Immigration Enforcement
Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts Gao ID: GAO-05-813 August 31, 2005The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. Immigration experts state that strategies to deter illegal immigration require both a reliable employment eligibility verification process and a worksite enforcement capacity to ensure that employers comply with immigration-related employment laws. This report examines (1) the current employment verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any, facing verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement program and any challenges in implementing the program.
The current employment verification process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed employees' documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. However, various studies have shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In 1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on a reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a further reduction, but this proposal has not yet been finalized. DHS is currently reviewing the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for completing this review. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, has potential to help enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document fraud. Yet, current weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements could, if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program's success. Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials stated that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely verifications if the number of employers using the program significantly increased. Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE, worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with DHS's mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address those sites' vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such as document fraud, which makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program, which, given limited resources and competing priorities for those resources, may hinder ICE's efforts to determine resources needed for the program.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-813, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2005:
Immigration Enforcement:
Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement
Efforts:
GAO-05-813:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-813, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets
attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. Immigration experts
state that strategies to deter illegal immigration require both a
reliable employment eligibility verification process and a worksite
enforcement capacity to ensure that employers comply with immigration-
related employment laws. This report examines (1) the current
employment verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any,
facing verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s (ICE) worksite enforcement
program and any challenges in implementing the program.
What GAO Found:
The current employment verification process is based on employers‘
review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity
and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have
reviewed employees‘ documents and that the documents appear genuine and
relate to the individual presenting them. However, various studies have
shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity
fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to
others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with
the employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and
easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized
workers. The large number and variety of documents acceptable for
proving work eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In
1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on
a reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and,
in 1998, proposed a further reduction, but this proposal has not yet
been finalized. DHS is currently reviewing the list of acceptable work
eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for
completing this review. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program
through which participating employers electronically verify employees‘
work eligibility, has potential to help enhance the verification
process and substantially reduce document fraud. Yet, current
weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program to
detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases,
and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements could,
if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program‘s success.
Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials stated
that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely
verifications if the number of employers using the program
significantly increased.
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE,
worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent
with DHS‘s mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS
and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing
unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address
those sites‘ vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of
employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests
have generally declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such
as document fraud, which makes it difficult to prove employer
violations. ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and measures for
its worksite enforcement program, which, given limited resources and
competing priorities for those resources, may hinder ICE‘s efforts to
determine resources needed for the program.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a target
time frame for completing the department‘s review of the Form I-9
process and issuing final regulations on the process, assess the
feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot Program‘s current
weaknesses, and establish additional output goals and measures and set
a target time frame for developing outcome goals and measures for the
worksite enforcement program. In written comments on a draft of this
report, DHS agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-813.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202)
512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process,
but the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to Enhance the Process:
Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures May Hinder
Worksite Enforcement Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9):
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Information on the Electronic Form I-9:
Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic
Pilot Program:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process:
Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated
Check and the Immigration Status Verifier Check:
Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement
Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003:
Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004:
Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year
from 1999 through 2003:
Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating
Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004:
Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in
Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
IIRIRA: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act:
INS: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service:
IRCA: Immigration Reform and Control Act:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 31, 2005:
The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John N. Hostettler:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
According to the final report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform, immigration contributes to the U.S. national economy by helping
to keep viable segments of certain labor-intensive industries, expand
foreign trade, provide valuable language and cultural expertise to U.S.
companies, and contribute to the economic revitalization of some
communities.[Footnote 1] Yet, the commission also noted that
immigration, particularly illegal immigration, has adverse
consequences, such as helping to depress wages for low-skilled workers
and creating net fiscal costs for state and local governments. Aliens,
including temporary foreign workers, legally enter and reside in the
United States through a variety of channels, such as immigration and
work visa programs, but aliens also illegally enter or overstay visas
and reside in the United States. The former U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that about 7 million
unauthorized aliens resided in the United States by January 2000, and
other organizations estimated that the unauthorized alien population
was about 10 million in 2004.[Footnote 2]
The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets
attracting illegal aliens to the United States. To help reduce the
attraction of this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA),[Footnote 3] which made it illegal for
individuals and entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or
recruit or refer for a fee unauthorized workers. The act established a
two-pronged approach for helping to limit the employment of
unauthorized workers: (1) an employment verification process through
which employers verify newly hired employees' work eligibility and (2)
a sanctions program for fining employers who do not comply with the
act. Under the employment verification process, employees and employers
must complete the Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9)
to certify that the employees are authorized to work in the United
States.[Footnote 4] Those employers who do not follow the verification
process can be sanctioned for knowingly hiring, continuing to employ,
or recruiting or referring for a fee unauthorized workers or for
improperly completing Forms I-9. Efforts to enforce these sanctions are
referred to as worksite enforcement.
In the nearly 20 years since the passage of IRCA, the employment
eligibility verification process and worksite enforcement program have
remained largely unchanged. Following the passage of the act, the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts
concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other
things, strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal
aliens to gain employment through a more reliable employment
eligibility verification process and a more robust worksite enforcement
capacity. In particular, the commission report and other studies have
found that the single most important step that could be taken to reduce
unlawful migration is the development of a more effective system for
verifying work authorization. Yet in the 8 years since the commission's
final report, few substantial enhancements have been applied to the
employment verification process, and the approach continues to rely on
the Form I-9, a procedure of which the commission was roundly critical
because of its vulnerability to fraud and potential to cause
discrimination. Moreover, in previous work, we reported that employers
of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that INS would
investigate, fine, or criminally prosecute them, a circumstance that
provides little disincentive for employers who want to circumvent the
law.[Footnote 5]
You asked us to review the federal government's policies and programs
aimed at enforcing immigration laws in the workplace. This report
addresses the following questions: (1) How does the current employment
verification process function and what are the challenges facing
verification? (2) What are the priorities and resources of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement
program and what challenges, if any, has the agency faced in
implementing the program?
To address these objectives, we interviewed officials from the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) and ICE, and officials from the Social
Security Administration (SSA) in headquarters and selected field
locations. We obtained from them information on the Form I-9 process
and the Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which
participating employers verify employees' work eligibility by
electronically checking information on employees' Forms I-9 with
information in SSA and DHS databases. We analyzed information from
these agencies, as well as related laws and regulations, to determine
how the current Form I-9 process functions, identify any challenges in
the current Form I-9 process, and examine DHS plans to modify the
process. We also interviewed representatives of 23 employers;[Footnote
6] 12 employer, employee, and advocacy groups;[Footnote 7] and 6
immigration experts[Footnote 8] to obtain their views on the Form I-9
process and the Basic Pilot Program. We selected the employers to
interview based on a mix of criteria, such as the number of employers'
pilot program queries and geographic location. We selected the
employer, employee, and advocacy groups to interview based on a mix of
criteria, such as industry representation and range of views on
immigration issues. In addition, we examined USCIS and SSA guidance,
instructions, and agreements for the Basic Pilot Program and the
results and methodology of an independent evaluation of the program
completed by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and
Westat in June 2002.[Footnote 9] We analyzed data on employer
participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program to determine how
participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We assessed
the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy and
completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the
data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered,
categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that the
independent evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of our review.
To obtain information on the worksite enforcement program priorities
and resources, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the
Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-
Related Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials
from 12 of the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices[Footnote
10] and 4 U.S. Attorney's Offices[Footnote 11] that were located in the
same areas as 4 of the field offices we visited. We selected the 12
field offices based on a mix of criteria, such as number of
investigations conducted by field offices, number of investigators in
each field office, and geographic location. We analyzed ICE
headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other documents on
worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities for and management of
worksite enforcement efforts. In addition, we analyzed ICE data on
worksite enforcement and assessed the data reliability by reviewing
data for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency officials
knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on how the
data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. We
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of our review. For more detailed information on our scope and
methodology, see appendix II. We conducted our work from September 2004
through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The employment verification process is primarily based on employers'
review of their new employees' work eligibility documents, but various
weaknesses, such as the process' vulnerability to fraud, have
undermined this process. Employers certify on the Form I-9 that they
have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the
documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them.
However, various studies have shown that document fraud (use of
counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid
documents or information belonging to others) have made it difficult
for employers who want to comply with the employment verification
process to ensure that they hire only authorized workers and have made
it easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized
workers. The large number and variety of documents included in the list
of acceptable documents for proving work eligibility have also
undermined the process. We have previously reported on federal
government efforts to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility
documents and make the remaining acceptable documents more secure. In
1997, the former INS issued an interim rule on reductions in the number
of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a
further reduction. However, DHS has not yet finalized the proposal, and
the 1997 interim rule remains in effect. Although department officials
told us that the agency is currently assessing modifications to the
list of acceptable work eligibility documents, the department has not
established a target time frame for completing this assessment and
issuing final regulations on the list of acceptable documents. In
addition, the Basic Pilot Program has potential to enhance this process
and help to significantly reduce document fraud. According to ICE
officials, access to Basic Pilot Program information could help the
agency better target its worksite enforcement efforts at those
employers who do not follow program requirements. If the program is
expanded, however, several current weaknesses in the program, including
its inability to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data
into its databases that may lengthen the pilot program verification
process, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program
requirements intended to protect employees from discriminatory
practices, could become more significant and adversely affect a greater
number of employers and employees, if not addressed. Additionally,
USCIS officials told us that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be
able to complete timely verifications of work eligibility if the number
of employers using the program were to significantly increase,
primarily because of limited program funding and the growth in other
verification programs. These officials said that USCIS is planning to
fund an evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program to assess, among other
things, the program's current costs, any improvements in DHS data
accuracy, and employers' compliance with program requirements. Although
the results of this evaluation should help provide information on the
pilot program's weaknesses, without information on the feasibility and
costs of addressing those weaknesses, USCIS and Congress cannot
effectively assess possibilities for future implementation of the
program, including increased program usage.
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE,
worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent
with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS
and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on
identifying and removing unauthorized workers from critical
infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power plants, to
help address vulnerabilities at those sites. We previously reported
that if businesses at such sites were to be compromised by terrorists,
this would pose a threat to domestic security.[Footnote 12] In fiscal
year 1999, INS devoted about 9 percent of its agent investigative work-
years to worksite enforcement, and in fiscal year 2003 ICE devoted
about 4 percent, although ICE has proposed increasing resources for
worksite enforcement. The number of notices of intent to fine issued to
employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers or improperly
completing Forms I-9 and the number of administrative worksite arrests
have also generally declined. For example, the number of notices of
intent to fine generally decreased from 417 in fiscal year 1999 to 3 in
fiscal year 2004. ICE has attributed this decline to various factors
including the widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it
difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly hired
unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and ICE have faced difficulties
in setting and collecting fine amounts from employers and in detaining
unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. According to ICE, pursuit
of civil settlements with employers rather than administrative fines
could help address some of the difficulties faced in the fines process,
but it is too early to tell what effect, if any, use of civil
settlements will have on worksite enforcement efforts. Furthermore,
although ICE has identified two output measures for the worksite
enforcement program, these measures address only two elements of the
program. Without additional output goals and measures for the worksite
enforcement program, ICE's ability to effectively determine resources
needed for the program may be hindered, especially given ICE's limited
resources and competing priorities for those resources. Although ICE is
developing outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
program, until it finalizes these goals and measures, the agency may
not be able to effectively evaluate the results of program efforts.
To strengthen the current employment verification process, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a specific
time frame for completing the department's review of the Form I-9
process, including an assessment of the possibility of reducing the
number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing final
regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form I-9.
To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased
or mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to
include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect
identity fraud, delays in entry of employment authorization information
into databases, and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and
resources that would be needed to support increased or mandatory use of
the program. To help evaluate the results of worksite enforcement
program efforts and determine resource levels needed for the program,
we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Assistant Secretary for ICE to establish additional output goals and
measures for the worksite enforcement program, and set a target time
frame for completing the assessment and development of outcome goals
and measures for the program. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DHS agreed with the recommendations.
Background:
IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the
employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to
properly complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may
face civil or administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each
employee for whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or
presented.[Footnote 13] The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 limited employer liability for
certain technical violations of Form I-9 paperwork
requirements.[Footnote 14] According to the act, a person or entity is
considered to have complied with the employment verification process if
the person or entity made a good faith attempt to properly complete the
Form I-9.[Footnote 15] Employers who knowingly hire or continue to
employ unauthorized aliens may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each
employee, depending on whether the violation is a first or subsequent
offense. Employers who engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly
hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens are subject to
criminal penalties consisting of fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized
employee and up to 6 months imprisonment for the entire pattern or
practice.
ICE is primarily responsible for enforcing the employer sanction
provisions of IRCA as well as many other immigration-related laws. ICE
has approximately 5,000 investigative agents in 26 Office of
Investigations field offices that are headed by special agents in
charge. ICE's Worksite Enforcement/Critical Infrastructure Unit
oversees programs to protect U.S. critical infrastructure, including
military, economic, industrial, and transportation infrastructure, and
manages the agency's worksite enforcement efforts. Prior to the
creation of ICE in March 2003, INS enforced IRCA and other immigration-
related laws.
Basic Pilot Program Employment Verification Process:
IIRIRA required INS to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test
electronic means for employers to verify an employee's eligibility to
work: the Basic Pilot Program, the Citizen Attestation Verification
Pilot Program, and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program. The
three pilot programs were to test whether pilot verification procedures
could improve the existing Form I-9 process by reducing (1) document
fraud and false claims of U.S. citizenship, (2) discrimination against
employees, (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) the
burden on employers to verify employees' work eligibility. IIRIRA
established the three pilot programs to be in effect for 4 years, but
Congress extended authorization for the pilots for an additional 2
years in 2002 and for another 5 years in 2003.[Footnote 16] Congress
also mandated DHS to expand the Basic Pilot Program to employers in all
50 states by December 2004, which DHS did.[Footnote 17] DHS terminated
the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program and the Machine-
Readable Document Pilot Program in 2003 because of technical
difficulties and unintended consequences, such as increased fraud and
discrimination, identified in evaluations of the programs.[Footnote 18]
The Basic Pilot Program is a part of USCIS's Systematic Alien
Verification for Entitlements Program, which provides a variety of
verification services for federal, state, and local government
agencies. USCIS estimates that there are more than 150,000 federal,
state, and local agency users that verify immigration status through
the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program. In fiscal
year 2004, about 2,300 employers actively used the Basic Pilot Program
within the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program.
The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an
electronic method to verify their employees' work eligibility.
Employers may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program but
are still required to complete Forms I-9 for all newly hired employees
in accordance with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers
query the pilot program's automated system by entering employee
information provided on the forms, such as name and Social Security
number, into the pilot Web site within 3 days of the employees' hire
date. The pilot program then electronically matches that information
against information in SSA and, if necessary, DHS databases to
determine whether the employee is eligible to work, as shown in figure
1. The Basic Pilot Program electronically notifies employers whether
their employees' work authorization was confirmed. Those queries that
the DHS automated check cannot confirm the pilot refers to USCIS staff,
called immigration status verifiers, who check employee information
against information in other DHS databases.
Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee's work
authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by
an immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a
tentative nonconfirmation of the employee's work authorization status.
In this case, the employers must notify the affected employees of the
finding, and the employees have the right to contest their tentative
nonconfirmations within 8 working days by contacting SSA or USCIS to
resolve any inaccuracies in their records.[Footnote 19] During this
time, employers may not take any adverse actions against those
employees, such as limiting their work assignments or pay. When
employees do not contest their tentative nonconfirmations within the
allotted time, the Basic Pilot Program issues a final nonconfirmation
for the employees. Employers are required to either immediately
terminate or notify DHS of the continued employment of workers who do
not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and those who
the pilot program finds are not work-authorized.
Recent Proposals Related to Employment Verification and Worksite
Enforcement:
There is ongoing congressional consideration about employment
verification and worksite enforcement efforts, and various initiatives
have been proposed related to these issues, including possible new
temporary worker programs. Since January 2004, the current
administration has discussed the possibility of initiating a guest
worker program in which foreign workers would be granted status for
employment in the United States for a specified period of time.
Similarly, some recent legislative proposals would provide a means for
foreign workers to obtain temporary employment and possible permanent
residency or citizenship at a later date. Other initiatives propose
revising visa programs to increase the number of foreign workers
legally admitted to the United States. In addition, legislative
proposals have addressed methods for enhancing employment verification
and worksite enforcement efforts. For example, one proposal would make
use of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory for all employers, and another
would increase the fine amounts for employers who knowingly hire
unauthorized workers. These initiatives reflect differing perspectives
on employment verification and worksite enforcement and touch on a
variety of related issues, such as the number of foreign workers, if
any, needed in the United States, the economic impact of illegal aliens
residing in the country, and policy decisions on ways to address the
millions of illegal aliens in the United States.
Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process,
but the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to Enhance the Process:
The current employment verification process relies on employers' review
of work eligibility documents to determine whether employees are
authorized to work, but the process has several weaknesses. Document
and identity fraud have hindered employers' efforts to reliably verify
employees' work eligibility under the Form I-9 process. In addition,
the large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work
eligibility have undermined the process. We have previously reported on
the need to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents
and to improve the integrity of the documents.[Footnote 20] The Basic
Pilot Program, as a voluntary, automated verification program, offers a
mechanism with potential to enhance the employment verification process
by reducing document fraud. ICE officials said that access to Basic
Pilot Program information could help the agency better target its
worksite enforcement efforts by identifying employers who do not follow
program requirements. However, existing weaknesses in the program, such
as the inability of the program to detect identity fraud, delays in
entering data into DHS databases, and some employer noncompliance with
pilot program requirements, could become more significant and
additional resources could be needed if employer participation in the
program greatly increased or was made mandatory.
Current Employment Verification Process Based on Employers' Review of
Documents:
In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on
employers' review of documents presented by employees to prove identity
and work eligibility. Under the process, employers must request that
newly hired employees present a document or documents that confirm
employees' identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees
must attest that they are U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent
residents, or aliens authorized to work in the United States. Employers
must then certify that they have reviewed the documents presented by
their employees to establish identity and work eligibility and that the
documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them.
In making their certifications, employers are expected to judge whether
the documents presented are obviously counterfeit. Employers are deemed
in compliance with IRCA if they have followed the verification
procedures, including instances when an unauthorized alien may have
presented fraudulent documents that appeared genuine. In addition, on
the Form I-9, employers are required to reverify the employment
eligibility of individuals whose work authorization has expired, such
as aliens with temporary work authorization, to determine whether the
individuals are authorized to continue to work.
Document and Identity Fraud Have Undermined the Form I-9 Process:
Since the passage of IRCA in 1986, document fraud (use of counterfeit
documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or
information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers
who want to comply with IRCA to ensure that they employ only authorized
workers through the current verification and reverification processes.
In its 1997 report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform noted that the widespread availability of false documents made
it easy for unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In
1999, we reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have either
fraudulently used valid documents that belong to others or presented
counterfeit documents as evidence of employment eligibility.[Footnote
21] Furthermore, in 2004 we reported that unauthorized workers were
able to use false documents to illegally gain entry to secure areas of
critical infrastructure sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants,
and military bases.[Footnote 22] Representatives from some of the
employers and employer associations we interviewed for this review
indicated that, in cases where employees present documents that
employers suspect of being counterfeit, employers may not request that
these employees present other documents proving their work eligibility
because the employees could claim that employers are discriminating
against them. To help protect against discriminatory hiring practices,
such as employers requesting specific documents from foreign-looking or
sounding employees, employers are prohibited under IRCA from requesting
that new employees present specific documents from among the list of
acceptable documents to prove their identity and work eligibility.
Although studies suggest that the majority of employers comply with
IRCA and try to hire only authorized workers, the studies have also
noted that some employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers, often to
exploit the workers' low cost labor.[Footnote 23] In 1997, the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform reported that the minority of
employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens avoided sanctions by going
through the motions of compliance while accepting false documents.
Likewise, in 1999 we concluded that those employers who do not want to
comply with IRCA can intentionally hire unauthorized aliens under the
guise of having complied with the employment verification requirements
by claiming that unauthorized workers presented false documents to
obtain employment.[Footnote 24]
Large Number and Variety of Acceptable Documents Have Hindered Employer
Verification Efforts:
The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for
proving work eligibility have also complicated employer verification
efforts under IRCA. Following passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could
present any of 29 different documents to establish their identity and/
or work eligibility. In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of
acceptable work eligibility documents from 29 to 27. Eight of these
documents establish both identity and employment eligibility (e.g.,
U.S. passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish
identity only (e.g., driver's license); and 7 documents establish
employment eligibility only (e.g., Social Security card without the
legend "Not Valid for Employment").[Footnote 25] The interim rule
implemented changes to the list of acceptable work eligibility
documents mandated by IIRIRA and was intended to serve as a temporary
measure until INS issued final rules on modifications to the Form I-9.
In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in the number of acceptable
work eligibility documents to 14 but did not finalize the proposed rule.
Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to
reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the
employment verification process simpler and more secure. In 1990, we
reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents
contributed to (1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the
employment verification requirements and (2) discrimination against
authorized workers.[Footnote 26] A 1992 report prepared by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary noted that the first step to simplifying the
employment verification process was to reduce the current list of
acceptable work eligibility documents and make them more counterfeit-
proof.[Footnote 27] In 1998, INS noted that, when IRCA was first
passed, a long, inclusive list of acceptable work eligibility documents
was allowed for the Form I-9 to help ensure that all persons who were
eligible to work could easily meet the requirements, but as early as
1990, there had been evidence that some employers found the list
confusing. In 1999 we reported that various studies of IRCA's
employment verification process advocated that the number of documents
that employees can use to demonstrate employment eligibility should be
reduced to make the employment verification process more secure and
easier to understand.[Footnote 28]
Additionally, some of the employers, employer associations, and
immigration experts we interviewed for this review told us that the
large number of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility and
the fact that the Form I-9 has not been updated have impeded employer
efforts to verify employment eligibility. Representatives from three
employer associations said that member employers have expressed
concerns that the Form I-9 has not been updated to reflect changes in
the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, causing confusion
among some employers regarding which documents are acceptable. In
addition, among the 23 employers we interviewed, 5 discussed the need
to update the Form I-9 to reflect revisions to the list of acceptable
work eligibility documents. Two of these employers told us that they
manually edit the Form I-9 to reflect the changes in the list of
acceptable work eligibility documents.
DHS officials told us that the department is assessing possible
revisions to the Form I-9 process, including revisions to the number of
acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not established a target
time frame for completing this assessment.[Footnote 29] They said that
the Handbook for Employers, which provides guidance for completing the
Form I-9, would also need to be updated. In May 2005, DHS released an
updated version of the Form I-9 that changed references from INS to DHS
but did not modify the list of acceptable work eligibility documents on
the Form I-9 to reflect changes made to the list by the 1997 interim
rule. In the absence of final regulations and an updated Form I-9 and
handbook, employers, employees, and other stakeholders may not clearly
understand the Form I-9 process, particularly which documents are
acceptable for proving work eligibility.
Proposals Have Been Made to Improve Document Integrity:
We have previously reported on efforts to enhance the integrity of
acceptable work eligibility documents, which could help reduce document
fraud and make the employment verification process more secure,
especially if the number of acceptable documents was reduced. For
example, in 1999 we reported that INS had taken steps to increase the
integrity of immigration documents, such as by issuing new employment
authorization documents with visible security features like holograms
and by issuing permanent resident cards with digital photographs and
fingerprint images.[Footnote 30] We noted that, although INS enhanced
the integrity of its documents, unauthorized aliens could present non-
INS documents, such as Social Security cards, to employers to prove
work eligibility. In 1998, we reported on estimates of costs associated
with alternative proposals for SSA issuance of enhanced Social Security
cards.[Footnote 31] We are currently reviewing SSA efforts to enhance
the integrity of Social Security cards and how enhanced cards might
strengthen the employment verification process and plan to report on
these issues next year.
In addition, we have previously reported on the possible use of
biometrics in verification and identification processes--such as those
used at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 32] Biometrics covers a wide
range of technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring
and analyzing human characteristics.[Footnote 33] Biometrics can
theoretically be very effective personal identifiers because the
characteristics they measure are thought to be distinct to each person.
Because they are tightly bound to an individual, biometrics are more
reliable, cannot be forgotten, and are less easily lost, stolen, or
guessed. While biometrics may show promise in enhancing verification
and identification processes, we have also reported on the trade-offs
for using biometric indicators, such as concerns regarding the
protections under current law for biometric data, the absence of clear
criteria governing data sharing, and infrastructure processes such as
the binding of an identity to the biometric data. We reported that
while a biometric placed on a token, such as a passport or visa, cannot
necessarily link a person to his or her identity, it can reduce the
potential for an individual to assume multiple identities. We also
reported that although federal agencies are required by statute to
provide security protections for information collected and maintained
by or for the agency commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm
that would result from unauthorized disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of the information, poor information
security is a widespread federal problem with potentially severe
consequences. In reporting on the possible use of biometrics in
verification and identification processes, we identified several
examples of such risks associated with using biometric data.[Footnote
34]
Recent laws and legislative proposals have addressed possible ways to
enhance the integrity of documents and strengthen the employment
verification process. The Real ID Act of 2005 mandated that states must
meet minimum standards in developing and issuing driver's licenses
before federal government authorities can accept state driver's
licenses as identification for official purposes.[Footnote 35] These
standards include (1) adding physical security features to prevent
counterfeiting and tampering, (2) including common machine-readable
technology on driver's licenses, and (3) requiring driver's license
applicants to provide evidence of their dates of birth and Social
Security numbers. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 required SSA to form a task force to, among other things,
establish standards for safeguarding Social Security cards from
counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft.[Footnote 36] In
addition to these laws, various legislative proposals address possible
ways to make identity and work eligibility documents more secure and to
enhance the employment verification process. For example, one recent
proposal would mandate that individuals can present only machine-
readable, counterfeit and tamper-resistant Social Security cards to
obtain employment. According to the proposal, these machine-readable
cards would allow employers to check employees' work authorization
status against information maintained in an employment eligibility
database.[Footnote 37] These laws and proposals differ in the extent to
which they address issues related to enhancing employment verification
through electronic means, such as the availability and accessibility of
machine-readable technology and the security and privacy of information
maintained on documents and in databases.
Basic Pilot Program Shows Promise in Enhancing Employment Verification,
but Current Weaknesses Could Undermine Increased Use:
Basic Pilot Program May Help Employers Reliably Verify Work Eligibility
and Decrease Document Fraud:
Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step
that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the development of
a more effective system for verifying work authorization. In
particular, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that
the most promising option for verifying work authorization was a
computerized registry based on employers' electronic verification of an
employee's Social Security number with records on work authorization
for aliens. The Basic Pilot Program, which is currently available on a
voluntary basis to all employers in the United States, operates in a
similar way to the computerized registry recommended by the commission.
Yet only a small portion--about 2,300 in fiscal year 2004--of the
approximately 5.6 million employer firms nationwide actively used the
pilot program.[Footnote 38]
The Basic Pilot Program assists employers in detecting document fraud
by helping to eliminate employer guesswork as to whether information
contained on work eligibility documents presented by employees is
authentic or counterfeit. If newly hired employees present counterfeit
documents containing false information, the pilot program would not
confirm the employees' work eligibility because the employees' Form I-
9 information, such as a false name or Social Security number, would
not match SSA and DHS database information when queried through the
Basic Pilot Program. In the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, the
Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat found
that the program appeared to reduce unauthorized employment arising
from employee presentation of counterfeit or altered documents
containing false information. Twenty of the 22 employers we interviewed
who participated in the Basic Pilot Program indicated that the program
helps them to reliably verify newly hired employees' work authorization
status.
ICE Sees Additional Benefit in Access to Basic Pilot Program Data:
ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic Pilot
Program and does not have direct access to program information, which
is maintained by USCIS. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they
have requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific
employers who participate in the program and are under ICE
investigation. ICE officials told us that program data could indicate
cases in which employers do not follow program requirements and
therefore would help ICE better target its worksite enforcement efforts
toward those employers. For example, the Basic Pilot Program's
confirmation of numerous queries of the same Social Security number
could indicate that the Social Security number is being used
fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is knowingly hiring
unauthorized workers by accepting the same Social Security number for
multiple employees. However, USCIS officials stated that they have
concerns about providing ICE with broader access to Basic Pilot Program
information for the worksite enforcement program. USCIS officials said
that, if ICE has access to pilot program information for worksite
enforcement purposes, that access might create a disincentive for
employers to participate in this voluntary program and could be used
for purposes other than identifying potentially unscrupulous employers.
These officials stated that employers may be less likely to join or
participate in the program because the employers may believe that they
are more likely to be targeted for a worksite enforcement investigation
as a result of program participation.
ICE suggested that there could be possible benefits to their worksite
enforcement efforts if employers were required to participate in a
mandatory automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program.
ICE officials said that a mandatory automated verification system could
help ICE focus worksite enforcement efforts on employers who try to
evade using the program. They also stated that a mandatory system like
the pilot program could limit the ability of employers who knowingly
hired unauthorized workers to claim that the workers presented false
documents to obtain employment, assisting ICE agents in proving
employer violations of IRCA. Officials from 7 of the 12 Special Agent
in Charge field offices we interviewed suggested that a mandatory Basic
Pilot Program could help them better target their worksite enforcement
efforts.
Basic Pilot Program Does Not Help Employers Detect Identity Fraud in
Verifying Employees' Work Eligibility:
Although an automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program
has potential to enhance the employment verification process and help
employers detect use of counterfeit documents, the program cannot
currently help employers detect identity fraud. In 2002 we reported
that, although not specifically or comprehensively quantifiable, the
prevalence of identity fraud seemed to be increasing, a development
that may affect employers' ability to reliably verify employment
eligibility.[Footnote 39] If an unauthorized worker presents valid
documentation that belongs to another person authorized to work, the
Basic Pilot Program may find the worker to be work-authorized.
Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit documentation that
contains valid information and appears authentic, the Basic Pilot
Program may verify the employee as work-authorized. DHS officials told
us that the department is currently considering possible ways to
enhance the Basic Pilot Program to help it detect cases of identity
fraud, for example, by modifying the program to provide a digitized
photograph associated with employment authorization information
presented by an employee. Yet, DHS cannot fully assess possible ways to
modify the Basic Pilot Program to address identity fraud in the absence
of data on the costs and feasibility of implementing such modifications.
In addition, the Basic Pilot Program does not assist employers in
verifying the work authorization status of employees whose status
requires reverification and therefore does not help employers detect
document or identity fraud in the reverification process. Employers
currently may not use the Basic Pilot Program to re-verify the
employment eligibility of individuals whose work authorization has
expired, and employers agree not to use the pilot program for
reverification when registering to participate in the program.
Therefore, participating employers cannot fully use the Basic Pilot
Program to verify the work authorization status of all employees for
whom verification, including reverification, is required under the Form
I-9 process. According to one USCIS official, the pilot program does
not face any technological or other limitations that would prevent the
program from being used for reverification purposes, if such use was
required or allowed as part of the pilot program.
Delays in Data Entry May Lengthen the Pilot Program Verification
Process:
Another current weakness in the Basic Pilot Program that could affect
the program's success if use increased or was made mandatory is delays
in the entry of information on immigrants' and nonimmigrants' arrivals
and employment authorization into DHS databases. Although the majority
of pilot program queries entered by participating employers are
confirmed via the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15
percent of queries authorized by DHS required manual verification by
immigration status verifiers in fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 40]
According to USCIS, immigration status verifiers typically resolve
cases referred to them for verification within 24 hours, but a small
number of cases take longer. For example, nine employers we interviewed
reported that a small number of immigration status verifier
verifications took longer than 24 hours to resolve, with a few
verifications taking as long as 2 weeks to resolve.
Immigration status verifiers reported that the primary reason for
queries to require verification by them is because of delays in entry
of employment authorization information into DHS databases. USCIS
officials told us that those verifications that take longer than a few
days to resolve are generally caused by delays in the entry of data on
employees who received employment authorization documents generated by
a computer and camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases,
such as those used at ports of entry for refugees and at USCIS field
offices. They said that information on the employment authorization
documents generated through this process is electronically sent to
USCIS headquarters for entry but is sometimes lost or not entered into
databases in a timely manner. By contrast, employment authorization
documents issued at USCIS service centers are produced via computers
that are used to update data in USCIS databases, which USCIS officials
told us represent the majority of employment authorization documents
currently issued by USCIS. The Temple University Institute for Survey
Research and Westat found that verifications that require immigration
status verifiers' review lengthen the time needed to complete the
employment verification process. In addition, among the 22 employers we
interviewed, 7 reported that they may experience some losses in work
time, training, or money for background checks and physicals when
employees contest tentative nonconfirmations.
USCIS has taken steps to increase the timeliness and accuracy of
information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot
Program. In June 2004, USCIS reported that, among other improvements,
it had started work to expedite data entry for new lawful permanent
residents and arriving nonimmigrants and to improve data entry for
changes in work authorization status.[Footnote 41] For example, USCIS
said that it has worked to reduce the time in which data are available
for Basic Pilot Program verifications by expediting submission of data
on newly arrived immigrants and nonimmigrants from ports of entry and
field offices to USCIS service centers for data entry. The agency
reported that, as a result of its efforts, data on new immigrants are
now typically available for verification within 10 to 12 days of an
immigrant's arrival in the United States while previously, the
information was not available for up to 6 to 9 months after arrival.
Moreover, USCIS reported it has worked to increase the timeliness and
availability of temporary work authorization information in its
databases by increasing the number of employment authorization
documents issued by service centers as compared with the number of
documents issued through computers not directly linked to DHS
databases. The department reported that, while in 1999 less than half
of all employment authorization documents were issued by service
centers, over three-quarters of the cards are now issued through
service centers. USCIS officials told us that the agency has continued
these efforts to improve the timeliness and accuracy of information
entered into DHS databases and noted that the agency is currently
planning to fund another evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program that
will include a review of the accuracy of DHS database information.
Furthermore, analysis of the Basic Pilot Program database indicates
that the timeliness and accuracy of the DHS automated checks against
the Basic Pilot Program database have improved. In fiscal year 2004,
about 10 percent of all queries were referred to DHS for verification.
Among those queries authorized by DHS, the percentage of queries
verified by the DHS automated check increased from about 67 percent in
fiscal year 2000 to about 85 percent in fiscal year 2004, as shown in
figure 2.
Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated
Check and the Immigration Status Verifier Check:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred.
[End of figure]
Although USCIS has taken some steps to improve the timeliness and
accuracy of information entered into databases used as part of the
Basic Pilot Program and plans to review the accuracy of database
information as part of its planned evaluation of the pilot program,
USCIS cannot effectively assess future use of the pilot program,
including possible increased program usage, without information on the
costs and feasibility of ways to further reduce delays in the entry of
information into DHS databases.
Employer Noncompliance with Pilot Program Procedures May Adversely
Affect Employees:
Another factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the pilot program
if usage is increased or made mandatory is employer noncompliance with
Basic Pilot Program requirements. These requirements are intended to
safeguard employees queried through the program from such harm as
discrimination or reduced training and pay. The Temple University
Institute for Survey Research and Westat evaluation of the Basic Pilot
Program concluded that the majority of employers surveyed appeared to
be in compliance with Basic Pilot Program procedures. However, the
evaluation found evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures
that specifically prohibit screening job applicants and taking actions
that adversely affect employees while they are contesting tentative
nonconfirmations, such as limiting employees' work assignments or pay.
For example, 30 percent of the employers surveyed for the evaluation
reported restricting work assignments while employees contested
tentative nonconfirmations, a practice that is prohibited under the
Basic Pilot Program. Of the 22 employers we interviewed who participate
in the pilot, 7 reported using the Basic Pilot Program in a way that
did not conform with pilot program procedures, including using the
pilot program to screen job applicants before offering jobs to the
applicants.
The Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help
USCIS determine whether employers follow program requirements. For
example, these reports could help USCIS identify employers who do not
appear to refer employees contesting tentative nonconfirmations to SSA
or DHS, which is required under pilot program procedures. USCIS could
then follow up to determine if such employers are following pilot
procedures that require employers to refer all employees with tentative
nonconfirmations to SSA or DHS. USCIS officials told us that efforts to
review employers' use of the pilot program have been limited by lack of
staff available to oversee and examine employer use of the program, and
they noted that there are currently 15 USCIS headquarters staff members
responsible for administering USCIS verification programs, including
the Basic Pilot Program. The officials said that, as part of the next
evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess the extent to
which employers follow pilot program requirements and procedures, such
as employer adherence to requirements to notify employees of tentative
nonconfirmations. However, without information on the costs and
feasibility of routinely reviewing employers' use of the pilot program,
USCIS cannot fully determine possible ways to regularly examine
employer use of the program and therefore the extent to which employers
comply with pilot program requirements.
Current Program May Not Complete Timely Verifications if Use Greatly
Increased:
According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS
verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete
timely verifications if the number of employers using the Basic Pilot
Program were to significantly increase. In particular, these officials
said that if a significant number of new employers registered for the
program or if the program were mandatory for all employers or a segment
of employers, additional resources would be needed to maintain timely
verifications, given the growth in other verification programs. For
example, the REAL ID Act of 2005[Footnote 42] mandated that states must
meet minimum standards in issuing driver's licenses and nondriver
identification cards, including verifying the immigration status of all
noncitizen applicants, before federal government authorities can accept
the licenses and cards for official purposes beginning in 2008.
Currently, USCIS has approximately 38 immigration status verifiers
available for completing Basic Pilot Program verifications, and these
verifiers reported that they are able to complete the majority of
current required checks within their target time frame of 24
hours.[Footnote 43] However, USCIS officials said that because of the
growth in other verification programs that would increase the number of
verifications that require checks by immigration status verifiers, the
agency has serious concerns about its ability to complete timely
verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users greatly
increased.
USCIS officials also stated that the agency lacks funding to further
expand the Basic Pilot Program. The Basic Pilot Program and other
verification programs have been funded by fees USCIS receives from
applicants for adjudication of immigration and citizenship benefits.
USCIS allocated about $3.5 million from its fee accounts for all of its
verification programs, including the Basic Pilot Program, in fiscal
year 2005.[Footnote 44] USCIS officials said that this allocation
included a $500,000 increase for additional employee verifications by
employers using the Basic Pilot Program. However, these officials told
us that current funding levels allocated for USCIS verification
programs would not be sufficient to cover costs associated with
mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program for all employers, should this
be adopted. In 2004, we reported that USCIS fees were not sufficient to
fully fund the agency's operations but noted that cost data were
insufficient to determine the full extent of the funding
shortfall.[Footnote 45]
The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat
estimated a range of costs associated with expanding the dial-up
version of the pilot program,[Footnote 46] including costs for making
the program mandatory for a selected group of employers, like employers
with more than 10 employees, and making the program mandatory for all
employers, regardless of the number of employees. The report estimated
that a mandatory dial-up version of the pilot program for all employers
would cost the federal government, employers, and employees about $11.7
billion total per year, with employers bearing most of the
costs.[Footnote 47] USCIS has worked with participating employers to
switch them to the Web-based version of the program and discontinued
the dial-up version in June 2005. The Temple University Institute for
Survey Research and Westat did not estimate costs for a mandatory Web-
based version, although they noted that operating costs associated with
such a program would be less than for the dial-up version because
employer computer maintenance and telephone costs would be lower. As
part of the next evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess
the costs and potential time frames associated with making the Web-
based version mandatory for all employers or specific segments of
employers. Given the growth in other USCIS verification programs, USCIS
cannot effectively assess potential costs for making the Web-based
version of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory without information on
other possible resources needed for the program, such as staff needed
for conducting manual verifications.
Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures May Hinder
Worksite Enforcement Efforts:
The worksite enforcement program is one of various ICE immigration
enforcement programs, and has been a relatively low priority. Since
fiscal year 1999, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to
employers for violations of IRCA and the number of administrative
worksite arrests have declined, which, according to ICE, are due to
various factors, such as the widespread use of counterfeit documents
that make it difficult for ICE agents to prove employer violations. INS
and ICE have also faced difficulties in setting and collecting
meaningful fine amounts and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested
at worksites. In addition, ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and
measures for the worksite enforcement program, making it difficult for
ICE and Congress to assess program performance and determine resource
levels for the program.
Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority for ICE, but
ICE Has Proposed Additional Resources for the Program:
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
formerly managed by INS and now managed by ICE, and competes for
resources with these other program areas, such as alien smuggling and
fraud. Among INS and ICE responsibilities, worksite enforcement has
been a relatively low priority. For example, in the 1999 INS Interior
Enforcement Strategy, the strategy to block and remove employers'
access to undocumented workers was the fifth of five interior
enforcement priorities.[Footnote 48] In this same year, we reported
that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS, worksite
enforcement received a small portion of INS's staffing and enforcement
budget. We noted that the number of employer investigations INS was
able to conduct each year covered only a fraction of the estimated
number of employers who may have hired unauthorized aliens.[Footnote 49]
In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after
September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources
primarily on national security cases, such as investigations of aliens
in the United States who may have overstayed their authorized time
periods for being in the country and the National Security Entry and
Exit Registration System; on participation in Joint Terrorism Task
Forces;[Footnote 50] and on critical infrastructure protection. In
particular, INS and then ICE focused available resources for worksite
enforcement mainly on identifying and removing unauthorized workers
from critical infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power
plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those sites. In 2004, we
reported that, if critical infrastructure-related businesses were to be
compromised by terrorists, this would pose a serious threat to domestic
security.[Footnote 51] In 2003, we testified that, given ICE's limited
resources, it needs to ensure that it targets those industries where
employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential risk to
national security.[Footnote 52] According to ICE officials, the agency
adopted this focus on critical infrastructure protection because the
fact that unauthorized workers can obtain employment at critical
infrastructure sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those
sites' hiring and screening practices, and unauthorized workers
employed at those sites are vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists,
smugglers, traffickers, or other criminals.
Consistent with these priorities, in 2003 ICE headquarters issued a
memo requiring field offices to request approval from ICE headquarters
prior to opening any worksite enforcement investigation not related to
the protection of critical infrastructure sites, such as investigations
of farms and restaurants. ICE officials told us that the purpose of
this memo was to help ensure that field offices focused worksite
enforcement efforts on critical infrastructure protection operations.
Field office representatives told us that noncritical infrastructure
worksite enforcement was one of the few investigative areas for which
offices had to request approval from ICE headquarters to open an
investigation. According to ICE, the agency recently issued a memo
delegating authority to approve noncritical infrastructure worksite
enforcement cases to field offices' Special Agents in Charge. Eight of
the 12 offices we interviewed told us that worksite enforcement was not
an office priority unless the worksite enforcement case related to
critical infrastructure protection. ICE has inspected Forms I-9 and
employer records at hundreds of critical infrastructure sites as of
March 2005. For example, as part of Operation Tarmac, ICE conducted
investigations at nearly 200 airports nationwide and, as part of
Operation Glow Worm, conducted investigations at more than 50 nuclear
power plants as of March 2005.[Footnote 53] Between October 2004 and
the beginning of May 2005, about 77 percent of the worksite enforcement
cases opened by ICE were related to critical infrastructure
protection.[Footnote 54]
Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small
portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program.
As shown in figure 3, in fiscal year 1999, INS allocated about 240 full-
time equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year
2003, ICE allocated about 90 full-time equivalents.[Footnote 55]
Between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, the percentage of agent work-years
spent on worksite enforcement efforts generally decreased from about 9
percent to about 4 percent.
Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement
Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although worksite enforcement may remain a low priority relative to
other programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the
worksite enforcement program by adding staff to its headquarters'
worksite enforcement unit,[Footnote 56] which was comprised of three
staff members as of July 2005, and hiring additional worksite
enforcement staff for field offices. In particular, ICE plans to use
the $5 million provided for fiscal year 2005 by a congressional
conference report for the worksite enforcement program to fund
additional headquarters positions for the worksite enforcement
unit.[Footnote 57] In its fiscal year 2006 budget submission, ICE
requested funding for 117 compliance officers, 20 additional
investigative agents, and 6 additional program managers for worksite
enforcement. ICE has proposed hiring these compliance officers to
conduct the administrative elements of worksite enforcement cases, such
as the inspection of Forms I-9 and other employment records. ICE
officials said that these officers would pass cases involving potential
criminal violations to investigative agents for review. ICE officials
told us that the agency would use the compliance officers only for
worksite enforcement efforts. According to ICE, compliance enforcement
officers are less costly than investigative agents. ICE estimates that
each investigative agent would cost the agency approximately $167,000
to $176,000 in fiscal year 2006, while one compliance enforcement
officer would cost about $76,000. At this point, it is unclear what
impact, if any, these additional resources would have on worksite
enforcement efforts.
ICE Attributes Decline in Numbers of Employer Fine Notices and Worksite
Arrests to Document Fraud and Resource Allocation Decisions:
The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as
the number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally
declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of
intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9
or knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417
to 3.[Footnote 58] (See figure 4.)
Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite enforcement
operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown in figure
5, the number of administrative worksite arrests declined by about 84
percent from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003.
Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year
from 1999 through 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to ICE records, worksite enforcement criminal arrests totaled
159 in fiscal year 2004 and 81 in the period from October 2004 through
April 2005.[Footnote 59]
ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine
issued to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to
various factors including the widespread availability and use of
counterfeit documents and the allocation of resources to other
priorities. Various studies have shown that the availability and use of
fraudulent documents have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove
that employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers. For example, in
previous work we reported that the prevalence of document fraud made it
difficult for INS to prove that an employer knowingly hired an
unauthorized alien.[Footnote 60] In 1996, the Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General reported that the proliferation of
cheap fraudulent documents made it possible for the unscrupulous
employer to avoid being held accountable for hiring illegal
aliens.[Footnote 61] ICE officials told us that employers who agents
suspect of knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that they
were unaware that their workers presented false documents at the time
of hire, making it difficult for agents to prove that the employer
willfully violated IRCA. In commenting on a draft of this report, ICE
also noted that the IIRIRA provision that limited employer liability
for certain Form I-9 paperwork violations affects ICE's ability to
substantiate employer charges for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers
and, therefore, the number of notices of intent to fine that ICE
issues. This provision came into effect in 1996, so it is unclear what
effect, if any, the provision had on the decline in the number of
notices of intent to fine issued between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.
In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources
to other priorities has contributed to the decline in the numbers of
notices of intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS
focused its worksite enforcement resources on egregious employer
violators who were linked to other criminal violations like smuggling,
fraud, or worker exploitation, and de-emphasized administrative
employer cases and fines. Furthermore, INS investigative resources were
redirected from worksite enforcement activities to criminal alien
cases, which consumed more investigative hours by the late 1990s than
any other enforcement activity. After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE
focused investigative resources on national security cases and, in
particular, focused worksite enforcement efforts on critical
infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS's primary
mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the redirection of
resources from other enforcement programs to perform national security-
related investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional
program areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite
enforcement. Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as
immigration experts we interviewed, noted that the focus on critical
infrastructure protection does not address the majority of worksites in
industries that have traditionally provided the magnet of jobs
attracting illegal aliens to the United States.
INS and ICE Have Faced Difficulties in Setting Fine Amounts and in
Detaining Unauthorized Workers, but Have Taken Steps to Address
Difficulties:
INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting final
fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring
unauthorized workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at
worksites. ICE officials told us that because fine amounts are so low,
the fines do not provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also
said that when agents could prove that an employer knowingly hired an
unauthorized worker and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine
amounts agents recommended were often negotiated down in value during
discussions between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of
mitigated fines may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low
that they believe that employers view the fines as a cost of doing
business, making the fines an ineffective deterrent for employers who
attempt to circumvent IRCA. ICE officials at 11 of the 12 field offices
at which we interviewed staff said that they experienced instances in
which fine amounts were mitigated down in value. According to ICE, the
agency mitigates employer fine amounts because doing so may be a more
efficient use of government resources than pursuing employers who
contest or ignore fines, which could be more costly to the government
than the fine amount sought. Recently, ICE settled a worksite
enforcement case with a large company without going through the
administrative fine process. As part of the settlement, the company
agreed to pay $11 million and company contractors agreed to pay $4
million in forfeitures--more than any administrative fine amount ever
issued against an employer for IRCA violations, according to ICE.
One ICE official said that use of such civil settlements instead of
pursuit of administrative fines, specifically in regard to
investigations of noncritical infrastructure employers, could be a more
efficient use of investigative resources. ICE officials also said that
use of civil settlements could help ensure employers' future compliance
by including in the settlements a requirement to enter into compliance
agreements, such as the Basic Pilot Program. ICE recently employed this
strategy in its $15 million settlement with the large company. As part
of the settlement, the company agreed to enter into a compliance
program with ICE. Other compliance agreements with employers could
involve mandatory participation in the Basic Pilot Program.
Additionally, ICE officials said that the agency has proposed working
with employers who are not the subjects of worksite enforcement
investigations to help them ensure compliance with IRCA through
enhanced education and partnerships. In April 2005, ICE issued its
interim strategic plan, which, as part of its objective on identifying
critical industries for worksite enforcement operations, included an
approach for partnering with businesses to help them comply with
IRCA.[Footnote 62] This partnership program, called the ICE Mutual
Agreement between Government and Employers, is intended to provide
employers with training and best practices for complying with IRCA. In
addition to implementing this partnership program, ICE plans to promote
expanded use of the Basic Pilot Program to help encourage employers in
critical industries to strengthen their ability to verify employees'
work eligibility. The practice of civil settlements with employers and
joint compliance programs are in the early stages of implementation;
therefore the extent to which they may address the difficulties faced
in setting fine amounts that provide a meaningful deterrent is not yet
known.
The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting total fine amounts
from employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously
reported that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting total
fine amounts from employers for a number of reasons including that
employers went out of business, moved, or declared bankruptcy.[Footnote
63] In 1996, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
reported that the deterrent effect of civil fines on sweatshop
operators was adversely affected by collection difficulties and noted
that INS had no national system for billing, tracking, and collecting
employer fines. In 1998, INS created the Debt Management Center to
centralize the collections process, and the center is now responsible
for collecting fines ICE issued against employers for violations of
IRCA and providing other collection services for ICE and USCIS. The ICE
Debt Management Center has collected total amounts on most of the
invoices issued to employers for final fine amounts between fiscal
years 1999 and 2004--about 94 percent as of the end of June
2005[Footnote 64].:
In addition, ICE's Office of Detention and Removal has limited
detention space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite
enforcement investigations are a low priority for that space.[Footnote
65] In 2004, the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security
sent a memo to the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
and the Assistant Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the
detention of aliens. According to this memo, aliens who are subjects of
national security investigations were among those groups of aliens
given the highest priority for detention, while aliens arrested as a
result of worksite enforcement investigations were among those groups
of aliens given the lowest priority. Officials in 8 of the 12 field
offices we interviewed told us that lack of sufficient detention space
has limited the effectiveness of worksite enforcement efforts. For
example, ICE officials stated that if investigative agents arrest
unauthorized aliens at worksites, the aliens would likely be released
because the Office of Detention and Removal detention centers do not
have sufficient space to house the aliens. Field office representatives
said that offices can expend a large amount of resources to arrest
unauthorized aliens at worksites and that these aliens would likely be
released and may re-enter the workforce, in some cases returning to the
worksites from where they were originally arrested. As a result, the
use of resources to arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites may be
unproductive. A congressional conference report for fiscal year 2005
provided funds to the Office of Detention and Removal for an additional
1,950 bed spaces.[Footnote 66] Given competing priorities for detention
space, the effect, if any, these additional bed spaces will have on
ICE's priority given to workers detained as a result of worksite
enforcement operations cannot currently be determined.
ICE Has Not Yet Developed Outcome Goals and Measures for Worksite
Enforcement:
Given ICE's limited resources and competing priorities for those
resources, ICE's lack of performance goals and measures for the
worksite enforcement program may hinder the agency's ability to
effectively determine and allocate resources for the program.
Performance goals and measures are intended to provide Congress and
agency management with the information to systematically assess a
program's strengths, weaknesses, and performance. A performance goal is
the target level of performance--either output or outcome--expressed as
a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement will
be compared. A performance measure can be defined as an indicator,
statistic, or metric used to gauge program performance and may
typically include outputs and outcomes. Outputs provide status
information about an initiative or program in terms of completing an
action in a specified time frame. Outcomes show results or outcomes
related to an initiative or program in terms of its effectiveness,
efficiency, or impact. Outputs should support or lead to outcomes and,
for each outcome goal, there are typically several output goals.
Outputs and outcomes together help agencies determine and report on
products or services provided through a program and the results of
those products or services.
ICE lacks output goals and measures necessary to inform its resource
allocation decisions. Output goals and measures are an essential
management tool in managing programs for results. They help provide the
information that agencies need to aid in determining resources for a
program and whether they are using program resources efficiently and
effectively. ICE officials told us that the agency does not plan to
focus on developing and using output goals and measures for worksite
enforcement, such as the number of cases initiated or number of
worksite arrests made, because they believe that such goals and
measures do not adequately indicate ICE's level of effort for worksite
enforcement. Therefore, the ICE officials said that ICE plans to focus
on developing outcome goals and measures for the program that better
reflect the program's effect. Yet in its fiscal year 2006 budget
request, ICE identified two output measures for its worksite
enforcement program: a 20 percent increase in the number of
administrative worksite case completions and criminal employer case
presentations made to the U.S. Attorney's Office in fiscal year 2007
and a 30 percent increase in these two indicators in fiscal year 2008.
Although these two measures would provide a general indication of ICE's
level of worksite enforcement activity, these measures alone would not
allow ICE or Congress to effectively determine resources needed for the
worksite enforcement program because these indicators address only two
elements of the worksite enforcement program and do not address other
program elements, such as critical infrastructure protection.
Furthermore, in July 2005 the Secretary of Homeland Security discussed
the need for DHS, of which ICE is a part, to be an effective steward of
its resources. Without additional output goals and measures for
worksite enforcement, ICE's ability to effectively determine and
allocate worksite enforcement resources needed to meet program goals,
especially given other agency priorities for resources, and to fully
assess whether the agency is using those resources effectively and
efficiently in implementing the program may be hindered.
In addition, ICE lacks outcome goals and measures that may hinder its
ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement
program efforts, including critical infrastructure protection efforts.
Outcome measures provide agencies with an assessment of the results of
a program activity or policy compared to its intended purposes. ICE
officials told us that the agency plans to develop outcome goals and
measures for its worksite enforcement program, but it has not yet
developed these goals and measures. As a first step, ICE officials told
us that field offices conducted baseline threat-level assessments in
August and September 2004 to help identify regional risks, such as
risks to critical infrastructure sites. These officials stated that an
action plan will be developed to address these risks. Field office
agents will then measure how well a particular threat has been
addressed by measuring the impact of ICE's investigative activities on
deterring threats or decreasing vulnerabilities to national security.
ICE has not yet established target time frames for developing worksite
enforcement program outcome goals and measures and, without these goals
and measures, ICE may not be able to effectively assess the results of
program efforts. For example, until ICE fully develops outcome goals
and measures, it may not be able to completely determine the extent to
which its critical infrastructure protection efforts have resulted in
the elimination of unauthorized workers' access to secure areas of
critical infrastructure sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for
its worksite enforcement program.
Conclusions:
Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United
States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process
and a credible worksite enforcement program to help ensure that
employers are meeting verification requirements. The current Form I-9
employment verification process has not fundamentally changed since its
establishment in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses in the process have
undermined its effectiveness. Although DHS and the former INS have been
assessing changes in the process since 1997, DHS has not yet issued
final regulations on these changes, and it has not established a
definitive time frame for completing the assessment. Completion of this
assessment and issuance of final regulations should strengthen the
current employment verification process and make it simpler and more
secure. Furthermore, the Basic Pilot Program, or a similar automated
verification system, if implemented on a much larger scale, shows
promise for enhancing the employment verification process and reducing
document fraud. However, current weaknesses in pilot program
implementation would have to be fully addressed to help ensure the
efficient and effective operation of an expanded or mandatory pilot
program, or a similar automated employment verification program, and
the cost of additional resources would be a consideration. Although
USCIS plans to review current pilot program weaknesses, additional
information on the costs and feasibility of addressing these weaknesses
is needed to assist USCIS and Congress in assessing possible future use
of the Basic Pilot Program, including increased program usage.
Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible
worksite enforcement program is needed because no verification process
is foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with the law.
ICE's focus on critical infrastructure protection since September 11,
2001 is consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism by
detecting and mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks at
critical infrastructure sites which, if exploited, could pose serious
threats to domestic security. This focus on critical infrastructure
protection, though, generally does not address noncritical
infrastructure employers' noncompliance with IRCA. As a result,
employers, particularly those not located at or near critical
infrastructure sites, who attempt to circumvent IRCA face less of a
likelihood that ICE will investigate them for failing to comply with
the current employment verification process or knowingly hiring
unauthorized workers. ICE is taking some steps to address difficulties
it has faced in its worksite enforcement efforts, but it is too early
to tell whether these steps will improve the effectiveness of the
worksite enforcement program. In addition, given ICE's limited
resources and competing priorities for those resources, additional
output goals and measures are needed to help ICE track the progress of
its worksite enforcement efforts, effectively determine the resources
needed to meet worksite enforcement program goals, and ensure that
program resources are used efficiently and effectively. Moreover, a
target time frame for developing outcome goals and measures is needed
to assist Congress and ICE in determining whether the worksite
enforcement program, including critical infrastructure protection, is
achieving its desired outcomes.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen the current employment verification process, we recommend
that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following action:
* set a specific time frame for completing the department's review of
the Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of
reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and
issuing final regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an
updated Form I-9.
To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased
or mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the
following action:
* include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect
identity fraud in the verification and reverification processes, delays
in entry of new arrival and employment authorization information into
DHS databases, and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and
resources needed to support any increased or mandatory use of the
program.
To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources needed for the
worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the efficient and
effective use of program resources, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to take the
following two actions:
* establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite
enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE
worksite enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the
program, and:
* set a specific time frame for completing the assessment and
development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
program to provide a target level of performance for worksite
enforcement efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program
results have met program goals.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on this report from the Secretary of Homeland
Security. In its response, DHS agreed with our recommendations. DHS's
comments are reprinted in Appendix V. DHS also provided technical
comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. We
also received technical comments from SSA, which we considered and
incorporated where appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
after the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of
this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
Labor, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and appropriate congressional committees. We will also make copies
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If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the employment eligibility verification (Form I-9)
process functions, we examined laws related to the employment
verification process, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996; federal regulations on the Form I-9 process; and former
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) guidance on the Form
I-9, such as the Handbook for Employers, which provides instructions
for completing the form. We evaluated this information to identify the
Form I-9 requirements, including employer and employee responsibilities
for completing the form, and challenges to meeting those requirements.
We examined our past reports and other studies, such as the 1997 U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform Report to Congress, to obtain further
information on the employment verification process. We analyzed former
INS plans for addressing Form I-9 challenges, including its plans to
modify the list of acceptable work eligibility documents. We also
examined U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) interim
guidelines on the electronic Forms I-9 to determine what guidance, if
any, they provide to employers using the electronic form.
To determine challenges to the Form I-9 process and obtain information
on the Basic Pilot Program, we also interviewed and obtained
information from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
ICE, and Social Security Administration (SSA) officials. In addition,
we interviewed representatives of 23 employers; 12 employer, employee,
and advocacy groups; and 6 immigration experts to obtain their views on
employment verification and worksite enforcement.[Footnote 67] We
selected the employers to interview based on a mix of the following
criteria: the total number of Basic Pilot Program queries; the total
number or percentage of pilot program queries that resulted in
authorized employment, tentative nonconfirmations, and final
nonconfirmations; geographic proximity to the ICE field offices we
visited; previous records of being sanctioned for Form I-9 violations;
and industry categorization. The 23 employers we interviewed were
located in the following states: California, Illinois, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, and Texas. The 23 employers were also part of the
following industries: meat processing, transportation, health care,
landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, food services, agriculture,
janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical
infrastructure, local government, and newspaper. One of the employers
we interviewed did not participate in the Basic Pilot Program. As a
result, when we discuss employers' views on the Basic Pilot Program, we
refer to the views of the 22 employers we interviewed who participated
in the Basic Pilot Program.
We selected the 9 employer and employee associations with which to meet
based on a mix of criteria, including industry categorization, gross
output by industry in 2002, number of paid employees by industry in
2002, and estimates of the number of illegal immigrants employed by
industry.[Footnote 68] We interviewed officials from employer and
employee associations in the following industries: construction,
agriculture, accommodation, food services, retail, health care, and
meat. We selected the 3 advocacy groups to interview based on the
groups' interest in issues related to employment verification and
worksite enforcement efforts and interviewed officials from advocacy
groups that represent a range of views on these issues. We selected the
6 immigration experts to interview based on the experts' range of views
on immigration issues. We analyzed information from these agencies,
employers, groups, and experts to determine their views on the Form I-
9 process and difficulties in verifying work eligibility through the
process. We used information obtained from employers, employer and
employee associations, and advocacy groups only as anecdotal examples,
as information from these entities cannot be generalized to all
employers and groups in the United States.
Furthermore, we evaluated information from USCIS and SSA on the Basic
Pilot Program, including the Basic Pilot Program user's manual and
memorandum of understanding for employers, to determine how the pilot
program functions and how it might assist participating employers in
reliably verifying employees' work eligibility and in detecting
counterfeit documents. We analyzed this information to determine
ongoing challenges in implementing the Basic Pilot Program and ways
these challenges could affect increased or mandatory use of the pilot
program. We did not evaluate security measures in place for the Basic
Pilot Program or the program's vulnerability to security risks. To
identify pilot program challenges, we examined the findings and
methodology of the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program completed by
the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in
June 2002. In addition, we analyzed data on employer participation in
and use of the Basic Pilot Program, including data on Basic Pilot
Program employment authorizations, to determine how participation and
use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We assessed the reliability of
these data by reviewing them for accuracy and completeness,
interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and
examining documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, and
verified in the databases. We determined that the independent
evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of our review.
To obtain information on the implementation of the worksite enforcement
program, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the
Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-
Related Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials
from 12 of the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices. We met
with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles and San
Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New
Jersey; New York City, New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas. We
spoke with officials from the following 4 field offices over the
telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo, New York; and
Seattle, Washington. We selected the 12 field offices based on a mix of
the following criteria: the number of investigators in each field
office in fiscal year 2003, the number of investigations conducted by
each field office in fiscal year 2003,[Footnote 69] the estimated
number of undocumented immigrants in the state in which each field
office was located, the number of sanctions issued to employers as a
result of closed cases located in the same city as the field office
between calendar years 1986 and 2000,[Footnote 70] the number of
critical infrastructure operations in which the field office
participated from October 2001 through April 2004, the number of
employers located in the same city as the field office that
participated in the Basic Pilot Program, and geographic area. We also
interviewed officials from 4 U.S. Attorney's Offices that were located
in the same areas as 4 of the field offices we visited. We met with
officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney's Offices: the Southern
District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the Southern District of
Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western District of Texas U.S.
Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern District of California
U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone. We used information obtained
from the field offices only as anecdotal examples, as information from
these entities cannot be generalized to all field offices in the United
States.
We analyzed ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and
other documents on worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities
for and management of worksite enforcement efforts and to identify any
challenges in program implementation. We analyzed ICE's April 2005
Interim Strategic Plan to determine ICE's strategy for its worksite
enforcement program. We also examined former INS guidance and
strategies and other studies, such as reports from the Department of
Justice Office of the Inspector General, to determine how worksite
enforcement priorities, implementation, and challenges have evolved.
In addition, we separately analyzed ICE and INS data on the worksite
enforcement program and assessed their validity and reliability by
reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency
officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on
how the data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases.
We determined that the data from each agency were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of our review. However, we could not compare the INS
and ICE data because, following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the
case management system used to enter and maintain information on
immigration investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE,
agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs Service's case management
system, called the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for
entering and maintaining information on investigations, including
worksite enforcement operations. Prior to the creation of ICE, the
former INS entered and maintained information on investigative
activities in the Performance Analysis System, which captured
information on immigration investigations differently than the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System.
Additionally, ICE officials indicated that, in a few cases, the INS and
ICE data did not completely account for all worksite enforcement
operations results. ICE officials told us that agents use judgment in
categorizing cases entered into both systems and there are a limited
number of instances in which agents did not appropriately categorize
cases. For example, ICE officials told us that, in reviewing worksite
enforcement cases in the ICE system for fiscal year 2004, they found a
few cases that agents inappropriately categorized as worksite
enforcement.
To determine the investigative agent work-years, or full-time
equivalents, that INS spent on the worksite enforcement program for
each fiscal year from 1999 through 2003, we divided the total hours INS
reported spending on employer investigations by the total hours spent
on all investigations, including agent hours spent on leave, training,
and other administrative and noninvestigative work. We then multiplied
this result by 2,080 hours, which constitute one work-year, to
determine the number of work-years spent on worksite enforcement.
We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Information on the Electronic Form I-9:
In October 2004, Congress authorized the electronic Form I-9 to be
implemented by the end of April 2005.[Footnote 71] ICE has provided
interim guidelines for using electronic Forms I-9, until the agency
issues final regulations on their use. The interim guidelines specify
that employers will have options for completing, signing, storing, and
presenting for inspection electronic Forms I-9. For example, the
guidelines note that employers may choose to complete Forms I-9 on
paper and store the forms electronically or they may choose to both
electronically complete and store Forms I-9. The guidelines also state
that electronic signatures could be generated through various
technologies such as electronic signature pads, personal identification
numbers, biometrics, and dialog boxes. The guidelines also state that
employers could use electronic storage systems to retain Forms I-9 that
include quality assurance steps to prevent and detect the unauthorized
creation, addition, alteration, deletion, or deterioration of
electronically stored data. In addition, employers may consider an
electronic storage system that includes an indexing system and ability
to reproduce legible and readable hard copies of electronically stored
forms.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic
Pilot Program:
Employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program has
generally increased. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the number of
employers actively using the Basic Pilot Program increased from 1,205
to 2,305. In addition, as shown in figure 6, the number of total
queries processed through the Basic Pilot Program has generally
increased since fiscal year 2000.
Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating
Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest thousand.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 7, the majority of Basic Pilot Program queries that
resulted in employment authorizations for each fiscal year from 2000
through 2004 were issued by SSA.
Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in
Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 26, 2005:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Re: Draft Report GAO-05-813, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. The following
represents the Departmental response to the recommendations contained
in the draft report.
Recommendation: To strengthen the current employment verification
process, GAO recommends the Secretary of Homeland Security take the
following Action:
* Set a specific timeframe for completing the department's review of
the Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of
reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and
issuing final regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an
updated Form I-9.
Response: Concur. The Department's Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agrees that a timeframe should be established to assess the
possibility of reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility
documents for the I-9 Form.
Recommendation: To assist Congress and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) in assessing the possibility of increased or mandatory
use of the Basic Pilot Program, GAO recommends the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the following
action:
* Include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect
identity fraud in the verification and re-verification processes,
delays in entry of new arrival and employment authorization information
into DHS databases, employer noncompliance with program procedures, and
resources needed to support any increased or mandatory use of the
program.
Response: Generally Concur. The Basic Pilot Program has the potential
to enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document
fraud. The testing of alternative pilots and continuous improvements to
the Basic Pilot has collectively made a step toward developing workable
alternatives to enhance the employment verification process.
Furthermore, it has been important to test and evaluate alternative
employment verification systems. before creating an expensive new
mandatory national employment verification system. USCIS concurs with
GAO's recommendation concerning USCIS' upcoming evaluation of the Basic
Pilot Program. The evaluation, which will begin in the fall of 2005,
will evaluate the new Web-based access method to determine the extent
to which it resolves the deficiencies found in the computer and modem
access method evaluated earlier. The assessment also will address why
some employers appear to have more problems following proper pilot
procedures than others. In addition, the evaluation will address the
feasibility and cost accuracy of the pertinent databases.
Recommendation: To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources
needed for the worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the
efficient and effective use of program resources, GAO recommends the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE
to take the following two actions:
* Establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite
enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE
worksite enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the
program, and:
* Set a specific timeframe for completing the assessment and
development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
program to provide a target level of performance for worksite
enforcement efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program
results have met program goals.
Response: Concur. ICE Office of Investigations will proceed with the
recommendation to establish additional goals and measures for the
worksite enforcement program to more clearly indicate ICE's target
level of activity, based on current resources and mandates. The
established goals and measures also will address the needed resources
to implement the program and achieve the target level of activity. The
Office of Investigations will establish a timeframe for completing the
assessment and development of outcome goals and measures for the
worksite enforcement program.
We thank you again for the opportunity to review the report and provide
comments.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Orlando Copeland, Michele
Fejfar, Ann H. Finley, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn Godfrey, Charles
Michael Johnson, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American:
Immigration and Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997).
[2] In March 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
merged into the Department of Homeland Security. The service's
immigration functions were divided between U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement is responsible for managing and implementing the worksite
enforcement program.
[3] P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq.
[4] See appendix I for a copy of the Form I-9.
[5] GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized
Alien Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999).
[6] One of the 23 employers we interviewed did not participate in the
Basic Pilot Program. As a result, when we discuss the views of
employers on the Basic Pilot Program, we refer to the views of the 22
employers we interviewed that participated in the program. The 23
employers we interviewed were located in the following states:
California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. They
were part of the following industries: meatpacking, transportation,
health care, landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, food services,
agriculture, janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical
infrastructure, local government, and newspaper. According to
Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6 million employer firms
in the United States in 2002. The most current data available on the
number of employers in the United States were from 2002.
[7] We interviewed officials from 9 employer and employee associations
in the following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation,
food services, retail, health care, and meat. We interviewed officials
from three advocacy groups that represent a range of views on
immigration-related issues.
[8] The 6 immigration experts we interviewed have a range of views on
immigration-related issues.
[9] Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic
Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
[10] We met with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los
Angeles and San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit,
Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York City, New York; and Houston and
San Antonio, Texas. We spoke with officials from the following 4 field
offices over the telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo,
New York; and Seattle, Washington.
[11] We met with officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney's
Offices: the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the
Southern District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western
District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern
District of California U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone.
[12] GAO, Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration
Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements,
GAO-05-66 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).
[13] In 1999, the Department of Justice increased the amounts of the
civil penalties from those established in IRCA to the current levels to
reflect a ten percent adjustment for inflation. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b).
Under the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of
1990, as amended, federal agencies are to make regular adjustments for
inflation of civil monetary penalties that they are charged with
enforcing. 28 U.S.C. 2641 note.
[14] 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA of 1996 was enacted within a larger
piece of legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
1997, P.L. 104-208.
[15] According to IIRIRA, a person or entity with certain Form I-9
paperwork violations must be informed of the violation and provided
with a period of not less than 10 business days to correct the
violations. If the person or entity does not correct the violations
within the specified time period, the person or entity would not be
considered to have made a good faith attempt to comply with the Form I-
9 requirement.
[16] Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, P.L. 107-128 and Basic Pilot
Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, P.L.108-156.
[17] P.L. 108-156. IIRIRA required the INS to initially operate the
Basic Pilot Program in at least five of the seven states with the
highest estimated population of undocumented aliens in the United
States. In 1997, INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot
Program to employers in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and
Texas. In 1999, INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot
Program to employers in Nebraska because, at the time, INS was
conducting an initiative in the state, called Operation Vanguard, to
help the meatpacking and processing industry gain and maintain a legal
workforce.
[18] Under the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program, only the
status of newly hired employees attesting to being work-authorized
noncitizens was electronically checked against information in INS
databases. The evaluation of this pilot program identified several
problems, including inherent discrimination against work-authorized
noncitizens and the lack of strong safeguards against fraudulent
citizenship attestions. The evaluation stated that individuals who
attested to being citizens did not need to show documents proving their
citizen status, and the individuals' information was not queried
through the pilot program. The Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program
was initiated only in Iowa because Iowa was the sole state at the start
of the pilot program issuing driver's licenses and identification cards
that included machine-readable information needed for completing the
Form I-9 (e.g., name, date of birth, Social Security number). In
evaluating this pilot program, the Institute for Survey Research and
Westat found that the program had a number of technical and procedural
problems, such as card reader difficulties in reading the driver's
licenses and Iowa's no longer requiring the Social Security number as
the driver's license number. This change in Iowa's requirements
resulted in the inability of employers to use the readers on driver's
licenses without Social Security numbers. See Institute for Survey
Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen Attestation Verification
Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April 2003) and Institute
for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Machine-Readable
Document Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May 2003).
[19] In February 2005 we reported that verification services, like the
Basic Pilot Program, provide a valuable opportunity to prevent many
unintended or careless mistakes when hiring new workers and reporting
worker earnings. In particular, we concluded that the Basic Pilot
Program provides an option for addressing the problem of unauthorized
workers' earnings posted to the Earnings Suspense File, which occurs
when individuals' names or Social Security numbers in wage reports do
not match SSA records. According to SSA officials, when individuals
contest SSA tentative nonconfirmations, SSA can update the individuals'
information in the SSA database when, for example, individuals provide
information on name changes or correct inaccurate birthdates. SSA
officials said that such updates may help prevent wage reporting
problems and the posting of individuals' wage information to the
Earnings Suspense File. GAO, Social Security: Better Coordination among
Federal Agencies Could Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports, GAO-05-154
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2005).
[20] GAO, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of
Discrimination, GAO/GGD-90-62, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1990) and
GAO/GGD-99-33.
[21] GAO/GGD-99-33.
[22] GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a
Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004).
[23] There are no current reliable data available on the number or
percentage of employers who seek to comply with IRCA and those who
attempt to circumvent it.
[24] GAO/GGD-99-33.
[25] See appendix I for the complete list of acceptable work
eligibility documents.
[26] GAO/GGD-90-62.
[27] U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Options for an Improved Employment
Verification System (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992).
[28] GAO/GGD-99-33.
[29] In addition to developing a rule on the reduction of the number of
acceptable work eligibility documents, DHS is also developing
regulations on the electronic Form I-9, which employers were authorized
to use beginning at the end of April 2005. See appendix III for more
information on the electronic Form I-9.
[30] GAO/GGD-99-33.
[31] GAO, Social Security: Mass Issuance of Counterfeit-Resistant Cards
Expensive, but Alternatives Exist, GAO/HEHS-98-170 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 20, 1998).
[32] GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
[33] GAO, Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics, GAO-03-
1137T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).
[34] GAO-03-174.
[35] P.L. 109-13, 49 U.S.C. 30301 note.
[36] P.L. 108-458.
[37] Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act
of 2005, H.R. 98, 109TH Cong.
[38] The number of employers who actively used the program in fiscal
year 2004 includes a small number of employers who switched between two
versions of the program and, as a result, were counted twice as active
users. USCIS is not able to easily determine which employers were
counted twice. In addition, the approximately 2,300 employers who
actively used the pilot program in fiscal year 2004 do not reflect the
number of worksites or individual business establishments using the
program. In 2002, the most recent year for which data are available,
there were approximately 5.6 million firms in the United States. Under
the Basic Pilot Program, one employer may have multiple worksites that
use the pilot program. For example, a hotel chain could have multiple
individual hotels using the Basic Pilot Program. This hotel chain would
represent one employer using the pilot program. A firm is a business
organization consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the
same state and industry that were specified under common ownership or
control. See appendix IV for data on employer participation and use of
the Basic Pilot Program.
[39] GAO, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be Growing, GAO-
02-363 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2002).
[40] In fiscal year 2004, about 10 percent of total Basic Pilot Program
queries were referred to DHS for verification. Of these queries
referred to DHS for verification, about 85 percent were confirmed via
the DHS automated check.
[41] DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington,
D.C.: June 2004).
[42] P.L. 109-13, codified at 49 U.S.C. 30301.
[43] Other immigration status verifiers are dedicated to completing
manual verifications for other USCIS verification programs.
[44] According to USCIS, in fiscal year 2005, the agency allocated
about $475,000 to reimburse SSA for Basic Pilot Program query costs and
about $337,500 for employer query costs. In addition, USCIS estimated
about $7 million in annual costs for verifications by immigration
status verifiers.
[45] GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient
to Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations, GAO-04-
309R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 5, 2004). In April 2004, USCIS raised its
fees for immigration benefit applications.
[46] Under the dial-up version of the Basic Pilot Program, employers
installed pilot program software directly onto a computer and used a
dedicated telephone line to access the pilot system.
[47] The Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated that the
contractor who runs the Basic Pilot Program charged $0.28 per query.
They estimated that it cost about $6 to resolve each query that
required review by immigration status verifiers.
[48] INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: January
1999).
[49] GAO/GGD-99-33.
[50] The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System domestic
registration required selected groups of aliens from a number of
countries to register with immigration authorities between November
2002 and April 2003. Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multi-agency
investigative teams composed of federal, state, and local agencies that
work jointly with other nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism
matters.
[51] GAO-05-66.
[52] GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration
Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-03-660T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10,
2003).
[53] Operations Tarmac and Glow Worm were ICE initiatives to detect and
remove unauthorized workers from airports and nuclear power plants,
respectively.
[54] Data are not available on the number of critical infrastructure
and noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement cases ICE opened
prior to fiscal year 2005 because before fiscal year 2005, ICE's case
management system did not distinguish between the two case types.
[55] One full-time equivalent is equal to one work-year or 2,080
nonovertime hours.
[56] ICE headquarters' worksite enforcement unit is responsible for
managing the agency's worksite enforcement program.
[57] H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-774 (2004) accompanying the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334.
[58] ICE worksite enforcement investigations can span several fiscal
years. For example, ICE can open an investigation in one fiscal year,
but may not complete the case, including issuing a notice of intent to
fine, if warranted, for several fiscal years. In addition, after ICE
issues a notice of intent to fine, employers may negotiate with ICE
attorneys to set a final amount for the fine. Therefore, ICE could
issue a notice of intent to fine in one fiscal year, but not issue the
final order for the fine until the following fiscal year.
[59] These data on worksite enforcement criminal arrests for fiscal
years 2004 and 2005 do not include data on the number of worksite
enforcement administrative arrests for those fiscal years. Fiscal year
2004 and 2005 data cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal
years because the way INS agents entered data on investigative work-
years into the INS case management system differs from the way ICE
agents enter such data into the ICE system. Following the creation of
ICE in March 2003, the case management system used to enter and
maintain information on immigration investigations changed. With the
establishment of ICE, agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs
Service's case management system, called the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System, for entering and maintaining information on
investigations, including worksite enforcement operations. Prior to the
creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained information on
investigative activities in the Performance Analysis System, which
captured information on immigration investigations differently than the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System.
[60] GAO/GGD-99-33 and GAO, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to
Alien Illegal Activities, GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
[61] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Immigration and Naturalization Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and
Employing Illegal Aliens in Sweatshops, I-96-08 (Washington, D.C.: May
1996).
[62] ICE's objective for identifying critical industries for worksite
enforcement operations included the following five elements: (1)
identify and remove unauthorized workers from critical industries; (2)
implement and expand an ICE-employer partnership program to enhance
employer compliance, training, and information sharing; (3) investigate
criminal employers linked to smuggling, trafficking, worker
exploitation, and other criminal violations; (4) revitalize employer
sanctions to provide financial deterrence; and (5) promote use of
employment eligibility verification technology, like the Basic Pilot
Program. See ICE, Interim Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
[63] GAO/GGD-99-33.
[64] The Debt Management Center issues invoices to employers for
collecting fine amounts. According to ICE, multiple invoices can be
issued for each final order for an employer fine, as a payment plan is
typically established for employers as part of the final order for the
fine amount.
[65] The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for
identifying and removing criminal aliens from the United States. The
office is also responsible for managing ICE's space for detaining
aliens.
[66] H.R. Con. Rep. 109-72 (2005) accompanying the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13.
[67] According to Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6
million employer firms in the United States in 2002, the year for which
the most current data are available.
[68] At the time of selection, 2002 data on gross output by industry
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce were the
most current data available. Also, the most recent data available on
the total number of paid employees by industry from the U.S. Census
Bureau, Department of Commerce were from 2002.
[69] At the time of selection, the most current data available on the
number of investigators in each field office and the number of
investigations conducted by each field office were from fiscal year
2003.
[70] At the time of selection, the most current data available on the
number of sanctions issued to employers located in the same city as the
field offices were from calendar years 1986 through 2000.
[71] P.L. 108-390.
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