Federal Emergency Management Agency
Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement Gao ID: GAO-06-746T May 9, 2006The size and strength of hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history and raised major questions about our nation's readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO has a large body of completed and ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricane Katrina as well as a wealth of historical experience in reviewing the federal government's response to disasters and catastrophic events. A great deal of attention has been focused on lessons learned from the 2005 hurricane season and many recommendations have been advanced on how to improve the nation's preparedness and ability to effectively respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO's testimony today describes some factors for success and other issues that Congress may wish to consider as it determines what changes to make, including those of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) organizational placement, to improve the nation's readiness and ability to respond effectively to major disasters, including catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause.
Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina, questions have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement, including whether FEMA should be disbanded and functions moved to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or again become an independent agency. The history of the federal government's approach to emergency management reflects experience with specific disasters and differences in opinion regarding the most effective structure for this function. Prior to 1979, emergency management was led by the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. FEMA was established as an independent agency in 1979. Based on recommendations following the response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, FEMA was elevated to a cabinet level agency whose director reported to the President. In March 2003, FEMA became part of DHS. As Comptroller General Walker has noted previously, a number of factors may be ultimately more important to FEMA's success in responding to and recovering from future disasters than its organizational placement. These include: the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities and authorities; the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership; the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological resources; and the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships. As Congress considers changing FEMA's organizational placement, it may also wish to consider key issues affecting organizational structure, including: the relevance of FEMA's mission to the broader organization in which it resides; the extent to which goals and objectives are shared; the ability to leverage effectively the resources of other agencies and programs; and gains in efficiency and effectiveness through eliminating duplications and overlaps. The nation's next major response and recovery challenge, whether natural or man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA's efforts to improve its preparedness and capability. Although organizational structure is important, future success is likely to principally depend upon focus, skilled leadership, clear roles and responsibilities, operational plans realistically exercised, and key resources appropriately and effectively deployed.
GAO-06-746T, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement
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Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security,
U.S. House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, May 9, 2006:
Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational
Placement:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-06-746T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-746T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The size and strength of hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the
largest natural disasters in our nation‘s history and raised major
questions about our nation‘s readiness and ability to respond to
catastrophic disasters. GAO has a large body of completed and ongoing
work on a range of issues relating to all phases of the preparation,
response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricane Katrina
as well as a wealth of historical experience in reviewing the federal
government‘s response to disasters and catastrophic events.
A great deal of attention has been focused on lessons learned from the
2005 hurricane season and many recommendations have been advanced on
how to improve the nation‘s preparedness and ability to effectively
respond to catastrophic disasters. GAO‘s testimony today describes some
factors for success and other issues that Congress may wish to consider
as it determines what changes to make, including those of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency‘s (FEMA) organizational placement, to
improve the nation‘s readiness and ability to respond effectively to
major disasters, including catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause.
What GAO Found:
Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina,
questions have been raised regarding the agency's organizational
placement, including whether FEMA should be disbanded and functions
moved to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland
Security, or again become an independent agency.
The history of the federal government‘s approach to emergency
management reflects experience with specific disasters and differences
in opinion regarding the most effective structure for this function.
Prior to 1979, emergency management was led by the Federal Disaster
Assistance Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. FEMA was established as an independent agency in 1979.
Based on recommendations following the response to Hurricane Andrew in
1992, FEMA was elevated to a cabinet level agency whose director
reported to the President. In March 2003, FEMA became part of DHS.
As Comptroller General Walker has noted previously, a number of factors
may be ultimately more important to FEMA's success in responding to and
recovering from future disasters than its organizational placement.
These include
* the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities and
authorities;
* the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership;
* the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological resources; and
* the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships.
As Congress considers changing FEMA‘s organizational placement, it may
also wish to consider key issues affecting organizational structure,
including
* the relevance of FEMA‘s mission to the broader organization in which
it resides;
* the extent to which goals and objectives are shared;
* the ability to leverage effectively the resources of other agencies
and programs; and
* gains in efficiency and effectiveness through eliminating
duplications and overlaps.
The nation‘s next major response and recovery challenge, whether
natural or man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA‘s
efforts to improve its preparedness and capability. Although
organizational structure is important, future success is likely to
principally depend upon focus, skilled leadership, clear roles and
responsibilities, operational plans realistically exercised, and key
resources appropriately and effectively deployed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making recommendations at this time.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-746T].
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202)-512-8757 or
jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the future of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
My remarks today are grounded in the work GAO has done to date on
FEMA's performance in the days, weeks, and months after hurricane
Katrina as well as our completed work on FEMA's role in responding to
and recovering from prior disasters and catastrophes before and after
its incorporation into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). My
remarks are also fully consistent with Comptroller General Walker's
previous testimony on this subject matter.
The events of hurricane Katrina graphically demonstrated the
limitations of the nation's ability to respond to a catastrophic
disaster. FEMA, within DHS, has the primary responsibility for
coordinating and implementing key aspects of the federal emergency
response and, as a result, has come under fire for shortcomings in its
mission performance after the disaster. Reports from the House, Senate,
White House, DHS Inspector General, and FEMA all identified problems in
FEMA's leadership and capabilities in the preparation for, response to,
and short-term recovery from hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 1] These
reports, along with our own observations, indicate that there were
concerns about FEMA's leadership of the federal response and questions
regarding the missions, roles, and responsibilities of FEMA and other
federal, state, and local officials and organizations in preparing for
and responding to hurricane Katrina. FEMA's capabilities were stretched
to the limit and beyond, as reflected by, for example, a limited
ability to marshal, transport, and track the delivery of commodities to
areas of greatest need; difficulties in providing the number of
emergency response staff with the knowledge and experience to meet the
needs of thousands of disaster victims; and the inadequate capacity of
FEMA's information systems. Finally, the reports and our own work
identified concerns regarding the effectiveness of planning, exercises,
and related partnerships, functions traditionally supported by FEMA
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs.
The observations in this statement are based on prior GAO reports, our
ongoing work on hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and GAO field visits to
the affected Gulf Coast areas. We also have done a great deal of work
on prior disasters. In 1993, we conducted several reviews examining the
federal response to hurricane Andrew. All of these reviews focused on
the unique challenges involved in responding to catastrophic disasters.
These reviews defined catastrophic disasters as a subset of other
disasters requiring federal assistance. Unlike the bulk of disasters
requiring FEMA to respond, catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the
ability of state, local, and voluntary agencies to adequately provide
victims with essential services, such as food and water, within 12 to
24 hours. We also conducted extensive work following the events of
September 11, 2001.[Footnote 2] These prior GAO reports focused on
improving the immediate response to catastrophic disasters, and we made
various recommendations within this context, many of which continue to
apply and help form the basis of our views on the issue of FEMA's
future organizational placement today.
GAO teams have visited the areas most affected by hurricanes Katrina
and Rita--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We interviewed
officials and analyzed information from the various involved federal
agencies, such as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and
local organizations, including state emergency management agencies;
state adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from
nongovernmental agencies. Additionally, we have closely followed the
hearings conducted by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, the House's Select Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, and other
congressional committees on hurricane Katrina issues. We have studied
the House Select Committee report, the White House report on lessons
learned from the federal response to hurricane Katrina, the Department
of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, FEMA's
initial response assessment of the agency's performance during
hurricane Katrina, as well as the report released last week by the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We
discussed our preliminary observations with the Deputy Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security in March 2006 before testifying on our
observations of federal preparation, response, and recovery efforts
related to hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 3]
Summary:
A catastrophic disaster, such as hurricane Katrina, almost immediately
overwhelms state and local response capacity, degrading the ability of
state and local personnel to respond effectively. Hurricane Katrina
destroyed or crippled essential communications infrastructure in the
hardest-hit areas, further exacerbating the ability of state and local
personnel to respond. In preparing for and responding to any major
disaster, but particularly a catastrophic one, the roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the preparation and
response at all levels of government must be clearly defined and
communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision
making. At the same time, effective decision making depends on having
trained and experienced leaders equipped with the resources and
capabilities needed to implement those decisions. Capabilities--the
ability to carry out specific tasks with desired results--are built
upon the appropriate combination of resources including people,
processes, funds, and technology. Ensuring that those capabilities are
available and effective requires planning, coordination, training, and
exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested, problems
identified, and issues subsequently addressed in partnership with other
federal, state, and local stakeholders.
Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina,
questions have been raised regarding the agency's organizational
placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved
to other agencies, remain within DHS, or again become an independent
agency. In our view, taking actions to improve the weaknesses
identified in after-the-fact analyses of FEMA's performance before,
during, and after hurricane Katrina may be more important to FEMA's
success in responding to and aiding the recovery from future disasters,
most importantly the 2006 hurricane season, than its organizational
placement. Factors that might affect performance include:
* the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities and
authorities;
* the experience of, and training provided to, FEMA leadership;
* the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological resources;
and:
* the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships.
If a change in FEMA's organizational placement is considered, we
believe certain other issues should be considered to assess alternative
approaches. These include issues such as mission relevancy and shared
goals and objectives, as well as leveraging effectiveness and gains
through consolidation.
Background:
In considering FEMA's future, it is useful to understand its past.
Before the establishment of FEMA and its placement within DHS, federal
disaster response and recovery was also managed by an agency within an
executive department. The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive
disasters requiring major federal response and recovery operations by
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, established within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Hurricane Carla struck in
1962, hurricane Betsy in 1965, hurricane Camille in 1969, and hurricane
Agnes in 1972. The San Fernando earthquake rocked Southern California
in 1971, and the Alaskan earthquake hit in 1964. To respond to national
concern regarding these events, the Congress passed the 1974 Disaster
Relief Act that established the process of Presidential disaster
declarations.
However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented. Many
parallel programs and policies existed at the state and local level,
compounding the complexity of federal disaster relief efforts. In 1979,
President Carter issued an executive order that merged many of the
separate disaster-related responsibilities into a new, independent
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Among other agencies, FEMA
absorbed the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire
Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service
Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the
General Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense responsibilities were
also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department's
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.
FEMA led the federal response to hurricane Andrew, which slammed into
and leveled much of South Florida in August 1992. In 1993, we conducted
several reviews examining the federal response. The reviews focused on
the unique challenges involved in responding to catastrophic disasters
and raised questions about whether and how national disaster response
efforts had incorporated lessons from experiences with hurricane Hugo
in 1989.[Footnote 4] These prior GAO reports focused on improving the
immediate response to catastrophic disasters, and we made various
recommendations within this context. While some of our prior
recommendations were acted upon, others were not. For example,
President Clinton elevated the FEMA director to cabinet status in 1996,
providing the type of direct communication and lines of responsibility
we had recommended. However, we also recommended that FEMA improve its
catastrophic disaster response capability by using existing authority
to aggressively respond to catastrophic disasters, assessing the extent
of the damage, and then advising state and local officials of
identified needs and the federal resources available to address them.
One criticism of the FEMA response to hurricane Katrina was that FEMA
officials were more reactive than proactive in identifying the
emergency needs of communities in the immediate days after the
disaster.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 5] which established DHS,
created new requirements for emergency preparedness and response,
including developing a comprehensive National Incident Management
System (NIMS) and a comprehensive National Response Plan (NRP). NIMS is
intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity
of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of
federal, state, and local governments and various first responder
disciplines at each level during an emergency event. NIMS established
the Incident Command System (ICS) as a standard incident management
organization with five functional areas--command, operations, planning,
logistics, and finance/administration--for management of all major
incidents. It also prescribes interoperable communications systems and
preparedness before an incident happens, including planning, training,
and exercises. The NRP is intended to be an all- discipline, all-
hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the
management of domestic incidents where federal involvement is
necessary. It is to operate within the framework of NIMS.
On March 1, 2003, FEMA became part of DHS pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. FEMA retained its authority to administer the
provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (the Stafford Act),[Footnote 6] which sets forth the
primary programs and processes for the federal government to provide
major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments,
tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit
organizations. Among its missions within DHS, FEMA is to lead the
effort to prepare the nation for natural and man-made disasters and
effectively manage federal response and recovery efforts following any
presidentially declared incident. FEMA is also to initiate proactive
mitigation activities, train first responders, and manage the National
Flood Insurance Program. FEMA shares responsibility for preparing the
nation for natural and man-made disasters with other organizations
within DHS, including the Office of Grants and Training that
administers federal homeland security grants for state and local first
responders.
Factors Other Than Organizational Placement May Affect FEMA's
Performance:
Organizational changes, such as separating FEMA from DHS, are often
viewed as a fix to address performance issues. Our institutional
knowledge regarding organizational performance factors suggests that
organizational changes alone may not adequately address underlying
systemic conditions that result in an organization's performance
problem. Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in
our nation's history; its size and strength will have effects for years
to come. It exacted terrible human costs with the loss of significant
numbers of lives and resulted in billions of dollars in property
damage, clearly overwhelming the capabilities of several federal,
state, and local agencies. Nevertheless, after-the-fact analyses point
to improvements needed in (1) the clarity of FEMA's mission and related
responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission performance
expectations; (2) the experience and training of FEMA leadership; (3)
the adequacy of FEMA's human, financial, and technological resources;
and (4) the effectiveness of FEMA's planning, exercises, and related
partnerships. If successfully implemented, such improvements may
obviate the need for major organizational changes.
Clarity of FEMA's Mission and Related Responsibilities and Authorities:
In the event of a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels
must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to
facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing
for and in the early hours and days after the disaster. In the
aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 1992, we discussed the critical
importance of clearly defining and communicating leadership roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for catastrophic response in
advance of such events. Based on our assessments of the federal
response, we recommended that in a catastrophic disaster a single
individual directly responsible and accountable to the President should
be designated to act as the central focal point to lead and coordinate
the overall federal response when a catastrophic disaster has happened
or is imminent. President Clinton's elevation of the position of FEMA
director to cabinet status in 1996 provided the direct lines of
communication and accountability envisioned in our recommendation. The
subsequent incorporation of FEMA into DHS changed the direct reporting
relationship between FEMA and the President. With the passage and
subsequent implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
Secretary of DHS, rather than the FEMA Director, became the cabinet-
level focal point for natural and man-made crises and emergency
planning. The incorporation of FEMA into DHS raised questions during
hurricane Katrina regarding lines of authority with respect to not only
the DHS Secretary and the FEMA Director, but also the key officials
reporting to them, the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO), respectively.
During incidents of national significance, including catastrophic
disasters, the overall coordination of federal incident management
activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security under
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-5 (HSPD-5), and the NRP. There are three key leadership roles
defined under the NRP needed to manage a catastrophic disaster. First,
the role of the Secretary of Homeland Security is to provide strategic,
national leadership as the focal point for federal response and
coordination. Second, the role of the PFO is to act as the Secretary of
Homeland Security's formally designated representative locally to
oversee, coordinate, and execute the secretary's incident management
responsibilities. Third, the FCO is a position created by the Stafford
Act and is appointed by the FEMA Director to manage federal resource
support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies.
The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal
disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected localities
by making mission assignments to specific federal agencies that have
needed resources and capabilities.
FEMA's incorporation into DHS appears to have introduced some
uncertainty regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of the
DHS secretary and the PFO relative to the FEMA director and the FCO.
The questions raised by the various assessments of the federal response
during hurricane Katrina highlight the importance of clarity in FEMA's
mission and related responsibilities and authorities, as the following
examples illustrate:
* The White House report recommended that the PFO be given operational
authority to manage and coordinate federal response, assets and, in a
multi-state disaster, to oversee the multiple federal coordinating
officers operating in the various states and make any operational
decisions necessary, within the law, without having to obtain approval
from headquarters.
* The DHS OIG recommended that FEMA clarify the roles of the PFO, the
FCO, the Federal Resource Coordinator, and the Disaster Recovery
Manager to provide a clear distinction for the types and levels of
response activities that warrant a combination or modification to those
roles; develop procedures for the timely activation of each role; and,
ensure that these officials be provided with the necessary training to
complement their qualifications for serving in these positions.
Similarly, the OIG recommended that FEMA establish clear roles and
responsibilities for the Housing Area Command and define its reporting
requirements and chain of command relationships with the FEMA
headquarters, Joint Field Offices, and Technical Assistance
Contractors.
* FEMA's internal assessment identified the need for senior management
to develop doctrine to provide a single, simplified command structure
for operations in temporary joint field offices created to lead federal
response and recovery efforts.
* The Senate report recommended that the Stafford Act should be amended
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and the NRP
should be revised to eliminate the PFO position for Stafford Act-
declared emergencies and disasters.
More explicit authority is needed to enhance federal leadership in
situations when it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to
catastrophic magnitude in a more proactive manner. In our July 1993
report on the federal response to hurricane Andrew, we also noted that
encouraging agencies to do as much catastrophic disaster preparation as
possible in advance of a Stafford Act declaration could reduce the
federal response time to the ensuing catastrophe. We stated that when
there is early warning, as there usually is with hurricanes, federal
agencies must mobilize resources and deploy personnel before the
catastrophe strikes. However, the Stafford Act did not, and still does
not, explicitly authorize such predeclaration activities. As a result,
federal agencies may fail to undertake extensive predeclaration
preparations because of uncertainty over whether FEMA will request
their assistance under the Stafford Act and ultimately reimburse their
predeclaration costs. Therefore, we continue to believe that Congress
should consider giving federal agencies, including FEMA, explicit
authority under the Stafford Act to take actions to prepare for a
catastrophic disaster when there is warning.
Experience and Training of FEMA Leadership:
In order to effectively fulfill the leadership roles and
responsibilities and to exercise lines of authority for the response at
all levels to facilitate rapid and effective decision making in the
event of a catastrophic disaster, leaders should have the experience
and training needed to perform effectively, especially in the early
hours and days after the disaster. In the aftermath of hurricane Andrew
in 1992, we discussed the critical importance of the quality of
leadership during catastrophic disasters. For example, we noted that
leadership creates a powerful, meaningful perception that the federal
government recognizes an event is catastrophic, is in control, and is
going to use every means necessary to meet the immediate mass-care
needs of disaster victims. Assessments of FEMA's performance during and
after hurricane Katrina have raised similar issues and resulted in
recommendations related to the experience and training of FEMA
leadership, as illustrated in the following examples:
* The House Select Committee concluded that federal agencies, including
DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and
responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. According to the Committee's
report, senior officials were ill-prepared due to their lack of
experience and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities
prescribed by the NRP, and FEMA lacked adequately trained and
experienced staff for the hurricane Katrina response. The report noted
that, since 2002, FEMA had lost a number of its top disaster
specialists, senior leaders, and experienced personnel and that even
before hurricane Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of sufficiently
trained procurement professionals.
* The White House report included recommendations to enhance DHS
expertise and experience and to develop DHS regions that would be fully
staffed, trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all
preparedness activities and any emergency that may require a
substantial federal response. The report also recommended the
establishment of a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP for all
department and agency personnel with incident management
responsibilities, noting that each Regional Director should have
significant expertise and experience, core competency in emergency
preparedness and incident management, and demonstrated leadership
ability.
* FEMA's assessment of the agency's performance during and after
hurricane Katrina resulted in a recommendation that emergency
management personnel at all levels should be required to have training
on ICS and the NRP and recommended the creation of a rotational
training program for field personnel to spend time at FEMA headquarters
and for FEMA managers at headquarters to train in the field on
simulated and actual disaster events. The assessment also recommended
that FEMA identify and name qualified personnel with leadership ability
and emergency response experience as FEMA liaison officers for
counties, parishes, or boroughs in advance of disasters. Further, it
recommended a more comprehensive training program to prepare existing
and new personnel for Disaster Recovery Center assignments.
* The Senate report concluded that training and exercises were needed
to ensure that everyone involved in disaster response understands their
roles and responsibilities and is prepared to carry them out.
Adequacy of FEMA's Human, Financial, and Technological Resources:
Even trained and experienced leaders who share a clear and common
understanding of their mission and authorities across a community of
federal, state, and local emergency management officials cannot
effectively implement those authorities or exercise leadership without
access to the human, financial, and technological resources needed to
take action. For noncatastrophic disasters, the federal government
should be in a support and assist role, providing resources and other
assistance to enable state and local governments to carry out their
responsibilities. However, for catastrophic disasters that can
overwhelm the ability of state and local and voluntary agencies to
adequately provide victims with essential services, the federal
government should be more proactive, anticipating state and local
needs, pre-positioning resources, and providing selected resources
where they are needed or likely to be needed. The federal government
must develop more capabilities and expertise to respond proactively
when a catastrophic disaster is imminent or occurs.
When we reviewed FEMA's response to hurricane Andrew in 1992, we
concluded that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate had many of the
people and resources needed, with people skilled in such areas as
strategic and tactical planning, logistics, command and control, and
communications, and resources including communications, transportation,
life support, as well as sophisticated computer- modeling equipment. At
that time we reported that, through constant planning and exercising,
the directorate had maintained a high level of readiness and was able
to quickly deploy people and resources from a number of locations to
anywhere in the United States (although we identified a number of
shortcomings in FEMA's response that primarily reflected the magnitude
of the disaster.) Unfortunately, the various reports and our own work
on FEMA's performance before, during, and after hurricane Katrina
suggest that FEMA's human, financial, and technological resources were
insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented degree
of damage and the resulting number of disaster victims of the
hurricane, as the following examples illustrate:
* The Senate's report concluded that FEMA did not have the resources to
fulfill the mission and respond effectively in a catastrophic event and
recommended that DHS must develop the national capabilities--especially
surge capacity--it needs to respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring
it has sufficient full-time staff, response teams, contracting
personnel, and adequately trained and sufficiently staffed reserve
corps to ramp up capabilities, as needed. In terms of technology, the
Senate report recommended that DHS complete and/or adopt technology and
information management systems to effectively manage disaster-related
activities and develop an efficient ordering system that minimizes
delays and provides order status and accurate, timely commodity
tracking as well as a transportation protocol that moves commodities
and resources directly from the supplier to the users. The report
concluded that resources are needed for staffing and preparation of
regional strike teams, better development of a trained cadre of
reservists, and the development of new logistics capabilities.
* DHS's OIG report included a number of recommendations related to
enhancing human and technological resources and capabilities. The
recommendations directed FEMA to:
* develop a disaster workforce plan for standing capability for
permanent, temporary, and reserve staff responsive to previous disaster
needs and also develop a plan that is scalable to other events
irrespective of cause, size, or complexity;
* provide training to additional National Processing Service Center
staff and contractors to enhance FEMA's capability to perform applicant
assistance and case management activities responsive to the needs of
applications;
* develop a more comprehensive program to recruit, train, and retain
local hires for use in augmenting FEMA's disaster assistance employees
and permanent staff;
* determine and fill requirements to provide emergency responders with
communications equipment capable of performing in austere conditions;
and:
* develop and implement a resource-tracking system that is capable of
documenting whether resources were delivered and the efficiency with
which the resource was provided.
* FEMA's initial response assessment concluded that the agency needs to
lead an audit of current staffing capability and workforce demands for
staff in a severe or catastrophic event and determine the number of
personnel available to serve in each position or unit for such a
disaster. This information is to be used to develop and implement a
strategy for addressing any identified staffing gaps. The assessment
also concluded that FEMA needs to develop a communications suite that
operates independently of normal communications infrastructure and is
able to be moved into disaster locations.
* The White House report identified the need for each homeland security
region to have access to the resources, equipment, and personnel needed
to establish a self-sufficient temporary Joint Field Office to direct
response and recovery efforts anywhere within the region.
* The House Select Committee also concluded that despite extensive
preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to respond to the
catastrophic effects of hurricane Katrina. For example, the report
noted that FEMA's logistics and contracting systems did not support a
targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities; long-
standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed
FEMA's ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing; and
the readiness of FEMA's national emergency response teams was
inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response.
Effectiveness of FEMA's Planning, Exercises, and Related Partnerships:
Fewer federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic
disaster if state and local governments' response capabilities are
greater. The goal of emergency planning is simple: to have the skills
and resources to respond, when needed, with well-planned, well-
coordinated, and effective efforts to save lives and property and aid
recovery from the emergency or disaster--regardless of the size or
nature of the emergency. However, because FEMA is not a first
responder, state and local government officials and emergency and
homeland security managers must take the lead in developing strategic
and operational plans and identifying the basic capabilities each
jurisdiction might need to meet local, regional, and state prevention,
mitigation, response, and recovery expectations--whether defined by
federal guidance or by state and local assessments. That is because
local officials are most knowledgeable of their communities, including
their needs and capabilities. In addition, local emergency first
responders--police, fire fighters, emergency medical personnel, and
others such as public health and hospital personnel--will still be the
first on the scene of an incident.
Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to test
emergency management plans. It is important that exercises be designed
to be both as realistic as possible and stress the emergency management
system as almost any major event will. The training should also be
linked to the essential capabilities and emphasize identifying,
developing, and sustaining baseline capabilities for prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery. This would involve defining
baseline capabilities at each level of government--federal, regional,
state, and local--and surge capabilities in the event of a catastrophic
disaster, based on risk to an individual jurisdiction and what would be
required to support mutual aid compacts.
In our previous work on hurricane Andrew, we identified the critical
importance of conducting strong advance planning and robust training
and exercise programs and the need for the federal government to
upgrade training and exercises for state and local governments
specifically geared toward catastrophic disaster response. Our review
uncovered shortcomings both in the way FEMA helps state and local
governments train and conduct exercises in anticipation of catastrophic
disasters and in the way it monitors state and local preparedness.
Thus, we concluded that FEMA could do more to ensure that state and
local governments prepare for catastrophic disaster response.
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the potential benefits of applying
lessons learned from training exercises and experiences with actual
hurricanes as well as the dangers of ignoring them. For example,
confusion with emergency plans complicated the evacuations and
everything that followed. Clearly, plans were not implemented or were
only partially implemented, and state officials requested aid early but
in some cases were slow to deploy their own resources. Our own work and
assessments of FEMA's performance during and after hurricane Katrina
have made a variety of recommendations intended to improve the
effectiveness of federal planning, exercises, and related partnerships,
as the following examples show:
* The White House report recommended that DHS (1) develop and implement
homeland security regions that are fully staffed, trained, and equipped
to manage and coordinate all preparedness activities and any emergency
that may require a substantial federal response and (2) conduct
training and exercises for key state and local officials.
* The Senate report recommended that (1) national emergency response
plans be reviewed and coordinated with the states and on a regional
basis to ensure the plans are understood, trained, and exercised prior
to an emergency; (2) officials in emergency agencies at the federal,
state, and local levels of government, as well as first responder
groups outside of government receive regular training on NRP and NIMS;
(3) DHS consider tying future cost-share requirements for preparedness
grant funds to performance and results of these exercises; (4) DHS
establish regional strike teams and enhance regional operations--
building on FEMA's 10 existing regional offices--to provide better
coordination between federal agencies and the states in preparing for
and responding to disasters; and (5) resources be provided for
additional planning and more frequent and ambitious training and
exercises.
* The DHS OIG report recommended that FEMA (1) develop and implement a
system that automates and tracks the selection, deployment, training,
and demobilization of responders; (2) develop more effective and
efficient plans for the delivery of assistance to address long-term
housing issues, and test these plans in a simulated environment before
application in actual disasters; (3) request an appropriation or
provide other funding, resources, and institutional support to agency
components and to state and local partners to complete draft or
proposed catastrophic planning initiatives for natural disasters; (4)
develop a formal mechanism to ensure continuity between preparedness,
response, and recovery by including FEMA regional staff in the
Preparedness Directorate's relationships with state emergency
management agencies for grants, exercises, planning, technical
assistance, and training.
* The House report observed that the hurricane Pam exercise reflected
recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a category 4
or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans. Implementation of lessons learned
from hurricane Pam was incomplete.
* FEMA's initial assessment concluded that FEMA must develop a concept
of operations for logistically supporting Emergency Management
Assistance Compact resources that are requested for disaster response
efforts.
In summary, the difficulties described above would not, we believe, be
fixed by simply moving FEMA to an independent status. Indeed, we know
that many of lessons learned from hurricane Katrina were acted on for
hurricane Rita, with a much better response effort, indicating that
organizational change is not the primary key to success.
Taking actions to improve these operational weaknesses in FEMA's
performance before, during, and after hurricane Katrina may be more
important to FEMA's success in responding to and recovering from the
next hurricane season, than its organizational placement. Of course,
FEMA will need financial and other resources to address the problems
that have been identified in the wake of hurricane Katrina.
Issues for Consideration of a Change in FEMA's Organizational
Placement:
A number of alternative organizational changes are now being considered
in response to hurricane Katrina. For example, the White House report
recommended keeping FEMA within DHS, but would preserve FEMA as an
independent operating agency to perform its response and recovery
mission while making other organizational changes, such as transferring
the National Disaster Medical System from DHS to the Department of
Health and Human Services. The Senate report recommended creation of a
new, comprehensive emergency management organization within DHS that
would fuse DHS's emergency management, preparedness, and critical
infrastructure assets into a new organization. Other observers have
proposed removing FEMA from DHS completely.
If an organizational change remains under consideration, our past work
could be helpful. Before the formation of DHS, the Comptroller General
testified before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security that
reorganizations of government agencies frequently encounter start-up
problems and unanticipated consequences and are unlikely to fully
overcome obstacles and challenges and may require additional
modifications in the future.[Footnote 7] He also asked a number of
questions related to mission relevancy and shared goals and leveraging
effectiveness and gains through consolidation that could be used to
evaluate whether individual agencies or programs should be included or
excluded from the proposed department. Some of these questions are
appropriate today for discussing FEMA's future, and I would suggest
that they might be useful if a change in FEMA's organizational
placement is under consideration.
Mission relevancy and shared goals:
* Is homeland security a major part of the agency or program mission?
Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?
* Does the agency or program being considered for the new department
share primary goals and objectives with the other agencies or programs
being consolidated?
Congress might consider whether or how moving FEMA out of DHS would
impact DHS's mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
of acting as a focal point for natural and man-made crises and
emergency planning. DHS's Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate--primarily FEMA--was to help ensure the effectiveness of
emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies. Removing FEMA from DHS might impact the ability of
the department and its remaining components and FEMA itself in fully
addressing the close links between preparedness, prevention, response,
and recovery for all hazards.
Leverage Effectiveness and Gains Through Consolidation:
* Does the agency or program being considered for the new department
create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness of other agencies
and programs or the new department as a whole?
* Does the agency or program being considered for the new department
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland security missions
through eliminating duplications and overlaps, closing gaps, and
aligning or merging common roles and responsibilities?
The dispersion of responsibility for preparedness and response across
more than one federal agency was a problem we identified during the
formation of DHS.[Footnote 8] As I mentioned earlier, FEMA was
established in 1979 to consolidate federal emergency preparedness
mitigation and response in a single federal agency. Its
responsibilities were to include, among other things, the coordination
of civil defense and civil emergency planning and the coordination of
federal disaster relief. FEMA was responsible for responding to a wide
range of disasters, including floods, hurricanes, earthquakes,
hazardous material accidents, nuclear accidents, and biological,
chemical, and nuclear attacks.[Footnote 9] However, when Congress
created DHS, it separated FEMA's responsibilities for preparedness and
response activities into two directorates. Responsibility for
preparedness for terrorism disasters was placed in the department's
Border and Transportation Security Directorate, which included FEMA's
Office of National Preparedness. Other types of FEMA disaster
preparedness and response efforts were transferred to the department's
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. In January 2003, we
observed that this organizational arrangement would challenge FEMA in
ensuring the effective coordination of preparedness and response
efforts and enhancing the provision and management of disaster
assistance for efficient and effective response.[Footnote 10]
A division of responsibility remains under the recent DHS
reorganization resulting from Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage Review
with preparedness efforts--including planning, training, exercising,
and funding--consolidated into a Preparedness Directorate. FEMA reports
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security for response and
recovery missions. Secretary Chertoff has stated the reorganization
would focus FEMA on its historic mission of response and recovery. We
believe this division of responsibility should be reconsidered.
Concluding Observations:
The next response and recovery challenge this nation will face, whether
natural or man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA's
efforts to improve its preparedness and capability. To encourage
agility and innovation in preparing for the next major disaster event,
focused, skilled leadership is essential, and these leaders must have
clear operational plans, realistically exercised, evaluated, and
adapted with key resources identified, provided, and appropriately
deployed. Organizational changes, while important, may not by
themselves necessarily produce these desired results. Incentives and
sanctions are also important as well as the responsibilities and
resource commitments of all levels of government and nongovernment
entities.
As the administration and the Congress assess if further organizational
changes are immediately necessary, we suggest they use the questions
discussed above as a basis for consideration to evaluate whether
individual agencies or programs, including FEMA, should be included or
excluded from DHS.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or other members of the committee may have at this
time.
FOOTNOTES
[1] These reports are: House Select Committee, A Failure of Initiative:
Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation For and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.:
February 2006); The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006); DHS Office
of Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster
Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington,
D.C.: March 2006); FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane
Katrina in Louisiana (Washington, D.C.: February 2006); and Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation
Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
[2] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA's Post 9/11 Public
Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-03-926 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 29, 2003) and GAO, September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster
Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-04-72 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
31, 2003).
[3] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).
[4] See, for example, GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's
Response to Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July
23, 1993) and GAO, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate
the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO-93-46
(Washington, D.C.: May 25, 1993).
[5] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[6] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.
[7] GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues,
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
[8] GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[9] GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23,
1993).
[10] GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal
Emergency Management Agency, GAO-03-113 (Washington, D.C.: January
2003).
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