of
mission at the five posts chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005
delayed approving DHS‘s requests for the assignment of VSOs until DHS
answered specific questions regarding the program‘s goals and
objectives, staffing requirements, and plans to coordinate with
existing staff and law enforcement and border security programs at
post. DHS‘s development of a strategic plan may address outstanding
questions from chiefs of mission and other embassy officials and help
DHS expand the program.
DHS Participation in the Visa Process in Saudi Arabia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) develop a
strategic plan to guide visa security operations and (2) develop and
maintain performance data that demonstrate the impact of the Visa
Security Program.
In addition, Congress may wish to consider amending section 428(i) of
the Homeland Security Act to allow DHS the flexibility to determine the
extent to which the VSOs in Saudi Arabia will review applications,
based upon the development of a risk-assessment tool.
We received comments from DHS and State, both of which agreed with our
report. DHS stated it was developing a strategic plan and a system to
measure program impact, as we recommended.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-801.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Several Factors Have Limited the Impact of Visa Security Operations in
Saudi Arabia:
DHS's Plans for Expansion of the Visa Security Program Delayed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
Table:
Table 1: Visa Security Program Expansion:
Figures:
Figure 1: Establishment and Implementation of the Visa Security
Program:
Figure 2: Visa Process in Saudi Arabia:
Abbreviations:
CLASS: Consular Lookout and Support System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
VSO: Visa Security Officer:
Letter July 29, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks highlighted vulnerabilities
that existed in the visa process, particularly the lack of emphasis
placed on using interviews and application reviews as antiterrorism
tools.[Footnote 1] In October 2002, we reported that the visa process
should be strengthened and that increased priority should be given to
national security.[Footnote 2] On November 25, 2002, Congress passed
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The act provides, among other
things, for the assignment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and
training to consular officers regarding visa security, among other
things.[Footnote 3] In particular, the act mandated that DHS personnel,
referred to as Visa Security Officers (VSO), in Saudi Arabia review all
visa applications prior to final adjudication by Department of State
(State) consular officers. By September 2003, VSOs had assumed their
responsibilities at U.S. posts in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. DHS
plans to expand the Visa Security Program[Footnote 4] to additional
posts throughout fiscal years 2005 and 2006.[Footnote 5] Congress
appropriated $10 million for the program in fiscal year 2005, and DHS
requested $15 million for fiscal year 2006.
Due to the congressional interest in effective implementation of the
Visa Security Program, we assessed (1) the Visa Security Officers'
activities in Saudi Arabia, and (2) DHS's plans to expand the program
to other consular posts overseas. To assess DHS operations in Saudi
Arabia, we reviewed documentation on and observed visa operations at
the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. In Saudi
Arabia and Washington, D.C., we interviewed DHS officials who manage
the Visa Security Program, as well as State consular officials. To
assess DHS's plans for expansion of the Visa Security Program, we
visited two of the five posts to which DHS plans to expand the program
and interviewed consular and embassy officials, including the chiefs
and deputy chiefs of mission, at these locations to discuss the posts'
plans for the VSOs. We also spoke with the consuls general from the
other three posts initially chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005.
In addition to our review of the DHS Visa Security Program, we will
report later this year on (State) changes to the visa process since our
2002 report. We conducted our evaluation from August 2004 to June 2005
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
VSOs assigned to consular posts in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, are
required to review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by
consular officers and assist consular officers with interviews and
fraud prevention. According to DHS, State's consular officials, and the
deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs strengthen visa
security at these posts. VSOs offer law enforcement and immigration
experience and have access to and experience using information from law
enforcement databases, which are not readily available to consular
officers. The VSOs in Saudi Arabia provided anecdotal evidence of their
contributions to the visa process; however, DHS does not maintain
comprehensive data on the results of their activities, such as the
number of cases for which VSOs recommended refusal, and thus is unable
to fully demonstrate the program's overall impact on visa operations.
Further, additional factors have limited the impact of the VSOs. Since
the initial deployment of VSOs in August 2003 until June 2005, DHS
assigned temporary officers to the posts in Saudi Arabia for tours that
lasted between 2 and 15 months, which initially hindered continuity in
operations. In June 2005, DHS hired and deployed permanent VSOs to
Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the mandate requiring that VSOs review all
visa applications in Saudi Arabia, including visas preliminarily
refused by consular officers and low-risk applicants, limits their
ability to perform other tasks that would further benefit consular
officers, such as providing additional fraud prevention and detection
training. Moreover, security concerns at consular posts in Saudi Arabia
limit the number of personnel from DHS, as well as other agencies, that
can be stationed at these posts.
DHS planned to expand the Visa Security Program to five locations in
fiscal year 2005 and intends further expansion in future years;
however, chiefs of mission at the posts chosen for expansion in fiscal
year 2005 delayed approval of DHS's National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 38[Footnote 6] requests. Embassy and State officials
attributed the delays to questions about the program's goals,
objectives, and staffing requirements, as well as DHS's plans to
coordinate with existing law enforcement and border security staff and
programs at post. According to DHS officials, the department provided
sufficient responses throughout 2004 and 2005 to answer the concerns
raised by chiefs of mission. However, DHS has not developed a strategic
plan for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia or the future
expansion posts in fiscal year 2005 and beyond. The development of a
plan may address questions from chiefs of mission and prevent delays in
approving the assignment of VSOs during future expansion of the Visa
Security Program.
In this report, we are recommending that DHS, in consultation with
State, develop a strategic plan to guide the operations of the Visa
Security Program in Saudi Arabia and the program's expansion to other
embassies and consulates. This plan should define mission priorities
and long-term goals and identify the outcomes expected at each post. In
addition, the strategic plan and supporting documents should include
the criteria used to select the locations for expansion, justification
for the number of VSOs at each post, costs associated with assigning
VSOs overseas, and the roles and responsibilities of the VSOs in
relation to other agencies at post. We are also recommending that DHS
develop and maintain comprehensive performance data that track the
results of VSO activities to demonstrate the Visa Security Program's
impact at each location.
We are also including a matter for congressional consideration.
Congress may wish to consider amending section 428(i) of the Homeland
Security Act 2002, which requires the review of all visa applications
in Saudi Arabia, to allow DHS the flexibility to determine which
applications VSOs will review prior to final adjudication by consular
officers. This would give VSOs greater discretion to prioritize their
review of applicants to focus on those who may pose a risk to national
security and would provide them time to perform other tasks that could
benefit consular officers.
We received written comments from DHS and State, which we have
reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively. DHS and State agreed
with our report. DHS stated it was developing a strategic plan and a
system to measure program impact, as we recommended. State agreed with
the conclusions of the report. Both DHS and State agreed that amending
the requirement for DHS to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia
would allow time for other high-priority activities.
Background:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and gave it responsibility for visa policy.
Section 428 of the act also authorized DHS to immediately assign
personnel to Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications prior to
final adjudication, as well as the future assignment of officers to
other locations overseas to review visa applications.[Footnote 7] In
August 2003, DHS created the Office of International Enforcement within
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,[Footnote 8] to
implement these requirements. In the same month, four temporary DHS
officers were deployed to Saudi Arabia to begin reviewing all visa
applications. In September 2003, DHS and State signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to govern the implementation of section 428. This
agreement broadly defines the DHS officers' responsibilities in
reviewing visa applications, indicating, in particular, that they will:
* provide expert advice to consular officers regarding specific
security threats relating to visa adjudication, specifically by
gathering and reviewing intelligence relevant to visa adjudication and
providing training to consular officers on terrorist threats and
detecting applicant fraud;
* review applications on their own initiative or at the request of
consular officers, and provide input on or recommend security advisory
opinion requests;[Footnote 9] and:
* conduct investigations on consular matters under the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Several other agencies stationed overseas have roles in the visa
adjudication process. For example, the State Department Diplomatic
Security Bureau's regional security officers assist the consular
section by investigating passport and visa fraud detected through the
consular officers' reviews of visa applications and supporting
documents.[Footnote 10] In addition, officials from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation overseas can assist consular officers when questions
about an applicant's potential criminal history arise during
adjudication. DHS's Bureaus of Citizenship and Immigration Services and
Customs and Border Protection have responsibility for some immigration
and border security programs overseas. For example, consular officers
may seek advice from these officials on issues such as DHS procedures
at U.S. ports of entry.
In October 2003, DHS designated its Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to handle the operational and policy-making
responsibilities outlined in section 428 (e) and (i). Subsequently, ICE
created an office to oversee the Visa Security Program. Since the
assignment of VSOs to Saudi Arabia in 2003 until May 2005, DHS has
spent about $4 million for Visa Security Program operations at
headquarters and overseas, of which approximately $2 million was spent
on operations in Saudi Arabia. Figure 1 provides a timeline for the
establishment and implementation of the visa security program.
Figure 1: Establishment and Implementation of the Visa Security
Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In August 2004, the DHS Office of Inspector General reported on the
planning and implementation of the VSOs' activities in Saudi Arabia.
The report was based on observations beginning in July 2003, at which
time DHS was in the early stages of designing the Visa Security
Program.[Footnote 11] (DHS officers did not arrive in Saudi Arabia
until August 31, 2003.) According to the Inspector General, DHS
operations at the time of the review were not as efficient or effective
as they could be due to the use of temporary officers in Saudi Arabia,
a lack of specialized training and foreign language proficiency, and
the lack of a clear plan for the VSOs. The Inspector General
recommended that DHS hire permanent officers, develop a visa security
training program, and establish criteria for selecting VSOs. According
to the Inspector General's office, DHS has taken steps to implement
these recommendations, but as of July 8, 2005, six remain open.
Several Factors Have Limited the Impact of Visa Security Operations in
Saudi Arabia:
According to embassy officials in Saudi Arabia and DHS officials, the
VSOs enhance homeland security through their review of visa
applications at posts in Saudi Arabia. However, several factors have
hindered the program, including a lack of comprehensive data on the
VSOs' activities and results in Riyadh and Jeddah to demonstrate the
program's overall impact at these posts.
VSOs Provide Additional Law Enforcement Capability to the Visa Process
in Saudi Arabia:
VSOs in Saudi Arabia provide an additional law enforcement capability
to the visa adjudication process. VSOs have access to and experience
using important law enforcement information not readily available to
consular officers. Moreover, VSOs' border security and immigration
experience can assist consular officers during the visa process.
VSOs Provide Additional Review to Visa Adjudication Process:
According to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief of
mission, and DHS officials, VSOs in Saudi Arabia enhance the security
of the visa adjudication process at these consular posts. In
particular, the consular sections in Riyadh and Jeddah have
incorporated the VSOs' review of all visa applications into the
adjudication process (see fig. 2). After consular officers interview an
applicant and review the relevant supporting documentation, they make a
preliminary determination about whether to issue or refuse the visa or
refer the case to Washington for additional security clearances.
Consular officers may consult with VSOs during this initial
determination. According to the VSOs, within 24 hours of this initial
determination by consular officers, they review the application and
inspect the applicant's documentation for evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation, indicators of potential national security risks,
criminal activity, and potential illegal immigration risks. VSOs may
also query the applicant's information against a number of law
enforcement, immigration, and other databases, which may contain more
detail than the consular officers' name check results. Based on these
reviews, the VSOs will either affirm or oppose the consular officer's
original decision, and the consular officer then decides to issue or
deny the visa. If the consular section chief and the VSOs disagree on a
case, it is sent to DHS, where the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with State officials, will render a final determination.
According to a consular official in Saudi Arabia at the time of our
visit in February 2005, no case has ever been sent back to Washington
for such a decision.
Figure 2: Visa Process in Saudi Arabia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to reviewing applications, the VSOs may conduct secondary
interviews with some visa applicants based either on findings from
their application reviews or a consular officer's request. For example,
DHS officials in Riyadh reported that the VSOs, in cooperation with
intelligence officials at post, interviewed an applicant who had ties
to an organization of national security concern to the U.S. government.
This individual was denied a visa after the interview based upon the
VSO's determination of the potential threat the individual posed to the
United States. We also observed the VSOs conduct a secondary interview
with an applicant they had identified as a concern through their
physical review of the visa application.
VSOs Have Access to Law Enforcement Information Not Readily Available
to Consular Officers:
VSOs have access to and experience using immigration and law
enforcement databases not readily available to consular officers, who
are not classified as criminal justice, or law enforcement, personnel.
Consular officers rely on information contained in the Consular Lookout
and Support System (CLASS)[Footnote 12] to adjudicate a visa. As law
enforcement agents, the VSOs can access detailed criminal history
records and immigration information not included in CLASS. For example,
the VSOs have access to criminal history records contained in the
National Crime Information Center's Interstate Identification Index,
which cannot be directly accessed by consular officers.[Footnote 13]
The VSOs also use databases containing information on employers and
businesses, hotel reservation information, and sponsors of applicants
seeking temporary work visas. They can use these databases to verify,
for instance, an applicant's claim to be working for a particular
business. Consular officials at headquarters and in the field believe
this data would be useful to them in the adjudication process,
particularly at the other posts worldwide that do not have VSOs.
Indeed, consular officials in Washington indicated that they are
working with DHS to gain access to these databases.
In Riyadh, we observed a VSO assist a consular officer review a
potential "hit" in CLASS for an applicant in Riyadh. The applicant
claimed that, during a trip to the United States, border inspectors
refused him entry to the country even though he had a valid visa. At
the consular officer's request, we observed the VSO search a database
and inform the consular officer that the applicant at the window had
been placed on the "No-Fly" list[Footnote 14]--information that was not
specified in CLASS--since the issuance of the initial visa and was
therefore ineligible for another visa. In addition, the VSOs in Riyadh
conduct searches on applicants' names prior to their interviews with
consular officers and provide more detailed information on potential
matches obtained from these searches of law enforcement databases.
Consular officers indicated that this practice helps them tailor their
questioning of applicants.
Furthermore, the VSOs in Saudi Arabia interact with consular officers
on a real-time basis. We observed consular officers ask the VSOs for
assistance during interviews, for example, to clarify questions
pertaining to potential criminal hits in CLASS. By contrast, in other
embassies, consular officers must request additional information from
other DHS overseas offices or from Washington.
VSOs Provide Law Enforcement and Fraud Detection Knowledge and
Training:
According to DHS, the VSOs' law enforcement experience and training and
knowledge of immigration law enables them to more effectively identify
applicants who are potential threats to U.S. national security, as well
as identify potentially fraudulent documents submitted by applicants.
Since the Inspector General's report in 2004, DHS has developed
criteria for selecting VSOs, which includes certain levels of law
enforcement and counterterrorism experience, as well as knowledge of
immigration law and experience working overseas. In addition, VSOs have
experience and training in detecting fraudulent documents. The
Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS states that VSOs at
consular posts will provide antifraud training to consular officers,
among other things. This training is particularly useful given that
State does not have full-time fraud prevention officers at all of its
consular posts overseas, with antifraud duties often performed by
junior officers on a part-time basis.[Footnote 15] Indeed, at all but
one of the posts that have or plan to have VSOs, consular officers
served as part-time fraud prevention officers in addition to their
other duties in the consular section. Therefore, the VSOs' experience
in this area can be valuable to consular sections.
Impact of the Visa Security Program in Saudi Arabia Limited by Several
Factors:
The deputy chief of mission, consular officers, and VSOs in Saudi
Arabia indicated that the VSOs have positively impacted visa
operations; however, several issues raise concerns about the role and
impact of these officers. These include (1) the use of temporary duty
employees, which can limit the impact of the VSOs in Saudi Arabia; (2)
the lack of Arabic language proficient officers; (3) the requirement
that the officers review all visa applications, which limits their time
to perform other valuable tasks; and (4) the lack of measurable data on
the VSOs' activities, which would demonstrate their impact on the visa
process.
* From August 31, 2003, through June 2005, DHS assigned temporary duty
VSOs to Saudi Arabia for tours that varied in length between about 2
and 15 months, for an average assignment of about 7 months. According
to the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the use of temporary
VSOs led to a lack of continuity in visa security operations, and, as a
result, the VSOs initially were not able to significantly impact the
visa process at post. The constant turnover of officers can hinder the
development of institutional knowledge and overall visa security
efforts. However, the deputy chief of mission indicated that each
subsequent temporary officer improved operations in Saudi Arabia and
enhanced security of the visa adjudication process. DHS acknowledged
that the reliance on temporary detailed staff is not ideal for the
continuity of operations and the ongoing development of the Visa
Security Program. DHS officials believe that they have addressed the
situation as DHS has hired and trained four permanent employees who
were deployed to Saudi Arabia in June 2005, and will be assigned for a
12-month tour.
* Most of the VSOs stationed in Saudi Arabia since 2003 have not been
proficient Arabic speakers and, according to DHS, two of the four new
permanent staff assigned to Saudi Arabia speak Arabic. Additionally,
consuls general at three of the locations chosen for expansion told us
language proficiency would be beneficial at their posts, particularly
for interviewing applicants and reviewing applications and documents.
The ability to speak the host country language is a qualification for
VSOs, as agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding with State. DHS
acknowledged the utility of language capability, but noted that law
enforcement skills and expertise outweigh the limitations of a lack of
language proficiency. According to DHS, if language training is deemed
necessary, such courses would be offered in addition to the standard
VSO training, which includes courses on interviewing, detection of
deception, and national security law, as well as regional and country
briefings.
* The Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS states that
VSOs would provide training to consular officers on detecting
applicants who pose a threat to homeland security and fraudulent
documents; however, the requirement that VSOs review all visa
applications in Saudi Arabia limits the amount of time that they can
spend on training and other valuable services. We observed that VSOs in
Riyadh and Jeddah must spend a significant amount of time reviewing all
visa applications, including those of low-risk applicants or
individuals who do not pose a threat to national security, as well as
those that have preliminarily been refused by consular officers. For
example, according to DHS officials, lower priority applications may
include those from elderly applicants and very young children.
Furthermore, the requirement has resulted in extremely long work hours
for the VSOs. For example, to return applications to consular officers
within 24 hours of the initial decision, the three VSOs in Riyadh and
one VSO in Jeddah were each working 7 days per week at the time of our
visit. Moreover, the VSOs spend considerable time--as much as 2 hours
each day, according to one officer in Jeddah--reviewing applications
that are preliminarily refused by consular officers or from low-risk
applicants. A Visa Security Program official noted that this mandate is
only for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and not other posts
to which DHS plans to assign VSOs. At posts outside of Saudi Arabia,
DHS proposed the use of site-specific criteria to focus the review of
applications based on several factors, including the number of
applications at the post and post-specific threat assessments. VSOs,
DHS and State officials, and the deputy chief of mission all agreed
that the mandate to review all applications was forcing the VSOs to
spend time on lower priority tasks, limiting their ability to perform
other activities, such as providing training or conducting additional
secondary interviews of applicants. Consular officers also agreed that
they would benefit from additional training and other interaction with
the VSOs. According to DHS, if its VSOs were granted more flexibility
to determine the extent of their review and were not required to review
all applications, they could prioritize visa application reviews--a
process which they plan to implement at other posts. DHS acknowledged
that adding additional officers to the posts in Saudi Arabia could
allow VSOs time to perform other tasks, but DHS would still need to
prioritize these resources to address training and other activities in
Saudi Arabia. However, security concerns at the U.S. embassy and
consulate have limited the number of personnel DHS, as well as other
U.S. agencies, can assign to these posts.[Footnote 16]
* DHS has not maintained measurable data to fully demonstrate the
impact of VSOs on the visa process. The VSOs that were stationed in
Riyadh during our visit estimated that, based on their review of visa
applications, they had recommended that visas be refused after the
preliminary decision to issue a visa by consular officers in about 15
cases between October 2004 and February 2005. In addition, the DHS
officials in Saudi Arabia and in Washington, D.C., were able to provide
anecdotal examples of assistance provided to the consular officers.
However, DHS has not developed a system to fully track the results of
visa security activities in Saudi Arabia. For example, DHS could not
provide data to demonstrate the number of cases for which they have
recommended refusal.
DHS's Plans for Expansion of the Visa Security Program Delayed:
DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional posts
in fiscal year 2005; however, the assignments of VSOs were delayed at
four of the five selected expansion posts. DHS attributed the delay to
resistance by State, as well as funding problems. State and chiefs of
mission attributed the delays to various questions about the program,
including the criteria used by DHS to select expansion posts and the
reasoning for the number of VSOs requested for the posts. A strategic
plan to guide operations and expansion of the Visa Security Program
could have answered some of these questions and potentially prevented
some delays in expanding the program to additional posts, but DHS has
not prepared such a plan.
DHS's Expansion of the Visa Security Program in Fiscal Year 2005:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the assignment of DHS
officers to each diplomatic post where visas are issued to provide
expert advice and training to consular officers and review visa
applications.[Footnote 17] In 2003, a DHS working group established
criteria for ranking potential posts for the program's expansion. The
site selection criteria considered the following primary factors:
* risk of terrorism in a country based on State's threat assessments
and intelligence of terrorist activity;
* visa workload;
* visa denial rates; and:
* issuance of visas to multiple nationalities at a post.
In addition, a Visa Security Program official indicated that DHS also
considered intelligence reports and the host nation circumstances,
including government cooperation, corruption, immigration controls, and
identification document controls, when selecting potential expansion
posts. DHS conducted site assessments, in coordination with State, at
six consular posts in October and November 2003 and April 2004 to
further evaluate the potential for establishing the Visa Security
Program at these posts. According to DHS, delays in expanding the
program were due, in part, to the fact that funding was not
reprogrammed for visa security operations until December 2004.
DHS selected five posts to expand the Visa Security Program and in June
2004 submitted requests for the assignment of 21 VSO positions to five
posts. One post approved the NSDD-38 request in July 2004. Another post
approved the assignment of VSOs in March of 2005, and two posts
approved the requests in June 2005. As of June 2005, one post has still
not approved the NSDD-38 request. Four posts have approved the
assignment of VSOs at their respective posts, but DHS had not yet
assigned VSOs to any of the expansion posts.
Questions Raised by Embassy Officials Contributed to Delays of DHS
Expansion:
Embassy officials raised questions and concerns regarding the plans to
expand the Visa Security Program, which contributed to the delays in
the approval of the NSDD-38 requests. State's Office of Rightsizing the
U.S. Overseas Presence supported the posts' questions of DHS's plans
for expansion of the Visa Security Program.
Questions Raised about the Site Selection Criteria Used to Select
Expansion Posts:
Embassy officials at the expansion posts expressed concerns with the
site selection process and the criteria DHS used to select the posts,
which contributed to the delays in approving DHS's requests for VSOs.
Based on DHS's quantitative evaluation criteria used to select
expansion posts, visa issuing posts were ranked to identify priority
posts for the deployment of VSOs. However, of the 5 posts selected for
expansion of the Visa Security Program, 2 of the posts ranked outside
of the top 10 posts identified by DHS's evaluation. Moreover, embassy
officials at one of these expansion posts that did not rank in the
initial top 10 believe that DHS's selection criteria does not justify
the assignment of VSOs to their post. In particular the consular chief
stated that the post had a relatively low application volume and a low
refusal rate--two criteria that DHS used to select the fiscal year 2005
expansion posts. DHS stated that this particular post was chosen based
on other qualitative data, consultation with law enforcement and
intelligence officials, and practical considerations for expansion of
the program. These additional factors were not included in the
methodology DHS developed to identify priority posts for expansion of
the Visa Security Program. Embassy officials at 2 posts chosen for
expansion were unaware of the criteria used to select the expansion
posts; however, DHS stated that they had explained their criteria.
Embassy officials also questioned the reasoning behind the number of
VSOs that DHS requested for assignment to the selected expansion posts.
In June 2004, DHS originally requested the assignment of 21 VSO
positions to 5 posts. According to DHS, the request for the number of
VSOs at each post was based on the assessment of several factors
including the workload at post. However, chiefs of mission and consular
officials also told us that they were unclear about the number of VSOs
required for visa security operations and requested for assignment. DHS
officials stated that they had explained their rationale fully. As of
June 2005, four posts had approved the assignment of 13 VSO positions.
Table 1 shows the number of VSO positions requested compared to the
number of VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission.
Table 1: Visa Security Program Expansion:
Location: Post 1;
Date of NSDD-38 request: June 2004;
Date of approval: July 2004;
VSO positions requested by DHS: 5;
VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission: 4.
Location: Post 2;
Date of NSDD-38 request: June 2004;
Date of approval: March 2005;
VSO positions requested by DHS: 5;
VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission: 3.
Location: Post 3;
Date of NSDD-38 request: June 2004;
Date of approval: Not yet approved;
VSO positions requested by DHS: 4;
VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission: 0.
Location: Post 4;
Date of NSDD-38 request: June 2004;
Date of approval: June 2005;
VSO positions requested by DHS: 3;
VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission: 3.
Location: Post 5;
Date of NSDD-38 request: June 2004;
Date of approval: June 2005;
VSO positions requested by DHS: 4;
VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission: 3.
Total;
VSO positions requested by DHS: 21;
VSO positions approved by chiefs of mission: 13.
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
Note: Table 1 shows VSO positions and administrative support positions
approved as of June 2005.
[End of table]
DHS received approval for 8 fewer VSO positions than it requested, and
received the full complement of staff requested at one expansion post.
This gap in approving the assignment of VSOs indicates that DHS either
overestimated the staff it needed to conduct activities at each post or
will not have enough staff at each post to effectively impact the visa
adjudication process at these locations.
DHS negotiated the final number of positions with chiefs of mission at
several posts to help expedite the NSDD-38 requests. For example, DHS
and embassy officials at one post agreed to reduce the number of
positions requested from 5 to 3; subsequently, the NSDD-38 request was
approved in March 2005. The deputy chief of mission and consul general
at another embassy noted that DHS's request for four VSOs appeared
excessive, considering the low volume of visas that are processed at
that post, which conducts about 30 to 40 applicant interviews daily,
and that there are only four consular officers stationed at the post.
Therefore, the embassy approved two VSOs in June 2005. The post that
has not approved DHS's request as of June 2005 proposed that DHS assign
not four but one VSO for a 6-month assignment. According to the chief
of mission, during this time, the VSO could demonstrate how the program
would benefit the post, as well as the need for the additional
positions DHS requested. DHS officials, however, believe that one
officer would not be sufficient to meet the threat to visa security at
the post.
Office of Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas Presence Supports Questions of
DHS's Expansion Plans:
As we have previously reported, questions related to (1) security of
facilities and employees, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and
(3) cost of operations should be addressed when determining the
appropriate number of staff that should be assigned to a U.S.
embassy.[Footnote 18] In August 2004, State's Office of Rightsizing the
U.S. Overseas Presence,[Footnote 19] which manages the NSDD-38 process
for the U.S. government, issued interim guidance to chiefs of mission
regarding factors to consider when approving DHS's requests for VSOs. A
Rightsizing Office official stated that this guidance is consistent
with guidance that is applicable to all agencies that submit NSDD-38
requests. Specifically, the cable advised the five chiefs of mission at
posts selected for VSO expansion to delay approving the DHS positions
until State or the post had received sufficient responses to several
outstanding issues, including:
* criteria for selecting the expansion posts;
* agreement on administrative support services, such as building
maintenance, utilities, supplies, and equipment, among others;
* the extent to which the VSOs will have regional responsibilities at
other embassies or consulates;
* the roles and responsibilities of the VSOs in relation to State's
consular fraud investigators and regional security officers at post, as
well as any other agencies at post; and:
* the criteria that will be used to measure the effectiveness of the
visa security operations.
In 2004 and 2005, DHS provided responses, through State's Bureau of
Consular Affairs, to the questions raised by the chiefs of mission at
four of the expansion posts. According to DHS, the responses were
sufficient to answer the concerns raised by the chiefs of mission. We
reviewed the responses to the posts, and identified a number of issues
that had not been fully addressed. For example, the documentation did
not specify the criteria that DHS will use to demonstrate the
effectiveness of its officers. Nevertheless, the chiefs of mission at
three posts approved NSDD-38 requests in March and June 2005.
DHS Lacks a Strategic Plan to Guide Operations and Expansion of the
Visa Security Program:
In 2003, DHS and State agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding that DHS
would identify those diplomatic and consular posts where DHS considered
the presence of its personnel necessary to perform visa security
functions and would subsequently assign VSOs to those posts. DHS plans
to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional consular posts
throughout fiscal year 2005. Furthermore, DHS plans to expand the Visa
Security Program beyond the posts initially selected for expansion,
conducted a site assessment in May 2005 for a sixth expansion location,
and plans to continue deployment of VSOs to attain worldwide coverage
of the program. According to DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security
has suggested a pace of five new posts per year.
Although DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program in fiscal year
2005 and beyond, it does not a have a strategic plan[Footnote 20] that
defines mission priorities and long-term goals and identifies the
outcomes expected at each post to guide operations of the program. We
have identified the development of a strategic plan as an essential
component of measuring progress and holding agencies accountable for
achieving results.[Footnote 21] The development of an overall strategic
plan for the Visa Security Program prior to the expansion of the
program may have addressed the questions initially raised by State and
embassy officials that led to the delay of the assignment of VSOs.
Moreover, a strategic plan would provide a framework for DHS to address
broader questions regarding the selection criteria for expansion, the
roles and responsibilities of VSOs, and the cost of establishing the
program at posts. In addition, a strategic plan would guide rightsizing
analyses to determine the appropriate number of VSOs at each post.
Officials from DHS and State, as well as consular officials we
contacted overseas, all agreed that the development of such a plan
would be useful to guide visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and
other posts. It would also be useful to inform the Congress, as well as
State and other agencies who participate in the visa process at
consular posts overseas.
Furthermore, as a key stakeholder in the Visa Security Program, State
should be consulted in the strategic planning process and, therefore,
the concerns and questions raised by State's Office of Rightsizing the
U.S. Overseas Presence and chiefs of mission should be addressed by
DHS. Moreover, without a strategic plan that serves as a roadmap for
expansion, DHS may continue to experience delays in the approval of
NSDD-38 requests at future expansion posts.
Conclusions:
The placement of VSOs overseas has the potential to improve the
security of the visa process at U.S. embassies and consulates. However,
the congressional mandate requiring the VSOs in Saudi Arabia to review
all applications prior to adjudication limits them from engaging in
other counterterrorism activities, such as providing additional
training to consular officers on fraud prevention and interview
techniques. Moreover, DHS has not incorporated key features of strong
program management essential to measuring program results and holding
staff accountable for achieving results into its oversight of the Visa
Security Program. Before DHS expands this program to other consular
posts, it needs a plan outlining its goals and objectives to allow the
department to measure program performance and determine the overall
value of its visa security operations worldwide. Such a plan needs to
address questions from the chiefs of mission who must approve the
assignment of VSOs to U.S. embassies or consulates. Addressing these
questions would help facilitate negotiations of the expansion of the
Visa Security Program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that the Visa Security Program, and its expansion to
other locations worldwide, is managed effectively, we recommend that
the Secretary of Homeland Security:
* develop a strategic plan, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, to guide visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and in other
embassies and consulates overseas. This plan should incorporate the key
elements of strategic planning, including a mission statement, program
goals and objectives, approaches to achieving those goals, a connection
between the long-term and short-term goals, and a description of how
the effectiveness of the program will be evaluated. In addition, DHS
should include or develop supporting documents that provide more
specific information on the criteria used to select the locations for
expansion, justification for the number of VSOs at each post, the roles
and responsibilities of the VSOs in relation to other agencies located
at post, and the resources needed to establish the Visa Security
Program overseas.
* develop performance data that can be used to assess the results of
the Visa Security Program at each post.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Congress may wish to consider amending current legislation, which
requires that VSOs in Saudi Arabia review all visa applications prior
to adjudication, to provide DHS the flexibility to determine the extent
to which VSOs review applications, based upon the development of a risk-
assessment tool. This flexibility will allow them to engage in other
activities that will provide additional benefit to consular officers
and the visa process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DHS and State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see
apps. II and III).
DHS stated it was taking actions to implement performance measurements
and a strategic plan for the Visa Security Program, as described in our
recommendations. DHS indicated that it is expanding the tracking and
measurement of performance data to better reflect program results. In
addition, DHS stated it is developing a strategic plan that will
integrate the key elements described in our recommendation; however,
DHS stated that it was unlikely that such a plan would have aided in
the approval of the NSDD-38 requests at the five expansion posts. We
believe that a strategic plan would allow DHS to better address
questions about the program and would be useful in guiding visa
security operations in Saudi Arabia and other consular posts. Regarding
the matter for congressional consideration to provide DHS with the
flexibility to determine the review of visa applications in Saudi
Arabia, DHS agreed that it needed to expand some of the VSOs'
activities in Saudi Arabia, such as providing additional training,
which we found were not being provided because of the volume of work
that resulted from fulfilling the legislative requirement. DHS noted
that a legislative change should maintain DHS's authority and
discretion in determining the scope of the VSOs' review. DHS also
provided additional details on the Visa Security Program, its plans to
improve operations, and its interaction with State regarding program
expansion. These comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our
analysis. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated
into the report, as appropriate.
State agreed with our conclusions, stating that the report is an
accurate description of the implementation of the Visa Security
Program. In addition, State agreed with our matter for congressional
consideration. State noted that the ability of the VSOs in Saudi Arabia
to access law enforcement and other databases not available to consular
officers highlights the importance of shared, interoperable databases
worldwide. With regard to the program's expansion outside Saudi Arabia,
State also noted that chiefs of mission and its Rightsizing Office are
obligated to ensure that staffing overseas for all agencies is at the
proper level and consistent with available space and resources. State's
comments are reprinted in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security, and to other interested Members of Congress. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4128 or [Hyperlink, fordj@gao.gov]. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jon Kyl:
Chairman:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Cox:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John N. Hostettler:
Chairman:
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Visa Security Officers' activities in Saudi Arabia, we
reviewed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which authorized DHS to
create the Visa Security Program. In addition, we reviewed the
subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and
DHS regarding the implementation of the requirements set forth in
section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. We also reviewed a prior
report from August 2004 on DHS's implementation of section 428
requirements, conducted by the DHS Office of Inspector General, and
spoke with the Inspector General officials who conducted that review.
We interviewed officials from DHS who manage the Visa Security Program
in Washington, D.C., as well as officials from State's Bureau of
Consular Affairs and the Office of Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas
Presence. Moreover, we observed the VSOs' activities in Riyadh and
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and interviewed the VSOs, as well as consular
officials and the chief of mission, regarding the impact of the Visa
Security Program at these posts.
To assess DHS's plans to expand the Visa Security Program to consular
posts outside Saudi Arabia, we reviewed documentation on the
department's requests to establish new positions at 5 additional posts
and spoke with DHS officials regarding the planned expansion. In
addition, we reviewed DHS's criteria for selecting VSOs and the
criteria and methodology for selecting expansion posts. We also
compared DHS's management strategy for the Visa Security Program and
its expansion with criteria from the Government Performance and Results
Act and associated GAO reports on performance-based, strategic
planning. In addition, we visited two of the five posts to which DHS
plans to expand the Visa Security Program and interviewed consular and
embassy officials, including the chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission,
at these locations to discuss these posts' plans for the VSOs. We also
spoke with officials from other law enforcement agencies at post who
work with the consular section. Further, we spoke with the consuls
general from the other three posts initially chosen for expansion in
fiscal year 2005 to discuss the status of DHS plans to expand to these
locations. We conducted our evaluation from August 2004 to June 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Office of the Assistant Secretary:
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
425 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20536:
July 15, 2005:
Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: GAO Report - Job Code 320352, DHS Visa Security Program:
On behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security; I would like to thank
you for your report entitled Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of
Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program." Given the
Secretary's authority over visa issuance under Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act, the security of the visa process is one of the
Department's highest priorities.
We are pleased that e GAO has recognized the benefits to national
security provided b DHS' Visa Security Program (VSP). In particular,
the GAO has recognized the unique and complementary expertise; that a
DHS law enforcement officer provides in the visa process. The
observations cited in your report -the real-time interaction between
Visa Security Officers (VSOs) and consular officers throughout the
adjudication process, the advice provided by VSOs to consular officers,
and the investigative expertise demonstrated by VSOs in resolving
complex cases - speak to the powerful partnership of DHS and State in
visa issuance. We are confident that the positive impact of this
partnership will increase as DHS expands this program to additional
locations.
Most critically, the Visa Security Program increases the security of
the United States by identifying the not yet known threats to national
security who attempt to exploit the visa process. The traditional
screening systems, which include "name checks" of applicants against
various watch lists and law enforcement databases, have provided an
essential security foundation. However, by integrating DHS law
enforcement through the VSP, we add a powerful and necessary human
investigative capability that allows the United States to move well
beyond "name checks" to focus on identifying new threats long before
they reach U.S. borders. This capability, when combined with DHS'
security mandate and unique statutory authority, makes the VSP an
essential component of DHS' strategy of layered, risk-based defenses.
The integration and expansion of databases and automated screening
systems is necessary for homeland security, but not sufficient to
identify threats that are not yet known. We support the expanded
sharing of information between all appropriate U.S. personnel involved
in screening activities. We caution, however, that no amount of
automation can replace the skill, judgment, and expertise of a
seasoned, professional law enforcement officer with a focused mission
and the unique authority to ensure the security of visa issuance from
ever-changing threats.
Effective performance measurement is the cornerstone of strong program
management, Our systems and mechanisms for recording and reporting
performance-related data are continually improving and will further
demonstrate that visa issuance is more secure because of DHS' unique
enforcement capability and national security role. We are expanding the
tracking and measurement of performance outcomes to reflect the full
set of the VSP's functional responsibilities: investigations, vetting
of visa applicants, advising and training of consular officers, and
other important law enforcement activities.
Accordingly, the VSP's performance metrics will not, based on a single
factor, overturn a consular officer's recommendation. Given our
collaborative operational approach, we seek to achieve consensus and
minimize the number of times DES "overrules" the Department of State.
Success must be measured through DHS' ability to generate additional
enforcement value from the visa process, rising such indicators as:
generation of new lookouts; denial of visas to ineligible applicants;
identification of terrorist and criminal threats, trends, and tactics;
initiation of criminal investigations; delivery of training; and other
enforcement-related activities.
As described in the ICE Strategic Plan, the Visa Security Program is an
important tool in ICE's efforts to "prevent exploitation of our customs
and immigration systems" (Goal 2). Specifically, the VSP focuses on
preventing "terrorists and other criminals from obtaining visas" to
enter the United States. The additional strategic elements we have
worked to develop include our vision for the program's expansion,
specific strategic objectives, performance measures, and other
important factors. ICE is integrating these elements into a more
detailed, initiative-specific strategic plan, which will be a valuable
management tool to be shared with our stakeholders. Though useful for
communications purposes, it is unlikely such a plan would have aided
the approval of our NSDD-38s, considering ICE has consulted with the
State Department on this program during the past two years.
ICE has the highest standards for personnel selection, and those
selected as Visa Security Officers are among the best the U.S.
government has to offer for this mission. We are proud of our officers'
exemplary performance and the strong, collaborative relationships they
have developed at their posts, as noted by GAO throughout this report.
In this context, foreign language capability is one qualification for
DHS officers assigned overseas, but it is not the only one. Our
staffing decisions reflect careful consideration of the full law
enforcement needs at each location. We are confident that the
considerable benefit of DHS' presence to law enforcement, in terms of
national security an investigative expertise, outweighs any perceived
constraint related to language ability's effect on conducting
enforcement activity. We also note that our selection criteria are
consistent with those of other law enforcement and government entities
operating overseas. Like all federal agencies. ICE will continue to
increase its number of foreign language-capable personnel overseas, but
we will not compromise the high standards Visa Security Officers must
meet to succeed in this mission.
There also is a need for streamlined communication and coordination
channels for the NSDD-38 recess. DHS has coordinated closely with State
on this initiative since March 2003, starting with a comprehensive
Memorandum of Understanding that established guidelines for assignment
of DHS personnel overseas, their duties once assigned, and the
interactions and authorities they have with respect to consular
officers and the visa process. Subsequently, DHS consulted State and
other agencies' officials, both domestically and abroad, in the
selection of posts for further deployment. Only after that extensive
consultation process did DHS formally submit NSDD-38 requests for
deployment to additional locations, which then were followed by
extensive communication throughout 2004 and 2005, as noted by GAO.
Despite these efforts, we have observed that the NSDD-38 process often
leads to a lack of communication between U.S. agencies and chiefs of
tnission, thus delaying the progress of important security initiatives.
We believe the most appropriate and effective NSDD-38 process is that
which facilitates open, direct, and expeditions dialogue between
Departments and provides the Chief of Mission with sufficient
information to evaluate agencies' carefully considered NSDD-38s. We
will continue to work with all stakeholders to encourage two-way
communication as we expand this important program.
Finally, your report highlights for Congressional consideration the
potential amendment of Section 428(i) of the Homeland Security Act.
GAO's stated rationale for this change is to allow DHS officers to
expand their capacity to perform all Section 428 functions, including
investigations and additional training for consular officers. We agree
these. important activities should be expanded. It is the position of
DHS that any legislative amendment to Section 428(i) should emphasize
the importance of each of these functions, and clearly maintains DHS'
authority and discretion in determining this scope of its operational
activities. We look forward to working with the Congress this issue.
We appreciate the dedication of you and your staff in compiling this
important report. Enclosed are comments specific to the GAO's findings
and recommendations, including general and technical comments regarding
statements that need to be clarified prior to finalization of this
report. If we can offer any further assistance, please contact
Stephanie Jones-Hampton, ICE OI GAO Coordinator, at (202) 305-0513.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael J. Garcia:
Assistant Secretary:
DHS General and Technical Comments to Draft GAO Report - 320352 General
Comments:
Incomplete/"Anecdotal" Performance Data:
p. 1, first sentence under "What GAO Found" "however, no data exists to
demonstrate the VSOs' impact."
This should read "however, incomplete data exists to demonstrate the
VSOs' impact." Otherwise, this statement is inconsistent with GAO's
findings throughout the report that "..DHS does not maintain
comprehensive data on the results of their activities, and thus is
unable to fully demonstrate the program's overall impact." [emphasis
added]
p. 4, under "Results in Brief: "The VSOs in Saudi Arabia provided
anecdotal evidence of their contributions to the visa process.."
We do not support GAO's use of the term "anecdotal." DHS maintains
official, formalized documentation of its visa applicant review,
training. and investigative activities through several official systems
of record, including weekly operational reports, reports of
investigation in TECS, and a workload tracking database. Some of this
information, such as examples of the operational reports, was provided
to GAO. Other evidence, such as that relating to ongoing
investigations, was described but not provided due to its law
enforcement sensitivity. DHS is currently expanding other efforts, such
as with our workload tracking database, to enable more comprehensive
performance measurement of the full range of VSP program activities and
outcomes. Regardless, there is clear evidence that significantly more
documentation of the program's impact exists than has been given credit
here.
p. 4, under "Results in Brief" "..however DHS does not maintain
comprehensive data on the results of their activities such as the
number of cases for which they recommended fusal, and thus is unable to
fully demonstrate the VSOs' impact."
p. 16, first bullet: "VSOs .. had recommended that visas be refused in
about 15 cases between October 2004 and February 2005."
This statistic refers to the number of times VSOs have formally
"overruled" consular officers, not the number of times VSOs have
recommended denial. Recommended denials occur on a daily basis.
However, sine recommended denials can happen at any point during the
visa process, they are more difficult to track and measure. We have
unproved our approach for measuring these recommendations and will be
collecting much more accurate data in this area.
p. 9, first paragraph, "..several factors have hindered the program,
including a lack of comprehensive data.."
This appears to be an error in syntax. A lack of comprehensive data
does not hinder the program, but may hinder the ability to fully
measure performance. We suggest a clarification in this language to
reflect that performance measurement is hindered.
DHS Role/Agencies' Roles:
p. 6, under Background, first sentence, "The Homeland Security Act-gave
it a role in the visa process."
p.7, first paragraph, "Several other agencies stationed overseas have
roles in the visa adjudication process."
More precisely, the Act made DHS responsible for visa policy and
related guidance and regulations. Specifically, Section 428(b)(1)
states that the Secretary "shall be vested exclusively with all
authorities to issue regulations with respect to, administer, and
enforce the provisions of such Act, and of all other immigration and
nationality laws, relating to the functions of consular officers of the
United States in connection with the granting and refusal of visas...".
It also assigned DHS a specific operational role, implemented through
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Visa Security Program.
VSP's operational role is unique in the visa process worldwide,
providing law enforcement resources dedicated entirely to the single
mission of visa security, as achieved through the vetting of visa
applicants, investigations, and the delivery of advice and training to
consular officers.
VSOs' Capability:
p. 9, second paragraph, "VSOs in Saudi Arabia provide an additional law
enforcement capability to the visa adjudication process."
p. 9, second paragraph, "Moreover, VSOs' border security and
immigration experience can assist consular officers during the visa
process."
VSOs provide a unique and dedicated law enforcement capability focused
entirely on visa security as the front line of homeland security. Such
capability does not otherwise exist in Saudi Arabia or at any other
posts globally. The VSOs' law enforcement expertise, sophisticated
understanding of immigration law, and experience with the spectrum of
border security functions qualifies them for the breadth of their
operational duties-the vetting of visa applicants, investigations, and
providing advice and training to consular officers. In addition to
enhancing security, these dedicated resources yield other benefits: for
example, according to Department of State statistics, the average
processing time for the visa adjudication at the Saudi posts has
improved dramatically, in part because VSOs have been able to resolve
outstanding questions about individual visa applicants, enabling swift
resolution on cases that would have lagged for weeks or months.
Number of VSOs in Saudi/Security Concerns:
p. 5, top paragraph, last sentence: "Moreover, physical security
concerns ... limit the number of personnel..."
p. 15, last sentence, "However, security concerns at the U.S. embassy
and consulate have limited the number of personnel DHS, as well as
other U.S. agencies, can assign to these posts."
p. 15, near the top, "...the 3 VSOs in Riyadh and 1 VSO in Jeddah were
each working 7 days per week at the time of our visit."
In Spring 2004, because of security concerns, State issued an ordered
departure, which reduced the staff levels of all agencies; it reduced
VSP's staff level from six to four. Since that time, according to data
from the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), consular visa activity
now is up over 50% year-over-year for the recent two-month period.
State has filled several of its vacated consular positions since the
ordered departure. DHS has requested that we be allowed to fill the two
vacant VSO positions so that DHS may reasonably accomplish its critical
security mandate given the substantial workload increase.
Use of Temporary Detail (TDY) Officers:
* p. 4, under "Results in Brief": "Since the initial deployment... DHS
assigned temporary officers to the posts in Saudi Arabia for tours that
tasted between 2 and 15 months, which initially hindered continuity in
operations."
The cited observation that temporary deployments led to "constant
turnover" that hindered continuity in operations reflects the program's
initial start-up phase in late 2003. It must be noted that over the
last 18 months, officer assignments have been long-term and stable.
Since January 2004, ICE has minimized turnover by deploying officers on
long- term assignments of approximately 6 to 12 months. Our permanent
officers are now assigned for 12-month tours, consistent with DOS
policy that applies to all U.S. government personnel assigned to Saudi
Arabia.
NSDD-38 Delays/DOS Questions:
p. 5, middle paragraph, "DHS planned to expand the Visa Security
Program to five locations in fiscal year 2005 ... however, chiefs of
mission at the posts chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 told us
that they delayed approval ... questions about the program's goals,
objectives, and staffing requirements, as well as DRS' plans to
coordinate with existing law enforcement... "
p. 16, second paragraph, "The State Department and chiefs of mission
attributed the delays to various questions about the program, including
the criteria used by DHS to select expansion..."
p. 5, middle paragraph, "According to DHS officials, the department
provided sufficient responses throughout 2004 and 2005 to answer the
concerns raised by chiefs of mission." p. 17, bottom, "Embassy
officials raised questions and concerns.... State's Office of
Rightsizing supported the posts' questions of DHS' plans for
expansion..."
p. 18, top, "Embassy officials at the expansion posts expressed
concerns with the site selection process and criteria used to select
the posts..."
p. 18, second paragraph, "Embassy officials also questioned the
reasoning behind the number of VSOs that DHS requested for assignment
to the selected expansion posts...
p. 20, bottom, and p. 21 top, "In 2004 and 2005, DHS provided
responses, through State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, to the questions
raised by the chiefs of mission... According to DHS, the responses were
sufficient...."
Since the Department's inception in March 2003 through the present, DHS
has worked extremely closely with State to develop and implement all of
the responsibilities of Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act.
This effort began with the development of a comprehensive Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between DHS and State that was intended to
establish the detailed blueprint for implementation of each
Department's roles, responsibilities, and authorities. The development
process for this MOU took approximately six months and involved very
close coordination between DHS and State, culminating in a detailed, 19-
page MOU that was signed by Secretaries Ridge and Powell in September
2003. Included in this MOU are the roles of VSOs and Consular Officers,
the processes and mechanisms for expanding VSO deployment,
qualifications for visa security officers, and other considerations. In
joint DHS-DOS testimony before Congress on September 30, 2003,
Assistant Secretary Harty of the Bureau of Consular Affairs stated that
"the MOU establishes guidelines for assignment of DHS personnel at our
missions abroad, their duties once assigned, and the interactions and
authorities they will have with consular officers and the visa process
once they arrive overseas." In this testimony, she also attributes the
length of time taken to develop this detailed MOU to the desire to "get
it right the first time."
Pursuant to the MOU, DHS began an in-depth quantitative and qualitative
evaluation process to determine locations for future expansion. As GAO
notes, this process began with a matrix of quantitative data, which
helped DHS narrow the field of locations to further evaluate. DHS then
considered qualitative data, including intelligence, additional risk
factors, existing DHS overseas staffing, other agency perspectives, and
practical and logistical considerations. DHS and State jointly
conducted site assessments, where the DHS-DOS assessment teams
consulted with Chiefs of Mission, consular officials, administrative
officials, and other agencies at post. The purpose of these visits was
to collect additional qualitative information relevant to final
deployment determinations, provide additional information to embassy
officials regarding program objectives, and respond to any questions or
concerns. After that process was complete, DHS, in consultation with
State, selected the "top five" locations for deployment. These are the
five locations referenced in this report. DHS made its official
homeland security determination under Section 428, and DHS sent the
NSDD-38s in June 2004. All told, this in-depth, consultative selection
process lasted approximately seven months.
Over the next year, DHS again worked closely with DOS officials to
provide as much information as possible in response to additional
inquiries surrounding our NSDD-38s. In response to these issues, State
requested DHS and DOS develop a second Memorandum of Understanding
regarding implementation of Section 428. DHS complied and jointly
drafted another MOU with State, which was finalized in November 2004.
As a result, the DOS Office of Rightsizing followed its original August
2004 cable, which had advised Chiefs of Mission to delay approval of
our NSDD-38's, with a November 2004 worldwide cable advising that posts
should now "respond expeditiously to these pending NSDD-38 requests."
As noted by GAO, we were approved for additional locations in March and
June of 2005. We have provided GAO with a detailed record of our
documented interactions and communication efforts during these 12
months.
As stated in our official response, we believe that the process for
evaluating NSDD-38s needs to be significantly streamlined in order to
promote direct dialogue and minimize the need for agencies to respond
to multiple requests for similar information. Such a streamlined
process would clarify State's needs and concerns upfront, provide
appropriate opportunities for agencies to respond, and allow swift
resolution. We will continue to exercise every effort to keep all
parties as informed as possible regarding the Visa Security Program.
Determination of Number of VSOs:
p. 18, second paragraph, "Embassy officials also questioned the
reasoning behind the number of VSOs that DHS requested for assignment
to the selected expansion posts...
p. 19, first paragraph, "...will not have enough staff at each post to
effectively impact the visa adjudication process at these locations."
p. 19, second paragraph, "DHS negotiated the final number of
positions...
p. 19, second paragraph, "The deputy chief of mission and consul
general at another embassy noted that DHS' request for four VSOs
appeared excessive, considering the low volume of visas that are
processed at that post, which conducts about 30 to 40 applicant
interviews daily ..." [consider technical edit - they actually approved
three.]
DHS bases its determinations of the size of each location footprint
based on a case-by-case assessment of the magnitude and nature of the
work to be performed at each post. Considering that VSP's functional
responsibilities involve vetting of visa applicants, providing training
and advice, and initiating investigations, the size and nature of visa
workload is one of several factors. Furthermore, the nature of VSP
operations involves taking an active, day-to-day role in the visa
adjudication process, partnering with Consular Officers to add an
additional enforcement dimension. This generally warrants a contingent
of at least three officers at a given location (or more if deemed
necessary) to ensure an appropriate skill mix and ensure continuity of
operations. (We note that GAO's observation of the high workload
demands on our diminished staff of four officers in Saudi Arabia
supports our original threat and workload assessment in requesting a
total of six officers at those two posts.) We recognize that there may
be instances in which DHS' determination of the threat at a particular
location is different from that of other officials. However, we believe
strongly that these determinations, which are strictly guided by a
homeland security perspective, reflect the intent of DHS' statutory
authority under Section 428. We have welcomed each opportunity to share
our rationale in making these determinations, and we are confident that
as our operational presence expands, so too will the understanding of
this unique mission.
Legislative Change:
* p. 6, second paragraph, "We are also including a matter for
congressional consideration..."
* p. 23, under "Matter for Congressional Consideration..."
* p. 23, last sentence, "This flexibility will allow them to engage in
other activities that will provide additional benefit to consular
officers and the visa process."
As indicated in our official response, DHS agrees with GAO's
observation that it would be beneficial for VSOs in Saudi Arabia to
have more flexibility to prioritize their activities, which is
currently constrained due to the requirement to review all visa
applications. It is the position of DHS that any legislative amendment
to Section 428(i) must emphasize the importance of each of these
functions and must maintain DHS' authority and discretion in
determining the scope of its operational activities.
IG Report:
p. 8, last sentence, "According to the Inspector General's office, DHS
has taken steps to implement these recommendations, but as of July 8,
2005, six remain open."
Though some recommendations from this initial report remain open, the
IG designated all of them "resolved" at the time of publication in
August 2004 (meaning the IG validated the approach and progress made in
those areas), and we expect the remaining six recommendations to be
formally closed shortly.
Name Checks/Systems Access:
p. 9, last paragraph, "VSOs may also query the applicant's information
against a number of law enforcement ... databases, which may contain
more detail than the consular officers' name check results."
p. 11, "VSOs Have Access to Law Enforcement Information Not Readily
Available to Consular Officers"
p. 12, second paragraph, "In addition, the VS Os in Riyadh conduct
searches on applicants' names prior to their interviews with consular
officers and provide more detailed information on potential matches
obtained from these searches of law enforcement databases."
It is important to note that the VSOs' work in this regard is of an
investigative nature and is more sophisticated than a simple name
check. Name checks, through such automated screening systems as CLASS,
are intended to identify known threats based on specific biographic
information and predefined rules. Above and beyond this, VSOs conduct
investigative research on the applicant and his/her businesses,
associates, sponsors, and addresses, and any other relevant information
to assemble a complete picture in order to determine whether the
applicant presents a potential threat to the United States. Critically,
this activity often yields new information that is not yet a part of
government databases and watch lists. In this light, simply citing
"access to information not readily available to consular officers"
mischaracterizes the professional skill involved in researching and
evaluating this type of information, and perpetuates a mistaken premise
that "access to additional systems" without requisite professional
expertise can sufficiently address vulnerabilities in visa security. In
order to fully address these homeland security vulnerabilities, we must
be able to identify all threats beyond basic screening and pursue all
appropriate enforcement beyond a visa denial.
Saudi Process:
* p. 10, Figure 2.
For the reasons stated above with respect to the nature of VSO vetting,
we suggest modifying the box in the lower left-hand corner, "VSOs in
Riyadh conduct some name checks..." to "VSOs in Riyadh conduct
applicant vetting."
Site Selection:
Program, two of the posts ranked outside of the top 10 posts identified
by DHS' evaluation."
The characterization of DHS' evaluation process is inaccurate. DHS'
methodology involved two stages: quantitative analysis followed by
qualitative analysis. The initial quantitative analysis examined a
series of standard workload and enforcement data related to a number of
evaluation criteria and was intended to develop a "short list" of posts
for further evaluation. GAO's statement on page 18 of the report
implies that quantitative analysis was the conclusion of the DHS'
analysis, when in fact it was the initiation of DHS' analysis. Since a
simple numerical formula based on available data cannot accurately
capture the full risk picture, a more sophisticated qualitative
analysis followed. This stage involved collecting and evaluating
additional information sources, interagency consultation, the review of
intelligence reports, consideration of existing DHS overseas staffing,
and practical and logistical considerations. Based on this additional
information, DHS, in consultation with State, made its final
selections. This is consistent with DHS' authority in Section 428 and
the MOU with State. State officials were consulted throughout this
process, and DHS was not made aware of any objections until after DHS
submitted the NSDD-38s.
* p. 18, first paragraph, "In particular the consular chief stated that
the post had a relatively low application volume and a low refusal
rate..."
In DHS' assessment, low application volume and low refusal rate do not
necessarily translate into low threat. We stand by our determination.
Strategic Plan:
p. 21, bottom paragraph, "Although DHS plans to expand the Visa
Security Program in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, it does not a have a
strategic plan..."
p. 21, bottom paragraph, p. 22, top, "The development of an overall
strategic plan ... may have addressed the questions initially raised by
State and embassy officials that led to the delay of the assignment of
VSOs."
p. 22, second paragraph, "Furthermore... the concerns and questions
raised by State's Office of Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas Presence and
chiefs of mission should be addressed by DHS. Further, without a
strategic plan that serves as a roadmap for expansion, DHS may continue
to experience delays in the approval of NSDD-38 requests at future
expansion posts."
p. 22, bottom paragraph, "Before DHS expands this program to other
consular posts, it needs a plan outlining its goals and objectives ...
Such a plan needs to address questions from the chiefs of mission who
must approve the assignment of VSOs to U.S. embassies or consulates,
and would help facilitate negotiations of the expansion of the Visa
Security Program."
DHS has already developed many if not most of the components of a
strategic plan for the Visa Security Program, including our mission,
strategic objectives, approach to risk management, planning and
budgeting estimates, optimal performance measures, and other key
elements. We strongly agree with GAO that these pieces need to be
integrated into a strategic plan and are working toward that end. We do
not, however, share GAO's belief that a strategic plan will minimize
future delays to VSP implementation. The mission, goals, and objectives
of the VSP have been clear to State since the signing of the September
2003 MOU. We believe that the process for NSDD-38 review has been
unnecessarily delayed. These delays have prevented the VSP from the
timely expansion that is needed to mitigate urgent threats. Unless
addressed, we expect such delays to continue.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated July 15, 2005.
GAO Comments:
1. We revised the highlights page to reflect that no comprehensive data
exists to demonstrate the impact of the VSOs in Saudi Arabia.
2. We requested documentation from DHS on the visa application reviews
conducted by VSOs in Saudi Arabia. DHS provided weekly operational
reports that contained descriptive examples of the reviews of visa
applications and the outcomes of those reviews. DHS did not provide
systematic data on the operations of the VSOs, and VSOs in Saudi Arabia
stated that they did not have a system in place to track the activities
of the program. The steps DHS describes appear to be positive steps to
incorporate performance measurement into the Visa Security Program, and
to implement a workload tracking database. We believe these actions
should allow DHS to better demonstrate program results and are
consistent with our recommendation.
3. We revise the report to clarify that VSOs may recommend a refusal
after a preliminary determination to issue the visa by a consular
officer. We agree that there might be additional cases where VSOs may
influence the decision of consular officers. We believe it is important
to measure other outcomes that demonstrate the impact of the Visa
Security Program. Furthermore, we believe that it is not difficult to
track additional data, and such performance measures should be
incorporated into the tracking system for VSO activities.
4. We do not agree that the statement was an error in syntax. We
believe that performance measurement is an integral part of effective
program management, and the lack of comprehensive data on program
impact has hindered the Visa Security Program. Performance data could
be used to demonstrate the effectiveness of operations in Saudi Arabia,
as well as to illustrate the benefits of the program when presenting
the benefits of the program to interested parties, including chiefs of
mission at future expansion posts and the Congress.
5. In August 2004, the DHS Office of Inspector General found that the
continued use of temporary officers to fill VSO positions was not
conducive to developing an effective or efficient long-term visa
security operation. In addition, in February 2005, the deputy chief of
mission in Saudi Arabia told us that the use of temporary VSOs led to a
lack of continuity in operations, and that the VSOs initially were not
able to significantly impact the visa process at post. Our report
recognized that DHS assigned permanent officers to Saudi Arabia in June
2005.
6. We revised the figure to reflect that VSOs also conduct
investigative research on visa applicants in addition to conducting
name checks.
7. Our report noted that, in addition to the quantitative data used as
preliminary selection criteria, DHS stated it used qualitative data and
other practical considerations in choosing the posts. DHS did not
provide this qualitative data nor the additional considerations used to
select expansion posts to GAO, and thus we were unable to assess the
additional criteria. We made an assessment based on the information and
data provided by DHS.
8. We believe that the development of a strategic plan would assist DHS
by providing stakeholders, such as State and chiefs of mission, with
information regarding the mission, goals and operations of the Visa
Security Program. A strategic plan may have helped to address the
questions raised by State and embassy officials that led to the delays
in the approvals of the NSDD-38 requests. In addition, we believe that
a strategic plan would expedite the approval of future NSDD-38 requests
for assignment of VSOs to consular posts. State officials support this
view. DHS is taking positive steps by working towards the development
of a strategic plan as we recommend.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
JUL 22 2005:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "BORDER
SECURITY: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Homeland
Security's Visa Security Program," GAO Job Code 320352.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Susan Jacobs, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Consular Affairs, at (202) 736-
4985.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Katie Hartsburg;
CA - Maura Harty;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report "BORDER SECURITY:
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Homeland Security's Visa
Security Program" (GAO-05-639 GAO Code 320352):
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the report on Actions
Needed to Strengthen Management of Homeland Security's Visa Security
Program. On the whole, we believe the report is a fair and accurate
depiction of the implementation of Section 428 to date.
The report notes, "VSOs in Saudi Arabia aim to provide an additional
security layer to the visa adjudication process. Additionally, VSOs
have access to important law enforcement information not readily
available to consular officers." The "added value" of the Section 428
officers posted in Riyadh and Jeddah - their ability to access
databases unavailable to consular officers - highlights the importance
of shared interoperable databases and of providing consular officers
access to all law enforcement and other databases that contain
information relevant to making visa determinations. The lack of direct
access by consular officers to these systems has important consequences
for our goal to "push out the borders" to the maximum extent possible
in order to enhance U.S. border security. Since only two posts have a
DHS Section 428 presence, consular officers at all other 209 posts are
screening applicants and issuing visas without the ability to access
all available information that may be relevant or necessary to
adjudicate any given visa application. Providing consular officers
worldwide with access to law enforcement and other databases not
currently available to them would be a cost effective and efficient way
of improving the visa adjudication process.
With further regard to the visa adjudication process, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has the authority to deny a visa in accordance with
law. However, the State Department's expectation is that these denials
will be based primarily on national security, counter-terrorism, or
fraud grounds. As their name suggests, the function of VSOs is not to
adjudicate visas, but to provide security related consultative services
to consular officers in their adjudications.
As mentioned above, only two posts have Section 428 officers, and NSDD-
38 agreements have been reached to place VSOs at four others. While the
law authorizes DHS to have Section 428 officers at every post, DHS is
not required to place a Section 428 officer at each post, and -
consistent with Section 428 - the MOU makes explicit that each
placement is subject to the NSDD-38 process. In evaluating DHS NSDD-38
proposals, Chiefs of Mission and the State Department's Office of Right-
Sizing have an obligation to ensure that staffing overseas is at the
proper level and consistent with available space and resources for all
agencies at each Mission. In DHS site visits to various posts, there
was some lack of clarity in articulating its selection criteria, e.g.,
how many officers would be assigned and what functions each would
perform. Chiefs of Mission had both policy and process questions for
DHS before agreeing to the assignment of officers. In general, we
concur with GAO's assessment that increased consultation with the
Department of State on selection criteria would facilitate the NSDD-38
process.
While VSOs have done a fine job in Saudi Arabia under difficult
conditions, we do not believe that Saudi Arabia should be the model for
future deployments. If VSOs are to evaluate intelligence and provide
expert advice and training to consular officers on terrorist travel and
trends, VSOs will not be able to review 100% of all applications. We
encourage DHS to institute a policy that gives VSOs flexibility to
focus their resources on terrorism concerns as it takes up its
responsibilities in other posts. Finally, we concur in the GAO
recommendation that Congress consider revising the law to eliminate the
need for 100% review in Saudi Arabia.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Jess Ford (202) 512-4128:
Acknowledgments:
In addition, John Brummet, Daniel Chen, Katie Hartsburg, Jeff Miller,
Mary Moutsos, Joseph Carney, and Etana Finkler made key contributions
to this report.
(320352):
FOOTNOTES
[1] A visa is a U.S. travel document that most foreign citizens must
obtain before arriving at U.S. ports of entry to enter the United
States temporarily for business, tourism, or other reasons. The United
States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the
United States. In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to
nonimmigrant visas only.
[2] We reported that the visa process prior to September 11 focused
primarily on screening applicants to determine if they intended to work
or reside illegally in the United States. See GAO, Border Security:
Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-
132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[3] P.L. 107-296.
[4] For the purpose of this report, we will refer to DHS's program that
oversees the implementation of the requirements in sect. 428 (e) and
sect. 428 (i) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as the Visa Security
Program.
[5] In this report, we do not name the exact locations DHS plans to
expand to because the department stated this is sensitive information.
[6] The National Security Decision Directive-38 process requires non-
State agencies to seek approval of chiefs of missions on any proposed
changes in the size, composition, or mandate of their staff.
[7] P.L. 107-296, Sec. 428(e) and Sec. 428(i).
[8] Border and Transportation Security is responsible for, among other
things, (1) preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of
terrorism to the United States, while ensuring the efficient flow of
lawful traffic and commerce; (2) securing U.S. transportation systems;
and (3) enforcing U.S. immigration laws.
[9] In some cases, the consular officer is required to submit an
application for a Security Advisory Opinion, or decides that one is
needed. A Security Advisory Opinion provides an opinion or clearance
from Washington on whether to issue a visa to an applicant. These
clearances are required for a number of reasons, including when an
applicant's name appears as a "hit" in the name-check system, or if the
applicant's country of origin is a state sponsor of terrorism.
[10] State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security is mainly responsible for
providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy. Overseas, bureau personnel develop and implement security
programs to safeguard all personnel who work in every U.S. diplomatic
mission around the world.
[11] DHS Office of Inspector General, An Evaluation of DHS Activities
to Implement Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, OIG-04-
33 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2004).
[12] CLASS is a State Department name check database that posts use to
access critical information for visa adjudication. The system contains
records provided by numerous agencies and includes information on
persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, criminal histories,
and terrorism concerns.
[13] Section 403 of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) directs the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide State with access to
criminal history records contained in the National Crime Information
Center's Interstate Identification Index (NCIC - III) files for the
purpose of determining whether or not a visa applicant has a criminal
history record. In accordance with this mandate, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation provides extracts that contain biographical information
such as the date of birth and height of the person with the criminal
record. However, the extracts in CLASS do not contain details such as
the charge or disposition of the case, which are necessary to determine
if the applicant might be ineligible for a visa. To see this degree of
detail from the records, the National Crime Prevention and Privacy
Compact Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 14611 et seq.) (Compact Act) requires
that consular officers first submit fingerprints of the visa applicant
for positive identification before the record can be released.
[14] The Transportation and Security Administration maintains the "No-
Fly" list, which identifies individuals known or reasonably suspected
to be a threat to national security and allows airlines to pre-screen
passengers' names before a flight.
[15] Consular officers who serve as fraud prevention managers are in
charge of investigating cases of fraud, conducting fraud training for
the consular section, and providing information on fraud relevant to
the consular section at post.
[16] Pursuant to DHS's NSDD-38 request for Saudi Arabia, the department
is authorized to have up to 6 personnel in Saudi Arabia.
[17] The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to assign DHS
officers to consular posts overseas unless he determines that such an
assignment at a particular post would not promote homeland security.
[18] See GAO, Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff
Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, GAO-02-780 (Washington,
D.C.: July 26, 2002).
[19] State's Office of Rightsizing the U.S. Overseas Presence is
charged with aligning the number and location of staff assigned
overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and other
constraints. The office leads State's efforts to coordinate and manage
deployment of personnel of all U.S. government agencies overseas.
[20] The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as amended,
P.L. 103-62, provides a strategic planning and management framework
intended to improve federal programs' performance. The act outlines key
elements of a strategic plan including the development of a mission
statement, general goals and objectives that explains expected results,
operational processes and resources needed to accomplish the program
goals, daily performance and activities linked to program goals,
external factors that affect the program, and performance assessments
to establish and revise program goals.
[21] See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996)
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