Transportation Security Administration
More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed Gao ID: GAO-05-935 September 23, 2005The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assigned Federal Security Directors (FSD) to oversee security, including the screening of passengers and their baggage, at the nation's more than 440 commercial airports. FSDs must work closely with stakeholders to ensure that airports are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a terrorist attack. This report addresses (1) the roles and responsibilities of FSDs and the clarity of their authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents, (2) the extent to which FSDs formed and facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders, and (3) FSDs' views of key changes TSA made to better support or empower the FSD position.
TSA has issued guidance that clearly defines FSDs' roles and responsibilities. However, TSA's guidance related to FSDs' authority is outdated and lacks clarity regarding FSD authority relative to other airport stakeholders. TSA's document that delegates authority to FSDs gives them authority to supervise and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that was never established. Also, it does not clearly address FSD authority during a security incident relative to other parties with airport security responsibilities. At airports GAO visited, stakeholders said that this information had never been communicated to them and they were not always clear on the FSDs' authority in such situations. For example, confusion arose at one airport over whether the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during a security incident. In August 2005, TSA officials stated that they were updating guidance on FSDs' authority but had not finalized their revisions prior to this report's issuance. All of the FSDs and most stakeholders at the airports GAO visited reported developing partnerships that were generally working well. Communication and coordination were taking place among stakeholders at these airports, including meetings, briefings, and training exercises. According to TSA, partnerships with airport stakeholders are essential to FSDs' success in addressing aviation security and customer service needs. For example, FSDs rely on law enforcement stakeholders during security incidents since they do not have their own law enforcement resources. FSDs also rely on air carriers for passenger volume information to schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on FSDs for efficient screening that minimizes passenger wait times. TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position, and most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes favorably. For example, most of the FSDs we interviewed were satisfied with TSA's new local hiring process that provided more options for FSDs to be involved in hiring screeners, and most said that the new process was better than the more centralized hiring process it replaced. Most FSDs we interviewed also saw value in the headquarters group TSA established to provide operational support to the field and a communication link among headquarters, field-based Area Directors, and FSDs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-935, Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed
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Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2005:
Transportation Security Administration:
More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed:
GAO-05-935:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-935, a report to the Ranking Democratic Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assigned Federal
Security Directors (FSD) to oversee security, including the screening
of passengers and their baggage, at the nation's more than 440
commercial airports. FSDs must work closely with stakeholders to ensure
that airports are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a
terrorist attack. This report addresses (1) the roles and
responsibilities of FSDs and the clarity of their authority relative to
that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents, (2) the
extent to which FSDs formed and facilitated partnerships with airport
stakeholders, and (3) FSDs‘ views of key changes TSA made to better
support or empower the FSD position.
What GAO Found:
TSA has issued guidance that clearly defines FSDs‘ roles and
responsibilities. However, TSA‘s guidance related to FSDs‘ authority is
outdated and lacks clarity regarding FSD authority relative to other
airport stakeholders. TSA‘s document that delegates authority to FSDs
gives them authority to supervise and deploy a TSA law enforcement
force that was never established. Also, it does not clearly address FSD
authority during a security incident relative to other parties with
airport security responsibilities. At airports GAO visited,
stakeholders said that this information had never been communicated to
them and they were not always clear on the FSDs‘ authority in such
situations. For example, confusion arose at one airport over whether
the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during a security
incident. In August 2005, TSA officials stated that they were updating
guidance on FSDs‘ authority but had not finalized their revisions prior
to this report‘s issuance.
All of the FSDs and most stakeholders at the airports GAO visited
reported developing partnerships that were generally working well.
Communication and coordination were taking place among stakeholders at
these airports, including meetings, briefings, and training exercises.
According to TSA, partnerships with airport stakeholders are essential
to FSDs‘ success in addressing aviation security and customer service
needs. For example, FSDs rely on law enforcement stakeholders during
security incidents since they do not have their own law enforcement
resources. FSDs also rely on air carriers for passenger volume
information to schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on FSDs for
efficient screening that minimizes passenger wait times.
TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position,
and most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes
favorably. For example, most of the FSDs we interviewed were satisfied
with TSA‘s new local hiring process that provided more options for FSDs
to be involved in hiring screeners, and most said that the new process
was better than the more centralized hiring process it replaced. Most
FSDs we interviewed also saw value in the headquarters group TSA
established to provide operational support to the field and a
communication link among headquarters, field-based Area Directors, and
FSDs.
Number of FSD Positions Dedicated to One Airport or Multiple Airports,
as of January 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct TSA to
update its Delegation of Authority to FSDs and communicate this
information to FSDs and airport stakeholders. The Department of
Homeland Security generally concurred with GAO‘s findings and
recommendations and described corrective actions that it has initiated
or plans to take to address the issues identified.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-935.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202)
512-8777 or Berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Federal Security Directors Have a Range of Responsibilities, but TSA's
Guidance Regarding FSDs' Authority Is Unclear:
TSA Provided Opportunities for Some FSDs to Participate in Developing
TSA Aviation Security Policy:
FSDs Formed Partnerships with Key Stakeholders and Participated in
Communication and Coordination Efforts:
TSA Made Changes to Better Support or Empower the FSD Position and Was
Planning Additional Changes:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25
Federal Security Directors:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration Organization Chart:
Figure 2: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of
January 2005:
Figure 3: Number of FSD Positions with Responsibility for a Designated
Number of Airports, as of January 2005:
Abbreviations:
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:
BTS: Border and Transportation Security:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FSD: Federal Security Director:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
MANPADS: Man Portable Air Defense System:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSES: Transportation Senior Executive Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 23, 2005:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Federal Security Directors (FSD) are the ranking Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) authorities responsible for leading and
coordinating TSA security activities at the nation's more than 440
commercial airports. During 2002, the first year FSDs were assigned to
airports, FSDs worked to meet deadlines associated with screening,
including deploying over 55,000 passenger and baggage screeners and
screening checked baggage using explosive detection systems. As a part
of their security responsibilities, FSDs must coordinate closely with
airport and air carrier officials, local law enforcement, and emergency
response officials to ensure that airports are adequately protected and
prepared in the event of a terrorist attack. FSDs' success in
sustaining and ensuring the effectiveness of aviation security efforts
are dependent on their ability to develop and maintain effective
partnerships with these stakeholders.
In March 2004, after FSDs had been deployed at airports for over 2
years, we surveyed all 155 FSDs at that time and learned that most
thought they needed certain additional authorities and flexibilities to
better address airport staffing and security needs. Since that survey,
TSA has taken steps to enhance FSDs' authority and provide
flexibilities in certain areas. To provide additional information on
the ability of FSDs to address airport security needs, this report
addresses the following questions: (1) What are the roles and the
responsibilities of FSDs and how clear is their authority relative to
that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents? (2) To
what extent are FSDs involved in the development of TSA aviation
security policy? (3) How have FSDs at selected airports formed and
facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders, and how are these
partnerships working? (4) What key changes has TSA made or planned to
make to better support or empower the FSD position, and how have
selected FSDs viewed these efforts?
To address these questions, we interviewed TSA's Chief Operating
Officer and officials from TSA's Aviation Security Program Office,
Office of Law Enforcement, Office of Compliance Programs, and Office of
Human Resources, and we reviewed relevant laws and TSA documentation
related to the FSD position. To obtain additional views on the role of
the FSD and FSD-stakeholder partnerships, we met with headquarters
officials from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border and
Transportation Security Directorate (BTS),[Footnote 1] and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Counter-Terrorism and Criminal
Investigations Divisions. We also met with officials from national
organizations representing airports (the American Association of
Airport Executives and the Airports Council International), airport law
enforcement officials (the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network),
and air carriers (the Air Transport Association). We conducted site
visits to seven airports. We selected these airports because they
incorporated all five airport security categories[Footnote 2]--three
airports with an FSD dedicated solely to each airport, and two sets of
airports where the FSD was responsible for at least two airports. At
each airport, we met with the FSD (five in total) or the top-ranking
TSA official, as well as the Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement and
Regulatory Inspection, where these positions existed. During our
meetings with FSDs, we obtained their views on changes TSA made to
further enhance the FSD position, as well as views on their roles and
responsibilities and perspectives on their partnerships with local
stakeholders. At airports, we also met with key stakeholders--airport
managers, airport law enforcement, station managers representing
selected air carriers, and FBI Airport Liaison Agents and officials
from DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) (at the two international airports we
visited) to obtain their views on the roles and responsibilities of the
FSD and partnerships and communication mechanisms with FSDs.
To corroborate and expand on what we learned from the FSDs we
interviewed during our site visits, we randomly selected 25 additional
FSDs and telephoned them to obtain their views on a range of topics
including recent TSA initiatives and the development of federal
aviation security policy. We also included selected questions--
regarding the adequacy of the FSDs' authority and flexibility--that we
had posed earlier, in a March 2004 Web-based survey of all 155 FSDs in
place at that time conducted in support of other aviation security
reviews. Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone as part of this
review, 21 were FSDs at the time of that Web-based survey and, as such,
responded to both. The information we obtained during our seven airport
visits and telephone interviews with 25 FSDs cannot be generalized to
all airports and FSDs across the nation.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I contains more details about our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
TSA developed guidance that describes the roles and responsibilities of
the FSD position, such as ensuring overall aviation security, providing
regulatory oversight, implementing policy, and managing stakeholder
relationships. However, the document that specifically describes the
FSDs' authority--TSA's Delegation of Authority to FSDs--is outdated,
does not clearly address the extent of FSD authority relative to other
airport stakeholders, and has not been adequately communicated to these
stakeholders. The document has not been updated since FSDs were first
assigned to airports and gives FSDs authority to supervise and deploy a
TSA law enforcement force that was envisioned but never established.
Also, the document describes some of the authorities of FSDs but does
not clearly address the extent of their authority relative to other
airport stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies, during
security incidents. Stakeholders at the airports we visited said they
were not always clear on the authority FSDs had relative to that of
other agencies, particularly FSDs' authority in various security
incidents, and that such information had not been communicated to them.
For example, at two airports, confusion or conflicting opinions arose
over whether the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during
particular security incidents. Stakeholders at the national level also
questioned the clarity of the FSDs' authority relative to other
agencies, particularly during security incidents. For example, FBI
headquarters officials stated that past airport training exercises
revealed that some FSDs thought they were in charge of certain
situations for which the FBI had authority. According to these
officials, in an actual security incident, confusion over roles could
result in conflict, confusion, and increased response time. In
addition, 18 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone said they
believed that TSA needs to do more to clarify their roles and
responsibilities for the benefit of FSDs and stakeholders, and many
stated that the authority of the FSD, in particular, needed
clarification. In August 2005, TSA officials stated that they had
drafted a new Delegation of Authority that clarified FSDs' authority.
However, TSA had not completed the revision prior to the issuance of
this report.
TSA does not charge FSDs with responsibility for developing federal
aviation security policy, but it does provide several opportunities for
some FSDs to be involved in developing some such policies. TSA's FSD
Advisory Council provides one mechanism for selected FSDs to be
involved in TSA's development of aviation security policy. The FSD
Advisory Council consists of 22 FSDs who the Administrator selects
based on various factors, such as airport security category. FSD
members provide the Administrator their opinions and guidance on
establishing and modifying TSA policies and procedures when requested
and have opportunities for input in other areas. On occasion, some FSDs
also have had the opportunity to provide input on draft federal
aviation security policy through ad hoc consultation groups organized
by TSA's Aviation Security Program Office. Testing new technology and
procedures at their airports has been another way for some FSDs to be
involved in developing federal aviation security policy.
FSDs responsible for the seven airports we visited reported that they
had entered into partnerships with airport stakeholders, and FSDs and
stakeholders we contacted at these airports said that their
partnerships were generally working well. TSA recognizes that building
and maintaining partnerships with airport stakeholders is essential to
FSDs' success in addressing security as well as maintaining an
appropriate level of customer service. TSA established general guidance
for FSDs to follow in building stakeholder partnerships but has left it
to the FSDs to determine how best to achieve effective partnerships at
their respective airports. FSDs need to partner with law enforcement
stakeholders, for example, because they do not have a law enforcement
body of their own to respond to security incidents. Partnerships can be
of mutual benefit to FSDs and airport stakeholders and can enhance
customer service. For example, FSDs rely on air carrier data on the
number of passengers transiting through checkpoints to appropriately
schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on the FSD to provide an
efficient screening process to minimize wait times for passengers. At
the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders cited several ways FSDs
maintained partnerships, including being accessible to their
stakeholders to help resolve problems and meeting with stakeholders to
discuss how to implement new security policies. In addition, a variety
of communication and coordination efforts were in place at the airports
we visited, and many of these efforts existed before TSA assigned FSDs
to airports. Formal mechanisms included security and general airport
operations meetings, incident debriefings, and training exercises to
help ensure a coordinated response in the event of a security incident.
TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position
by providing FSDs with more authority and flexibility, and FSDs we
interviewed generally viewed most of these efforts favorably. For
example, TSA implemented a local hiring initiative designed to vest
FSDs with more authority to address their screener staffing needs by,
among other things, giving FSDs the flexibility to select their level
of participation in the hiring process. Most of the 25 FSDs we
interviewed stated that this new hiring method addressed their needs
better than TSA's former highly centralized approach, although 12 of
the 25 FSDs said that to a great or very great extent, they still
wanted more authority in this area. When we originally posed the same
question regarding FSD authority in hiring screeners in our March 2004
survey of all 155 FSDs, 88 percent of those FSDs stated that to a great
or very great extent they wanted more authority in selecting screeners.
In another effort to move more decision making to the field, TSA
physically relocated its five Area Director positions from headquarters
to the field and established a group in headquarters to provide
operational support and a communication link among headquarters, field-
based Area Directors, and FSDs. FSDs we interviewed were split on
whether they thought moving the Area Director position to the field was
helpful, but most considered the group TSA established in headquarters
to be a valuable resource. TSA had three other efforts under way that
could significantly affect FSDs--the implementation of a new staffing
model for allocating screeners at airports, a reassessment of the
number of management positions allocated to each FSD, and a
reassessment of which and how many airports are assigned to FSDs. TSA
took steps to involve at least some FSDs in these efforts. However,
most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said that TSA had not involved them.
TSA headquarters officials said that they acknowledge the importance of
FSDs' involvement in agency planning efforts, and when practical and
appropriate, have attempted to obtain a broad spectrum of FSD input.
To assist TSA in fully communicating key areas of FSD authority to
ensure organizational goals and objectives are achieved, we recommend
that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary
of Homeland Security for TSA to update the Delegation of Authority to
FSDs to clearly reflect their authority relative to other airport
stakeholders during security incidents and communicate this information
to FSDs and relevant stakeholders.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations and agreed that efforts to implement these
recommendations are critical to enable FSDs to effectively oversee
security at the nation's commercial airports. DHS described actions TSA
has initiated to revise and update the Delegation of Authority to FSDs.
Once approved, TSA plans to notify FSDs and airport stakeholders of
their responsibilities under the new Delegation of Authority. A copy of
DHS's comments is included as appendix III.
Background:
A federal position dedicated to overseeing security at commercial
airports was first established in 1990 under the Federal Aviation
Administration and was later transferred to TSA. The Federal Aviation
Administration established the position of Federal Security Manager
pursuant to a mandate in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990.[Footnote 3] Federal Security Managers, responsible for security
at the nation's largest airports, developed airport security plans in
concert with airport operators and air carriers; provided regulatory
oversight to ensure security measures were contained in airport plans
and were properly implemented; and coordinated daily federal aviation
security activities, including those with local law enforcement.
According to TSA officials, regional civil aviation security field
offices, headed by Civil Aviation Security Field Officers and staffed
with security inspectors, had been in place at commercial airports
since the mid-1970s and eventually covered the more than 440 commercial
airports required to have security programs. In practice, the field
office staff performed compliance and enforcement inspections and
assessed penalties, while the Federal Security Managers served in a
liaison and coordination role as on-site security experts. To avoid
duplication of effort, Civil Aviation Security Field Officers were not
assigned responsibilities at airports where Federal Security Managers
were designated or stationed.
In November 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) into law, shifting certain responsibilities for aviation
security from air carriers to the federal government and the newly
created TSA.[Footnote 4] Specifically, ATSA created TSA and granted it
direct operational responsibility for, among other things, passenger
and checked baggage screening. On February 17, 2002, pursuant to ATSA,
TSA assumed responsibility from FAA for security at the nation's
commercial airports, including FAA's existing aviation security
programs, plans, contracts, regulations, orders, directives, and
personnel.[Footnote 5] On February 22, 2002, FAA and TSA jointly
published a final rule transferring the civil aviation security
regulations from FAA to TSA and amending those rules to comport with
ATSA and enhance security as required by the act. According to TSA
officials, DOT and TSA leadership administratively changed the name of
the Federal Security Manager to Federal Security Director to avoid
confusion with the liaison role of the Federal Security Manager prior
to September 11. The FSD role was more comprehensive and had
responsibilities that included overseeing passenger and baggage
screening. Airport operators retained responsibility for the security
of the airport operating environment, that is, perimeter security,
access control to secured areas, and other measures detailed in the
approved airport security plan, while the FSD provided regulatory
oversight over these efforts.
FSDs report to one of five Area Directors, based on their geographic
regions, on administrative matters. However, they report to TSA
headquarters (the Aviation Security Program Office and Transportation
Security Operations Center) on operational issues, such as reporting
security incidents. FSDs are part of the Aviation Security Program
Office within TSA's Office of Intermodal Programs, as shown in figure
1. The Aviation Security Program Office focuses on specific functions
related to TSA's Aviation Security Program, including staffing,
training, and equipping the federal security work force. The
Transportation Security Operations Center serves as a single point of
contact for security-related operations, incidents, or crises in
aviation and all surface modes of transportation. FSDs are to report
any security incident at their airport immediately to the center, which
is to provide guidance, if needed, as well as look for patterns among
all incidents that occur throughout the country. The center provides
FSDs daily intelligence briefings based on incident information from
FSDs and information from TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence
Service. The Transportation Security Intelligence Service provides
FSDs, Deputy FSDs, and Assistant FSDs with a classified Daily
Intelligence Summary containing the most current threat information
from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and
stakeholders and provides the FSD staff with an unclassified TSA Field
Intelligence Summary to be used in briefing screeners and screening
management about current threats and other issues related to aviation
security.
Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration Organization Chart:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TSA's Area Directors are responsible for monitoring and annually
assessing the performance of FSDs. FSD performance is to be assessed in
terms of successful accomplishment of organizational goals as well as
specific performance metrics associated with aviation security within
the FSD's area of responsibility. Area Directors are required to follow
DHS's performance management guidance for FSDs who are part of the
Transportation Senior Executive Service (TSES) and TSA's performance
management guidance for FSDs who are not part of the TSES (non-TSES).
According to TSA Human Resources officials, about one-third of the FSDs
are part of the TSES, and they are generally assigned to larger
airports.
FSDs are responsible for overseeing security operations at the nation's
commercial airports--443 airports as of January 2005--which TSA
classifies in one of five airport security categories (X, I, II, III,
IV).[Footnote 6] These categories are based on various factors such as
the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which
passengers are screened at the airport, and other special security
considerations. In general, category X airports have the greatest
number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have the fewest.
These airports can vary dramatically, not just in passenger and flight
volume, but in other characteristics, including physical size and
layout. Figure 2 identifies the number of commercial airports by
airport security category, as of January 2005.
Figure 2: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of
January 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: TSA periodically reviews and updates airport security categories
to reflect current operations. We used the categories in place in
January 2005 to conduct the above analysis. Percentages do not total
100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
TSA had 157 FSD positions at commercial airports nationwide, as of
January 2005.[Footnote 7] Although an FSD is responsible for security
at every commercial airport, not every airport has an FSD dedicated
solely to that airport. Most category X airports have an FSD
responsible for that airport alone. Other airports are arranged in a
"hub and spoke" configuration, in which an FSD is located at or near a
hub airport but also has responsibility over one or more spoke airports
of the same or smaller size that are generally located in geographic
proximity.[Footnote 8] At spoke airports, the top-ranking TSA official
located at that airport might be a Deputy FSD, Screening Manager, or
even Screening Supervisor, although the FSD has overall responsibility
for the airport.[Footnote 9] Figure 3 identifies the number of FSDs
responsible for specific numbers of airports. For example, figure 3
shows that 44 FSDs are responsible for a single airport, 37 are
responsible for two airports (one hub and one spoke), and 1 is
responsible for nine airports (one hub and eight spokes).
Figure 3: Number of FSD Positions with Responsibility for a Designated
Number of Airports, as of January 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FSDs rely on their management staff to help carry out their
responsibilities at airports, but the exact FSD management positions
vary by airport. At larger airports, FSDs might have four Assistant
FSDs--one for Law Enforcement, one for Regulatory Inspection, one for
Screening, and another for Operations. However, not every FSD or
airport has these Assistant FSD positions. Assistant FSDs for Law
Enforcement coordinate law enforcement activities at the airport and
often work with local Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Assistant FSDs for
Regulatory Inspection are responsible for matters related to the
enforcement of, and compliance with, approved security plans and
directives pertaining to airport and aviation security. These
responsibilities include a key function of the oversight of airport
compliance with regulatory requirements and security measures contained
in approved security plans and security directives. Assistant FSDs for
Screening are responsible for passenger and baggage screening and
managing all screener staff, and Assistant FSDs for Operations are
responsible for managing nonscreening operations (e.g., exercise
planning and execution, crisis management, and vulnerability
assessments) and designated aspects of administrative support. An FSD
responsible for a large airport may also have a Deputy FSD, and that
position could be located at a hub airport where the FSD is located or
at a spoke airport. Other FSD management staff positions vary by
airport and airport size, but may include a Stakeholder Manager,
Customer Support Manager, Training Coordinator, Human Resource
Specialist, Financial Specialist, Scheduling Operations Officer,
Screening Supervisors and Managers, administrative support personnel,
as well as other positions.
Federal Security Directors Have a Range of Responsibilities, but TSA's
Guidance Regarding FSDs' Authority Is Unclear:
TSA developed guidance that describes the many roles and
responsibilities of the FSD position, most of which is associated with
securing commercial airports from terrorist threats. However, its
guidance addressing FSD authority is outdated and does not clearly
describe the FSDs' authority relative to other airport stakeholders
during a security incident. Furthermore, some of the stakeholders at
airports we visited said that the FSDs' authority relative to others
was not always clear during a security incident, and that the FSDs'
authority in such cases had not been communicated to them. Most of the
25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone said that TSA needed to do more to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FSD position for the
benefit of FSDs and stakeholders, with the majority of these FSDs
stating that their authority needed further clarification.
FSDs Have a Range of Responsibilities Related to Airport Security:
The FSD is the ranking TSA authority responsible for the leadership and
coordination of TSA security activities at the nation's commercial
airports. As such, the FSD is responsible for providing day-to-day
operational direction for federal security at the airport or airports
to which the FSD is assigned. ATSA established broad authorities of the
FSD, while specific responsibilities of the FSD are laid out in TSA
Delegation Orders, the FSD position description, and TSA's 2004
Executive FSD Guide,[Footnote 10] and include the following:
Overseeing security screening of passengers, baggage, and air cargo.
FSDs are responsible for providing direct oversight of passenger and
baggage screening by managing the local screening force, which is
typically composed of federal employees.[Footnote 11] To carry out this
responsibility, FSDs engage in activities that include ensuring
implementation of required screener-training programs, anticipating and
preparing for training on new screening technologies and procedures,
and developing local training initiatives to test and improve screener
performance. In accordance with regulations, aircraft operators perform
their own security screening of air cargo, and FSDs are responsible for
overseeing operators' performance in implementing required security
measures.
Providing regulatory oversight of all U.S. air transportation
facilities and operations. FSDs are responsible for ensuring that
airports, airlines (foreign and domestic), air cargo carriers, and
indirect air carriers comply with TSA regulations and security
directives governing such things as perimeter security, access
controls, procedures for challenging questionable identification
documents, aircraft searches, and general security procedures.[Footnote
12] This is accomplished through administering appropriate compliance
and enforcement actions with the goal of discovering and correcting
deficiencies and vulnerabilities in aviation security. FSDs oversee
civil enforcement activities at their airports involving findings of
noncompliance with security requirements by airlines, airports, and
individuals, including passengers. To carry out their regulatory
oversight responsibilities, FSDs and staff engage in activities that
include conducting stakeholder meetings with all regulated parties to
discuss regulatory changes or educate them on current aviation threats.
Analyzing and addressing security threats. FSDs are responsible for
conducting analyses of security threats and vulnerabilities in and
around their airports. To carry out this responsibility, FSDs seek
intelligence from sources external to TSA, build systems to analyze the
information received from intelligence organizations and apply it to
the local airport security, and direct TSA regulatory agents to test
security measures and procedures and identify potential security
weaknesses.
Building and managing relationships with airport stakeholders. FSDs are
responsible for building and managing relationships with local
stakeholders (e.g., airport management, airlines, and concessionaires)
to ensure that security operations run smoothly. To carry out this
responsibility, FSDs engage in activities that include collaborating
with airlines to identify and resolve issues of efficient passenger
flow and customer service while maintaining security standards. FSDs
also coordinate with airport and airline management; federal, state,
and local governments; law enforcement agencies; and relevant private
sector entities to organize and implement a Federal Security Crisis
Management Plan at each airport. The plan is essentially a protocol for
what TSA employees and airport stakeholders should do in the event of
an emergency, including a terrorist incident, within the airport.
Other FSD responsibilities include communicating information received
from TSA headquarters to appropriate stakeholders, maintaining quality
customer service for airlines and passengers, providing leadership to
the TSA employee population, managing and coordinating their direct
staff, and overseeing management of TSA facilities and equipment
resources. In addition, TSA has directed FSDs to conduct outreach and
liaison with the general aviation community in their areas, although it
has not given FSDs regulatory oversight responsibility over general
aviation airports.[Footnote 13]
TSA's Guidance Regarding Aspects of FSDs' Authority Is Outdated, Lacks
Clarity, and Has Not Been Adequately Communicated to Stakeholders:
FSDs' roles and responsibilities have been fairly well documented, but
their authority relative to other airport stakeholders during security
incidents has not been clearly defined. Section 103 of ATSA addressed
FSD authority at the broadest level by giving FSDs responsibility for
overseeing the screening of passengers and property and for carrying
out any other duties prescribed by the TSA Administrator.[Footnote 14]
TSA's Executive FSD Guide, discussed earlier, describes FSD
responsibilities, but it does not address the FSDs' authority in
security incidents. That authority is addressed more specifically in
TSA's June 2002 Delegation of Authority to Federal Security Directors
(Delegation Order), which gives FSDs the authority to provide for
overall security of aviation, including the security of aircraft and
airports and related facilities to which they are assigned.[Footnote
15]
The Delegation Order is outdated in that it gives FSDs the authority to
train, supervise, equip, and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that
was never established. Officials from TSA's Aviation Security Program
Office acknowledged that the document is outdated and has not been
updated since FSDs were first assigned to airports. According to
officials from TSA's Office of Law Enforcement, TSA originally
envisioned that all FSDs would be federal law enforcement officers
(e.g., GS-1811--criminal investigators) and would command a TSA police
force. However, the force was never established, and FSDs were not
given federal law enforcement status. TSA has assigned an Assistant FSD
for Law Enforcement to about half the FSDs in the country, but this is
the only law enforcement position on their staff. Instead, airport
police or state or local law enforcement agencies primarily carry out
the law enforcement function at airports.[Footnote 16]
Furthermore, the Delegation Order does not clearly address the extent
of FSD authority relative to other parties with responsibilities
related to airport security, including law enforcement agencies. For
example, the Delegation Order gives the FSD authority to clear, close,
or otherwise secure facilities under certain circumstances, and after
taking such action, requires the FSD to provide feedback to the airport
operator on the reasons the security action was taken. The document
also provides that, under certain circumstances, the FSD has the
authority to cancel, delay, return, or divert flights and search and
detain persons or property. However, it does not clearly address what
authority, if any, FSDs have over other parties, such as airport law
enforcement personnel, on which it would need to rely to take these
actions. In August 2005, TSA officials told us that they had drafted a
revised Delegation Order that clarified the authority of FSDs and that
it is was being reviewed internally. They stated that the revised
document restates some of the FSDs' previous authority and provides for
some new ones, such as entering into interagency agreements.
Stakeholders at some of the airports we visited told us that the FSDs'
role, particularly regarding their authority relative to other parties,
was not sufficiently clear, and at least one stakeholder at every
airport we visited said such information had never been communicated to
them. At three of the seven airports, stakeholders said that aspects of
the FSD's authority during a security incident lacked clarity. For
example, at two airports, confusion or conflicting opinions developed
over whether the FSD had the authority to take certain actions during
particular security incidents. Furthermore, six stakeholders at two of
the airports we visited were also unclear about the FSD's authority
regarding control over airport law enforcement personnel and canine
teams, access to secured information, and specific operational changes.
Additionally, at least one stakeholder at each of the seven airports we
visited said he or she had never been briefed or given information on
the role of the FSD. Among these stakeholders was an airport manager
who said he had specifically sought out documents detailing the FSD's
roles and authority, including how the FSD would fit into the airport's
incident command system. At another airport, airport management
officials said they had to take the initiative, in conjunction with the
FSD and law enforcement stakeholders, to develop a matrix identifying
first responders and the lead agency for various types of incidents
after a potential hijacking situation highlighted the need to document
and share such guidance.
Several stakeholders at the national level also raised questions
regarding the clarity of the FSD's authority relative to that of other
parties, including FSDs' authority in particular security incidents.
Specifically, FBI headquarters officials and representatives of two
industry associations representing airports and airport law enforcement
officials voiced concern about the clarity of FSDs' authority, noting
that initially some of the first FSDs attempted to assert control over
airport stakeholders, such as the airport police department. FBI
headquarters officials were concerned, on the basis of past airport
exercises, that relationships between FSDs and the FBI had not been
explicitly delineated. Officials stated that if a conflict with local
FBI authorities occurred during an actual security incident, it might
create confusion and result in a longer response time. As of October
2004, FBI headquarters officials informed us that the FBI was
attempting to enter into a memorandum of understanding with TSA to
clarify certain aspects of each agency's authority. TSA officials said
that, as of August 2005, TSA and the FBI had not entered into a
memorandum of understanding and were not able to provide us any
additional information on this issue.
Our telephone interviews with selected FSDs also indicated a need for a
clearer statement of their authority. Most (18) of the 25 FSDs we
interviewed said, to varying degrees, that TSA needed to do more to
clarify the role and responsibilities of the FSD position--not just for
the benefit of FSDs and their staff, but for the benefit of airport
stakeholders as well. (These and other responses to selected questions
we posed during our interviews with 25 FSDs are contained in app. II.)
More specifically, when we asked those 18 FSDs what needed further
clarification, 11 said that their authority needed to be further
defined. Among these 11 were 6 FSDs who believed TSA should develop a
document that delineates the authority of the position or update the
Delegation Order. For example, FSDs told us that other agencies do not
understand the authority of the FSD or TSA, and have asked for a
document to be made widely available to federal agencies, state and
local law enforcement, emergency responders, and other airport
stakeholders. Four FSDs explained that clarification of the FSDs'
authority is needed with respect to critical incident response.
TSA Provided Opportunities for Some FSDs to Participate in Developing
TSA Aviation Security Policy:
TSA does not charge FSDs with responsibility for developing TSA
aviation security policy. However, TSA does expect FSDs to provide
input on draft policy from TSA headquarters when called upon and to
recommend policies and procedures for addressing emerging or unforeseen
security risks and policy gaps. According to TSA officials, the agency
provides several opportunities for some FSDs to be involved in
developing some TSA aviation security policies through the FSD Advisory
Council, ad hoc consultation groups, and the piloting of new security
procedures and technology.
The FSD Advisory Council provides a mechanism for selected FSDs to be
involved in TSA's efforts to develop aviation security policy,
according to TSA officials. The FSD Advisory Council was originally
established as a way for the Aviation Security Program Office to
conduct outreach among the FSDs. However, in May 2004, the TSA
Administrator recast the council as an advisory board reporting
directly to him and, for the most part, responding to his agenda items.
The council consists of 22 FSDs who the Administrator selects based on
factors such as geographic location, airport security category, and
strong FSD leadership, according to a TSA official responsible for
council coordination. Most FSDs do not serve on the council for more
than 1 year, but their term is ultimately left to the Administrator's
discretion. Council meetings occur over a 3-day period in Washington,
D.C., generally on a monthly basis. According to TSA officials, during
council meetings, the FSDs provide the Administrator their opinions and
guidance on establishing and modifying TSA policies and procedures and
have opportunities for input in other areas. Four of the five FSDs at
airports we visited, including two who were council members, saw the
council as an effective way for the Administrator to gather input on
new TSA policy initiatives and issues confronting FSDs. The fifth FSD
commented that most of the issues discussed by the council appeared to
be more relevant to airports larger than his.
On occasion, some FSDs have the opportunity to provide input on draft
TSA aviation security policy through ad hoc consultation groups
organized by the Aviation Security Program Office, according to TSA
officials. For instance, when TSA establishes a new standard operating
procedure, it typically consults a selected group drawn from, perhaps,
9 or 10 airports. These groups are ad hoc and may include different
combinations of FSDs, FSD staff, and airport stakeholders. For example,
TSA formed a group of FSDs, screeners, and airport and air carrier
staff from multiple airports to address anticipated increases in the
2004 summer travel season. According to the TSA officials, TSA
typically consults such groups on most significant policy developments.
However, the more urgent or sensitive a new policy, the less likely TSA
will have time to obtain input outside of headquarters. The official
stated that TSA does not involve every FSD in every policy it develops
but added that he could not think of any policy in the last 6 months
that had not involved at least some FSDs in its development.
Participating in pilots of new technology and procedures at their
airports is another way FSDs can be involved in developing TSA aviation
security policy. TSA has a variety of ongoing pilot programs that it
generally characterizes as either technology-or procedure-based. For
example, TSA has tested and evaluated at multiple airports a technology
pilot--the Explosive Trace Detection Portal Program--that is designed
to analyze the air around a passenger for traces of explosive material.
TSA's procedure-based pilots include the Registered Traveler Program,
which identifies participating travelers through biometric identifiers,
such as fingerprints, and helps to expedite these passengers through
required security screening for weapons and explosives. In addition,
TSA has piloted other program initiatives, such as its Next Generation
Hiring Program, which TSA reported provides a more localized approach
to screener hiring that enables FSDs to influence the hiring process
for their airports. TSA first piloted this initiative at Boston Logan
International Airport and gradually expanded testing to other airports,
continuing to make changes before implementing the program nationwide.
Not all FSDs or their airports have been involved in piloting new
technologies and procedures. According to TSA headquarters officials,
TSA decided to limit the airports at which it conducts these types of
pilots to a selected group of "model" airports, although it does
conduct pilots not involving technology or procedures at other
airports. As such, in December 2004, in an effort to streamline the
airport selection process for technology pilots, TSA identified 15
airports and recommended they be used for such pilots on an ongoing
basis.[Footnote 17] According to these officials, the selected airports
provide diversity in geography, demographics, and baggage and materials
to be screened. Ten of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said TSA had offered
their airports opportunities to pilot a new program or technology
(collectively, more than 20 such opportunities), and all of them
subsequently participated.
Although TSA officials told us that opportunities exist for some FSDs
to be involved in developing TSA aviation security policy, most of the
FSDs (21 of 25) who we interviewed characterized themselves as not
involved in developing such policy. Three of the five FSDs at airports
we visited suggested that TSA should consult FSDs on security policies
before issuing them, although some noted time may not permit this on
urgent security measures. Two of these FSDs said it would be helpful if
TSA allowed FSDs a comment period for new policy, and another said that
because TSA does not involve FSDs in developing policy, its weekly
national conference calls with FSDs are filled with questions and
discussions about new security directives.
FSDs Formed Partnerships with Key Stakeholders and Participated in
Communication and Coordination Efforts:
FSDs reported they entered into these partnerships at the seven
airports we visited, and FSDs and stakeholders stated that these
partnerships were generally working well. Furthermore, FSDs initiated
communication and coordination efforts with stakeholders or were
involved in efforts already established--such as meetings and
briefings--to address a range of issues, including airport security,
operations, and coordination.
TSA Views Stakeholder Partnerships with FSDs as Essential:
As discussed earlier, TSA has given FSDs responsibility for building
and managing relationships with airport stakeholders and has generally
left it to the FSDs to determine how to develop effective stakeholder
relationships. According to TSA's Executive FSD Guide, building and
maintaining stakeholder partnerships is a major responsibility of FSDs,
and these partnerships can create capabilities at airports where the
sum is greater than the parts. TSA further reinforces the importance of
FSDs' building and managing partnerships by including this activity as
a standard rating element on their annual performance assessments. TSA
addressed the importance of partnerships in connection with planning
for increased passenger traffic during the summer months of 2004 in its
best practice guide--the Aviation Partnership Support Plan.[Footnote
18] This document recognized the need for FSDs and airport stakeholders
to work together toward achieving security and customer service. For
example, the plan addressed the importance of TSA and air carrier
station managers working together to identify a process for
communicating, handling, and destroying sensitive passenger load data,
and it encouraged FSDs to develop formal working groups to bring
together local stakeholders.
According to parties at the airports we visited and TSA guidance,
developing partnerships with airport stakeholders is essential for FSDs
to effectively do their job. First, according to FSDs, FSD staff, and
law enforcement stakeholders at the airports we visited, FSDs lack law
enforcement personnel to respond to a security incident and, therefore,
must rely on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in
these instances. TSA also recognizes that, for example, FSDs would have
to work with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to respond to a
security incident on an aircraft where the door has been closed for
embarkation, because FSDs do not have the resources needed to respond
to such an incident. Second, developing partnerships can provide
benefits to FSDs and airport stakeholders. For example, FSDs need air
carrier data on the number of passengers transiting airport checkpoints
to appropriately schedule screeners. At the same time, air carriers
seek an efficient screening process to minimize wait times for their
customers. Various parties we interviewed, including airport
stakeholders, BTS and FBI officials, and an industry representative,
recognized the importance of partnerships in helping the airport
operate smoothly. For example, one industry representative said that
airport management needs security and threat information from the FSD,
and the FSD needs to understand nonsecurity issues that affect the
FSD's job, such as an upcoming local event that may increase passenger
traffic.
FSDs and Stakeholders Reported Partnerships Were Generally Working
Well:
FSDs and most of the stakeholders at the seven airports we visited said
that they had developed partnerships, and they described these
partnerships as generally working well. The FSDs responsible for these
airports reported having positive partnerships with airport
stakeholders. More specifically, one FSD said that having common goals
with stakeholders, such as ensuring security, enhanced their
partnerships. Another FSD saw himself as a catalyst for partnerships at
his airport and as a facilitator among stakeholders who did not always
get along. At most of these airports, stakeholders also reported that
FSD-stakeholder partnerships were working well and identified examples
of successful practices. Some spoke of the value of an FSD being
accessible to stakeholders to help resolve problems by, for example,
being visible at the airport and maintaining an open-door policy. Seven
stakeholders stated that the FSDs at their airports discussed TSA
security directives and worked with them when it was not clear how to
interpret or implement them.[Footnote 19] At one airport, the FSD,
airport management, and air carriers teamed together to look for
opportunities to enhance security and customer service. To this end,
they formed a working group and developed a proposal for TSA that
addressed issues involving technology, infrastructure, transportation
assets, and local budgetary control for the FSD. Finally, at another
airport, in an effort to manage stakeholders' concerns about wait times
and customer service, the FSD arranged for staff to help screen all of
the airport vendors and concessionaires, as required, but at an
established time to ensure passengers were minimally affected.
Partnerships at airports across the country were generally working well
or better at the time of our review than when TSA first assigned FSDs
to airports, according to several federal agency officials and industry
representatives at the national level. Some airport stakeholders and
industry representatives stated that some FSDs' authoritative
management style and lack of airport knowledge contributed to tensions
in earlier FSD-stakeholder relationships. However, during the course of
our review, TSA officials said they received very few complaints about
FSDs from airport stakeholders, and industry representatives and
officials from BTS (which oversees CBP and ICE), and the FBI said that
partnerships were generally working well or had improved. For example,
FBI officials had queried 27 of their Airport Liaison Agents in October
2004 about their relationships with FSDs, and 20 of the 22 agents who
responded characterized these relationships as generally good. FBI
officials told us that at one airport where coordination and
partnerships stood out as being particularly strong, the FSD met with
stakeholders every morning.
TSA established 80 Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement positions across
the country to help FSDs partner and act as liaison with law
enforcement stakeholders and to conduct certain criminal
investigations. This position is always filled by a federal law
enforcement officer (a criminal investigator), and is the only law
enforcement officer assigned to an FSD. Office of Law Enforcement
officials stated that this position is essential for interacting with
local law enforcement stakeholders, and they would like to see every
FSD have at least one Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement and more than
one at larger airports. Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement report
directly to their respective FSDs, and at smaller airports without this
position, the FSD takes on responsibility for coordinating with law
enforcement stakeholders.[Footnote 20] Given the number of positions
authorized, not all FSDs have Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement on
their staff. Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 13 reported having this
position on their staff, and 12 reported not having this position.
Regardless of whether these FSDs had this position, almost all (23)
said it was important to have the position on their staff to coordinate
with the law enforcement and intelligence community and perform
criminal investigations.[Footnote 21] An Assistant FSD for Law
Enforcement explained during one airport visit that his familiarity
with legal processes and procedures facilitated his working
relationship with the FBI and U.S. Attorneys. FBI headquarters
officials also reported that the Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement
position has helped improve coordination between TSA and the FBI at
airports. TSA did not provide an agency-level position on whether every
FSD needs an Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement.
Although most of our contacts reported that partnerships between FSDs
and airport stakeholders were generally working well, about half (13)
of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said that it is challenging to foster
partnerships with the parties they are responsible for regulating.
Several FSDs stated that while it may be hard to partner with those one
regulates, having good communication and relationships with
stakeholders and a mutual understanding of the responsibility of
regulating airport security makes such partnering possible. According
to officials from TSA's Office of Compliance Programs, the office has
articulated a policy of compliance through cooperation, which has
helped FSDs foster partnerships with airport stakeholders while
achieving TSA's regulatory oversight mission. For example, TSA
established a Voluntary Disclosure Program that allows stakeholders to
forgo civil penalty actions by bringing violations to the attention of
TSA and taking prompt corrective action. The philosophy behind this
program is that aviation security is well served by providing
incentives to regulated parties to identify and correct their own
instances of noncompliance and to invest more resources in efforts to
preclude their recurrence.[Footnote 22] According to Office of
Compliance Program officials, 75 percent of issues of noncompliance
were closed by administrative action rather than civil enforcement
during the past 2 fiscal years. Furthermore, in half the cases
reported, FSDs were able to address the discovered security gaps and
close the issue with a note to the inspection files, instead of writing
a formal investigation report.
At one airport we visited, not all stakeholders agreed that
partnerships with the FSD were working well. Airport management,
airport law enforcement, and air carriers at this airport said the FSD
was not accessible, often did not attend meetings to which he had been
invited, and sometimes did not send FSD staff to meetings in his place.
These stakeholders also criticized the FSD for not distributing
security directives and meeting to discuss their implementation.
However, local federal stakeholders at this airport (representing the
FBI, CBP, and ICE) said that the FSD had established positive
partnerships with them and had communicated well.
FSDs and Stakeholders Said They Participated in Many Communication and
Coordination Efforts:
According to TSA's Executive FSD Guide, FSDs are responsible for
conducting group or one-on-one meetings with airport managers and air
carriers. FSDs and stakeholders at all seven of the airports we visited
told us that they were involved with these and other communication and
coordination efforts. FSDs and stakeholders described a variety of such
mechanisms, including meetings and training exercises, noting that many
of these were in place before FSDs were assigned to airports. A BTS
official explained that at larger airports, FSDs inherited coordination
mechanisms and relationships established between federal agencies and
other stakeholders. In contrast, at smaller airports, FSDs had to
educate stakeholders on involving and communicating more with federal
officials. At two of the larger airports we visited, stakeholders said
that the FSDs initiated communication and coordination efforts on their
own, such as holding routine intelligence briefings and meetings with
law enforcement agencies and representatives of U.S. Attorneys'
Offices. Aside from the more formal communication and coordination
mechanisms, FSDs and some of the stakeholders at all seven airports we
visited said they frequently shared information and developed
partnerships informally through telephone calls, e-mails, and face-to-
face interactions.
At all of the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders reported that
meetings to discuss improvements to airport security and operations and
coordination meetings were held, although the type of participants and
frequency of these meetings varied. FSDs and stakeholders reported that
some of these meetings were held on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly
basis, while others were held on an impromptu basis when FSDs or
stakeholders had an issue to discuss. According to an FBI official,
most of the Airport Liaison Agents they had queried were having monthly
meetings with their FSDs. Similarly, a BTS official said that all FSDs
had monthly meetings with representatives from other BTS agencies (ICE
and CBP) to improve coordination of law enforcement and security
efforts among these agencies at airports.[Footnote 23] Although five of
the seven airports we visited had standing formal meetings, two of the
smaller airports did not. Rather, at these airports, the FSD and
stakeholders reported interacting daily and holding meetings on an as-
needed basis.
In addition to meetings, incident debriefings and training exercises to
ensure a coordinated response in the event of a security incident were
conducted at most of the airports we visited. Stakeholders at three of
the airports mentioned that debriefings occurred after an actual
incident to address questions and discuss how the incident had been
handled. For example, at one airport, a stakeholder explained that a
debriefing helped alleviate concerns he had regarding his lack of
involvement during a particular incident. According to TSA, response to
an actual event is typically only as good as the training for it;
hence, TSA requires FSDs to hold quarterly training exercises at their
airports. Training exercises included tabletop simulation
exercises,[Footnote 24] hijacking scenarios, and Man Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS)[Footnote 25] vulnerability assessments to
identify areas where a MANPADS attack could be launched. Sometimes
protocols or security directives are written as a result of airport
incidents and debriefings. At all seven airports we visited, protocols
for responding to incidents existed, according to FSDs, their staff, or
stakeholders, and at most of these airports, protocols were written
into the Airport Security Plan. However, a TSA headquarters official
explained that a protocol cannot exist for every possible incident,
given that security incidents are often unique.
TSA Made Changes to Better Support or Empower the FSD Position and Was
Planning Additional Changes:
TSA has made a number of changes intended to provide FSDs with more
authority and flexibility in carrying out their responsibilities, and
most FSDs we interviewed responded favorably to these changes. In
addition, TSA was planning additional efforts during our review that
could affect FSDs, and the majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said
they were not involved in these efforts.
Most FSDs We Interviewed Viewed the Changes TSA Made Favorably:
To further support or empower the FSD position, TSA increased FSDs'
authority to address performance and conduct problems, established a
local hiring initiative, increased flexibility to provide screener
training, relocated Area Director positions to the field, and
established a report group and a mentoring program. The majority of
FSDs we interviewed had positive views of most of these
changes.[Footnote 26]
Local hiring initiative. TSA developed a local screener hiring
initiative that, among other things, vested more hiring authority with
FSDs to address airport staffing needs. To meet a post-September 11
statutory deadline, TSA brought a workforce of 57,000 federal screeners
on board within 6 months using a highly centralized approach of
recruiting, assessing, hiring, and training.[Footnote 27] With this
accomplished, TSA began piloting a reengineered local hiring
initiative, called Next Generation Hiring, in June 2004. Its goal was
to ensure the involvement of FSDs and their staff in the hiring
process, streamline the process, and make the process more responsive
to the full range of airport needs. The program was designed to give
FSDs and their staff the flexibility to determine which aspects, or
phases, of local hiring they wish to participate in, and how much
contractor support they need.[Footnote 28] TSA incorporated
modifications as a result of lessons learned from its pilot and initial
implementation sites as it gradually rolled out this initiative to
additional locations. By March 2005, TSA had established 12 fully
operational local hiring centers around the country, with locations
based on various factors, including geography and operational need.
When we asked all 155 FSDs in our March 2004 survey if they wanted more
authority in selecting screeners, 136 (88 percent) said they wanted
more authority to do this to a great or very great extent, and another
9 percent said they wanted more authority in this area to a moderate
extent. When we interviewed 25 FSDs during this review, approximately 1
year after TSA began rolling out the Next Generation Hiring program, 12
reported that they wanted more authority in selecting screeners to a
great or very great extent, even given their participation options
under Next Generation Hiring, and another 8 said they wanted more
authority in this area to a moderate extent.[Footnote 29]
Nevertheless, 18 of the 25 FSDs stated that Next Generation Hiring
provided for their airports' screener staffing needs better than TSA's
former hiring process to a very great, great, or moderate extent. In
addition, 14 of the 25 FSDs stated that, overall, they were satisfied
with the new program's ability to meet their screener staffing needs,
but 7 said they were not satisfied.[Footnote 30] Comments from those
dissatisfied FSDs included statements that the contractor had not done
a good job in the recruiting aspect of the process and that the new
hiring process still takes too long--a comment echoed by some FSDs we
interviewed during our airport visits earlier in the program's rollout.
TSA officials stated that the goal of Next Generation Hiring was not
necessarily to reduce the time it takes to bring a new screener on
board at every airport. Rather, the goal was to be more responsive to
all local hiring needs--not just the needs of the largest airports.
According to a program official, early data on Next Generation Hiring
have been positive, though limited. For example, data from a
nonscientific sample of several airports showed that under Next
Generation Hiring, fewer screeners resigned within their first month
than before the program was in place (about 18 percent resigned in the
first month before Next Generation Hiring; about 7.5 percent resigned
in the first month after the program was initiated at those airports).
Officials also concluded, on the basis of their limited data and
anecdotal information, that candidates selected at airports where the
FSD and staff were conducting the hiring process were more selective in
accepting offers because they had more knowledge of what the job would
entail than contractors did when they handled the hiring process.
Increased flexibility to provide screener training. TSA expanded FSDs'
flexibility to offer training locally to screeners in two respects in
April 2004. First, TSA developed and implemented a new basic screener
training program to cover the technical aspects of both passenger and
checked baggage screening, and allowed FSDs to choose whether new
screeners would receive instruction in one or both of these screening
functions during initial training. According to TSA officials, this
approach provides the optimum training solution based on the specific
needs of each airport and reflects the fact that, at some airports, the
FSD does not need all screeners to be fully trained in both passenger
and checked baggage screening. Second, TSA offered FSDs the flexibility
to deliver basic screener training using either contractors or local
TSA employees as instructors, provided they have experience as
instructors and are approved by TSA.[Footnote 31]
Prior to TSA providing FSDs with more training flexibility, 110 of the
155 FSDs (71 percent) who responded to our March 2004 survey said that
they wanted more flexibility to design and conduct local training to a
great or very great extent.[Footnote 32] A year later, when we asked 25
FSDs during this review about their satisfaction with the flexibility
they had in offering training locally to screeners, 21 said they were
satisfied. Several noted this was an area where they had seen
improvement in the flexibility TSA had given them.
Increased authority to address performance and conduct problems. TSA
expanded FSDs' authority to address employee performance and conduct
problems over time, beginning in 2003 when FSDs were delegated
authority to suspend employees for up to 3 days. In July 2004, FSDs
were delegated the authority to take the full range of disciplinary
actions, including removal, in accordance with TSA policy. In September
2004, TSA again increased the authority of FSDs by allowing them to use
a streamlined, one-step process in taking certain disciplinary actions,
such as the termination of employment for screeners involved in theft
or the use of drugs or alcohol.[Footnote 33] During our telephone
interviews with FSDs, conducted more than 6 months after the last of
these increases in FSD authority, 24 of the 25 FSDs said they were
satisfied with their current authority to address employee performance
and conduct problems. Moreover, 2 of the 5 FSDs we interviewed during
our airport visits said that their increased authority in this area was
an important change that exemplified TSA's efforts to further empower
FSDs.
Relocation of Area Director positions. In September 2004, as part of an
overall reorganization effort, TSA physically relocated its five Area
Director positions from the Aviation Security Program Office in
headquarters to the field. According to TSA headquarters officials, the
goal was to move more TSA authority and decision making from
headquarters to the field and to create efficiencies in TSA's processes
and procedures. In making this change, TSA named five existing FSDs--
one in each of TSA's five geographic areas--to assume the
responsibility of being Area Directors in addition to continuing to
serve as FSDs of major airports. FSDs in each of the new Area
Directors' geographic regions report to their respective Area Director
on administrative matters. However, they report to TSA headquarters
(the Aviation Security Program Office and Transportation Security
Operations Center) on operational issues, such as reporting security
incidents. To support these "dual hatted" FSDs with their additional
Area Director responsibilities, TSA authorized each to hire five
additional staff.
The 25 FSDs we interviewed were divided on whether they thought having
Area Directors in the field was helpful--12 said it was helpful and 12
said it was not helpful--and some offered comments.[Footnote 34] On one
hand, several FSDs said that field-based Area Directors who were also
FSDs had a much better understanding of what FSDs encounter each day.
On the other hand, several said that FSDs were better served by Area
Directors located at headquarters because they were more aware of
everything that was taking place and had more staff to support them.
Views on this topic were also mixed among the five FSDs we interviewed
during our airport visits.
Two Area Directors were among the 25 FSDs we interviewed, and both
thought the change to field-based Area Directors was helpful but
thought that the position should be further empowered. One explained
that the Area Directors should be involved in operational issues in
addition to administrative matters, although he would need additional
staff if he also had this responsibility. The other Area Director said
that, as one of only five Area Directors, he is responsible for too
many airports.
Report Group.[Footnote 35] In conjunction with moving the Area Director
positions out of headquarters, TSA established this group in September
2004 to conduct some of the duties previously performed by Area
Directors when at headquarters. It was also intended to provide
operational support and a communication link between TSA headquarters
and field-based Area Directors, and in turn, FSDs and their staff. The
group manages and standardizes communications (including sending daily
recaps of each day's business), continually updates point-of-contact
lists that identified who FSDs and their staff should contact when a
problem arises, and serves as a troubleshooter for unresolved issues.
For example, FSDs and their staff may call the Report Group for
assistance if they have already contacted the appropriate headquarters
contacts and their issue or question was not resolved.
Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 16 considered the Report Group to be a
valuable resource, and 7 said they did not consider it valuable.
Although TSA established the group just prior to our airport visits,
FSDs we interviewed at that time saw the potential value of the group
and noted that its daily recaps were already helpful in consolidating
and sharing consistent information, as were the point-of-contact lists.
Mentoring Program. TSA began offering an optional mentoring experience
to newly appointed FSDs and Deputy FSDs in April 2004 to support their
transition into their new positions. Under this program, mentor
coordinators match new FSDs and Deputy FSDs (mentoring colleagues) with
more experienced counterparts (mentors) at other airports somewhat
comparable in size and complexity. As TSA names new FSDs and Deputies,
the coordinators offer them a choice of prescreened volunteer mentors,
give participants suggested steps for proceeding with the mentoring
relationship, and provide a list of frequently asked questions and
answers about the program.
Only 2 of the 5 FSDs we visited and 4 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed had
participated in the Mentoring Program--either by being a mentor or by
being mentored--and all but one saw it as having value.[Footnote 36]
One FSD, who had been mentored, explained that having a mentor helped
him learn a very challenging job and provided the opportunity to bounce
ideas off of an experienced FSD. About half (13) of the 25 FSDs said
that they were not familiar with TSA's mentoring program.
TSA Was Planning Additional Initiatives That Could Affect FSDs:
At the time we interviewed FSDs, TSA was planning the following three
additional initiatives that could affect at least some FSDs. The
majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said they were not involved in
these efforts.
TSA's Screening Allocation Model. TSA has been developing a model for
determining screener staffing levels after initially deploying its
federal screener workforce in 2002 based on estimates of screeners
performing screening functions under privatized agencies, instead of a
model. In September 2003, in an effort to right-size and stabilize its
screener workforce, TSA hired a consultant to conduct a study of
screener staffing levels at the nation's commercial airports. Among
other things, the consultant was tasked with (1) developing a
comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate details to account for
the considerable variability that occurs among airports, (2) creating a
staffing analysis model to be used as a management tool to determine
daily and weekly staffing levels and deploying the model to commercial
airports nationwide, and (3) developing user-friendly simulation
software to determine optimum screener staffing levels for each
commercial airport with federal screeners. In March 2004, while
awaiting the completion of this model, TSA established specific airport
staffing limits to meet a congressionally mandated cap for screeners
set at the level of 45,000 full-time-equivalent positions. In the
summer of 2004, the model was selected, developed, and deployed for
airport data input. That fall, TSA officials told us they expected the
model, which was being validated with airports at the time, would
demonstrate TSA's need for screeners beyond the mandated cap. FSDs we
interviewed during our airport visits shared this view and the
expectation that many airports would see increases in their screener
allocations. In July 2005, TSA finalized and submitted to Congress its
standards for determining aviation security staffing for all airports
at which screening is required.[Footnote 37]
The Screening Allocation Model does not give FSDs the authority to
determine the number of screeners authorized for their airports, nor
was it intended to do so. When asked if they would like to have greater
authority in determining screener staffing levels for the airports they
oversee, 23 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed answered that, to a great or
very great extent, they would like greater authority. One FSD
commented, for example, that there will always be a need for FSDs to
have a way to adjust screener numbers and that the screener staffing
system needs to have sufficient flexibility to address sudden changes
in screening demands. This view was fairly consistent with what FSDs
had said a year earlier in our March 2004 survey, when we posed the
same question to all FSDs. At that time, 145 of 154 FSDs (94 percent)
answered in the same way when asked if they wanted more authority in
determining the number of screeners for their airports.
Although TSA officials said that they had obtained a variety of data
from FSDs during the course of the development of its Screening
Allocation Model, not all of the FSDs we contacted saw themselves as
having been involved in the model's development. Of the 25 FSDs we
interviewed, 14 said that TSA had not involved them or provided them
with the opportunity to have input into the development of the model.
Of the 14 FSDs who said they were not involved, 11 were dissatisfied
regarding their lack of involvement. Furthermore, among the 11 FSDs who
said they were involved in developing the model, 5 were dissatisfied
regarding their level of involvement.[Footnote 38] According to TSA
officials, FSDs provided information for the model regarding their
respective airports, and headquarters validated the numbers the model
generated for each airport.
Reassessments of airport hub and spoke configurations and FSD
management staff. TSA began two related reviews in June 2004: (1) a
reassessment of the hub and spoke configurations of commercial airports
and (2) a reassessment of the number of management and administrative
positions allocated to each FSD.[Footnote 39] The hub and spoke
reassessment could result in changes to the number or the specific
airports for which some FSDs are responsible. According to TSA
headquarters officials, TSA undertook this reassessment because some
FSDs had airports in more than one state, and complexities arose when
working with multiple state laws and regulations, as well as U.S.
Attorneys and police departments from multiple state jurisdictions.
Officials anticipated that after TSA completes its review, a few
situations will continue in which FSDs have responsibility for airports
in more than one state, but only when the distance between certain
airports necessitates.
Related to its review of hub and spoke configurations, TSA undertook a
reassessment of FSD management staff levels, recognizing that some
airports--typically smaller ones--were overstaffed, while others--
typically larger airports--were understaffed. According to TSA
officials, TSA initially distributed FSD staff based on the security
classification of the airport and, to a lesser extent, the size or
annual number of aircraft boardings. This, coupled with resource
constraints that resulted in fewer positions being authorized than were
needed, resulted in an imbalance in FSD staff among airports.
Authorizations for the FSD staff positions ranged from 1 position at
category III and IV airports with a minimum threshold of boardings, to
16 positions at category X and large category I airports. TSA made
decisions regarding some of these positions (e.g., whether a particular
FSD should be assigned a Deputy FSD or an Assistant FSD for Law
Enforcement), while FSDs were left to make decisions about other
positions (e.g., whether to include a Training Coordinator or a Human
Resources Specialist as one of the FSD's management staff). Although
TSA made adjustments to some FSDs' staff levels over time, officials
recognized that an across-the-board reassessment was needed.
The majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said that they were not
involved in either of these two reassessment efforts, and most who were
not involved were dissatisfied with their lack of involvement. Fourteen
of the 25 FSDs said they had not been involved in TSA's reassessment of
airport hub and spoke configurations, and 19 of the 25 FSDs said they
had not been involved the reassessment of FSD management staff levels.
TSA headquarters officials said that they acknowledge the importance of
FSDs' involvement in agency planning efforts, and when practical and
appropriate, TSA has attempted to obtain a broad spectrum of FSD input.
They said that in conducting these two particular reassessments, they
formed a team that included three FSDs and three Deputy FSDs.
Conclusions:
For FSDs to carry out their responsibilities effectively, FSDs, their
staff, and airport stakeholders need a clear statement of the FSDs'
authority, relative to other stakeholders, in the event of security
incidents. TSA's primary document outlining FSDs' authority is
outdated, and neither it, nor other statements TSA has issued,
delineates the authority of the FSD in various security situations
relative to other parties. The absence of a clear understanding of the
authority of the position has reportedly resulted in confusion during
past security incidents and has raised concerns among some stakeholders
at both the national and airport levels about possible ambiguity
regarding FSDs' authority during future incidents. Updating TSA's
Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clarify their authority relative to
others and developing other documents, as warranted, would benefit FSDs
by further enabling them to communicate and share consistent
information about their authority with their staff and airport
stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies. Stakeholders need to
be clear on which agency has authority or lead responsibility in the
event of various types of security incidents to reduce the likelihood
of confusion or a delayed response.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To clarify the authority of the Federal Security Director during
various security incidents and help ensure a consistent understanding
of the authority of FSDs among FSDs, their staff, and airport
stakeholders, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the
Transportation Security Administration to take the following two
actions:
* update TSA's Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect the
authority of FSDs relative to other airport stakeholders during
security incidents and:
* communicate the authority of the FSD position, as warranted, to FSDs
and all airport stakeholders.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.
On September 15, 2005, we received written comments on the draft
report, which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS, in its
written comments, generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations, and agreed that efforts to implement these
recommendations are critical to enable FSDs to effectively oversee
security at the nation's commercial airports. Regarding our
recommendation that TSA update its Delegation of Authority to FSDs and
communicate this information to FSDs and relevant stakeholders, DHS
stated that a new restatement of the Delegation Order has been drafted
by a working group composed of FSDs from the FSD Advisory Council and
the Office of Chief Counsel. The Delegation Order has a new concise
format that restates some of the FSDs' previous authorities and
proposes some new authorities, such as entering into interagency
agreements and administering oaths, consistent with the evolving
operational requirements in the field. DHS further stated that the
Delegation Order is being internally coordinated for comment and
clearance and will be presented for consideration of senior leadership
and the Administrator. At that time, FSDs and airport stakeholders will
be notified of their responsibilities under the new Delegation Order.
TSA also provided additional technical comments on our draft report,
which we have incorporated where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies to
appropriate congressional committees and subcommittees, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for
TSA, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of:
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
To examine the role of the Federal Security Director (FSD), we
addressed the following questions: (1) What are the roles and the
responsibilities of FSDs and how clear is their authority relative to
that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents? (2) To
what extent are FSDs involved in the development of federal aviation
security policy? (3) How have FSDs at selected airports formed and
facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders, and how are these
partnerships working? (4) What key changes has the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) made or planned to make to better support
or empower the FSD position, and how have selected FSDs viewed these
efforts?
To address aspects of each of these objectives, we interviewed TSA's
Chief Operating Officer and other TSA officials from headquarters
offices, including the Aviation Security Program Office, Office of Law
Enforcement, Office of Compliance Programs, and Office of Human
Resources. We reviewed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
and other relevant laws, as well as TSA documents related to the FSD
position, including delegations of authority, position descriptions,
the Executive FSD Guide, performance management guidance, and the FSD
Advisory Council Charter. We also reviewed TSA documents related to its
recent operational changes, such as the Next Generation Hiring Guide,
Communication Liaison Group Mission Statement,[Footnote 40] and the TSA
Management Directive on Addressing Performance and Conduct Problems. We
met with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) headquarters officials
from the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, which oversees
TSA, and Counter-Terrorism Division and Criminal Investigations
Division officials within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
headquarters. To address all but the fourth objective, we also met with
representatives of four national associations--the American Association
of Airport Executives, Airports Council International, Air Transport
Association, and Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network. [Footnote
41]
In addition, to address all of this report's objectives, we conducted
field visits to seven airports. We selected these airports because they
were close to our staff and incorporated all five airport security
categories--three airports with an FSD dedicated to a single airport
and two sets of airports where the FSD was responsible for at least two
airports. Specifically, we visited three category X airports (Los
Angeles International Airport, California; Washington Dulles
International Airport, Virginia; and Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport, Virginia); Bob Hope Airport, California (category I); Long
Beach-Daugherty Field Airport, California (category II);
Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport, Virginia (category III); and
Shenandoah Valley Airport, Virginia (category IV).
At each airport we visited, we met with local TSA officials and key
airport stakeholders to discuss the role of the FSD and FSD-stakeholder
partnerships and communication mechanisms. We met with the FSD (at the
three airports with dedicated FSDs and the two hub airports) or the top-
ranking TSA official (at the two spoke airports), as well as the
Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement and Regulatory Inspection, where
these positions existed. During our meetings with FSDs, we also
obtained their views on changes TSA had made or planned to make to
enhance the FSD position. We also met with key airport stakeholders,
including airport managers, airport law enforcement officials, station
managers representing selected air carriers (15 representatives of 12
air carriers and, additionally, two air carrier representative groups
specific to two airports we visited), and FBI Airport Liaison Agents
and officials from DHS's Customs and Border Protection as well as
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (at the two international airports
we visited). At each airport, we conducted a single joint interview
with representatives from multiple air carriers, and we selected air
carriers through different means. At airports with an air carrier
council, we asked the council head to identify approximately three
carriers. Although we left the final decision to the council head, we
suggested that he or she include the largest or one of the largest
carriers (according to the percentage of the airport's passenger
travel) at the airport, an independent air carrier, and an
international carrier, if it was an international airport. At airports
without an air carrier council, the Air Transport Association or the
airport operator recommended the air carriers. At the smallest
airports, we met with all air carriers because of the small numbers.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the
information we obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to
all airports or FSDs across the nation.
To corroborate what we learned from the five FSDs during our field
visits, we telephoned 25 additional FSDs to obtain their views on a
range of topics including recent TSA initiatives and federal aviation
security policy. We also included selected questions--regarding their
need for greater authority and flexibility--that we had posed in our
March 2004 Web-based survey of all 155 FSDs, conducted to support other
GAO aviation security reviews. This allowed us to make a rough
comparison between the 2004 responses and 2005 responses to these
questions. We selected a random sample of FSDs in place since September
1, 2004, to ensure they had an experience base from which to answer our
questions.[Footnote 42] We excluded from the list the five FSDs we
interviewed during our airport visits and individuals who were no
longer FSDs.[Footnote 43] TSA reviewed our selection procedures but did
not know the identities of the specific 25 FSDs we interviewed. The 25
FSDs were from a cross section of all five airport security categories.
A GAO survey specialist who was involved in designing the Web-based
survey, along with GAO staff knowledgeable about issues facing FSDs
developed the structured telephone interview instrument. We conducted
pretest interviews with 3 FSDs to ensure that the questions were clear
and concise, and subsequently conducted the 25 telephone interviews
from late April to early May 2005. Although the telephone interviews
were conducted with a random sample of FSDs, the sample is too small to
generalize the interview results to all FSDs across the nation with
reliable statistical precision.
The practical difficulties of conducting interviews may introduce
errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the
sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how the
data were analyzed can introduce unwanted variability into the results.
We took steps in the development of the questions, the data collection,
and the data analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors. For
example, a survey specialist helped develop the interview questions in
collaboration with GAO staff with subject matter expertise. Then, as
mentioned earlier, the draft questions were pretested to ensure that
the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to comprehend.
Interviews were conducted by GAO staff familiar with the subject matter
and proper interviewing procedures. Finally, when the data were
analyzed, a second, independent analyst checked to make sure that the
results were correct.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25
Federal Security Directors:
Note. GAO interviewers did not read "no opinion" or "don't know"
response options to respondents, however they recorded these responses
when provided. Interviewers informed respondents that if they had any
comments to any question, the interviewer would record the comment.
1. To what extent, if at all, do you need or would you like to have
greater authority in determining the number of screeners to better
address airport specific staffing or security needs at the airport(s)
you oversee?
Very great extent: 14;
Great extent: 9;
Moderate extent: 1;
Some or little extent: 1;
No extent: 0.
2. Did TSA involve you or provide you any opportunity to have input
into the development of the REGAL screener staffing model?
Yes: 11;
No: 14.
3. How satisfied are you with that involvement? Would you say you are:
Very satisfied: 4;
Generally satisfied: 5;
Not satisfied: 16.
4. In your opinion, to what extent, if at all, does the Next Generation
Hiring program provide for your airport(s)'s screener staffing needs
better than TSA's former hiring process?
Very great extent: 3.
Great extent: 7.
Moderate extent: 8.
Some or little extent: 2.
No extent: 4.
No opinion: 1.
5. Overall, how satisfied are you with Next Generation Hiring's ability
to meet your airport's screener staffing needs? Would you say you are:
Very satisfied: 4.
Generally satisfied: 10.
Not satisfied: 7.
No opinion: 4.
6. Given the options FSDs have for participating in the selection of
screeners under Next Generation Hiring, to what extent, if at all, do
you need or would you like to have greater authority in the selection
of screeners in order to better address airport specific staffing or
security needs at the airport(s) that you oversee?
Very great extent: 7;
Great extent: 5;
Moderate extent: 8;
Some or little extent: 1;
No extent: 3;
No opinion: 1.
7. Did you participate in TSA's orientation program for new FSDs?
Yes: 23;
No (Skip to Question 9): 2.
8. How valuable do you think this orientation program was in preparing
you for your duties as an FSD? Would you say it was:
Very valuable: 10.
Generally valuable: 12.
Not valuable: 1.
9. With the exception of the orientation program that you may have
attended, has TSA provided you any additional or follow-up training?
Yes: 15;
No: 10.
10. In your opinion, does TSA need to provide additional training to
either new or experienced FSDs to help them do their job more
effectively?
Yes: 23;
No (Skip to Question 12): 2.
11. In what areas does TSA need to provide more training to FSDs? [NOTE
1] (Respondents could provide more than one response.)
Regulatory Matters: 11.
Human Resources: 10.
Depends on the FSD's Background: 6.
Leadership: 6.
General Management: 5.
FSD Roles and Responsibilities: 3.
Aviation Industry: 2.
Technical Training on Equipment: 2.
[1] This was an open-ended question; respondents were not provided
response categories.
12. How involved have you been in TSA's effort to reassess hub and
spoke configurations of airports across the country? Would you say you
have been:
Very involved: 6;
Generally involved: 5;
Not involved: 14.
13. How satisfied are you with that level of involvement? Would you say
you are:
Very satisfied: 6.
Generally satisfied: 6.
Not satisfied: 12.
No opinion: 1;
14. Given your airport's security needs, would you say that the current
number of FSD management positions TSA has allocated to you is:
More than adequate: 1.
Adequate: 17.
Not adequate: 7.
15. How involved have you been in TSA's effort to reassess the number
of management positions each FSD should be allocated? Would you say you
have been:
Very involved: 3;
Generally involved: 3;
Not involved: 19.
16. How satisfied are you with that level of involvement? Would you say
you are:
Very satisfied: 1;
Generally satisfied: 6;
Not satisfied: 17;
No opinion: 1.
17. Do you currently have an 1811 (that is, a criminal investigator) on
your FSD management staff?
Yes: 13;
No: 12.
18. Regardless of whether you currently have an 1811, how important do
you think it is to have an 1811 on your staff to support your airport's
security needs? Would you say it is:
Very important: 19;
Generally important: 4;
Not important (Skip to Question 20): 2.
19. Please respond to the following questions:
a. How important is it to you to have an 1811 on your staff to
facilitate communication and/or coordination with the law enforcement
and/or Intelligence community?
Very important: 20;
Generally important: 3;
Not important: 0.
b. How important is it to you to have an 1811 on your staff to perform
the duties of a criminal investigator?
Very important: 16;
Generally important: 7;
Not important: 0.
[End of table]
20. In your opinion, how helpful is it having TSA Area Directors
located in the field rather than in headquarters? Would you say it is:
Very helpful: 8;
Generally helpful: 4;
Not helpful: 12;
No opinion: 1.
21. How valuable a resource do you think TSA's Report Group, previously
named the Communication Liaison Group, is for FSDs? Would you say it
is:
Very valuable: 2;
Generally valuable: 14;
Not valuable: 7;
No opinion: 2.
22. Which of the following statements best describes your familiarity
with TSA's mentoring program for new FSDs and Deputy FSDs?
I am familiar with it and have been a mentor: 1;
I am familiar with it and have been a mentee: 3;
I am familiar with it, but have not been a participant: 8;
I am not familiar with it (Skip to Question 24): 13.
23. In your opinion, how valuable is the mentoring program in preparing
new FSDs or Deputy FSDs for their roles? Would you say it's:
Very valuable: 6;
Generally valuable: 4;
Not valuable: 1;
No opinion: 1.
24. How satisfied are you with your current authority to take
disciplinary or adverse actions to address employee performance or
conduct problems? Would you say you are:
Very satisfied: 11;
Generally satisfied: 13;
Not satisfied: 1.
25. How satisfied are you with the flexibility TSA has given you to
offer training locally to your screeners?
Very satisfied: 9;
Generally satisfied: 12;
Not satisfied: 3;
No opinion: 1.
26. To what extent, if at all, do you think TSA needs to do more to
clarify the role and responsibilities of the FSD position?
Very great extent: 3;
Great extent: 8;
Moderate extent: 5;
Some or little extent: 2;
No extent (Skip to Question 29): 7.
27. What do you think needs further clarification? (See page 18 of this
report for a discussion of the responses received.)
28. Who would need that clarification? (Respondents could provide more
than one response.)
FSDs: 16;
FSD management staff: 16;
airport stakeholders: 16;
Other: 10.
29. To what extent, if at all, do the demands of screening keep you
from focusing on other significant aspects of airport security as much
as you would like?
Very great extent: 1;
Great extent: 2;
Moderate extent: 6;
Some or little extent: 6;
No extent + (Skip to Question 31): 10.
30. In your opinion, how challenging, if at all, is it to develop
partnerships with stakeholders you regulate? Would you say it's:
Very challenging: 2;
Generally challenging: 11;
Not challenging: 12.
31. Given FSDs' responsibilities for ensuring airport security, how
adequately do you think TSA headquarters has focused on its regulatory
oversight mission? Would you say it's been:
More than adequate: 1;
Adequate: 17;
Not adequate: 7.
32. Has TSA ever offered any of your airports the opportunity to pilot
a new program or technology?
Yes: 10;
No: 14;
Don't know: 1.
33. Have any of your airports ever participated in a TSA pilot of a new
program or technology?
Yes: 10;
No (Skip to Question 35): 14;
Don't know (Skip to Question 35): 1.
34. Overall, how satisfied have you been with the level of involvement
you've had in evaluating this pilot program or technology? Would you
say you have been:
Very satisfied: 8;
Generally satisfied: 1;
Not satisfied: 1.
35. Overall, how satisfied have you been with your airport's level of
involvement in piloting new TSA programs or technologies? Would you say
you have been:
Very satisfied: 4;
Generally satisfied: 10;
Not satisfied: 8;
No opinion: 3.
36. Overall, how involved have you been as an FSD in developing federal
airport security policy? Would you say that you've been:
Very involved: 1;
Generally involved: 3;
Not involved: 21.
37. How satisfied are you with that level of involvement? Would you say
you are:
Very satisfied: 1;
Generally satisfied: 8;
Not satisfied: 16.
38. How often, if ever, do you think that TSA security policies, as
they are initially issued, need clarification?
Most of the time: 7;
Sometimes: 15;
Never (Skip to Question 40): 3.
39. More specifically, which types of security policies-security
directives, policy directives, and/or standard operating procedures-
need clarification at times? For each type, please tell me if you think
they need clarification. (Respondents could provide more than one
response):
Security Directives: 19;
Policy Directives: 12;
Standard Operating Procedures: 19;
Other: 0.
40. At your airport(s), how often, if ever, do you find that it is not
feasible to implement TSA security policies as they are initially
issued?
Most of the time: 0;
Sometimes: 7;
Never (Skip to Question 42): 18.
41. More specifically, which types of security policies-security
directives, policy directives, and/or standard operating procedures-
are not feasible to implement at times. (Respondents could provide more
than one response.)
Security Directives: 5;
Policy Directives: 3;
Standard Operating Procedures: 5;
Other: 0.
42. When questions arise, how satisfied are you with TSA's efforts to
clarify security policy?
Very satisfied: 4;
Generally satisfied: 19;
Not satisfied: 2.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
September 15, 2005:
Ms. Cathleen Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Berrick:
RE: Draft Report GAO-05-935, Transportation Security Administration:
More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work done to
identify areas for improvement in the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA's) review of Federal Security Directors roles and
responsibilities. We generally concur with the report and its
recommendations and appreciate the discussion of challenges, and
related on-going and planned work designed to fully meet our
responsibilities.
The report acknowledges the substantial progress TSA has made to better
support and empower the Federal Security Director position through
increased communication and coordination efforts. To clarify the
authority of the Federal Security Director during various security
incidents and help ensure a consistent understanding of this authority,
GAO recommends that "the Secretary of Homeland Security direct TSA to
update its Delegation of Authority to FSDs and communicate this
information to FSDs and airport stakeholders". DHS agrees that efforts
to implement these recommendations are critical to enable Federal
Security Director's to effectively oversee security at the nation's
commercial airports.
TSA already has initiated efforts to revise and update the Delegation
of Authority for the Federal Security Directors. A new restatement of
the FSD Delegation has been drafted by a working group composed of FSDs
from the Advisory Council and the Office of Chief Counsel. The
Delegation has a new concise format that restates some of the FSDs
previous authorities and proposes some new authorities (e.g., inter-
agency agreements, administering oaths, etc.) consistent with the
evolving operational requirements in the field. The Delegation is being
internally coordinated for comment and clearance. The Delegation will
be presented for consideration of senior leadership and the
Administrator.
At that time, FSDs and airport stakeholders will be notified of their
responsibilities under the new Delegation.
In summary, DHS appreciates your review of the roles and
responsibilities of Federal Security Directors and thanks you for the
thorough analysis and discussion that comprises this report. We
continue to be cognizant of the areas upon which we can improve.
Sincerely,
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact mentioned above, Glenn Davis, Assistant
Director; David Alexander; Grace Coleman; Tracey Cross; Wayne Ekblad;
David Hancock; Stuart Kaufman; Janice Latimer; Thomas Lombardi; and
Lori Weiss made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] BTS, one of five operational directorates within DHS, is tasked
with securing the nation's borders and safeguarding its transportation
infrastructure. TSA is part of the BTS organization. As part of his
July 2005 announcement to reorganize the department, the Secretary of
DHS proposed the dissolution of BTS, pending the enactment of
legislation to effect this change.
[2] TSA classifies commercial airports in five airport security
categories based on factors such as the number of takeoffs and
landings, the extent of passenger screening, and other security
considerations.
[3] Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, §
104, 104 Stat. 3066, 3070-71.
[4] Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-
71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[5] ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of
Transportation. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-296,
116 Stat 2135, enacted in November 2002, transferred TSA to the newly
created Department of Homeland Security, where TSA presently resides as
a distinct entity within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate.
[6] According to TSA, the total number of commercial airports regulated
for security in the United States varies depending on various factors
such as the type and level of commercial operations that an aircraft
operator conducts at that particular airport, the time of year or
season where a particular airport is located, and the economic
stability of that airport's region.
[7] The number of FSDs was based on the most current list TSA had at
the time of our review.
[8] In contrast to how TSA uses the terms "hub airport" and "hub and
spoke," airlines refer to an airline hub as an airport that an airline
uses as a transfer point to get passengers to their intended
destination. It is part of a hub and spoke model, where travelers
moving between airports not served by direct flights change planes en
route to their destination.
[9] A Screening Manager is responsible for individuals at screening
checkpoints and maintains communication with supervisors regarding any
issues that might reveal a weakness or vulnerable area of security
screening that is discovered during the course of screening duties. A
Screening Supervisor is responsible for supervising personnel
performing preboard security screening of persons and their carry-on
and checked baggage.
[10] TSA's Executive FSD Guide: A Tool for Development (August 2004).
[11] As of August 2005, five airports rely on a private screening
contractor instead of a federal TSA screening force, and two additional
airports have applied to TSA to use private screeners. Section 108 of
ATSA required TSA to establish a pilot program permitting a small
number of commercial airports to use private screening contractors to
conduct passenger and baggage screening operations rather than federal
screeners. Beginning on November 19, 2004, all commercial airports with
federal security screening became eligible to apply to opt out of using
federal screeners through the Screening Partnership Program. According
to TSA guidance, the FSD at a privately screened airport would not have
direct administrative control over the screening workforce but would
still be responsible for overall security at the airport. For more
information see GAO, Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on
TSA's Progress to Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage
Screening Services, GAO-05-126 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).
[12] Indirect air carriers, sometimes referred to as freight
forwarders, consolidate cargo shipments and deliver them to air
carriers and cargo facilities of passenger and all-cargo air carriers
that store cargo until it is placed aboard an aircraft.
[13] General aviation includes a wide range of on-demand activities
such as pilot training, flying for business and personal reasons,
delivery of emergency medical services, and sightseeing. Most of the
responsibility for determining vulnerabilities and enhancing security
at general aviation airports lies with airport operators. For more
information on TSA activities related to general aviation, see GAO,
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success, GAO-05-144 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
[14] Pursuant to ATSA, the head of TSA was referred to as the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security. Since TSA transferred to DHS,
the head of TSA is now referred to as the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security for TSA. This position is also referred to as the TSA
Administrator.
[15] TSA's Delegation of Authority to FSDs was issued on June 14, 2002.
[16] Some airports have their own independent airport police forces;
others rely on state and city police forces. Still others have
contractual agreements for airport security with local sheriff's
departments.
[17] TSA may add other airports to its recommended model airport list
on a case-by-case basis on the recommendation of the Assistant
Administrator for Aviation Security Programs.
[18] TSA Aviation Partnership Support Plan (May 14, 2004).
[19] According to TSA officials, FSDs are responsible for ensuring
affected parties receive security directives, but they do not expect
FSDs to hand-deliver every security directive to every stakeholder.
[20] According to TSA Office of Law Enforcement officials, if a
specific need should arise at an airport without an Assistant FSD for
Law Enforcement, the Office of Law Enforcement will instruct the
nearest Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement to respond to the situation.
[21] About half (13) of the 25 FSDs said they had a criminal
investigator as part of their management staff (when FSDs have criminal
investigators on their staff, they hold the position of an Assistant
FSD for Law Enforcement), and all of those FSDs considered this
position to be important in addressing their airports' security needs-
-12 of the 13 considered it very important--and several added that they
needed more than one of these positions on their staff. In addition, 10
of the 12 FSDs who did not have this position on their staff considered
it a position that would be important in supporting their airports'
security needs.
[22] TSA's voluntary disclosure policy directive relates to information
and guidance that may be used by aircraft operators (except
individuals), indirect air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports,
and flight training providers when voluntarily disclosing to TSA
apparent violations of TSA regulations (applicable regulations include
49 C.F.R. parts 1542, 1544, 1546, 1548, and 1552). The TSA Voluntary
Disclosure program does not apply to violations or apparent violations
committed by individuals serving as agents of covered regulated
entities.
[23] In August 2004, the Under Secretary of BTS directed all DHS
agencies with an airport presence to establish a formal committee to
ensure that senior operational managers were communicating across
agency lines and fully coordinating law enforcement and security
efforts. The FSD was tasked with coordinating the establishment of
these committees.
[24] A tabletop exercise is a focused practice activity that places the
participants in a simulated situation requiring them to function in the
capacity that would be expected of them in a real event. Its purpose is
to promote preparedness by testing policies and plans and by training
personnel.
[25] MANPADS are shoulder-launched surface-to-air guided missiles that
are accurate, concealable, transportable, and designed to be user-
friendly. DHS, in partnership with other federal agencies, is working
to counter the threat of MANPADS to civilian commercial aircraft. As
part of its overall MANPADS strategy, TSA is performing airport
vulnerability assessments to identify and map the areas around an
airport from which a MANPADS attack could be initiated, and it is
working with surrounding communities to coordinate the efforts of
agencies responsible for responding to this type of threat.
[26] Some of the changes we discussed with FSDs during airport visits
had just recently been implemented by TSA.
[27] We previously reported that TSA's hiring process hindered the
ability of some FSDs to adequately staff passenger and baggage
screening checkpoints. See GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in
Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations,
GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
[28] For each of the three basic phases of hiring (recruiting,
interviewing, and job offer and acceptance), FSDs may choose whether
they want to conduct the phase primarily on their own, work in
partnership with the TSA contractor, or turn the execution over to the
contractor. Joint execution is not an option for the third phase--job
offer and orientation.
[29] Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed in the spring of 2005 as part of
this review, 21 had responded to our Web-based survey of all FSDs,
which we conducted in March 2004 as part of other GAO reviews.
[30] The remaining 4 FSDs said they had no opinion on this issue.
[31] For local employees to be approved as instructors by TSA, they
must be nominated by an FSD and have a current or prior instructor
certification by a recognized training and development organization or
have at least 2 years of experience as an instructor. In addition,
local TSA instructors must have successfully completed the course of
instruction they will be teaching and demonstrate instructional skills
by assisting a TSA-approved instructor in classroom instruction and
monitoring actual classroom instruction. We reported this and other
information related to TSA screener training and performance issues in
GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C: May
2, 2005).
[32] The question posed in that survey asked FSDs about their need for
more flexibility to design and conduct local training and did not
specify screener training.
[33] In addition, the one-step process may be used to suspend screener
personnel for 3 days or less; suspend, remove, or reduce pay band or
rate of pay for any employee serving a trial period; and to
indefinitely suspend screeners for serious misconduct that necessitates
immediate action under certain designated conditions. All indefinite
suspensions must be reviewed for legal sufficiency by a TSA counsel and
may be coordinated with a designated Employee Relations Specialist
prior to issuance.
[34] One FSD had no opinion.
[35] This group was named the Communications Liaison Group when it was
initially established in September 2004 and was later renamed the
Report Group. When established, the group was composed of former Area
Directors and their staff.
[36] Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone, only 4 were named FSDs
after TSA established the Mentoring Program.
[37] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, required TSA to develop and submit, to
the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives, standards for determining aviation security staffing
at commercial airports no later than 90 days after December 17, 2004,
the date of the act's enactment, and GAO to conduct an analysis of
these standards. TSA's submission of its Report to Congress--Aviation
Security Staffing Standards--constituted TSA's submission to meet this
reporting requirement of the law.
[38] Ten of the 25 FSDs pointed out that the model, as modified,
functions under a 45,000 screener cap, which is too low and does not
take into account real-life factors such as screener vacation time,
military time, training time, or sick leave. As a result, according to
one FSD, security lines are longer and service is poorer.
[39] According to TSA officials, the hub and spoke reconfigurations and
new FSD staffing numbers were rolled out to the field in late July
2005--about 1 year after TSA began the reassessment and several months
after we conducted telephone interviews with FSDs.
[40] The Communications Liaison Group was subsequently renamed the
Report Group, but the original mission statement remained in effect.
[41] The American Association of Airport Executives, which represents
over 800 airports (mostly domestic) and has approximately 4,000
members, works to shape federal policy governing aviation and ensure
that the airport perspective is included as legislation and regulations
are developed. The Airports Council International, with 567 members
operating over 1,540 airports in 175 countries and territories, is an
international association of airports whose primary purpose is to
advance the interests of airports and to promote professional
excellence in airport management and operations. The Air Transport
Association is the only trade association of principal U.S. airlines.
Among other things, it works with its members to support measures that
enhance airport safety and security. The Airport Law Enforcement
Agencies Network is composed of domestic and foreign airport law
enforcement agencies, or port authorities and their associated national
law enforcement, regulatory, or intelligence agencies. Its mandates
include facilitating the exchange of information concerning airport-
related crimes among member agencies and providing insight and
experience to governmental agencies.
[42] Twenty-one of the 25 FSDs we interviewed had responded to our
March 2004 survey of all FSDs. Twenty of the 21 FSDs were named as FSDs
in 2002, and the other 1 became an FSD in 2003. The 4 FSDs who were not
included in the March 2004 survey were not named as FSDs until later in
2004, after we conducted the initial survey.
[43] We based our sample on a September 2004 list of FSDs. We
subsequently updated this list based on our review of TSA press
releases of new FSD assignments made from September 2004 through March
2005, and then verified our revised list with TSA for accuracy and
completeness before drawing our sample of FSDs.
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