Emergency Preparedness and Response
Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents
Gao ID: GAO-06-467T February 23, 2006
This testimony discusses the challenges of effective emergency preparedness for, response to, and recovery from major emergencies, including catastrophic incidents. Effective emergency preparedness and response for major events requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple players from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental entities. Effective emergency preparedness and response requires putting aside parochialism and working together prior to and after an emergency incident. September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the context of emergency management preparedness in the United States, including federal involvement in preparedness and response. The biggest challenge in emergency preparedness is getting effective cooperation in planning, exercises, and capability assessment and building across first responder disciplines and intergovernmental lines. DHS has developed several policy documents designed to define the federal government's role in supporting state and local first responders in emergencies, implement a uniform incident command structure across the nation, and identify performance standards that can be used in assessing state and local first responder capabilities. Realistic exercises are a key component of testing and assessing emergency plans and first responder capabilities, and the Hurricane PAM planning exercise demonstrated their value. With regard to the status of emergency preparedness across the nation, we know relatively little about how states and localities (1) finance their efforts in this area, (2) have used their federal funds, and (3) are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds. Katrina has raised a host of questions about the nation's readiness to respond effectively to catastrophic emergencies. Effective emergency preparedness is a task that is never done, but requires continuing commitment and leadership because circumstances change and continuing trade-offs because we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do.
GAO-06-467T, Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents
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Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, State of California:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:00 a.m. PST:
February 23, 2006:
Emergency Preparedness and Response:
Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-06-467T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission,
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the challenges
of effective emergency preparedness for, response to, and recovery from
major emergencies, including catastrophic incidents. Effective
emergency preparedness and response for major events requires the
coordinated planning and actions of multiple players from multiple
first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as
well as nongovernmental entities. Effective emergency preparedness and
response requires putting aside parochialism and working together prior
to and after an emergency incident. As one participant in responding to
Katrina put it, the aftermath of a major disaster is no time to be
exchanging business cards.
September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the context of emergency
management preparedness in the United States, including federal
involvement in preparedness and response. The biggest challenge in
emergency preparedness is getting effective cooperation in planning,
exercises, and capability assessment and building across first
responder disciplines and intergovernmental lines. DHS has developed
several policy documents designed to define the federal government's
role in supporting state and local first responders in emergencies,
implement a uniform incident command structure across the nation, and
identify performance standards that can be used in assessing state and
local first responder capabilities. Realistic exercises are a key
component of testing and assessing emergency plans and first responder
capabilities, and the Hurricane PAM planning exercise demonstrated
their value. With regard to the status of emergency preparedness across
the nation, we know relatively little about how states and localities
(1) finance their efforts in this area, (2) have used their federal
funds, and (3) are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend
those funds. Katrina has raised a host of questions about the nation's
readiness to respond effectively to catastrophic emergencies. Effective
emergency preparedness is a task that is never done, but requires
continuing commitment and leadership because circumstances change and
continuing trade-offs because we will never have the funds to do
everything we might like to do.
September 11, 2001 Changed the Context of Emergency Preparedness:
Prior to September 11, 2001, emergency preparedness and response had
primarily been the responsibility of state and local governments and
had focused principally on emergencies resulting from nature, such as
fires, floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, or accidental acts of man,
not acts of terrorism. The federal government's role in supporting
emergency preparedness and management prior to September 11 was limited
primarily to providing resources before large-scale disasters like
floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, and response and recovery
assistance after such disasters. However, after September 11 and the
concern it engendered about the need to be prepared to prevent,
mitigate, and respond to acts of terrorism, the extent of the federal
government's financial support for state and local government emergency
preparedness and response grew enormously, with about $11 billion in
grants distributed from fiscal years 2002 through 2005. At the same
time the federal government has been developing guidance and standards
for state and local first responders in the areas of incident
management and capabilities and tying certain requirements to the award
of grants.
The nation's emergency managers and first responders have lead
responsibilities for carrying out emergency management efforts. First
responders have traditionally been thought of as police, fire fighters,
emergency medical personnel, and others who are among the first on the
scene of an emergency. However, since September 11, 2001, the
definition of first responder has been broadened to include those, such
as public health and hospital personnel, who may not be on the scene,
but are essential in supporting effective response and recovery
operations.[Footnote 1] The role of first responders is to prevent
where possible, protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery
from emergency incidents. First responders are trained and equipped to
arrive at the scene of an emergency and take immediate action. Examples
include entering the scene of the incident and assessing the situation,
setting up a command center, establishing safe and secure perimeters
around the event site, evacuating those within or near the site,
tending to the injured and dead, transporting them to medical care
centers or morgues, rerouting traffic, helping to restore public
utilities, and clearing debris.
Last year, GAO issued a special report on 21st Century Challenges,
examining the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook, the
nation's ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American
Society, and the future role of the federal government. Among the
issues discussed was homeland security.[Footnote 2] In our report we
identified the following illustrative challenges and questions for
examining emergency preparedness and response in the nation:
* Defining an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level
of risk. The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an
unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable
level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments,
particularly federal funding? What criteria should be used to target
federal and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize
results and mitigate risk within available resource levels?
* What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in
identifying risks--from nature or man--in individual states and
localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and
capacities that first responders need?
* Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector
protection of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and what
changes might be necessary?
* What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results
management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and who
is accountable for the many components of homeland security when many
partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How can these
actors be held accountable and by whom?
* What costs should be borne by federal, state, and local governments
or the private sector in preparing for, responding to, and recovery
from disasters large and small--whether the acts of nature or the
deliberate or accidental acts of man?
* To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and
foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency planning
and response?
These issues are enormously complex and represent a major challenge for
all levels of government. But the experience of Hurricane Katrina
illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult issues.
Katrina was a catastrophe of historic proportions in both its
geographic scope--about 90,000 square miles--and its destruction. Its
impact on individuals and communities was horrific. Katrina highlighted
the limitations of our current capacity to respond effectively to
catastrophic events--those of unusual severity that almost immediately
overwhelm state and local response capacities. [Footnote 3] Katrina
gives us an opportunity to learn from what went well and what did not
go so well and improve our ability to respond to future catastrophic
disasters.
It is generally accepted that emergency preparedness and response
should be characterized by measurable goals and effective efforts to
identify key gaps between those goals and current capabilities, with a
clear plan for closing those gaps and, once achieved, sustaining
desired levels of preparedness and response capabilities and
performance. The basic goal of emergency preparedness for a major
emergency is that first responders should be able to respond swiftly
with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective actions that save
lives and property, mitigate the effects of the disaster, and set the
stage for a quick, effective recovery. In a major event, coordinated,
effective actions are required among responders from different local
jurisdictions, levels of government, and nongovernmental entities, such
as the Red Cross.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define
and act on the answers to four basic, but hardly simple, questions with
regard to emergency preparedness and response:
1. What is important (that is, what are our priorities)?
2. How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments,
performance standards)?
3. How do we measure, attain, and sustain success?
4. On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite
resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions, and the data
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have
better information and a sense of what needs to be done for some types
of major emergency events than others. For some natural disasters, such
as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and
therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation and response
efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has
experience with earthquakes, and Florida has experience with
hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has experience with such
potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Nor
is there any recent experience with a pandemic that spreads to
thousands of people rapidly across the nation, although both the AIDS
epidemic and SARS provide some related experience.
Planning and assistance has largely been focused on single
jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors. However, well-
documented problems with first responders from multiple jurisdictions
to communicate at the site of an incident and the potential for large
scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated a debate on the
extent to which first responders should be focusing their planning and
preparation on a regional and multi-governmental basis.
The area of interoperable communications is illustrative of the general
challenge of identifying requirements, current gaps in the ability to
meet those requirements and assess success in closing those gaps, and
doing this on a multi-jurisdictional basis. We identified three
principal challenges to improving interoperable communications for
first responders:[Footnote 4]
* clearly identifying and defining the problem;
* establishing national interoperability performance goals and
standards that balance nationwide standards with the flexibility to
address differences in state, regional, and local needs and conditions;
and:
* defining the roles of federal, state, and local governments and other
entities in addressing interoperable needs.
The first, and most formidable, challenge in establishing effective
interoperable communications is defining the problem and establishing
interoperability requirements. This requires addressing the following
questions: Who needs to communicate what (voice and/or data) with whom,
when, for what purpose, under what conditions? Public safety officials
generally recognize that effective interoperable communications is the
ability to talk with whom you want, when you want, when authorized, but
not the ability to talk with everyone all of the time. Various reports,
including ours, have identified a number of barriers to achieving
interoperable public safety wire communications, including incompatible
and aging equipment, limited equipment standards, and fragmented
planning and collaboration. However, perhaps the fundamental barrier
has been and is the lack of effective, collaborative,
interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning. The needed
technology flows from a clear statement of communications needs and
plans that cross jurisdictional lines. No one first responder group or
governmental agency can successfully "fix" the interoperable
communications problems that face our nation.
The capabilities needed vary with the severity and scope of the event.
In a "normal" daily event, such as a freeway accident, the first
responders who need to communicate may be limited to those in a single
jurisdiction or immediately adjacent jurisdictions. However, in a
catastrophic event, effective interoperable communications among
responders is vastly more complicated because the response involves
responders from the federal government--civilian and military--and, as
happened after Katrina, responders from various state and local
governments who arrived to provide help under the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) among states. These responders generally
bring their own communications technology that may or may not be
compatible with those of the responders in the affected area. Even if
the technology were compatible, it may be difficult to know because
responders from different jurisdictions may use different names for the
same communications frequencies. To address this issue, we recommended
that a nationwide database of all interoperable communications
frequencies, and a common nomenclature for those frequencies, be
established.
Katrina reminded us that in a catastrophic event, most forms of
communication may be severely limited or simply destroyed--land lines,
cell phone towers, satellite phone lines (which quickly became
saturated). So even if all responders had had the technology to
communicate with one another, they would have found it difficult to do
so because transmission towers and other key supporting infrastructure
were not functioning. The more comprehensive the interoperable
communications capabilities we seek to build, the more difficult it is
to reach agreement among the many players on how to do so and the more
expensive it is to buy and deploy the needed technology. And an always
contentious issue is who will pay for the technology--purchase,
training, maintenance, and updating.
DHS Activities to Identify What Needs to Be Done to Promote Emergency
Preparedness Capabilities of First Responders:
Effective preparation and response requires clear planning, a clear
understanding of expected roles and responsibilities, and performance
standards that can be used to measure the gap between what is and what
should be. It also requires identifying the essential capabilities
whose development should be a priority, and capabilities that are
useful, but not as critical to successful response and mitigation in a
major emergency. What is critical may cut across different types of
events (e.g., incident command and communications) or may be unique to
a specific type of event (e.g., defusing an explosive device).
DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives to promote the
further development of the all-hazards emergency preparedness
capabilities of first responders. These include the development of the
(1) National Response Plan (what needs to be done to manage a
nationally significant incident, focusing on the role of federal
agencies); (2) National Incident Management System (NIMS), a command
and management process to be used with the National Response Plan
during an emergency event (how to do what needs to be done); and (3)
National Preparedness Goal (NPG), which identifies critical tasks and
capabilities (how well it should be done).
The National Response Plan's (NRP) stated purpose is to "establish a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident
management across a spectrum of activities including prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery." It is designed to provide the
framework for federal interaction with state, local, and tribal
governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations. The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
amended, established the process for states to request a presidential
disaster declaration in order to respond to and recover from events
that exceed state and local capabilities and resources. Under the NRP
and the Stafford Act,[Footnote 5] the role of the federal government is
principally to support state and local response activities. A key
organizational principle of the NRP is that "incidents are typically
managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and
jurisdictional level." An "incident of national significance" triggers
federal support under the NRP; a second "catastrophic incident" trigger
allows for accelerated federal support. All catastrophic incidents are
incidents of national significance, but not vice-versa. The basic
assumption of the federal government as supplement to state and local
first responders was challenged by Katrina, which (1) destroyed key
communications infrastructure; (2) overwhelmed state and local response
capacity, in many cases crippling their ability to perform their
anticipated roles as initial on-site responders; and (3) destroyed the
homes and affected the families of first responders, reducing their
capacity to respond. Katrina almost completely destroyed the basic
structure and operations of some local governments as well as their
business and economic bases.
The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as:
"any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy,
national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident
could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of
time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State,
local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and
significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services
to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All
catastrophic incidents are Incidents of National Significance. These
factors drive the urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure
accelerated Federal/national assistance." [Footnote 6]
Exactly what this means for federal, state, and local response has been
the subject of recent congressional hearings on Katrina and the
recently issued report by the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina.[Footnote 7]
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 required the adoption of
NIMS by all federal departments and agencies and that federal
preparedness grants be dependent upon NIMS compliance by the
recipients. NIMS is designed as the nation's incident management
system. The intent of NIMS is to establish a core set of concepts,
principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable
effective, efficient, and collaborative emergency event management at
all levels. The idea is that if state and local firsts responders
implement NIMS in their daily response activities, they will have a
common terminology and understanding of incident management that will
foster a swift and effective response when emergency responders from a
variety of levels of government and locations must come together to
respond to a major incident. As we noted in our report on interoperable
communications, such communications are but one important component of
an effective incident command planning and operations structure.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 required DHS to coordinate
the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal
"to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that
appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist
attacks and large-scale natural or accidental disasters with the
resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them." The
goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events. To implement
the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness Goal using 15
emergency event scenarios,[Footnote 8] 12 of which were terrorist
related,[Footnote 9] whose purpose was to form the basis for
identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of
emergency events. Some state and local officials and experts have
questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for
preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and
the emphasis on terrorist scenarios (12 of 15). The scenarios focused
on the consequences that first responders would have to address.
According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the planning
scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-
scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be
prepared. Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state,
and local emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over
1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical tasks.
DHS then identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to
federal, state, and local first responders on the capabilities they
need to develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005 (see
appendix I). Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected
to perform every task, possession of a target capability could involve
enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional
and federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for
these capabilities; and DHS is reassessing both the National Response
Plan and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane
Katrina experience. Prior to Katrina, DHS had established seven
priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness:
* implementation of NRP and NIMS;
* implementation of the Interim National Infrastructure Protection
Plan;[Footnote 10]
* expanding regional cooperation;
* strengthening capabilities in interoperable communications;
* strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration;
* strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis;
and:
* strengthening capabilities in detection and response for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons.
Those seven priorities are incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006
homeland security grant guidance. The guidance also adds an eighth
priority that emphasizes emergency operations and catastrophic
planning.
The Critical Importance of Realistic Exercises and After-Action
Reports:
With almost any skill and capability, experience and practice enhance
proficiency. For first responders, exercises--particularly for the type
or magnitude of events for which there is little actual experience--are
essential for developing skills and identifying what works well and
what needs further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly
catastrophic incidents, by definition require the coordinated actions
of personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of
government, plus nonprofit organizations and the private sector. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective
response.
Following are some illustrative tasks needed to prepare for and respond
to a major emergency incident that could be tested with realistic
exercises:
Preparation:
* assessing potential needs, marshalling key resources, and moving
property and people out of harm's way prior to the actual event (where
predictable or where there is forewarning),
Response:
* obtaining and communicating accurate situational data for evaluating
and coordinating appropriate response during and after the event;
* leadership: effectively blending (1) active involvement of top
leadership in unified incident command and control with (2)
decentralized decision making authority that encourages innovative
approaches to effective response;
* clearly understood roles and responsibilities prior to and in
response to the event;
* effective communication and coordination; and:
* the ability to identify, draw on, and effectively deploy resources
from other governmental, nonprofit, and private entities for effective
response:
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance. The
Hurricane PAM exercise of 2004 was essentially a detailed planning
exercise that was highly realistic and involved a wide variety of
federal, state, and local first responders and officials. Although
action plans based on this exercise were still being developed and
implemented when Katrina hit, the exercise proved to be remarkably
prescient in identifying the challenges presented if a major hurricane
hit New Orleans and resulted in flooding the city.
The importance of post-exercise assessments is illustrated by a
November 2005 report by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Inspector General on the April 2005 Top Officials 3 Exercise (TOPOFF3)
which noted that the exercise highlighted at all levels of government a
fundamental lack of understanding regarding the principles and
protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.[Footnote 11] For example, the
report cited confusion over the different roles and responsibilities
performed by the Principal Federal Officer (PFO) and the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO). The PFO is designated by the DHS Secretary
to act as the Secretary's local representative in overseeing and
executing the incident management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for
incidents of national significance. The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command system and structure, and does not have direct
authority over the senior law enforcement officials, the FCO, or other
federal and state officials. The FCO is designated by the President and
manages federal resources and support activities in response to
disasters and emergencies declared by the President. The FCO is
responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster
assistance and programs to the affected state, the private sector, and
individual victims. The FCO also has authority under the Stafford Act
to request and direct federal departments and agencies to use their
authorities and resources in support of state and local response and
recovery efforts.
In addition to confusion over the respective roles and authority of the
PFO and FCO, the report noted that the exercise highlighted problems
regarding the designation of a PFO and the lack of guidance on training
and certification standards for PFO support personnel. The report
recommended that DHS continue to train and exercise the NRP and NIMS at
all levels of government and develop operating procedures that clearly
define individual and organizational roles and responsibilities under
the NRP.
Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities
Is Limited:
In the last several years, the federal government has awarded some $11
billion in grants to federal, state, and local authorities to improve
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. What is
remarkable about the whole area of emergency preparedness and homeland
security is how little we know about how states and localities (1)
finance their efforts in this area, (2) have used their federal funds,
and (3) are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those
funds.
The National Capital Region (NCR) is the only area in the nation that
has a statutorily designated regional coordinator.[Footnote 12] In our
review of emergency preparedness in the NCR, we noted that a
coordinated, targeted, and complementary use of federal homeland
security grant funds was important in the NCR--as it is in all areas of
the nation. The findings from our work on the NCR are relevant to all
multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional efforts to assess and improve
emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
In May 2004, we reported that the NCR faced three interrelated
challenges: the lack of (1) preparedness standards (which the National
Preparedness Goal was designed to address); (2) a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities; and (3) a readily available, reliable source of data on the funds available to first responders in the NCR and their use.[Footnote 13] Without the standards, a regionwide plan, and data on spending, we noted, it is extremely difficult to determine whether NCR first responders have the ability to respond to threats and emergencies with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts that involve a variety of first responder disciplines from NCR jurisdictions. To the extent that the NCR had coordinated the use of federal grant funds, it had focused on funds available through the Urban Area Security Initiative grants. We noted that it was important to have information on all grant funds available to NCR jurisdictions and their use if the NCR was to effectively leverage regional funds and avoid unnecessary duplication. As we observed, the fragmented nature of the multiple federal grants available to first responders--some awarded to states, some to localities, some directly to first responder agencies--may make it more difficult to collect and maintain regionwide data on the grant funds received and the use of those funds. Our previous work suggests that this fragmentation in federal grants may reinforce state and local fragmentation and can also make it more difficult to coordinate and use those multiple sources of funds to achieve specific objectives.[Footnote 14]
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants is that
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with
their grant application. States must use this justification to outline
the implementation approaches for specific investments that will be
used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and
Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans are multiyear global program
management plans for the entire state homeland security program that
look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The
justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS
homeland security grant program, including all UASI funding, any base
formula allocations for the State Homeland Security Program and the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and all formula allocations
under the Metropolitan Medical Response System and Citizen Corps
Program. In the guidance DHS notes that it will use a peer review
process to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the
effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities it has
outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.
Catastrophic Events:
On February 1, 206, GAO issued its preliminary observations regarding
the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 15]
Catastrophic events are different in the severity of the damage, number
of persons affected, and the scale of preparation and response
required. They quickly overwhelm or incapacitate local and/or state
response capabilities, thus requiring coordinated assistance from
outside the affected area. Thus, the response and recovery capabilities
needed during a catastrophic event differ significantly from those
required to respond to and recover from a "normal disaster." Key
capabilities such as emergency communications, continuity of essential
government services, and logistics and distribution systems underpin
citizen safety and security and may be severely affected. Katrina
basically destroyed state and local communications capabilities,
severely affecting timely, accurate damage assessments in the wake of
Katrina.
Whether the catastrophic event comes without warning or there is some
prior notice, such as a hurricane, it is essential that the leadership
roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for responding to such
an event be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to
facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing
for and in the early hours and days after the event. Streamlining,
simplifying, and expediting decision making must quickly replace
"business as usual." Yet at the same time, uncoordinated initiatives by
well-meaning persons or groups can actually hinder effective response,
as was the case following Katrina.
Katrina raised a number of questions about the nation's ability to
respond effectively to catastrophic events--even one with several days
warning. GAO has underway work on a number of issues related to the
preparation, response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We are examining what went well and why
and what did not go well and why, and what our findings suggest for any
specific changes that may be needed.
Concluding Observations:
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task
that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver
bullet," no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but
requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because
circumstances change and we will never have the funds to do everything
we might like to do.
The basic steps are easy to state but extremely difficult to complete:
* develop a strategic plan with clear goals, objectives, and
milestones;
* develop performance goals that can be used to set desired performance
baselines:
* collect and analyze relevant and reliable data;
* assess the results of analyzing those data against performance goals
to guide priority setting;
* take action based on those results; and:
* monitor the effectiveness of actions taken to achieve the designated
performance goals.
It is important to identify the specific types of capabilities, such as
incident command and control, with broad application across emergencies
arising from "all-hazards," and those that are unique to particular
types of emergency events. The priority to be given to the development
of specific, "unique" capabilities should be tied to an assessment of
the risk that those capabilities will be needed. In California, for
example, it is not a question of if, but when, a major earthquake will
strike the state. There is general consensus that the nation is at risk
of an infectious pandemic at some point, and California has just issued
a draft plan for preparing and responding to such an event. On the
other hand, assessing specific terrorist risks is more difficult.
As the nation assesses the lessons of Katrina, we must incorporate
those lessons in assessing state and local emergency management plans,
amend those plans as appropriate, and reflect those changes in planned
expenditures and exercises. This effort requires clear priorities, hard
choices, and objective assessments of current plans and capabilities.
Failure to address these difficult tasks directly and effectively will
result in preparedness and response efforts that are less effective
than they should and can be.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions the Commission Members may have.
[End of section]
Appendix I: DHS's Target Capabilities List 2.0 (Draft) as of December
2005:
Common Target Capabilities:
* Planning;
* Communications;
* Risk management;
* Community preparedness and participation:
Prevent Mission Area:
* Information gathering and recognition of indicators and warnings;
* Intelligence analysis and production;
* Intelligence/information sharing and dissemination;
* Law enforcement investigation and operations;
* CBRNE detection:
Protect Mission Area:
* Critical infrastructure protection (CIP);
* Food and agriculture safety and defense;
* Epidemiological surveillance and investigation;
* Public health laboratory testing:
Respond Mission Area:
* Onsite incident management;
* Emergency operations center management;
* Critical resource logistics and distribution;
* Volunteer management and donations;
* Responder safety and health;
* Public safety and security response;
* Animal health emergency support;
* Environmental health;
* Explosive device response operations;
* Firefighting operations/support;
* WMD/hazardous materials response and decontamination;
* Citizen Protection: evacuation and/or in-place protection;
* Isolation and quarantine;
* Urban search and rescue;
* Emergency public information and warning;
* Triage and pre-hospital treatment;
* Medical surge;
* Medical supplies management and distribution;
* Mass prophylaxis;
* Mass prophylaxis appendix;
* Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services);
* Fatality management:
Recover Mission Area:
* Structural damage and mitigation assessment;
* Restoration of lifelines;
* Economic and community recovery:
FOOTNOTES
[1] First responders have traditionally been thought of as local fire,
police, and emergency medical personnel who respond to events such as
fires, floods, traffic or rail accidents, and hazardous materials
spills. As a result of the increased concerns about bioterrorism and
other potential terrorist attacks, the definition of first responders
has been broadened. Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act defined
emergency response providers as including "Federal, State, and local
emergency public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency
medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related
personnel, agencies, and authorities." Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub.L. No. 107-296 § 2, 116. Stat.2135, 2140 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §
101(6). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 defined the term
"first responder" as "individuals who in the early stages of an
incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life,
property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response
providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101),as well as emergency management, public health, clinical
care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as
equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during
prevention, response, and recovery operations."
[2] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[3] Events need not be catastrophic for the federal government to
provide assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, or to provide coordination under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the National Response Plan.
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, GAO-04-470 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004).
[5] The Stafford Act is the short title for the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended.
[6] The NRP includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which applies to a
subset of incidents of national significance meeting the NRP's
definition of a "catastrophic incident:" The annex does not apply
unless the Secretary of Homeland Security designates the incident as
"catastrophic," which did not occur during Hurricane Katrina.
[7] A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2006).
[8] The 15 scenarios were: (1) improvised nuclear device attack, (2)
aerosol anthrax attack, (3) pandemic influenza, (4) biological attack
with plague, (5) chemical attack with blister agent, (6) chemical
attack with toxic chemical agent, (7) chemical attack with nerve agent,
(8) chemical attack resulting in chlorine tank explosion, (9) major
earthquake, (10) major hurricane, (11) radiological attack with
dispersal device, (12) improvised explosive device attack, (13)
biological attack with food contamination, (14) biological attack with
foreign animal disease (foot and mouth disease), and (15) cyber attack.
[9] According to DHS officials, there was less concern about planning
for natural disasters because there is a tremendous amount of
experience, actuarial data, geographical and seasonal patterns, and
other information that is not available in the context of terrorism.
[10] The goal of the plan, issued in draft in November 2005, is to
enhance protection of the nation's critical infrastructure and key
resources to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of
deliberate efforts by terrorists to "destroy, incapacitate, or exploit"
them.
[11] DHS Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Top Officials 3
Exercise, OIG-06-07 (Washington, D.C.: November 2005).
[12] The NCR is composed of the District of Columbia and surrounding
jurisdictions in the states of Maryland and Virginia.
[13] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004); and
Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency
Preparedness in the National Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington,
D.C.: July 14, 2005).
[14] GAO, Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet
Outstanding Needs, GAO-03-1146T (Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003).
[15] GAO, Statement of Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: February 1,
2006).