Homeland Security
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies Gao ID: GAO-07-89 October 20, 2006Because terrorists do not operate on a 9-5 schedule, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its operational components have established information gathering and analysis centers that conduct activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Staff at these operations centers work to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts. DHS has determined that out of 25 operations centers, four require higher levels of collaboration that can only be provided by personnel from multiple DHS agencies, and other federal, and sometimes state and local, agencies. For these four multi-agency operations centers, this report (1) describes their missions, products, functions, and customers and (2) assesses the extent to which DHS efforts to promote collaboration among the multiple agencies responsible for the centers reflect key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaborative efforts. To do so, GAO visited operations centers, reviewed data and reports from the centers, and interviewed center and other DHS officials.
Each of the four multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers has a different mission and therefore produces different products, yet all contribute to the larger mission of DHS and have similar functions and customers. Customs and Border Protection runs two of the four multi-agency operations centers--the National Targeting Center and the Air and Marine Operations Center. The former monitors the international movement of potential terrorists and produces reports on suspect individuals; the latter maintains situational awareness of the nation's airspace, general aviation, and sea-lanes and produces reports on suspicious private air and marine craft. The Transportation Security Administration's operations center monitors passengers on commercial flights; works to mitigate the vulnerabilities of commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines, the National Capital Region, and critical infrastructure across the nation; and produces reports on these topics. DHS's Operations Directorate runs the National Operations Center Interagency Watch and works to enhance efficiency and collaboration among DHS components. This operations center has a more strategic mission in that it uses information gathered by the other operations centers to provide overall national situational awareness, and it prepares security briefs for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Opportunities exist to enhance collaboration among 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers. While DHS has leveraged resources by having staff from multiple agencies work together, the centers lack joint strategies for collaboration and staffing needs assessments, and they have not established a definition of watchstander roles for all agencies at each center. The centers also lack standards and procedures for using DHS's primary information sharing network; mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and reinforced accountability through agency plans and reports. GAO's previous work has shown that such practices are effective in enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. The establishment of DHS's Operations Directorate in 2005 provides a means to promote implementation of more collaborative practices at the centers.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-89, Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
GAO:
October 2006:
Homeland Security:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers
Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies:
Homeland Security:
GAO-07-89:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-89, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Because terrorists do not operate on a 9-5 schedule, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and its operational components have established
information gathering and analysis centers that conduct activities 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Staff at these operations
centers work to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts. DHS has
determined that out of 25 operations centers, four require higher
levels of collaboration that can only be provided by personnel from
multiple DHS agencies, and other federal, and sometimes state and
local, agencies. For these four multi-agency operations centers, this
report (1) describes their missions, products, functions, and customers
and (2) assesses the extent to which DHS efforts to promote
collaboration among the multiple agencies responsible for the centers
reflect key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaborative
efforts. To do so, GAO visited operations centers, reviewed data and
reports from the centers, and interviewed center and other DHS
officials.
What GAO Found:
Each of the four multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers has a
different mission and therefore produces different products, yet all
contribute to the larger mission of DHS and have similar functions and
customers. Customs and Border Protection runs two of the four multi-
agency operations centers”the National Targeting Center and the Air and
Marine Operations Center. The former monitors the international
movement of potential terrorists and produces reports on suspect
individuals; the latter maintains situational awareness of the nation‘s
airspace, general aviation, and sea-lanes and produces reports on
suspicious private air and marine craft. The Transportation Security
Administration‘s operations center monitors passengers on commercial
flights; works to mitigate the vulnerabilities of commercial airports,
rail stations, and pipelines, the National Capital Region, and critical
infrastructure across the nation; and produces reports on these topics.
DHS‘s Operations Directorate runs the National Operations Center
Interagency Watch and works to enhance efficiency and collaboration
among DHS components. This operations center has a more strategic
mission in that it uses information gathered by the other operations
centers to provide overall national situational awareness, and it
prepares security briefs for federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies.
Opportunities exist to enhance collaboration among 24/7/365 multi-
agency operations centers. While DHS has leveraged resources by having
staff from multiple agencies work together, the centers lack joint
strategies for collaboration and staffing needs assessments, and they
have not established a definition of watchstander roles for all
agencies at each center. The centers also lack standards and procedures
for using DHS‘s primary information sharing network; mechanisms to
monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and reinforced accountability
through agency plans and reports. GAO‘s previous work has shown that
such practices are effective in enhancing and sustaining collaboration
among federal agencies. The establishment of DHS‘s Operations
Directorate in 2005 provides a means to promote implementation of more
collaborative practices at the centers.
Figure: Staff Working to Maintain Situational Awareness at Operations
Centers:
[See PDF for Image]
Sources: from left to right: TSA and CBP.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Director of the DHS Operations Directorate
provide guidance to multi-agency operations centers to implement key
practices to enhance and sustain collaboration. DHS agreed with our
recommendations and identified a number of actions that the Operations
Directorate plans to take to enhance collaboration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-89].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Jones at (202)512-
8777 or jonespl@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
While the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers' Missions and Products
Differ, Functions and Customers Are Similar:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS's Four Multi-Agency
Operations Centers:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Staffed by One DHS
Component:
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: 24/7/365 DHS National Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple
DHS Agencies:
Table 2: Description of the Functions Performed by the Four DHS Multi-
Agency Operations Centers:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organizations within the Department of Homeland Security That
Conduct 24/7/365 Activities:
Figure 2: Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information and
Data:
Figure 3: National Targeting Center Sources of Information and Data at
and between the Nation's Ports of Entry:
Figure 4: Modes of Transportation Monitored by the Transportation
Security Operations Center:
Figure 5: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch Information and
Data Sources:
Abbreviations:
AMOC: Air and Marine Operations Center:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HSIN: Homeland Security Information Network:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
NOC: National Operations Center:
NOC-Watch: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch:
NT: National Targeting Center:
TSA: Transportation Security Agency:
TSOC: Transportation Security Operations Center:
USCG: United States Coast Guard:
USSS: United States Secret Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 20, 2006:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Norm Coleman:
Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 1] established the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the primary mission of
preventing terrorist attacks against the United States. To accomplish
this mission, DHS must be aware of the potential risks and
vulnerabilities faced by the nation, including terrorist threats to our
transportation infrastructure (such as rail, aviation, and shipping);
terrorists entering our country through land, air, and sea ports; and
terrorists operating within our borders. Because terrorists do not
operate on a 9-to-5 schedule, DHS and some of its operational
components (six DHS agencies and DHS's Operations Directorate[Footnote
2]) have established information gathering and/or analysis centers that
conduct activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
Staff at these operations centers conduct monitoring and surveillance
activities to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts by
providing real-time situational awareness to a variety of federal,
state, and local governments and private-sector entities. According to
DHS, this constant situational awareness is needed to facilitate an
immediate response during times of crisis or other national incidents.
The six DHS agencies and the DHS Operations Directorate that run
national operations centers "24/7/365" gather and/or analyze
information through monitoring and surveillance activities to help
detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts across the entire United
States.[Footnote 3] In addition, DHS conducts other 24/7/365
activities, such as telecommunications services, security alarm
monitoring, and region-specific operations at a variety of other
centers. We identified a total of 20 national and 5 regional DHS
centers that conduct 24/7/365 activities.[Footnote 4] Twenty-one of the
25 centers employ staff from one DHS agency on a regular full-time
basis and perform agency-specific functions. Appendix I provides
details on the missions and functions of these centers.
DHS has determined that the remaining 4 centers have broader security
missions and require higher levels of collaboration that can only be
provided by personnel from multiple DHS agencies, and other federal,
and sometimes state and local, agencies. In January 2003, we designated
implementation and transformation of the new Department of Homeland
Security as high risk based on three factors: the enormity of the
effort, the challenges faced by the components, and the potential
impact of failure to effectively carry out the homeland security
mission.[Footnote 5] Given the critical homeland security role played
by these operations centers and the opportunity to facilitate the
department's transformation efforts by maximizing collaboration at the
program level, this report focuses on these four national operations
centers that are "multi-agency," that is, staffed by personnel from
more than one agency within DHS, along with other federal, and
sometimes state and local, agencies. The 4 centers are described in
table 1.
Table 1: 24/7/365 DHS National Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple
DHS Agencies:
Sponsoring organization: center: Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
Air Marine and Operations Center (AMOC)[A];
Mission: To detect, sort, track, and facilitate the interdiction of
criminal entities throughout the Western Hemisphere, by utilizing
integrated air and marine forces, the latest technology, and tactical
intelligence;
Other participating DHS agencies: U.S. Coast Guard;
Other participating agencies outside DHS: Federal Aviation
Administration; Department of Defense National Guard Bureau-Air
National Guard; Government of Mexico.
Sponsoring organization: center: National Targeting Center (NTC);
Mission: To coordinate and support all agency field-level anti-
terrorism activities by providing tactical targeting and analytical
research, and to be a single point of reference for all agency anti-
terrorism efforts;
Other participating DHS agencies: Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Federal Air Marshals; Transportation Security Administration; U.S.
Coast Guard;
Other participating agencies outside DHS: Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Department of State; Food and Drug Administration; U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Sponsoring organization: center: Transportation Security Administration
(TSA); Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)[B];
Mission: To provide situational awareness and information sharing in
day-to-day coordination and incident management for all transportation
security-related operations and issues worldwide by monitoring,
responding to, and investigating security incidents involving all
transportation sectors;
Other participating DHS agencies: U.S. Secret Service[C]; Customs and
Border Protection[C];
Other participating agencies outside DHS: Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Federal Aviation Administration; U.S. Capitol Police;
U.S. Air Force; D.C. Metro Police.
Sponsoring organization: center: DHS Operations Directorate; National
Operations Center Interagency Watch (NOC-Watch)[D];
Mission: To act as the primary national-level hub for domestic
situational awareness, common operating picture, combining and sharing
of information, communications, and operations coordination pertaining
to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident management
by facilitating information sharing with other federal, state, local,
tribal, and nongovernmental emergency operations centers; and by fusing
law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response, and private-
sector reporting;
Other participating DHS agencies: U.S. Secret Service; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Federal Protective Service; Federal Air Marshals;
Transportation Security Administration; Customs and Border Protection;
U.S. Coast Guard; Federal Emergency Management Agency;
Other participating agencies outside DHS: Central Intelligence Agency;
Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Department of Interior; Drug Enforcement Administration; Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Virginia State Police; Fairfax County
Police; New York, Boston, and Los Angeles police departments.
Source: GAO generated based on information from DHS.
[A] On August 22, 1988, the Customs Air Interdiction Program
established the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
Center, West, at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California. In
October 1994, the facility was renamed the Domestic Air Interdiction
Coordination Center. In 1999, marine programs were merged with air
interdiction programs, and the name of the Riverside facility was
changed to the Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center.
Effective March 1, 2003, the center was renamed the Air and Marine
Operations Center.
[B] The TSOC comprises three watch functions--the National Capital
Region Coordination Center is responsible for National Capital Region
air security and defense functions; the National Infrastructure
Coordination Center is responsible for continuously assessing the
status of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources; and
the TSA Command Watch is responsible for coordinating the execution of
the TSOC mission.
[C] The National Capital Region Command Center, one of three watch
functions of the TSOC, constitutes the multi-agency element because it
is staffed by other DHS component agencies--the U.S. Secret Service and
CBP.
[D] Prior to May 25, 2006, the National Operations Center-Interagency
Watch was called the Homeland Security Operations Center. The
Interagency Watch also incorporates staff from DHS's Offices of
Information & Analysis; Infrastructure Protection, and Incident
Management Division, as well as a variety of other DHS and non-DHS
organizations.
[End of table]
To assess the collaboration among DHS agencies working at each multi-
agency 24/7/365 operations center, this report answers the following
questions:
1. What are the missions, functions, and products of the multi-agency
24/7/365 DHS operations centers and who are their customers?
2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing and
sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers?
To answer our first objective, we analyzed information obtained from
the responsible component agencies and the Operations Directorate on
the mission and functions of all of the 24/7/365 activities in DHS. We
visited all 4 multi-agency centers, as well as centers operated by
other component agencies including the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service to observe
their operations, interview officials responsible for managing the
centers, and identify centers that employed staff from multiple DHS
agencies.[Footnote 6] From the 4 national operations centers that
employed staff from multiple DHS component agencies--the Air and Marine
Operations Center (AMOC), the National Targeting Center (NTC), the
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), and the National
Operations Center-Interagency Watch (NOC-Watch)--we obtained additional
information on both the products the centers regularly developed and
their primary customers. We also interviewed several staff assigned to
centers from participating DHS component agencies-- referred to as
watchstanders[Footnote 7]--to discuss their roles and responsibilities
at the centers and the overall mission of the centers to which they had
been assigned.
To answer our second objective, we met with the acting director and
other responsible officials from the Operations Directorate to discuss
its role and responsibilities. We reviewed transition, management
integration, and planning and policy documents as well as strategic
plans and annual performance reports and planning documents from DHS
and its component agencies. We also reviewed and analyzed the results
of studies undertaken by DHS to assess and improve coordination and
collaboration at the multi-agency centers as well as reports from GAO,
the Congressional Research Service, the DHS Office of Inspector
General, and others that addressed the integration, coordination, and
collaboration of departmentwide program functions. We then assessed
DHS's efforts related to integration, coordination, and collaboration
at the multi-agency centers to determine the extent to which they
reflect DHS's application of the key practices we have found can help
enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies and found to
be at the center of successful mergers and transformations.[Footnote 8]
We conducted our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II includes more detailed information on our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
The four multi-agency operations centers each have their own mission
and generate different products while performing some similar functions
and sharing a number of customers. The missions of the AMOC, NTC, and
TSOC are tactical, including such activities as monitoring the nation's
airspace, the movement of potential terrorists, and the passengers on
commercial flights, respectively. NOC-Watch's mission is more strategic
in that it collects information gathered by the other multi-agency
operations centers[Footnote 9] and provides a national perspective on
situational awareness for potential terrorist activity. The products of
the four multi-agency operations centers reflect their different
missions and range from reports on suspicious private air and marine
craft from the AMOC, individuals entering the country at land, sea and
airports from the NTC, and individuals traveling on commercial flights
from the TSOC, to an overview of the national threat environment from
the NOC-Watch. The multi-agency operations centers all share common
functions such as maintaining situational awareness, information
sharing and communications; coordinating internal operations and
coordinating among federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector
entities; and managing incidents and making decisions. In addition, the
AMOC and NOC-Watch exercise operational command and control and, along
with the NTC, coordinate with foreign governments. The four multi-
agency operations centers' primary customers include federal, state,
and local governments; private-sector entities; and some foreign
governments.
DHS has leveraged its resources--one key collaborative practice--by
having staff from multiple agencies work together at the four
operations centers. However, opportunities exist to further implement
this and the other relevant practices that our previous work has
identified as important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration among
federal agencies. Specifically, not all of the components responsible
for managing the operation centers have:
* established goals to define and articulate a common outcome and
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies for collaboration (related to
two of our key practices);
* assessed staffing needs to leverage resources;
* defined roles and responsibilities of watchstanders from agencies
other than the managing one;
* applied standards, policies, and procedures for DHS's information
sharing network to provide a means to operate across agency boundaries;
* prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results of
the operations centers to reinforce collaborative efforts; and:
* reinforced agency accountability for collaboration efforts through
agency plans and reports.
For example, some DHS components have established a variety of internal
and external working agreements, memorandums, and in the case of the
Joint Field Offices, standard operating procedures. However, DHS's
Operations Directorate, which is responsible for coordinating
operations, has not provided guidance on how and when such agreements
should be used to improve collaboration among the sponsoring and
participating components at the operations centers we reviewed. Nor
have any of these centers documented goals or joint strategies using
these or other types of agreements. Without having a documented joint
strategy for collaboration, there is a risk that center staff
monitoring potential terrorist activities may not operate in the most
collaborative manner. DHS has also not assessed staffing needs to
leverage resources and help ensure that there are enough watchstanders,
who occupy the primary positions at the multi-agency operations
centers, to conduct surveillance activities. While three of the four
multi-agency operations centers had developed descriptions for the
watchstander position staffed by their own agency, only one center--the
AMOC--had also developed a position description for staff assigned to
the center from another DHS agency. The other centers relied on the
components providing staff to define their watchstanders' roles and
responsibilities. Lack of a consistent definition for the watchstander
position may lead to people at the same center in the same role
performing the same responsibilities differently or not at all. Because
of the potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive action at
24/7/365 operations centers, it is important that the roles and
responsibilities of watchstanders are described and understood by both
the staff and the officials responsible for managing the operations
centers. In another example, DHS had not provided the standards,
policies, and procedures for the use of its Homeland Security
Information Network, its primary information-sharing tool. Without the
application of the standards, policies, and procedures, users were
unsure of how to use the network and, therefore, did not maximize the
operation centers' capacity for sharing security-related information.
In terms of monitoring, evaluating, and reporting the results of joint
efforts at the multi-agency operations centers, in January 2004, AMOC
began collecting data to measure productivity, but had not yet
evaluated efforts, and the rest of the multi-agency centers have not
developed any methods for evaluating and reporting results. Finally,
neither DHS nor the multi-agency operations centers have reinforced
accountability for collaborative efforts through joint agency planning
and reporting. Such public accounting through published strategic and
annual performance plans and reports makes agencies answerable for
collaboration results. The Operations Directorate, established in
November 2005 to improve operational efficiency and coordination,
provides DHS with an opportunity to more fully implement the key
practices that are important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration
at its multi-agency operations centers. Although the Operations
Directorate does not possess administrative, budgetary, or operational
control over the other component's operations centers, guidance from
the Operations Directorate could help the other components responsible
for the 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers make key advances in
each collaborative practice.
To provide a setting for enhanced collaboration among the staff at each
operations center, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security charge the Director of the Operations Directorate
with developing and providing guidance and helping to ensure the three
component agencies of the four multi-agency operations centers take the
following six actions: define common goals and joint strategies;
clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders; apply
standards, policies, and procedures for using DHS's information
network; conduct staffing needs assessments; prepare mechanisms to
monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of collaborative efforts;
and address collaborative efforts at the four multi-agency operations
centers in plans and reports.
In reviewing a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the recommended
actions to enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations
centers. Among other things, DHS noted plans to conduct an independent
study, initiated in September 2006, to leverage technical and
analytical expertise to support expanding the capabilities of the
Operations Directorate. In addition, DHS said it plans to move elements
of the National Operations Center to the Transportation Security
Operations Center in 2007 and, ultimately to colocate the DHS
headquarters, and all the DHS component headquarters along with their
respective staffs and operations centers, at one location. We agree
that these leadership efforts provided by the Operations Directorate
could further enhance collaboration among DHS's component agencies,
along with the key practices suggested by our review of collaboration
practices among agencies across the federal government. DHS's written
comments are presented in appendix III.
Background:
Twenty-two Agencies Merged to Form DHS in the Aftermath of 9/11:
DHS was created in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. Not since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 has
the federal government undertaken an organizational merger of this
magnitude. Enacted on November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act
established DHS by merging 22 distinct agencies and organizations with
multiple missions, values, and cultures.[Footnote 10] The 22 agencies
whose powers were absorbed or in part assumed by DHS came from eight
different departments (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health
and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury) and two
independent offices (the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the
General Services Administration). In addition, DHS merged
responsibilities from former agencies to create some new agencies, such
as Customs and Border Protection. On March 1, 2003, DHS officially
began operations as a new department. DHS is among the largest federal
government agencies, with approximately 180,000 employees and an
estimated budget of $43.6 billion for fiscal year 2007.
DHS's mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America,
prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect against and respond to
threats and hazards to the nation, ensure safe and secure borders,
welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free flow of
commerce. Six of the seven primary operational agencies, and the
Operations Directorate of the department, have identified the need to
conduct activities in support of the homeland security mission 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. The department's July 2006
organizational chart, as illustrated in figure 1, highlights these six
agencies and the Operations Directorate.
Figure 1: Organizations within the Department of Homeland Security That
Conduct 24/7/365 Activities:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DHS.
[End of figure]
Three DHS Components Sponsor Multi-Agency Operations Centers:
The three components of DHS that have overall responsibility for the
four multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers were created in response
to the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment
of DHS. By merging portions of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture with elements of U.S.
Customs, CBP was created as part of DHS in 2003 to protect the nation's
borders in order to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering or exiting the United States while facilitating the flow of
legitimate trade and travel. CBP sponsors two 24/7/365 multi-agency
operations centers: the Air and Marine Operations Center and the
National Targeting Center. TSA, established in 2001 (as part of the
Department of Transportation), and incorporated into DHS in 2003,
protects the nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of
movement for people and commerce and sponsors the Transportation
Security Operations Center. DHS established the Office of Operations
Coordination (referred to as the Operations Directorate) after a broad
internal review in 2005. The Operations Directorate, which sponsors the
National Operations Center (includes the previous Homeland Security
Operations Center), is responsible for coordinating internal and
external operational issues throughout the department, conducting
incident management, and facilitating rapid staff planning and
execution.[Footnote 11] The three sponsoring components provide overall
direction and management for their respective centers.
Transformation Challenges and Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies:
We have previously reported that establishing the new DHS is an
enormous undertaking and the new department needs to build a successful
transformation that does the following: instills the organization with
important management principles; rapidly implements a phased-in
transition plan; leverages the new department and other agencies in
executing the national homeland security strategy; and builds
collaborative partnerships with federal, state, local, and private-
sector organizations.[Footnote 12]
DHS faces significant management and organizational transformation
challenges as it works to protect the nation from terrorism and
simultaneously establish itself. For these reasons, in January 2005, we
continued to designate the implementation and transformation of the
department as high risk. DHS's Inspector General reported, in December
2004, that integrating DHS's many separate components into a single,
effective, efficient, and economical department remains one of its
biggest challenges.[Footnote 13] We also reported in 2005 that agencies
can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by engaging in
eight key management practices:[Footnote 14]
* defining and articulating a common outcome;
* establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;
* identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
* agreeing on roles and responsibilities;
* establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to
operate across agency boundaries;
* developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results of
collaborative efforts;
* reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through
agency plans and reports; and:
* reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through performance management systems.
Although there is no commonly accepted definition for collaboration, in
our previous assessment of collaborative efforts among federal agencies
we defined it as any joint activity by two or more organizations that
is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when
the organizations act alone. This report focuses on the actions DHS and
its components have taken to make collaboration at multi-agency
operations centers as effective as possible. Joint activities take
place at operations centers where multiple components staff
watchstander positions and provide liaison, expertise, and access to
information that would not otherwise be on hand. For this report, we
selected the first seven of the eight key practices listed above and
assessed the first two key practices together, thereby reducing our
focus to six areas. We did not address the eighth practice--reinforcing
individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance
management systems--because an in-depth examination of component
agencies' performance management systems was beyond the scope of this
review.
While the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers' Missions and Products
Differ, Functions and Customers Are Similar:
The four multi-agency operations centers each have their own mission
and generate different products while performing similar functions and
sharing a number of customers. The missions of the AMOC, NTC, and TSOC
are tactical, including such activities as monitoring the nation's
airspace, the movement of potential terrorists, and the passengers on
commercial flights, respectively. NOC-Watch's mission is more strategic
in that it collects information gathered by the other multi-agency
operations centers[Footnote 15] and provides a national perspective on
situational awareness. The products of the four multi-agency operations
centers reflect their different missions and range from reports on
suspect individuals traveling on commercial flights to reports on
suspicious private air and marine craft. The multi-agency operations
centers all share some common functions: maintaining situational
awareness and information sharing and communications; coordinating
internal operations and coordinating among federal, state, local,
tribal, and private-sector entities; and managing incidents and making
decisions. While all the multi-agency operations centers share common
customers, such as foreign, federal, state, and local governments, the
NOC-Watch has a larger number of customers, given its role as a hub for
overall situational awareness.
The Different Missions of the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers
Result in Different Products:
Of the four multi-agency operations centers, three--AMOC, NTC and TSOC-
-have tactical yet different missions and provide different products
that reflect their respective missions. The NOC-Watch has a more
strategic mission in providing an overall assessment of situational
awareness.
Air and Marine Operations Center:
The AMOC's primary mission is to detect, sort, track, and facilitate
the interdiction of criminal entities throughout the Western
Hemisphere, by utilizing integrated air and marine forces, the latest
technology, and tactical intelligence. AMOC's maintains day-to-day,
around-the-clock airspace situational awareness of the nation's borders
through identification and detection of foreign and domestic threats.
Created in 1988 by the U.S. Customs Service and located in Southern
California, the AMOC was established as the Air and Marine Operations
Center on March 1, 2003. In addition to CBP and U.S. Coast Guard
personnel, the AMOC is staffed by the Federal Aviation Administration,
and the Department of Defense National Guard Bureau-Air National Guard,
as well as a representative of the government of Mexico.
AMOC staff use surveillance systems and databases to detect, identify,
and track potential threats, and to coordinate the apprehension of
criminals using law enforcement air, marine, and ground interdiction
forces. Staff utilize a surveillance system that includes an extensive
network of over 200 ground-based radar and satellite tracking systems
throughout North America and the Caribbean. Staff also use numerous law
enforcement and Federal Aviation Administration databases to ensure
that U.S. entry policy and procedures are followed. Figure 2 shows the
variety of information and data sources employed by the AMOC.
Figure 2: Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information and
Data:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: From left to right, top to bottom: CBP, CBP, FAA, CBP, CBP,
CBP, and CBP.
[End of figure]
Staff can conduct detailed research from a transnational and criminal
threat perspective to identify suspect persons, aircraft, and marine
vessels. AMOC staff use the resulting information to coordinate air and
marine law enforcement activity with various agencies such as the U.S.
Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; federal, state,
and local law enforcement; the Department of Defense; U.S. and foreign
air traffic control facilities; and foreign government coordination
centers.[Footnote 16] The AMOC Daily Intelligence Report focuses on the
nation's borders involving suspicious private air and marine craft that
are detected by radar, eyewitnesses, or surveillance aircraft.
National Targeting Center:
The NTC's mission is to coordinate and support all agency field-level
anti-terrorism activities by providing tactical targeting and
analytical research, and to be a single point of reference for all
agency anti-terrorism efforts. NTC monitors the movement of potential
terrorists and prevents them and any weapons of terror from entering
and exiting our country through land, air, and sea ports. Established
on October 22, 2001, under the U.S. Customs Service, the NTC, located
in Northern Virginia, began 24/7/365 operations November 10, 2001. In
addition to CBP personnel, the NTC is staffed by the U.S. Coast Guard,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Air Marshal Service, and
the Transportation Security Administration.
NTC staff use sophisticated information-gathering techniques and
analytical tools to look at data containing passenger and flight
information. These data include lists of known terrorists, foreign
visitors whose official authorization permitting entry into and travel
within the United States has elapsed (visa overstays), passport
information, and cargo listings to seek potential matches. Any
inconsistency identified in the data can trigger additional analysis.
Figure 3 shows the variety of sources of information and data sources
employed by the NTC.
Figure 3: National Targeting Center Sources of Information and Data at
and between the Nation's Ports of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: Bottom right: Houston Airport System; all others: CBP.
[End of figure]
NTC works with a variety of federal stakeholders. For example, the NTC
works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening
Center to identify persons on the National Terrorist Watch List. NTC
staff also provide information from CBP's Advance Passenger Information
System for TSA's performance of a risk assessment on crewmembers on
international flights. Federal Air Marshals use information developed
by the NTC to determine if they need to put resources on a specific
flight. Using NTC capabilities to screen crew, vessel, and cargo, along
with other information, the U.S. Coast Guard determines vessels and
crewmembers that warrant further surveillance or assessment and can
prioritize its inspection efforts. NTC also helps in implementing the
pilot Immigration Advisory Program by reviewing advance information on
travelers forwarded by program teams to identify travelers at foreign
airports that may present a risk or warrant more intensive examination
before they board aircraft bound for the United States. (Passengers
whose travel documents are invalid, expired, or otherwise may have been
altered, counterfeited or obtained through fraud are advised, as is the
airline, before they leave their foreign location that they will likely
be deemed inadmissible and denied entry upon arrival in the United
States.) The NTC reports we reviewed primarily identified individuals
at and between domestic ports of entry and certain critical foreign
ports.
Transportation Security Operations Center:
The TSOC's mission is to provide situational awareness and information
sharing in day-to-day coordination and incident management for all
transportation security related operations and issues worldwide by
monitoring, responding to, and investigating security incidents
involving all transportation sectors. TSOC maintains situational
awareness of passengers on commercial flights and works to minimize and
mitigate security vulnerabilities of the National Capital Region and
critical infrastructure such as commercial airports, rail stations, and
pipelines. The TSOC, located in Northern Virginia, began 24/7/365
operations in August 2003. The National Capital Region Command Center
constitutes the multi-agency element of the TSOC because it is staffed
by other DHS component agencies--specifically the U.S. Secret Service
and Customs and Border Protection. In addition, representatives of
organizations outside of DHS such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, District of Columbia Metro Police, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Capitol Police, and the U.S. Air Force (Northeast
Air Defense Sector) provide watchstanders for the TSOC.
As part of its mission, TSOC staff coordinate with federal, state, and
local homeland security entities to identify activities that might
indicate a threat to national security and isolate indications of
impending attack while assessing their potential impact. The TSOC also
furnishes alerts and reports to field security organizations while
combining intelligence with operational information across all modes of
transportation. Last, it monitors incidents and crises, including
national special events such as presidential inaugurations and the
Super Bowl, for TSA headquarters and makes recommendations to DHS
leadership. Figure 4 shows the modes of transportation monitored by the
TSOC.
Figure 4: Modes of Transportation Monitored by the Transportation
Security Operations Center:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: From left to right, top tot bottom: GAO, PhotoDisc, CBP, TSA,
GAO, PhotoDisc, and GAO.
[End of figure]
The TSOC reports we reviewed provided information on incidents across
all modes of transportation, including National Capital Region security
incidents, critical infrastructure, and individuals of interest related
to the No-Fly List.[Footnote 17]
National Operations Center-Interagency Watch:
The NOC-Watch is designed to perform a more strategic mission than the
other three multi-agency operations centers. NOC-Watch acts as the
primary national-level coordination point for awareness of events that
may affect national security or safety. The center is responsible for
combining and sharing of information, communications, and operations
coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and
domestic incident management by facilitating information sharing with
other federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities and
by fusing law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response,
and private-sector reporting. Created as the Homeland Security
Operations Center and located in Northwest Washington, D.C., the center
was established on February 19, 2003, and redesignated the National
Operations Center on May 25, 2006. The NOC-Watch is the 24/7/365
element of the center. In addition to staff from the Operations
Directorate, the NOC-Watch includes other DHS staff from 20 components
and offices such as representatives from the U.S. Secret Service,
Federal Protective Service, Federal Air Marshal Service, Transportation
Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Coast
Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, National Biological Surveillance
Group, U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, and other DHS directorates. The NOC-Watch also
includes representatives from 35 other federal, state, and local
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence
Agency; National Security Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Interior (U.S.
Park Police); Drug Enforcement Administration; Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives; Virginia State Police; Fairfax County Police;
and the New York, Boston, and Los Angeles police departments; and a
number of other organizations.
NOC-Watch staff use information gathered and communicated by the three
tactical centers; other DHS operation centers; other federal, state,
and local entities; and a wide variety of other information sources to
provide overall national situational awareness related to homeland
security. The NOC-Watch reports, via the DHS Director of Operations, to
the Secretary of Homeland Security and coordinates directly with the
White House and focuses on two goals: (1) the detection, prevention,
and deterrence of terrorist attacks and (2) domestic incident
management during crises and disasters or national special events.
Figure 5 shows some of the sources of information and agencies with
which that information is shared.
Figure 5: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch Information and
Data Sources:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: Logos from GAO, photo from DHS.
[End of figure]
Situation reports prepared by the Operations Directorate's NOC-Watch
that we reviewed contained information reported from other DHS
subcomponents and operations centers such as the TSOC, NTC, and AMOC,
as well as external intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the
private sector. The NOC-Watch also prepares a Homeland Security
Operations Morning Brief that provides information to federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies on the national picture at the
sensitive but unclassified level.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Share Common Functions and
Customers:
All four centers conduct common functions to maintain situational
awareness and communicate and coordinate with other federal, state, and
local governments, as well as private-sector entities. The centers do
so to support both the mission of the sponsoring component organization
and the underlying homeland security mission of DHS. On the basis of
our discussions with center officials and our assessment of documents
they provided, we summarized these functions and found that all DHS
multi-agency operations centers perform 9 of 11 functions identified in
table 2. (According to TSOC officials, the TSOC does not coordinate
with foreign governments, and NTC and TSOC officials said they do not
exercise command and control functions.)
Table 2: Description of the Functions Performed by the Four DHS Multi-
Agency Operations Centers:
Functions: Situation awareness/information sharing and communications:
Situation awareness/monitoring (all four centers);
Description: The continual process of collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating intelligence, information, and knowledge to allow
organizations and individuals to anticipate requirements and to react
effectively and to establish a common operational picture--a broad view
of the overall situation as reflected by situation reports, aerial
photography, and other information or intelligence.
Functions: Situation awareness/information sharing and communications:
Situation assessment/analysis (all four centers);
Description: The evaluation and interpretation of information gathered
from a variety of sources (including weather information and forecasts,
computerized models, Geographic Information Systems data mapping,
remote sensing sources, ground surveys, etc.) that, when communicated
to emergency managers and decision makers, can provide a basis for
incident management decision making.
Functions: Situation awareness/information sharing and communications:
Information dissemination and real-time communications (all four
centers);
Description: The process of providing information such as current
threat-level information, announcements, reports, and urgent alerts to
federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector officials about
possible terrorism activities[A] on a continuous basis.
Functions: Coordination: Intradepartmental coordination (all four
centers);
Description: The sharing of information and operations with other DHS
component agencies to synchronize activities and accomplish a
collective task.
Functions: Coordination: Other federal agency coordination and state,
local, tribal coordination (all four centers);
Description: The sharing of information, activities, and operations
with federal, state, and local governments who have a shared
responsibility in preparing for terrorist attacks as well as other
disasters to accomplish a collective task.
Functions: Coordination: Private-sector, nongovernment coordination
(all four centers);
Description: The sharing of information, activities, and operations
with organizations and entities that are not part of any governmental
structure to accomplish a collective task (e.g., for- profit and not-
for-profit organizations, formal and informal structures, commerce and
industry, private emergency response organizations, and private
voluntary organizations).
Functions: Coordination: Foreign government coordination (NOC-Watch,
NTC, and AMOC);
Description: The sharing of information and operations with
representatives of other foreign national governments to synchronize
activities and accomplish a collective task.
Functions: Incident management and decision-making: Incident management
(all four centers);
Description: The development of strategies and tactics and the
ordering, coordination, and release of resources in response to an
event, such as a terrorist attack or natural disaster.
Functions: Incident management and decision-making: Decision-making
support (all four centers);
Description: The development of ideas, alternatives, or plans to aid
decision makers in selection of a course of action, in responding to a
new event or to make adjustments as an ongoing situation changes.
Functions: Operational activities: Operational coordination; (all four
centers);
Description: The integrating or linking together of different
organizational elements by synchronizing activities to accomplish a
collective task.
Functions: Operational activities: Operational command and control;
(NOC-Watch and AMOC);
Description: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated command organization over assigned forces or assets in the
accomplishment of a specified mission.
Source: GAO based on DHS information.
[A] Section 892(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2252 (2002), defines homeland security
information to include information possessed by a federal, state, or
local agency that (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B)
relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist
activity; (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a
suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (D) would improve the
response to a terrorist act.
[End of table]
Multi-agency operations centers' customers include federal, state, and
local governments and private-sector entities, along with foreign
governments. The NOC-Watch has a larger number of overall customers; as
the national-level multi-agency hub for situational awareness and a
common operating picture, the NOC-Watch provides information to a wider
range of government customers, including federal executive leadership,
and intelligence and law enforcement agencies at the federal, state,
and local level.
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS's Four Multi-Agency
Operations Centers:
DHS has leveraged its resources--one key collaborative practice--by
having staff from multiple agencies work together at the four
operations centers. However, opportunities exist to further implement
this and the other relevant practices that our previous work has
identified as important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration among
federal agencies. For example, not all of the components responsible
for managing the operation centers had:
* established goals to define and articulate a common outcome and
mutually reinforcing or joint strategies for collaboration (related to
two of our key practices);
* assessed staffing needs to leverage resources;
* defined roles and responsibilities of watchstanders from agencies
other than the managing one;
* applied standards, policies, and procedures for DHS's information
sharing network to provide a means to operate across agency boundaries;
* prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results of
the operations centers to reinforce for collaborative efforts; and:
* reinforced agency accountability for collaboration efforts through
agency plans and reports.
The Operations Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve
operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an
opportunity to more consistently implement these practices that can
enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies at multi-
agency operations centers.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Lack Documented Goals and
Joint Strategies:
The three DHS components responsible for the four multi-agency centers
have not developed and documented common goals or joint strategies for
their operation that our work has shown could enhance collaboration
among the agencies. Officials at the four multi-agency operations
centers we visited said they did consider formally documenting working
agreements but concluded it was not essential since all of the agencies
involved were part of DHS. Officials from the NOC said that the lack of
formal agreements is a reflection of the speed with which the center
was established and the inherent flexibility offered to DHS agencies in
order to get them to staff the operation center positions. Nonetheless,
as the DHS Office of Inspector General has reported, memorandums of
understanding are valuable tools for establishing protocols for
managing a national-level program between two organizations.[Footnote
18] Within DHS, external and internal memorandums of agreement and
other interagency joint operating plans are often used to document
common organizational goals and how agencies will work together. For
example:
* The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan[Footnote 19] among
the Department of Defense, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and
the AMOC highlights an agreement between a DHS component and other
federal agencies.
* The Joint Field Office Activation and Operations Interagency
Integrated Standard Operating Procedure[Footnote 20] describes how a
temporary federal multi-agency coordination center should be
established locally to facilitate field-level domestic incident
management activities related to prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery and addresses the roles and responsibilities of multiple
DHS components such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and other federal agencies such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
* Guidelines Governing Interaction Between ICE's Office of
Investigations and CBP's Office of Border Patrol[Footnote 21] documents
a memorandum of understanding between the Office of Investigations at
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and CBP's Border Patrol, entered
into in November 2004, that governs the interaction between the two
components and formalizes roles and responsibilities in order to
further enhance information sharing.
Thus, although some DHS components have established a variety of
internal and external working agreements, memorandums, and in the case
of the Joint Field Offices, standard operating procedures, DHS's
Operations Directorate, which is responsible for coordinating
operations, has not provided guidance on how and when such agreements
should be used to improve collaboration among the sponsoring and
participating components at the operations centers we reviewed. Nor
have any of these centers documented goals or joint strategies using
these or other types of agreements.
Our previous work has shown that memorandums of agreement or
understanding and strategic plans can both be used to establish common
goals and define joint strategies for how agencies will work together.
According to our work, collaborative efforts are further enhanced when
staff working across agency lines define and articulate a common
federal outcome, or purpose, that is consistent with their respective
agency goals and missions. Joint strategies or mutual agreements also
contribute to another key area when they are used as a vehicle for
identifying and defining more specific expectations of the roles and
responsibilities of staff provided by collaborating agencies.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Are at Varying Stages of
Assessing Staffing Needs:
The extent to which officials responsible for managing the four multi-
agency operations centers had conducted needs assessments to determine
the staffing requirements of each center varied. For example, CBP
officials conducted an evaluation in June 2005 that addressed AMOC
capabilities and continuing staffing needs related to AMOC personnel,
but did not address the need for, or responsibilities of, U.S. Coast
Guard staff at the center. AMOC officials did cite a requirement for
additional staff from the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as a requirement
for an Immigration and Customs Enforcement position in a subsequent
strategic planning effort (although these requirements had not been
filled). However, there was not a specific assessment supporting the
need for these staff positions. NTC officials had not conducted a
staffing needs assessment but said they plan to conduct an assessment
based upon current targeting programs, the scheduled expansion of
existing programs, and the onset of additional CBP targeting programs.
They said they plan to include data on the volume of telephone calls
handled by the center and the number of information requests completed
by the NTC in support of CBP targeting and operations, and they expect
to complete the assessment in October 2006. TSOC and NOC-Watch
officials said they had not documented a needs analysis for staff from
agencies other than the sponsoring agency. Instead, they viewed the
cross-agency staffing requirement as a historical edict based on a
general assumption that other agency staff expertise was needed to
fulfill the mission of their operations center.
Our work has shown that collaborating agencies should identify the
resources, including human resources, needed to initiate or sustain
their collaborative effort and take steps to leverage those resources.
Because each agency, or component, has different strengths and
limitations, assessing these varying levels allows them collectively to
obtain additional resources otherwise unavailable individually. Formal
assessment of the need for all participating agencies' staff to perform
specific functions allows for the leveraging of resources to more
effectively meet the operational needs of each agency or component.
Three of the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Not Established
a Definition of Watchstander Roles and Responsibilities for All
Agencies at Each Center:
While three of the four multi-agency operations centers had developed
descriptions for the watchstander position staffed by their own agency,
only one center--the AMOC--had developed a position description for
staff assigned to the center from another DHS agency. At the AMOC,
center officials require that Coast Guard staff meet a standardized set
of requirements for radar watchstanders. The other centers relied on
the components providing staff to define their watchstanders' roles and
responsibilities. Lack of a consistent definition for the watchstander
position may lead to people at the same center in the same role
performing the same responsibilities differently or not at all.
Our work has shown that defining roles and responsibilities both
enhances and sustains collaboration among federal agencies. Because of
the potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive action at
24/7/365 operations centers, it is important that the roles and
responsibilities of watchstanders are described and understood stood by
both the staff and the officials responsible for managing the
operations centers. Further, a definition of the watchstander role and
responsibilities is important for supporting agency officials who must
make staffing decisions about assigning qualified and knowledgeable
personnel to the centers. Finally, internal controls standards[Footnote
22] require that management and employees establish a positive control
environment as a foundation for strong organizational internal
controls. According to the standard, one activity that agency officials
may consider implementing as part of the control environment is to
identify, define, and provide formal, up-to-date job descriptions or
other means of identifying and defining job-specific tasks.
DHS Did Not Provide All Multi-Agency Operations Centers with Standards,
Policies, and Procedures for Use of Its Information Sharing Network to
Operate across Agency Boundaries:
To collaborate by sharing information through DHS's primary information
sharing system, the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN),[Footnote 23] agencies participating in multi-agency operations
centers need to be connected to the network and have the guidance that
enables its use. In the course of our work, we learned that CBP's
National Targeting Center could not collaborate with other users of
HSIN because the system was not connected for NTC
watchstanders.[Footnote 24] Other concerns about the use of HSIN to
enhance coordination and collaboration have also been identified by the
DHS Inspector General. According to the Inspector General, DHS did not
provide adequate user guidance, including clear information sharing
processes, training, and reference materials needed to effectively
implement HSIN.[Footnote 25] The report noted that in the absence of
clear DHS direction, users were unsure of how to use the system. Though
DHS officials said other networks such as the Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System are primarily used for coordination of intelligence analysis,
the connectivity problem with the primary DHS-wide information sharing
system, HSIN, remained unresolved as of September 2006.
Our work has shown that to facilitate collaboration, agencies need to
address the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data
systems used in the collaborative effort. Furthermore, as agencies
bring diverse cultures to the collaborative effort, it is important to
address these differences to enable a cohesive working relationship and
to create the mutual trust required to enhance and sustain the
collaborative effort. Frequent communication among collaborating
agencies is another means to facilitate working across agency
boundaries and prevent misunderstanding. The lack of standards,
policies, and procedures for use of HSIN at DHS operations centers
could limit the frequency and effectiveness of communications among the
centers.
Three of Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Not Developed
Methods to Monitor, Evaluate, and Report Results of Joint Efforts:
With the exception of AMOC, the multi-agency centers have not developed
methods to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of joint efforts.
For example, the Office of Management and Budget's assessment of the
NOC-Watch for 2005 determined that center officials had not established
effective annual or long-term performance goals.[Footnote 26] Nor were
performance measures or other mechanisms in place to monitor and
evaluate the joint efforts of multiple DHS agencies at the TSOC and
NTC. In response to a report by the DHS Office of Inspector General in
March 2004 that found the AMOC did not have organizational performance
measures and individual performance standards to assess AMOC's
effectiveness and productivity,[Footnote 27] AMOC officials reported to
the Inspector General that they began collecting data in January 2004
on a daily basis to measure productivity for the overall operations
center as well as individual watchstanders, including U.S. Coast Guard
representatives.
Our work has shown that developing means to monitor, evaluate, and
report areas of improvement allow agencies to enhance collaboration.
Developing performance measures and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate
the contributions can help management, key decision makers, and both
stakeholders and customers obtain feedback through internal reports in
order to improve operational effectiveness and policy. Developing goals
and providing performance results can also help reinforce
accountability through joint planning and reporting of collaborative
efforts.
The Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Are at Various Stages of
Reinforcing Accountability for Collaborative Efforts through Joint
Agency Planning and Reporting:
Neither DHS nor the component agencies responsible for managing the
four multi-agency operations centers consistently discuss or include a
description of the contribution of collaborative efforts of the multi-
agency operations centers in their strategic or annual performance
plans and reports. The most recent DHS strategic plan, issued in 2004,
neither included a discussion of performance goals nor addressed the
joint operations of the multi-agency centers. The plan reported only
that DHS "will provide integrated logistical support to ensure a rapid
and effective response and coordinate among Department of Homeland
Security and other federal, state, and local operations centers
consistent with national incident command protocols." CBP's 2005 annual
report on the operations of the NTC does, however, include a section
dedicated to the contributions of the external liaisons in describing
the roles and responsibilities of other DHS agency personnel including
the Federal Air Marshal Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
and the U.S. Coast Guard, and the accomplishments they have made in the
center's operations. In addition, the AMOC strategic plan for 2005
generally discussed the importance of collaboration with other
component agencies and included a goal to strengthen component agency
partnerships to maximize homeland security strategies. Reports of the
components responsible for managing the other centers do not address
the roles and contributions of other supporting agencies in
accomplishing the centers' missions. DHS agencies responsible for
providing staff to support watchstander positions for multi-agency
operations centers managed by other agencies also do not address their
participation in the operations of the operations center in strategic
plans or performance reports. In general, managing and supporting
agencies that do mention the operations centers do not include any
discussion of the relationship between the participating agencies'
missions or strategies and those of the centers.
Our work has shown that federal agencies can use their strategic and
annual performance plans as tools to drive collaboration with other
agencies and partners and establish complementary goals and strategies
for achieving results. These performance plans can also be used to
ensure that goals are consistent and, if possible, mutually
reinforcing. Accountability is also reinforced when strategic and
annual performance plans help to align agency policy with collaborative
goals. A public accounting through published strategic and annual
performance plans and reports makes agencies answerable for
collaboration.
DHS's Operations Directorate Has an Opportunity to Help Ensure That Key
Practices for Collaboration Are Implemented at the Multi-Agency
Operations Centers:
DHS established a new Office of Operations Coordination in November
2005 (referred to as the Operations Directorate) to increase its
ability to prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and
other emergencies and improve coordination and efficiency of
operations. In responding to a draft of this report, DHS cited a number
of efforts that the new directorate plans to take to fulfill this
leadership role. Among other things, DHS said it plans to conduct an
independent study, initiated in September 2006, to leverage technical
and analytical expertise to support expanding the capabilities of the
Operations Directorate. In addition, DHS said it plans to move elements
of the National Operations Center to the Transportation Security
Operations Center in 2007 and, ultimately to colocate the DHS
headquarters and all the DHS component headquarters along with their
respective staffs and operations centers at one location. DHS also
cited the development of a new working group that is developing a
national command and coordination capability. While we agree that these
leadership efforts proposed by the Operations Directorate could further
enhance collaboration among DHS's component agencies, because DHS
officials did not provide any information or documentation of these
efforts in response to our requests during the course of the review, we
were unable to determine the extent to which these efforts are likely
to enhance and sustain departmental collaboration. Nonetheless, further
departmental focus on the key practices we have identified could
enhance collaboration among the component agencies. For example, at the
time of our review, the directorate had not taken steps to gather
information on the resources available at each center. The director's
office did not have ready access to information such as centers'
budgets or other financial information needed for reporting across the
components, the number of staff employed at the multi-agency centers,
or the number and type of operations centers managed by the various
components. After being directed to the components for budget and
staffing information, we found that the managing components of the
multi-agency operations centers also did not have ready access to up-
to-date information on the number of staff the centers employed. Such
information could be useful to the directorate's efforts to develop a
national command and coordination capability and further enhance
collaboration among the components with multi-agency operations
centers. Directorate officials said that the Operations Directorate had
not assumed its full range of responsibilities due to not being fully
staffed until March 2006 and because of the revisions to the National
Response Plan formalized in May 2006.[Footnote 28] In responding to a
draft of this report, DHS said that the Operations Directorate does not
have the authority to direct or exercise control over other components'
operations centers with respect to administration and support,
including organization, staffing, control of resources and equipment,
personnel management, logistics, and training. Nonetheless, while the
Operations Directorate lacks authority to direct the actions of the
other components' operations centers and obtaining compatible data may
be difficult since the reporting systems of several centers were in
place prior to the creation of DHS, without compatible staffing and
financial data Operations Directorate leadership officials are hampered
in their ability to understand and compare the relative personnel and
operating costs of the 24/7/365 operations centers and use such
information to promote the expected unity of effort within the
department.
Enhanced leadership from the Operations Directorate to support
consistent reporting of operations centers' budgets and staffing could
also support collaborative actions in two of the previously mentioned
key areas: assessing staffing needs to leverage resources, and applying
standards, policies, and procedures to operate across agency
boundaries. In the absence of leadership to support these and other
collaborative efforts, DHS officials have not yet taken full advantage
of an opportunity to meet the directorate's responsibilities.[Footnote
29]
Conclusions:
The establishment of the Operations Directorate with the express intent
of enhancing collaboration and coordination among the department's
operational components provides an opportunity to implement practices
that could enhance collaboration among DHS agencies working together at
each multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center. Having staff from
multiple agencies work together is a way of leveraging resources, one
key practice for enhancing collaboration. However, those resources may
not be used to their full potential if other steps to enhance
collaboration are not taken, and the Operations Directorate could
provide guidance to help ensure that the sponsors of the operations
centers take the appropriate steps. There are multi-agency operations
centers that lack common goals and joint strategies; clearly defined
roles and responsibilities; compatible standards, policies, and
procedures for information networking; consistent staffing assessments;
prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of
collaborative efforts; and reinforced agency accountability through
agency plans and reports. Our previous work has shown that these are
all critical components in enhancing collaboration among federal
agencies. Given that the collaboration in multi-agency operations
centers focuses on gathering and disseminating information on real-time
situational awareness related to disasters and possible terrorist
activity, it is important that the staff at the centers achieve the
most effective collaboration possible.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff
at each multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security charge the Director of
the Operations Directorate with developing and providing guidance and
helping to ensure the agencies that sponsor the centers take the
following six actions:
* define common goals and joint strategies;
* clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders;
* implement compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using
DHS's information network to provide a means of operating across agency
boundaries;
* conduct staffing needs assessments;
* implement mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results
of collaborative efforts; and:
* address collaborative efforts at the four multi-agency operations
centers in plans and reports on the level of each operation center's
managing agency.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On October 16, 2006, DHS provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see app. III.) DHS agreed with the six recommended actions to
enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations centers and
said it planned to take action to implement the practices. In the draft
report, we said that the Operations Directorate had not yet taken
actions to fulfill its leadership role and that a lack of leadership by
the Operations Directorate to support consistent reporting of
operations centers' budgets and staffing limits collaborative actions.
DHS did not agree that leadership provided by the Operation Directorate
to support collaboration is lacking and provided a number of examples
of leadership efforts. Among other things, DHS noted plans to conduct
an independent study, initiated in September 2006, to leverage
technical and analytical expertise to support expanding the
capabilities of the Operations Directorate. In addition, DHS said it
plans to move elements of the National Operations Center to the
Transportation Security Operations Center in 2007 and, ultimately to
colocate the DHS headquarters and all the DHS component headquarters
along with their respective staffs and operations centers at one
location. We identified the planned actions in the report and agree
that these leadership efforts by the Operations Directorate have the
potential to further enhance collaboration among DHS's component
agencies, along with the key practices suggested by our efforts to
review collaboration among agencies across the federal government.
However, because Operations Directorate officials did not provide any
information or documentation of these efforts in response to our
requests during the course of the review, we were unable to determine
the extent to which these efforts are likely to enhance and sustain
departmental collaboration.
In addition, DHS officials cited what they considered to be
misconceptions expressed in the draft report. They said that the
Operations Directorate does not have the administrative, budgetary,
programmatic, or command and control authority to direct or exercise
control over other component's operations centers. They also said that
our draft incorrectly reported that the National Operations Center
replaced the Homeland Security Operations Center. Although it was not
our intent to imply that the Operations Directorate has administrative,
budgetary, programmatic, or command and control authority to direct or
exercise control over other component's operations centers, we added a
clarifying reference to address DHS's concern. Finally, although we
reported that the new National Operations Center includes (rather than
replaced) the previous Homeland Security Operations Center, we also
added a footnote to further clarify that the scope of responsibilities
of the new National Operations Center is greater than that of the
Homeland Security Operations Center.
We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Assistant
Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration, the
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be available on GAO's Web site
at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
Jonespl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Paul L. Jones:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Staffed by One DHS
Component:
DHS agency: Department of Homeland Security Headquarters (DHS);
#: 1;
Center: U.S.-Computer Emergency Readiness Team;
Mission: To monitor cyber security, respond to incidents, and direct
communications.
DHS agency: Department of Homeland Security Headquarters (DHS);
#: 2;
Center: National Communications Center;
Mission: To assist in the initiation, coordination, restoration, and
reconstitution of national security and emergency preparedness
telecommunications services or facilities under all conditions, crises,
or emergencies.
DHS agency: Transportation Security Administration (TSA);
#: 3;
Center: TSA Office of Intelligence;
Mission: To provide warning and intelligence analysis to inform field
operators, industry, and TSA leadership.
DHS agency: Transportation Security Administration (TSA);
#: 4;
Center: Federal Air Marshal Service, Mission Operations Control Center;
Mission: To provide support to for scheduling, law enforcement
situations, crisis management, and safety and security-related matters.
DHS agency: Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
#: 5;
Center: Situation Room;
Mission: To provide information on significant incidents from field and
sector offices, providing situational awareness to the Commissioner and
senior CBP management.
DHS agency: Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
#: 6;
Center: Caribbean Air Marine Operations Center (Regional Operations);
Mission: To utilize integrated air and marine forces, technology, and
tactical intelligence to detect, sort, track, and facilitate the
interdiction of criminal entities throughout the Caribbean area.
DHS agency: Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
#: 7;
Center: National Airspace Security Operations Center (Regional
Operations);
Mission: To utilize integrated air forces, technology, and tactical
intelligence to maintain air domain awareness, and detect, sort, track,
and facilitate the interception of intruder aircraft throughout the
National Capital Region.
DHS agency: Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
#: 8;
Center: National Law Enforcement Communications Center;
Mission: To monitor radio communications among CBP personnel for
officer safety purposes, and to coordinate tactical communications and
analytical investigative support to various DHS and other law
enforcement agencies to support homeland security.
DHS agency: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
#: 9;
Center: ICE Operations Center;
Mission: To provide senior management with daily reports and
coordination on all significant incidents, events, and matters that
have an impact on the mission of ICE and DHS.
DHS agency: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
#: 10;
Center: ICE Intelligence Watch;
Mission: To provide timely, effective classified intelligence support
to ICE headquarters and field personnel by serving as a clearinghouse
for the screening, evaluation, processing, exploitation, dissemination,
and coordination of intelligence information.
DHS agency: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
#: 11;
Center: Law Enforcement Support Center;
Mission: To provide timely immigration status and identification
information to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on
aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity.
DHS agency: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
#: 12;
Center: Federal Protective Service Mega-Center System (4 regional
centers)[A];
Mission: To provide alarm monitoring and dispatch services to all
federally owned and leased buildings.
DHS agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
#: 13;
Center: National Response Coordination Center;
Mission: To maintain national situational awareness and to monitor
emerging incidents or potential incidents with possible operational
consequences (becomes multi-agency under incident surge conditions).
DHS agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
#: 14;
Center: FEMA Operations Center[B];
Mission: To facilitate, in coordination with the NOC, the distribution
of warnings, alerts, and bulletins to the entire emergency management
community using a variety of communications systems.
DHS agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
#: 15;
Center: Mobile Emergency Response Support Operations Centers (5
regional centers);
Mission: To serve as the emergency operations center for FEMA regions
and associated state operations centers providing time-sensitive
information flow affecting federal involvement and provide a deployed
operations center platform using assigned mobile assets during all
catastrophic events.
DHS agency: United States Secret Service (USSS);
#: 16;
Center: Joint Operations Center;
Mission: To provide command, control, communication, and monitoring for
ensuring the security of the White House complex and surrounding
grounds.
DHS agency: United States Secret Service (USSS);
#: 17;
Center: Intelligence Division Duty Desk;
Mission: To coordinate communications for the receipt, coordination,
and dissemination of protective intelligence information and activities
that require immediate action in support of protection assignments.
Also provides "as needed" information and coordination support for the
service.
DHS agency: United States Coast Guard (USCG);
#: 18;
Center: U.S. Coast Guard Command Center;
Mission: To gather, coordinate, and disseminate information as the
direct representative of the Coast Guard Commandant and the National
Response Center. Serves as the primary communications link of priority
operational and administrative matters between USCG field units,
District and Area Commanders, senior Coast Guard officials, DHS
officials, the White House, other federal agencies, state and local
officials, and foreign governments.
DHS agency: United States Coast Guard (USCG);
#: 19;
Center: Intelligence Coordination Center (includes three 24/7/ 365
watch locations with one, the Intel Plot, colocated at U.S. Coast Guard
Command Center);
Mission: To function as the national-level coordinator for collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination of Coast Guard intelligence.
Provides all-source, tailored, and integrated intelligence and
intelligence services to DHS, Coast Guard, Commandant/ staff,
intelligence community, combatant commanders, and other services and
agencies; The Intel Plot provides predictive and comprehensive
intelligence support to priority requirements of the Commandant and
senior staff at Coast Guard headquarters.
DHS agency: United States Coast Guard (USCG);
#: 20;
Center: National Response Center[C];
Mission: To serve as the single federal point of contact for all
pollution incident reporting. Also serves as a communications center in
receiving, evaluating, and relaying information to predesignated
federal responders, and advises FEMA of potential major disaster
situations.
DHS agency: United States Coast Guard (USCG);
#: 21;
Center: Regional Command Centers (46)[D]; Area Command Centers (2);
District Command Centers (9); Sector Command Centers (35);
Mission:To serve as points of coordination at various organizational
levels for operational command, control, communications, intelligence,
and analysis.
Source: GAO generated based on information from DHS.
[A] According to a Federal Protective Service official, the service has
expanded its mission parameters in recent years beyond physical
protection, and has initiated programs to better identify
vulnerabilities, threats, and response requirements for attacks by
international or domestic terrorist individuals or groups. The official
said that with the advent of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, the service is applying a specialized intelligence capability to
support its expanded role as national coordinator for enhancing the
protection of all federal, state, and local government facilities that
are determined to be nationally critical.
[B] According to FEMA officials, the FEMA Operations Center serves as
the alternate NOC. Should the NOC be rendered incapable of functioning
for any reason, they said the FEMA Operations Center will assume
critical NOC functions until the NOC is returned to normal operating
status.
[C] According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, the National Response
Center is a joint effort cochaired by the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Environmental Protection Agency that is housed at U.S. Coast Guard
headquarters.
[D] According to a U.S. oast Guard official, the Area and District
Command Centers are also designated as International Rescue
Coordination Centers, and all Sector Command Centers are also
designated Rescue Sub-Centers in accordance with international
convention.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our overall objective was to assess the collaboration among the four
multi-agency DHS operations centers. The key questions addressed were
as follows:
1. What are the missions, functions, and products of the multi-agency
24/7/365 DHS operations centers and who are their customers?
2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing and
sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers?
To answer our first objective, we obtained and reviewed information on
the missions and functions of all 24/7/365 operations centers in DHS.
We visited centers managed by the Operations Directorate, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the
Secret Service to observe their operations, interview officials
responsible for managing the centers, and identify centers that
employed staff from multiple DHS agencies. We identified four centers
that employed staff from multiple DHS component agencies: the Air and
Marine Operations Center, the National Targeting Center, the
Transportation Security Operations Center, and the National Operations
Center-Interagency Watch. We gathered and analyzed information
regarding the products the multi-agency centers developed on a regular
basis and the primary customers served by the centers.
To answer our second objective, we met with responsible officials of
the NOC-Watch and the acting Director of the Operations Directorate to
discuss the roles and responsibilities of the new organization
established as a result of the department's Second Stage Review. We
discussed the transition, current operations, and policy and procedures
put in place by the Operations Directorate since the reorganization. We
also met with officials from TSA, USCG, CBP, ICE, and the Operations
Directorate to discuss how staff are assigned by these agencies to the
four multi-agency operations centers. We spoke with watchstanders
assigned to several of the centers from other DHS component agencies to
discuss their roles and responsibilities at the centers, and the
overall mission of the centers to which they had been assigned. We
reviewed planning and policy documents including DHS's strategic plans
and performance and accountability reports as well as our prior
reports[Footnote 30] and reports from DHS's Inspector General that
addressed DHS management issues. For the four national operations
centers we identified as multi-agency DHS centers, we also reviewed
strategic plans, standard operating procedures, and annual reports and
performance and accountability reports. We assessed DHS's efforts and
actions taken by the Operations Directorate to encourage coordination
among the multi-agency centers and to promote collaboration among the
staff representing DHS agencies at the centers to determine the extent
that they reflected consideration of key practices that our previous
work has shown can enhance and sustain a collaborative relationship
among federal agencies. Eight practices we identified to enhance and
sustain collaboration are identified below:
* defining and articulating a common outcome;
* establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;
* identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
* agreeing on roles and responsibilities;
* establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to
operate across agency boundaries;
* developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results;
* reinforcing agency accountability for collaboration efforts through
agency plans and reports; and,
* reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through performance management systems.
For the purposes of this review, we selected the first seven of the
eight practices. We combined our discussion of the implementation of
the first two practices--defining and articulating a common outcome and
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies. We did not
address the eighth practice--reinforcing individual accountability for
collaborative efforts through performance management systems--because
an in-depth examination of component agencies' performance management
systems was beyond the scope of this review. We selected examples that,
in our best judgment, clearly illustrated and strongly supported the
need for improvement in specific areas where the key practices could be
implemented.
We conducted our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
October 16. 2006:
Mr. Paul L. Jones:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D. C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Jones:
Re: Draft Report GAO-07-89, Homeland Security Opportunities for
Enhancing Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple
DHS Agencies.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. DHS
appreciates the GAO's efforts, insights, identification of improvement
opportunities, and recommendations.
Overview:
In general, DHS agrees with the GAO's six recommended actions to
enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations centers:
(1) Define common goals and joint strategies.
(2) Clarify the roles and responsibilities for watch-standers.
(3) Implement compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using
DHS's information network to provide a means of operating across agency
boundaries.
(4) Conduct staffing needs assessments.
(5) Implement mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the
results of collaborative efforts.
(6) Address collaborative efforts at the multi-agency operations
centers in plans and reports on the level of each operation center's
managing agency.
To that end, the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) works to
provide guidance aimed at improving collaboration among DHS components'
operations centers. It is crucial, however, to recognize that OPS does
not possess administrative, budgetary or operational control over the
component's operations centers, which is implied in the text of the
report:
[OPS] "...had not yet taken actions to fulfill this leadership role...
for example, by gathering information on the resources available at
each center...did not have ready access to centers' budgets...other
financial information needed for reporting across the components, the
number of staff employed..."
"The lack of leadership from the Operations Directorate to support
consistent reporting of operations centers' budgets and staffing..."
DHS respectfully disagrees with the report's implication that needed
collaboration is tied to a lack of leadership in OPS. Although DHS's
operations centers closely collaborate, centers are responsible for
supporting the mission of their respective parent organization and are
not designed to serve, or report to OPS. Nevertheless, the Office of
Operations Coordination has strong working relationships with all
operations centers in DHS, which has helped provide the situational
awareness needed by DHS leadership to make critical decisions. This
cooperation is enhanced through real-world events and exercises. In
addition, OPS is driving a significant effort to improve collaboration
by planning to collocate the National Operations Center (NOC) and
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC).
Progress:
DHS recognizes that the Office of Operations Coordination has made many
significant strides forward with regard to subject areas comprising the
GAO's six recommendations, notwithstanding that OPS is a newly created
DHS Component. Examples of such achievements are:
(1) In addition to leading the effort to cascade the operations
function throughout the Department (strategic, operational, and
tactical levels), OPS has spearheaded the development and
implementation of the following Homeland Security Council Katrina
Report's tasks:
* Establish a National Operations Center (NOC):
* Establish National Information and Knowledge Management System:
* Establish a National Reporting System:
* Establish National Information Requirements and a National:
* Information Reporting Chain:
* Establish and Maintain Deployable Communications Capability:
* Develop & Resource a Federal Planning and Execution System:
* Establish a Permanent Planning/Operations Staff Housed within the
NOC:
(2) OPS established the National Operations Center (NOC), the Planning
Element and a deployable communications capability. Also, OPS has
developed a conceptual interagency planning process and continue to
accomplish the above tasks in the context of the NRP scenarios via an
incremental development process. OPS's initial focus has been on
hurricane preparation, response and recovery. For hurricane scenarios,
OPS identified the information requirements, worked through interagency
roles and responsibilities, and implemented the following processes:
reporting, resolution, information flow, information integrity,
products (SPOTREPS, EXSUMS, SITREPS, COP/COD, POTUS Slides). OPS has
developed the associated business process for the NOC and its
interagency partners. OPS intent is to continue forward from natural
disasters to terrorist events, so that it will accomplish the above
tasks for all threats and all hazards.
(3) Additionally, OPS is supporting a pioneering effort in the
Directorate of Preparedness for a National Command and Coordination
Capability. This effort is being developed via an interagency working
group and it has produced the following:
* Terms of Reference:
* Strategic Concept:
* Functional Requirements and Implementation Plan:
* Plan of Action and Milestones:
* 'To Be' Architectural Framework:
The Way Ahead:
A. Mission Blueprint Development and Implementation. In order to
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of OPS, an independent study
was started in early September 2006. The intent is to leverage
technical and analytical expertise to support expanding the
capabilities of OPS (conceptual, procedural, technical) in a
comprehensive and rapid manner.
B. Operating Focus. Continue to focus on current operations,
development of the NOC and the Planning Element capabilities, and
providing a unified National operating capability in support of the NRP
scenarios and the War on Terrorism.
C. Implement GAO Key Practices. Continue overall efforts to develop
improve and sustain relationships, functionality, processes,
integration, collaboration, and documentation in order to enhance
operational readiness and mission accomplishment.
D. NOC Move to TSOC. Moving elements of the NOC to the TSA facility in
Herndon, VA is scheduled for 2007. The move is intended to enhance the
functionality, efficiency and effectiveness of the NOC. This is an
interim step bridging the development of the DHS Campus.
E. DHS Campus. Collocating the DHS headquarters and all the DHS
Component headquarters along with their respective staffs and
operations centers at one location. One idea has the NOC at the center
of a `hub and spoke' configuration with a Component operations centers
at each spoke. The Pentagon-like idea is intended to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of DHS operations.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office:
Appendix 1: Misconceptions:
There are three basic misconceptions that underlie this report:
(1) That OPS has administrative control operations centers. While OPS
does have administrative control over the NOC-Watch, it does not have
the authority to direct or exercise control over Component/subordinate
operations centers with respect to administration and support,
including organization, staffing, control of resources and equipment,
personnel management, logistics and training.
(2) That OPS has command and control authority. There is no Secretary's
Delegation of Authority for OPS to assume command and control over the
Department's operations centers. OPS is a staff element and as such
does not command.
(3) That the NOC replaced the HSOC.
a. The NOC did more than replace the HSOC, because it integrates the
HSOC's "watch function" with other critical functions to include a new
planning capability. The NOC has five components: The Watch, the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), the National Response Coordination
Center (NRCC), the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC),
and the Planning Element (PE). Each is responsible for distinct but
complementary tasks toward accomplishing the overall DHS mission.
b. The only DHS operations center that OPS administratively controls is
the the NOC-Watch and planning element. Thus, the NOC operates as a
matrix organization in order to accomplish its mission. The
descriptions below provide a brief overview of the composition and
roles of each NOC element.
(1). The Watch is comprised of representatives from DHS components and
agencies from Federal, State, and local departments and agencies, as
required, supporting steady-state, 24/7, threat-monitoring requirements
and domestic incident management activities. The organizational
structure of The Watch is designed to integrate a full spectrum of
interagency subject matter expertise and reach-back capability and
planning to meet the demands of a wide range of potential incident
scenarios.
(2). In partnership with other elements of the NOC, the OIA is
responsible for interagency intelligence collection, analysis,
production, and product dissemination for DHS. To accomplish this
function the OIA is integrated into the NOC and is critical to the
"quick look" capability and "Indications & Warning" capability.
(3). The NRCC is FEMA's operations center located in the FEMA
Headquarters building, Washington, DC. The NRCC surges, from a small
watch team who provide 24/7 coverage, by calling in Emergency Support
Function (ESF) personnel as needed for incident coverage. There are 15
ESFs and the NRCC provides overall Federal response coordination for
the ESFs and the incidents. The NRCC monitors potential or developing
incidents and supports the efforts of regional and field components.
(4). The NICC belongs to Infrastructure Protection in the Preparedness
Directorate and it is located in the TSA building, Herndon, VA. The
NICC monitors the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources on
an ongoing basis and conducts daily polling of the standing information-
sharing entities for incidents and abnormalities. During an incident,
the NICC provides mechanisms to share and assess information across
infrastructure and key resources sectors through appropriate
information-sharing entities.
(5). The Planning Element supports crisis planning and the production
and execution of national operational plans under a unified planning
effort for domestic incidents that would require a Federal response.
The PE will participate in the development of strategic guidance,
concept development, plan development, and plan refinement leading to
publication of a series of plans for potential homeland security
events.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Jones (202) 512-8777:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Keisling, Kathleen
Ebert, Dorian Dunbar, Scott Behen, Keith Wandtke, Amanda Miller,
Christine Davis, and Willie Commons III made key contributions to this
report. Additional assistance was provided by Katherine Davis.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
[2] Established in 2005, the Operations Directorate is a separate
organization within DHS that is responsible for one 24/7/365 center and
exists to improve operational efficiency and coordination across the
department, among other things.
[3] The six primary component agencies that conduct 24/7/365 operations
are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security
Administration, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service; the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services does not have an operations
center that conducts activities 24/7/365 days a year.
[4] As defined for this report, the national centers conduct
information gathering and/or analysis activities that cover the entire
nation as opposed to a specific region or activities limited to alarm
system monitoring or communications relays. For example, the U.S. Coast
Guard has 46 command center locations at the area, district, and sector
levels to serve as regional points of coordination for operational
command and control, communications, and intelligence and analysis.
Meanwhile, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Federal Protective
Service Mega-Center System consists of four individual regional center
locations that provide alarm monitoring to federally owned or leased
buildings. We did not count these DHS regional centers with multiple
locations more than once since they performed the same mission. As
another example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Mobile
Emergency Response Support Operations Centers are located in five
regions that we counted as one center, for the purposes of our review.
[5] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003).
[6] During incidents or emergencies, other operations centers may
employ staff from multiple agencies. For example, the Coast Guard's
regional command centers that normally focus on a variety of U.S. Coast
Guard's missions and are not normally interagency in structure have
established protocols with other DHS agencies, such as Customs and
Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate
a unified or incident command structure when needed. These U.S. Coast
Guard centers have extra space and equipment that allow for surge
capabilities and full coordination with each partner agency to host ad
hoc interagency operations.
[7] For the purpose of this report, we use the term "watchstander" to
refer to an individual required to work full-time on a rotating 24-hour
schedule, 7 days per week, to maintain situational awareness, conduct
information assessment and threat monitoring to deter, detect, and
prevent terrorist incidents. A watchstander may also act as a liaison
between his agency and other agency representatives at the center, and
may manage response to critical threats and incidents.
[8] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[9] In addition, the NOC-Watch gathers information from other DHS
operations centers, as well as a variety of other federal, state, and
local government and law enforcement organizations.
[10] DHS was initially created with 22 originating agencies and
organizations. Shortly thereafter in June 2003, a 23rd organization,
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, was transferred into DHS from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
[11] According to DHS, the National Operations Center incorporates the
24/7/365 Interagency Watch, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Response
Coordination Center, and an office called the Planning Element. The
National Operations Center also shares responsibility for the National
Infrastructure Coordination Center which is colocated and integrated as
a watch function at the Transportation Security Operations Center.
[12] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures, Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[13] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Office of Audits, Major Management Challenges Facing The Department Of
Homeland Security, DHS/OIG-05-06 (Washington, D.C.: December 2004).
[14] GAO-06-15, 4.
[15] In addition, the NOC-Watch gathers information from other DHS
operations centers, as well as a variety of other federal, state, and
local government and law enforcement organizations.
[16] Foreign government coordination centers that partner with the Air
and Marine Operations Center include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Joint Interagency Task Forces, Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos, the
U.S. Embassy Mexico's Intelligence Analysis Center, and the Canadian
National Operations Center.
[17] The No-Fly List is a list of individuals who are prohibited from
boarding an aircraft. Originally created and maintained by TSA, the No-
Fly List is the consolidated terrorist watch list maintained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation-administered Terrorist Screening
Center. Both TSA and CBP use the No-Fly List for screening airline
passengers. TSA is responsible for screening domestic airline
passengers; CBP screens international passengers. CBP also uses this
list to screen cruise line passengers.
[18] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, An Assessment of the
Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2005).
[19] Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Interdiction
Command and Control Plan, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2005).
[20] Department of Homeland Security, Joint Field Office Activation and
Operations Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure, version
8.3 Interim Approval (Washington, D.C.: April 2006) i-ii.
[21] As cited in DHS-OIG-06-04, 42.
[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C. November 1999).
[23] The HSIN is an unclassified, Web-based system that provides a
secure, collaborative environment for real-time information sharing
that includes reporting, graphics, and chat capabilities, as well as a
document library that contains reports from multiple federal, state,
local, and private-sector sources. HSIN supplies suspicious incident
and pre-incident information, mapping and imagery tools, 24x7
situational awareness, and analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and
weapons.
[24] Other single agency operations centers such as the U.S. Coast
Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center were also not fully connected.
For example, U.S. Coast Guard officials told us that HSIN has never
been widely used by analysts or watchstanders at their Intelligence
Coordination Center due to technical and testing issues that made the
system unavailable. We were also told that the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Operations Center had never been connected to HSIN due to
technical problems.
[25] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Office of Information Technology, HSIN Could Support Information
Sharing More Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[26] As reported on ExpectMore.gov found at [Hyperlink,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail.10003615.2005.html].
[27] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Office of Audits, AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For
Providing Assistance To Other Agencies, DHS/OIG-04-20 (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004).
[28] Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Change to the National
Response Plan Version 5.0, (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006).
[29] Our work on mergers and transformations suggests that leadership
within the department must set the direction, pace, and tone and
provide a clear, consistent rationale that brings everyone together
behind a single mission and establish integrated strategic goals to
guide the transformation. Highlights Of A GAO Forum--Mergers and
Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14,
2002).
[30] GAO, A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve
Management Integration, GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: March 2005);
Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal
Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
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