Aviation Security
Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-06-371T April 4, 2006Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening airline passenger and checked baggage screening and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights TSA's efforts to (1) enhance the performance, management, and deployment of the transportation security officer (TSO) workforce; (2) strengthen procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage; and (3) leverage and deploy screening technologies.
TSA has taken steps to enhance the TSO workforce's performance, management, and deployment, yet continues to face challenges in allocating staff and ensuring that training is available. For example, TSA developed a Screening Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at commercial airports. However, some assumptions in the model--such as that 20 percent of the TSO workforce will be part-time--may be flawed, given that federal security directors (the lead TSA authorities at U.S. airports) have had difficulty filling this quota and some said they have not been able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to improve the training offered to its TSO workforce, insufficient staffing and a lack of electronic connectivity to access on-line learning have prevented TSOs from taking full advantage of training opportunities. TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities in part based on risk assessments, as GAO has previously advocated. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered, vetted, and tested a variety of new procedures for passenger and baggage screening. Some passenger screening procedure changes are based on risk-related factors, including results of covert (undercover, unannounced) tests that are designed to reveal system vulnerabilities. Our ongoing work on how TSA makes these changes indicates that TSA could do more evaluation to ensure the changes achieve the desired results. TSA has taken steps to develop and deploy technologies to strengthen commercial aviation security; however, challenges in funding and planning have created impediments to implementation. For example, TSA has deployed explosives detection systems--either stand-alone or incorporated in-line with baggage conveyor systems--to detect explosives in checked baggage. A TSA cost-benefit analysis of the in-line systems being installed at 9 airports showed that they could yield significant savings for the federal government. However, their deployment has been hampered by a lack of planning and funding strategies. TSA is currently assessing financing options to support the deployment of in-line systems and has begun prioritizing which airports would benefit from their deployment.
GAO-06-371T, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain
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Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, April 4, 2006:
Aviation Security:
Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but
Challenges Remain:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-06-371T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-371T, a testimony before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task”with hundreds of
airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily
carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. It has
been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at
commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is
making in strengthening airline passenger and checked baggage screening
and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights
TSA‘s efforts to (1) enhance the performance, management, and
deployment of the transportation security officer (TSO) workforce; (2)
strengthen procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage; and
(3) leverage and deploy screening technologies.
What GAO Found:
TSA has taken steps to enhance the TSO workforce‘s performance,
management, and deployment, yet continues to face challenges in
allocating staff and ensuring that training is available. For example,
TSA developed a Screening Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing
levels at commercial airports. However, some assumptions in the
model”such as that 20 percent of the TSO workforce will be part-
time”may be flawed, given that federal security directors (the lead TSA
authorities at U.S. airports) have had difficulty filling this quota
and some said they have not been able to hire up to their authorized
staffing levels. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to improve the
training offered to its TSO workforce, insufficient staffing and a lack
of electronic connectivity to access on-line learning have prevented
TSOs from taking full advantage of training opportunities.
TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance
detection capabilities in part based on risk assessments, as GAO has
previously advocated. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered, vetted, and
tested a variety of new procedures for passenger and baggage screening.
Some passenger screening procedure changes are based on risk-related
factors, including results of covert (undercover, unannounced) tests
that are designed to reveal system vulnerabilities. Our ongoing work on
how TSA makes these changes indicates that TSA could do more evaluation
to ensure the changes achieve the desired results.
TSA has taken steps to develop and deploy technologies to strengthen
commercial aviation security; however, challenges in funding and
planning have created impediments to implementation. For example, TSA
has deployed explosives detection systems”either stand-alone or
incorporated in-line with baggage conveyor systems”to detect explosives
in checked baggage. A TSA cost-benefit analysis of the in-line systems
being installed at 9 airports showed that they could yield significant
savings for the federal government. However, their deployment has been
hampered by a lack of planning and funding strategies. TSA is currently
assessing financing options to support the deployment of in-line
systems and has begun prioritizing which airports would benefit from
their deployment.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen aviation security, to include passenger and checked baggage
screening operations. TSA generally agreed with our recommendations and
is taking actions to implement them. GAO also has several ongoing
reviews related to the issues addressed in this testimony, and will
issue separate reports related to these areas at later dates, with
additional recommendations as appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-371T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at
(202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the progress made and challenges remaining in the physical
screening of airline passengers and their checked baggage, and in the
deployment of explosive detection technologies. Securing commercial
aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports, thousands of
aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of
passengers and pieces of checked baggage. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted on November 19, 2001,
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandated
actions designed to strengthen aviation security, including requiring
that TSA assume responsibility for conducting passenger and checked
baggage screening at over 400 commercial airports in the United States
by November 19, 2002. It has been over 3 years since TSA assumed this
responsibility, and the agency has spent billions of dollars and
implemented a wide range of initiatives to strengthen the key
components of its passenger and checked baggage screening systems--
people, processes, and technology. These components are interconnected
and are critical to the overall security of commercial aviation.
My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in
strengthening airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and the
challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key
areas, including TSA's efforts to (1) enhance the performance of the
transportation security officer (TSO--formerly referred to as
screeners) workforce and manage and deploy the TSO workforce; (2)
strengthen procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage on
passenger aircraft; (3) leverage and deploy screening technologies; and
(4) measure the effectiveness of its passenger and checked baggage
screening systems.
My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing
the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our preliminary
observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening
procedures and staffing standards for TSOs. We did our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I contains a list of related GAO products released since
September 11, 2001.
Summary:
TSA has taken steps to enhance the performance, management, and
deployment of its TSO workforce, but it continues to face staffing and
training challenges. Acknowledging imbalances in the screener
workforce, TSA developed standards for determining TSO staffing for all
airports at which federal screening is required and developed a
Screening Allocation Model (SAM) to determine airport staffing levels.
In determining staffing allocations, the SAM takes into account not
only flight and passenger data, but also data unique to each airport--
including flight schedules, load factors, passenger and baggage
distribution curves, and TSA passenger and baggage screening
configurations. However, in interviewing several Federal Security
Directors (FSD)--the ranking authorities responsible for the leadership
and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation's commercial
airports--we identified some preliminary concerns about the SAM. For
example, one assumption of the SAM is that 20 percent of the TSO
workforce at airports will be part-time. However, FSDs whom we spoke to
said that it has been a challenge to attract, hire, and retain TSA's
part-time TSO workforce, which has made this goal difficult to achieve.
Further, several of the FSDs we interviewed stated that they had not
been able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels, and that the
SAM did not take into account that TSOs were also being routinely used
to carry out non-screening and administrative duties. TSA has
established the National Screening Force to provide screening support
to all airports in times of special need, and implemented a number of
initiatives to reduce attrition among its TSO workforce. In addition to
having an adequate number of screeners, effective screening involves
screeners being properly trained to do their job. TSA has taken
numerous steps to expand training beyond the basic training requirement
to include self-guided courses on its Online Learning Center; a
recurrent training requirement of 3-hours per week, averaged over a
quarter; and training on threat information, explosives detection, and
new screening approaches. However, insufficient TSO staffing and a lack
of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity create impediments to the
TSO workforce taking full advantage of training opportunities.
TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance
detection capabilities, but could strengthen its evaluation of these
procedures. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered proposals for passenger
screening procedural changes from a variety of sources within the
agency. Based on preliminary observations from our ongoing review, we
found that most of these proposed changes for passenger screening were
intended to improve efficiency or TSA's ability to detect prohibited
items. Other security-related changes to passenger screening procedures
are made based on several risk-based factors, including results of
covert (undercover, unannounced) tests that are designed to reveal
vulnerabilities in the screening system. TSA also recently piloted
additional procedures that would incorporate unpredictability into the
screening system and allow TSOs to determine the level of screening
passengers should receive based on suspicious behavior. TSA vets
proposed screening procedural changes through various TSA offices and
tests significant proposed changes in an operational environment.
However, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA's evaluation of
procedural changes could be strengthened to include how the procedure
would reduce vulnerability to a terrorist attack.
TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to
strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and
funding challenges. Effective screening depends on having the right
technology in place to detect threats, and TSA has taken steps to
deploy and develop technologies to strengthen commercial aviation
security. However, challenges in funding and planning created
impediments to the technology's implementation. For example, to improve
explosives detection at some passenger screening checkpoints, TSA has
deployed explosives trace portal machines, which use puffs of air to
help detect the presence of explosives on individuals. The Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) fiscal year 2007 budget request states
that about 434 explosive trace portal machines will be in operation
throughout the country during fiscal year 2007.
However, limited progress has been made in fielding other explosives
detection technology at passenger checkpoints. At baggage screening
checkpoints, TSA has been effective in deploying explosive trace
detection systems (in which TSOs collect samples by rubbing bags with
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials) and the more efficient explosive detection systems
(in which probing radiation is used to examine objects inside baggage
and identify characteristic signatures of threat explosives). Now that
the initial deployment of this equipment has been completed, however,
TSA must focus on deploying enhanced explosive detection systems,
including larger or smaller models depending on the needs of a
particular airport, and on incorporating explosive detection systems in-
line with baggage conveyor systems, to further enhance efficiency and
security. In looking to the future, DHS has agreed with our
recommendations to improve its research and development (R&D)
management and planning, including completing basic research, strategic
planning, and risk assessment efforts; coordinating R&D efforts with
transportation stakeholders; and assessing the costs and benefits of
deploying explosive detection systems--either in-line or stand-alone at
the nation's airports. In February 2006, TSA took a positive step
forward by completing a strategic framework for its checked baggage
screening operations that will help ensure the efficient allocation of
limited resources to maximize technology's effectiveness in detecting
threats. However, additional work will be needed to determine funding
and deployment strategies to support the implementation of in-line
baggage screening systems.
TSA has measures in place to assess the effectiveness of passenger and
checked baggage screening systems. TSA headquarters has conducted
covert testing of passenger and checked baggage screening by having
inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through checkpoints in order
to measure vulnerabilities and identify systematic problems affecting
TSO performance in the areas of training, procedures, and technology.
These tests have identified that, overall, weaknesses and
vulnerabilities exist in the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems. Implemented in September 2002, the testing protocols for
passenger and checked baggage screening changed in September 2005 to
implement a more risk-based approach and focus on catastrophic threats
to aircraft. Additionally, in February 2004 and February 2005, for
passengers and checked baggage, respectively, TSA issued protocols to
help FSDs conduct covert testing of local airport screening activities.
Other ways TSA tests the effectiveness of passenger and baggage
screening include the use of the Threat Image Projection system, which
projects threat images onto a screen as the bag is screened to test the
screener's ability to positively identify the threat; annual screener
recertification testing; and passenger and checked baggage performance
indexes. These performance indexes reflect indicators of effectiveness,
efficiency, and customer satisfaction. However, due to a lack of
targets for each component of the index, TSA may have difficulty
performing meaningful analyses of the parts of the index.
Background:
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the President signed
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act into law on November 19,
2001, with the primary goal of strengthening the security of the
nation's aviation system. To this end, ATSA created TSA as an agency
with responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including
aviation.[Footnote 1] As part of this responsibility, TSA oversees
security operations at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports,
including passenger and checked baggage screening operations. Prior to
the passage of ATSA, the screening of passengers and checked baggage
had been performed by private screening companies under contract to the
airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible for
ensuring compliance with screening regulations. Today, TSA security
activities, including passenger and checked baggage screening at
airports, are overseen by Federal Security Directors--the ranking
authorities responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA
security activities at the nation's commercial airports. Each FSD is
responsible for overseeing security activities, including passenger and
checked baggage screening, at one or more commercial airports.
TSA reported that between October 2004 and September 2005, about 735
million passengers were physically screened. In addition, 550 million
bags were screened using explosive detection systems with standard
screening procedures.
Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening:
In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for
passenger and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA set forth
specific enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement,
with deadlines for completing many of them. These requirements
included:
* assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations at
more than 400 commercial airports by November 19, 2002;
* establishing a basic screener training program composed of a minimum
of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job
training;
* conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners;
* conducting operational testing of screeners;[Footnote 2]
* requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an operational
test; and:
* screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives
detection systems by December 31, 2002.[Footnote 3]
Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.[Footnote 4] TSOs (formerly
referred to as screeners) must inspect individuals for prohibited items
at designated screening locations.[Footnote 5] The four passenger
screening functions are (1) X-ray screening of property, (2) walk-
through metal detector screening of individuals, (3) hand-wand or pat-
down screening of individuals, and (4) physical search of property and
trace detection for explosives.
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or
weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is accomplished
through the use of explosive detection systems[Footnote 6] (EDS) or
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems,[Footnote 7] and through the
use of other means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive
passenger bag match,[Footnote 8] when EDS and ETD systems are
unavailable.
The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS
appropriations act allocates about $3.6 billion to TSA for passenger
and checked baggage screening operations, of which about $2.4 billion
is for the TSO workforce and the remaining amount is for private sector
TSOs,[Footnote 9] equipment purchase, installation and maintenance, and
support functions associated with the TSO workforce, such as training
and other human resource functions.[Footnote 10] The President's fiscal
year 2007 budget request includes about $3.5 billion for passenger and
checked baggage screening, of which about $2.5 billion would support
the TSO workforce.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of Its
TSO Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges:
TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but Faces
Challenges in Hiring, Deploying, and Retaining TSOs:
TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen its management and
deployment of the TSO workforce, but it continues to face challenges in
hiring and deploying passenger and checked baggage TSOs. To accomplish
its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and
checked baggage TSOs trained and certified in the latest screening
procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that staffing
shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability of some
FSDs to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and
oversee screening operations at their checkpoints without using
additional measures such as overtime.[Footnote 11] TSA has acknowledged
that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener
workforce and has since been taking steps to address these imbalances
over the past 2 years.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required
TSA to develop and submit to Congress standards for determining the
aviation security staffing for all airports at which screening is
required.[Footnote 12] The act also directed GAO to review these
standards, which we are doing. These staffing standards are to provide
for necessary levels of airport security, while also ensuring that
security-related delays experienced by airline passengers are
minimized. In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation security
staffing standards to Congress. Known as the Screening Allocation Model
(SAM), these standards are intended to provide an objective measure for
determining TSO airport staffing levels, while staying within the
congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 full-time equivalents (FTE)
screeners.[Footnote 13]
Whereas TSA's prior staffing model was demand-driven based on flight
and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand data but
also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through the airport and
the availability of the workforce. In determining the appropriate TSO
staffing levels, the SAM first considers the workload demands unique to
each individual airport--including flight schedules, load factors and
connecting flights, and number of passenger bags. These demand inputs
are then processed against certain assumptions about the processing of
passengers and baggage--including expected passenger and baggage
processing rates, required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage
equipment, and equipment alarm rates. Using these and various other
data, the SAM determines the daily workforce requirements and
calculates a work schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a
recommended mix of full-time and part-time staff and a total number of
TSO FTE needed to staff the airport, consistent with a goal of 10
minutes maximum wait time for processing passengers and baggage.
For fiscal year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of 42,170
TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay within a 43,000
TSO FTE budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006, TSA officials reduced the
number of FTEs allocated to airports to 42,056, which allowed it to
fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the National Screener Force--a force composed
of TSOs who provide screening support to all airports--and to maintain
a contingency of 329 TSO FTEs in reserve to meet unanticipated demands,
such as a new air carrier coming on line at an airport.[Footnote 14] As
of January 2006, there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and 5,782 part-time
TSOs on board nationwide, representing an annualized rate of 41,085 TSO
FTEs. According to TSA headquarters officials, the SAM can be adjusted
to account for the uniqueness of particular airport security
checkpoints and airline traffic patterns. Further, it is up to the FSDs
to ensure that all of the data elements and assumptions are accurate
for their airports, and to bring to TSA's attention any factors that
should be reviewed to determine if changes to the SAM are appropriate.
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests a total of 45,121 FTEs
for TSO personnel compensation and benefits.
As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified
several preliminary concerns about TSA's efforts to address its
staffing imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport
passenger and checked baggage screening checkpoints, which we are
continuing to assess. At the five airports we visited, FSD staff raised
concerns about the SAM assumptions as they related to their particular
airports.[Footnote 15] Among other things, they noted that the
recommendation for 20 percent part-time TSO workforce--measured in
terms of FTEs--often could not be reached, the expected processing
rates for passenger and baggage screening were not being realized, non-
passenger screening at large airports was higher than assumed, and the
number of TSO FTEs needed per checkpoint lane and per baggage screening
machine was not sufficient for peak periods. Regarding the SAM
assumption of a 20 percent part-time TSO FTE level across all airports,
FSD staff we visited stated that the 20 percent goal has been difficult
to achieve because of, among other things, economic conditions leading
to competition for part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled
with a lack of mass transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since
fiscal year 2002, and part-time workers' desire to convert to full-time
status. According to TSA headquarters officials, while the nationwide
annual TSO attrition rate is about 23 percent (compared to a rate of 14
percent reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent for part-time
TSOs. TSA has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs since it began
actively recruiting them in the summer of 2003. In February 2004, we
reported that FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that
they experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners,
which they believed to be due to many of the same factors, such as low
pay and benefits, undesirable hours, the location of their airport, the
lack of accessible and affordable parking or public transportation, and
the high cost of living in the areas surrounding some
airports.[Footnote 16] These FSDs stated that very few full-time
screeners were interested in converting to part-time status--a
condition that still exists--and TSA officials stated that attrition
rates for part-time screeners were considerably higher than those for
full-time screeners.
At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing review of
the SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been able to hire up
to their authorized staffing levels. In February 2004, we reported that
many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern that TSA's hiring
process was not responsive to their needs and hindered their ability to
reach their authorized staffing levels and adequately staff screening
checkpoints. Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with the lack of a
continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition,
and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis. We
reported that TSA was taking steps to make the hiring process more
responsive to FSDs' needs. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs with more
input into the hiring process in an effort to streamline the process
and enable FSDs to more quickly meet their staffing needs.
During our five airport visits, some FSD staff also cited another
limitation of the SAM--specifically, that the model does not account
for screeners who are performing administrative or other duties. The
officials also noted that, because they are not authorized to hire a
sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely
used--in some cases full time--to carry out non-screening and
administrative duties, including supporting payroll, scheduling,
uniform supplies, legal support, logistics, and operations center
activities. At the five airports we visited in January and February
2006, out of a total of 2,572 TSO FTEs on-board at those airports,
roughly 136 FTEs (just over five percent) were being used for
administrative duties. FSD staff stated that some of these TSOs are
being used on a part-time basis, while others are used on a full-time
basis. The use of TSOs in these support functions could adversely
affect the ability of FSDs to adequately staff their screening
checkpoints.
To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational
flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003,
TSA established a National Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Force
(formerly known as the Mobile Screening Force established in November
2002) to provide screening support to all airports in times of
emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that
require a greater number of screeners than regularly available to FSDs.
In February 2004, we reported that the National Screening Force
consisted of over 700 full-time passenger and baggage TSOs. TSA
officials stated that while these screeners have a home airport to
which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening
staff approximately 70 percent of the year.
TSA budgeted for 615 FTEs for the National Screening Force in fiscal
year 2006. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $35
million for operational expenses of the force (not including salaries
and benefits of force members). According to the budget request, in
fiscal year 2007, the National Screening Force will generally be
deployed only to those airports experiencing significant staffing
shortfalls associated with increased seasonal traffic or when a special
event, such as a Super Bowl or a large national conference, occurs
requiring an immediate influx of additional TSO support. At one
category X airport we recently visited, the FSD stated that because of
challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he currently
had 59 members of the National Screening Force deployed to his airport,
and had been relying on this force since 2004. The President's fiscal
year 2007 budget request states that TSA will continue to review
methods for reducing costs associated with this force, including
ensuring that each airport has a sufficient staffing program in place
to address short-term needs.
In February 2006 in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request,
TSA identified a number of initiatives it has under way to address the
management of the TSO workforce, including:
* requesting $10 million to support TSO retention programs, including
utilizing workforce retention flexibilities to potentially include pay
for performance, performance bonuses, retention allowances, college
credit reimbursement, and flexible staffing; and:
* establishing retention incentives for part-time screeners.
We will continue to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing work
on TSA's aviation security staffing standards.
TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training but Faces Challenges in Delivering
the Training:
Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003,[Footnote 17] TSA
has taken a number of actions designed to strengthen training available
to the TSO workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance
of TSOs. Additionally, TSA's Office of Inspections (OI, formerly the
Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review) makes recommendations to
TSA leadership in its reports on covert (undercover, unannounced)
testing results. These recommendations address deficiencies identified
during testing and are intended to improve screening effectiveness. As
of December 2005, OI had issued 29 reports to management on the results
of its checkpoint and checked baggage covert testing. In total, the
reports include 19 distinct recommendations related to passenger and
checked baggage screening.[Footnote 18] Of these 19 recommendations, 11
relate to screener training.
In September 2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or
deployed a recurrent training program for passenger TSOs. At that time,
little training was available to TSOs once they completed their basic
TSO training. Since then, TSA has expanded training available to the
TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online Learning Center that makes
self-guided courses available over TSA's intranet and the Internet and
expanding training available to supervisory TSOs. TSA also established
a recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a
quarter, and provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate and
enhance TSO training, including at least one modular bomb set kit--
containing components of an improvised explosive device (IED)--and at
least one weapons training kit. TSA has also instituted a program
called "Threat in the Spotlight" that, based on intelligence TSA
receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat information
regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past screening
checkpoints. Additionally, in December 2005, TSA reported completing
enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 TSOs. This
training included both classroom and hands-on experiences, and focused
particularly on identifying X-ray images of IED component parts, not
just a completely assembled bomb. TSA plans for the remaining TSO
workforce to receive this training by June 2006 through the Online
Learning Center or other delivery methods. TSA also has developed new
training curricula to support new screening approaches. For example,
TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in behavior
observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers
exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception.
However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and a
lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the Online
Learning Center have made it difficult for all TSOs at many airports to
receive required training and has limited TSO access to TSA training
tools.[Footnote 19] As previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to
address the TSO staffing challenges. However, it is too soon to
determine whether TSA's efforts will address TSA's ability to provide
required training while maintaining adequate coverage for screening
operations. In terms of access to the Online Learning Center, TSA plans
to complete the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity
to airports during fiscal year 2007. TSA established its Online
Learning Center to provide passenger and baggage screeners with online,
high-speed access to training courses. However, effective use of the
Online Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access,
which TSA had not been able to provide to all airports. In May 2005, we
reported that as of October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce
did not have high speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning
Center. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request reports that
approximately 220 of the more than 400 airport and field locations have
full Information Technology (IT) infrastructure installation, to
include high-speed network connectivity, while the rest of the airports
operate with dial-up access to TSA systems. According to the budget
request, TSA will use $120 million in fiscal year 2006 to deploy high-
speed connectivity to all category X and I airports and preliminary
high-speed connectivity to all category II, III, and IV airports. The
budget request includes a request for a total of $90 million to support
this effort in fiscal year 2007, of which $54 million is needed to
complete the deployment of high-speed connectivity at category II, III,
and IV airports.[Footnote 20]
TSA Is Making Changes to Its Passenger Screening Procedures to Enhance
Detection Capabilities Based on Risk and Other Factors, but Could
Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Procedures:
Proposed Passenger Checkpoint Screening Procedural Changes Are
Generally Based on Operational Experience and Risk-Based Assessments:
Our preliminary analysis of TSA data indicates that since April 2005,
TSA has considered 70 proposed changes to passenger checkpoint
screening procedures.[Footnote 21] Most of these proposed changes were
generated by TSA airport officials and TSA's Security Operations
division, which is responsible for developing and overseeing the
implementation of checkpoint screening procedures. TSA headquarters
also formally solicited input from TSA airport staff by initiating a
field review of standard operating procedures (SOP), which involved
representatives from airports across the nation. This review resulted
in 120 suggested revisions to the passenger checkpoint screening
procedures. To a lesser extent, changes to checkpoint screening
procedures are recommended by TSA senior leadership, such as the
Assistant Administrator of Security Operations or the Assistant
Secretary. Congress has also proposed and subsequently mandated changes
to checkpoint screening procedures, such as adding lighters to the list
of items prohibited on aircraft. According to a senior TSA official,
recent suggestions for procedural changes, such as removing small
scissors from the prohibited items list to allow TSOs to focus on
higher risk items, were generated by a TSA task force focused on
improving the agency's ability to detect explosives at the screening
checkpoint.
Based on our preliminary analysis, the majority of proposed SOP changes
considered by TSA in April 2005, August 2005, September 2005, and
December 2005 were not specifically designed to enhance the security of
the screening process.[Footnote 22] Of the 70 proposed checkpoint
screening SOP changes considered by TSA, 23 were intended to improve
the efficiency of the screening process (e.g. passenger flow) such as
modifying the HazMat reporting requirements to exclude torch lighters
and pepper spray in quantities less than 4 ounces. Seven of the 70
proposed changes considered by TSA during this period were intended to
specify or clarify procedures for passengers requiring special
consideration, such as law enforcement officers. Ten of the proposed
changes were specifically intended to improve TSA's ability to detect
prohibited items. Sixteen proposed changes were intended to enhance
customer service or clarify the wording of the SOP. Fourteen of the 70
proposed changes were not included in these categories.[Footnote 23]
According to TSA, security-related proposed changes to checkpoint
screening procedures are based on risk-based factors, including
previous terrorist incidents, threat information, vulnerabilities of
the screening system, as well as operational experience and stakeholder
concerns. For example, according to TSA officials, the initial change
to the pat-down procedure in September 2004 was based on the attacks
carried out on two Russian aircraft. According to TSA, the pat-down
procedure was further revised in response to passenger concerns that
the procedure was too invasive. TSA officials stated that the pat-down
procedure was changed a third time based on additional threat
information. TSA also informed us that reported threat information led
them to further amend the pat-down procedure in December 2005.
Recommended changes to passenger checkpoint screening procedures are
also generated based on the results of covert testing conducting by
TSA's Office of Inspections and the DHS Office of Inspector General
(OIG). Covert tests are designed to assess vulnerabilities in the
checkpoint screening system to specific threats, such as vulnerability
to the various methods by which terrorists may try to conceal hand
guns, knives, or IEDs. OI and the DHS OIG identified vulnerabilities in
the checkpoint screening system, which existed, in part, due to
deficiencies in screening procedures. To address these vulnerabilities,
since March 2005, OI and the DHS OIG recommended four changes to the
passenger checkpoint screening procedures.[Footnote 24] TSA has also
made procedure changes in response to operational experience and
stakeholder concerns. For example, TSA changed the SOP to specify the
"individual tester" instead of "supervisor" to alleviate field
confusion that supervisors were the only ones allowed to perform a
particular task. Also, based on field input, TSA is changing the SOP to
allow TSOs to instruct passengers with long hair to hold their hair
during the explosives trace portal (ETP) screening process. TSA also
made changes due to stakeholder concern, such as modifications to the
pat-down procedure. After passengers expressed discomfort with the
invasive nature of the procedure, TSA modified it to be less invasive
while maintaining its security effectiveness.
TSA Could Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Screening Procedural
Changes Based on our Preliminary Observations:
As previously mentioned, TSA airport staff and headquarters officials
suggest changes to checkpoint screening procedures to generally improve
the efficiency, effectiveness and clarity of screening procedures.
These proposed procedural changes are periodically gathered and vetted
through various TSA offices, and ultimately the Assistant Administrator
of Security Operations, for approval. The offices involved in the
review process for SOP changes include Security Operations, Office of
Chief Counsel, and the Office of Training. As required, proposed
procedural changes are also evaluated by other offices including the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Civil Rights, and Office
of Passengers with Disabilities. Representatives of these component
divisions meet informally or formally to discuss proposed changes and
determine whether the changes should be incorporated into the
checkpoint screening SOP.
In addition, TSA officials informed us that the agency evaluates all
significant proposed changes in an operational environment prior to
determining whether such changes should be implemented nationwide.
Specifically, under the current Assistant Secretary, TSA pilot tests
changes that require substantial training or that may generate concerns
from the traveling public. The significant changes implemented in
December 2005 include revisions to the pat-down procedure, the
procedure for searching carry-on luggage, the process for screening
selectee passengers,[Footnote 25] and the list of items prohibited on
aircraft. The major changes also include a new procedure for screening
passengers for IEDs. While TSA evaluated these procedures in an
operational environment, our preliminary analysis suggests that the
evaluations primarily focused on the operational feasibility of the
procedures, and less on how these procedures would reduce vulnerability
to a terrorist attack. TSA assesses the vulnerability of the existing
checkpoint screening system by conducting covert tests in which persons
attempt to carry prohibited items through the checkpoint without the
items being detected. However, TSA officials questioned whether covert
testing could be used to assess statistically whether new procedures
would decrease the vulnerability of the screening system. For example,
TSA officials stated that since some procedures are only piloted in the
operational environment for a few days, TSA could not run enough covert
tests for the results to allow for comprehensive analysis of reduced
vulnerability. TSA officials also stated that because the agency
implements a layered approach to passenger screening, it would be
difficult to determine the extent to which any one layer reduces
vulnerability of the checkpoint screening system.
During the course of our review, we met with five aviation security
experts, four of which identified covert testing as the best way to
assess the security effectiveness of new and existing procedures.
However, they also acknowledged the difficulty of using covert testing
to assess the extent to which specific procedures would reduce
vulnerabilities, especially considering that the effectiveness of a
procedure also relies on the capability of TSOs and screening
equipment.
TSA also recently piloted additional procedures that would incorporate
unpredictability into the screening system and that would allow TSOs to
determine the level of screening passengers should receive based on
suspicious behavior. While TSA has not yet determined whether to
incorporate these new procedures into the SOP, our preliminary
observations indicate that TSA did not have a formal evaluation plan in
place when piloting these procedures. Regarding screening passengers
based on suspicious behavior, TSA officials stated that this method has
been successful for law enforcement officials, including those
operating in airports, as well as aviation officials in other countries
such as Israel. FSD staff at three airports that participated in the
piloting of these procedures identified factors TSA headquarters should
consider prior to implementing these procedures, one of which is the
lack of TSOs to conduct these procedures. FSD staff at one airport said
that they had to close a screening lane in order to have a sufficient
number of TSOs to implement the piloted procedure. FSD staff at all
three airports also reported that some TSOs had to work overtime so
that other TSOs could be trained to implement these procedures. TSA
headquarters staff stated that the prohibited items list and changes to
other programs would offset the additional TSO resources needed to
implement these procedures. However, FSD staff with whom we spoke at 2
of the airports that piloted these procedures stated that the changes
made did not free up screening resources as was planned.
TSA Is Supporting the Development and Deployment of Technologies to
Strengthen Commercial Aviation Security, but Faces Management and
Funding Challenges:
DHS and TSA Are Taking Steps to Develop and Deploy Technologies for
Screening Passengers and Checked Baggage, but Further Planning Is
Needed to Focus R&D Efforts:
DHS's and TSA's research and development efforts for passenger and
checked baggage screening are part of a broader DHS program focused on
researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and
mitigate terrorist threats. History has shown that terrorists will
adapt their tactics and techniques in an attempt to bypass increased
security procedures, and are capable of developing increasingly
sophisticated measures in an attempt to avoid detection. This ever
changing threat necessitates the need for continued R&D of new
technologies and the fielding of these technologies to strengthen
aviation security.
In March 2005, the DHS OIG reported that significant improvement in
screener performance may not be possible without greater use of new
technology. The DHS OIG encouraged TSA to expedite its testing programs
and give priority to technologies that will enable the screening
workforce to better detect both weapons and explosives. In addition,
the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request states that checkpoints
do not currently have the ability to accurately and quickly detect
explosives on all passengers, and only a minimal number of airline
passengers are directed to a selectee lane for further inspection in
which they are manually searched for explosives. The request further
states that "many travelers are allowed to pass through the checkpoints
without complete testing and detection," and recognizes the importance
of filling this detection gap. TSA officials stated that the agency is
addressing this issue through a variety of security measures. TSA has
recently put increased focus on the threats posed by IEDs and is
investing in technology for this purpose. For example, about 60
explosives trace portal machines have been installed at over 20
airports. This new technology uses puffs of air to help detect the
presence of explosives on individuals. DHS's fiscal year 2007 budget
request states that TSA expects that about 434 explosive trace portal
machines will be in operation throughout the country by September 2007.
TSA is also developing backscatter technology, in which backscatter
signals interact with explosives, plastics and metals, giving them
shape and form and making them easy to visually interpret. However,
limited progress has been made in fielding this technology at airport
passenger screening checkpoints. We will soon begin a review of DHS's
and TSA's progress in planning for, managing, and deploying their R&D
programs in support of passenger checkpoint screening operations.
To enhance checked baggage screening, TSA is developing and testing
next-generation EDS machines. Most of the currently deployed EDS
technology was developed prior to the passage of ATSA and was based on
criteria set forth by Congress in the Aviation Security Improvement Act
of 1990. According to TSA, since the large-scale deployment of EDS
machines in 2002 and 2003, manufacturers have only marginally improved
false alarm rates and throughput capabilities of the equipment. The
maximum number of bags an EDS machine can screen per hour is 500, which
can be achieved only when the machines are integrated in-line with the
baggage conveyor system. New EDS equipment was certified in 2005,
including a smaller EDS machine designed to replace ETD machines used
for primary screening and an upgraded large EDS machine. In September
2005, TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 72 smaller
EDS machines to be installed at 24 airports. The President's fiscal
year 2007 budget request for TSA includes funding to support research
and development for EDS machines that can operate at up to 900 bags per
hour and employ new threat detection concepts. In its February 2006
strategic framework for checked baggage screening, TSA identified
development of high-throughput EDS machines and lowering of false alarm
rates as key arenas for improving investment management of next-
generation technologies.
We reported in September 2004 that DHS and TSA have made some progress
in managing transportation security R&D programs according to
applicable laws and R&D best practices. However, we found that their
efforts were incomplete in several areas, including preparing strategic
plans for R&D efforts that contain measurable objectives, preparing and
using risk assessments to select and prioritize R&D projects, and
coordinating with stakeholders--a condition that increases the risk
that their R&D resources will not be effectively leveraged. We also
found that TSA and DHS delayed several key R&D projects and lacked both
estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects
and adequate databases to effectively manage their R&D portfolios. We
recommended that DHS and TSA (1) conduct some basic research in the
transportation security area; (2) complete their strategic planning and
risk assessment efforts; (3) develop a management information system
that will provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible
project information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios;
and (4) develop a process with the Department of Transportation to
coordinate transportation security R&D efforts and share this
information with transportation stakeholders. DHS and TSA agreed that
the recommendations were key to a successful R&D program. We will
examine DHS's and TSA's efforts to implement these recommendations as
part our upcoming review of TSA's checkpoint R&D program.
TSA Is Focusing Its Checked Baggage Strategic Planning Efforts on
Deployment of In-line EDS Systems, but Faces Challenges in Funding
These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis:
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at
the nation's airports--mainly as part of interim lobby screening
solutions--to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for
explosives, as mandated by Congress. Although TSA made progress in
fielding EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's airports, TSA placed
this equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--to
conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather
than integrating EDS machines in-line with airports' baggage conveyor
systems. TSA officials stated that they employed these interim
solutions because of the significant costs required to install in-line
systems and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor
systems to accommodate the equipment. These interim screening solutions
led to operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number
of screeners and screening fewer bags for explosives each hour, as
compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems.
Performing primary screening using ETD machines, as is the case for
more than 300 airports, is more labor intensive and less efficient than
screening using the EDS process. TSA's placement of stand-alone EDS and
ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in passenger crowding,
which presented unsafe conditions and may have added security risks for
passengers and airport workers. In May 2004, TSA conducted a
retrospective cost-benefit analysis on nine airports with agreements to
install in-line screening systems and found that significant savings
and other benefits, including reduced screener staffing requirements
and increased baggage throughput, may be achieved through the
installation of in-line systems. TSA estimated that in-line baggage
screening systems at these nine airports would save the federal
government about $1 billion over 7 years,[Footnote 26] compared with
stand-alone EDS systems, and that initial investment would be recovered
in a little over 1 year.[Footnote 27] TSA's analysis also showed that a
cost savings may not be achieved for all airports. According to TSA's
data, federal cost savings varied from about $50 million to over $250
million at eight of the nine airports, while at one airport, there was
an estimated $90 million loss.[Footnote 28]
With the objective of initially fielding this equipment largely
accomplished, TSA is shifting its focus from equipping airports with
interim screening solutions to systematically planning for the more
optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, although
identifying the resources to fund the systems on a large-scale basis
continues to be a challenge. To assist TSA in planning for the optimal
deployment of checked baggage screening systems, we recommended in our
March 2005 report that TSA systematically evaluate baggage screening
needs at airports, including the costs and benefits of installing in-
line baggage screening systems--explosive detection systems integrated
in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems--at airports that do not
yet have in-line systems installed. We suggested that part of such
planning should include analyzing which airports should receive federal
support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems based on cost savings
that could be achieved from more effective and efficient baggage
screening operations and on other factors, including enhanced security.
Also, for airports where in-line systems may not be economically
justified because of high investment costs, we suggested that a cost-
effectiveness analysis be used to determine the benefits of additional
stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place of the more
labor-intensive ETD machines. We also recommended that TSA consider the
costs and benefits of the new technologies being developed through its
research and development efforts, which could provide smaller EDS
machines that have the potential to reduce the costs associated with
installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems or to replace ETD
machines currently used as the primary method for screening at over 300
airports nationwide. DHS agreed with our recommendations and stated
that TSA had initiated an analysis of deploying in-line EDS machines
and was in the process of formulating criteria to identify those
airports that would benefit from an in-line EDS system. DHS also stated
that TSA had begun conducting an analysis of the airports that rely
heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening
technology to identify those airports that would benefit from
augmenting ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment.
On February 8, 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress outlining a
framework for a strategic plan for its TSA Checked Baggage Screening
Program. TSA plans to finalize the plan, including funding and cost-
sharing strategies for in-line baggage screening systems, in Spring
2006. The framework introduces a strategy intended to increase security
through deploying EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-
cycle costs for the program, minimize impacts to TSA and
airport/airline operations, and provide a flexible security
infrastructure for accommodating growing airline traffic and potential
new threats. The framework addresses the following issues:
* Optimized checked baggage screening solutions--finding the ideal mix
of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening solutions.
* Funding prioritization schedule by airport--which airports should
receive funding for an in-line baggage screening system based on
quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other factors.
* Deployment strategy--a plan for the acquisition of next-generation
EDS systems, the redeployment of existing EDS assets, and investment in
life-cycle extension programs.
* EDS Life-Cycle Management Plan--structured guidelines for EDS R&D
investment, procurement specifications for next-generation EDS systems,
and the redeployment of existing EDS assets and investment in life-
cycle extension programs that minimize the cost of ownership of the EDS
systems.
* Stakeholder collaboration plan--TSA plans to work closely with
airport operators and other key stakeholders to develop airport-
specific screening solutions, refine the nationwide EDS deployment
strategy, and investigate alternative funding programs that may allow
for innovative as well as non-federal sources of funding or financing,
including formulas for sharing costs between different government
entities and the private sector.
This strategic framework is a positive step forward in systematically
planning for TSA's checked baggage screening program. The completion of
a strategic plan for this program should help TSA ensure that it is
efficiently allocating its limited resources to maximize the
effectiveness of its checked baggage screening operations. However, it
will be important for TSA to complete their analysis and plans for the
funding of in-line EDS systems, which has been the primary obstacle to
the deployment of these systems over the past few years.
TSA Has Strengthened Its Efforts to Measure the Effectiveness of
Screening Systems:
TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the
various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems--people, processes, and technology--but results of covert
testing identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to
exist. In November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to strengthen
its efforts to measure the performance of its aviation security
system.[Footnote 29] At that time, TSA had collected limited data on
the effectiveness of its aviation security programs and initiatives.
Specifically, limited covert testing had been performed, the Threat
Image Projection (TIP) system[Footnote 30] was not fully operational at
passenger screening checkpoints and was not available for checked
baggage screening systems, and TSA had not fully implemented a
congressionally mandated annual screener proficiency review (referred
to as the recertification program). Since then, TSA has implemented and
strengthened efforts to collect performance data in these areas.
In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the amount of
passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it performs and
recently changed its approach to covert testing to focus its resources
on catastrophic threats--threats that can take down an airplane or blow
up an airplane. These tests, in which undercover OI inspectors attempt
to pass threat objects through passenger screening checkpoints and in
checked baggage, are designed to measure vulnerabilities in passenger
and checked baggage screening systems and to identify systematic
problems affecting performance of TSOs in the areas of people
(training), processes (procedures), and technology. OI began conducting
covert testing in September 2002, conducting test scenarios for the
passenger checkpoint and for checked baggage. These scenarios were
carried over from tests developed and conducted under FAA, but OI
reported using more updated weapons than those used by FAA and more
robust tests. TSA considers its covert testing as a snapshot of a TSO's
ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time, as one
of several indicators of systemwide screener performance, and as an
important mechanism for identifying areas in passenger and checked
baggage screening needing improvement.
In September 2003, we reported that OI had conducted limited covert
testing, but planned to double the amount of tests it conducted during
fiscal year 2004, based on an anticipated increase in its staff from
about 100 full-time equivalents to about 200 full-time
equivalents.[Footnote 31] TSA officials stated that based on budget
constraints, OI's fiscal year 2004 staffing authorization was limited
to 183 full-time-equivalents.[Footnote 32] Despite a smaller than
expected staff increase, by the end of the second quarter of fiscal
year 2004, OI had already surpassed the number of tests it had
performed during fiscal year 2003--conducting a total of 836 tests in
fiscal year 2003 and 1,233 in the first two quarters of fiscal year
2004.[Footnote 33]
Our analysis of TSA's covert testing results for tests conducted
between September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall,
weaknesses existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects
on passengers, in their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage. Covert
testing results in this analysis cannot be generalized either to the
airports where the tests were conducted or to airports
nationwide.[Footnote 34]
During the first 3 years of covert testing, OI decided to maintain the
same test scenarios and same level of difficulty so that test results
would be comparable over time.[Footnote 35] In July 2005, OI began
revamping its covert testing program based on the results of the
Secretary of DHS's Second Stage Review--a review of the department's
programs, policies, operations, and structure.[Footnote 36]
Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA, instructed OI to
implement a more risk-based approach and focus its resources on
catastrophic threats--threats that can take down an airplane or blow up
an airplane. In August 2005, the Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA,
further instructed OI to discontinue its former covert testing program
and implement the revamped covert testing program. OI began
implementation of its revamped testing in September 2005. OI conducted
117 tests over a 1-week period at one airport focusing on catastrophic
threats and incorporated additional testing elements that had not
previously been included. According to OI officials, this testing
involved over 50 personnel from various TSA components. Since then, OI
has conducted tests at three additional airports.[Footnote 37] OI
officials stated that TSA leadership is considering these initial tests
in making final determinations regarding the revised testing program
that OI will implement, and that final decisions regarding the
structure, content, and frequency of these tests have not yet been
made.
In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct their own
covert testing of local airport passenger screening activities--a
practice that TSA had previously prohibited.[Footnote 38] Between May
2004 and April 2005, FSDs conducted a total of 17,954 local covert
tests at 350 airports; as of February 2006, TSA reported that FSDs had
conducted a total of 48,826 local covert tests. In February 2005, TSA
released a general procedures document for local covert testing at
checked baggage screening locations. Between March 2005 and September
2005, 1,370 local tests of EDS screening were conducted at 71 airports.
TSA headquarters officials stated that a key challenge FSDs face in
conducting local testing is the lack of available federal staff to
conduct the testing, particularly at smaller airports. In May 2005, we
reported that TSA officials stated that they had not yet begun to use
data from local covert testing to identify training and performance
needs because of difficulties in ensuring that local covert testing is
implemented consistently nationwide.[Footnote 39] TSA officials stated
in March 2006 that data is available for use by FSDs to identify
training needs and TSO performance.
Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security
effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening procedures and
technologies in the operating environment in addition to other TSA
measures that assess the performance of passenger and checked baggage
TSOs. One other source of information on TSO performance in detecting
threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to
test passenger screeners' detection capabilities by projecting threat
images, including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as
they are screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible for
identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched.
Once prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is
real and then records the TSO's performance in a database that could be
analyzed for performance trends.[Footnote 40] TIP threat detection
results in conjunction with OI covert test results and local testing
are intended to assist TSA in identifying specific training and
performance improvement efforts.
In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP as
planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the
more than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide. In December 2005, TSA
reported that it has further expanded the image library to include
additional images of IEDs and IED components as part of its effort to
improve TSOs' detection of explosives. Additionally, the President's
fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA plans to maximize the
training benefits of the TIP system by tailoring TIP sessions to
address individual TSO weaknesses revealed in user performance data.
For example, if a TSO has particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the
TIP would trigger the projection of a higher proportion of simulated
IEDs while that TSO was operating the machine than under standard
circumstances. While there have been improvements in TIP for passenger
screening, TIP is not yet available for checked baggage screening. In
April 2004, we reported that TSA officials stated that they were
working to resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for
checked baggage screening on EDS machines and have started EDS TIP
image development.[Footnote 41] However, in December 2004, TSA
officials stated that because of severe budget reductions, TSA will be
unable to begin implementing a TIP program for checked baggage in
fiscal year 2005. Officials did not specify when such a program might
begin.
Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual
recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an annual
proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all
qualifications and standards required to perform the screening
function. To meet this requirement, TSA established a recertification
program. The first recertification program--which was conducted during
the period October 2003 through March 2004--was composed of two
assessment components, one of TSOs' performance and the other of TSOs'
knowledge and skills. During the performance assessment component of
the recertification program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and
individual goals, such as maintaining the nation's air security,
vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost attention to tasks that will
prevent security threats, and demonstrating the highest levels of
courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of satisfaction with
screening services. The knowledge and skills assessment component
consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard operating
procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical demonstration of
skills.
Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification testing
for the first 2 years the program was in place, with about 1 percent of
TSOs subject to recertification failing to complete this requirement.
In both years, TSOs faced the greatest difficulty on their first
attempt to pass the practical demonstration of skills module--a hands-
on simulated work sample used to evaluate a screener's knowledge,
skill, and ability when performing specific screener tasks along with
the ability to provide customer service.[Footnote 42] According to TSA
officials, at the completion of recertification at an airport, TSA
management has access to reports at both the individual TSO and airport
level, which identify the specific areas that were missed during
testing. National level reports are also available that isolate areas
that need improvement and can be targeted in basic and recurrent
training. In fiscal year 2004, TSA established a performance measure
for the recertification program.[Footnote 43]
During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function TSOs
who were actively working as both passenger and checked baggage TSOs
were required to take only the recertification test for passenger TSOs.
They were therefore not required to take the recertification testing
modules required for checked baggage, even though they worked in that
capacity.[Footnote 44] TSA's second annual recertification testing,
which began in October 2004, included components for dual-function
TSOs, but did not include an image recognition module for checked
baggage TSOs--which would include dual-function screeners performing
checked baggage screening. TSA officials stated that a decision was
made to not include an image recognition module for checked baggage
TSOs during this cycle because not all checked baggage TSOs would have
completed training on the onscreen resolution protocol by the time
recertification testing was conducted at their airports.[Footnote 45]
In October 2005, TSA released guidance for screener recertification
that included an image recognition module for checked baggage and dual-
function screeners trained in the onscreen alarm resolution protocol.
In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of
TSOs, TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure the
effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems.
These indexes measure overall performance through a composite of
indicators and are derived by combining specific performance measures
relating to passenger and checked baggage screening, respectively.
Specifically, these indexes measure the effectiveness of the screening
systems through machine probability of detection and covert testing
results;[Footnote 46] efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent
per passenger or bag screened; and customer satisfaction through a
national poll, customer surveys, and customer complaints at both
airports and TSA's national call center. We reported in May 2005 that
the screening performance indexes developed by TSA can be a useful
analysis tool, but without targets for each component of the index, TSA
will have difficulty performing meaningful analyses of the parts that
make up to the index. For example, without performance targets for
covert testing, TSA will not have identified a desired level of
performance related to screener detection of threat objects.
Performance targets for covert testing would enable TSA to focus its
improvement efforts on areas determined to be most critical, as 100
percent detection capability may not be attainable. In January 2005,
TSA officials stated that the agency planned to track the performance
of individual index components and establish performance targets
against which to measure these components.
Concluding Observations:
Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant accomplishments in
meeting congressional mandates related to establishing passenger and
checked baggage screening operations. With the initial congressional
mandates now largely met, TSA has turned its attention to assessing and
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of its passenger and checked
baggage screening systems. As threats and technology evolve, it is
vital that TSA continue to enhance training and procedures for the TSO
workforce. Over the past several years, TSA has strengthened its TSO
training program in an effort to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge
and skills needed to successfully perform their screening functions.
However, without addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing
training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport
training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening
workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at a
desired level. TSA is also revising existing screening procedures and
developing new procedures to enhance security effectiveness, many of
which are risk-based, as we have previously advocated. Additionally,
TSA has developed a staffing model intended to provide the necessary
levels of TSOs to support security activities at the nation's airports.
However, given the challenges TSA faces in determining appropriate
staffing levels at airports--to include hiring the appropriate mix of
part-time TSOs needed to support screening functions--it is critical
that TSA carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys, and
manages its TSO workforce to help strengthen its passenger and checked
baggage screening programs.
As TSA works towards improving the performance of individual TSOs and
screening operations, it will also be important that the agency deploy
and leverage screening equipment and technologies, sustain its research
and development efforts, and strengthen its R&D management and planning
efforts. We are encouraged that TSA is currently undertaking efforts to
systematically analyze the cost and benefits of in-line baggage
screening systems and to identify innovative funding and financing
options. This planning should help TSA support future funding requests
by demonstrating enhanced security, improved operational efficiencies,
and cost savings to both TSA and the affected airports.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, Kristy Brown, Philip Caramia,
Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Christine Fossett, Tom Lombardi, Laina
Poon, and Maria Strudwick made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) with responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation, including aviation. Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101, 115
Stat. 597 (2001). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on
November 25, 2002, transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department
of Homeland Security Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178.
[2] TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a
screener conducted by TSA, on any screening function, to assess the
screener's threat item detection ability or adherence to TSA-approved
procedures.
[3] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for screening
all checked baggage using explosive detection systems was, in effect,
extended until December 31, 2003.
[4] Sterile areas are areas located within the terminal where
passengers wait after screening to board departing aircraft. Access to
these areas is generally controlled by TSA screeners at checkpoints
where they conduct physical screening of passengers and their carry-on
baggage for weapons and explosives.
[5] TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in
accordance with passenger screening standard operating procedures. If
an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must
not be allowed into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft.
[6] Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine
objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of
threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode.
[7] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials.
[8] Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening
checked baggage that requires that the passenger be on the same
aircraft as the checked baggage.
[9] ATSA required that TSA begin allowing all commercial airports to
apply to TSA to transition from a federal to a private TSO workforce.
To support this effort, TSA created the Screening Partnership Program
to allow all commercial airports an opportunity to apply to TSA for
permission to use qualified private screening contractors and private
sector screeners. Currently, private screening companies provide
passenger and checked baggage screening at six airports.
[10] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064 (2005); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 49-
50 (2005).
[11] GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
[12] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat 3638, 3723-24.
[13] One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-
overtime hours.
[14] This budgetary FTE limit is not to be confused with the 45,000 FTE
screener cap imposed by Congress in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act
that limits the total number of FTE screeners available to TSA.
[15] We interviewed FSD staff at 3 category X airports, 1 category I
airports, and 1 category III airport. TSA classifies the commercial
airports in the United States into one of five security risk categories
(X, I, II, III, IV, and V) based on various factors, such as the total
number of takeoffs and landings annually, and other special security
considerations. In general, category X airports have the largest number
of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest.
[16] GAO-04-440T.
[17] GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 24, 2003).
[18] Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports issued
by OIAPR.
[19] GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington
D.C.: May 2, 2005).
[20] According to the budget request, the remaining $36 million is
needed to support operations and maintenance costs, including recurring
costs for routers, switches, circuits, cabinets, racks, and network
monitoring.
[21] In April 2005, TSA began documenting proposed changes to passenger
checkpoint screening procedures.
[22] TSA does not review proposed SOP changes on a regular basis.
Rather, the administration accumulates proposed changes and reviews
them periodically on an as-needed basis. Since TSA began documenting
proposed changes to checkpoint screening procedures, the agency has
conducted three reviews of proposed changes, which took place in April
2005, August 2005, and September 2005.
[23] TSA attributed nine proposed changes to senior leadership
direction, and TSA did not categorize five proposed changes from 2005.
[24] Office of Inspections recommended two additional changes to
checkpoint screening procedures prior to March 2005.
[25] A selectee is a person identified for additional screening by a
computer-assisted passenger screening system or another process as
determined and approved by TSA.
[26] This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if
received up front.
[27] For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-94 stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to
compute the present value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real
discount rate. Following Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost
savings are $1.14 billion. In addition, in TSA's analysis, the federal
government does not pay for $319 million, or 25 percent, of project
costs. Accounting for these costs to reflect total costs, as
recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall savings to $820 million.
[28] The relatively large costs for upfront in-line EDS at one airport
are not offset by the modest amount of estimated operation and
maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS system may be more
costly than EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another airport the
upfront costs of in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone EDS, and
there is a substantial amount of estimated operation and maintenance
cost savings. Therefore, the in-line EDS system for this latter airport
may be less costly than stand-alone EDS.
[29] GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and
Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).
[30] The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs'
detection capabilities by projecting threat images, including images of
guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened. TSOs are
responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling for
the bag to be searched.
[31] GAO-03-1173.
[32] Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time assignment
for the majority of OI staff. According to OI, 14 full-time-equivalent
positions in headquarters are dedicated fully to the covert testing
program, which includes covert testing of all modes of transportation,
not just airports. These 14 full-time-equivalents are in a special
group that forms the core of team leaders for the covert testing trips.
[33] OI conducted a total of 2,369 passenger and checked baggage covert
tests in fiscal year 2004.
[34] Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were not
identified using the principles of probability sampling. In a
probability sample to assess screener detection of threat objects, each
screening of a passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of
being selected. A well-designed probability sample would enable failure
rates to be generalized to all airports. However, for cost and
operational reasons, probability sampling may not be feasible for
passenger and checked baggage screening because it would require a very
large sample size and an exhaustive examination of each sampled
passenger or baggage to determine if there was a threat object to
detect.
[35] In August 2004, OI began piloting various enhanced covert test
scenarios based on more current threat information.
[36] The review examined elements of the Department of Homeland
Security in order to recommend ways that DHS could better manage risk
in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence; prioritize policies
and operational missions according to this risk-based approach; and
establish a series of preventive and protective steps that would
increase security at multiple levels.
[37] OI conducted testing at two of the three airports twice during
September 2005 through December 2005.
[38] The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004 and
August 2004 to provide information on alternative testing methods.
[39] GAO-05-457.
[40] The TIP database records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false alarm
rate. These two results are used to determine the probability of
detection and probability of false alarm, which determine overall TIP
performance. The TIP performance measure is classified as sensitive
security information.
[41] GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-505T
(Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004).
[42] We cannot reported on the specific results of the testing due to
the security classification of this testing.
[43] Information related to the measures is sensitive security
information.
[44] As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce included
approximately 25,947 dual-trained TSOs who were certified to serve as
passenger or baggage TSOs.
[45] TSA's onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS
machine alarm goes off, indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA
screeners, by reviewing computer-generated images of the inside of the
bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item or items are in
fact explosive materials. If the screener is unable to make this
determination, the bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an
area where it receives a secondary screening by a screener with an ETD
machine.
[46] According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are
established by the certification standards for each particular model of
machine, and machines are not deployed unless they have met those
standards.
