Immigration Benefits
Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud Gao ID: GAO-06-259 March 10, 2006In 2002, GAO reported that immigration benefit fraud was pervasive and significant and the approach to controlling it was fragmented. Experts believe that individuals ineligible for these benefits, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain in the U.S. You asked that GAO evaluate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (USCIS) anti-fraud efforts. This report addresses the questions: (1) What do available data and information indicate regarding the nature and extent of fraud? (2) What actions has USCIS taken to improve its ability to detect fraud? (3) What actions does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take to sanction those who commit fraud?
Although the full extent of benefit fraud is unknown, available evidence suggests that it is a serious problem. Several high-profile immigration benefit fraud cases shed light on aspects of its nature--particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent documents and can be facilitated by white collar and other criminals, with the potential for large profits. USCIS staff denied about 20,000 applications for fraud in fiscal year 2005. USCIS has established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is performing risk assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain benefits. However, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of internal control standards established by GAO and fraud control best practices identified by leading audit organizations--particularly a comprehensive risk management approach, a mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring during the course of normal activities, clear communication regarding how to balance multiple objectives, mechanisms to help ensure that staff have access to key information, and performance goals for fraud prevention. DHS does not have a strategy for sanctioning fraud. Best practices advise that a credible sanctions program, which includes a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness, is an integral part of fraud control. Because most immigration benefit fraud is not prosecuted criminally, the principal means of sanctioning it would be administrative penalties. Although immigration law gives DHS the authority to levy administrative penalties, the component of DHS that administers them does not consider them to be cost-effective and does not routinely impose them. However, DHS has not evaluated the costs and benefits of sanctions, including the value of potential deterrence. Without a credible sanctions program, DHS's efforts to deter fraud may be less effective, when applicants perceive little threat of punishment.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-259, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud
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United States Government Accountability Office:
March 2006:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
Immigration Benefits:
Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's
Ability to Control Benefit Fraud:
GAO-06-259:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-259, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2002, GAO reported that immigration benefit fraud was pervasive and
significant and the approach to controlling it was fragmented. Experts
believe that individuals ineligible for these benefits, including
terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain
in the U.S. You asked that GAO evaluate U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service‘s (USCIS) anti-fraud efforts. This report addresses
the questions: (1) What do available data and information indicate
regarding the nature and extent of fraud? (2) What actions has USCIS
taken to improve its ability to detect fraud? (3) What actions does the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take to sanction those who commit
fraud?
What GAO Found:
Although the full extent of benefit fraud is unknown, available
evidence suggests that it is a serious problem. Several high-profile
immigration benefit fraud cases shed light on aspects of its
nature”particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent
documents and can be facilitated by white collar and other criminals,
with the potential for large profits. USCIS staff denied about 20,000
applications for fraud in fiscal year 2005. USCIS has established a
focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control strategy
that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is performing
risk assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain
benefits. However, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of
internal control standards established by GAO and fraud control best
practices identified by leading audit organizations”particularly a
comprehensive risk management approach, a mechanism to ensure ongoing
monitoring during the course of normal activities, clear communication
regarding how to balance multiple objectives, mechanisms to help ensure
that staff have access to key information, and performance goals for
fraud prevention. DHS does not have a strategy for sanctioning fraud.
Best practices advise that a credible sanctions program, which includes
a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness, is an integral part of fraud
control. Because most immigration benefit fraud is not prosecuted
criminally, the principal means of sanctioning it would be
administrative penalties. Although immigration law gives DHS the
authority to levy administrative penalties, the component of DHS that
administers them does not consider them to be cost-effective and does
not routinely impose them. However, DHS has not evaluated the costs and
benefits of sanctions, including the value of potential deterrence.
Without a credible sanctions program, DHS‘s efforts to deter fraud may
be less effective, when applicants perceive little threat of punishment.
Minimizing Immigration Benefit Fraud through Internal Controls:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To enhance DHS‘s efforts to control benefit fraud, GAO recommends that
USCIS implement additional internal controls and best practices to
strengthen its fraud control environment and that DHS develop a
strategy for implementing a sanctions program that includes a mechanism
for assessing their effectiveness and that considers the costs and
benefits of sanctions, including their deterrence value. DHS generally
agreed with 4 of the 6 recommendations but cited actions indicating it
has addressed GAO‘s other 2 recommendations. GAO believes that
additional actions are needed.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-259. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Paul L. Jones at (202) 512-8777 or
jonespl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Fraud Is A Serious Problem, But Its Full Extent Is Unknown:
Although USCIS Has Taken Steps to promote Fraud Control, Additional
Controls and Best Practices Could Improve Its Ability to Detect Fraud:
Most Benefit Fraud Is Not Criminally Prosecuted, but DHS Does Not Have
an Administrative Sanctions Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: USCIS Applications Completed in Fiscal Year 2005:
Figure 2: Immigration Benefit Fraud Detection and Referral Process:
Figure 3: Internal Control Environment:
Abbreviations:
AICPA: American Institute of Certified Accountants:
BFU: Benefit Fraud Unit:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CFR: Code of Federal Regulations:
CIS: Citizenship and Immigration Services:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOL: Department of Labor:
FDNS: Office of Fraud Detection and National Security:
FDU: Fraud Detection Unit:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
INA: Immigration and Nationality Act:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
NAO: National Audit Office of the United Kingdom:
PAS: Performance Analysis System:
TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communication System:
USCIS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services:
March 10, 2006:
The Honorable John N. Hostettler:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Chairman:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
In fiscal year 2005, over 6 million applications were filed by those
seeking an immigration benefit--the ability of an alien to live and in
some cases work in the United States either permanently or on a
temporary basis. Most immigration benefits can be classified into two
major categories--family-based and employment-based. Family-based
applications are filed by U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens to
establish their relationships to certain alien relatives such as a
spouse, parent, or minor child who wish to immigrate to the United
States. Employment-based applications include applications filed by
employers for aliens to come to the United States temporarily to work
or receive training or for alien workers to work permanently in the
United States. Other immigration benefits include granting citizenship
to resident aliens (called naturalization), offering asylum to aliens
who fear persecution in their home countries, and authorizing
international students to study in the United States.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) is the agency primarily responsible for
processing applications for immigration benefits. The former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) previously had this
responsibility, which USCIS assumed when DHS was created in March 2003.
USCIS's staff of adjudicators process immigration benefits in 4 service
centers and 33 district offices around the country. In some cases,
applicants may try to obtain a benefit illegally through
fraud.[Footnote 1] USCIS adjudicators who suspect fraud are to refer
suspicious applications and supporting evidence to USCIS's Office of
Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS), created in 2003. FDNS
staff are responsible for reviewing these potential fraud cases and
determining whether to forward them to DHS's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)--which, among other things, is responsible for
investigating violations of immigration law, including immigration
benefit fraud. ICE may or may not decide to initiate a criminal
investigation, depending on the facts in the referral and on workloads
and priorities of its field offices.
DHS, terrorism experts, and federal law enforcement officials familiar
with immigration benefit fraud believe that individuals ineligible for
immigration benefits, including terrorists and criminals, could use
fraudulent means to enter or remain in the United States. In 2002, we
reported that immigration benefit fraud was pervasive and significant
and that INS's approach to immigration benefit fraud was fragmented and
unfocused.[Footnote 2] A 2005 study by a former 9/11 Commission counsel
found that of the 94 foreign-born terrorists known to operate in the
United States between the early 1990s and 2004, 59 or two-thirds
committed immigration fraud including 6 of the September 11th
hijackers.[Footnote 3] To determine what actions have been taken since
our 2002 report to address immigration benefit fraud, you asked that we
evaluate current anti-fraud efforts. This report addresses the
following questions:
(1) What do available data and information indicate regarding the
nature and extent of immigration benefit fraud?
(2) What actions has USCIS taken to improve its ability to detect
immigration benefit fraud?
(3) What actions does DHS take to sanction those who commit benefit
fraud?
To address these questions, we interviewed responsible officials at and
reviewed relevant documentation obtained from DHS and the Departments
of State, Justice, and Labor. Regarding the nature and extent of
immigration benefit fraud, we analyzed USCIS management data contained
in its Performance Analysis System (PAS), results from two fraud
assessments USCIS had completed before December 2005, information
reported by DHS and the U.S. Attorneys Offices based on investigations
and prosecutions of immigration benefit fraud, and information in fraud
bulletins prepared by one USCIS Service Center. We evaluated the
methodology used in USCIS's fraud assessments and determined that it
provided a reasonable basis for projecting the frequency with which
fraud was committed within the time period from which the samples were
drawn. We assessed the data derived from PAS and determined that these
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review.
Because we selected investigations and prosecutions to review based
upon information that was available, the information obtained from them
is not necessarily representative or exhaustive of all immigration
benefits cases nationwide. Similarly, information contained in the
fraud bulletins is not necessarily representative of immigration
benefit fraud nationwide. To determine how USCIS detects fraud during
the adjudications process and to evaluate these efforts, we interviewed
USCIS headquarters officials and USCIS's Office of Fraud Detection and
National Security staff. We also interviewed 59 adjudicators at the 4
USCIS Service Centers and 2 USCIS district offices with responsibility
for and familiarity with adjudicating different types of applications
in a group setting, which allowed us to identify points of consensus
among these adjudicators. In addition we interviewed ICE Office of
Investigations officials from four ICE field offices. As we did not
select probability samples of adjudicators and ICE Office of
Investigations staff to interview, the results of these interviews may
not be projected to the views of all USCIS adjudicators and ICE Office
of Investigations field staff nationwide. Further, we compared the
practices in place to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government[Footnote 4] and to guidance from internationally recognized,
leading organizations in fraud control, including the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the United Kingdom's
National Audit Office. To determine what measures DHS has taken to
sanction those who commit immigration fraud, we interviewed
knowledgeable officials at USCIS and ICE, examined fraud investigation
and prosecution statistics, and analyzed USCIS statistics about the
amount of fraud identified by its adjudicators. We conducted our work
from October 2004 to December 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents more
details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Results In Brief:
Our review of several high-profile immigration benefit fraud cases
sheds light on some aspects of the nature of immigration benefit fraud-
-particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent
documents, that it can be facilitated by white collar and other
criminals, and that it has the potential to result in large profits.
Although the full extent of benefit fraud is not known, available
evidence suggests that it is an ongoing and serious problem. Fraudulent
documents submitted included but were not limited to marriage and birth
certificates, financial statements, business plans, organizational
charts, fictitious employee resumes, and college transcripts. White-
collar and other criminals can facilitate immigration benefit fraud.
Individuals who pose a threat to national security and public safety
may seek to enter the United States by fraudulently obtaining
immigration benefits. Moreover, those facilitating immigration benefit
fraud, in some cases, have reaped large profits from aliens willing to
pay thousands of dollars to fraudulently obtain an immigration benefit.
In fiscal year 2005, USCIS denied about 20,000 applications due to
fraud. In addition, in 2005, USCIS's new fraud detection office
conducted the first two in a series of planned fraud assessments--
reviews of applications for religious worker and replacement permanent
resident card benefits. Based on the results of the completed religious
worker assessment, which estimated that 33 percent of all religious
worker applications were potentially fraudulent, we project that about
660 applications--one-third of religious worker applications submitted
over a 6-month period in 2004--may have contained fraudulent
information. Some findings of the religious worker assessment, and
facts uncovered during criminal investigations and prosecutions,
demonstrate that USCIS adjudicators do not always detect fraud during
the adjudications process, thus allowing applicants to receive benefits
for which they were not eligible. Moreover, USCIS's policy of issuing
temporary work authorization within 90 days to those applicants waiting
for their applications for permanent residency to be decided, although
intended to allow bonafide applicants to work as soon as possible, can
be exploited by aliens filing fraudulent applications with the intent
of receiving the temporary work authorization for which they would
otherwise be ineligible. These aliens can then use the temporary work
authorization to obtain other official documents, such as drivers'
licenses. Based on an estimate from the DHS Office of Immigration
Statistics that about 85 percent of applicants who apply for permanent
residency also apply for temporary work authorization, the Citizenship
and Immigration Services Ombudsman contends that many aliens who filed
a fraudulent claim for permanent residency may have received temporary
work authorization.
To help it detect immigration benefit fraud, USCIS established FDNS as
its focal point for dealing with immigration benefit fraud, outlined a
strategy for detecting immigration benefit fraud, and is undertaking a
series of risk assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud
for certain immigration benefits. However, USCIS has not yet
implemented some aspects of internal control standards established by
GAO and fraud control best practices identified by leading audit
organizations that could further enhance its ability to detect fraud.
Specifically, USCIS's new fraud detection office is in the initial
stages of implementing a fraud assessment program, which examines the
extent and nature of fraud associated with the immigration category
being assessed. However, this program, as currently implemented, does
not provide a basis for the type of comprehensive risk analysis we
advocate. First, USCIS current assessment plan does not include risk
assessment of the majority of major immigration benefit categories--for
example, temporary work authorization. Additionally, it focuses
primarily on determining the fraud rate for selected immigration
applications and identifying procedural vulnerabilities, for example,
not routinely verifying the existence of churches associated with
religious work applications. It does not draw on all available sources
of strategic threat information to assess threats, such as ICE's Office
of Intelligence, nor does it assess the consequences of granting a
benefit to the wrong person--for example some benefits facilitate
access to critical infrastructure while others do not. More
comprehensive information about vulnerabilities, threats, and
consequences as part of its fraud assessments would allow USCIS to
identify those benefits that represent the highest risk and practice
risk-based decision making in its efforts to balance fraud detection
with other organizational priorities like reducing backlogs and
improving customer service. In addition, USCIS also lacks a mechanism
to help ensure that information gathered during the course of its
normal operations and those of related operations--including criminal
investigations and prosecutions--inform decisions about whether and
what actions, including changes to policies, procedures, or
programmatic activities, might improve the ability to detect fraud.
Moreover, adjudicators we interviewed reported that communication from
management did not clearly communicate to them the importance of fraud
control, rather it emphasized meeting production goals, designed to
reduce the backlog of applications, almost exclusively. These
adjudicators shared, for example, memos from different parts of the
agency, which they told us sent conflicting messages about how they
were to balance, during the course of their duties, fraud-prevention
objectives with service-related objectives. USCIS headquarters
operations management told us that the adjudications operations is a
"high-pressure" production environment and that they are seeking to
increase production, but it was not their intention that this should
come at the expense of making incorrect adjudication decisions. Also,
our interviews with adjudicators indicated that they have limited
access to some tools that could support their fraud detection ability
such as external databases for verifying applicant information.
Interviews with USCIS staff also indicated that adjudicators may not
always receive relevant information that could support their efforts to
detect fraud, and although some information is provided, it is not
always provided in a form that adjudicators can reasonably manage as,
for example, in an electronic database. Finally, USCIS has not
established performance goals--measures and targets--to assess its
benefit fraud activities.
DHS does not have a strategy for sanctioning fraud or for evaluating
the effectiveness of sanctions. Best practice guidance issued by the
United Kingdom's National Audit Office, for example, suggests that a
strategy for sanctioning fraud, along with a mechanism for evaluating
the effectiveness of sanctions is central to a good fraud control
environment. Available data from the first half of fiscal year 2005
about the number of applications denied for fraud compared with the
number of investigations indicates that most immigration fraud detected
by USCIS does not result in ICE criminal investigations and subsequent
prosecutions. Since most fraud is not criminally prosecuted, the
principal means of sanctioning it would be administrative penalties.
The Immigration and Nationality Act does provide the authority to levy
administrative penalties; however, DHS does not currently use this
authority. This is largely because a 1998 federal court ruling enjoined
INS from implementing certain administrative penalties for document
fraud until it revised certain forms to provide adequate notice to
aliens of the immigration consequences of waiving the opportunity to
challenge document fraud fines. Although DHS has not conducted a formal
cost-benefit analysis, according to ICE officials responsible for
pursuing administrative penalties, these penalties are not cost
effective because the fines are less than the costs to impose them when
a hearing is requested. Accordingly, DHS has not made updating the
forms to allow sanctions to be administered in compliance with the
court ruling a priority. Nevertheless, according to USCIS officials, an
effective administrative sanctions program is important to its fraud
deterrence efforts. The lack of a clear strategy for how and when to
punish fraud perpetrators, which considers the nonfinancial benefit of
deterrence and includes a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness,
limits DHS's ability to project a convincing message that those who
commit fraud face a credible threat of punishment in one form or
another.
In order to enhance USCIS's ability to detect immigration benefit
fraud, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Director of USCIS to adopt additional internal controls and
best practices to strengthen USCIS's fraud control environment,
particularly by (1) expanding the scope of its current fraud assessment
program and using a more comprehensive risk management approach; (2)
establishing a mechanism to ensure that information uncovered during
USCIS's and related agencies' normal operations feeds back into
evaluations of USCIS's policies, procedures, and operations; (3)
clearly communicating to adjudications staff the importance of both
fraud prevention-related and service-related objectives, and how these
objectives are to be balanced by adjudicators as they carry out their
duties; (4) providing USCIS staff with access to information and tools
from relevant internal and external sources; and (5) establishing
outcome and output based performance goals that reflect the status of
fraud control efforts. In addition, in order to enhance DHS's ability
to sanction immigration benefit fraud, we recommend the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS and the Assistant
Secretary of ICE to develop a strategy for sanctioning immigration
benefit fraud that takes into account the value of deterrence and
establishes a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness.
Background:
USCIS is responsible for processing millions of immigration benefit
applications received each year for various types of immigration
benefits, determining whether applicants are eligible to receive
immigration benefits, and detecting suspicious information and evidence
to refer for fraud investigation and possible sanctioning by other
components or agencies. USCIS processes applications for about 50 types
of immigration benefits. In fiscal year 2005, USCIS received about 6.3
million applications and adjudicated about 7.5 million applications.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of applications completed by type of
application in fiscal year 2005.
Figure 1: USCIS Applications Completed in Fiscal Year 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To process these immigration benefit applications, in fiscal year 2005
USCIS had a staff of about 3,000 permanent adjudicators located in 4
service centers, where most applications are processed, and 33 district
offices.[Footnote 5] In fiscal year 2004, for example, service centers
adjudicated about 67 percent of all applications, and districts about
33 percent. In general, service centers adjudicate applications that do
not require an interview with the applicant, using the evidence
submitted with the applications. District offices generally adjudicate
applications where USCIS requires an interview with the applicant
(e.g., naturalization). USCIS also has 8 offices that process
applications for asylum in the United States. In fiscal year 2005,
USCIS's budget amounted to just under $1.8 billion, of which about $1.6
billion was expected from service fees and $160 million from
congressionally appropriated funds.
In fiscal year 2004, USCIS had a backlog of several million
applications and has developed a plan to eliminate it by the end of
fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 6] In June 2004, USCIS reported that it
would have to increase production by about 20 percent to achieve its
goal of adjudicating all applications within 6 months or less by the
end of fiscal year 2005. At that time, it estimated that it would have
to increase current annual processing from about 6 million to 7.2
million applications. Since USCIS did not plan for further increases in
staffing levels, reaching its backlog goal would require some reduction
in average application processing times, overtime hours, and
adjudicator reassignments.
With the creation of DHS in 2003, the immigration services and
enforcement functions of the former INS transitioned to different
organizations within DHS. USCIS assumed the immigration benefit
functions and ICE assumed INS's investigative and detention and removal
of aliens functions. Within ICE's Office of Investigations, the
Identity and Benefit Fraud unit now conducts immigration benefit fraud
criminal investigations and ICE's Office of Detention and Removal
Operations is responsible for identifying and removing aliens illegally
in the United States.
Because the immigration service and enforcement functions are now
handled by separate DHS components, these components created two new
units to, among other things, help coordinate the referral of suspected
immigration benefit fraud uncovered by adjudicators to ICE's Office of
Investigations. First, USCIS created FDNS in 2003 to, among other
things, receive fraud leads from adjudicators and determine which leads
should be referred to ICE's Office of Investigations. To accomplish
this task, FDNS has Fraud Detection Units (FDUs) at all four USCIS
service centers and the National Benefits Center.[Footnote 7] When
fraud is suspected, the applications are to be referred FDUs. The FDUs,
comprised of Intelligence Research Specialists and assistants, are
responsible for further developing suspected immigration fraud
referrals to decide which leads should be referred to ICE for possible
investigation. FDU staff are also to refer to ICE or other federal
agencies applicants who may pose a threat to national security or
public safety or who are potentially deportable. FDUs are responsible
for following up on potential national security risks identified during
background checks of immigration benefit applicants. FDUs also perform
intelligence analysis to identify immigration fraud patterns and major
fraud schemes. In addition to establishing FDUs, in January 2005 FDNS
assigned 100 new Immigration Officers to USCIS district offices,
service centers, and asylum offices to work directly with adjudicators
to handle fraud referrals and conduct limited field inquiries. Second,
ICE's Office of Investigations created four new Benefit Fraud Units
(BFUs) in Vermont, Texas, Nebraska and California located either at or
near the four USCIS service centers. The ICE BFUs are responsible for
reviewing, assessing, developing, and when appropriate, referring to
ICE field offices for possible investigation immigration fraud leads
and other public safety leads received from the FDUs and elsewhere.
Specifically, the ICE BFUs are intended to identify those referrals
which they believe warrant investigation, such as organizations and
facilitators engaged in large-scale schemes or individuals who pose a
threat to national security or public safety, and refer them to ICE
field offices. In turn, ICE field offices will investigate and refer
those cases they believe warrant prosecution to the U.S. Attorneys
Offices. Figure 2 illustrates the typical immigration benefit fraud
referral and coordination process.
Figure 2: Immigration Benefit Fraud Detection and Referral Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the office of the Citizenship
and Immigration Services Ombudsman. The ombudsman's primary function is
to: assist individuals and employers in resolving problems with USCIS;
identify areas in which individuals and employers have problems in
dealing with USCIS; and propose changes in the administrative practices
of USCIS in an effort to mitigate problems. The ombudsman has issued 2
annual reports that have highlighted issues related to prolonged
processing times, limited case status information, immigration benefit
fraud, insufficient standardization in processing, and inadequate
information technology and facilities.
Other federal agencies also play important roles in the immigration
benefit application adjudication process. The Department of State is
responsible for approving and issuing a visa allowing an alien to
travel to the United States. The Department of Labor's (DOL) Division
of Foreign Labor Certification provides national leadership and policy
guidance to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Labor
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) concerning foreign
workers seeking admission to the United States for employment. DOL
provides certifications for foreign workers to work in the United
States, on a permanent or temporary basis, when there are insufficient
qualified U.S. workers available to perform the work at wages that meet
or exceed the prevailing wage for the occupation in the area of
intended employment. The DOL Office of the Inspector General's Office
of Labor Racketeering and Fraud Investigations is responsible for
investigating fraud related to these labor certifications.
Fraud Is A Serious Problem, But Its Full Extent Is Unknown:
Fraudulent schemes used in several high-profile immigration benefit
fraud cases sheds light on some aspects of the nature of immigration
benefit fraud--particularly that it is accomplished by submitting
fraudulent documents, that it can be committed by organized white-
collar and other criminals, and that it has the potential to result in
large profits for these criminals. The benefit fraud cases we reviewed
involved individuals attempting to obtain benefits for which they were
not eligible by submitting fraudulent documents or making false claims
as evidence to support their applications. Fraudulent documents
submitted included but were not limited to birth and marriage
certificates, tax returns, financial statements, business plans,
organizational charts, fictitious employee resumes, and college
transcripts. For example, in what ICE characterized as one of the
largest marriage fraud investigations ever undertaken, 44 individuals
were indicted in November 2005 for their alleged role in an elaborate
scheme to obtain fraudulent immigrant visas for hundreds of Chinese and
Vietnamese nationals. According to a USCIS fraud bulletin, this scheme
may have been ongoing for 10 years. Another major investigation
revealed evidence that an attorney had filed about 350 applications on
behalf of aliens seeking permanent employment as religious workers at
religious institutions in the United States. Investigators found
evidence that most of these aliens were unskilled laborers who were not
pastors or other religious workers and had little or no previous
affiliation with the religious institution. According to this
investigation, some religious institutions appeared to specialize in
obtaining legal status for aliens in the country who were not eligible
for religious worker immigration benefits. In another investigation
involving at least 2,800 apparently fraudulent marriage and fiancée
applications identified in 2002 and investigated through 2004, a U.S.
citizen appeared to have submitted multiple applications with as many
as 11 different spouses.
One USCIS Service Center prepared fraud bulletins using information
from various State Department Consular posts overseas describing
immigration fraud uncovered by these posts. Our analysis of the
bulletins issued from July 2004 through December 2004 prepared by
USCIS's California Service Center revealed that aliens from 23
different countries were believed to have sought a variety of
immigration benefits fraudulently. For example, individuals apparently
sought to enter the United States through fraud by falsely claiming
they were: (1) legitimately married to or a fiancé of a U.S. citizen;
(2) a religious worker; (3) a performer in an entertainment group; (4)
a person with extraordinary abilities, such as an artist, race car
driver, or award winning photographer; (5) an executive with a foreign
company; (6) a child or other relative of a citizen or permanent
resident; or (7) a domestic employee of an alien legally in the United
States, such as a diplomat or business executive. According to one of
the bulletins, in one case State Department consular officers suspected
illegal aliens were entering the United States under the guise of
membership in a band. According to another bulletin, two individuals
were suspected of smuggling children into the United States. In one
case, the alleged parents submitted a non-immigrant visa application
for their "daughter," and provided a fraudulent birth certificate and
passport for her. The "parents" eventually admitted to taking children
to the United States as their own to reunite them with their illegally
working family members.
Some individuals seeking immigration benefits pose a threat to national
security and public safety, and white collar and other criminals
sometimes facilitate immigration benefit fraud. For example, according
to FDNS, each year about 5,200 immigration benefit applicants are
identified as potential national security risks, because their personal
information matches information contained in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's Interagency Border Inspection System, a database of
immigration law violators and people of national security interest.
Additionally, according to federal prosecutors, immigration benefit
fraud may involve other criminal activity, such as income tax evasion,
money laundering, production of fraudulent documents, and conspiracy.
Also, organized crime groups have used sophisticated immigration fraud
schemes, such as creating shell companies, to bring in aliens
ostensibly as employees of these companies. In addition, a number of
individuals linked to a hostile foreign power's intelligence service
were found to have been employed as temporary alien workers on military
research.
Investigations have revealed that perpetrating fraud on behalf of
aliens can be a profitable enterprise. For instance, in 2003 and 2004,
one USCIS service center identified about 2,800 apparently fraudulent
marriage applications between low-income U.S. citizens and foreign
nationals from an Asian country. The U.S. citizens appeared to have
been paid between $5,000 and $10,000 for participating in the marriage
fraud scheme. In another example from an investigation by DOL's
Inspector General, to fraudulently obtain the labor certifications
needed to work in the United States, at least 900 aliens allegedly paid
a recruitment firm an average of $35,000, with some aliens paying as
much as $90,000, resulting in at least $31 million in revenue for this
firm. In one of the largest labor certification fraud schemes ever
uncovered, federal investigators found evidence that a prominent
immigration attorney in the Washington D.C. area submitted at least
1,436 and perhaps as many as 2,700 fraudulent employment applications
between 1998 and 2002. According to the sworn testimony of a DOL
special agent, this attorney and his associates are alleged to have
made at least $11.4 million for the 1,400 applications that the agent
reviewed, in all of which he found evidence of fraud, and perhaps as
much as $21.6 million if all 2,700 applications were fraudulent, as he
strongly suspected. In another case, an attorney allegedly charged
aliens between $8,000 and $30,000 to fraudulently obtain employment-
based visas to work in more than 200 businesses that included pizza
parlors, auto parts stores and medical clinics.
Although the full extent of immigration benefit fraud is unknown,
available USCIS data indicate that it is a serious problem. According
USCIS PAS data, in fiscal year 2005, USCIS denied just over 20,000
applications because USCIS staff detected fraudulent application
information or supporting evidence during the course of adjudicating
the benefit request. Three application categories accounted for more
than three-quarters of the fraud denials: temporary work authorization
(36 percent), application for permanent residency (30 percent), and
application for a spouse to immigrate (14 percent). These three
application types also accounted for almost half of all applications
adjudicated by USCIS in fiscal year 2005. Moreover, in fiscal year
2005, USCIS denied approximately 800,000 applications for other
reasons, such as ineligibility for the benefit sought or failure to
respond to information requests. USCIS adjudications staff and
officials told us that it is likely that some of these applications
denied for other reasons also involved fraud.
Information provided by State Department and DOL officials also
indicates that fraud is a serious problem. Once USCIS approves a
sponsor's application on behalf of an alien to immigrate, the
application is sent to the State Department's National Visa Center,
which forwards the application to the appropriate State Department
overseas consulate post, which then interviews the alien to determine
whether a visa should be issued. According to National Visa Center
officials, out of 2,400 applications returned on average each month to
USCIS by the National Visa Center, that are denied or withdrawn for
various reasons, about 900 involve fraud or suspected fraud as
determined by consular officers overseas. When the DOL Inspector
General audited labor certification applications filed in 2001, it also
found indications of a significant amount of fraud. According to the
Inspector General, of the approximate 214,000 applications filed from
January 1, 2001, through April 30, 2001, and not subsequently canceled
or withdrawn, 54 percent (about 130,000) contained false--possibly
fraudulent--information.[Footnote 8]
In June 2005, the FDNS completed the first in a series of fraud
assessments. The results from this assessment of religious worker
applications indicate that about 33 percent of the 220 sampled
applications resulted in a preliminary finding of potential
fraud.[Footnote 9] Based on a 33 percent rate, we estimate that, during
the 6-month period of fiscal year 2004 from which the sample was drawn,
about 660 out of approximately 2,000 applications may have been
fraudulent.[Footnote 10] Of the 72 potential fraud cases discovered in
the fraud assessment, about 54-percent (39 cases) showed evidence of
tampering or fabrication of supporting documents; 44-percent (32 cases)
of the petitioners' addresses did not reveal a bona fide religious
institution; about 42-percent (30 cases) may have misrepresented the
beneficiaries' qualifications; and 28-percent (20 cases) did not
provide the salary noted in the application. The assessment also
uncovered one case where law enforcement had identified an applicant as
a suspected terrorist.
Information from other investigations and prosecutions of benefit fraud
also reveal that, in some cases applicants may have submitted
fraudulent documents and made false statements that were not detected
before the applicant obtained an immigration benefit. For example,
while investigating one fraud scheme, investigators identified more
than 2,000 apparently fraudulent applications where there was evidence
that some aliens, fraudulently claiming to be managers and executives
of foreign companies with U.S. affiliates, acquired benefits that
granted them the ability to work in the United States. To execute this
scheme, organizers allegedly prepared application packages that
included fraudulent business and employee related documents including
financial statements, business plans, organizational charts and
fictitious employee resumes.
One joint law enforcement investigation, previously mentioned,
uncovered evidence that an attorney and his associate had filed at
least 1,436 applications on behalf of legitimate companies--mostly
local restaurants--that did not actually request these workers. In this
case, they forged the signatures of company management on the
applications. Another investigation involving marriage fraud found
evidence that U.S. citizens were recruited and paid to marry Vietnamese
nationals. The fraud organizers appeared to have assisted the U.S.
citizens in obtaining their passports, scheduled travel arrangements,
and escorted them to Vietnam where they arranged introductions with
Vietnamese nationals whom the citizens then married. These citizens
then filed applications that facilitated these Vietnamese nationals'
entry into the United States as spouses even though it appeared that
they did not intend to live together as husband and wife.
Even when adjudicators rejected applications based on fraud, some of
these applicants had already received interim benefits while their
applications were pending final adjudication allowing them to live and
work in the United States, and in some cases obtain other official
documents, such as a driver's license. Under current USCIS policy, for
example, if USCIS cannot adjudicate an application for permanent
residency and the accompanying application for work authorization
within 90 days the applicant is entitled to an interim work
authorization, an interim benefit designed to let applicants work while
awaiting a decision regarding permanent residency.[Footnote 11]
According to the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman's
fiscal year 2004 and 2005 annual reports and our discussion with him,
for many individuals the primary goal is to obtain temporary work
authorization regardless of the validity of their application for
permanent residency. That is, aliens can apply for temporary work
authorization, knowing that they do not qualify for permanent
residency, with the intent of exploiting the system to gain work
authorization under false pretenses.
Once a temporary work authorization is fraudulently obtained, an alien
can use it to obtain other valid identity documents such as a temporary
social security card and a drivers' license, thus facilitating their
living and working in the United States. According to the FDNS
Director, once such fraud scheme involved at least 2,500 individuals in
Florida who allegedly filed frivolous applications for employment
authorization and then used the receipt, showing they had filed an
application, to obtain Florida State driver's licenses or
identification cards.[Footnote 12] ICE agents we interviewed also said
that they suspected that many individuals apply for permanent residency
fraudulently simply to obtain a valid temporary work authorization
document. The interim benefit remains valid until it expires or until
it is revoked by USCIS.
In his 2005 report, the Ombudsman cites a DHS Office of Immigration
Statistics estimate--which the ombudsman's office confirmed with
USCIS's division of performance management--that about 85 percent of
applicants for permanent residency also apply for temporary work
authorization. As a result, according to the ombudsman, many aliens
have received temporary work authorizations, for which they were later
found to be ineligible. Our analysis of PAS data shows, for example,
that from fiscal year 2000 through 2004, USCIS denied 26,745
applications due to fraud out of the approximately 3 million
applications received for permanent residency. These data illustrate
that, if aliens that filed fraudulent applications for permanent
residency also requested temporary work authorization at a rate
consistent with the 85 percent cited by the Office of Immigration
Statistics, then thousands of aliens received temporary work
authorization based on their fraudulent claims for permanent residency
during fiscal year 2000 through 2004.
Although USCIS Has Taken Steps to promote Fraud Control, additional
controls and best practices could improve its ability to detect fraud:
To help it detect immigration benefit fraud, USCIS has taken some
important actions consistent with activities prescribed by the
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and with
recognized best practices in fraud control. Specifically, it has
established an internal unit to act as its focal point for addressing
immigration benefit fraud, outlined a strategy for detecting
immigration benefit fraud, and is undertaking a series of fraud
assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain
immigration benefits. However, USCIS has not applied some aspects of
internal control standards and fraud control best practices that could
further enhance its ability to detect fraud.
Internal Control Standards and Other Guidance Provide Direction for
Establishing Good Fraud Control Practices:
The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide an
overall framework to identify and address, among other things fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Implementing good internal control
activities and establishing a positive control environment is central
to an agency's efforts to detect and deter immigration benefit fraud.
The standards address various aspects of internal control that should
be continuous, built-in components of organizational operations,
including the control environment, risk assessment, control activities,
information and communications, and monitoring.
As with work we have previously published related to managing improper
payments, fraud control would typically require a continual interaction
among these components in keeping with an agency's various
objectives.[Footnote 13] For example, internal controls that promote
ongoing monitoring work together with risk assessment controls to
provide a foundation for decision making. Also, as internal control
standards advise, a precondition to risk assessment is the
establishment of clear, consistent agency objectives. Once established,
risk assessment controls must also work together with information and
communication controls to ensure that that every level of the agency is
cognizant of the commitment and approach to both controlling fraud and
meeting other agency objectives. Similarly, conditions governing risk
change frequently, and periodic updates are required to ensure that
risk information--including threats, vulnerabilities and consequences-
-stays current and relevant. Information collected through periodic
assessment, as well as daily operations can inform the assessment, and
particularly, the analysis of risk. As shown in figure 3, the control
environment surrounds and reinforces the other components, but all
components work in concert toward a central objective, which, in this
case, is to minimize immigration benefit fraud.
Figure 3: Internal Control Environment:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Other audit organizations have published guidance that includes
discussion of sound management practices for controlling fraud that
complement the internal control standards. Among these are the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) guidance on
management of antifraud programs and controls to help prevent and deter
fraud[Footnote 14] and a fraud control practices guide developed by the
United Kingdom's National Audit Office (NAO) entitled "Good Practices
in Tackling External Fraud." The NAO guidance outlines a risk-based
strategic approach to combating fraud that also includes evaluating the
effectiveness of sanctions.
Consistent with Internal Control Standards and Fraud Control Best
Practices, USCIS Has Established a Fraud Focal Point, Related
Strategies and a Fraud Assessment Program:
According to internal control standards, factors leading to a positive
control environment include clearly defining key areas of authority and
responsibility, establishing appropriate lines of reporting, and
appropriately delegating authority and responsibility for operating
activities. Similarly, the NAO fraud control guidance advises agencies
to develop specific strategies to coordinate their fraud control
efforts and to ensure that someone is fully responsible for
implementing the plans in the way intended and that sufficient
resources are in place. Consistent with internal control and best
practice guidance, USCIS established the FDNS office to enhance its
fraud control efforts by serving as its focal point for addressing
immigration benefit fraud.
Established in 2003, FDNS is intended to combat fraud and foster a
positive control environment by pursuing the following objectives:
* develop, coordinate, and lead the national antifraud operations for
USCIS;
* oversee and enhance policies and procedures pertaining to the
enforcement of law enforcement background checks on those applying for
immigration benefits;
* identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in the various policies,
practices and procedures which threaten the legal immigration process;
* recommend solutions and internal controls to address these
vulnerabilities; and act as the primary USCIS conduit and liaison with
ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other members of the
law enforcement and intelligence community.
In September 2003, in support of its objectives, FDNS outlined a
strategy for detecting immigration benefit fraud in USCIS's National
Benefit Fraud Strategy. According to the strategy, because most
immigration benefit fraud begins with the filing of an application, a
sound approach to fraud prevention begins at the earliest point in the
process--the time an application is received. Accordingly, USCIS
established FDNS Fraud Detection Units (FDUs) in each of the service
centers in order to help identify potential fraud and process
adjudicator referrals. Subsequently, FDNS appointed staff to serve as
Immigration Officers to work directly with adjudicators at the service
centers and district offices in the task of identifying potential fraud
and, to some extent, verifying fraud through administrative inquiries-
-once it was determined that ICE had declined to investigate a
referral--in order to assist adjudicators in making eligibility
determinations.
The strategy also discusses various technological tools to help the
FDUs detect fraud early in the process--in particular, by enabling FDNS
staff to check databases to confirm applicant information and by
developing new automated tools to analyze application system data using
known fraud indicators and patterns to help identify potential cases of
fraud. USCIS has hired a contractor to develop for FDNS an automated
capability to screen incoming applications against known fraud
indicators, such as multiple applications received from the same
person. According to FDNS, it plans to deploy an initial data analysis
capability by the third quarter of fiscal year 2006 and release
additional data analyses capabilities at later dates, but could not
predict when these latter capabilities would be achieved. However,
according to an FDNS operations manager, the near and midterm plans are
not aimed at providing a full data mining capability. In the long term,
USCIS plans to integrate these data analyses tools for fraud detection
into a new application management system being developed as part of
USCIS's efforts to transform its business processes for adjudicating
immigration benefits which includes developing the information
technology needed to support these business processes. Also, in the
long term, according to the FDNS Director, a new USCIS application
management system would ideally include fraud filters, to screen
applications and remove suspicious applications from the processing
stream before they are seen by adjudicators.
FDNS has adopted as one of its objectives the identification and
evaluation of vulnerabilities in USCIS policies, practices, and
procedures that threaten the immigration benefit process. Consistent
with this objective and good internal control practices, in February
2005, FDNS began to conduct a series of fraud assessments aimed at
determining the extent and nature (i.e. how it is committed) of fraud
for several immigration benefits that FDNS staff determined, based on
past studies and experience, benefit fraud may be a problem. To conduct
these assessments, FDNS first selected a statistically valid sample of
applications.[Footnote 15] FDNS field staff then attempted to verify
whether key information on the applications was true. They did this by
doing such things as comparing information contained in benefit
applications with information in USCIS data systems and law enforcement
and commercial databases, conducting interviews with applicants, and,
in some cases, visiting locations to verify, for example, whether a
business actually existed. As of December 2005, FDNS had completed its
assessment of the religious worker application and replacement of
permanent resident card applications, and was in the process of
completing the assessment of two immigrant worker application
subcategories.[Footnote 16] As of December 2005, FDNS planned to
initiate two other assessments in January 2006 and another at a later
time.[Footnote 17]
Additional Internal Controls and Use of Other Best Practices Could
Further Improve USCIS's Ability to Detect Benefit Fraud:
Although USCIS has taken some important steps consistent with internal
control standards and other good fraud control practices, it has not
yet implemented some aspects of internal control standards and fraud
control best practices that could further enhance its ability to detect
fraud. Specifically, it lacks (1) a comprehensive approach for managing
risk, (2) a monitoring mechanism to ensure that knowledge arising from
routine operations informs the assessment of policies and procedures,
(3) clear communication regarding how to balance multiple agency
objectives, (4) a mechanism to help ensure that adjudicators and FDNS
staff have access to important information, and (5) performance goals
related to fraud prevention.
USCIS Has Not Adopted a Comprehensive Risk Management Approach to Help
Guide Its Fraud Control Efforts:
Although FDNS has initiated a fraud assessment program that identifies
vulnerabilities for the specific benefit being assessed, it does not
employ a comprehensive risk management approach to help guide its fraud
control efforts. That is, FDNS has not (1) developed a plan for
assessing the majority of benefits that USCIS administers, (2) fully
incorporated threat and consequence information as part of the
assessment process, and (3) applied a risk-based approach to evaluating
alternatives for mitigating identified vulnerabilities.
A central component of the Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government is risk assessment, which includes identifying and
analyzing risks that agencies face from internal and external sources
and deciding what actions should be taken to manage these risks. NAO's
fraud control guide also advises that in the fraud context, risk
assessment involves such things as assessing the size of the threat
from external fraud, the areas most vulnerable to fraud, and the
characteristics of those who commit fraud. Moreover, we have
consistently advocated a model of risk management that takes place in
the context of clearly articulated goals and objectives and includes
comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences
to help agencies evaluate and select among alternatives for mitigating
risk in light of the potential for a given activity to be effective,
the related cost of implementing the activity, and other relevant
management concerns (including its impact on other agency
objectives).[Footnote 18]
FDNS fraud assessments are an initial step toward adopting a risk
management approach. However, FDNS has no plans to assess the majority
of the benefit types that it administers. FDNS's current plan calls for
assessing benefit types that represent only about 25 percent of the
applications USCIS received in fiscal year 2004, for example, and do
not include benefits like temporary work authorization which accounted
for almost 30 percent of applications received in 2004, and which the
CIS Ombudsman suspects may be a high risk for fraud, and for which PAS
data show a high denial rate for fraud. FDNS officials told us that,
although the fraud assessments have been valuable, they have taken more
time and effort than originally planned. Likewise, FDNS has not
established a strategy and methodology for prioritizing any future
fraud assessments. Until it extends the assessments to additional
benefit types, the fraud assessments offer only limited information
about vulnerabilities to the immigration benefits system:
Moreover, the approach to risk management that we advocate calls for
the assessment of threats and consequences, in addition to the
vulnerability information provided by the current approach to fraud
assessment. Currently, the fraud assessments do not incorporate a
comprehensive threat assessment--that is, they do not draw on all
available sources of threat information--for example, information that
might be available from such sources as ICE's Office of Intelligence
and other DHS intelligence gathering efforts. Threat assessment might
help FDNS identify, for example, whether terrorists might be more
likely to try to exploit certain immigration benefits. Neither do the
fraud assessments include an assessment of the consequences of granting
a particular benefit to a fraudulent filer. Such an assessment might
help USCIS determine the relative harm that granting such a benefit
might pose to the United States and its immigration benefit system.
Although ultimately any benefit obtained under false pretenses
undermines the system established by U.S. immigration law,
consideration of whether, for example, granting a specific benefit may
also facilitate easier access for potential terrorists to critical
infrastructure or pose a greater detriment to the U.S. economy could
inform sound risk-based decision making.
Equipped with a more comprehensive understanding of the risks it faces-
-particularly which benefits represent the highest risk, USCIS
management would then be in a better position to select appropriate
risk mitigation strategies and actions, particularly in situations
where it is necessary to make resource trade-offs or to balance
multiple agency objectives. For example, an obvious vulnerability to
the immigration benefit system is the submission of false eligibility
evidence. Currently, however, USCIS procedures do not include the
verification of any eligibility evidence for any benefit, despite its
potential to help mitigate vulnerability to fraud.[Footnote 19]
Verification of such evidence--by comparing it to other information in
USCIS databases, by checking it against external sources of
information, or by interviewing applicants--is the most direct and
effective strategy for mitigating this vulnerability. Employer wage
data reported to state labor agencies, for example, could be a useful
source of information to help determine if an employer has paid
prevailing wages. Data from state motor vehicle departments can be used
to verify that the two individuals claiming to be married live at the
same address. We previously reported that USCIS could benefit from
verifying employer related information with the Internal Revenue
Service.[Footnote 20] USCIS adjudicators told us that access to
commercial databases that provide identification and credential
verification would be helpful in verifying information contained in
benefit applications. Additionally, district office adjudicators told
us that it was often only during interviews that fraud became evident,
even when their earlier review had not raised suspicions.[Footnote 21]
A successful State Department effort offers further evidence that the
practice of verifying key information can be an effective mitigation
strategy. Due to a high incidence of fraud in a program that allows
foreign companies to bring executives into the United States, one State
Department consular post in Latin America began verifying with local
authorities two key pieces of evidence that applicants were required to
submit. According to the post, it subsequently noticed a decrease in
the number of potentially fraudulent applications for this benefit.
On the other hand, verifying any applicant-submitted evidence in
pursuit of its fraud-prevention objectives represents a resource
commitment for USCIS and a potential trade-off with its production and
customer service-related objectives. In fiscal year 2004, USCIS had a
backlog of several million applications and has developed a plan to
eliminate it by the end of fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 22] In June 2004,
USCIS reported that it would have to increase monthly production by
about 20 percent to achieve its legislatively mandated goal of
adjudicating all applications within 6 months or less by the end of
fiscal year 2006. According to USCIS, because it does not plan to
increase its current overall staffing level, meeting its backlog
reduction goal will require some combination of reductions in the
standard processing time for various applications, overtime hours, and
adjudicator reassignments. It would be impossible for USCIS to verify
all of the key information or interview all individuals related to the
millions of applications it receives each year--approximately 7.5
million applications in fiscal year 2005--without seriously
compromising its service-related objectives. Identifying situations and
benefits that represent the highest risk to USCIS could help its
management determine whether and under what circumstances verification
is so vital to maintaining the integrity of the immigration benefits
system that it outweighs any potential increase in processing time and
costs. In this example, such an approach to risk management would
inform selection among alternative verification strategies by
considering (1) the risk of failing to detect fraud based on
information provided by assessments of vulnerabilities, threats, and
consequences, (2) the cost of conducting the verification (including
its effect on other organizational objectives like service), and (3)
the potential for the verification activities, given the current tools
and information available, to actually detect fraud.
In addition to procedural vulnerabilities like the verification
example, a risk management approach could also guide USCIS in the
evaluation of policies that strike a balance between two or more agency
objectives and organizational priorities. For example, as previously
discussed, USCIS's policy of granting interim employment authorization
documents to applicants whose adjustment of status applications have
not been adjudicated within 90 days[Footnote 23] can be exploited by
aliens seeking to gain work authorization under false pretenses and to
use work authorization to obtain valid identity documents such as
temporary social security cards and drivers licenses. In his 2004 and
2005 annual reports, the CIS Ombudsman identified this policy as a
significant vulnerability in the immigration benefits process, because
he contends that for many individuals the primary goal is to obtain
temporary work authorization regardless of the validity of their
applications for permanent residency. On the other hand, as we have
previously reported, the reason for issuing temporary work
authorization is to allow legitimate applicants to work as soon as
possible, which according to USCIS, can serve to reduce the negative
effects of delay on applicants and their families.[Footnote 24] Using
more comprehensive risk information to evaluate policies that represent
trade-offs between fraud control and other agency objectives may help
USCIS management determine whether and to what extent unintended policy
consequences like in this example place the integrity of the
immigration benefits system at risk. This kind of risk management
approach also would provide USCIS management an opportunity to evaluate
and select among various approaches to balancing fraud control with
other agency objectives. In the temporary work authorization example,
USCIS could evaluate a variety of alternative strategies and select
among them on the basis of all available information, including risk.
These strategies might include: (1) maintaining the current policy if
it is found to pose a tolerable level of risk, (2) seeking applicable
regulatory changes, or (3) applying the policy disparately, to the
extent allowed by law, across benefit types based on the level of risk
each represents. In commenting on our draft report, DHS stated that
there is a proposed regulatory change that would clarify USCIS's
ability to withhold the adjudication of an application for employment
authorization pending an ongoing investigation.
USCIS Lacks a Mechanism to Ensure That Ongoing Monitoring Occurs in the
Course of Normal Operations:
Internal control standards advise that controls should be generally
designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of
normal operations and is ingrained in the agency's operations. FDNS's
fraud assessment program provides some information about how fraud is
committed in the form of concentrated periodic assessments. However,
currently USCIS does not have a mechanism to ensure routine feedback to
FDNS about vulnerabilities identified during the course of normal
operations and to incorporate it into adjudication policies and
procedures.
Besides information about vulnerabilities obtained from its operational
experience adjudicating applications, additional information might be
available to FDNS from external entities that also have responsibility
for some aspect of controlling benefit fraud. One external source of
fraud information that might inform USCIS operations is the U.S.
Attorneys Office, which prosecutes immigration benefit fraud cases. For
example, one U.S. Attorney, based on cases his office has prosecuted,
has issued memoranda showing how underlying regulatory and adjudication
processes have invited abuse of the immigration system. A March 2005
memorandum prepared by this office explained how a recent investigation
revealed significant weaknesses in the asylum process that allowed
ineligible aliens to obtain asylum, and made suggestions for reforming
the process. The memorandum stated that these suggestions were intended
to start a discussion among federal agencies with immigration
responsibilities that could lead to needed reforms. In commenting on
our draft report, DHS stated that USCIS is developing a plan of action
to work with other DHS entities and the Executive Office of Immigration
Review within the Department of Justice to respond to specific
recommendations made by the U.S. Attorney that prepared the memorandum
on asylum program weaknesses.
Another source of information available to USCIS about fraud
vulnerabilities are the criminal investigations conducted by ICE, DOL,
and the DHS Office of Inspector General,[Footnote 25] which could
reveal such information as the characteristics of those who commit
fraud and how these individuals exploited weaknesses in the immigration
benefit process to obtain benefits illegally. USCIS's National Benefit
Fraud Strategy does not mention incorporating lessons learned from
investigative and prosecutorial activities into its fraud control
efforts--specifically, how the knowledge ICE, DOL, and DHS
investigators and U.S. Attorneys gained during the course of
investigations and prosecutions could be collected and analyzed in
order to become aware of opportunities to reduce fraud
vulnerabilities.[Footnote 26] A mechanism to help ensure that
information from these and related sources results in appropriate
refinements to policies and procedures could enhance USCIS's efforts to
address fraud vulnerabilities.
DOL, which plays an important role in the benefits process for some
permanent employment benefits, has used external information to refine
its procedures in this way. Specifically, it analyzed the results of
major criminal investigations and prosecutions to evaluate and
establish new procedures that require verifying key application
information, such as the existence of a business. DOL found it was
necessary to change its permanent labor certification procedures to
require verification of basic application information in order to
mitigate the risk of mistakenly approving permanent labor certification
applications, and protect the fundamental integrity of the labor
certification process from blatant abuse.[Footnote 27]
USCIS May Not Clearly Communicate the Importance of Fraud Control and
How Adjudicators are to Balance it with Other Objectives:
Internal control standards advise that for agencies to manage their
operations, they must have relevant, reliable, and timely
communications. Furthermore, establishing a positive fraud control
environment is central to an agency's efforts to detect and deter
immigration benefit fraud. The NAO guidance also advises management to
ensure that all levels of the organization are made to share a concern
about fraud. It is the stated mission of USCIS to provide the right
benefit, to the right person, at the right time, and no benefit to the
wrong person. Specifically, it aims to adjudicate all benefit requests
within 6 months of receipt, without compromising the integrity of the
process, nor significantly increasing staff. These objectives--speed,
quality, and cost--are inherently in tension with one another.
Therefore, it is particularly important, given USCIS's multiple
objectives, that it clearly communicates the importance of each of the
objectives at every level of the organization, and provides clear
guidance to adjudicators about how to balance them in the course of
their daily duties.
Although USCIS's backlog elimination plan acknowledges the need to
balance its focus on reducing the backlog with efforts to ensure
adjudicative quality, some USCIS adjudicators we interviewed indicated
that it was not clear to them how the agency expected them to balance
fraud detection efforts and production goals during the course of their
duties. Adjudicators we spoke with said that communications from
management emphasized meeting production backlog goals almost
exclusively. They said that management's focused attention on reducing
the backlog placed additional pressure on them to process applications
faster, thereby increasing the risk of making incorrect decisions,
including approving potentially fraudulent applications. For example,
adjudicators at all four service centers we spoke with told us that
operations management seemed to be almost exclusively focused on
reducing the backlog in order to meet production goals.[Footnote 28]
USCIS headquarters operations management responsible for overseeing
adjudications at service centers and district offices told us that the
adjudications operation is a "high-pressure" production environment and
that they are seeking to increase production, but it was not their
intention that this should come at the expense of making incorrect
adjudication decisions.
The FDNS Director told us that he had also discussed with operations
management the need to strike a more balanced approach to meeting
production goals and ensuring that the right eligibility decision is
made. He acknowledged that until FDNS establishes an ability to
proactively identify fraud through its automated analysis tools,
adjudicators will continue to play a primary role in detecting fraud.
Therefore, he acknowledged the importance of clear and balanced
communications from operations management to adjudicators in support of
USCIS's new fraud detection process and the shared responsibilities in
this regard.
Nevertheless, adjudicators we interviewed told us that they have
received guidance from different parts of the agency regarding the
lengths to which they should go in confirming suspected fraud that they
were uncertain how to interpret. For example, in December 2004, the
FDNS Director issued guidance stating that adjudicators should obtain
the evidence needed to support their suspicions of fraud before making
a referral, including, if necessary, requesting additional evidence
from applicants. According to adjudicators and FDU staff we
interviewed, this guidance appears to conflict with a subsequent
January 2005 memorandum, issued by the Director of Service Center
Operations, which states that adjudicator requests for information
should not be used as a device simply to "investigate" suspected fraud.
Adjudicators we interviewed at one service center said that whenever
operations management communicated with them about practicing more
discretion in issuing requests for additional evidence, they believed
it was primarily intended to put more pressure on them to process
applications faster, which in turn they said puts additional pressure
on them to not to request additional evidence when making eligibility
decisions. Consequently, they were concerned about having to approve
applications with less confidence in the correctness of their
determinations. An FDNS Immigration Officer working in a service center
echoed the adjudicators concerns about seemingly conflicting guidance,
saying that interpreting such guidance from management made the job of
adjudicators more difficult. However, he said that adjudicators and
local managers would more likely heed the direction of USCIS operations
management, their direct supervisors, rather than FDNS. Clear
communications about the importance of both fraud prevention-related
and service-related objectives and how they are to be balanced may help
adjudicators ensure that they are appropriately supporting USCIS's
multiple objectives as they carry out their duties.
Adjudicators and FDNS Staff Lack Access to Important Information and
Information Tools:
USCIS does not have a mechanism to help ensure that adjudicators have
access to information related to detecting fraud they may need to carry
out their responsibilities. Information regarding fraud trends can be
provided in various forms including e-mails, intranet Web pages, and
bulletin board notices. The adjudicators at the service centers and
district offices we visited received some fraud-related information or
training subsequent to their initial hire.[Footnote 29] Our interviews
indicated, however, that the frequency and method for distributing
ongoing information about fraud detection is not uniform across the
service centers and district offices we visited; some adjudicators
reported that more information or a more centralized information
management system would better prepare them to detect fraud. At two
service centers, adjudicators we interviewed told us that, after their
initial training, they were provided with some information regarding
fraud trends via e-mail. However, these adjudicators also reported
difficulty with managing the information in this format. They said that
providing this information through a different means--either through a
Web-based system or through a training course that would summarize new
knowledge related to fraud trends--would be easier and quicker to use.
One of the service centers provided adjudicators with operating
manuals--developed for specific benefit application types--that
included information regarding typical fraud trends encountered by the
service center, which adjudicators said they found useful in their
efforts to detect fraud.
At two other service centers, adjudicators we interviewed told us that
they were not provided any fraud e-mail updates but received some
limited information about fraud during general group meetings.
Adjudicators at these two centers told us that receiving more specific
and detailed information about fraud trends and practices would enhance
their ability to detect fraud. At one service center, adjudicators
suggested that having a method by which to incorporate the knowledge
and lessons learned from experienced adjudicators would also help them
to better detect fraud. Additionally, one of the district offices we
visited provided an additional 2-day training course that included
techniques for detecting fraud during an interview. Adjudicators we
interviewed at this district office told us that the course helped
prepare them to better detect fraud. USCIS headquarters officials
responsible for field operations told us that there is no standard
training regarding fraud trends and that fraud-related training varied
across field offices. In commenting on our draft report, DHS stated
that FDNS has created a Website that includes relevant policy
memoranda, fraud trends, lessons learned and a number of other tools to
aid adjudication officers.
In addition to calling for relevant information to be shared
internally, internal control standards require that management ensure
that there are adequate means of communicating with and obtaining from
external stakeholders information that may have a significant impact on
achieving agency goals. During our review, USCIS and ICE, had not yet
established a feedback mechanism for the timely sharing of information
related to the status and outcomes of fraud referrals that is essential
to the fraud referral process shared by USCIS and ICE. According to
FDNS field staff we interviewed, information from ICE field offices on
the status of USCIS referrals--for example, whether ICE has initiated
an investigation in response to a referral--was sporadic and incomplete
in some cases and non-existent in other cases. In addition, when ICE
fails to accept a referral, FDNS may initiate an administrative inquiry
to resolve an adjudicator's suspicions of fraud. However, because ICE
did not routinely provide information about its investigative
decisions, it was difficult for FDNS to know when to initiate such
inquiries or to plan for the staff time needed to conduct them.
Moreover, according to FDNS staff and adjudicators we interviewed,
without timely feedback about the investigative status of their
referrals, adjudicators lacked the information needed to make more
timely eligibility determinations, whether or not an investigation is
opened by ICE. In November 2005, ICE and USCIS officials told us that
ICE investigators were recently assigned to each of the FDUs, which may
help increase communication and information sharing between USCIS and
ICE.
Additionally, according to the FDNS Director, having direct access to
information stored in ICE's case management information system, the
Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) maintained by Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), would allow FDNS staff to determine with
greater certainty whether someone who has filed for an immigration
benefit is connected to any ongoing ICE criminal investigation.
However, ICE officials told us they opposed allowing FDNS access to
sensitive case management information. They said that there was a need
to segregate sensitive law enforcement data about ongoing cases from
non-law enforcement agencies like FDNS.
In commenting on our draft report, DHS provided us with a February 14,
2006 memorandum of agreement between ICE and USCIS that established a
mechanism for the sharing of information related to the status and
outcomes of fraud referrals. In addition the agreement provides USCIS
staff with access to TECS data so USCIS can determine whether someone
who has filed for an immigration benefit is connected to any ongoing
ICE criminal investigation.
DHS Lacks Performance Goals for USCIS's Antifraud Efforts:
Internal control standards call for agencies to establish performance
measures to monitor performance related to agency objectives. Measuring
performance allows an organization to track progress made toward
achieving its objectives and provides managers with crucial information
on which to base management decisions. The Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 also requires that agencies establish long-
term strategic and annual goals, measure performance against these
goals, and report on the progress made toward meeting their missions
and objectives. It calls for agencies to assess specific outcomes
related to their missions and objectives, in addition to designing
output measures to describe attributes of the goods and services
produced by the agencies' programs.
USCIS's 2005 Strategic Plan includes both a prevention theme--ensuring
the integrity of the system, and a service theme--providing efficient
and customer oriented services, along with related goals and
objectives. However, DHS and USCIS have not established specific
performance goals to assess benefit fraud activities. In fiscal year
2004 USCIS reported performance goals related to naturalization, legal
permanent residency, and temporary residency to DHS for its annual
Performance and Accountability Report. The objective for each of these
three performance goals was to "provide information and benefits in a
timely, accurate, consistent, courteous, and professional manner; and
prevent ineligible individuals from receiving" the benefit. Although
the objective includes preventing ineligible individuals from receiving
the benefit, the related measure--achieve and maintain a six month
cycle time goal--does not.
There is no discussion in the strategic plan of how to balance its
prevention objectives with its service objectives. Instead, USCIS's
long term strategic approach appears to rely heavily on the development
of an enhanced case management system, new fraud databases and data
analyses tools, and automated information services to overcome the
inherent tension between these prevention and services themes as they
relate to the prevention of benefit fraud and reducing the backlog of
immigration applications. Establishing output measures--for example,
the number of cases referred to and accepted by FDNS--and outcome
measures--for example, the percentage of fraudulent applications
detected relative to targets established using baseline data from fraud
assessments--could provide USCIS with more complete information about
the effectiveness of its fraud control efforts in meeting its strategic
goal objective to ensure the security and integrity of the immigration
system.
FDNS officials told us that they are now participating in USCIS' Office
of Policy and Strategy Performance Measurement Team's efforts to
develop performance metrics, and that FDNS is leading an effort to
develop metrics related to USCIS's strategic goal to ensure the
security and integrity of the immigration system by increasing the
detection of attempted immigration benefit fraud. However, specific DHS
metrics regarding USCIS's antifraud efforts have yet to be developed
and approved by DHS.
MOST Benefit FRAUD IS NOT CriminalLY ProsecutED But DHS Does Not Have
an Administrative Sanctions PROGRAM:
Although best practice guidance suggests that sanctions for those who
commit benefit fraud are central to a strong fraud control environment,
and the INA provides for criminal and administrative sanctioning, DHS
does not currently actively use the administrative sanctions available
to it. Fraud control best practices advise that a credible sanctions
program, which incorporates a mechanism for evaluating its
effectiveness, including the wider value of deterrence, is an integral
part of fraud control. According to the AICPA's fraud guidance, the way
an entity reacts to fraud can send a strong message that helps reduce
the number of future occurrences. Therefore, taking appropriate and
consistent actions against violators is an important element of fraud
control and deterrence. The guide further advises that a strong
emphasis on fraud deterrence has the effect of persuading individuals
that they should not commit fraud because of the likelihood of
punishment. Similarly, the NAO guide states that a key element of a
good fraud control program is to impose penalties and sanctions on
those who commit fraud in order to penalize those who commit fraud and
deter others from carrying out similar types of fraud.
Data provided by USCIS indicates that most benefit fraud it uncovers
and refers to ICE is not prosecuted. In fiscal year 2005, USCIS
referred 2,289 immigration benefit fraud cases to ICE BFUs. However,
only 598, about 26%, were accepted by the BFUs. Neither USCIS nor ICE
was able to provide us with information about which of the FDNS
referrals accepted by the BFUs resulted in an ICE investigation.
However, ICE officials said that the majority of ICE's immigration
benefit fraud investigations do not originate with USCIS referrals, but
from other investigative sources. Given limits on its resources, ICE
officials told us that they generally prioritize their investigative
resources and assign them to cases involving individuals who are filing
large numbers of fraudulent applications for profit, because these
cases generally have a greater probability of being prosecuted by the
U.S. Attorneys Offices. Therefore, the principal means of imposing
sanctions on most immigration benefit fraud would be through
administrative penalties.
The INA provides both criminal and administrative sanctions for those
who commit immigration benefit fraud.[Footnote 30]The act's criminal
provisions provide for fines and/or imprisonment for up to 5 years for
a person who fails to disclose that they have, for a fee, assisted in
preparing an application for an immigration benefit that was falsely
made, and monetary fines and/or imprisonment for up to 15 years for a
second such conviction. The act also provides for administrative
penalties for applicants who make false statements or submit a
fraudulent document to obtain an immigration benefit or enter into a
marriage solely to obtain an immigration benefit.[Footnote 31] For
document fraud committed after 1999, it provides monetary fines ranging
from $275 to $2,200 per document subject to a violation for a first
offense and from $2,200 to $5,500 per document for those who have
previously been fined. Monetary penalties collected are to be deposited
into the Immigration Enforcement Account within the Department of the
Treasury. Funds from this account can be used for activities that
enhance enforcement of provisions of the INA including: (1) the
identification, investigation, apprehension, detention, and removal of
criminal aliens; (2) the maintenance and updating of a system to
identify and track criminal aliens, deportable aliens, inadmissible
aliens, and aliens illegally entering the United States; and (3) for
the repair, maintenance, or construction of border facilities to deter
illegal entry along the border. In addition, under certain
circumstances, individuals determined through the adjudication process
to have committed fraud, are deemed inadmissible should they later try
to file another immigration application. In some cases, aliens who are
determined in a formal hearing to have committed fraud can be removed
from the United States and be barred from entering in the future.
DHS does not currently have a clear and comprehensive strategy for
imposing sanctions or evaluating their effectiveness and is not
actively enforcing the administrative penalties provided for by the
INA. This is largely due to a 1998 federal appeals court ruling
upholding a nationwide permanent injunction against the procedures used
by INS to institute civil document fraud charges under the
INA.[Footnote 32] The court found that INS provided insufficient notice
to aliens regarding their right to request a hearing on the imposition
of monetary fines and the immigration consequences of failing to do so,
and that until proper notifications were included on the fine and
hearing waiver forms, INS was enjoined from implementing civil
penalties for document fraud. According to the Director of Field
Operations for ICE's Office of Principal Legal Advisor, after the court
ruling, the government's cost to investigate and prosecute an
immigration fraud case administratively, including appeals costs, would
not be offset by the monetary sum that might be obtained. Moreover, the
director stated that even if successful, there was no guarantee that
the government could collect its fine from the alien. Therefore,
according to the director, ICE does not consider implementing the
administrative penalties for document fraud to be cost effective.
Accordingly, DHS has not made updating the forms in response to the
ruling a priority. Similarly, another USCIS attorney told us that the
provision of INA that pertains to marriage fraud is rarely used
because, due to the significant commitment of resources necessary to
establish a finding of fraud, enforcing it might not be cost effective.
However, DHS has not conducted a formal analysis, which includes an
attempt to value the benefit of deterrence, to determine the total
costs and benefits of imposing sanctions.
Senior USCIS officials we spoke with, however, told us that
administrative sanctions are important to their fraud control efforts.
According to the FDNS Director, without the credible threat of a
penalty, individuals have no fear of filing future fraudulent
applications. In this regard, he said that FDNS administrative
investigations of fraud referrals not investigated by ICE are critical,
and, in his estimation, the resulting denial of a benefit and potential
removal of an alien offer an effective deterrent to immigration benefit
fraud. However, the director said that although an alien who commits
immigration benefit fraud might be removable from the United States
and, therefore, has some disincentive to commit fraud, U.S. citizens,
if they are not prosecuted criminally, have little disincentive because
without the enforcement of administrative sanctions they are not likely
to be penalized, even if their violations are detected. Additionally,
according to the Chief of Staff for USCIS, a strategy for
administratively sanctioning those who commit fraud is necessary for
controlling and deterring fraud.
Although DHS does not actively use its authorities to impose
administrative penalties, Congress has continued to support the concept
in legislation. In particular, the Real ID Act of 2005 allows the
Secretary of Homeland Security, after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, to impose an administrative fine of up to $10,000 per
violation on an employer for a substantial failure to meet any of the
conditions of a petition for certain non-immigrant workers or a willful
misrepresentation of a material fact in such a petition, and allows the
secretary to deny petitions filed with respect to that employer for at
least 1 year and not more than 5 years.[Footnote 33] However, without a
strategy which includes a mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of
sanctions and considers both the monetary value of fines collected and
the value of deterrence, DHS will not be able to determine how and
under what circumstances to best use the authority provided by the INA
and other legislation to promote a credible threat of punishment in
order to deter fraudulent filers.
Although it lacks a strategy for imposing criminal and administrative
sanctions, DHS, along with DOL, has proposed administrative rule
changes that will help sanction those who commit fraud. Among other
things, DHS has proposed that USCIS be able to deny, for a period of
time, all applications from employers that DOL or DHS has found,
respectively, to have submitted false information about meeting
regulatory requirements or provided statements in their applications
that were inaccurate, fraudulent or misrepresented a material fact.
Final rules have not yet been published.
Conclusions:
In light of competing organizational priorities, institutionalizing
fraud detection--such that it is a built-in part of the adjudications
process and always a central part of USCIS's planning, procedures, and
methods--is vital to USCIS's ability to accomplish its goals and
objectives, particularly protecting the integrity of the immigration
benefit system. USCIS has taken some important steps to implement
internal controls, primarily through the activities of the Office of
Fraud Detection and National Security. By strengthening existing
controls and implementing additional fraud control practices, USCIS
could enhance its ability to detect benefit fraud and gain greater
assurance that its operations are designed to protect the integrity of
the system, even as it strives to enhance service and meet its backlog
reduction goals. Specifically, expanding the types of benefits it
assesses, including assessments of consequence, and drawing on all
available sources of threat information to develop current fraud
assessment activities into a more comprehensive risk management
approach would provide additional knowledge about fraud risks and put
the agency in a better position to make risk-based evaluations of its
policies, procedures, and programmatic activities. Also, a mechanism to
ensure that information uncovered during the course of normal
operations--in USCIS and related agencies--feeds back into USCIS
policies and procedures would help to ensure that it addresses
loopholes and procedural weaknesses. In addition, clear communication
of the importance of fraud prevention-related objectives and how they
are to be balanced, in practice, with service-related objectives would
help USCIS adjudicators to ensure that they are supporting the agency's
multiple objectives as they carry out their duties. Moreover, the
provision of the tools and the relevant information that its
adjudicators need to determine the status of fraud referrals could help
them make timely and informed eligibility determinations with greater
confidence of their accuracy. Finally, performance goals--that include
output and outcome measures, along with associated targets--reflecting
the status of fraud control efforts would provide valuable information
for USCIS management to evaluate its various policies, procedures, and
programmatic activities and a better understanding of both the progress
made and areas requiring more focused management attention to enhance
fraud prevention.
By demonstrating sufficiently adverse consequences for individuals who
perpetrate fraud, sanctions serve to discourage future fraudulent
filings, as individuals observe that the potential costs of engaging in
fraud are likely to outweigh the potential gains. It is important to
any program that encounters fraud to have a credible sanctions program
to penalize those who engage in fraud and deter others from doing so.
Currently, DHS's sanctions program for immigration fraud is not a
threat to most perpetrators because relatively few are prosecuted
criminally and administrative sanctions are not actively being used.
Although DHS officials told us that administrative sanctions are not
cost-effective, comparing only the costs of administering sanctions
with the potential return from the collection of fines may undervalue
their potential deterrent effects. Although developing a sound
methodology to establish and determine the value of deterrence provided
by sanctions will require effort, best practices call for cost-
effective sanctions, and consideration of the full range of costs and
benefits, financial and nonfinancial, is central to making a valid
determination of cost-effectiveness. Developing and implementing a
strategy for imposing sanctions that includes a mechanism for assessing
effectiveness and that more fully evaluates costs and benefits,
including nonfinancial benefits like the value of deterrence, could
give DHS a better indication of how and under what circumstances
administrative sanctions should be employed to enhance USCIS's fraud
deterrence efforts.
Recommendations For Executive Action:
In order to enhance USCIS's overall immigration benefit fraud control
environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Director of USCIS to take the following five actions, which
are consistent with internal control standards and best practices in
the area of fraud control:
Enhance its risk management approach by (1) expanding its fraud
assessment program to cover more immigration application types; and (2)
fully incorporating threat and consequence assessments into its fraud
assessment activities; and (3) using risk analysis to evaluate
management alternatives to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.
Implement a mechanism to help USCIS ensure that information about fraud
vulnerabilities uncovered during the course of normal operations--by
USCIS and related agencies--feeds back into and contributes to changes
in policies and procedures when needed to ensure that identified
vulnerabilities result in appropriate corrective actions.
Communicate clearly to USCIS adjudicators the importance USCIS's fraud-
prevention objectives and how they are to be balanced with service-
oriented objectives to help adjudicators ensure that both objectives
are supported as they carry out their duties.
Provide USCIS adjudicator staff with access to relevant internal and
external information that bears on their ability to detect fraud, make
correct eligibility determinations, and support the new fraud referral
process--particularly ongoing updates regarding fraud trends and other
information related to fraud detection.
Establish output and outcome based performance goals--along with
associated measures and targets--to assess the effectiveness of fraud
control efforts and provide more complete performance information to
guide management decisions about the need for any corrective action to
improve the ability to detect fraud.
In addition, in order to enhance DHS's ability to sanction immigration
benefit fraud, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the Director of USCIS and the Assistant Secretary of ICE to:
Develop a strategy for implementing a sanctions program that includes
mechanisms for assessing their effectiveness and for determining their
associated costs and benefits, including their deterrence value.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, State, Justice and Labor for review. On March 1, 2006 we
received written comments on the draft report from the Department of
Homeland Security which are reproduced in full in appendix II. The
Departments of State, Justice and Labor had no comments on our draft
report. In its written comments, DHS stated that our report generally
provided a good overview of the complexities associated with pursing
immigration benefit fraud and the need to have a program in place that
proactively assesses vulnerabilities within the myriad of immigration
processes. However, DHS stated that our report did not fully portray
USCIS's efforts to address immigration benefit fraud and provided other
examples of efforts USCIS has undertaken or plans to undertake. Where
appropriate, we revised the draft report to recognize these additional
efforts by USCIS to address immigration benefit fraud. DHS noted that
USCIS used GAO's 2002 report on immigration benefit fraud as the
foundation to build its antifraud program and believes that USCIS is on
the right track to creating an effective antifraud program. We believe
that USCIS is moving in the right direction and recognize that FDNS is
in the beginning stages of developing and implementing a new antifraud
program for USCIS.
Overall, DHS agreed with and/or plans to take action to implement four
of our six recommendations, but cited actions it has already taken to
indicate that aspects of our other two recommendations are already in
place. Specifically, regarding our recommendation that DHS enhance its
risk management approach, DHS agreed that USCIS can enhance its risk
management approach by expanding its fraud assessment program to cover
more application types and plans to do so. DHS stated that USCIS
believes that benefit fraud assessments currently underway do provide a
comprehensive risk analysis to identify vulnerabilities and measures to
mitigate such vulnerabilities. While we agree that some of the actions
FDNS has taken with regard to the specific fraud assessments contain
elements of risk assessment and mitigation measures, a risk management
approach that is consistent with the framework that we advocate in
order for agencies to have a solid risk-based foundation to make
resource allocation and other operational decisions would include a
more comprehensive and systematic treatment of threat and consequence
as part of USCIS's risk analysis. Moreover, we have not seen evidence
that USCIS intends to use the results of risk analysis as a continuous,
built-in component of its operations to evaluate and adjust, as
necessary, policies and procedures.
Regarding our recommendation that DHS provide USCIS adjudicator staff
relevant information, DHS agreed that it needs to provide USCIS staff
access to relevant internal and external information and is initiating
training for supervisory adjudication officers and is planning to
provide adjudicators selective access to the State Department's
Consolidated Consular Database and other open source databases.
Regarding our recommendation that DHS establish performance goals to
assess the effectiveness of fraud control efforts, DHS agreed that
additional output and outcome based performance goals and measures are
needed.
Regarding our recommendation that DHS develop a strategy for
implementing a sanctions program, DHS agreed to study the costs and
benefits of an administrative sanctions program.
Regarding our recommendation that USCIS clearly communicate the
importance of USCIS' fraud-prevention activities, DHS stated USCIS
leadership clearly advocates balancing objectives related to timely and
quality processing of immigration benefits. As examples of USCIS's
focus on the integrity of USCIS data and processes, DHS cited the
creation of FDNS and the recent move of FDNS to a new directorate that
reports directly to the Deputy Director of USCIS allowing FDNS to
provide focus and guidance to all USCIS operations. Although USCIS
management believes these efforts clearly demonstrate the importance of
fraud prevention, our interviews with adjudicators in service centers
and district offices indicate that this message may not be reaching
USCIS adjudications staff. Therefore, we continue to believe that
clearly communicating the importance of fraud prevention and guidance
on how USCIS staff are to balance the fraud prevention and service
oriented objectives is needed.
Regarding our recommendation that USCIS implement a mechanism to feed
back information uncovered during the course of its normal operations
and those of related agencies about fraud vulnerabilities, DHS stated
that it believes such a feedback loop already exists within the
process. DHS cited meetings that FDNS leadership had with a U.S.
Attorneys Office regarding vulnerabilities in the asylum process and
FDNS participation in various task forces that allows for the sharing
of information. Although these are all positive efforts, USCIS does not
have a mechanism in place to ensure that such information is
consistently gathered from all relevant sources and fed back to FDNS.
Therefore, we continue to believe that USCIS needs to establish a
mechanism, memorialized in policies and procedures, which would ensure
that information about fraud vulnerabilities uncovered by USCIS staff
and related agencies feeds back to FDNS.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Labor, the
Attorney General, and other interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Jonespl@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Paul L. Jones,
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the extent and nature of immigration fraud, we reviewed the
results of the FDNS's ongoing fraud assessments. Regarding the fraud
assessments, we interviewed the FDNS managers responsible for
administering the assessment, reviewed documentation outlining the
assessment's design, implementation and initial results from 2 fraud
assessments. To better understand the nature of immigration benefit
fraud and to identify common fraud patterns, we analyzed examples of
fraud case histories for several petition types planned to be assessed
by FDNS. In addition, we analyzed information contained in fraud
bulletins prepared by U.S. Citizen Immigration Services' (USCIS)
California Service Center that contained reports by various State
Department overseas consular posts on immigration fraud these posts had
uncovered. We also analyzed PAS data to determine trends in the volume
of applications being processed, approved, and denied. We assessed the
data derived from PAS and determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review. We interviewed adjudications
staff and field managers to evaluate the extent to which internal
controls and practices for detecting fraud were incorporated into USCIS
policies, procedures, and tools. We met with headquarters officials
from USCIS operations and FDNS, as well as officials from the
Departments of Labor and State responsible for fraud detection efforts.
We conducted site visits or contacted staff at all four USCIS services
centers--we visited three USCIS service centers in Laguna Niguel,
California; Dallas, Texas; and St. Albans, Vermont; and conducted
telephone interviews with USCIS staff at the Lincoln, Nebraska service
center. We also interviewed 59 adjudicators at the 4 USCIS service
centers and 2 USCIS district offices with responsibility for and
familiarity with adjudicating different types of applications in a
group setting, which allowed us to identify points of consensus among
the adjudicators. We also visited USCIS district offices in Dallas and
Boston responsible for coordinating their fraud referrals with two of
the 4 service centers we visited. USCIS service center and district
office officials selected the adjudicators we interviewed based upon
our request that we meet with adjudicators that had responsibility for
and familiarity with adjudicating different types of applications. We
also interviewed FDNS staff assigned to work with the four service
centers and two district offices we visited or contacted. We also
interviewed staff from ICE's Identity and Benefit Fraud Unit in
Washington, D.C. and those agents assigned to BFUs in California, Texas
and Vermont. As we did not select a probability sample of USCIS staff
and ICE Office of Investigations agents to interview, the results of
these interviews cannot be projected to all USCIS staff and ICE Office
of Investigations officials nationwide. In addition, we reviewed
efforts by the Department of Labor's Inspector General to determine the
extent of immigration fraud in the Permanent Labor Certification
Program. We also met with the CIS Ombudsman to discuss his fiscal year
2004 and fiscal year 2005 reports.
To determine what actions USCIS has taken to improve its ability to
detect immigration benefit fraud, we reviewed USCIS's efforts to
improve its fraud detection capabilities, including resources devoted
specifically to detecting fraud by FDNS. We also reviewed USCIS's
policies, adjudication procedures, and fraud detection processes as
well as the tools used by adjudicators to detect fraudulent immigration
benefit applications. To determine what actions have been taken to
sanction those who commit fraud, we interviewed USCIS and ICE
attorneys, identified the investigative resources that ICE had made
available for immigration fraud investigations, and determined how
USCIS and ICE coordinate the investigation of potential fraud. In
addition, we examined fraud investigation and prosecution statistics,
and analyzed USCIS statistics about the amount of fraud identified by
its adjudicators. We also determined how ICE investigative efforts are
coordinated with the U.S. Attorneys Offices and how their priorities
affect the investigation and prosecution of immigration benefit fraud
schemes of various types. For this portion of our review, we met with
headquarters officials from ICE, and interviewed agents in four ICE
field offices based in Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, and San Antonio. We
also interviewed representatives from the U.S. Attorneys Office for the
Eastern District of Virginia and the Executive Office of the U.S.
Attorneys within the Department of Justice. Finally, we examined the
current sanctions for those who commit immigration benefit fraud and
reviewed proposed fraud regulatory changes. To evaluate DHS efforts to
detect and sanction immigration benefit fraud, we used the Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government and with best practices
advocated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) and by the United Kingdom's National Audit Office (NAO).
We conducted our work between October 2004 and December 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
March 1, 2006:
Homeland Security:
Mr. Paul L. Jones:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Jones:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report entitled "Immigration
Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance
DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud" GAO-06-259. It generally
provides a good overview of the complexities associated with pursuing
immigration benefit fraud and the need to have a program in place that
proactively assesses vulnerabilities within the myriad of immigration
processes. However, the report does not fully portray how the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been addressing anti-fraud
since its inception on March 1, 2003.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) used the GAO Report,
Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach is Needed to Address
Problems, GAO-02-66, January 31, 2002, as the foundation to build its
anti-fraud effort with the establishment of the Office of Fraud
Detection and National Security (FDNS). Development of this program
started in 2003, FDNS was officially created in May 2004 and FDNS
Immigration Officers were deployed to the field in January 2005.
Although it is still a new and developing program, USCIS is on the
right track with respect to creating an effective anti-fraud program.
To date, it has established a joint benefit fraud strategy with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), created the necessary
organizational crosswalks, developed policies and procedures, and
implemented a strategy for conducting benefit fraud assessments.
The GAO found the establishment of FDNS as a focal point for dealing
with immigration benefit fraud, a strategy for detecting immigration
benefit fraud and the initiation of a series of benefit risk assessment
were good starts for an effective anti-fraud program. However, the GAO
concluded that USCIS needed to address some aspects of internal control
standards and fraud control best practices identified by leading audit
organizations. For example, the GAO found the program does not provide
a basis for the type of comprehensive risk analysis advocated in the
GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. USCIS
believes that benefit fraud assessments currently underway do provide a
comprehensive risk analysis to identify vulnerabilities and measures to
mitigate such vulnerabilities. No such assessments have ever before
been conducted of the immigration benefit processes. The GAO suggests
that FDNS' assessments do not draw on all available sources of
strategic threat information. FDNS performs systems checks in all
available enforcement systems, and deconflicts suspected fraud targets
with ICE. To facilitate this, ICE has a supervisory special agent
collocated with headquarters FDNS and a senior special agent at each
Service Center Fraud Detection Unit. FDNS also meets regularly with
ICE's Identity and Benefit Fraud Unit; has an Intelligence Research
Specialist detailed to ICE's Office of Intelligence, DHS's Operations
Center, and the Terrorist Screening Center. The FDNS Director sits on
the DHS Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis Intelligence
Council. FDNS' Chief of the National Security Branch sits on DHS's
Homeland Security Terrorist Threat Intelligence Group, along with other
agency chiefs and assistant directors. FDNS also has ongoing
communication with ICE's National Security Threat Protection Unit, and
is about to implement a joint religious worker fraud initiative focused
on identifying systemic flaws/national security risks in the Religious
Worker Program. These interagency anti-fraud and national security
efforts are also unprecedented.
In addition, the ongoing benefit fraud assessments are addressing
benefit types considered "high risk." They were chosen because the
application/petition either provided evidence of permanent resident
status, were the basis for applying to obtain permanent resident
status, or provided long-term employment based non-immigrant visas. In
addition, these benefit types were selected because the 9/11 Commission
Report identified marriage fraud as a major target of terrorists aimed
at embedding themselves in the United States, and because GAO, in
separate reports, documented the existence of significant fraud among
religious workers and inter-company transferees. Given existing
resources, it is not possible to conduct assessments on all benefit
types within the first years of operation. However, FDNS intends to
conduct assessments on an ongoing basis and will expand them to include
additional benefit types.
The GAO suggests that USCIS is not effectively addressing temporary
work authorizations provided to applicants who have to wait more than
90 days for their applications to be processed. This is not a simple
issue. Applications for employment authorization are typically
ancillary applications tied to a "parent" application - for example,
they are filed in conjunction with an application for adjustment of
status based on an employment based petition. The fraud is not
typically found on the application for employment authorization -
rather, it is based in the underlying "parent" application/petition.
Therefore, the best course of action is to address the problem at the
source - i.e. the petition. Addressing the problem at the employment
authorization application stage would not adequately address the
problem. Further, the interim employment authorization is necessary
because it is not possible to detect fraud and resolve all background
check processes in all cases based on existing technology in 90 days.
However, there is a proposed regulatory change that would clarify
USCIS' ability to withhold the adjudication of an application for
employment authorization pending an ongoing investigation.
The GAO also found that USCIS lacks a mechanism to help ensure that
information gathered during the course of its normal operations and
those of related operations - including criminal investigations and
prosecutions - inform decisions about whether and what actions,
including changes to policies, procedures or programmatic activities,
might improve the ability to detect fraud. FDNS is currently developing
its back-end processes, which include sharing information/lessons
learned from routine operations and addressing shortcomings. For
example, all fraud leads are entered into the FDNS-Data System. That
information will be compared against incoming receipts in order to
identify any new applications/petitions filed by individuals or
companies who have previously filed fraudulent applications/petitions.
In addition, current policy requires an "after action" report to be
completed for all major conspiracy cases. This report summarizes the
results and findings of the case, including information such as
statistics on how many people were denied benefits due to fraud, which
factors led to approvals of some cases, how the information can be used
in the future to identify fraudulent files, and best practices learned
during the process. Finally, FDNS is actively engaged with ICE and the
Departments of Labor and State on the formation of inter-agency benefit
fraud task forces. One of the purposes of such is to share information,
including systems access, lessons learned; decide on joint operations,
etc.
The GAO further concluded that ICE and USCIS lacked a mechanism to
share information related to the status of fraud investigation
referrals from USCIS. Per a February 14, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement,
ICE will accept or decline a referral from USCIS within 60 days. If the
case is accepted for criminal investigation, ICE is required to provide
a status report if and when the investigation is approaching one year.
The Memorandum of Agreement requires ICE to provide USCIS with a case
closure report upon completion of the investigation. USCIS is in the
process of developing an ICE tab in the FDNS-Data System, which ICE
will use to provide information regarding pending referrals/
investigations.
To support its finding that USCIS also lacked a mechanism to share
information with other external entities, GAO cited a recent memorandum
from the U.S. Attorney of the Eastern District of Virginia. This
memorandum referenced weaknesses in the asylum process that allowed
ineligible aliens to obtain asylum and recommended procedural
improvements to the asylum process. USCIS' Asylum Division and the
Arlington Asylum Office worked closely with FDNS and the U.S.
Attorney's Office throughout this investigative process, which
ultimately yielded 26 criminal indictments. As partners in the
investigative process, USCIS also learned a number of lessons in that
case, and is developing a plan-of-action to work with other DHS
entities and the Executive Office for Immigration Review to respond to
the U.S. Attorney's specific recommendations. In fact, USCIS had
already begun to implement several of the recommendations prior to the
investigation. USCIS senior leadership, which included the Director,
FDNS, and the Acting Chief Counsel, met with the Assistant U.S.
Attorney to discuss lessons learned during this and other recent
prosecutions. Guidance to USCIS officers will result from this meeting.
FDNS is also a member of the Inter-agency Immigration Benefits Fraud
Task Force led by this U.S. Attorney's Office. The San Francisco Asylum
Task Force, the Los Angeles Asylum Fraud Working Group, and the New
York-New Jersey Asylum Anti-Fraud Task Force also include in their
membership USCIS Asylum Offices, FDNS and U.S. Attorney's Offices in
those respective regions. All four task forces have demonstrated
success in sharing information and otherwise collaborating to prevent
asylum fraud.
Finally, the GAO concluded that DHS should develop a strategy for
sanctioning fraud as well as evaluating the effectiveness of
administrative type sanctions. Although DHS will explore this as part
of its overall prevention strategy in detecting, deterring and
mitigating threats to our homeland, we believe the process established
by USCIS and ICE creates an effective deterrent. Once fraud is
validated, the application/petition is denied for fraud, the case is
entered into the FDNS-Data System to be compared against incoming
receipts to identify any and all future applications or petitions that
may be filed, a look-out is posted in law enforcement systems and the
alien is placed in removal proceedings.
The GAO recommended the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Director of USCIS to implement additional internal controls and best
practices to strengthen its fraud control environment. We have
addressed each of the five specific recommendations as follows:
Enhance its risk management approach by (1) expanding its fraud
assessment program to cover more immigration application types; (2)
fully incorporating threat and consequence assessment into its fraud
assessment activities; and (3) using risk analysis to evaluate
management alternatives to mitigating identified vulnerabilities.
As discussed above, USCIS plans to expand the benefit fraud assessment
to incorporate more immigration benefit types and will continue to
incorporate threat and consequence assessments into its analysis. Such
assessments and analyses will be used to mitigate vulnerabilities
found.
Implement a mechanism to help USCIS ensure that information about fraud
vulnerabilities uncovered during the course of normal operations - by
USCIS and related agencies - feeds back into and contributes to changes
in policies and procedures when needed to ensure that identified
vulnerabilities result in appropriate corrective actions.
Such a feedback loop is already within the process. For example, from
the benefit fraud assessment of religious worker petitions, FDNS
recommended a site check be conducted for all petitions. In addition,
USCIS is developing regulatory changes to mitigate vulnerabilities in
the process. Further cooperation with the U.S. Attorney discussed above
is another example of this ongoing process.
Communicate clearly the importance of USCIS' fraud-prevention
objectives and how they are to be balanced with service-oriented
objectives to help adjudicators ensure that both objectives are
supported as they carry out their duties.
USCIS leadership clearly advocates balancing objectives related to
timely and quality processing of immigration benefits with emphasis on
national security. FDNS would not have been created if senior
leadership did not believe national security and fraud detection were a
high priority. USCIS adjudicators now have a chain of command in place
within USCIS to use when fraud is suspected. In November 2005, FDNS
hosted a national conference for all immigration officers and
intelligence research specialists to address key objectives and
priorities, lessons learned during the first year of operations, needed
adjustments, and mid-to long-term plans. Finally, to ensure continued
focus on national security, the new USCIS Director moved FDNS from
Domestic Operations, where it had been organizationally situated and
placed it in a third directorate focused on integrity of USCIS data and
processes, that reports directly to the Deputy Director. This allows
FDNS to provide focus and guidance to all USCIS operations.
Provide USCIS staff with access to relevant internal and external
information that bears on their ability to detect fraud, make correct
eligibility determinations, and support the new fraud referral process
- particularly the status of fraud referrals to ICE and ongoing updates
regarding fraud trends and other information related to fraud
detection.
FDNS has created a website that includes relevant policy memos,
standard operating procedures, success stories relating to
prosecutions, fraud trends, lessons learned and a number of other tools
to aid officers in the performance of their duties. The website lists
an email address which employees can use to seek and/or report
information to FDNS. The Fraud Detection Unit at the National Benefits
Center created a website which contains information regarding recent
fraud patterns involving legalization applications. USCIS has
incorporated FDNS in its Basic and Journeyman level adjudicator
training at the Immigration Officer Academy and is initiating training
for non-FDNS supervisory adjudication officers. Finally, USCIS is
planning to provide selective access to the Department of State's
Consolidated Consular Database and other open source databases;
however, this policy needs to be based on an approach that balances
productivity with integrity.
Establish output and outcome based performance goals - along with
associated measures and targets - to assess the effectiveness of fraud
control efforts and provide more complete performance information to
guide management decisions about the need for any corrective action to
improve the ability to detect fraud.
FDNS has created performance goals for the number of benefit fraud
assessments conducted during the fiscal year and the number of
recommended policy, procedural, and regulatory changes that resulted
from the findings. FDNS agrees additional output and outcome based
performance goals and measures are needed.
The GAO also recommended the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Director of USCIS and the Assistant Secretary of ICE to develop a
strategy for implementing a sanctions program that includes mechanisms
for assessing its potential effectiveness and associated cost and
benefit, including deterrence values. As discussed above, DHS believes
the current process creates a more effective deterrent than an
administrative sanctions program. In some cases, FDNS' administrative
approach is even more of a deterrent than criminal prosecution.
However, DHS will study the costs and benefits for an administrative
sanctions program related to immigration benefit fraud.
We thank you again for the opportunity to provide comments on this
draft report and look forward to working with you on future homeland
security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: Paul L. Jones, (202) 512-8777:
Staff Acknowledgements:
In addition to the above, Joel Aldape, David Alexander, Jenny Chanley,
Frances Cook, Michael P. Dino, Nancy Finley, Carlos Garcia, Kathryn
Godfrey, Larry Harrell, and David Nicholson were key contributors to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Immigration benefit fraud refers to the willful misrepresentation
of material fact to gain an immigration benefit. It is often
facilitated by document fraud (use of forged, counterfeit, altered or
falsely made documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid
documents or information belonging to others).
[2] GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to
Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).
[3] Testimony of Janice Kephart, former counsel, The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, before the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship and the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Senate
Judiciary Committee, Mar. 14, 2005.
[4] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/
AMID-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999)
[5] USCIS also employed an additional 1,475 adjudicators on a temporary
basis to support its backlog reductions efforts.
[6] See GAO, Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address
Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington
D.C.: November 2005).
[7] The National Benefits Center serves as a hub for applications
adjudicated at USCIS field offices. Among other things, the center
performs initial evidence review and conducts background checks before
sending the file to the appropriate district office for adjudication.
[8] DOL Inspector General, Restoring Section 245(i) of the Immigration
Nationality Act Created a Flood of Poor Quality Foreign Labor
Certification Applications Predominantly for Aliens Without Legal Work
Status, Report No: 6-04-004-03-321 (Washington, D.C. : September 30,
2004).
[9] USCIS reviewed applications submitted on behalf of religious
workers--such as ministers, or other individuals who work in a
professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation--seeking an
immigrant visa in order to work in the United States. FDNS chose this
application because based upon past experience FDNS believed there was
a high prevalence of fraud. According to FDNS, most of the fraud
involved religious institutions that were not affiliated with a major
religious organization.
[10] However, with a sampling margin of error of 5 percent, the fraud
rate could be between 28 percent and 38 percent.
[11] 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d). 8 CFR § 274a.12(c) states that USCIS has
the discretion to establish a specific validity period for an
employment authorization document, and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) provides
that such period shall not exceed 240 days in the case of an interim
authorization.
[12] USCIS subsequently informed Florida's Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles, and the American Association of Motor Vehicles
Administration issued a national advisory notifying other state motor
vehicle departments that they should not accept the application receipt
as evidence of lawful immigration status.
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Strategies to Manage Improper
Payments, Learning from Private Sector Organizations, GAO-02-69G
(Washington, D.C.: October 2001).
[14] Excerpt from Statement on Auditing Standards, No. 99,
Considerations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.
[15] For each of assessment, USCIS plans to review a sample of
applications designed to achieve a 95 percent confidence interval.
Reviews will be conducted by Immigration Officers in district offices.
[16] For the religious worker assessment, USCIS staff reviewed a sample
of 220 cases that were randomly selected from a 6-month period of April
1, 2004, to September 30, 2004. For the replacement of permanent
resident card assessment, USCIS staff reviewed a sample of 245 cases
that were selected from a six-month period of May 1, 2004 to October
31, 2004. Cases selected included pending and completed cases.
[17] USCIS asked that we not divulge the specific benefit types planned
for future assessments because of concerns that publishing this
information could jeopardize the validity of these future assessments.
[18] See, for example, GAO, Homeland Security, A Risk Management
Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.:
October 2001); and GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to
Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: December 2005).
[19] According to the Adjudicator's Field Manual, adjudicators are to
try to adjudicate the application based only on their review of the
evidence submitted. The field manual further states that only when an
adjudicator cannot decide whether to grant an immigration benefit based
on the evidence submitted, are they to consider taking additional steps
such as conducting internal research, requesting additional evidence,
interviewing individuals, or requesting a site visit.
[20] See GAO, Taxpayer Information: Options Exist to Enable Data
Sharing between IRS and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges, GAO-06-100
(Washington, DC: Oct. 11, 2005).
[21] Currently, personal interviews are conducted only for certain
applications and only in USCIS's district offices.
[22] See GAO-06-20Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure
Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington D. C.: November 2005).
[23] 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d). 8 CFR § 274a.12(c) states that USCIS has
the discretion to establish a specific validity period for an
employment authorization document, and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) provides
that such period shall not exceed 240 days in the case of an interim
authorization.
[24] See GAO, Immigration Benefits, Several Factors Impede Timeliness
of Application Process, GAO-01-488 (Washington D.C.: May 2001).
[25] Among other things, this office investigates criminal allegations
of USCIS employee involvement in immigration benefit fraud. The DHS
Office of Inspector General provides the results of such investigations
to USCIS's Office of Security and Investigations.
[26] A February 2005 memorandum of agreement between USICS and ICE
requires ICE to submit a report on the findings of investigations
resulting from referrals from USCIS. However, the memorandum does not
require ICE to report the findings from benefit fraud investigations
resulting from other sources, such as other ICE investigations or other
agencies.
[27] For permanent employment immigration, petitioners are required to
obtain labor certifications from the Department of Labor. The DOL is
required to certify that there are not sufficient U. S. workers who are
able, willing, qualified, and available and that at least the
prevailing wage will be paid. The labor certification is then submitted
to USCIS along with an application for an alien worker using an I-140
immigration form. USCIS's responsibility is to then ensure that the
prospective employee has the necessary qualifications for the job.
[28] At one service center the union representing adjudicators filed a
grievance in June 2005 claiming that proposed new performance standards
for adjudicators were unrealistic and would compromise the quality of
adjudication decisions.
[29] USCIS initial adjudicator training provides approximately 4 hours
of fraud-related training that focuses primarily on detecting
fraudulent documents during 6 weeks of training.
[30] Immigration fraud can also be criminally prosecuted under other
federal statutes.
[31] 8 U.S.C. §§1324 c (a), (d); 1154 (C).
[32] Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9TH Cir. 1998).
[33] Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 404(a), 119 Stat. 302, 319-20
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)).
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