Border Security
US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry Gao ID: GAO-07-248 December 6, 2006The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea and land ports of entry (POEs). These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify visitors' identities, and record arrival and departure. GAO was asked to review implementation at land POE facilities and in doing so GAO analyzed: (1) efforts to implement US-VISIT entry capability; (2) efforts to implement US-VISIT exit capability; and (3) DHS's efforts to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO reviewed DHS and US-VISIT program documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.
US-VISIT entry capability has been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology being tested does not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS has not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intends to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program, or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot ensure that the program will meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at the border in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-248, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2006:
Border Security:
US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological
Challenges at Land Ports of Entry:
GAO-07-248:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-248, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the U.S. Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to
collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals
entering and exiting the United States at air, sea and land ports of
entry (POEs). These data, including biometric identifiers like digital
fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists,
verify visitors‘ identities, and record arrival and departure. GAO was
asked to review implementation at land POE facilities and in doing so
GAO analyzed: (1) efforts to implement US-VISIT entry capability; (2)
efforts to implement US-VISIT exit capability; and (3) DHS‘s efforts to
define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security
initiatives. GAO reviewed DHS and US-VISIT program documents,
interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied
traffic levels on both borders.
What GAO Found:
US-VISIT entry capability has been installed at 154 of the 170 land
POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had
improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS
plans to further enhance US-VISIT‘s capabilities by, among other
things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10
fingerprints (see photo, left, below). While this may aid border
security, installation could increase processing times and adversely
affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic
congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO‘s work indicated
that management controls in place to identify such problems and
evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered.
For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites
visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT
has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that
uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put
US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for
improvement.
US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-
VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a
major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit
technology being tested (see photo, right, below) does not meet the
statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and cannot ensure
that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS has not
yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intends
to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program, or use nonbiometric
solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in
a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan
for POE facilities modifications.
DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other
emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot
ensure that the program will meet strategic program goals and operate
cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with
these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and
others to present passports or other documents at the border in 2009,
is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-
VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility
modifications needed to ensure success.
Figure: US-VISIT entry capability ste-up with computer and camera
(left); non biometric exit identification readers mounted over highway
(right):
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS improve existing management controls for US-
VISIT; develop performance measures to assess the impact of US-VISIT at
land POEs; and ensure that a statutorily mandated report describes how
DHS will move to a biometric entry/exit capability and align US-VISIT
with emerging land border security initiatives. DHS generally agreed
and said that it has begun to or plans to implement GAO‘s
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-248].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202)
512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Has Installed US-VISIT Biometric Entry Capability at Nearly All
Land POEs, but Faces Challenges Identifying and Monitoring the
Operational Impacts on POE Facilities:
DHS Cannot Currently Implement a Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability at
Land POEs and Faces Uncertainties as Testing of an Alternative Exit
Strategy Continues:
DHS Has Not Articulated How US-VISIT Strategically Fits with Other Land-
Border Security Initiatives:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Visa Waiver Countries:
Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the US-VISIT Program:
Appendix IV: The 20 Busiest Land Ports of Entry (POE) by Volume of
Individuals Entering the United States in Fiscal Year 2005:
Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at Which US-VISIT Has Been
Installed:
Appendix VI: Actions Taken by US-VISIT Program Office to Mitigate
Privacy Risks Associated with RFID at Land POEs:
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Readers Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land POEs:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of the Scope, Schedule for Completion, and Intended
Functionality of the US-VISIT Increment Schedule:
Table 2: US-VISIT Appropriations Enacted, Fiscal Years 2003 Through
2007 (in millions of dollars):
Table 3: Land POEs visited by GAO, August 2005 to February 2006:
Table 4: Countries Participating in the Visa Waiver Program:
Table 5: RFID Read Rate Test Results for Persons in Vehicles and
Pedestrians Exiting the Country with RFID-Readable Documents:
Table 6: RFID Test Read Rates for Persons Re-Entering the Country in
Vehicles at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID Technology:
Table 7: RFID Test Read Rates for Pedestrians Re-entering the Country
at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID Technology:
Figures:
Figure 1: Persons Processed under US-VISIT as a Percentage of all
Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, Fiscal Year
2004:
Figure 2: US-VISIT Equipment (computer, camera, and printer) at a Land
POE Secondary Inspection Area:
Figure 3: Overview of US-VISIT Enrollment at Land POEs for Visitors
with and without Visas Entering the Country for the First Time:
Figure 4a: Land POE at Blaine-Peace Arch in Blaine, Washington:
Figure 4b: Land POE Facility at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel in Detroit,
Michigan:
Figure 4c: Land POE Facility at Rouses Point, New York:
Figure 5: Nogales-Morley Gate POE, Arizona:
Figure 6: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE:
Figure 7a: Metal Gantry with RFID Readers and Antennas at the Thousand
Islands Bridge POE, Alexandria Bay, New York:
Figure 7b: RFID Portals Positioned Next to Exit Doors at the Blaine-
Peace Arch POE in Washington State:
Figure 8a: RFID Installation at the Nogales-Mariposa POE in Arizona,
Facing Toward Mexico:
Figure 8b. Two Pedestrians Exiting the Country at the Nogales-Mariposa
POE, Arizona, Walking Toward Mexico:
Abbreviations:
AIDMS: Automated Identification Management System:
APIS: Advance Passenger Information System:
BCC: Border Crossing Card:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DMIA: Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
Improvement Act:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
IDENT: Automated Biometric Identification System:
IIRIRA: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
POE: port of entry:
RFID: radio frequency identification:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communications System:
US-VISIT: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology:
VWP: Visa Waiver Program:
WHTI: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative:
December 6, 2006:
Congressional Requesters:
This report is a publicly available version of our report on the
implementation of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports of entry (POE).[Footnote 1]
Our original report was designated For Official Use Only because,
according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it contained
specific information of a sensitive nature.
In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the need to secure U.S.
borders has taken on added importance and has received increasing
attention from Congress and the public. In an effort to avoid
repetition of such attacks, and improve overall national security,
Congress and the Administration have sought better ways to record and
track the entry and departure of foreign visitors who pass through U.S.
POEs by air, land, or sea, to verify their identities, and to
authenticate their travel documentation. In March 2003, responsibility
for these efforts was transferred from the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service to DHS. Pursuant to several statutory mandates,
DHS, in consultation with the Department of State, established an
automated visitor system to integrate information on the entry and exit
from the United States of foreign nationals, called the US-VISIT
Program.
According to DHS, the purpose of US-VISIT is to enhance the security of
U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade,
ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect
visitors' privacy. The program is managed by the US-VISIT Program
Office, which is headed by the US-VISIT Director, who currently reports
to the DHS Deputy Secretary. US-VISIT is used in the field by officers
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a separate DHS
component. US-VISIT processing is one of many activities that takes
place at POEs, where CBP officers enforce U.S. immigration laws
governing the admissibility of the millions of aliens entering and U.S.
citizens reentering the country daily; screen cargo for weapons or
illegal or dangerous goods; prevent narcotics, agricultural pests, and
smuggled goods from entering the country; and identify and arrest those
with outstanding criminal warrants.
US-VISIT is designed to use biographic information (e.g., name,
nationality, and date of birth) and biometric information (e.g.,
digital fingerprint scans and photographs) to verify the identity of
those covered by the program. The program applies to certain visitors
whether they hold a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country
that has a visa waiver agreement with the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program.[Footnote 2] U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents,
and most Canadian and Mexican[Footnote 3] citizens are currently exempt
from being processed under US-VISIT upon entering and exiting the
country.[Footnote 4] Foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT who intend
to enter the country encounter different inspection processes at
different types of POEs depending on their mode of travel. Foreign
nationals subject to US-VISIT who intend to enter the United States at
an air or sea POE are to be processed, for purposes of US-VISIT, in the
primary inspection area upon arrival. Generally, these visitors are
subject to prescreening before they arrive via passenger manifests,
which are forwarded to CBP by commercial air or sea carrier in advance
of arrival.[Footnote 5] By contrast, foreign nationals intending to
enter the United States at land POEs are generally not subject to
prescreening because they arrive in private vehicles or on foot and
there is no manifest to record their pending arrival. Thus, when
foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT arrive at a land POE, they are
directed by CBP officers from the primary inspection area to the
secondary inspection area for further processing. At all POEs, visitors
covered by US-VISIT who are determined to be admissible are issued an I-
94 arrival/departure form, which, among other things, records their
date of arrival and the date their authorized period of admission
expires. The requirement that arriving nonimmigrants admitted to the
United States, unless otherwise exempted, be issued an I-94 as evidence
of the terms of their admission predates implementation of US-VISIT and
was incorporated into US-VISIT processing.[Footnote 6]
Many aspects of US-VISIT program implementation have been driven or
defined by various legislative mandates. These include a 2001 statutory
requirement to focus particularly on the use of biometric technology in
developing the integrated entry-exit system subsequently named US-
VISIT; a 2002 statutory requirement to develop biometric identifier
standards to be used to verify the identity of persons seeking to enter
the United States at POEs; and a requirement to install at all POEs
equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and authentication
of U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens, as
well as Visa Waiver Program participant passports. In addition, by law,
an integrated entry and exit data system was to be implemented at all
U.S. POEs, including land POEs, by December 31, 2005, but there was no
specific requirement to collect any new data on foreign nationals
departing at land POEs by that date. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, on the other hand, did require the
collection of biometric exit data for all individuals subject to US-
VISIT, but it did not set a deadline for implementation of this
requirement.
The United States shares over 7,500 miles of land border with Canada
and Mexico and currently, CBP operates 170 land POEs on the northern
border with Canada and the southwest border with Mexico. These POEs are
diverse in nature, with some operating in urban areas, such as Detroit,
Michigan, and others operating in remote areas, such as the northern
plains in Montana or along the southwest border. Taken together, land
POEs process the largest number of visitors to the United States each
year among all POEs (about 79 percent of about 425 million total border
crossings during fiscal year 2004) and process fewer US-VISIT eligible
visitors as compared to other POEs (about 11 percent of about 42
million border crossings processed via US-VISIT during fiscal year
2004).
As US-VISIT was being installed at land POEs, questions arose about the
impact the program was having on the existing POE facilities where
legitimate land-border crossings take place, particularly in light of a
goal, stated by a former DHS Undersecretary, to develop a "smart
border--one that speeds through legitimate trade and travel, but stops
terrorists in their tracks." We were asked to review implementation of
US-VISIT at land POE facilities. Specifically, we analyzed the
following issues: (1) What has the US-VISIT Program Office done to
implement US-VISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what impact has
US-VISIT had on these facilities? (2) What is the status of US-VISIT
Program Office efforts to implement a US-VISIT exit capability at land
POE facilities? (3) What has DHS done to define a strategic context to
show how US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities at land POE facilities
fit with other current and emerging border security initiatives?
To meet our objectives, we met with officials at CBP and the US-VISIT
Program Office within DHS in Washington, D.C. We reviewed applicable
laws and regulations and studies on the US-VISIT program and examined
available DHS documents on US-VISIT entry and exit capability and
deployment at land POEs. We also visited 21 selected land POEs on the
northern and southern borders where US-VISIT entry capability had been
installed. Along the northern border, we visited land POEs at the
Windsor Tunnel and Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan; the Thousand
Islands Bridge at Alexandria Bay, Champlain, Overton Corners, and
Rouses Point in northern New York State; Highgate Springs and Alburg
Springs in northern Vermont; and Blaine-Pacific Highway and Blaine-
Peace Arch in Blaine, Washington. Along the southern border, we visited
the DeConcini, Morley Gate, and Mariposa POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the
POE in San Ysidro in California; and POEs in Brownsville-Matamoros
Bridge, Brownsville-Gateway, and Brownsville-Los Tomates/Veterans
International Bridge, Hidalgo, Progreso, Pharr, and Los Ebanos in
Texas. We selected these locations to ensure coverage on both borders
and to obtain a mix of sites with varied types of environments and
levels of traffic volume. Where feasible, we also chose to visit some
geographically proximate POEs to minimize travel costs. In addition,
five of these POEs (Thousand Islands Bridge, Blaine-Peace Arch, Blaine-
Pacific Highway, DeConcini, and Mariposa) had been designated by DHS as
locations to test exit technology. At all the locations we visited, we
observed how US-VISIT equipment was installed and operated and
interviewed CBP officials about US-VISIT installation and operations
following deployment. We also observed the impacts of US-VISIT
equipment and operations on POE facilities and infrastructures. In
addition, we examined whether internal control mechanisms were in place
and being used to ensure that program objectives were being achieved,
consistent with GAO's Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal
Government.[Footnote 7] The information from our site visits is limited
to the 21 land ports we visited and is not generalizable to all land
ports of entry. Appendix I discusses our scope and methodology in
greater detail.
We conducted our work from September 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DHS has installed the entry portion of US-VISIT at 154 of the nation's
170 land POEs,[Footnote 8] usually with minimal new construction or
changes to existing facilities. As required by law, the US-VISIT entry
capability includes biometric features--such as digital scans of 2
fingerprints--to help verify the identity of visitors. CBP officials at
all 21 land POEs we visited told us that US-VISIT's entry capability
has generally enhanced their ability to process visitors subject to US-
VISIT by providing assurance that visitors' identities can be confirmed
through biometric identifiers and by automating the paperwork
associated with processing I-94 arrival/departure forms. Going forward,
DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land
POEs intended to further bolster CBP's ability to verify the identity
of individuals entering the country, including a transition from
digitally scanning 2 fingerprints to 10. While such changes are
intended to further enhance border security, deploying them may have an
impact on aging and space-constrained land POE facilities because they
could increase inspection times and adversely affect POE operations.
Moreover, our previous and current work showed that the US-VISIT
program office had not taken necessary steps to help ensure that US-
VISIT entry capability operates as intended. For example, in February
2006 we reported that the approach taken by the US-VISIT program office
to evaluate the impact of US-VISIT on land POE facilities focused on
changes in I-94 processing time at 5 POEs and did not examine other
operational factors, such as US-VISIT's impact on physical facilities
or work force requirements.[Footnote 9] As a result, program officials
did not always have the information they needed to anticipate problems
that occurred, such as problems processing high volumes of visitors in
space constrained facilities. Turning to another aspect of our
evaluation, our standards for internal controls in the federal
government state that it is important for agencies to have controls in
place to help ensure that policies and procedures are applied and that
managers be made aware of problems so that that they can be addressed
and resolved in a timely fashion.[Footnote 10] CBP officials at 12 of
21 land POE sites we visited told us about US-VISIT-related computer
slowdowns and freezes which adversely affected visitor processing and
inspection times and at 9 of the 12 sites, computer processing problems
were not always reported to CBP's computer help desk, as required by
CBP guidelines. Although various controls are in place to alert US-
VISIT and CBP officials to problems as they occur, these controls did
not alert officials to all problems, given they had been unaware of the
problems we identified before we brought them to their attention. These
computer processing problems have the potential to not only
inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed to
complete the inspection process, but to compromise security,
particularly if CBP officers are unable to perform biometric checks--
one of the critical reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs. Our
internal control standards also call for agencies to establish
performance measures throughout the organization so that actual
performance can be compared to expected results. While the US-VISIT
program office established performance measures for fiscal years 2005
and 2006 intended to gauge performance of various aspects of US-VISIT
at air, sea and land POEs in the aggregate, performance measures
specifically for land POEs have not been developed. It is important to
do so, given that there are significant operational and facility
differences among these different types of POEs. Additional performance
measures that consider operational and facility differences at land
POEs would put US-VISIT program officials in a better position to
identify problems, trends, and areas needing improvements.
US-VISIT has concluded that, for various reasons, it cannot currently
implement a biometric US-VISIT exit capability without incurring a
major impact on land POE facilities. According to officials,
implementing a biometrically based exit recording system like that used
to record those entering or re-entering the country is potentially
costly (an estimated $3 billion), would require new infrastructure, and
would produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to
stop their vehicles upon exit to be processed--an option officials
consider unacceptable. US-VISIT officials stated that they believe
technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will enable the
biometric verification of persons exiting the country without a major
impact on facilities. In the interim, the US-VISIT program office is
testing radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as a
nonbiometric means of recording visitors as they exit. RFID technology
can be used to electronically identify and gather information contained
on a tag--in this case, a unique identifying number embedded in a tag
on a visitor's arrival/departure form--which an electronic reader at
the POE is intended to detect. While RFID technology has thus far
required few facility and infrastructure changes, US-VISIT's initial
testing and analysis of this technology has identified numerous
performance and reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID
readers to detect a majority of travelers' tags during testing.
Additional testing is planned to address such problems. Nevertheless,
the RFID solution does not meet the statutory requirement for a
biometric exit capability because the technology as tested cannot meet
a key goal of US-VISIT--ensuring that visitors who enter the country
are the same ones who leave. Specifically, the RFID tag in the
visitor's arrival/departure form cannot be physically tied to an
individual, which means that while a document may be detected as
leaving the country, the person to whom it was issued at time of entry
may be somewhere else. By statute, DHS was to have reported to Congress
by June 2005 on how it intended to fully implement an entry/exit
program. This plan is to include, among other things, a description of
the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a
comprehensive entry and exit screening system--including both biometric
entry and exit--and how it will fulfill statutory obligations. As of
October 2006, this plan was still under review in the Office of the
Secretary, according to US-VISIT officials. Without such a plan, DHS
cannot articulate how entry/exit concepts fit together--including any
interim nonbiometric solutions--and neither DHS nor Congress is in a
good position to prioritize and allocate resources, including funds for
any facility modifications that might be needed, for a US-VISIT exit
capability, to plan for the program's future, or to consider trade-offs
between traveler convenience and security.
DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with
other land-border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot
ensure that these programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and
operate cost effectively. As we reported 3 years ago, agency programs
need to properly fit within a common strategic context governing key
aspects of program operations, such as what functions are to be
performed, what facility or infrastructure changes will be needed to
ensure that they operate in harmony and as intended, and what standards
govern the use of technology. DHS has drafted a strategic plan defining
an overall immigration and border management strategy, but has not yet
approved it, and did not provide it to us for review. Meanwhile, new
border security initiatives or mandates are planned or under way that
could potentially have an impact on US-VISIT operations and facilities
at land POEs. For example, no later than June 2009, U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico will be required, for
the first time, to present a passport or other documents deemed
sufficient to show identity and citizenship when entering the country
from within the western hemisphere. It is not yet known what types of
documents, other than passports, may be permitted at land POEs, or
whether these documents and the equipment required to read them can be
aligned with US-VISIT technologies. Until decisions for this and other
initiatives are made, it remains unclear how this program will be
integrated with US-VISIT, if at all--raising the possibility that CBP
would be faced with managing differing technology platforms and border
inspection processes at each land POE. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work
in concert with other border security and homeland security initiatives
and what facility or facility modifications might be needed could help
Congress, DHS, and others better understand what resources and tools
are needed to ensure success and ensure that land POE facilities are
positioned to accommodate them.
To help DHS optimize its investment in US-VISIT at land POEs, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the US-
VISIT Program Director, in collaboration with the Commissioner of CBP,
to (1) improve existing controls for identifying and reporting computer
processing and other operational problems to help ensure that these
controls are consistently administered and (2) develop performance
measures specifically for assessing the impact of US-VISIT operations
at land POEs. Also, in view of the fact that DHS has not met the
statutory requirement that it issue a report describing a comprehensive
biometric entry and exit system for US-VISIT, we are also recommending
that as DHS finalizes the mandated report, the Secretary of Homeland
Security take steps to ensure that the report includes, among other
things, information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of
deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs; a
discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit
capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a
reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements;
and a description of how DHS plans to align US-VISIT with other
emerging land border security initiatives and what facilities or
facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that
different technologies and processes work in harmony.
DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it either
had begun to take or is planning to take actions to implement them. It
acknowledged that the exit technology tested by DHS would not satisfy
statutory requirements for a biometric exit system and said that it
would perform research and industry outreach to satisfy the mandate.
DHS, however, disagreed with our finding that the US-VISIT program
office did not fully consider the impact of US-VISIT on the overall
operations at POEs. It said that US-VISIT impacts are limited to
changes in Form I-94 processing time, which according to officials
improved, and that issues related to capacity, staffing, and other
factors are "arguably" beyond the scope of US-VISIT. We agree that the
approach taken to do operational assessments of the impact of US-VISIT
land POE facilities focused on changes to I-94 processing time. Our
concern is that the assessments did not examine other operational
factors, such as US-VISIT's impact on physical facilities, to help
ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended. We believe more complete
assessments of the impact of US-VISIT on land POE operations would
better position DHS to anticipate potential problems and develop
solutions, especially as additional US-VISIT capabilities, such as 10
fingerprint scanning, are introduced at these facilities.
Background:
US-VISIT is a large, complex governmentwide program intended to achieve
the goals of (1) enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and visitors,
(2) facilitating legitimate travel and trade, (3) ensuring the
integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and (4) protecting the
privacy of visitors. The program is intended to carry out these goals
by:
² collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign
nationals who enter and exit the United States;
² identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the
terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their
immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law
enforcement officials;
² detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying visitor identity,
and determining visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics
(digital fingerprints and a digital photograph); and:
² facilitating information sharing and coordination within the
immigration and border management community.
Currently, US-VISIT's scope includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and
exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter
and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs.
Legislative Overview:
The current statutory framework for US-VISIT originates with a
requirement to implement an integrated entry and exit data system for
foreign nationals, enacted in the Immigration and Naturalization
Service Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000.[Footnote 11]
The DMIA replaced in its entirety a provision of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
that had required an automated system to record and then match the
departure of every foreign national from the United States to the
individual's arrival record.[Footnote 12] The DMIA instead required an
electronic system that would provide access to and integrate foreign
national arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to
be created or collected under law and are in an electronic format in
certain databases, such as those used at POEs and consular offices.
Unlike the earlier law, the DMIA specifically provided that it not be
interpreted to impose any new documentary or data collection
requirements on any person, but it also provided that it not be
construed to reduce or curtail the authority of DHS or State under any
other provision of law. Thus, the DMIA did not specifically require the
collection of any new data on foreign nationals departing at land POEs.
The system as described in the DMIA is to compare available arrival
records to available departure records; allow on-line search procedures
to identify foreign nationals who may have overstayed their authorized
period of admission; and use available data to produce a report of
arriving and departing foreign nationals. The DMIA also required the
implementation of the system at airports and seaports by December 31,
2003, at the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004; and at
all remaining POEs by December 31, 2005.
Laws passed after the DMIA also provided specific requirements with
regard to the use of biometrics for those entering and leaving the
country. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act required, by October 26,
2003, the development and certification of a technology standard,
including appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be used
to verify the identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa, or seeking
to enter the United States pursuant to a visa, for the purposes of
conducting background checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a
person has not received a visa under a different name.[Footnote 13] The
act also provided that in developing US-VISIT, DHS and State were to
focus particularly on the utilization of biometric technology and the
development of tamper-resistant documents readable at POEs. The
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 required DHS
and State to implement, fund, and use the technology standard,
including biometric identifier standards, developed under the USA
PATRIOT Act at U.S. POEs; it also required the installation at all POEs
of equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and
authentication of all U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents
issued to aliens, and passports issued by Visa Waiver Program
participating countries with biometric identifiers. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,[Footnote 14] unlike the
DMIA, specifically required the collection of biometric exit data for
all categories of individuals required to provide biometric entry data
under US-VISIT, regardless of the port of entry where they entered the
United States. The 2004 law did not set a deadline for implementation
of this requirement, however. Appendix III discusses the legislative
history of the US-VISIT program in greater detail.
Management and Implementation of US-VISIT:
Within DHS, the US-VISIT Program Office is headed by the US-VISIT
Director, who reports directly to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland
Security. The US-VISIT Program Office has responsibility for managing
the acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT and
has been delivering US-VISIT capability incrementally. According to US-
VISIT, increments 1 and 2 include a mix of interim or temporary
solutions and permanent deployments. For example, increment 1B, dealing
with exit capability at airports, is still being piloted, while US-
VISIT entry capability at the 50 busiest land POEs--increment 2B--is
considered to be a permanent deployment. Increment 3--providing entry
capability at the land POEs not covered under Increment 2B--is
considered by US-VISIT to be a permanent deployment and increment 4 is,
according to US-VISIT, the yet-to-be defined US-VISIT strategic
capability. Table 1 summarizes the scope, timeline, and intended
functionality of the US-VISIT increment schedule. This report focuses
generally, but not exclusively, on increments 2B (entry capability at
the 50 busiest land POEs), 2C (exit capability at the 50 busiest land
POEs), and 3 (entry capability at the remaining land POEs)--the
increments and information that are shown in bold in table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Scope, Schedule for Completion, and Intended
Functionality of the US-VISIT Increment Schedule:
Increment: 1;
A;
Scope: Entry at air and sea ports of entry;
Schedule for completion: Jan. 5, 2004[A];
Intended functionality: Deliver the initial operational biometric entry
capability to 115 air and 14 sea ports.
Increment: 1;
B;
Scope: Exit at air and sea ports of entry;
Schedule for completion: Nov. 30, 2004;
Intended functionality: Evaluate exit pilot alternatives at 13 air and
2 seaports.
Increment: 2;
A;
Scope: Read visas and other travel documents embedded with biometric
information upon entry at all ports of entry;
Schedule for completion: Oct. 26, 2006;
Intended functionality: Deliver the initial operating capability to
compare and verify biometric data embedded in machine-readable visas
and other travel documents at all ports of entry.
Increment: 2;
B;
Scope: Entry at 50 busiest land ports of entry;
Schedule for completion: Dec. 31, 2004[B];
Intended functionality: Provide biometric entry capability at the 50
busiest land ports of entry, including an automated process for issuing
the I-94 entry and exit form.
Increment: 2;
C;
Scope: Exit and reentry at land ports of entry;
Schedule for completion: Jul. 2005-undefined;
Intended functionality: Automate recording of exit and reentry at
busiest 50 land ports of entry.
Increment: 3;
Scope: Remaining land ports of entry;
Schedule for completion: Dec. 31, 2005[B];
Intended functionality: Provide increment 2B entry capability at
remaining land ports.
Increment: 4;
Scope: Undefined;
Schedule for completion: Undefined;
Intended functionality: Define, design, build, and implement a
strategic US-VISIT capability.[C].
Source: US-VISIT Program Office.
Note: Bold text reflects increments primarily focused on land POEs.
[A] The statutory deadline for implementing US-VISIT at air and sea
ports of entry was December 31, 2003; the Federal Register notice
announcing implementation of increment 1A by that date was published on
January 5, 2004.
[B] Denotes a statutory deadline.
[C] According to US-VISIT program officials, increment 4 will likely
consist of a further series of enhancements.
[End of table]
From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, total funding for the
US-VISIT program has been about $1.7 billion. Table 2 summarizes
appropriations for US-VISIT for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, as
enacted.
Table 2: US-VISIT Appropriations Enacted, Fiscal Years 2003 Through
2007 (in millions of dollars):
Budget activity: US-VISIT;
2003 appropriated: $362;
2004 appropriated: $328;
2005 appropriated: $340;
2006 appropriated: $337;
2007 appropriated: $362.
Source: US-VISIT Program Office.
Note: Starting in Fiscal Year 2004, funding for the US-VISIT program
has been appropriated on a "no-year" basis, meaning that there is no
time limit on the spending of appropriated funds; funds that remain
unexpended at the end of a fiscal year are carried over into the next
fiscal year.
[End of table]
In prior reports on US-VISIT, we have identified numerous challenges
that DHS faces in delivering program capabilities and benefits on time
and within budget. In September 2003, we reported that the US-VISIT
program is a risky endeavor, both because of the type of program it is
(large, complex, and potentially costly) and because of the way that it
was being managed[Footnote 15]. We reported, for example, that the
program's acquisition management process had not been established, and
that US-VISIT lacked a governance structure. In March 2004, we
testified that DHS faces a major challenge maintaining border security
while still welcoming visitors. Preventing the entry of persons who
pose a threat to the United States cannot be guaranteed, and the missed
entry of just one can have severe consequences. Also, US-VISIT is to
achieve the important law enforcement goal of identifying those who
overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas. Complicating
the achievement of these security and law enforcement goals are other
key US-VISIT goals: facilitating trade and travel through POEs and
providing for enforcement of U.S. privacy laws and regulations[Footnote
16]. Subsequently, in May 2004, we reported that DHS had not employed
the kind of rigorous and disciplined management controls typically
associated with successful programs[Footnote 17]. Moreover, in February
2006, we reported that while DHS had taken steps to implement most of
the recommendations from our 2003 and 2004 reports, progress in
critical areas had been s[Footnote 18]low. Of 18 recommendations we
made since 2003, only 2 had been fully implemented, 11 had been
partially implemented, and 5 were in the process of being implemented,
although the extent to which they would be fully carried out was not
yet known.
US-VISIT Scope, Operations, and Processing at Land POEs:
As mentioned earlier, US-VISIT currently applies to a certain group of
foreign nationals--non-immigrants from countries whose residents are
required to obtain nonimmigrant visas before entering the United States
and residents of certain countries who are exempt from U.S. visa
requirements when they apply for admission to the United States for up
to 90 days for tourism or business purposes under the Visa Waiver
Program.[Footnote 19] US-VISIT also applies to (1) Mexican
nonimmigrants traveling with a Border Crossing Card (BCC) who wish to
remain in the United States longer than 30 days or who declare that
they intend to travel more than 25 miles into the country from the
border (or more than 75 miles from the Arizona border in the Tucson
area)[Footnote 20] and (2) Canadians traveling to the United States for
certain specialized reasons.[Footnote 21]
Most land border crossers--including U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
residents, and most Canadian and Mexican citizens--are, by regulation
or statute, not required to enroll into US-VISIT.[Footnote 22] In
fiscal year 2004, for example, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents comprised about 57 percent of land border crossers; Canadian
and Mexican citizens comprised about 41 percent; and less than 2
percent were US-VISIT enrollees. Figure 1 shows the number and percent
of persons processed under US- VISIT as a percentage of all border
crossings at land, air, and sea POEs in fiscal year 2004.
Figure 1: Persons Processed under US-VISIT as a Percentage of all
Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, Fiscal Year
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: Persons processed by US-VISIT may include foreign nationals who
were also issued an I-94 valid for multiple entries and who have re-
entered multiple times. Total entering the U.S. includes U.S. citizens
who may have re-entered the country multiple times and foreign
nationals, including those not issued I-94s, such as Canadian citizens
and Mexicans with BCCs, and those issued multiple entry I-94s who also
may have re-entered multiple times. U.S. citizens do not fall within
the statutory scope of US-VISIT and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT
screening.
[End of figure]
Foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT enter the United States via a
multi-step process. For individuals required to obtain visas before
entering the United States, the US-VISIT process begins overseas at
U.S. consular offices, which in addition to other processes, collect
biographic data (i.e., country of origin and date of birth) and
biometric data (i.e., digital fingerscans and a digital photograph)
from the applicant. These data are checked against databases or watch
lists of known criminals and suspected terrorists. If the individual's
name does not appear on any watch list and the individual is not
disqualified on the basis of other issues that may be relevant, he or
she is to be issued a visa and may seek admission to the United States
at a POE.
When visitors in vehicles first arrive at a land POE, they initially
enter the primary inspection area where CBP officers, often located in
booths, are to visually inspect travel documents and query the visitors
about such matters as their place of birth and proposed destination.
Visitors arriving as pedestrians enter an equivalent primary inspection
area, generally inside a CBP building. If the CBP officer believes a
more detailed inspection is needed or if the visitors are required to
be processed under US-VISIT for the first time,[Footnote 23] the
visitors are to be referred to the secondary inspection area--an area
away from the primary inspection area--which is generally inside a
facility. The secondary inspection area inside the facility generally
contains office space, waiting areas, and space to process visitors,
including US-VISIT enrollees. Equipment used for US-VISIT processing
includes a computer, printer, digital camera, and a two-fingerprint
scanner. Figure 2 shows US-VISIT equipment installed at one land POE.
Figure 2: US-VISIT Equipment (computer, camera, and printer) at a Land
POE Secondary Inspection Area:
[See PDF for image]
Source: US-Visit Program Office.
[End of figure]
CBP officers use a document reader to scan machine readable travel
documents, such as a passport or visa, and use computers to check
biographic data from the documents against watch list databases. For US-
VISIT processing, biometric verification is performed in part by taking
a digital scan of visitors' fingerprints (the left and right index
fingers) and by taking a digital photograph of the visitor. These data
are stored in the system's databases. The computer system compares the
two index fingerprints to those stored in DHS's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) that, among other things, collects and
stores biometric data about foreign nationals, including FBI
information on all known and suspected terrorists.
If the fingerprints are already in IDENT, the system performs a match
against the existing digital scans to confirm that the person
submitting the fingerprints at secondary inspection at the POE is the
one on file. In addition, the CBP officer visually compares the person
to the photograph that is in the database, which is brought up onto the
computer screen. If no prints are found in IDENT (for example, if the
visitor is from a visa-waiver country), that person is then processed
into US-VISIT, with biographic data entered into the databases, a
digital scan of his or her two index fingerprints, and a digital
photograph. Once the CBP officer deems the visitor to be admissible,
the individual is issued an I-94 or an I-94W (for persons from visa
waiver countries) arrival/departure form. Figure 3 shows how U.S.
citizens and most Mexicans, Canadians, and foreign nationals subject to
US-VISIT are to be processed at land POEs.
Figure 3: Overview of US-VISIT Enrollment at Land POEs for Visitors
with and without Visas Entering the Country for the First Time:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO (analysis), MapArt (map).
Note: Most Mexican entrants with BCCs are not required to obtain an I-
94 arrival/departure form if CBP officers determine that the entrants
do not intend to travel more than 25 miles into the country or stay
more than 30 days. If it is determined by the CBP officer that a
Mexican citizen intends to exceed either limit, the entrant is referred
to secondary inspection at the POE, where they are to be processed into
US-VISIT, and issued an I-94 form, if no grounds are found on which to
deny them entry. According to federal regulation (8 CFR §
235.1(f)(1)(v)(A)), in the Tucson sector, Mexican visitors may travel
up to 75 miles into the country without being issued an I-94 form,
which means that they generally would not be processed into US-VISIT
upon entry.
[End of figure]
In addition to IDENT, US-VISIT relies on a number of information
systems to process visitors. Among the computer software applications
utilized as part of US-VISIT is U.S. Arrival, which provides an
integrated process for issuing I-94 forms and collection of biometric
data for visitors covered by US-VISIT who arrive at land POEs. Another
is U.S. Pedestrian, which is used by CBP officers in conducting
inspections of visitors who arrive at land POEs, entering the United
States on foot, mostly along the southern border.
Overview of Land POE Facilities:
As of August 2006, there were 170 land POEs that are geographically
dispersed along the nation's more than 7,500 miles of borders with
Canada and Mexico. Some are located in rural areas (such as Alexandria
Bay, New York and Blaine-Pacific Highway, Washington) and others in
cities (such as Detroit) or in U.S. cities across from Mexican cities,
such as Laredo and El Paso, Texas. The volume of visitor traffic at
these POEs varies widely, with the busiest four POEs characterized by
CBP as San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa, California, and Bridge of
the Americas in El Paso, Texas. Appendix IV lists the 20 busiest land
POEs, based on the number of individuals in vehicles and pedestrian
traffic recorded entering the country through POEs in fiscal year 2005.
From a facilities standpoint, land POEs vary substantially in building
type and size (square footage) as shown in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c.
Figure 4a: Land POE at Blaine-Peace Arch in Blaine, Washington:
[See PDF for image]
Source: US_VISIT Program Office.
[End of figure]
Figure 4b: Land POE Facility at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel in Detroit,
Michigan:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 4c: Land POE Facility at Rouses Point, New York:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
DHS Has Installed US-VISIT Biometric Entry Capability at Nearly All
Land POEs, but Faces Challenges Identifying and Monitoring the
Operational Impacts on POE Facilities:
DHS has installed US-VISIT biometric entry capability at nearly all
land POEs consistent with statutory deadlines, but faces challenges
identifying and monitoring the operational impacts on POE facilities.
CBP officials at the 21 land POEs we visited told us that US-VISIT has
generally enhanced the officials' ability to process visitors subject
to US-VISIT by providing officials the ability to do biometric checks
and automating the issuance of the visitor I-94 arrival/departure form.
DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land
POEs intended to bolster border security, but deploying them poses
potential operational challenges to land POE facilities that are known
by DHS to be space-constrained. US-VISIT's efforts to evaluate the
impact of US-VISIT on land POE facilities thus far raises questions
about whether sufficient management controls exist to ensure that
additional operational impacts, such as processing delays or further
space constraints, will be anticipated, identified, and appropriately
addressed and resolved.
US-VISIT Biometric Entry Capability Was Installed at Nearly All Land
POEs with Minimal Construction, According to Program Officials:
In December 2005, DHS officials announced that US-VISIT biometric entry
capability had been installed at land POEs in conformance with
statutory mandates and Increments 2B and 3 of DHS's US-VISIT schedule.
Deployment at the 50 busiest land POEs was completed by December 31,
2004, and at all but 2 of the other land POEs where DHS determined the
program should operate by December 31, 2005, as required by law. Our
review of US-VISIT records and discussions with US-VISIT program
officials indicated that DHS installed US-VISIT biometric entry
capability at 154 of 170 land POEs. (App. V lists all land POEs where
US-VISIT has been installed.) With regard to 14 of the 16 POEs where US-
VISIT was not installed, CBP and US-VISIT program office officials told
us there was no operational need for US-VISIT because visitors who are
required to be processed into US-VISIT are, by regulation, not
authorized to enter the United States at these locations.[Footnote 24]
Generally, these POEs are small facilities in remote areas. At 2 other
POEs, US-VISIT needs to be installed in order to achieve full
implementation as required by law, but both of these present
significant challenges to installation of US-VISIT. These POEs do not
currently have access to appropriate communication transmission lines
to operate US-VISIT. CBP officials told us that, given this constraint,
they determined that they could continue to operate as before. Thus,
CBP officers at these locations process foreign visitors manually.
US-VISIT program officials reported and available records showed that
equipment for US-VISIT entry capability was installed with minimal
construction at the 154 land POEs. At the 21 land POEs we visited, we
observed that US-VISIT entry capability equipment had been installed
with little or no change to facilities. For example, at the Detroit-
Windsor tunnel and the Detroit Ambassador Bridge POEs in Detroit,
Michigan, officials confirmed that no additional computer workstations
were required to be installed; at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE at Blaine,
Washington, electrical capacity was upgraded to accommodate US-VISIT
computer needs. In general, our review of reports prepared for each of
these POEs indicated that DHS upgraded existing or added new computer
workstations and printers in the secondary inspections areas of these
facilities (the area where US-VISIT enrollees are processed); installed
digital cameras to photograph those to be processed in US-VISIT;
installed two-fingerprint scanners that digitally record fingerprints;
and installed electronic card readers for detecting data embedded in
machine-readable passports and visas. According to US-VISIT officials,
funding for installing US-VISIT entry equipment nationwide was
approximately $16 million--about 9 percent of the $182 million budgeted
for US-VISIT deployment at land ports between fiscal year 2003 and
fiscal year 2005. Officials reported that the remaining funds were
allocated to computer network infrastructure (about 72 percent) and
design and development, network engineering, fingerscan devices, and
public awareness and outreach (about 19 percent).[Footnote 25]
During our site visits, CBP officials at all 21 facilities told us that
having US-VISIT biometric entry capability generally improved their
ability to process visitors required to enroll in US-VISIT because it
provided them additional assurance that visitors are who they say they
are and automated the paperwork associated with processing the I-94
arrival/departure form. For example, with US-VISIT, the ability to scan
a visitor's passport or other travel document enables the computer at
the inspection site to capture basic biographic information and
automatically print it on the I-94 form; prior to US-VISIT deployment,
the I-94 was filled in manually by the CBP officer or the visitor.
Steps Have Been Taken to Address Operational Challenges Identified at
Land POEs, but DHS May Face Additional Challenges Resulting from
Planned Enhancements:
DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land
POEs that are designed to further bolster CBP's ability to verify that
individuals attempting to enter the country are who they say they are.
While these changes may further aid border security, deploying them
poses potential challenges to land POE facilities where US-VISIT
operates and where millions of visitors are processed annually. Our
site visits, interviews with US-VISIT and CBP officials, and the work
of others suggest that both before and after US-VISIT entry capability
was installed at land POEs, these facilities faced a number of
challenges--operational and physical--including space constraints
complicated by the logistics of processing high volumes of visitors and
associated traffic congestion.
With respect to operational challenges at land POE facilities, we
reported in November 2002--more than 2 years before US- VISIT entry
capability was installed at the 50 busiest land POEs--that busy land
POEs were experiencing 2-to 3-hour delays in processing visitors and
that any lengthening of the entry process could affect visitors
significantly, through additional wait times.[Footnote 26] While we
cannot generalize about the impact US-VISIT has had on processing time
at all land POEs, at one of the busiest land POEs we visited--San
Ysidro, California, where more than 41 million visitors entering the
country in 2005 were processed--CBP officials told us that, although
they had not measured differences in processing times before and after
US-VISIT was installed, the steps required to process US-VISIT visitors
had added to the total time needed to process all visitors entering
through the port. As a result, CBP officials told us that they must
occasionally direct visitors arriving at peak times, such as holidays,
to leave and return later in the day because there was no room for them
to wait. In this case, US-VISIT had an effect on both visitor
processing times and on the capacity of the facility to physically
accommodate pedestrian and vehicular traffic.[Footnote 27]
A similar type of operational problem that reflects how complex visitor
processing activities occur at facilities was reported by a contractor
retained by DHS to study wait times associated with the I-94 issuance
process at another busy POE, Nogales-DeConcini in Arizona.[Footnote 28]
The study, which examined wait times for 3 separate time periods over a
3-month period in the summer of 2005, found that wait times varied by
day (ranging from about 3½ minutes to almost 7 minutes across the time
periods studied) and was more a function of the number of people
waiting for an I-94 rather than the time needed to process each
individual under US-VISIT.[Footnote 29] The contractor noted that the
group size, wait time, and processing all affected the dynamics of the
secondary-processing area or room, which measured approximately 40 feet
by 50 feet. During one day of the study, the contractor noted that the
secondary processing room became crowded, straining processing
capacity. The contractor stated that this occurred because some of the
individuals waiting to obtain I-94s were students or seasonal workers
that required checks that included phone calls to verify their visa
status.[Footnote 30] The contractor concluded that US-VISIT provided an
advantage over manual I-94 processing because the processing was
ultimately more efficient. Nevertheless, the extent to which these
problems occur is unknown because US-VISIT has not performed comparable
studies at other locations.
DHS has long been aware of space constraints and other capacity issues
at land POE facilities. A task force report developed in response to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement
Act of 2000 found that 117 of 166 land POEs operating at that time
(about 70 percent) had three-fourths or less of the required
space.[Footnote 31] The US-VISIT Program Office subsequently confirmed
that land POEs had traffic flow problems (i.e., lack of space,
insufficient roadways, and poor access to facilities) and that many
were aging and undersized; the majority of land POEs were constructed
before 1970 when the volume of border crossings was not as great as it
is now. Our work for this report indicates that such problems persist,
though we cannot generalize to all facilities. For example, at the
Nogales-Morley Gate POE in Arizona, where up to 6,000 visitors are
processed daily (and up to 10,000 on holidays), US-VISIT equipment was
installed, but the system is not used there because CBP determined that
it could not accommodate US-VISIT visitors because of concerns about
CBP's ability to carry out the process in a constrained space while
thousands of other people not subject to US-VISIT processing already
transit through the facility daily.[Footnote 32] Thus, if a visitor is
to be processed into US-VISIT from Morley Gate, that person is directed
to return to Mexico (a few feet away) and to walk the approximately 100
yards to the Nogales-DeConcini POE facility, which has the capability
to handle secondary inspections of this kind. Figure 5 shows the
Nogales-Morley Gate POE building--the small windowed structure on the
right is the processing site.
Figure 5: Nogales-Morley Gate POE, Arizona:
[See PDF for image]
Source: US-VISIT Program Office.
[End of figure]
CBP officials at three other land POEs on the southwest border also
told us that space constraints were a factor in their ability to
efficiently process those subject to US-VISIT. Specifically, at the
POEs at Los Tomates, Gateway, and Brownsville/Matamoros, Texas, CBP
officials told us that US-VISIT had made I-94 processing more
efficient, but travelers continued to experience delays of up to 2
hours on peak holiday weekends as they had before US-VISIT was
installed. Officials at these facilities told us that they believe they
could alleviate this problem if the facility had the space to install
more workstations capable of operating US-VISIT entry capability.
According to CBP officials, CBP has begun to examine the condition of
each facility with the intent of developing a list of border station
construction and modification needs and plans to prioritize
construction projects based on need. In the meantime, CBP and US-VISIT
officials told us that they have taken steps to address problems
operating US-VISIT when space constraints are an issue. For example, at
the POE in Highgate Springs, Vermont, CBP officials told us that US-
VISIT computers and those needed to process commercial truck drivers
and their cargoes were competing for space at the interior counter area
of the building. Following our visit, we were told that the POE had
adjusted its space allocation inside the POE building so that there are
now five workstations for US-VISIT and other noncommercial visitor
processing, one of which can do both. According to the POE assistant
area port director, the POE also extended the hours during which truck
drivers can be processed in a separate building designed entirely for
processing them and their cargoes, in order to relieve the space
pressures in the main building that occur during the high-volume
tourist summer season.
US-VISIT and CBP officials reported that they have taken other steps to
try to minimize any problems that may arise integrating US-VISIT entry
capability operations with other CBP operations. For example, to help
ensure that US-VISIT does not have an adverse impact on CBP's
operations at ports of entry, US-VISIT and CBP established a liaison
office in June 2005, involving supervisory managers detailed from
various CBP offices. The liaison officers worked with US-VISIT staff to
overcome operational issues at POEs; review plans; develop and deliver
training; set up call sites during busy holiday periods to provide
support to POEs needing assistance; and work through technology
problems. A CBP official told us that he believes both US-VISIT and CBP
have been successful in helping land POEs overcome problems as they
arise (such as those that might occur operating new technology at space
constrained facilities). The CBP officers detailed to the liaison
office have since returned to their original duty stations. According
to CBP officials, CBP has an open invitation to re-initiate the liaison
office at any time.
While past challenges with facilities are well known to US-VISIT and
CBP officials and efforts have been made to address them, it is not
clear whether US-VISIT or CBP is prepared to anticipate additional
facilities challenges--challenges already acknowledged by senior US-
VISIT officials--that may arise as new US-VISIT capabilities are added.
The following two key initiatives, in particular, could affect
operations at land POEs:
² 10-fingerprint scanning of US-VISIT enrollees. DHS plans to require
that individuals subject to US-VISIT undergo a 10-fingerprint scan, in
place of the current 2, to ensure the highest levels of accuracy in
identifying people entering and exiting the country. Under this plan,
US-VISIT visitors would be required to have all fingerprints scanned
the first time they enroll in US-VISIT and to submit a 2-fingerprint
scan during subsequent visits. A cost/benefit analysis of this
capability is under way by DHS, selected components, and other
agencies, with an anticipated transition period (from the 2-to 10-
fingerprint scan requirement) taking place later this year and next. In
January 2006, the former Director of US-VISIT testified before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security that in order
to introduce a 10-fingerprint scan capability at land POEs and other
locations, DHS would need a 6-to-8-month period to develop the
capability and additional time to introduce initial operating
capability. The former Director testified that unresolved technical
challenges create the potential for a significant increase in the
length of time needed to process individuals subject to US-VISIT at
POEs once the 10-fingerprint requirement is in place.[Footnote 33] In
commenting on this report, DHS noted that US-VISIT has been working
with industry to speed up processing time and reduce the size of 10-
print capture devices to "eliminate or significantly reduce the impact
of deploying 10-print scanning." As noted earlier, our past work has
shown that any lengthening in the process of entering the United States
at the busiest POEs could inconvenience travelers and result in fewer
visits to the United States or lost business to the nation.[Footnote
34]
² Electronic passport readers for Visa Waiver Program travelers. All
Visa Waiver Program travelers with passports issued after October 26,
2005 must have passports that contain a digital photograph printed in
the document; passports issued to visa waiver travelers after October
26, 2006 must have integrated circuit chips, known as electronic
passports, which are also called "e-passports." (The Visa Waiver
Program allows travelers from certain countries to gain entry to the
United States without a visa.) These e-passports are to contain
biographic and biometric information that can be read by an e-passport
reader or scanner, a device which electronically reads or scans the
information embedded in the e-passport at close proximity, about 4
inches to the reader. According to DHS, all POEs must have the ability
to compare and authenticate e-passports as well as visas and other
travel and entry documents issued to foreign nationals by DHS and the
Department of State. Earlier this year, DHS announced it had
successfully tested e-passports and e-passport scanners. A US-VISIT
Program Office official told us that deployment of these scanners is
moving toward implementation at POEs located at 34 selected
international airports where about 97 percent of the Visa Waiver
Program travelers enter the country. The official said that e-passport
readers will not initially be installed at land POEs--which process a
small percentage of visa waiver travelers--and there is no timeline for
deploying the scanners at land POEs, although there are plans to do so
at some point. CBP's Director of Automated Programs in the Office of
Field Operations told us that e-passport readers and the database used
to process e-passport information do not operate as fast as current
processes at land POEs and thus could cause additional delays,
especially at POEs experiencing processing backlogs and wait times,
such as San Ysidro, California, and Nogales-Mariposa, Arizona.
Given the potential impact that enhancements to US-VISIT could have
both on visitor processing overall and on land POE facilities, it is
important for US-VISIT and CBP to be able to gauge how new changes
associated with US-VISIT may affect operations. However, our past work
showed that US-VISIT had not taken all needed steps to help ensure that
US-VISIT entry capability operates as intended because the approaches
used to gauge or anticipate the impact of US-VISIT operations on land
POE facilities was limited. Specifically, in 2005, in an effort to
evaluate the impact of US-VISIT on the busiest land POEs, DHS completed
evaluations of the time needed to process and issue the I-94 arrival/
departure form at 5 POEs. To conduct its study, DHS studied the I-94
process before and after US-VISIT was installed at five land POEs at
three locations (Port Huron, Michigan; Douglas, Arizona; and Laredo,
Texas). Based on data collected from these 5 POEs, US-VISIT officials
concluded that no additional staff or facility modifications were
needed at other POEs in order to accommodate US-VISIT. We reported in
February 2006 that the scope of this evaluation was too limited to
determine potential operational impacts on POEs. [Footnote 35] We
reported three limitations, in particular: (1) that the evaluations did
not take into account the impact of US-VISIT on workforce requirements
or facility needs because the evaluations focused solely on I-94
processing time; (2) that the locations selected were chosen in part
because they already had sufficient staff to support a US-VISIT pilot-
test; and (3) that US-VISIT officials did not base their evaluation of
I-94 processing times on a constant basis before and after deployment
of US-VISIT--that is, pre-deployment sites used fewer computer
workstations to process travelers than did sites studied after
deployment. We recommended that DHS explore alternative means to
obtaining a full understanding of the impact of US-VISIT on land POEs,
including its impact on workforce levels and facilities and that POE
sites be surveyed that had not been included in their original
assessment. US-VISIT responded that wait times at land POEs were
already known and that it would conduct operational assessments at POEs
as new projects came online. However, apart from a study conducted at
one POE facility by a DHS contractor in August 2005 (cited above), US-
VISIT has not provided documentation on any additional evaluations
conducted that would provide additional insights about the effect of US-
VISIT on land POE operations, including wait times.
We recognize that it may not be cost-effective for US-VISIT or CBP to
conduct a formal assessment of the impact US-VISIT has on each land POE
now that the entry capability has been installed or of all facilities
once new enhancements are introduced. Nevertheless, the assessment
methodology US-VISIT has used in the past--which focused on measuring
changes in I-94 processing times--raises questions about how the agency
will assess the impact that the transition from 2-to 10-fingerprint
scanning may have on land POE operations. That is, if US-VISIT uses the
same methodology and focuses on the changes in processing time, rather
than on the overall impact on operations, including facilities,
staffing, and support logistics, the results will have the same
limitations we highlighted in our earlier study. Our February 2006
recommendation would also be applicable to enhancements that have the
potential to negatively affect operations.
Management Controls Did Not Always Alert US-VISIT and CBP to
Operational Problems:
US-VISIT and CBP have management controls in place to alert them to
operational problems as they occur, but these controls did not always
work to ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended. Specifically, US-
VISIT and CBP officials had not been made aware of computer processing
problems that affected operations, in particular, until we brought them
to their attention, partly because these problems were not always
reported. These computer processing problems have the potential to not
only inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed to
complete the inspection process, but to compromise security,
particularly if CBP officers are unable to perform biometric checks--
one of the critical reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs.
Our standards for internal control in the federal government state that
it is important for agencies to provide reasonable assurance that they
can achieve effective and efficient operations.[Footnote 36] This
includes establishing and maintaining a control environment that sets a
positive and supportive attitude toward control activities that are
designed to help ensure that management's directives are carried out.
Control activities include reviewing and monitoring agency operations
at the functional level (i.e., at land POEs) to compare operational
performance with planned or expected results and to ensure that
controls described in policies and procedures are actually applied and
applied properly, and having relevant, reliable, and timely
communications to ensure that information flows down, across, and up
the organization thereby helping program managers carry out their
responsibilities and providing assurance that timely action is taken on
implementation problems or information that requires follow-up.
Our site visit interviews suggest that current monitoring and control
activities were not sufficient to ensure that US-VISIT performs in
accordance with its security mission and objectives. For example, at 12
of the 21 land POEs we visited, computer-processing problems arose
that, according to CBP officials at those locations, had an impact on
processing times and traveler delays. Generally, officials at these 12
sites said that computer problems occurred with varying frequency and
duration; some said that computers were at times slow or froze up
during certain times of the day, while others said that problems were
sporadic and they could not ascribe them to a particular time of the
day.[Footnote 37] None of the officials we interviewed had formally
assessed the impact of computer slowdowns or freezes on visitors and
visitor wait times, but nonetheless cited computer problems as a cause
of visitor delays. In November 2005, we notified a US-VISIT program
official in headquarters that we had heard about computer processing
problems at some of the POEs we had visited. The official told us that
US-VISIT had not been aware of these problems and said that, as a
result of our work, CBP had been contacted to investigate the problem.
In June 2006, a CBP official responsible for information technology at
CBP's data center told us that POEs had experienced slowdowns
associated with certain US-VISIT data queries.[Footnote 38] The CBP
official told us that since the computer processing problems were
identified and resolved, performance had greatly improved. We did not
verify whether the actions taken fully resolved these problems.
Others have also reported computer processing problems associated with
US-VISIT. Our review of the report prepared by the contractor hired by
DHS to study wait times at the POE in Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona
(discussed earlier) confirmed that slowdowns had occurred at the
facility during two of the periods covered by its study (June 2005 to
August 2005).[Footnote 39] According to the contractor, these slowdowns
resulted in CBP officers having to revert to manual I-94 processing
without the benefit of US-VISIT biometric checks. Specifically, in its
reports, the contractor noted that:
"...on the morning of Thursday, June 23, the computer systems used to
perform secondary inspections became very slow, impacting the issuance
of I-94 and enrollment in US-VISIT. The staff had to revert to using
the paper I-94s, which visitors had to fill out by hand..."
"As happened during the [prior] study, the computer systems were
unavailable for a period of time. This occurred on Tuesday from 1:00 to
2:00 p.m. Port officials decided to revert to the manual process
because the network had become very slow and the queue was growing. CBP
officers told — researchers that it was taking up to twenty minutes to
receive responses to queries...."
In an undated memorandum commenting on the contractor's report, US-
VISIT's Director of Mission Operations expressed concern about the
contractor's discussion of computer "downtime" as a factor impacting US-
VISIT processing times. He stated that these problems can be caused by
a variety of factors, including factors related to I-94 processing and
that capturing biometric information "is only rarely responsible for
the inability to complete the process." Based on our work, it is
unclear what analysis US-VISIT had done to make this determination.
US-VISIT officials told us that various controls are in place to alert
them to problems as they occur, but the lack of awareness about
computer-processing problems raises questions about whether these
controls are working as intended. US-VISIT officials told us that it is
their position that once US-VISIT entry capability equipment was
installed and operating, CBP became responsible for identifying
problems and notifying US-VISIT when US-VISIT-related problems occurred
so that US-VISIT can work with CBP to resolve them. The officials
stated that computer problems can be attributable to other processes
and systems not related to US-VISIT which are not the US-VISIT Program
Office's responsibility. In addition, the Acting Director of US-VISIT
noted that there are mechanisms in place to help CBP and US-VISIT
identify problems. For example, US-VISIT officials told us that US-
VISIT and CBP headquarters officials meet regularly to discuss issues
associated with US-VISIT implementation and CBP maintains a help desk
at its Virginia data center to resolve technology problems raised by
CBP field officials. Regarding the latter, the Acting Director noted
that if POE officials do not report problems, there is nothing CBP and
US-VISIT can do to resolve them. During our review, we noted that CBP
officers are required--in training and as part of standard operating
procedures--to report problems with US-VISIT technology to the CBP help
desk. Nevertheless, CBP officials at 9 of the 12 sites we visited where
computer processing problems were identified said they did not always
use the help desk to report or resolve computer problems (and thereby
generating a record of the problems). Officials at 5 of the 9 sites
told us they temporarily resolved the problem by turning off and
restarting the computers.
Although US-VISIT and CBP have some controls in place to help them
identify and address problems like those discussed above, these
controls may not have been implemented consistently or may not be
sufficient to ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended because
officials did not always alert CBP and US-VISIT program managers to the
fact that problems were occurring that adversely affected operations.
It is important that US-VISIT and CBP managers are alerted to problems
as they occur to ensure continuity of operations consistent with US-
VISIT's goal of providing security to U.S. citizens and travelers.
Moreover, in light of the fact that US-VISIT plans to enhance security
through additional technology investments and that it may be
challenging to deploy and operate at facilities that are already known
to be aging and undersized, it is incumbent upon the US-VISIT program
office to play a continuing and proactive role in the management
control structure.
Our internal control standards also call for agencies to establish
performance measures and indicators throughout the organization so that
actual performance can be compared to expected results. The US-VISIT
program office has established and implemented performance measures for
fiscal years 2005 and 2006 that are designed to gauge performance of
various aspects of US-VISIT covering a variety of areas, but these
measures do not gauge the performance of US-VISIT entry capabilities at
land POEs. For example, according to a July 2006 draft report prepared
by the US-VISIT program office, US-VISIT has begun to measure the ratio
of adverse actions (defined as decisions to deny entry into the
country) to total-biometric-watch-list "hits" when visitors are
processed at ports of entry.[Footnote 40] According to US- VISIT, this
measure seeks to help CBP focus its inspection activities on preventing
potential known or suspected criminals or terrorists from entering the
country. US-VISIT reported that it had not established a baseline or
target for this measure in fiscal year 2005. However, according to US-
VISIT, CBP officers at all POEs combined denied entrance to 30 percent
of persons whose biometric information appeared on a watch list during
fiscal year 2005 (about 617 of the 2,059 watch list "hits"). US-VISIT
established a target for this measure during fiscal year 2006 of 33
percent.
Another measure is designed to gauge the wait time incurred by a
specific US-VISIT activity at all air, land, and sea POEs, namely the
average response time to deliver results on biometric watch list
queries for finger scans. (This measure does not gauge other US-VISIT
related activities such as scanning the visa or passport, taking and
processing a digital photograph, or printing an I-94.) To ensure that
wait times are not increased substantially due to additional US-VISIT
capabilities at POEs, US-VISIT has established a goal of 10 seconds and
reported that, since October 2004, US-VISIT has been able to maintain,
on average, less than an 8-second response time at POEs at which US-
VISIT had been installed.
These and other existing measures of certain key aspects of program
performance with respect to both security and efficiency can be useful
in analyzing trends and measuring results against planned or expected
results. However, because there are operational and facility
differences among air, sea, and land POEs, it is important to be able
to measure and distinguish differences--one would not expect baseline
or target measures to be the same across these environments. At air and
sea ports, visitors are processed in primary inspection in a controlled
environment and CBP officers are able to prescreen visitors using
passenger manifests, which are transmitted to CBP while passengers are
enroute to the POE. By contrast, at land POEs, visitors arrive on foot
or in a vehicle and CBP officers refer them to secondary inspection for
US-VISIT processing without the benefit of a manifest and based on the
information available to officers at the point of initial contact--a
process substantially different than that used at air and sea ports.
The measures used in August 2006 aggregated baselines and targets for
all POEs and did not distinguish among them with regard to air, land,
and sea POEs.
Without additional performance measures to more fully gauge operational
impacts of US-VISIT on land POEs, CBP and US-VISIT may not be well
equipped to identify problems, trends, and areas needing improvements
now and as additional US-VISIT entry capabilities, such as 10-finger
scans, are introduced. Consistent with our past work, we believe such
measures could help DHS identify and quantify problems, evaluate
alternatives, allocate resources, track progress, and learn from any
mistakes that may have been made while deploying and operating US-VISIT
at land POEs.[Footnote 41]
DHS Cannot Currently Implement a Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability at
Land POEs and Faces Uncertainties as Testing of an Alternative Exit
Strategy Continues:
While federal laws require the creation of a US-VISIT exit capability
using biometric verification, the US-VISIT Program Office concluded
that implementing a biometrically-based exit-recording system like that
used to record visitors entering the country would require additional
staff and new infrastructure (such as buildings and roadways) that
would be prohibitively costly, would likely produce major traffic
congestion in exit lanes at the busier land POEs and could have adverse
impacts on trade and commerce. Although current technology does not
exist to enable biometric verification of those leaving the country
without major infrastructural changes, US-VISIT officials believe
technological advances over the next 5-to 10-years will enable them to
record who is leaving the country using biometrics without requiring
travelers to stop at a facility, thereby minimizing the need for major
infrastructure changes. In the interim, US-VISIT is testing an
alternative nonbiometric technology for recording visitors as they exit
the country, in which electronic tags containing a numeric identifier
associated with each visitor are embedded in I-94 forms. US-VISIT's own
analysis of this technology and our analysis and that of others has
identified numerous performance and reliability problems with this
solution, including the inability of the nonbiometric solution to
ensure that the person exiting the country is the same who entered. US-
VISIT has taken corrective actions and testing is still ongoing, but
uncertainties remain about how US-VISIT will use technology in the
future to meet biometric exit requirements. These uncertainties reflect
the fact that DHS has not met a June 2005 statutory requirement to
submit a report to the Congress that describes (1) the status of
biometric exit data systems already in use at POEs and (2) the manner
in which US-VISIT is to meet the goal of a comprehensive screening
system, with both entry and exit biometric capability.
Various Factors Have Prevented US-VISIT from Implementing a Biometric
Exit Capability:
Federal laws require the creation of a US-VISIT exit capability using
biometric verification methods to ensure that the identity of visitors
leaving the country can be matched biometrically against their entry
records.[Footnote 42] However, according to officials at the US-VISIT
program office and CBP and US-VISIT program documentation, there are
interrelated logistical, technological, and infrastructure constraints
that have precluded DHS from achieving this mandate, and there are cost
factors related to the feasibility of implementation of such a
solution. The major constraint to performing biometric verification
upon exit at this time, in the US-VISIT Program Office's view, is that
the only proven technology available would necessitate mirroring the
processes currently in use for US-VISIT at entry. A mirror-image system
for exit would, like entry, require CBP officers at land POEs to
examine the travel documents of those leaving the country, take
fingerprints, compare visitors' facial features to photographs, and, if
questions about identity arise, direct the departing visitor to
secondary inspection for additional questioning. These steps would be
carried out for exiting pedestrians as well as for persons exiting in
vehicles. The US-VISIT Program Office concluded in an internal January
2005 report assessing alternatives to biometric exit that the mirror-
imaging solution was "an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons,
including but not limited to, the additional staffing demands, new
infrastructure requirements, and potential trade and commerce
impacts."[Footnote 43]
US-VISIT officials told us that they anticipated that a biometric exit
process mirroring that used for entry could result in delays at land
POEs with heavy daily volumes of visitors. And they stated that in
order to implement a mirror-image biometric exit capability, additional
lanes for exiting vehicles and additional inspection booths and staff
would be needed, though they have not determined precisely how many.
According to these officials, it is unclear how new traffic lanes and
new facilities could be built at land POEs where space constraints
already exist, such as those in congested urban areas. (For example,
San Ysidro, California, currently has 24 entry lanes, each with its own
staffed booth and 6 unstaffed exit lanes. Thus, if full biometric exit
capability were implemented using a mirror image approach, San Ysidro's
current capacity of 6 exit lanes would have to be expanded to 24 exit
lanes.) As shown in figure 6, based on observations during our site
visit to the San Ysidro POE, the facility is surrounded by dense urban
infrastructure, leaving little, if any, room to expand in place. Some
of the 24 entry lanes for vehicle traffic heading northwards from
Mexico into the United States appear in the bottom left portion of the
photograph, where vehicles are shown waiting to approach primary
inspection at the facility; the six exit lanes (traffic towards
Mexico), which do not have fixed inspection facilities, are at the
upper left.
Figure 6: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Other POE facilities are similarly space-constrained. At the POEs at
Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona, for example, we observed that the facility
is bordered by railroad tracks, a parking lot, and industrial or
commercial buildings. In addition, CBP has identified space constraints
at some rural POEs. For example, the Thousand Islands Bridge POE at
Alexandria Bay, New York, is situated in what POE officials described
as a "geological bowl," with tall rock outcroppings potentially
hindering the ability to expand facilities at the current location.
Officials told us that in order to accommodate existing and anticipated
traffic volume upon entry, they are in the early stages of planning to
build an entirely new POE on a hill about a half-mile south of the
present facility. CBP officials at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE in
Washington state said that CBP also is considering whether to relocate
and expand the POE facility, within the next 5-to-10 years, to better
handle existing and projected traffic volume. According to the US-VISIT
program officials, none of the plans for any expanded, renovated, or
relocated POE include a mirror-image addition of exit lanes or
facilities comparable to those existing for entry.
In 2003, the US-VISIT Program Office estimated that it would cost
approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry and exit
capability at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be installed and
that such an effort would have a major impact on facility
infrastructure at land POEs. We did not assess the reliability of the
2003 estimate. The cost estimate did not separately break out costs for
entry and exit construction, but did factor in the cost for building
additional exit vehicle lanes and booths as well as buildings and other
infrastructure that would be required to accommodate a mirror imaging
at exit of the capabilities required for entry processing. US-VISIT
program officials told us that they provided this estimate to
congressional staff during a briefing, but that the reaction to this
projected cost was negative and that they therefore did not move ahead
with this option. No subsequent cost estimate updates have been
prepared, and DHS's annual budget requests have not included funds to
build the infrastructure that would be associated with the required
facilities.
US-VISIT officials stated that they believe that technological advances
over the next 5-to-10 years will make it possible to utilize
alternative technologies that provide biometric verification of persons
exiting the country without major changes to facility infrastructure
and without requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles,
thereby precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. US-
VISIT's report assessing biometric alternatives noted that although
limitations in technology currently preclude the use of biometric
identification because visitors would have to be stopped, the use of
the as-yet undeveloped biometric verification technology supports the
long-term vision of the US-VISIT program.[Footnote 44] However, no such
technology or device currently exists that would not have a major
impact on facilities. The prospects for its development, manufacture,
deployment and reliable utilization are currently uncertain or unknown,
although a prototype device that would permit a fingerprint to be read
remotely without requiring the visitor to come to a full stop is under
development.
While logistical, technical, and cost constraints may prevent
implementation of a biometrically based exit technology for US-VISIT at
this time, it is important to note that there currently is not a
legislatively mandated date for implementation of such a solution. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires US-
VISIT to collect biometric-exit-data from all individuals who are
required to provide biometric entry data.[Footnote 45] The act did not
set a deadline, however, for requiring collection of biometric exit
data from all individuals who are required to provide biometric entry
data. Although US-VISIT had set a December 2007 deadline for
implementing exit capability at the 50 busiest land POEs, US-VISIT has
since determined that implementing exit capability by this date is no
longer feasible, and a new date for doing so has not been set.
The US-VISIT Program Office Is Testing Nonbiometric Technology to
Record Travelers' Departure[Footnote 46]
Because there is at present no biometric technology that can be used to
verify a traveler's exit from the country at land POEs without also
making major and costly changes to POE infrastructure and facilities,
the US-VISIT Program Office sought an alternative means of recording a
visitor's exit from the country, using nonbiometric technology, that
could be tested at land POEs. US-VISIT determined that the chosen
nonbiometric technology would have to meet certain criteria. According
to the US-VISIT Program Office, the technology would have to: (1)
permit recording of an exiting visitor in order that stopping or
slowing down would not be required and privacy issues were addressed;
(2) result in no increase in wait times for visitors; (3) create no
degradation in the level of service at exit lanes; (4) create no
significant degradation in traffic patterns (that is, no additional
traffic congestion); (5) be convenient to the visitor, and (6) be
commercially available. None of these criteria directly addressed or
reflected the legislative mandate to deploy a system to record entry
and exit by foreign travelers using biometric identifiers in order to
ensure that persons leaving the country were those who had entered.
Rather, the criteria focused on choosing a technology that would not
require a major investment in facilities, would protect privacy, and
would not generate large traffic backups that would inconvenience or
delay both travelers and commercial carriers.
Among the technologies considered for testing by the US-VISIT Program
Office, the only one that met all the US-VISIT evaluation criteria was
passive, automated, radio frequency identification (RFID).[Footnote 47]
This technology, according to US-VISIT, "best satisfied all the
assessment criteria." RFID is an automated data-capture technology that
can be used to electronically store information contained on a very
small tag that can be embedded in a document (or some other physical
item). This information can then be identified, and recorded as having
been identified, by RFID readers that are connected to computer
databases.
For purposes of US-VISIT's testing of the nonbiometric technology, the
RFID tag is embedded in a modified I-94 arrival/departure form, called
an I-94A. Each RFID tag has only a single number stored in it; privacy
is protected because no information is stored on these tags other than
a unique ID number that is linked to the visitor's biographic
information. To facilitate the transmission of the number from the RFID
tag, a new DHS system of records--the Automated Identification
Management System (AIDMS) [Footnote 48]--was created to link the unique
RFID tag ID number to existing information stored in the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS) database, which is used by CBP
to verify travel information and update traveler data.[Footnote 49]
According to US-VISIT, limiting the data on the tag to a single number
helps preserve the privacy of travelers; acquisition of the number
would provide no meaningful information to non-authorized persons,
since they would then have to access TECS to link the number to
biographic data. However, access to computers and their databases at
land POEs is restricted to authorized personnel and involves additional
protections such as passwords as well as entrance into physically
restricted areas inside POE buildings. (A more detailed discussion of
RFID technology and privacy issues is contained in appendix VI.)
The RFID technology used in this way is considered passive because the
tag cannot initiate communications. Rather, the tag responds to radio
frequency emissions from an RFID reader--an electronic device that can
be installed on a pole, or on a steel gantry of the kind that holds
highway signs over the entire width of a roadway (see figure 11)--and
transmits the numeric information stored on the tag back to the reader,
from up to 30 feet away, according to the US-VISIT Program Office.
Figure 7a shows RFID readers mounted on a metal gantry at the Thousand
Islands Bridge land POE, Alexandria Bay, New York. The readers are
attached to metal extensions that project out from the right side of
the gantry, to record an I-94A embedded with tags that are inside the
vehicles that pass underneath. RFID readers can also be installed in
portals or on poles at pedestrian traffic areas to read the I-94A
embedded with tags of persons leaving the country on foot. Figure 7b
shows RFID readers in portals positioned on either side of pedestrian
exit doors at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE in Washington State.
Figure 7a: Metal Gantry with RFID Readers and Antennas at the Thousand
Islands Bridge POE, Alexandria Bay, New York:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 7b: RFID Portals Positioned Next to Exit Doors at the Blaine-
Peace Arch POE in Washington State:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Initial Results of Testing Using RFID Technology Indicate Problems
Meeting a Key Program Goal--Verifying the Identity of Persons Leaving
the Country:
In December 2004 and January 2005, a team of US-VISIT contractors
conducted the first part of a feasibility study to test passive RFID
equipment in a simulated environment-at a mock POE in Virginia. At this
site, different types of vehicles-including cars, buses, and trucks--
were run at different speeds to test RFID read rates. Pedestrians
carrying documents with RFID tags embedded or attached were not tested.
The feasibility study raised numerous issues about the reliability and
performance of the RFID technology. For example, RFID readers held on a
gantry over a roadway had difficulty detecting RFID-detectable tags
that were inside vehicles with metallic tinted windows (whether the
windows were open or closed). The read rate was improved from about 56
percent to about 70 percent if the readers were moved to both sides of
the road, rather than overhead, and if the occupants held their
documents with the RFID-detectable tags up to the vehicle's side
windows. The study concluded that the physical actions of the visitor
had to be taken into account when obtaining a read of the I-94A and
made specific recommendations to improve read rates, such as suggesting
that vehicle occupants hold the I-94A up to a side window and keep
multiple forms apart.
After the feasibility study, US-VISIT proceeded, as planned, with phase
1 of proof-of-concept testing for RFID at five land POEs at the
northern and southern borders to determine what corrective actions, if
any, should be taken to improve RFID read rates for exiting vehicles
and pedestrians. This effort comprised testing for both exit and for re-
entry by persons who have been issued a tag-embedded I-94A that is
valid for multiple entries over several months. [Footnote 50] The RFID
performance tests were conducted for one-week periods at land POEs, as
follows:[Footnote 51] vehicular traffic was tested at Nogales-Mariposa
and Nogales-DeConcini POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the Blaine-Pacific
Highway and Blaine-Peace Arch POEs in Blaine, Washington; and Thousand
Islands Bridge POE in Alexandria Bay, New York; pedestrian traffic was
tested at the Nogales-Mariposa and Nogales-DeConcini POEs.
For these exit tests, the US-VISIT Program Office developed critical
success factor target read rates to compare them to the actual read
rates obtained during the test for both pedestrians carrying an I-94A
with RFID-detectable tags and for travelers in vehicles who also had an
RFID-detectable I-94A with them inside the vehicles. The target exit
read rates ranged from an expected success rate of 70 percent to 95
percent, based on anticipated performance under different conditions,
partly as demonstrated in the earlier feasibility study, on business
requirements, and on a concept of operation plan prepared for Increment
2C.[Footnote 52]
In a January 2006 assessment[Footnote 53] of the test results, the US-
VISIT Program Office reported that the exit read rates that occurred
during the test generally fell short of the expected target rates for
both pedestrians and for travelers in vehicles. For example, according
to US-VISIT, at the Blaine-Pacific Highway test site, of 166 vehicles
tested, RFID readers correctly identified 14 percent; the target read
rate was 70 percent.[Footnote 54] Another problem that arose was that
of cross-reads, in which multiple RFID readers installed on gantries or
poles picked up information from the same visitor, regardless of
whether the individual was entering or exiting in a vehicle or on foot.
Thus, cross-reads resulted in inaccurate record-keeping. According to a
January 2006 US-VISIT corrective-action report, signal-filtering
equipment is to be installed to correct the problem and additional
testing is to be conducted to confirm and understand the extent of the
problem. The report also noted that remedying cross-reads would require
changes to equipment and infrastructure on a case-by-case basis at each
land POE, because each has a different physical configuration of
buildings, roadways, roofs, gantries, poles, and other surfaces against
which the signals can bounce and cause cross-reads. Each would
therefore require a different physical solution to avoid the signal
interference that triggers cross-reads. Although cost estimates or time
lines have not been developed for such alterations to facilities and
equipment, it is possible that having to alter the physical
configuration at each land POE in some regard and then test each
separately to ensure that cross-reads had been eliminated would be both
time consuming and potentially costly, in terms of changes to
infrastructure and equipment.
We observed potential problems with the RFID exit system relating to
facilities and infrastructure at some of the POEs we visited. At the
Nogales-Mariposa POE, in Nogales, Arizona, for example, we observed
that RFID portals for pedestrians had been placed on the right side of
the CBP POE building, on a rocky, sloping hillside, and that there was
no signage directing pedestrians to walk between them, nor was a
walkway installed, as shown in figure 8a. Although travelers were
expected to walk between the portals, this configuration enabled
pedestrians to avoid the portals altogether--to walk around them or
cross the road to avoid them, as shown in figure 8b.
Figure 8a: RFID Installation at the Nogales-Mariposa POE in Arizona,
Facing Toward Mexico:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 8b: Two Pedestrians Exiting the Country at the Nogales-Mariposa
POE, Arizona, Walking Toward Mexico:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
According to the US-VISIT corrective actions report, 15 percent of
exiting pedestrian (including those participating in the test and those
who did not) used the pathway between the two portals at the Nogales
facility during a September 2005 observation period.[Footnote 55] In
this same report, US-VISIT acknowledged that there was no defined
pathway or infrastructure for pedestrian exit at Nogales-Mariposa,
Arizona, and that only one of the three pedestrian paths were covered
by the portals that had been placed there. US-VISIT reported that while
the placement of the portal readers will not be changed, it is taking
steps to improve the likelihood of detection with additional antennae,
readers, and signage. However, there are no plans at present to modify
the existing POE infrastructure on the west side of the building where
the portals were installed, such as by installing a paved walkway or by
constructing fencing to divert those exiting to go through the readers
in order to increase the chances that exiting pedestrians are detected.
In commenting on this report, DHS stated that it had constructed a new
primary pedestrian exit walkway parallel to the existing pedestrian
entry and had installed signage, sidewalks, and a new secure gate.
However, according to a CBP official at the Nogales- Mariposa POE, the
newly constructed pedestrian exit walkway is on the other (east) side
of the building from the pathway where the portal readers were placed
and tested.
During the period that US-VISIT carried out RFID exit tests at land
POEs, US-VISIT also tested read rates for RFID-detectable documents
carried by pedestrians or persons in vehicles who had been issued an I-
94A during a prior visit to the United States, had subsequently left
the country, and were intending to re-enter.[Footnote 56] (I-94s can be
issued that are valid for up to 6 months for multiple re-entries into
the country.) US-VISIT performed the re-entry test for documents held
by persons in vehicles at the Mariposa and DeConcini POEs in Nogales,
Arizona; the Blaine-Pacific Highway and Blaine-Peace Arch, POEs in
Washington state; and Thousand Islands Bridge POE at Alexandria Bay,
New York. For pedestrians, the re-entry test was performed at the
Mariposa and DeConcini POEs in Nogales, Arizona (see tables 6a and 6b,
appendix VII). US-VISIT set higher expected target read rates for the
re-entry test than for exit because all persons and vehicles entering
or re-entering the country must stop for questioning by CBP officers
and must take travel documents out of their pockets or from inside a
vehicle, and show them to the officer, enhancing the likelihood that
RFID-detectable documents would be detected. As expected by US-VISIT,
read rates for the re-entry test for vehicles were generally higher
than for exit, although the results did not meet the critical success
factors initially projected by US-VISIT. Appendix VII discusses the
results of RFID performance for exit and re-entry in greater detail.
Beyond RFID operations issues that affect facilities, our work and that
of the DHS Privacy Office have identified other performance and
reliability problems related to passive RFID. In June 2005, we
testified before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity of the House Committee on Homeland
Security on similar reliability problems with RFID.[Footnote 57] We
noted, for example, that when an object close to the reader or tag
interferes with the radio waves, read-rate accuracy decreases, and that
environmental conditions, such as temperature and humidity, can make
tags unreadable. We further noted that tags read at high speeds have a
significant decrease in read rates.
According to US-VISIT officials, phase 2 of the RFID proof- of-concept
testing, which is to expand the capabilities identified at the five
phase 1 locations will, among other things, link visitor data to
vehicle exit data (or re-entry, if the visitor already has an RFID-
embedded I-94 form), address deficiencies noted in phase 1, and further
evaluate RFID performance. At the time of our review, many
uncertainties about the future of a US-VISIT exit capability remained
because US-VISIT had not developed a plan to show when phase 2 of proof-
of-concept testing of RFID would conclude, when an evaluation of the
technology would be completed, and how US-VISIT would define success.
However, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and
deadlines set, questions remain about DHS's intentions going forward.
For example, the RFID solution does not meet the congressional
requirement for a biometric exit capability because the technology that
has been tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT-- ensuring that
visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave. By design,
an RFID tag embedded in an I-94 arrival/departure form cannot provide
the biometric identity-matching capability that is envisioned as part
of a comprehensive entry/exit border security system using biometric
identifiers for tracking overstays and others entering, exiting, and re-
entering the country. Specifically, the RFID tag in the I-94 form
cannot be physically tied to an individual. This situation means that
while a document may be detected as leaving the country, the person to
whom it was issued at time of entry may be somewhere else.
DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the agency
intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program. As of
October 2006, this plan was still under review in the Office of the
Secretary, according to US-VISIT officials. According to statute, this
plan is to include, among other things, a description of the manner in
which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a comprehensive entry and
exit screening system--including both biometric entry and exit--and
fulfills statutory obligations imposed on the program by several laws
enacted between 1996 and 2002.[Footnote 58] Until such a plan is
finalized and issued, DHS is not able to articulate how entry/exit
concepts will fit together--including any interim nonbiometric
solutions--and neither DHS nor Congress is positioned to prioritize and
allocate resources for a US-VISIT exit capability or plan for the
program's future.
In commenting on this report, DHS acknowledged that the interim non-
biometric exit technology using RFID tags embedded in the I-94 does not
meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability. DHS
stated that it used the non-biometric technology because industry was
not to the point of developing a device that could satisfy US-VISIT
requirements, such as not impacting traffic flows or not having safety
impacts. DHS said that US-VISIT officials would perform subsequent
research and industry outreach activities in an attempt to satisfy
statutory requirements for a biometric exit capability.
DHS Has Not Articulated How US-VISIT Strategically Fits with Other Land-
Border Security Initiatives:
In recent years, DHS has planned or implemented a number of initiatives
aimed at securing the nation's borders. However, DHS has not defined a
strategic context that shows how US-VISIT fits with other land border
initiatives. As we reported in September 2003, agency programs need to
properly fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of
program operations--e.g., what functions are to be performed by whom;
when and where they are to be performed; what information is to be used
to perform them; what rules and standards will govern the application
of technology to support them; and what facility or infrastructure
changes will be needed to ensure that they operate in harmony and as
intended.[Footnote 59] Without a clear strategic context for US-VISIT,
the risk is increased that the program will not operate with related
programs and thus not cost-effectively meet mission needs.
In our September 2003 report, we stated that DHS had not defined key
aspects of the larger homeland security environment in which US-VISIT
would need to operate. For example, certain policy and standards
decisions had not been made, such as whether official travel documents
would be required for all persons who enter and exit the country,
including U.S. and Canadian citizens, and how many fingerprints would
be collected--factors that could potentially increase inspection times
and ultimately increase traveler wait times at some of the higher
volume land POE facilities. To minimize the impact of these changes, we
recommended that DHS clarify the context in which US-VISIT is to
operate. Three years later, defining this strategic context remains a
work in progress. Thus, the program's relationships and dependencies
with other closely allied initiatives and programs are still unclear.
According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, the Program Office drafted
in March 2005 a strategic plan that showed how US-VISIT would be
strategically aligned with DHS's organizational mission and also
defined an overall vision for immigration and border
management.[Footnote 60] According to this official, the draft plan
provided for an immigration and border management enterprise that
unified multiple internal departmental and other external stakeholders
with common objectives, strategies, processes, and infrastructures. As
of October 2006, we were told that DHS had not approved this strategic
plan. This draft plan was not available to us, and it is unclear how it
would provide an overarching vision and road map of how all these
component elements can at this time be addressed given that critical
elements of other emerging border security initiatives have yet to be
finalized. For example, under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, DHS and State are to develop and implement a
plan, no later than June 2009, which requires U.S. citizens and foreign
nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico to present a passport or other
document or combination of documents deemed sufficient to show identity
and citizenship to enter the United States (this is currently not a
requirement for these individuals entering the United States via land
POEs from within the western hemisphere). This effort, known as the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), was first announced in
2005, and some members of Congress and others have raised questions
about agencies' progress carrying out WHTI. In May 2006, we issued a
report that provided our observations on efforts to implement WHTI
along the U.S. border with Canada.[Footnote 61] We stated that DHS and
State had taken some steps to carry out the Travel Initiative, but they
had a long way to go to implement their proposed plans, and time was
slipping by. Among other things, we found that:
* key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a
passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of Canada
enter or return to the United States--a decision critical to making
decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the country,
including what common facilities or infrastructure might be needed to
perform these inspections at land POEs;
* a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form
of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help
DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not made
decisions involving a broad set of considerations that include (1)
utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2)
ensuring that proper equipment and facilities are in place to
facilitate crossings at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility
with other border crossing technology already in use.
As of September 2006, DHS had still not finalized plans for changing
the inspection process and using technology to process U.S. citizens
and foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico reentering or
entering the country at land POEs. In the absence of decisions about
the strategic direction of both programs, it is still unclear (1) how
the technology used to facilitate border crossings under the Travel
Initiative will be integrated with US-VISIT technology, if at all, and
(2) how land POE facilities would have to be modified to accommodate
both programs to ensure efficient inspections that do not seriously
affect wait times. This raises the possibility that CBP would be faced
with managing differing technology platforms and border inspection
processes at high-volume land POEs facilities that, according to DHS,
already face space constraints and congestion.
Similarly, it is not clear how US-VISIT is to operate in relation to
another emerging border security effort, the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI)--a new comprehensive DHS initiative, announced last year, to
secure the country's borders and reduce illegal migration. According to
DHS, as of June 2006, SBI is to focus broadly on two major themes:
* border control--gaining full control of the borders to prevent
illegal immigration, as well as security breaches, and:
* interior enforcement--disrupting and dismantling cross border crime
into the interior of the United States while locating and removing
aliens who are present in the United States in violation of law.
Under SBI and its CBP component, called SBInet, DHS plans to use a
systems approach to integrate personnel, infrastructures, technologies,
and rapid response capability into a comprehensive border protection
system. DHS reports that, among other things, SBInet is to encompass
both the northern and southern land borders, including the Great Lakes,
under a unified border control strategy whereby CBP is to focus on the
interdiction of cross-border violations between the ports and at the
official land POEs and funnel traffic to the land POEs.
DHS has recently awarded a contract to help DHS design, build, and
execute SBInet. Although DHS has published some information on various
aspects of SBI and SBInet, it remains unclear how SBInet will be
linked, if at all, to US-VISIT so that the two systems can share
technology, infrastructure, and data across programs. For example, from
a border control perspective, questions arise on whether CBP needs
additional resources, facilities or facility modifications, and
procedural changes at land POEs if all those who attempt to enter the
country on the northern and southern border are successfully funneled
to land POEs.
Also, given the absence of a comprehensive entry and exit system,
questions remain about what meaningful data US-VISIT may be able to
provide other DHS components, such as Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), to ensure that DHS can, from an interior enforcement
perspective, identify and remove foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT
who may have overstayed their visas. In a May 2004 report, we stated
that although no firm estimates were available, the extent of
overstaying is significant.[Footnote 62] We stated that most long-term
overstays appeared to be motivated by economic opportunities, but a few
had been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related
activities. Notably, some of the September 11 hijackers had overstayed
their visas. We further reported that US-VISIT held promise for
identifying and tracking overstays as long as it could overcome
weaknesses matching visitors' entry and exit.
Conclusions:
Developing and deploying complex technology that records the entry and
exit of millions of visitors to the United States, verifies their
identities to mitigate the likelihood that terrorists or criminals can
enter or exit at will, and tracks persons who remain in the country
longer than authorized is a worthy goal in our nation's effort to
enhance border security in a post-9/11 era. But doing so also poses
significant challenges; foremost among them is striking a reasonable
balance between US-VISIT's goals of providing security to U.S. citizens
and visitors while facilitating legitimate trade and travel. DHS has
made considerable progress making the entry portion of the US-VISIT
program at land ports of entry (POEs) operational, and border officials
have clearly expressed the benefits that US-VISIT technology and
biometric identification tools have afforded them. Nevertheless, US-
VISIT is one in a series of ambitious border security initiatives that
could take a toll on the current facilities and infrastructure in place
to support the activities at land POEs, which already process a large
majority (more than 75 percent) of all visitors entering the United
States via legal checkpoints. Many land POEs operate out of small,
aging structures that are constrained by space and that were
constructed before technology and associated equipment played a
prominent role in processing activities.
Our current and past work has raised questions on whether DHS has
adequately assessed how US-VISIT has affected operations at land POEs,
given current constraints at facilities that routinely experience high
traffic volumes and which encounter occasional computer-processing
problems. As additional US-VISIT capabilities-- such as 10-fingerprint
scanning--are installed at land POEs and as other border security
initiatives unfold, including the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
it is particularly important that DHS be able to anticipate potential
problems and develop solutions to minimize any operational and
logistical impacts on aging and already overcrowded land POE
facilities. Our earlier recommendation on this issue suggested that DHS
needed to expand upon prior efforts to assess the impact of US-VISIT on
busy land POEs in order to obtain a fuller understanding of the
system's impact on these facilities from an operational and human
capital perspective. We believe this remains an important step to take
because it would help DHS establish a baseline or foundation from which
to anticipate potential problems while providing a framework for
developing strategies and action plans to overcome them. Although US-
VISIT has said it would conduct operational assessments at POEs as new
projects came online, the assessment methodology US-VISIT has used in
the past--which focused on measuring changes in I-94 processing times-
-raised questions about how the agency will perform future assessments.
In addition, because US-VISIT will likely continue to have an impact on
land POE facilities as it evolves, it is important for US-VISIT and CBP
officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying and
reporting potential computer and other operational problems as they
arise--problems that could affect the ability of US-VIST entry
capability to operate as intended. If additional delays in processing
visitors were to occur, the ability of POE facilities to handle
additional vehicular and pedestrian traffic could be further strained,
and incidents requiring officials to turn visitors away temporarily may
increase. Likewise, if disruptions to US-VISIT computer operations are
not consistently and promptly reported and resolved and if
communication between CBP and US-VISIT officials about computer-related
problems and other operational challenges is not effective, then it is
possible that a critical US-VISIT function--notably, the ability to use
biometric information to confirm visitors' identities through various
databases--could be disrupted, as has occurred in the past. The need to
avoid disruptions to biometric verification is important given that one
of the primary goals of US-VISIT is to enhance the security of U.S.
citizens and visitors, and in light of the substantial investment DHS
has made in US-VISIT technology and equipment.
US-VISIT has taken appropriate steps to develop performance measures
that focus on various aspects of US-VISIT performance across air, land,
and sea POEs. However, these measures do not go far enough to assess
the affect of US-VISIT on POE operations, particularly land POEs, which
are operationally distinctive from air and sea POEs where US-VISIT
entry has also been installed. Such measures are needed to ensure that
officials can identify and address problems at land-based facilities
where improvements may be needed.
With respect to DHS's effort to create an exit verification capability,
developing and deploying this capability for US-VISIT at land POEs has
posed a set of challenges that are distinct from those associated with
entry. US-VISIT has not determined whether it can achieve, in a
realistic time frame, or at an acceptable cost, the legislatively
mandated capability to record the exit of travelers at land POEs using
biometric technology. Apart from acquiring new facilities and
infrastructure at an estimated cost of billions of dollars, US-VISIT
officials have acknowledged that no technology now exists to reliably
record travelers' exit from the country, and to ensure that the person
leaving the country is the same person who entered, without requiring
them to stop upon exit--potentially imposing a substantial burden on
travelers and commerce. US-VISIT officials stated that they believe a
biometrically based solution that does not require those exiting the
country to stop for processing, that minimizes the need for major
facility changes, and that can used to definitively match a visitor's
entry and exit will be available in 5 to 10 years. In the interim, it
remains unclear how officials plan to proceed--whether a nonbiometric
alternative now being tested can provide an acceptable interim solution
or whether the government ought to wait for a viable biometric solution
to become available. According to statute, DHS was required to report
more than a year ago on its plans for developing a comprehensive
biometric entry and exit system, but DHS has yet to finalize this road
map for Congress. Reporting might provide better assurance that US-
VISIT can balance its goals of providing security, serving the
immigration system, facilitating trade and travel, and protecting
privacy at land POEs. This plan would also give DHS the opportunity to
discuss the costs, benefits, barriers, and opportunities associated
with various strategies for deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit
capabilities and keep Congress informed of its progress overall. Until
DHS finalizes such a plan, neither Congress nor DHS are likely to have
sufficient information as a basis for decisions about various factors
relevant to the success of US-VISIT, ranging from funding needed for
any land POE facility modifications in support of the installation of
exit technology to the trade-offs associated with ensuring traveler
convenience while providing verification of travelers' departure
consistent with US-VISIT's national security and law enforcement goals.
Finally, DHS has not articulated how US-VISIT fits strategically and
operationally with other land-border security initiatives, such as the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and Secure Border Initiative.
Without knowing how US-VISIT is to be integrated within the larger
strategic context governing DHS operations, DHS faces substantial risk
that US-VISIT will not align or operate with other initiatives at land
POEs and thus not cost-effectively meet mission needs. Knowing how US-
VISIT is to work in harmony with these initiatives could help Congress,
DHS, and others better understand what resources, tools, and
investments in land POE facilities and infrastructure are needed to
ensure their success, while providing critical information to help make
decisions about other DHS missions. This could include, for example,
information on what funds and staffing resources ICE would need to
enforce immigration laws if US-VISIT were able to provide reliable and
timely information on potentially millions of persons who have
overstayed the terms of their visas, some of whom may pose a threat to
the nation's security.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in US-
VISIT at land POEs and security goals and objectives, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the US-
VISIT Program Director, in collaboration with the Commissioner of CBP,
to take the following two actions:
² improve existing management controls for identifying and reporting
computer processing and other operational problems as they arise at
land POEs and ensure that these controls are consistently administered;
and:
² develop performance measures for assessing the impact of US-VISIT
operations specifically at land POEs.
We also recommend that as DHS finalizes the statutorily mandated report
describing a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for US-
VISIT, the Secretary of Homeland Security take steps to ensure that the
report include, among other things,
² information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying
biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs;
² a discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit
capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a
reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements;
and:
² a description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border
security initiatives with US-VISIT and what facility or facility
modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that technology
and processes work in harmony.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security. In an October 31, 2006, letter, DHS provided written
comments, which are summarized below and included in their entirety in
appendix VIII.
DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it needed
to improve existing management controls associated with US-VISIT,
develop performance measures to assess the impact of US-VISIT
operations at land POEs, and ensure that the statutorily mandated
report describes how DHS will move to a biometric entry and exit
capability and align US-VISIT with emerging land border initiatives.
DHS did not provide timelines for when it plans to take these steps,
including finalizing the statutorily mandated report, which was to have
been issued to the Congress in June 2005.
DHS disagreed with certain aspects of or sought clarification on some
of our findings. DHS disagreed with our finding that the US-VISIT
program office did not fully consider the impact of US-VISIT on the
overall operations at POEs. It said that US-VISIT impacts are limited
to changes in Form I-94 processing time, which it says are positive, as
supported by US-VISIT evaluations. According to DHS other factors
related to capacity, staffing, and the volume of travelers are
"arguably" beyond the scope of US-VISIT.
We agree that the approach taken to do operational assessments of the
impact of US-VISIT land POE facilities focused on changes to I-94
processing time and that a variety of factors and processes can affect
traveler inspections and associated wait times at land POEs. However,
as discussed in this and our February 2006 report, the assessment
methodology US-VISIT has used thus far had limitations--including
focusing solely on I-94 processing time.[Footnote 63] Unanticipated
problems at facilities that routinely experience high traffic volumes
and occasionally encounter computer processing shortfalls raise
questions about whether DHS has adequately assessed how US-VISIT has
affected operations at land POEs. Although it may not be cost-effective
for US-VISIT or CBP to conduct a formal assessment of the impact of US-
VISIT at each land POE, it is important that DHS be positioned to
anticipate potential problems and develop solutions to minimize any
operational and logistical impacts on aging and already overcrowded
land POE facilities. This is especially true given that DHS recognizes
that the transition from 2-to 10-print digital scanning has a high
likelihood of impacting port facilities.
Regarding the latter, we have amended our report to clarify, consistent
with DHS's comments, that US-VISIT is currently working with industry
to speed up processing time and reduce the size of the 10-print capture
devices to "eliminate or significantly reduce the impact of deploying
10-print scanning." DHS efforts to work with industry highlights the
need to more fully assess how US-VISIT affects land POEs so that
potential problems can be identified and addressed before the readers,
or any other new programs, are introduced at land POEs. As noted in our
report, based on our past work, any lengthening in the process of
entering the United States at the busiest land POEs could inconvenience
travelers and result in fewer visits to the United States or lost
business to the nation.[Footnote 64]
DHS also suggested that we clarify its acknowledgement that the non-
biometric technology tested did not meet the statutory requirement for
biometric exit capability. DHS stated that the non-biometric technology
was used because industry has yet to develop a biometric exit device
that could satisfy mission requirements such as not impacting traffic
flow and not having safety impacts. We have amended our report to
clarify that DHS acknowledged that the non-biometric technology would
not satisfy statutory requirements and to reflect that it would perform
research and industry outreach to satisfy the mandate. Nonetheless, the
fact that the non-biometric exit technology used does not satisfy the
congressionally mandated biometric exit capability underscores the
importance of our recommendation for DHS to clearly articulate how it
plans to move from a non-biometric exit technology to a biometric exit
solution.
In addition, DHS suggested that we clarify that, with regard to the
RFID pedestrian exit portals at the Nogales-Mariposa, Arizona, POE, it
had constructed a new primary pedestrian exit walkway parallel to the
existing pedestrian entry and had installed signage, sidewalks, and a
new secure gate. We have amended the report to include information
about the new pedestrian exit walkway. However, as we noted in our
report, portals were installed only on one of the three pedestrian
pathways used to exit the United States. According to a CBP official at
the Nogales-Mariposa POE, the newly constructed pedestrian exit walkway
is on the other side of the building from the pathway where the portal
readers were placed and tested and thus would not mitigate the
vulnerabilities we identified.
Finally, DHS provided other comments that we considered technical in
nature. We have amended our report to incorporate these clarifications,
where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the issuance date of our original report, which, as discussed
earlier, was classified For Official Use Only. At that time, we will
provide copies of this report to appropriate departments and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available on GAO's Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Robert Filner:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Raul M. Grijalva:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ruben E. Hinojosa:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
House of Representatives:
[End of Section]
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
This report addresses the progress the Department of Homeland Security
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have made in implementing
the United States Visitor Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program at existing land Ports of Entry (POE). Specifically, we
analyzed the following issues: (1) What has the US-VISIT Program Office
done to implement US-VISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what
impact has US-VISIT had on these facilities? (2) What is the status of
US-VISIT Program Office efforts to implement a US-VISIT exit capability
at land POE facilities? (3) What has DHS done to define a strategic
context to show how US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities at land POE
facilities fit with other current and emerging border security
initiatives?
We performed our work at the Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT
Program Office and CBP. We also carried out work at 21 of 154 land POEs
where US-VISIT entry capability had been installed. At 3 of these 21
land POEs, DHS was also testing exit capability. Table 3 shows the 21
land POEs we visited, by location and state, between August 2005 and
February 2006.
Table 3: Land POEs visited by GAO, August 2005 to February 2006:
Northern border.
POE Name: Ambassador Bridge;
Location: Detroit;
State: Mich.
POE Name: Detroit-Windsor Tunnel;
Location: Detroit;
State: Mich.
POE Name: Overton Corners;
Location: Rouses point;
State: N.Y.
POE Name: St. John's Hwy;
Location: Rouses Point;
State: N.Y.
Thousands Island Bridge;
Location: Alexandria Bay;
State: N.Y.
POE Name: Champlain;
Location: Champlain;
State: N.Y.
POE Name: Highgate Springs;
Location: Highgate Springs;
State: Vt.
POE Name: Alburg;
Location: Alburg;
State: Vt.
POE Name: Peace Arch;
Location: Blaine;
State: Wash.
POE Name: Pacific Highway;
Location: Blaine;
State: Wash.
Southern border.
POE Name: DeConcini;
Location: Nogales;
State: Ariz.
POE Name: Morley Gate;
Location: Nogales;
State: Ariz.
POE Name: Mariposa;
Location: Nogales;
State: Ariz.
POE Name: San Ysidro;
Location: San Diego;
State: Calif.
POE Name: Los Tomates;
Location: Brownsville;
State: Tex.
POE Name: Gateway;
Location: Brownsville;
State: Tex.
POE Name: Brownsville Matamoros Bridge;
Location: Brownsville;
State: Tex.
POE Name: Hidalgo;
Location: Hidalgo;
State: Tex.
POE Name: Progreso;
Location: Progreso;
State: Tex.
POE Name: Los Ebanos;
Location: Los Ebanos;
State: Tex.
POE Name: Pharr;
Location: Pharr;
State: Tex.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In selecting land POEs to visit, we originally selected 10 land POEs on
the northern border and 10 POEs on the southern border based on
geographic dispersion along the border and taking into consideration
POEs that were located near each other to minimize travel costs. We
added the Morley Gate POE after we initially selected sites because it
is physically located about 100 yards from the DeConcini POE in
downtown Nogales (Ariz.) and after learning that US-VISIT was treating
Morley Gate as a stand-alone POE for US-VISIT deployment
purposes.[Footnote 65] In making our selections, we also considered US-
VISIT deployment schedules, facility size, and the number of border
crossings and I-94 issuances.[Footnote 66] Fifteen of the 21 selected
sites in our study were among the 50 busiest land POEs for which US-
VISIT entry capability was to be operating by December 31, 2004, as
required by law. The other 6 sites were among those remaining POEs
where, according to law, US-VISIT entry capability was to be operating
by December 31, 2005. While selecting sites, we also included the five
POEs at which the US-VISIT program office was testing radio frequency
identification (RFID) technology as part of a proof of concept for
meeting US-VISIT exit capability requirements. These were: Blaine-Peace
Arch; Blaine-Pacific Highway; Thousand Islands Bridge, Alexandria Bay;
Nogales-Mariposa; and Nogales-DeConcini. The information from our site
visits is limited to the 21 POEs we visited and is not generalizable to
the remaining POEs.
To examine what the US-VISIT Program Office has done to implement US-
VISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what impact US-VISIT has had
on these facilities, we interviewed US-VISIT and CBP headquarters
officials as well as CBP officials at the 21 locations we visited. We
obtained and analyzed available DHS reports on US-VISIT entry
capability planning, deployment, and operations across land POEs,
including the 21 we visited. At the 21 locations, we (1) discussed US-
VISIT entry capability deployment at the facility, any facility-related
barriers or constraints encountered during installation, and any
operational issues encountered since and (2) obtained any available
documentation about US-VISIT deployment and operations at the facility.
We also toured secondary inspection at each facility to observe what US-
VISIT equipment was installed, how it was installed, and where
possible, how it operated when visitors covered by US-VISIT arrived at
the facility for processing into the country. While doing our site
visits, we met with US-VISIT and CBP officials at headquarters to
discuss our field work; discern why problems we identified in the field
may have occurred, and if problems occurred, gather and analyze
available US-VISIT and CBP information about those problems, including
information on any corrective actions. We also examined whether
internal or management controls were in place to alert officials to the
problems we identified, and examined whether these controls were being
applied, consistent with GAO's Standards for Internal Controls in the
Federal Government.[Footnote 67] In addition, we interviewed CBP and US-
VISIT headquarters officials about plans for installing and operating
new technology and equipment related to US-VISIT, such as 10- finger-
scan readers, at land POEs; reviewed available DHS documents about
plans to implement these devices; and reviewed available DHS documents
that discussed performance measures for US-VISIT overall. We also
reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and DHS federal register notices
pertaining to US-VISIT entry capability deployment at land POEs, as
well as reports prepared by DHS, GAO, the DHS Office of Inspector
General, and the Congressional Research Service.
To determine the status of DHS's efforts to implement a US-VISIT exit
capability at land POEs, we interviewed US-VISIT and CBP headquarters
officials and CBP officials at the five locations where US-VISIT exit
capability was being tested (Nogales-Mariposa, Nogales-DeConcini,
Blaine-Pacific Highway, Blaine-Peace Arch, and Alexandria Bay). At each
of the locations, we toured the areas where exit testing equipment and
technology had been installed and discussed with CBP officials how it
was installed and to be tested. We also reviewed applicable laws and
regulations and obtained and analyzed available DHS reports on US-VISIT
exit capability including an operational alternatives assessment;
feasibility studies; and proof of concept performance evaluation and
corrective action reports. Our analysis of these reports focused on DHS
strategies for selecting, testing, acquiring, and evaluating
alternative methods that could meet the requirements; DHS's criteria
used to select and test the potential of RFID technology; and the
challenges encountered, including any privacy issues associated with
RFID use. Finally, we obtained and analyzed DHS reports on the costs of
the equipment and related facility infrastructure, such as the metal
gantry erected over roadways to hold RFID readers, to estimate what it
would cost to install RFID equipment at all land POEs. We developed our
overall estimate based on the average cost to date (about $1 million
each) of installing exit gantries and associated RFID equipment at the
four POEs where gantries and equipment were installed. (Although RFID
use was tested at five POEs, at the DeConcini POE in downtown Nogales,
Arizona, the RFID readers were placed on poles on either side of entry
lanes, since all entering vehicles pass under a large permanent canopy
structure that precludes installing a gantry. At the other four POEs,
RFID readers were attached to metal gantries placed over roadway
lanes.)
To examine what DHS has done to define a strategic context to show how
US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities at land POE facilities fit with
other current and emerging border security initiatives, we reviewed
past GAO reports and public DHS announcements about the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative and the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). We
also interviewed DHS officials about the status of efforts to implement
these initiatives as well as the status of efforts to develop and
promulgate a strategic plan for US-VISIT and compared available
information on DHS plans to implement initiatives with the results of
our discussions with US-VISIT program officials.
We conducted our work from September 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of Section]
Appendix II: Visa Waiver Countries:
The Department of State's (State) Visa Waiver Program (VWP) enables
nationals of certain countries to travel to the United States for
tourism or business for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a
visa. The program was established in 1986 with the objective of
promoting better relations with U.S. allies, eliminating unnecessary
barriers to travel, stimulating the tourism industry, and permitting
the Department of State to focus consular resources in other areas. VWP
eligible travelers may apply for a visa, if they prefer to do so. Not
all countries participate in the VWP, and not all travelers from VWP
countries are eligible to use the program. VWP travelers are screened
prior to admission into the United States, and they are enrolled in the
Department of Homeland Security's TUS-VISIT program. Currently, 27
countries participate in the Visa Waiver Program as shown in the
following table.
Table 4: Countries Participating in the Visa Waiver Program:
Andorra;
Australia;
Iceland;
Ireland;
Norway;
Portugal;
Austria;
Italy;
San Marino;
Belgium;
Japan;
Singapore;
Brunei;
Liechtenstein;
Slovenia;
Denmark;
Luxembourg;
Spain;
Finland;
Monaco;
Sweden;
France;
The Netherlands;
Switzerland;
Germany;
New Zealand;
United Kingdom.
Source: Department of State.
[End of table]
[End of Section]
Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the US-VISIT Program:
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
originally required the development of an automated entry and exit
control system to collect a record of departure for every alien
departing the United States and match the record of departure with the
record of the alien's arrival in the United States; make it possible to
identify nonimmigrants who remain in the country beyond the authorized
period; and not significantly disrupt trade, tourism, or other
legitimate cross-border traffic at land border ports of entry. It also
required the integration of overstay information into appropriate
databases of the INS and the Department of State, including those used
at ports of entry and at consular offices. The system was originally to
be developed by September 30, 1998; this deadline was changed to
October 15, 1998, and was changed again for land border ports of entry
and sea ports to March 30, 2001.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement
Act (DMIA) of 2000 replaced the 1996 statute in its entirety, requiring
instead an electronic system that would provide access to and integrate
alien arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to be
created or collected under law, are in an electronic format, and are in
a data base of the Department of Justice or the Department of State,
including those created or used at ports of entry and at consular
offices. The Act specifically provided that it not be construed to
permit the imposition of any new documentary or data collection
requirements on any person for the purpose of satisfying its
provisions, but it further provided that it also not be construed to
reduce or curtail any authority of the Attorney General (now Secretary
of Homeland Security) or Secretary of State under any other provision
of law. The integrated entry and exit data system was to be implemented
at airports and seaports by December 31, 2003, at the 50 busiest land
ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and at all remaining ports of
entry by December 31, 2005.
The DMIA also required that the system use available data to produce a
report of arriving and departing aliens by country of nationality,
classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant, and date of arrival in
and departure from the United States. The system was to match an
alien's available arrival data with the alien's available departure
data, assist in the identification of possible overstays, and use
available alien arrival and departure data for annual reports to
Congress. These reports were to include the number of aliens for whom
departure data were collected during the reporting period, with an
accounting by country of nationality; the number of departing aliens
whose departure data was successfully matched to the alien's arrival
data, with an accounting by country of nationality and classification
as an immigrant or nonimmigrant; the number of aliens who arrived
pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa, or as a visitor under the visa waiver
program, for whom no matching departure data have been obtained as of
the end of the alien's authorized period of stay, with an accounting by
country of nationality and date of arrival in the United States; and
the number of identified overstays, with an accounting by country of
nationality.
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act provided that, in developing the
integrated entry and exit data system under the DMIA, the Attorney
General (now Secretary of Homeland Security) and Secretary of State
were to focus particularly on the utilization of biometric technology
and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of
entry. It also required that the system be able to interface with law
enforcement databases for use by federal law enforcement to identify
and detain individuals who pose a threat to the national security of
the United States. The PATRIOT Act also required by January 26, 2003,
the development and certification of a technology standard, including
appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be used to verify
the identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa or persons seeking to
enter the United States pursuant to a visa for the purposes of
conducting background checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a
person has not received a visa under a different name. This technology
standard was to be the technological basis for a cross-agency, cross-
platform electronic system that is a cost-effective, efficient, fully
interoperable means to share law enforcement and intelligence
information necessary to confirm the identity of persons applying for a
U.S. visa or persons seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a
visa. This electronic system was to be readily and easily accessible to
consular officers, border inspection agents, and law enforcement and
intelligence officers responsible for investigation or identification
of aliens admitted to the United States pursuant to a visa. Every 2
years beginning on October 26, 2002, the Attorney General (now
Secretary of Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State were to
jointly report to Congress on the development, implementation,
efficacy, and privacy implications of the technology standard and
electronic database system.
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 required
that, in developing the integrated entry and exit data system for the
ports of entry under the DMIA, the Attorney General (now Secretary of
Homeland Security) and Secretary of State implement, fund, and use the
technology standard required by the USA PATRIOT Act at U.S. ports of
entry and at consular posts abroad. The act also required the
establishment of a database containing the arrival and departure data
from machine-readable visas, passports, and other travel and entry
documents possessed by aliens and the interoperability of all security
databases relevant to making determinations of admissibility under
section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In implementing
these requirements, the INS (now DHS) and the Department of State were
to utilize technologies that facilitate the lawful and efficient cross-
border movement of commerce and persons without compromising the safety
and security of the United States and were to consider implementing a
North American National Security Program, for which other provisions in
the act called for a feasibility study.
The act, as amended, also established a number of requirements
regarding biometric travel and entry documents. It required that not
later than October 26, 2004, the Attorney General (now Secretary of
Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State issue to aliens only
machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry
documents that use biometric identifiers and that they jointly
establish document authentication standards and biometric identifiers
standards to be employed on such visas and other travel and entry
documents from among those biometric identifiers recognized by domestic
and international standards organizations. It also required by October
26, 2005, the installation at all ports of entry of the United States
equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and authentication
of all U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens
and passports issued by visa waiver participants. Such biometric data
readers and scanners were to be those that domestic and international
standards organizations determine to be highly accurate when used to
verify identity, that can read the biometric identifiers used under the
act, and that can authenticate the document presented to verify
identity. These systems also were to utilize the technology standard
established pursuant to the PATRIOT Act.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 did not
amend the existing statutory provisions governing US-VISIT, but it did
establish additional statutory requirements concerning the program. It
described the program as an "automated biometric entry and exit data
system" and required DHS to develop a plan to accelerate the full
implementation of the program and to report to Congress on this plan by
June 15, 2005. The report was to provide several types of information
about the implementation of US-VISIT, including a "listing of ports of
entry and other DHS and Department of State locations with biometric
exit data systems in use." The report also was to provide a description
of the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a
comprehensive entry and exit screening system, "including both entry
and exit biometric;" and fulfills the statutory obligations imposed on
the program by several laws enacted between 1996 and 2002. The act
provided that US-VISIT "shall include a requirement for the collection
of biometric exit data for all categories of individuals who are
required to provide biometric entry data, regardless of the port of
entry where such categories of individuals entered the United States."
The new provisions in the 2004 act also addressed integration and
interoperability of databases and data systems that process or contain
information on aliens and federal law enforcement and intelligence
information relevant to visa issuance and admissibility of aliens;
maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the US-VISIT data system;
using the system to track and facilitate the processing of immigration
benefits using biometric identifiers; the goals of the program (e.g.,
serving as a vital counterterrorism tool, screening visitors
efficiently and in a welcoming manner, integrating relevant databases
and plans for database modifications to address volume increase and
database usage, and providing inspectors and related personnel with
adequate real time information); training, education, and outreach on
US-VISIT, low risk visitor programs, and immigration law; annual
compliance reports by DHS, State, the Department of Justice, and any
other department or agency subject to the requirements of the new
provisions; and development and implementation of a registered traveler
program.
[End of Section]
Appendix IV: The 20 Busiest Land Ports of Entry (POE) by Volume of
Individuals Entering the United States in Fiscal Year 2005:
Rank Order: 1;
Name of Land POE: San Ysidro;
Location: San Diego;
State: Calif;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 41,430,304.
Rank Order: 2;
Name of Land POE: Calexico;
Location: Calexico;
State: Calif;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 16,418,744.
Rank Order: 3;
Name of Land POE: Otay Mesa;
Location: Otay Mesa;
State: Calif;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 14,531,794.
Rank Order: 4;
Name of Land POE: Bridge of Americas;
Location: El Paso;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 14,229,629.
Rank Order: 5;
Name of Land POE: Paso del Norte;
Location: El Paso;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 13,443,901.
Rank Order: 6;
Name of Land POE: Hidalgo;
Location: Hidalgo;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 12,788,679.
Rank Order: 7;
Name of Land POE: Nogales DeConcini;
Location: Nogales;
State: Ariz;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 12,425,006.
Rank Order: 8;
Name of Land POE: Lincoln-Juarez Bridge;
Location: Laredo;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 12,328,941.
Rank Order: 9;
Name of Land POE: Niagara Falls[A];
Location: Niagara Falls;
State: N.Y;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 9,656,444.
Rank Order: 10;
Name of Land POE: San Luis;
Location: San Luis;
State: Ariz;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 9,017,655.
Rank Order: 11;
Name of Land POE: Laredo Convent Bridge;
Location: Laredo;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 8,376,604.
Rank Order: 12;
Name of Land POE: Detroit-Ambassador Bridge;
Location: Detroit;
State: Mich;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 7,438,654.
Rank Order: 13;
Name of Land POE: Douglas;
Location: Douglas;
State: Ariz;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 6,795,354.
Rank Order: 14;
Name of Land POE: Peace Bridge;
Location: Buffalo;
State: N.Y;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 6,725,942.
Rank Order: 15;
Name of Land POE: Brownsville-Gateway;
Location: Brownsville;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 6,712,108.
Rank Order: 16;
Name of Land POE: Ysleta;
Location: El Paso;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 6,492,695.
Rank Order: 17;
Name of Land POE: Calexico East;
Location: Calexico;
State: Calif;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 6,122,111.
Rank Order: 18;
Name of Land POE: Detroit Tunnel;
Location: Detroit;
State: Mich;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 5,719,476.
Rank Order: 19;
Name of Land POE: Port Huron;
Location: Port Huron;
State: Mich;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 5,080,176.
Rank Order: 20;
Name of Land POE: Eagle Pass Intern Bridge II;
Location: Eagle Pass;
State: Tex;
Total Number of US and Foreign Entrants (Pedestrians and Vehicle
Occupants): 4,945,237.
Source: CBP.
[A] This site comprises multiple POEs at this location.
[End of table]
[End of Section]
Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at Which US-VISIT Has Been
Installed:
According to the US-VISIT program office, US-VISIT entry capability was
installed at the following land POE by December 31, 2005. The list is
arranged in state alphabetical order.
Alaska (3):
Alcan, Alcan:
Dalton's Cache, Dalton's Cache:
Skagway, Skagway:
Arizona (8):
Douglas, Douglas:
Lukeville, Lukeville:
Nogales DeConcini:
Nogales Mariposa:
Morley Gate, Nogales:
San Luis, San Luis:
Sasabe, Sasabe:
Naco, Naco:
California (6):
Andrade, Andrade:
Calexico East-Imperial Valley, Calexico:
Calexico West, Calexico:
Otay Mesa, Otay Mesa:
San Ysidro, San Ysidro:
Tecate, Tecate:
Idaho (2):
Eastport, Eastport:
Porthill, Porthill:
Maine (15):
Bar Harbor Ferry, Bar Harbor:
Bridgewater, Bridgewater:
Calais-Ferry Point Bridge, Calais:
Coburn Gore, Coburn Gore:
Eastport, Eastport:
Fort Fairfield, Fort Fairfield:
Fort Kent, Fort Kent:
Hamlin, Hamlin:
Houlton, Houlton:
Jackman, Jackman:
Limestone, Limestone:
Lubec, Lubec:
Madawaska, Madawaska:
Van Buren, Van Buren:
Vanceboro, Vanceboro:
Michigan (6):
Detroit Ambassador Bridge, Detroit:
Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, Detroit:
Port Huron-Blue Water Bridge, Port Huron:
Sault Ste. Marie, Sault Ste. Marie:
Algonac Ferry, Algonac:
Marine City Ferry, Marine City:
Minnesota (8):
Baudette, Baudette:
Ely, Ely:
Grand Portage, Grand Portage:
International Falls, International Falls:
Lancaster, Lancaster:
Pine Creek, Roseau:
Roseau, Roseau:
Warroad, Warroad:
Montana (13):
Chief Mountain, Chief Mountain:
Del Bonita, Del Bonita:
Morgan, Loring:
Opheim, Opheim:
Piegan, Babb:
Raymond, Raymond:
Roosville, Roosville:
Scobey, Scobey:
Sweetgrass, Sweetgrass:
Turner, Turner:
Willow Creek, Turner:
Wild Horse, Havre:
Whitetail, Whitetail:
New Hampshire (1):
Pittsburg, Pittsburg:
New Mexico (3):
Antelope Wells, Antelope Wells:
Columbus, Columbus:
Santa Teresa, Santa Teresa:
New York (16):
Cape Vincent Ferry, Cape Vincent:
Champlain, Champlain:
Chateaugay, Chateaugay:
Fort Covington, Fort Covington:
Heart Island Ferry, Alexandria Bay:
Massena, Rooseveltown:
Mooers, Mooers Niagara (Lewiston- Queenston, Whirlpool, and Rainbow
Bridges), Niagara Falls:
Niagara Falls Amtrak Station, Niagara Falls:
Ogdensburg, Ogdensburg:
Overton Corners, Champlain:
Peace Bridge, Buffalo:
Rochester Ferry, Rochester:
Rouses Point, Rouses Point:
Thousand Islands Bridge, Alexandria Bay:
Trout River, Trout River:
North Dakota (18):
Ambrose, Ambrose:
Antler, Antler:
Carbury, Carbury:
Dunseith, Dunseith:
Fortuna, Fortuna:
Hannah, Hannah:
Hansboro, Hansboro:
Maida, Maida:
Neche, Neche:
Noonon, Noonan:
Northgate, Northgate:
Pembina, Pembina:
Portal, Portal:
Sarles, Sarles:
Sherwood, Sherwood:
St. John, St. John:
Walhalla, Walhalla:
Westhope, Westhope:
Ohio (1):
Jackson Street Pier Ferry, Akron:
Texas (25):
Amistad Dam, Amistad Village:
Bridge of the Americas/Cordova Bridge, El Paso:
Brownsville-Gateway:
Brownsville-Los Tomates/Veterans International Bridge:
Brownsville-Matamoros Bridge:
Columbia Solidarity Bridge, Laredo:
Convent Street (or Gateway to the Americas International Bridge),
Laredo:
Del Rio International Bridge, Del Rio:
Eagle Pass Bridge I, Eagle Pass:
Eagle Pass Bridge II, Eagle Pass:
Fabens, Fabens:
Falcon Heights, Falcon Heights:
Fort Hancock, Fort Hancock:
Gateway International Bridge, Brownsville:
Hidalgo, McAllen:
Lincoln-Juarez Bridge, Laredo:
Los Ebanos Ferry, Los Ebanos:
Los Indios, Los Indios:
Paso del Norte Bridge, El Paso:
Pharr, Pharr:
Presidio, Presidio:
Progreso, Progreso:
Rio Grande City, Rio Grande City:
Roma, Roma:
World Trade Bridge, Laredo:
Ysleta-Zaragoza Bridge, El Paso:
Vermont (14):
Alburg Springs, Alburg Springs:
Alburg, Alburg:
Beebe Plain, Beebe Plain:
Beecher Falls, Beecher Falls:
Canaan, Canaan:
Derby Line, Derby Line, I- 91:
Derby Line, Derby Line, Rte 5:
East Richford, East Richford:
Highgate Springs, Highgate Springs:
Morses Line, Morses Line:
North Troy, North Troy:
Norton, Norton:
Richford, Richford:
Richford/Pinnacle, Richford:
West Berkshire, West Berkshire:
Washington (13):
Blaine-Pacific Highway, Blaine:
Blaine-Peace Arch, Blaine:
Boundary, Boundary:
Danville, Danville:
Ferry, Ferry:
Frontier, Frontier:
Laurier, Laurier:
Lynden, Lynden:
Metaline Falls, Metaline Falls:
Nighthawk, Nighthawk:
Oroville, Oroville:
Point Roberts, Point Roberts:
Sumas, Sumas:
Canada (1):
Vancouver Amtrak Station:
[End of Section]
Appendix VI: Actions Taken by US-VISIT Program Office to Mitigate
Privacy Risks Associated with RFID at Land POEs:
Protecting the privacy of visitors to the United States is one of the
four stated primary mission goals of the US-VISIT program. We and
others have raised questions in recent years about the potential
privacy risks surrounding the use of RFID technology to track the
movement of persons, as opposed to goods; the potential for the
technology to be subverted for surveillance purposes, rather than
identification; and the potential for "function creep," whereby
information collected for one purpose gradually develops other
secondary uses, such as has occurred with Social Security
numbers.[Footnote 68] In congressional testimony, we have noted that
the use of RFID tags and associated databases raises important security
considerations related to the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the data on the tags and in the databases, and in how
this information is being protected.[Footnote 69] We have noted, as
well, that while the federal government had begun using RFID technology
for a variety of applications--to track and identify assets, weapons,
and baggage on flights, for example--using this technology for generic
inventory control did not raise the same privacy issues as using it to
track the movement of persons.[Footnote 70]
The US-VISIT Program Office has taken steps to meet statutory and
congressional requirements protecting the privacy of individuals who
would be affected if RFID technology were to be implemented as part of
the US-VISIT exit and re-entry process, and to address the privacy
concerns raised by us and others. According to OMB guidance,[Footnote
71] a privacy impact assessment should be conducted before an agency
develops or procures an information technology system, such as the
proposed RFID system, which collects, maintains, or disseminates
information about an individual--in this case, numeric information that
may be linked to biographic information contained within databases. In
January 2004, DHS published a Privacy Impact Assessment in the Federal
Register, as required by law, for the initial deployment of US-VISIT,
and published the latest in a series of updated Privacy Impact
Assessments in July 2005, addressing privacy issues related to the
proof-of-concept testing of RFID for Increment 2C.[Footnote 72]
In its July 2005 Privacy Impact Assessment, DHS said that by design,
the information embedded in the RFID-readable I-94 tag does not
compromise a visitor's security, for the following reasons and with the
following strictures:
² Passive RFID minimizes privacy impacts and reduces the chance of
visitors being surreptitiously tracked because it does not constantly
transmit information or "beacon" a signal.
² The numeric identifier read in the I-94 tag does not contain and is
not derived from any personal information, and can only be used to
obtain personal information when combined with data within the
Automated Identification Management System (the system created to link
the unique RFID tag ID number to existing biographic information
received from the TECS database).
² The Automated Identification Management System records the exit and
re-entry data automatically captured for a particular RFID tag, rather
than a specific individual. The individual's complete travel history is
created only when the information captured from the RFID tag is sent
along with the biographic information stored in the TECS database to a
DHS Arrival and Departure Information System.
² The Automated Identification Management System is undergoing the DHS
certification and accreditation process, which includes having an
approved detailed security plan and a comprehensive technical
assessment of the risks of operating the system. The certification and
accreditation process will be completed before the proof-of-concept
becomes operational.
² The Automated Identification Management System database can only be
accessed by authorized personnel signed into authorized workstations
that communicate with the system via a secure network. These computer
workstations are generally in CBP POE buildings, inside work areas with
physical controls over who can enter the area, according to the Privacy
Impact Assessment, and each POE is required to be in compliance with
DHS regulations with regard to security. Even if an RFID tag number
were secretly detected by someone, that person would also have to
obtain access to the Automated Identification Management System secure
database, to link the number to an individual's records.
DHS acknowledged that two potential privacy risks related to the RFID
exit/re-entry solution have been identified, and that US-VISIT creates
a pool of individuals whose personal information is at risk.
Nevertheless, it is stated in the July 2005 Privacy Impact Assessment
that the privacy risks will either be avoided or mitigated through the
use of access controls, education and training, encryption, and
minimizing collection and use of personal information will mitigate
privacy risks associate with data sharing. The first stated risk is
that, if the format or some other characteristic of the RFID tag number
renders it recognizable as a US-VISIT RFID tag, this would allow an
unauthorized reader to surreptitiously determine an individual's status
(i.e., within US-VISIT covered population). DHS stated that the RFID
tag number will be structured so that it cannot be used to identify an
individual specifically as a nonimmigrant. Second, DHS noted there is a
low risk that the RFID tag could be used to conduct surreptitious
locational surveillance of an individual; i.e., to use the presence of
the tag to follow an individual as he or she moves about in the United
States. However, ensuring that RFID tag numbers do not exhibit
properties that can be readily attributed to US-VISIT and using a
limited radio frequency range effectively mitigates this risk,
according to DHS.
[End of Section]
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Readers Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land POEs:
The US-VISIT Program Office has been testing the use of passive,
automated, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as a means
to record the exit of visitors from the United States at land POEs.
RFID is an automated data-capture technology that can be used to
electronically store information contained on a very small tag that can
be embedded in a document (or some other physical item); in this case,
US-VISIT embedded the tag in a modified Form I-94, called an I-94A.
This information can then be identified, and recorded as having been
identified, by RFID readers that are connected to computer databases.
The RFID tests were conducted for one-week periods at land POEs, as
follows:[Footnote 73] vehicular traffic was tested at Nogales-Mariposa
and Nogales-DeConcini POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the Blaine-Pacific
Highway and Blaine-Peace Arch POEs in Blaine, Washington; and Thousand
Islands Bridge POE in Alexandria Bay, New York; pedestrian traffic was
tested at the Nogales-Mariposa and Nogales-DeConcini POEs.
For these exit tests, the US-VISIT Program Office developed critical
success factor target read rates to compare them to the actual read
rates obtained during the test for both pedestrians carrying I-94As
with RFID-detectable tags and for travelers in vehicles who also had
RFID-detectable I-94As with them inside the vehicles. The target exit
read rates ranged from an expected success rate of 70 percent to 95
percent, based on anticipated performance under different conditions,
partly as demonstrated in the earlier feasibility study, on business
requirements, and on a concept of operation plan prepared for Increment
2C.[Footnote 74] Table 5 shows the exit test results compared to the
target read rates, reflecting specifically the percentage of persons
detected by the readers who were carrying RFID-detectable documents for
(1) pedestrians and (2) persons in vehicles, as they passed through the
POE area, while exiting the country.
Table 5: RFID Read Rate Test Results for Persons in Vehicles and
Pedestrians Exiting the Country with RFID-Readable Documents:
Type of test: Pedestrian Exit;
Location of test: Nogales-Mariposa;
Critical Success Factor Target Rate (%): 95;
Actual Read Rate (%): 67;
Sample Size (vehicles or pedestrians): 3[A].
Type of test: Vehicle Exit;
Location of test: Blaine-Pacific Highway; Thousand Islands Bridge at
Alexandria Bay;
Critical Success Factor Target Rate (%): 70; 70;
Actual Read Rate (%): 14; 4;
Sample Size (vehicles or pedestrians): 166; 50.
Source: US-VISIT Program Office:
[A] Because of the small number of pedestrians carrying RFID readable
documents in the test, any findings should be interpreted with caution.
[End of table]
In phase 1 of proof-of-concept testing for RFID, US-VISIT reported that
read rates were higher for both vehicle occupants and pedestrians who
held the I-94A up toward the reader, rather than leaving it inside a
pocket. Through the use of billboards, radio and print advertisements,
and other methods of communication, visitors were encouraged to place
their RFID-detectable I-94A forms on the vehicle dashboard or up to a
window. These locations were believed to increase the chances for a
successful read. Those who took these actions were referred to as
"participants," and those who did not as "nonparticipants." The US-
VISIT Program Office reported that during the week-long proof-of-
concept exit testing, one of the three pedestrians was a participant--
that is, the individual was observed as voluntarily complying with the
instructions; for those exiting in a vehicle, these data were not
reported. Moreover, although CBP officials made substantial pre-test
efforts to encourage travelers to optimize the chances of I-94A tags
being read, the report noted that this effort apparently met with mixed
success and that no additional solutions were planned.
During the time period that US-VISIT tested the performance of RFID
readers for detecting I-94As carried by persons exiting the country in
vehicles at two land POEs (Thousand Islands Bridge, Alexandria Bay, New
York and Blaine-Pacific Highway, Washington), it also tested RFID
reader performance for persons in vehicles with RFID-embedded I-94As
who re-entered the country at both of these locations and three others
(Blaine-Peace Arch, Washington; and, in Arizona, Nogales-Mariposa and
Nogales-DeConcini). In addition, tests of RFID detectability carried by
pedestrians re-entering the country were conducted at Nogales-Mariposa,
and Nogales-DeConcini; pedestrian exit was tested only at Nogales-
Mariposa because of operational constraints at Nogales-DeConcini,
according to the report on the tests. Since persons re-entering the
country with a RFID-enabled I-94 would already have obtained an I-94A
on a prior visit to the United States, in order for it to be detected
by an RFID reader, this process is sometimes referred to by the US-
VISIT program office as "re-entry."
DHS set separate, higher critical success factors (performance targets)
for the RFID proof-of-concept tests for the vehicle re-entry process
than for the vehicle exit process. According to a US-VISIT official,
these higher performance targets were based, in part, on the fact that
vehicles must stop as part of the re-entry process, which makes it more
likely that a tag will be detected than is the case for exiting
vehicles, which do not need to slow down or stop at land POEs.[Footnote
75] As with the tests conducted for exit, test observers monitored
traveler behavior to see whether, in compliance with numerous
advertisements in print and on local radio, the vehicle driver placed
the RFID-enabled I-94A on the vehicle dashboard or on an empty
passenger seat, or, for vehicle occupants, if they held the I-94A up to
a window or who made it otherwise visible, to better enable detection
it by the reader. Vehicle drivers or occupants who displayed an I-94A
in any of these requested ways were categorized as "participants," but
read rates for them were, nevertheless, low at four of five test
locations. For example, at Nogales-DeConcini, which had the lowest
vehicle-entry read rates overall, the read rate was 27 percent for the
62 persons re-entering in vehicles with visitors whom US -VISIT
reported as making an effort to have their I-94A tags read. In
contrast, at Nogales-Mariposa, which had the highest overall re-entry
read rate for the vehicle test, US-VISIT reported that 83 out of 96 (86
percent) of travelers who were categorized as participants were
detected. Among those at this same location who did not make this
effort, US-VISIT reported that I-94s with RFID tags were detected for
about half (51 percent) of the persons in the vehicles. Table 6 shows
the results of RFID read-rates upon re-entry for vehicle participants
and nonparticipants.
Table 6: RFID Test Read Rates for Persons Re-Entering the Country in
Vehicles at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID Technology:
Type of test: Vehicle entry;
Target read rate (%): 80;
Nogales- Mariposa: Percent and Number: P: 86% (83/96);
Nogales-DeConcini: Percent and Number: P: 27%; (17/62);
Blaine-Pacific Highway: Percent and Number: P: 45% (13/29);
Blaine-Peace Arch: Percent and Number: P: 55% (18/33);
Thousand Islands Bridge: Percent and Number: P: 33% (3/9).
Type of test: Vehicle entry;
Target read rate (%): [Empty];
Nogales-Mariposa: Percent and Number: N: 51% (101/199);
Nogales-DeConcini: Percent and Number: N: 11%; (25/236);
Blaine-Pacific Highway: Percent and Number: N: 14% (15/110);
Blaine- Peace Arch: Percent and Number: N: 19% (14/72);
Thousand Islands Bridge: Percent and Number: N: 67% (2/3).
Type of test: Vehicle entry;
Target read rate (%): [Empty];
Nogales-Mariposa: Percent and Number: C: 62% (184/295);
Nogales-DeConcini: Percent and Number: C: 14%; (425/ 298);
Blaine-Pacific Highway: Percent and Number: C: 20% (28/139);
Blaine-Peace Arch: Percent and Number: C: 30% (32/105);
Thousand Islands Bridge: Percent and Number: C: 42% (5/12).
Source: US-VISIT Program Office:
P: Participants: those vehicle drivers who placed the I-94A form either
on the dashboard, or on an empty seat; vehicle occupants who held the I-
94A up to a window or who placed it on the dashboard or who made it
otherwise visible.
N: Non-participants: Vehicle drivers and occupants who did not appear
to comply with any of the specified modes of making the I-94A visible.
C: Combined read rate for participants and nonparticipants.
[End of table]
Table 7 shows the results of RFID read-rate detection upon re-entry for
pedestrian participants and nonparticipants.
Table 7: RFID Test Read Rates for Pedestrians Re-entering the Country
at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID Technology:
Type of test: Pedestrian entry;
Target read rate (percent): 95;
Nogales-Mariposa: Percent and Number[A]: P: 100%; (1 out of 1);
Nogales-DeConcini: Percent and Number[A]: P: 84% (32/38);
Blaine- Pacific Highway: Percent and Number: No data;
Blaine-Peace Arch: Percent and Number: No data;
Thousand Islands Bridge: Percent and Number: No data.
Type of test: Pedestrian entry;
Nogales-Mariposa: Percent and Number[A]: N: 50%; (6/12);
Nogales- DeConcini: Percent and Number[A]: N: 68%; (179/264);
Blaine-Pacific Highway: Percent and Number: [Empty];
Blaine-Peace Arch: Percent and Number: [Empty];
Thousand Islands Bridge: Percent and Number: [Empty].
Type of test: Pedestrian entry;
Nogales-Mariposa: Percent and Number[A]: C: 54% (7/13);
Nogales- DeConcini: Percent and Number[A]: C: 70%; (211/302);
Blaine-Pacific Highway: Percent and Number: [Empty];
Blaine-Peace Arch: Percent and Number: [Empty];
Thousand Islands Bridge: Percent and Number: [Empty].
Source: US-VISIT Program Office:
[A] Because of the small number of pedestrians that participated in the
test, any findings should be interpreted with caution.
Note:
P is participants; defined as those pedestrians who held the I-94A form
so that it was out and visible upon entering the processing area.
N is non-participants; defined as those pedestrians who did not hold
the I-94A form in such as a way that it was visible.
C: Combined read rate for participants and nonparticipants:
[End of table]
[End of Section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
October 31, 2006:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
RE: Draft Report GAO-07-56, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces
Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of
Entry: (GAO Job Code 440427):
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials appreciate the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report referenced above.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) makes two recommendations
with which we generally agree. While we largely agree with GAO on many
of the findings, there are some findings with which we disagree. Our
attachment includes some clarifications and other comments that we
consider more than technical.
We appreciate the time GAO has taken to review the United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program's
ability to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign
nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land
ports of entry (POEs). US-VISIT represents the greatest advancement in
border technology in three decades. DHS established US-VISIT to enhance
the safety of our citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel
and trade, enhance the integrity of our immigration system, and protect
the privacy of travelers to the United States. In the three years since
its inception, US-VISIT has processed over 70 million visitors at ports
of entry, linking together systems from DHS and the Departments of
State and Justice. In FY 2005, US-VISIT was successfully deployed at
154 land border ports of entry, with the majority of ports reporting
improved process times. Even with US-VISIT's increased security checks,
travelers have not been significantly inconvenienced. In fact, wait
times for Form I-94 (Arrival-Departure Form) issuance at land border
ports of entry have gone down, and surveys from travelers show that the
vast majority do not object to US-VISIT's biometric procedures.
For all the successes of US-VISIT, Department officials agree that we
need to improve existing management controls associated with US-VISIT,
develop performance measures to assess the impact of US-VISIT
operations at land POEs, and ensure that the statutorily mandated
report mentioned in the draft report describes how DHS will move to a
biometric entry/exit capability and align US-VISIT with emerging land
border security initiatives. DHS officials have already established a
great deal of the foundation for meeting future challenges.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials will support US-VISIT
program officials as they implement the first recommendation. In
addition, CBP personnel have resolved the computer problems noted in
the draft report, implemented preliminary monitoring of the system, and
have established a working group to determine how to implement detailed
monitoring of all applications including US Arrival and US Pedestrian
at land border ports of entry.
Comments associated with our "sensitivity review" will be provided
under separate cover.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Attachment:
DHS/US-VISIT Clarifications and Other Comments Associated with GAO's
Draft Report Findings/Observations:
1. GAO Highlights page, second paragraph: "An interim non-biometric
exit technology being tested does not meet the statutory requirement
for a congressionally mandated biometric exit capability and cannot
ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave." DHS/
US-VISIT clarification: The interim solution (Passive RF embedded I-94)
was used because industry was not to the point of developing a
biometric exit device that could satisfy mission requirements such as
not impacting traffic flow and not having safety impacts. This position
is also reflected in operational alternatives documentation. Subsequent
research and industry outreach will be performed so that DHS/US-VISIT
officials can satisfy the biometric exit mandate.
2. Page 5, Results in Brief: GAO infers that US-VISIT has not
adequately evaluated the impact of the 2-to 10-print digital scanning
effort. US-VISIT response: US-VISIT officials have recognized that this
transition has a high likelihood of impacting port facilities and US-
VISIT personnel have taken significant steps to work with industry to
speed up processing time and to miniaturize the current 10-print
capture devices in an attempt to eliminate and/or significantly reduce
the impact of deploying 10-print scanning.
3. Page 6: US-VISIT comment: The language implies that US-VISIT
personnel did not fully consider the impact [of US-VISIT] on the
overall operations at the land POEs. According to US-VISIT officials,
the US-VISIT touch point in land border operations is in fact limited
to changes in I-94 processing time; the other factors related to port
secondary capacity, staffing and traveler throughput are constant
regardless of whether US-VISIT had been implemented. For example, the
lack of available port secondary parking due to CBP processing of
increased numbers of applicants for admission is not a symptom of US-
VISIT, (in fact in many cases US-VISIT decreased the processing time
for I-94 issuance), but is indicative of an increase in traffic and/or
policy changes as to what traveler population requires secondary
processing. These factors are arguably beyond the scope of US-VISIT and
are more appropriately addressed through a larger evaluation as to
whether or not current port facilities and staff are adequate to meet
mission requirements. It should also be noted that the 1-94 process is
one of many steps, each of which may impact overall wait times. A
similar discussion appears on page 32.
4. Page 14: US-VISIT clarification/comment: The statutory mandates
regarding biometric screening only applies to aliens and not U.S.
citizens. On pages 14 and 15, in the text preamble to the pie charts
[on page 16], GAO states that most land border crossers are, by
regulation, exempt from US-VISIT screening and U.S. citizens are
included in this group. Regulations flow from statutory language and US-
VISIT currently has no statutory mandate to screen U.S. citizens. GAO
should re-draft any chart (and explanatory text) that includes U.S.
citizens as part of the calculation of percentage of persons screened
by US-VISIT.
5. Page 16: US-VISIT comment: Crossing statistics appear misleading in
the report. For example, where GAO offers its first set of pie charts
on the number of persons processed via US-VISIT, the charts have
included U.S. citizens in the total numbers. This offers the uninformed
reader misleading percentage data regarding the sets of people US-VISIT
is authorized to screen biometrically at the land ports of entry.
6. Page 26: U.S. VISIT comment: The report presents conflicting
positions on the benefits realized from US-VISIT deployments. In
several locations the narrative notes that the capabilities provided by
US-VISIT are recognized as providing efficiencies to the I-94 process
(as supported by US-VISIT performance evaluations). In other sections
(e.g., page 26) there are statements that the capabilities have added
to the time required to process visitors. It is implied the additional
time resulted in turning visitors away at the border. US-VISIT
officials believe that the capabilities deployed have reduced the time
required to process an I-94, and officials have validated this position
with performance evaluations. Statements of increased time, based on
the inclusion of factors outside of the I-94 issuance process, are not
an accurate analysis of the operations at the POE. The concerns listed
by the San Ysidro offices are indicative of staffing and facilities
capacity factors, that were likely due to fully implementing national
policy guidelines as to which traveler populations require secondary
processing. These guidelines were not changed as a result of the
implementation of US-VISIT.
7. Page 50: "US-VISIT reported that while the placement of the portal
readers will not be changed, it is taking steps to improve the
likelihood of detection with additional antennae, readers, and signage.
However, there are no plans at present to modify the existing POE
infrastructure." US-VISIT comment: A new pedestrian walkway was
constructed parallel to the existing pedestrian entry. Signage,
sidewalks and a new secure roto-gate were installed to serve as the
primary pedestrian exit walkway.
8. Page 53: "According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, the Program
Office drafted in March 2005 a strategic plan that showed how US-VISIT
would be strategically aligned with DHS's organizational mission and
also defined an overall vision for immigration and border management."
GAO then has a footnote (number 59) saying, "This plan is distinct from
the legislatively mandated plan that is to describe a comprehensive US-
VISIT entry/exit screening system." US-VISIT comments: There is just
one plan - not two. The GAO language implies that there is more than
one plan. US-VISIT began working on a strategic plan in late 2004 and
finished it in March 2005. The Intel Reform Act of 2004, in section
7208(c), called for DHS to submit a plan to Congress on the current
functionality of the entry/exit system, as well as a plan for how the
Secretary intends to expedite full deployment. As part of the US-VISIT
response to this report requirement, US-VISIT officials included the
Executive Summary of the Strategic Plan to explain how entry/exit works
across the entire border and immigration enterprise.
[End of Section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the above, John F. Mortin, Assistant Director; Amy
Bernstein, Frances Cook, Odi Cuero, Richard Hung, Amanda Miller, James
R. Russell, and Jonathan Tumin made key contributions to this report.
(440562):
FOOTNOTES
[1] A port of entry is generally a physical location, such as a
pedestrian walkway and/or a vehicle plaza with booths, and associated
inspection and administration buildings, at a land border crossing
point, or a restricted area inside an airport or seaport, where entry
into the country by persons and cargo arriving by air, land, or sea is
controlled by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
[2] The Visa Waiver Program enables nationals of certain countries to
travel to the United States for tourism or business for stays of 90
days or less without obtaining a visa. Most western European countries
participate in this program, along with Japan, Singapore, Australia,
Brunei, and New Zealand. Appendix II lists all 27 Visa Waiver Program
countries.
[3] To visit the United States, Mexican citizens generally need either
a Mexican passport and U.S. visa, or a Border Crossing Card (BCC),
which is issued to Mexican visitors who wish to enter the country for
business or pleasure for no more than 6 months. The BCC contains
machine-readable biographic and biometric information. Mexican citizens
with BCCs who are traveling within 25 miles of the border, (75 miles in
Arizona, if entering through certain POEs near Tucson) and who plan to
stay no more than 30 days, are generally not subject to US- VISIT
processing upon entry. A Mexican citizen is subject to US-VISIT
requirements, however, if a CBP officer determines that the entrant
intends to stay more than 30 days or travel beyond the 25-or 75-mile
limit.
[4] On July 27, 2006 DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that,
if finalized, would expand the scope of US-VISIT to include, among
others, lawful permanent residents, aliens seeking admission on
immigrant visas, refugees and asylees, and certain categories of
Canadians. DHS did not report how many additional persons would be
covered by US-VISIT if the rule were adopted.
[5] Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 543, 557-59), commercial
air and sea carriers are to transmit crew and passenger manifests to
appropriate immigration officials before arrival of an aircraft or
vessel in the United States. These manifests are transmitted to CBP
through the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), which helps
officers identify (1) those arrivals for which biometric data are
available and (2) foreign nationals who need to be scrutinized more
closely.
[6] Visitors traveling on nonimmigrant visas are issued Form I-94 and
visitors from Visa Waiver Program countries are issued Form I-94W. Both
forms show the date of arrival, port of entry, and date the authorized
period of admission expires. Whereas passengers arriving on commercial
air or sea liners are to fill out portions of an I-94 or I-94W arrival
and departure form on the carrier in advance of arriving, visitors
subject to US-VISIT at land POEs are to provide information for I-94s
and I-94Ws during the inspection process, and the forms are issued
after the process is completed.
[7] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November
1999), and GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management
and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[8] US-VISIT was not installed at 14 of the 16 other POEs because
visitors subject to US-VISIT are not permitted to enter the country at
those locations; at the other 2 POEs, DHS lacked the infrastructure
needed to install the equipment.
[9] GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Key Border
Security Programs Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2006).
[10] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and GAO-01-1008G.
[11] 8 U.S.C. § 1365a.
[12] Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-558-
59.
[13] 8 U.S.C. § 1379. The official title of the USA PATRIOT Act is the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.
[14] Pub. L. No. 108-458.
[15] GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation
Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2003).
[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation
Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-04-569T (Washington, D.C.:
March 2004).
[17] GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration
Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586
(Washington, D.C.: May 2004).
[18] GAO-06-296.
[19] Certain holders of nonimmigrant visas, such as foreign diplomats
and other representatives of foreign governments, and representatives
of certain international organizations, are expressly exempted from US-
VISIT requirements by regulation, as are individuals who are younger
than 14 or older than 79 on the date of admission. 8 C.F.R. §
235.1(d)(1)(iv)(A), (B).
[20] Under 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(d)(1)(iv)(C), DHS and the State Department
may jointly exempt a class of aliens from US-VISIT requirements. On
August 31, 2004, DHS announced in the Federal Register that the two
agencies had determined that US-VISIT requirements generally would
apply only to Mexican nationals for whom a Form I-94 is issued under 8
C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(1)(iii) or (v). This means that Mexican nationals
using a BCC who are admitted for no more than 30 days to visit within
25 miles of the border (or to visit within 75 miles of the Arizona
border, if entering through certain POEs in Arizona) generally are not
subject to US-VISIT requirements. 69 Fed. Reg. 53,318, 53,323 (2004).
The CBP officer determines the intent of an applicant for admission
through the inspection process at a port of entry, in which the
applicant must establish that he or she is entitled to enter the United
States under all applicable laws and regulations. 8 C.F.R. §
235.1(d)(1). If a Mexican BCC holder is admitted to the United States
without an I-94, the terms of that individual's admission to the
country are the 30 day/25 mile or 75 mile limits, and violation of
those terms makes the individual removable from the country and
possibly inadmissible in the future. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1),
1182(a)(6), (9).
[21] These special cases include Canadians who are engaged to American
citizens, and Canadians who are traveling for the purpose of making
major financial investments in the United States.
[22] Since the statute governing US-VISIT applies to foreign national
arrival and departure data only, U.S. citizens do not fall within the
scope of the program and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT screening.
Also, in general, regardless of whether they are to be processed into
US-VISIT, Mexican citizens must present either a passport and visa or a
BCC when seeking admission to the United States, while Canadian
citizens generally do not need such documents. According to US-VISIT,
when Mexicans receive a BCC, the data on the individual entered into
U.S. databases at the time of their visa application are accessible by
US-VISIT--if they are to be processed into it for any reason.
[23] At land border POEs, the I-94 issued to foreign nationals covered
by US-VISIT who are deemed admissible is considered issued for multiple
entries, unless specifically annotated otherwise. A multiple entry I-94
permits them to reenter the country, generally for up to 6 months,
without additional US-VISIT processing during the period covered by the
I-94.
[24] According to CBP, these ports are classified as Class B ports.
Under 8 C.F.R. §100.4(c)(2), only citizens of the United States,
Canada, and Bermuda, and Lawful Permanent Residents of the United
States and certain holders of border crossing cards may enter through
Class B ports. Other foreign nationals are allowed to enter the United
States only at Class A ports.
[25] According to US-VISIT officials, as of March 2006 about $179.5
million of the total $182 million budget had been obligated.
[26] GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
[27] According to US-VISIT Program Office officials, prior to
deployment of US-VISIT entry capability, San Ysidro had its own system
that was specifically designed for the POE to minimize manual I-94
processing and help officers speed up the I-94 issuance process.
However, according to these officials, although San Ysidro's system was
"probably" faster than US-VISIT, it did not meet current US-VISIT
standards for data protection, integration, and privacy and did not
require officers to do the same database checks that are part of US-
VISIT. The officials noted that US-VISIT enhances security because it
is designed to access multiple databases nationwide and brings
uniformity to the I-94 issuance process across POEs.
[28] Center for Transportation Research, the University of Texas at
Austin, Assessing the Effects of US-VISIT RFID Technology
Implementation on Vehicle and Pedestrian Crossing Times at DeConcini,
Nogales, Ariz. Report No. 2 Pilot Data Collection and Analysis to
Baseline Data (Austin, Tex., November 2005). The project was performed
under contract for the DHS Private Sector Office. The report examines
processing times at primary inspection for privately owned vehicles
(POV) and pedestrians and also processing times for visitors who
require enrollment in US-VISIT with a focus on the introduction of
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology at the POE, which is
discussed later in this report.
[29] The average wait times were reported by the US-VISIT contractor
for the periods of June 20 through 25, 2005, and August 15 through 20,
2005. No results were reported for the third period from July 7 through
8, 2005.
[30] According to CBP, CBP officers determine what checks are needed to
determine admissibility depending on the purpose of travel.
[31] DMIA Task Force, DMIA Task Force First Annual Report to Congress,
Dec. 2002.
[32] CBP based this decision on the high volume of pedestrians entering
the United States through the Morley Gate POE; the fact that, before
deployment, I-94s had not been previously issued at the Morley Gate
POE; and the close proximity of the Morley Gate POE facility to the
nearby DeConcini POE facility, about 100 yards away.
[33] According to this official, there are at least four major unsolved
technological challenges to 10-fingerprint scanning, including: no
current fingerprinting device on the market that can take and process
10 prints as quickly as 2; no current device to capture 10 prints from
the visitor as physically easy as with 2; no current devices meet
operational processing requirements for ports of entry, embassies, or
consulates; and the need to manufacture sufficient quantities of
scanners to respond to the initiative.
[34] See GAO-03-171.
[35] GAO-06-296.
[36] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and GAO-01-1008G.
[37] Our review of CBP's information technology "help desk" tickets
from July 2005 through January 2006 suggested that similar types of
problems occurred at other locations where US-VISIT was installed. CBP
officers that operate US-VISIT in the field are instructed to call the
CBP help desk at the Newington Data Center in Virginia if they
encounter problems operating US-VISIT related software or equipment.
[38] CBP officials also dealt with sporadic network outages. In one
case, on December 2, 2005, the entire network went down for 3 hours
because of an accident. According to port officials, visitors seeking
entry into the country at the San Ysidro, California, POE were
initially asked to wait until the systems came back up or return at
another time. About an hour after the outage began, CBP officers began
to manually process I-94s for US-VISIT, in accordance with CBP standard
operating procedures, but without the benefit of a biometric
verification of their identity under US-VISIT.
[39] Center for Transportation Research, the University of Texas at
Austin. Assessing the Effects of US-VISIT RFID Technology
Implementation on Vehicle and Pedestrian Crossing Times at DeConcini,
Nogales, Ariz. Report No. 2 Pilot Data Collection and Analysis to
Baseline Data (Austin, Texas: November 2005).
[40] US-VISIT, Draft Performance Measures Report (Rosslyn, Va.: July
2006).
[41] GAO, Executive Guide: Measuring Performance and Demonstrating
Results of Information Technology Investments, AIMD-98-89 (Washington,
D.C.: March 1998).
[42] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 7208,
8 U.S.C. § 1365b. See also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
414(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 353 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1365a(b)(2)-(4).
[43] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Va.: Jan. 31, 2005).
[44] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Va: Jan. 31, 2005).
[45] 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d).
[46] 8 U.S.C.A. §1365c(2)(A)(ii).
[47] US-VISIT evaluated 12 different exit-recording technologies
against the six criteria listed above, including some that incorporated
biometric features--scanning the retina or iris, and a facial
recognition system. Because the biometric solutions considered would
have required an exiting visitor to slow down, stop, or possibly enter
a POE facility, they were rejected. Other alternatives, such as the use
of a global positioning system, were rejected because they transmit
signals that could facilitate surveillance of individuals, raising
concerns about privacy.
[48] AIDMS is a system separate from TECS, IDENT and other databases
used in the US-VISIT process.
[49] The Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) is a system
that maintains lookout (i.e., watch list) data, interfaces with other
agencies' databases, and is currently used by inspectors at ports of
entry to verify traveler information and update traveler data. Although
still labeled as a Treasury system, TECS has been transferred to CBP.
[50] According to the US-VISIT Program Office, approximately $104
million was budgeted in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to conduct proof-of-
concept testing of RFID for exit and re-entry. No separate break-out of
testing expenditures related to exit alone was available.
[51] Site selection factors included potential physical constraints,
such as protected historic structures that could hamper installation of
gantries, potential environmental impact, daily traffic and I-94
processing volume, speed limits, and weather conditions.
[52] A concept of operations defines how day-to-day operations are (or
will be) carried out to meet mission needs. The concept of operations
includes high-level descriptions of information systems, their
interrelationships, and information flows. It also describes the
operations that must be performed, who must perform them, and where and
how the operations will be carried out.
[53] US-VISIT Program Office, Increment 2C Proof of Concept--Phase 1
Performance Evaluation Report, Post Implementation (Rosslyn, VA: Jan.
20, 2006).
[54] A US-VISIT program official explained that for vehicles exiting
during RFID testing, one could "reasonably expect" a read rate of 70
percent because vehicles are not required to stop upon exit. The
official also cited vehicle speed, safety, and awareness (of optimal I-
94A positioning; for example, holding the I-94A up to the window of the
vehicle) as factors that affected RFID read rates.
[55] US-VISIT, Final Increment 2C Phase 1 Proof of Concept Corrective
Actions (Rosslyn, Va: January 2006).
[56] Although all the tests were carried out at five land POEs, the
number of POEs tested at which pedestrians exit and enter, and vehicles
exit and entry differed, due to varying test conditions, according to
the US-VISIT Program Office.
[57] GAO, Information Security: Key Considerations Related to Federal
Implementation of Radio Frequency Identification Technology, GAO-05-
849T (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2005).
[58] 8 U.S.C. §1365b(c)(2)(E).
[59] GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation
Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 19, 2006).
[60] In commenting on this report, DHS stated that this plan includes
US-VISIT's draft response to the legislative requirement that DHS
produce a report to the Congress by June 2005 that describes a
comprehensive US-VISIT entry/exit screening system, as discussed
earlier in this report.
[61] GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative on the U.S. Canadian Border, GAO-06-741R (Washington,
D.C.: May 25, 2006).
[62] GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a
Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004).
[63] GAO-06-296.
[64] GAO-03-171.
[65] At the time we selected sites for review, we were unaware that the
Morley Gate POE was being treated as a land POE separate from the other
land POEs at Nogales. However, since US-VISIT treated Morley Gate as a
separate POE for deployment, we also counted it as a stand alone POE.
[66] During fiscal year 2004, the number of I-94 issuances by the 21
selected sites ranged from 22 in Alburg Springs to about 398,900 in San
Ysidro.
[67] See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and GAO-01-1008G.
[68] GAO, Privacy: Key Challenges Facing Federal Agencies, GAO-06-777T
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006). See also, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, letter of 4 April, 2005, to U.S. Department of State
(Hyperlink,
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/RFID/RFID_passport.pdf); and
Juels, Ari; Molnar, David; and Wagner, David, Security and Privacy
Issues in E-passports, Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/095
(Hyperlink, http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/095).
[69] GAO, Information Security: Key Considerations Related to Federal
Implementation of Radio Frequency Identification Technology, GAO-05-
849T (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2005).
[70] GAO, Information Security: Radio Frequency Identification
Technology in the Federal Government, GAO-05-551 (Washington, D.C.: May
27, 2005).
[71] OMB M-03-22, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-
Government Act of 2002.
[72] An updated Privacy Impact Assessment was also published in
September 2004 to reflect inclusion of Visa Waiver Program visitors in
US-VISIT, expansion of US-VISIT to the 50 busiest land POEs, and
changes in the business processes used by DHS to share information with
federal law enforcement agencies.
[73] Site selection factors included potential physical constraints,
such as protected historic structures that could hamper installation of
gantries; potential environmental impact; daily traffic and I-94A
processing volume; speed limits; and weather conditions.
[74] A concept of operations defines how day-to-day operations are (or
will be) carried out to meet mission needs. The concept of operations
includes high-level descriptions of information systems, their
interrelationships, and information flows. It also describes the
operations that must be performed, who must perform them, and where and
how the operations will be carried out.
[75] According to a program official involved in setting the target
rates, the read rates expected for vehicles entering the country were
also expected to be lower than for pedestrians because of potential
interference from metal in vehicles.
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