Aviation Security
TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding Uncertainties Remain Gao ID: GAO-06-875T June 29, 2006The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed two types of baggage screening equipment: explosive detection systems (EDS), which use X-rays to scan bags for explosives, and explosive trace detection systems (ETD), in which bags are swabbed to test for chemical traces of explosives. TSA considers screening with EDS to be superior to screening with ETD because EDS machines process more bags per hour and automatically detect explosives without direct human involvement. In March 2005, GAO reported that while TSA had made progress in deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. GAO's testimony today updates our previous report and discusses TSA's (1) deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the identified benefits of in-line systems, and (2) planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and efforts to identify funding and financing options.
Since its inception in November 2001 through June 2006, TSA has procured and installed about 1,600 EDS machines and 7,200 ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400 airports. However, initial deployment of EDS machines in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD machines resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as compared with using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. For example, TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines required a greater number of screeners and resulted in screening fewer bags for explosives each hour. In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that many of the initial in-line EDS systems did not achieve the anticipated savings. However, recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. Finally, screening with in-line EDS systems may result in security benefits by reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, such as screening with explosives detection canines and physical bag searches, which involve trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to fund the installation of in-line EDS systems on a large-scale basis. In February 2006, TSA released its strategic planning framework for checked baggage screening aimed at increasing security through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-cycle costs, minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and airline operations, and providing a flexible security infrastructure. As part of this effort, TSA identified the 25 airports that should first receive federal funding for the installation of in-line EDS systems, and the optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes. In February 2006, TSA estimated that installing and operating the optimal checked baggage screening systems will cost about $22.4 billion over 20 years and reported that under current investment levels, installation of optimal baggage screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. TSA is collaborating with airport operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to identify funding and cost sharing strategies and is focusing its research and development efforts on the next generation of EDS technology.
GAO-06-875T, Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding Uncertainties Remain
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, June 29, 2006:
Aviation Security:
TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding Uncertainties Remain:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director Homeland Security and
Justice Issues:
GAO-06-875T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-875T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed two types
of baggage screening equipment: explosive detection systems (EDS),
which use X-rays to scan bags for explosives, and explosive trace
detection systems (ETD), in which bags are swabbed to test for chemical
traces of explosives. TSA considers screening with EDS to be superior
to screening with ETD because EDS machines process more bags per hour
and automatically detect explosives without direct human involvement.
In March 2005, GAO reported that while TSA had made progress in
deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic,
prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to
achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. GAO‘s
testimony today updates our previous report and discusses TSA‘s (1)
deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the identified benefits of in-
line systems, and (2) planning for the optimal deployment of checked
baggage screening systems and efforts to identify funding and financing
options.
What GAO Found:
Since its inception in November 2001 through June 2006, TSA has
procured and installed about 1,600 EDS machines and 7,200 ETD machines
to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400 airports. However,
initial deployment of EDS machines in a stand-alone mode”usually in
airport lobbies”and ETD machines resulted in operational inefficiencies
and security risks as compared with using EDS machines integrated in-
line with airport baggage conveyor systems. For example, TSA‘s use of
stand-alone EDS and ETD machines required a greater number of screeners
and resulted in screening fewer bags for explosives each hour. In March
2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help
fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that
screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government
about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that
many of the initial in-line EDS systems did not achieve the anticipated
savings. However, recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS
systems and EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for
higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. Finally, screening
with in-line EDS systems may result in security benefits by reducing
the need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, such as
screening with explosives detection canines and physical bag searches,
which involve trade-offs in security effectiveness.
TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of
checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made
available to fund the installation of in-line EDS systems on a large-
scale basis. In February 2006, TSA released its strategic planning
framework for checked baggage screening aimed at increasing security
through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-cycle costs,
minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and airline operations, and
providing a flexible security infrastructure. As part of this effort,
TSA identified the 25 airports that should first receive federal
funding for the installation of in-line EDS systems, and the optimal
checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports with the
highest checked baggage volumes. In February 2006, TSA estimated that
installing and operating the optimal checked baggage screening systems
will cost about $22.4 billion over 20 years and reported that under
current investment levels, installation of optimal baggage screening
systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. TSA is
collaborating with airport operators, airlines, and other key
stakeholders to identify funding and cost sharing strategies and is
focusing its research and development efforts on the next generation of
EDS technology.
Figure: EDS and ETD Machines Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO previously recommended that TSA systematically evaluate checked
baggage screening needs at airports, such as identifying the costs and
benefits of installing in-line systems or stand-alone EDS. DHS
generally concurred with our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-875T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at
(202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the
status of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to
deploy checked baggage screening technology to the nation's commercial
airports, and to discuss our work in this area. As you know, after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which highlighted the
vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to acts of terrorism, Congress passed
and the President signed into law, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), creating the TSA and mandating, among other
things, that all checked baggage at U.S. airports be screened using
explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002.[Footnote 1] To meet
this requirement, TSA deployed two types of equipment to screen checked
baggage for explosives: (1) explosives detection systems (EDS) that use
specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of explosives that may be
contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt and (2)
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, whereby a Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) swabs baggage and then inserts the swab into the
ETD machine, which in turn can detect chemical residues that may
indicate the presence of explosives within a bag.
In November 2002, Congress passed, and the President signed into law,
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which, in effect, extended the
deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives until
December 31, 2003, for airports at which TSA was unable to meet the
earlier deadline established by ATSA.[Footnote 2] In March 2005, we
reported that largely because of shortages of equipment and
insufficient time to modify airports to accommodate EDS machines, TSA
had been unable, at certain airports, to meet the 2002 congressionally
established deadline to screen all checked baggage for explosives using
explosive detection systems.[Footnote 3] We also reported that at most
smaller airports, where EDS machines are not installed, TSA screens
solely with ETD machines. Further we reported that while TSA had made
progress in deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a
systematic, prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these
machines to achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and
security. Finally, in February 2006, we reported that TSA considers
screening with EDS to be superior to screening with ETD because EDS
machines process more bags per hour and automatically detect explosives
without direct human involvement.[Footnote 4]
My testimony today updates the information we reported in March 2005,
and discusses (1) TSA's deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the
identified benefits of installing in-line checked baggage screening
systems at airports and (2) TSA's efforts to plan for and identify
funding options for the optimal deployment of EDS and ETD equipment,
including in-line checked baggage screening systems. My comments are
based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing TSA's checked
baggage screening program and our review of TSA documents related to
the deployment of checked baggage screening systems, including TSA's
February 2006 strategic planning framework for its checked baggage
screening program.[Footnote 5] We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains a
list of related GAO products issued on TSA's checked baggage screening
program.
Summary:
Since its inception in November 2001 through June 2006, TSA has
procured and installed about 1,600 EDS machines and about 7,200 ETD
machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400
commercial airports. However, initial deployment of EDS machines in a
stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD machines resulted
in operational inefficiencies and security risks as compared with using
EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems.
For example, TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines required a
greater number of screeners and resulted in screening fewer bags for
explosives each hour. Additionally, because in-line EDS checked baggage
screening systems can significantly reduce the need for TSOs to handle
baggage, installing them may also reduce the number of TSO on-the-job
injuries. In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA
has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA
estimated that screening with in-line EDS machines could save the
federal government about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006,
TSA reported that a savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be
realized over a period of 20 years by installing optimal checked
baggage screening systems, including in-line EDS machines, at the
airports with the highest checked baggage volumes. However, TSA also
reported in February 2006 that many of the initial in-line EDS systems
did not achieve the degree of anticipated savings initially estimated.
TSA has since determined that recent improvements in the design of the
in-line EDS systems and EDS screening technology now offer the
opportunity for higher performance and lower cost screening systems.
Screening with in-line EDS systems could also result in security
benefits by reducing congestion in airport lobbies and reducing the
need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, such as screening
with explosives detection canines and physical bag searches. TSA's use
of these procedures, which are only to be used when volumes of baggage
awaiting screening pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA officials
determine that there is a security risk associated with large
concentrations of passengers in an area, has involved trade-offs in
security effectiveness.[Footnote 6]
TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of
checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made
available to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-
scale basis. In February 2006, TSA released its strategic planning
framework for checked baggage screening aimed at increasing security
through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-cycle costs,
minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and airline operations, and
providing a flexible security infrastructure. According to TSA, the
framework will be used to establish a comprehensive strategic plan for
TSA's checked baggage screening program. TSA expects to complete the
strategic plan in early fall 2006. As part of this planning effort, TSA
identified, among other things, the top 25 airports that should first
receive federal funding for projects related to the installation of in-
line EDS systems, and the optimal checked baggage screening solutions
for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes. In June
2006, TSA officials reported that if the top 25 airports do not receive
in-line checked baggage screening systems, they will require additional
screening equipment to be placed in airport lobbies and additional TSO
staffing in order to remain in compliance with the mandate for
screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. In
February 2006, TSA estimated that the total cost of installing and
operating the optimal checked baggage screening systems at the 250
airports is approximately $22.4 billion over 20 years, of which about
$6 billion is for installation, life-cycle replacement, existing
committed funding, and equipment maintenance costs. However,
insufficient resources have been made available to fund in-line systems
on a large scale basis. TSA currently uses annual appropriations and a
mandatory appropriation from the Aviation Security Capital Fund to fund
the construction of in-line baggage screening systems[Footnote 7].
Further, in order to leverage federal and private sector resources, TSA
has supported the construction of in-line systems at 9 airports through
letter of intent agreement[Footnote 8]s. TSA reported that as of June
2006, 25 airports had operational in-line EDS systems and an additional
24 airports had in-line systems under development[Footnote 9]. In May
2006, TSA reported that under current investment levels, installation
of optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be completed
until approximately 2024. TSA is currently collaborating with airport
operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to identify funding and
cost-sharing strategies--an effort that TSA expects to complete by
early fall 2006. TSA is also focusing its research and development
efforts on the next generation of EDS technology.
Background:
Prior to the passage of ATSA in November 2001, only limited screening
of checked baggage for explosives occurred. When this screening took
place, air carriers had operational responsibility for conducting the
screening, while the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintained
oversight responsibility. With the passage of ATSA, TSA assumed
responsibility for ensuring that all checked baggage is properly
screened for explosives at airports in the United States where
screening is required, and for the procurement, installation, and
maintenance of explosive detection systems used to screen checked
baggage for explosives. Airport operators and air carriers continued to
be responsible for processing and transporting passenger checked
baggage from the check-in counter to the airplane.
Explosive detection systems used to screen checked baggage include EDS
and ETD machines. EDS machines, which cost between about $300,000 and
$1.2 million each, use computer-aided tomography X-rays adapted from
the medical field to examine the objects inside baggage to
automatically recognize the characteristic signatures of threat
explosives. TSA has certified, procured, and deployed EDS machines made
by three manufacturers. ETD machines, which cost approximately $40,000
to $50,000 each, work by detecting vapors and residues of explosives.
Because human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are then chemically analyzed in the ETD machines to identify any
traces of explosive materials, the use of ETD is more labor-intensive
and subject to more human error than the automated process of using EDS
machines. ETD is used for both primary, or the initial, screening of
checked baggage, and secondary screening, which resolves alarms from
EDS machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives inside a
bag.
As we reported in March 2005, to initially deploy EDS and ETD equipment
to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA
implemented interim airport lobby solutions and in-line EDS baggage
screening systems.[Footnote 10] The interim lobby solutions involved
placing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in the nation's airports, most
often in airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is
sorted for loading onto aircraft. For EDS in a stand-alone mode (not
integrated with an airport's or air carrier's baggage conveyor system)
and ETD, TSA TSOs are responsible for obtaining the passengers' checked
baggage from either the passenger or the air carrier, lifting the bags
onto and off of EDS machines or ETD tables, using TSA protocols to
appropriately screen the bags, and returning the cleared bags to the
air carriers to be loaded onto departing aircraft. In addition to
installing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport lobbies and
baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated with some airport operators and
air carriers to install integrated in-line EDS baggage screening
systems within their baggage conveyor systems.
In March 2005, we reported that TSA used most of its fiscal year 2002
through 2004 checked baggage screening program funding to design,
develop, and deploy interim lobby screening solutions rather than
install more permanent in-line EDS baggage screening systems. We also
reported that during our site visits to 22 category X, I, and II
airports,[Footnote 11] we observed that in most cases, TSA used stand-
alone EDS machines and ETD machines as the primary method for screening
checked baggage.[Footnote 12] Generally, this equipment was located in
airport lobbies and in baggage makeup areas. In addition, in our survey
of 155 federal security directors,[Footnote 13] we asked the directors
to estimate, for the 263 airports included in the survey, the
approximate percentage of checked baggage that was screened on or
around February 29, 2004, using EDS, ETD, or other approved
alternatives for screening baggage such as screening with explosives
detection canines, and physical bag searches. As shown in table 1, the
directors reported that for 130 large to medium-sized airports in our
survey (21, 60, and 49 category X, I, and II airports, respectively),
most of the checked baggage was screened using stand-alone EDS or ETD
machines. On average, the percentage of checked baggage reported as
screened using EDS machines at airports with partial or full in-line
EDS capability ranged from 4 percent for category II airports to 11
percent for category X airports. In addition, the directors reported
that ETD machines were used to screen checked baggage 93 to 99 percent
of the time at category III and IV airports, respectively.
Table 1: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened
Using EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 Airports on or around
February 29, 2004:
Airport category: Number of airports;
X: 21;
I: 60;
II: 49;
III: 73;
IV: 60;
Total: 263.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: EDS (at airports with no
in-line EDS capability);
X: 59;
I: 59;
II: 27;
III: 6;
IV: 0;
Total: 25.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: EDS (at airports with
partial or airportwide in-line EDS capability);
X: 11;
I: 8;
II: 4;
III: 0;
IV: 0;
Total: 3.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: Totala EDS;
X: 70;
I: 67;
II: 32;
III: 6;
IV: 0;
Total: 28.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: ETD;
X: 18;
I: 33;
II: 66;
III: 93;
IV: 99;
Total: 69.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: Totala EDS and ETD;
X: 88;
I: 99;
II: 98;
III: 99;
IV: 99;
Total: 98.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: Other approved method;
X: 12;
I: 1;
II: 2;
III: 2;
IV: 1;
Total: 2.
Percentage of checked baggage screened using: Totala;
X: 100;
I: 100;
II: 100;
III: 100;
IV: 100;
Total: 100.
Source: analysis of GAO federal security director survey data.
[A] Percentages in totals may not add to 100 percent because of
rounding.
[End of table]
The Deployment of Stand-alone Explosive Detection Systems Led to
Operational Inefficiencies and Security Risks that In-Line Systems
Could Address at Some Airports:
Stand-alone Checked Baggage Screening Systems Created Operational
Inefficiencies and Security Risks:
Since its inception in November 2001 through June 22, 2006, TSA has
procured and installed about 1,600 EDS machines and about 7,200 ETD
machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400
commercial airports. For the most part, TSA deployed EDS machines at
larger airports and ETD machines at smaller airports, resulting in
primary screening being conducted solely with ETD machines at over 300
airports. TSA installed ETD machines instead of EDS for primary
screening at these airports because of the configuration of screening
stations, the costs associated with procuring EDS, and the low
passenger volume at smaller airports. Table 2 summarizes the location
of EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's airports by airport category
as of June 22, 2006.
Table 2: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S. Airports as of June 22,
2006:
Airport category: X;
Number: Airports: 27;
Number: EDS machines: 1,019;
Number: ETD machines: 3,439.
Airport category: I;
Number: Airports: 55;
Number: EDS machines: 468;
Number: ETD machines: 1,969.
Airport category: II;
Number: Airports: 73;
Number: EDS machines: 104;
Number: ETD machines: 889.
Airport category: III;
Number: Airports: 116;
Number: EDS machines: 29;
Number: ETD machines: 607.
Airport category: IV;
Number: Airports: 176;
Number: EDS machines: 7;
Number: ETD machines: 432.
Airport category: Total;
Number: Airports: 447;
Number: EDS machines: 1,627;
Number: ETD machines: 7,336.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[End of table]
Stand-alone EDS and ETD machines are both labor-and time-intensive to
operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS or ETD
machine for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor
system prior to being loaded onto an aircraft. With an in-line EDS
system, checked baggage is screened within an airport's baggage
conveyor system, eliminating the need for a TSO or other personnel to
physically transport the baggage from the check-in point to the EDS
machine for screening and then to the airport baggage conveyor system.
Further, according to TSA officials, ETD machines and stand-alone EDS
machines are less efficient in the number of checked bags that can be
screened per hour per machine than are EDS machines that are integrated
in-line with the airport baggage conveyor systems. According to TSA
estimates, the number of checked bags screened per hour can more than
double when EDS machines are placed in-line versus being used in a
stand-alone mode. Table 3 identifies TSA's estimates for bags screened
per hour by EDS machines in stand-alone and in-line configurations and
ETD machines.
Table 3: Estimated Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line
EDS Machines and ETD Machines:
Type of equipment: EDS machines;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: [Empty];
Bags per hour: In-line: [Empty].
Type of equipment: CTX 2500--stand-alone only;
Bags per hour: Stand- alone: 120;
Bags per hour: In-line: NA.
Type of equipment: CTX 5500;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 180;
Bags per hour: In-line: 250.
Type of equipment: CTX 9000--in-line only;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: NA;
Bags per hour: In-line: 500.
Type of equipment: L3 6000;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 140;
Bags per hour: In-line: 500.
Type of equipment: Reveal CT-80;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 80;
Bags per hour: In-line: NA.
Type of equipment: ETD machines--stand-alone only;
Bags per hour: Stand-alone: 36;
Bags per hour: In-line: NA.
Source: TSA.
NA: Not applicable.
[End of table]
In-Line Systems Have Efficiency, Safety, and Security Benefits:
TSA has reported that in-line systems create significant efficiency
benefits. In January 2004, TSA, in support of its planning, budgeting,
and acquisition of security screening equipment, reported to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) that the efficiency benefits of in-line
rather than stand-alone EDS were significant, particularly with regard
to bags per hour screened and the number of TSOs required to operate
the equipment. According to TSA officials, at that time, a typical
lobby-based screening unit consisting of a stand-alone EDS machine with
three ETD machines had a baggage throughput (bags screened per hour) of
376 bags per hour with a staffing requirement of 19 TSOs. In contrast,
TSA estimated that approximately 425 bags per hour could be screened by
an in-line EDS machine with a staffing requirement of 4.25 TSOs.
In order to achieve the higher throughput rates and reduce the number
of TSOs needed to operate in-line baggage screening systems, TSA (1)
uses a screening procedure known as on-screen alarm resolution and (2)
networks multiple in-line EDS machines together, referred to as
multiplexing, so that the computer-generated images of bags from these
machines are sent to a central location where TSOs can monitor the
images of suspect bags centrally from several machines using the on-
screen alarm resolution procedure.[Footnote 14] A TSA official
estimated that the on-screen alarm resolution procedure with in-line
EDS baggage screening systems would enable TSA to reduce the number of
bags requiring the more labor-intensive secondary screening using ETD
machines by 40 to 60 percent. In estimating the potential savings in
staffing requirements, TSA officials stated that they expect to achieve
a 20 to 25 percent savings because of reductions in the number of staff
needed to screen bags using ETD to resolve alarms from in-line EDS
machines. According to TSA officials, as of June 22, 2006, all airports
with EDS equipment use on-screen alarm resolution protocols and 16
airports had networked in-line systems.
In May 2004, TSA conducted a limited, retrospective cost-benefit
analysis at the nine airports that signed letter of intent (LOI)
agreements and found that significant savings and other benefits could
be achieved through the installation of these systems.[Footnote 15]
This analysis was conducted to estimate potential future cost savings
and other benefits that could be achieved from installing in-line
systems instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. We reported in March
2005 that, according to TSA's analysis, in-line EDS would reduce by 78
percent the number of TSA TSOs and supervisors required to screen
checked baggage at these nine airports, from 6,645 to 1,477 TSOs and
supervisors. The actual number of TSOs and supervisor positions that
could be eliminated would be dependent on the individual design and
operating conditions at each airport. TSA estimated that in-line
baggage screening systems at these airports would save the federal
government about $1.3 billion[Footnote 16] compared with stand-alone
EDS systems and that TSA would recover its initial investment in a
little over 1 year.[Footnote 17] According to TSA's analysis of the
nine LOI airports, in-line cost savings critically depend on how much
an airport's facilities have to be modified to accommodate the in-line
configuration. Savings also depend on TSA's costs to buy, install, and
network the EDS machines; subsequent maintenance costs; and the number
of screeners needed to operate the machines in-line instead of using
stand-alone EDS systems. In its analysis, TSA also found that a key
factor driving many of these costs is throughput--how many bags an in-
line EDS system can screen per hour compared with the rate for a stand-
alone system. TSA's analysis also provided data to estimate the cost
savings resulting from installing in-line EDS checked baggage screening
systems for each airport over the 7-year period. According to TSA's
data, federal cost savings varied from about $50 million to over $250
million at eight of the nine airports, while at one airport, there was
an estimated $90 million loss.[Footnote 18]
In February 2006, TSA reported that a saving of approximately $4.7
billion could be realized over a period of 20 years by installing
optimal checked baggage screening systems at the 250 airports with the
highest checked baggage volumes. This savings represents the difference
between TSA's compliance only strategy--which assumes minimum capital
expenditures and no additional investment in in-line systems in order
to comply with the mandate to screen all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems--and its preferred strategy, which is based
on using optimal checked baggage screening systems, including in-line
EDS systems, for the 250 airports. TSA estimated that the compliance
only strategy would cost $27.05 billion and the preferred strategy
would cost $22.39 billion over 20 years, creating a saving of $4.66
billion.[Footnote 19]
TSA reported that many of the initial in-line systems have produced a
level of TSO labor savings insufficient to offset up-front capital
costs of constructing the systems. According to TSA, the facility and
baggage handling system modification costs have been higher than
expected, with the nine airports with LOIs having incurred or
projecting to incur up to $6 million or more in infrastructure costs
for every EDS machine required. TSA stated that the keys to reducing
future costs are establishing guidelines outlining best practices and a
set of efficient design choices, and using newer EDS technology that
best matches each optimally scaled design solution. In February 2006,
TSA reported that recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS
checked baggage screening systems and the EDS screening technology now
offer the opportunity for higher-performance and lower-cost screening
systems.
A safety benefit of in-line EDS systems is the potential to reduce on-
the job injuries. TSA reported that because procedures for using stand-
alone EDS and ETD machines require TSOs to lift heavy baggage onto and
off of the machines, the interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA
led to significant numbers of on-the-job injuries.[Footnote 20]
Additionally, in responding to our survey about 263 airports, numerous
federal security directors reported that on-the-job injuries related to
lifting heavy baggage onto or off the EDS and ETD machines were a
significant concern at the airports for which they were responsible.
Specifically, these federal security directors reported that on-the-job
injuries caused by lifting heavy bags onto and off of EDS machines were
a significant concern at 65 airports, and were a significant concern
with the use of ETD machines at 110 airports. To reduce on-the-job
injuries, TSA has provided training to TSOs on proper lifting
procedures. However, according to TSA officials, in-line EDS screening
systems would significantly reduce the need for TSOs to handle baggage,
thus further reducing the number of on-the-job injuries being
experienced by TSA TSOs.
Use of in-line EDS systems can also provide security benefits at
airports where they are installed by reducing congestion in airport
lobbies and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening
procedures at airports. During our site visits to 22 large and medium-
sized airports, several TSA, airport, and airline officials expressed
concern regarding the security risks caused by overcrowding due to ETD
and stand-alone EDS machines located in airport lobbies.[Footnote 21]
The location of the equipment resulted in less space available to
accommodate passenger movement and caused congestion due to passengers
waiting in lines in public areas to have their checked baggage
screened. TSA headquarters officials reported that large groups of
people congregating in crowded airport lobbies increases security risks
by creating a potential target for terrorists. TSA also reported that
airports favor replacing stand-alone EDS machines with in-line systems
to mitigate the negative effects of increased congestion and passenger
processing times. TSA further reported that in-line systems are more
secure than stand-alone EDS machines because the baggage screening is
performed away from passengers who otherwise could tamper with the
baggage.
Another potential security benefit of in-line EDS systems is the
reduction of the need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures.
In addition to screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD,
which TSA had determined to provide the most effective detection of
explosives, TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used
when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security
vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there is a
security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in an
area. These alternative screening procedures include the use of EDS and
ETD machines in nonstandard ways,[Footnote 22] and also include three
procedures that do not use EDS or ETD--screening with explosives
detection canines, physical bag searches, and matching baggage to
passenger manifests to confirm that the passenger and his or her
baggage are on the same plane.[Footnote 23] TSA's use of alternative
screening procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.
However, the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully known
because TSA has not tested the effectiveness of alternative screening
procedures in an operational environment.
As part of our ongoing work on TSA's use of alternative screening
procedures to screen checked baggage, we found that the superior
efficiency of screening with in-line EDS compared to screening with
stand-alone EDS may have been a factor in reducing the need to use
alternative screening procedures at airports where in-line systems were
installed. After in-line EDS systems are installed and staffing
reductions are achieved, redistributing the screening positions to
other airports with staffing shortages may reduce airports' need to use
alternative screening procedures. In addition to deploying more
efficient checked baggage screening systems, TSA is pursuing other
mitigating actions to reduce the need to use alternative screening
procedures. These factors include strengthening its coordination with
groups such as tour operators, deploying "optimization teams" to
airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to
determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest
remedies; and deploying additional EDS machines.
Although TSA officials have estimated that a low percentage of checked
baggage is currently screened using alternative screening procedures,
in February 2006 TSA reported that the use of alternative screening
procedures will increase at some airports because of rising passenger
traffic. TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an average of 0.76
checked bags per passenger were to remain constant through 2010, TSA
would be screening about 96 million more bags that it now screens. This
could increase airports' need to rely on alternative screening
procedures in the future in the absence of additional or more efficient
EDS machines, including in-line EDS systems.
TSA Has Begun Systematically Planning for the Optimal Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but It Continues to Face Funding
Uncertainties:
TSA Has Made Progress in Planning for the Optimal Deployment of Checked
Baggage Screening Systems:
TSA has made progress in its efforts to systematically plan for the
optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, but resources
have not been made available to fund these systems on a large-scale
basis. In March 2005, we reported that while TSA has made progress in
deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic,
prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to
achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and
security.[Footnote 24] We recommended that TSA assess the feasibility,
expected benefits, and cost to replace ETD machines with stand-alone
EDS machines for the primary screening of checked baggage at those
airports where in-line EDS systems would not be either economically
justified or justified for other reasons. In February 2006, in response
to our recommendation and a legislative requirement to submit a
schedule for expediting the installation and use of in-line systems and
replacement of ETD equipment with EDS machines, [Footnote 25] TSA
completed its strategic planning framework for its checked baggage
screening program. This framework introduces a strategy intended to
increase security through deploying in-line and stand-alone EDS to as
many airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for the program,
minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and provide a
flexible security infrastructure for accommodating growing airline
traffic and potential new threats. [Footnote 26] The framework is an
initial step in addressing the following areas:
* Optimized checked baggage screening solutions--finding the ideal mix
of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening solutions
for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes;
* Funding prioritization schedule by airport--identifying the top 25
airports that should first receive federal funding for projects related
to the installation of explosive detection systems based on
quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other factors;
* Deployment strategy--developing a plan for the acquisition of next-
generation EDS systems, the redeployment of existing EDS assets, and
investment in life-cycle extension programs;
* EDS Life-Cycle Management Plan--structuring guidelines for EDS
research and development investment, procurement specifications for
next-generation EDS systems, and the redeployment of existing EDS
assets and investment in life-cycle extension programs that minimize
the cost of ownership of the EDS systems; and:
* Stakeholder collaboration plan--working with airport operators and
other key stakeholders to develop airport-specific screening solutions,
refine the nationwide EDS deployment strategy, and investigate
alternative funding programs that may allow for innovative as well as
non-federal sources of funding or financing, including formulas for
sharing costs among different government entities and the private
sector.
TSA said it is continuing its efforts in these areas as it works toward
completing a comprehensive strategic plan for its checked baggage
screening program. TSA expects to complete the strategic plan in early
fall 2006.
While TSA has begun to conduct a systematic prospective analysis to
determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and
enhanced efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or by
making greater use of stand-alone EDS machines in lieu of ETD machines,
resources have not been made available on a large-scale basis to fund
these systems. In-line baggage screening systems are capital-intensive
because they often require significant airport modifications, including
terminal reconfigurations, new conveyor belt systems, and electrical
upgrades. According to TSA, lessons learned from the first airports
where in-line systems were built identified that facilities and
infrastructure modifications accounted for up to 50 percent of the
total cost of in-line screening systems, and modifications and upgrades
to the baggage handing system typically accounted for another 25
percent of the total cost. In February 2006, TSA estimated that the
total cost of installing and operating the optimal checked baggage
screening systems, including in-line EDS machines, at the 250 airports
is approximately $22.4 billion over 20 years, of which about $6 billion
is for installation, life-cycle replacement, existing committed
funding, and equipment maintenance costs.[Footnote 27] According to TSA
officials, the estimated costs to install in-line baggage screening
systems would vary greatly from airport to airport depending on the
size of the airport and the extent of airport modifications that would
be required to install the system.[Footnote 28] In March 2005 we
reported that while we did not independently verify the estimates,
officials from the Airports Council International-North America and
American Association of Airport Executives estimated that project costs
for in-line systems could range from about $2 million for a category
III airport to $250 million for a category X airport.[Footnote 29]
TSA's February 2006 strategic planning framework identified that
because many of the EDS and ETD machines were deployed in 2002 and 2003
to comply with ATSA and subsequent deadlines for achieving the 100
percent checked baggage screening mandate, a large share of the EDS
machines will incur life-cycle replacement obligations during the 2013
to 2014 time period. Although TSA has not completed its efforts to
develop a life-cycle cost model,[Footnote 30] TSA's February 2006
strategic planning framework identified that a substantial funding
requirement for EDS equipment life-cycle replacement will compete with
funding requirements for new in-line systems in approximately 8 to 9
years.[Footnote 31] Further, in June 2006, as discussed in the
framework, TSA officials reported that if the top 25 airports do not
receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they will require
additional screening equipment to be placed in airport lobbies and
additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance with the
mandate for screening all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems.
TSA Is Collaborating with Key Stakeholders to Identify Funding and
Financing Strategies for Installing Optimal Baggage Screening Systems:
In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying
on several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage
screening systems. One source of funding airport operators used was
FAA's Airport Improvement Program, which traditionally funds grants to
maintain safe and efficient airports. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 28
of the 53 airport officials we interviewed reported that their airports
either had constructed or were planning to construct in-line systems
relying on the Airport Improvement Program as their sole source of
federal funding. With Airport Improvement Program funds no longer
available after fiscal year 2003 for this purpose, airports turned to
other sources of federal funding to construct in-line systems.[Footnote
32] The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution
approved the use of LOIs as a vehicle to leverage federal government
and industry funding to support facility modification costs for
installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems.[Footnote 33] Between
June 2003 and February 2004, TSA issued eight LOIs to reimburse nine
airports for the installation of in-line EDS baggage screening systems
for a total cost of $957.1 million to the federal government over 4
years. That cost represents 75 percent of the facility modification
costs, with the airport funding the remaining costs.[Footnote 34] TSA
also uses other transaction agreements as an administrative vehicle to
directly fund, with no long-term commitments, airport operators for
smaller in-line airport modification projects.[Footnote 35] Under these
agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator also provides a
portion of the funding required for the modification. As of June 2006,
TSA reported that about $140 million had been obligated for other
transaction agreements for in-line EDS systems. To fund the procurement
and installation of explosive detection systems in-line, TSA also uses
annual appropriations and the $250 million mandatory appropriation of
the Aviation Security Capital Fund.[Footnote 36] For example, in fiscal
years 2005 and 2006, TSA received appropriations of $175 million and
$180 million, respectively, for the procurement of explosive detection
systems and received $45 million each year for the installation of
explosive detection systems. For fiscal year 2007, DHS requested $91
million for the procurement of explosive detection systems and $94
million for the installation of such systems. Of the $250 million
available through the Aviation Security Capital Fund, $125 million is
designated as priority funding for LOIs. The remaining $125 million is
to be allocated in accordance with a formula based upon the size of the
airport and risks to aviation security.[Footnote 37] Congress also
authorized an additional appropriation of $400 million per year through
fiscal year 2007 for airport security improvement projects that relate
to the use of in-line EDS systems. However, appropriations have not
been made under this authorization.[Footnote 38]
In July 2004, as part of this subcommittee's hearing on TSA's progress
in deploying in-line systems, TSA reported that there were nine in-line
systems in place and an additional nine were due to be completed by
2006. In March 2005, we reported that 12 airports had operational in-
line systems airportwide or at a particular terminal or terminals. As
of June 2006, 25 airports had operational in-line EDS systems and an
additional 24 airports had in-line systems under development.
Additionally, TSA reported that it has received requests from an
additional 50 airports either seeking funding to construct in-line EDS
systems or reimbursement for already completed in-line systems. Table 4
provides information on the status of in-line system deployment as of
February 2006.
Table 4: Airports with In-line Explosives Detection Systems That Are
Operational or Under Construction by Airport Category as of June 2006:
Status of in-line EDS system;
Airport category: X;
Airport category: I;
Airport category: II;
Airport category: III;
Airport category: IV.
Operational;
Airport category: 8;
Airport category: 11;
Airport category: 4;
Airport category: 2;
Airport category: 0.
Under Construction;
Airport category: 12;
Airport category: 12;
Airport category: 0;
Airport category: 0;
Airport category: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[End of table]
In a May 2006 meeting of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, TSA
reported that under current investment levels, installation of optimal
checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until
approximately 2024.[Footnote 39] TSA further reported that unless
investment is accelerated, substantial investment will be needed to
replace EDS and ETD machines at the end of their life cycles and to
refurbish suboptimal systems. TSA is currently collaborating with
airport operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to develop a
cost-sharing study that identifies funding and cost-sharing strategies
for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems. TSA plans to
use the results of this study to finalize its checked baggage screening
program strategic plan, which TSA expects to complete by early fall
2006.[Footnote 40] In its May 2006 report to the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, TSA outlined financing options including leasing
equipment, sharing savings from in-line systems with airports, and
enhancing eligibility for the Passenger Facility Charge,[Footnote 41]
LOIs, and tax credit bonds.[Footnote 42] In this meeting, TSA reported
that tax credit bonds had the most potential support among
stakeholders.
As TSA moves forward with planning for the deployment of checked
baggage screening systems and identifying funding and financing
options, it is also important for TSA to engage in planning to focus
its research and development efforts. To enhance checked baggage
screening, TSA is developing and testing next-generation EDS machines.
According to TSA, manufacturers have only marginally improved false
alarm rates and throughput capabilities of the equipment since the
large-scale deployment of EDS machines in 2002 and 2003. The maximum
number of bags an EDS machine can screen per hour is 500, which can be
achieved only when the machines are integrated in-line with the baggage
conveyor system. New EDS equipment was certified in 2005, including a
smaller EDS machine designed to replace ETD machines used for primary
screening and an upgraded large EDS machine. In September 2005, TSA
entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 72 smaller EDS
machines to be installed at 24 airports. The President's fiscal year
2007 budget request for TSA includes funding to support research and
development for in-line EDS machines that can operate at up to 900 bags
per hour and employ new threat detection concepts. In its February 2006
strategic framework for checked baggage screening, TSA identified the
development of high-throughput in-line EDS machines and lowering of EDS
false alarm rates as key areas for improving investment management of
next-generation technologies. TSA reported that these performance gains
would be feasible and available in the near term. TSA also reported
that given that the planning, design, and construction cycle for an in-
line system can be 2 to 3 years, and these high-throughput and lower
false alarm rate technologies are anticipated to be deployable by about
2008, the agency is recommending that all in-line planning and design
efforts consider these new technologies.
We reported in September 2004 that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and TSA have made some progress in managing their transportation
security research and development programs according to applicable laws
and R&D best practices.[Footnote 43] However, we found that their
efforts were incomplete in several areas, including preparing strategic
plans for R&D efforts that contain measurable objectives, preparing and
using risk assessments to select and prioritize R&D projects, and
coordinating with stakeholders--a condition that increases the risk
that their R&D resources will not be effectively leveraged. We also
found that TSA and DHS delayed several key R&D projects and lacked both
estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects
and adequate databases to effectively manage their R&D portfolios. We
recommended that DHS and TSA (1) conduct some basic research in the
transportation security area; (2) complete their strategic planning and
risk assessment efforts; (3) develop a management information system
that will provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible
project information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios;
and (4) develop a process with the Department of Transportation to
coordinate transportation security R&D efforts and share this
information with transportation stakeholders. In June 2006, DHS
reported several actions that it had taken to address these
recommendations, including coordinating with other federal agencies to
leverage their basic research, issuing a Science and Technology
Directorate Strategic Plan, implementing a program and project
management system to monitor program and project funding and
milestones, and establishing a memorandum of agreement that resulted in
the formation of a Mass Transit Technology Working Group to coordinate
efforts across agencies and to optimize resources. DHS also reported
that basic research has been limited because the majority of R&D funds
have been appropriated for countermeasures for specific threat areas.
We will examine these efforts to implement our recommendations as part
of our ongoing review of DHS's and TSA's airport checkpoint R&D
program.
Concluding Observations:
TSA has made progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation's
airports--mainly as part of interim lobby screening solutions--to
provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives as
mandated by Congress. With the objective of initially fielding this
equipment largely accomplished, TSA has shifted its focus from
equipping airports with interim screening solutions to systematically
planning for the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening
systems.
TSA's February 2006 strategic planning framework for the checked
baggage screening program is a positive step forward in systematically
planning for the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening
systems. The completion of a strategic plan for checked baggage
screening by early fall 2006 should help TSA more fully determine
whether expected reduced staffing costs, higher baggage throughput, and
increased safety and security will in fact justify the significant up-
front investment required to install in-line baggage screening systems.
TSA's retrospective analysis on nine airports installing in-line
baggage screening systems with LOI funds, while limited, estimated that
cost savings could be achieved through reduced staffing requirements
for TSOs and increased baggage throughput. Specifically, the analysis
identified that using in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at
these nine airports could save the federal government about $1.3
billion over 7 years and that TSA's initial investment would be
recovered in a little over 1 year. TSA also recently estimated that a
saving of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized over a period of
20 years by installing optimal checked baggage screening systems at the
250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes. However, TSA's
strategic planning framework identified that many of the initial in-
line systems have produced a level of savings insufficient to offset up-
front capital costs of acquiring and installing the systems.
Nevertheless, TSA reported that recent improvements in the design of
the systems and EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for
higher performance and lower-cost screening systems.
In-line EDS baggage screening systems have efficiency, safety, and
security benefits that have been reported on extensively by Congress,
GAO, TSA, and aviation industry representatives. As part of its
strategic planning efforts, TSA has identified the top 25 airports that
should first receive federal funding for projects related to the
installation of explosive detection systems and also identified the
ideal mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening
solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage
volumes. With this initial planning now completed, a critical question
that remains is how to fund and finance these screening systems and who
should pay for them. TSA is currently working with airport and air
carrier stakeholders to identify funding and financing options, an
effort that is due to be completed by early fall 2006.
As TSA works toward identifying funding and financing options, it will
also be important for the agency to sustain its R&D efforts and further
strengthen its R&D management and planning efforts. Researching and
developing technologies, such as higher-throughput EDS machines with
lower false alarm rates, should help TSA to improve the security and
efficiency of checked baggage screening.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee have.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis,
Michele Fejfar, Thomas Lombardi, Allison Sands, and Maria Strudwick
made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April
4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Management of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Improved. GAO-06-291SU. Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2006.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. GAO-
05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (2001). See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a), 44901(d)(1).
[2] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d)(2).
[3] GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365
(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005).
[4] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Management of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Improved; GAO-06-291SU (Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2006).
[5] Although we could not independently verify the reliability of all
of the information we obtained, we compared it with other supporting
documents, when available, to determine data consistency and
reasonableness.
[6] Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosives
detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage
screening operations are classified or are considered by TSA to be
sensitive security information. Accordingly, the results of our review
of this information have been removed from this testimony.
[7] Airports also rely on nonfederal sources of funding to fund in-line
EDS systems.
[8] A letter of intent, though not a binding commitment of federal
funding, represents an intent by TSA to provide future years funding in
support of a project, contingent upon the availability of appropriated
funds.
[9] The in-line systems were either airportwide (full) or at a
particular terminal or terminals (partial).
[10] GAO-05-365.
[11] TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one
of five categories--X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X
airports have the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV
airports have the smallest number.
[12] The 22 airports included 12 category X, 9 category I, and 1
category II airports. We conducted our site visits between September
2003 and March 2004.
[13] The federal security directors are the ranking TSA authorities
responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security
activities at the nation's commercial airports.
[14] Under the on-screen alarm resolution procedure, when an EDS
machine sets off an alarm, indicating the possibility that explosive
material may be contained in the bag, TSOs examine computer-generated
images of the inside of a bag to determine if suspect items identified
by the EDS machines are in fact suspicious. If a TSO, by viewing these
images, is able to determine that the suspect item or items identified
by the EDS machine are in fact harmless, the TSO is allowed to clear
the bag, and it is sent to the airline baggage makeup area for loading
onto the aircraft. If the TSO is not able to determine that the bag
does not contain suspicious objects, the bag is sent to a secondary
screening room where the bag is further examined by a TSO. TSA also
uses this on-screen alarm resolution procedure with stand-alone EDS
machines.
[15] We reviewed the TSA cost model showing savings expected to be
achieved with in-line rather than stand-alone EDS equipment at nine
airports. We assessed the model's logic to ensure its completeness and
correctness of calculations. Also, as discussed in appendix IV of our
March 2005 report (GAO-05-365), we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation
to: (1) illustrate sensitivity of potential cost savings of replacing
stand-alone with in-line EDS systems to alternative values of key cost
drivers and (2) to explore the variability in the key factors used by
TSA in their model. On the basis of our review of TSA's cost model, we
believe that it is sufficiently reliable for the analyses we conducted
and the information included in this testimony.
[16] This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if
received up front.
[17] For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-94 stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to
compute the present value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real
discount rate. Following Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost
savings are $1.14 billion. In addition, in TSA's analysis, the federal
government does not pay for $319 million, or 25 percent, of project
costs. Accounting for these costs to reflect total costs, as
recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall savings to $820 million.
[18] The relatively large costs for up-front in-line EDS at one of the
nine LOI airports were not offset by the modest amount of estimated
operation and maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS
system may be more costly than EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another
one of the nine LOI airports, the up-front costs of in-line EDS are
lower than for stand-alone EDS, and there is a substantial amount of
estimated operation and maintenance cost savings. Therefore, the in-
line EDS system at this latter airport may be less costly than stand-
alone EDS.
[19] These estimates are in present value terms. TSA estimated that it
would cost about $1.7 billion for the optimal systems at the 250
airports, and TSA would achieve savings of about $6.2 billion in TSO
staff savings. Additionally, TSA's estimate identified that equipment
maintenance and EDS equipment life cycle replacement costs would be
lower (about $150 million) under the preferred strategy.
[20] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has projected
based on the first two quarters of fiscal year 2006 that more than 16
percent of TSA employees will report a job related injury or illness by
the end of the fiscal year, the highest percentage in the federal
government.
[21] We conducted our site visits between September 2003 and March
2004.
[22] The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive
security information.
[23] It is TSA's policy to use standard EDS and ETD screening
procedures whenever possible because of legislative requirements to do
so and because TSA has concluded that these procedures provide the most
effective detection of explosives at a checked baggage screening
station.
[24] GAO-05-365.
[25] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 4019(a)-(c), 118 Stat. 3638, 3721-22.
[26] TSA has determined that the details of its analysis of the optimal
checked baggage screening solutions are sensitive security information.
[27] Operating costs include costs related to staffing, training, and
research and development.
[28] According to TSA, a fully automated in-line screening system is
not appropriate for every airport, even when security and operational
benefits are considered in the analysis. Therefore, for many smaller
airports or at smaller terminals or airline operational areas at larger
airports, the identification of other alternative in-line solutions,
such as partially automated ones, will accomplish the same goal of
moving checked baggage screening out of terminal lobbies. In February
2006, TSA reported that most of these solutions also offer significant
TSO savings over comparable airport lobby systems.
[29] Joint Statement of David Z. Plavin, President, Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA) and Todd Hauptli, Senior Executive
Vice President, American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE)
before the House Aviation Subcommittee Hearing on Passenger and Baggage
Screening Problems, February 12, 2004. GAO did not independently verify
cost figures provided in this testimony.
[30] Life-cycle costs provide an estimate of how long the machines will
be in operation and the estimated maintenance costs over this period.
[31] According to TSA, EDS machines are estimated to have a useful life
of 7 years, extended to 11 years with refurbishment.
[32] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, prohibited the use of
Airport Improvement Program funds for activities related to the
installation of in-line explosive detection systems. See Pub. L. No.
108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 283. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005,
and the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 2006,
continued this prohibition. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809,
3203 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396, 2400-01 (2005).
[33] Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, §
367, 117 Stat. 423-24.
[34] Under an LOI, the airport operator is responsible for providing
the total funding needed to complete the project with an expectation
that the federal government will reimburse the airport for a set
percentage of the costs over an agreed upon period of time, contingent
upon the availability of federal funds. Under all LOIs issued by TSA,
the federal government bears 75 percent of the cost, while the airport
operators bear 25 percent of the costs. Although the Vision 100--
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), Pub. L. No. 108-
176, § 605, 117 Stat. 2490, 2566-68 (2003) revised this cost share to
reflect a 90 percent - 10 percent difference, subsequent appropriations
acts have maintained the original 75 - 25 cost share for medium and
large hub airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923 but see, e.g., Pub. L. No.
109-90, 119 Stat. 2070 (2005).
[35] Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by
TSA to directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification
projects without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions
take many forms and are generally not required to comply with federal
laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements; and enable the federal government and others entering into
these agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually
agreeable.
[36] Vision 100 established the Aviation Security Capital Fund, which
authorized a mandatory appropriation of $250 million for each of fiscal
years 2004 through 2007 in support of airport improvement projects
related to the installation of explosive detection systems. See 49
U.S.C. § 44923. In the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations Act,
however, Congress appropriated $250 million for the physical
modification of airports to install checked baggage explosive detection
systems but did so separate from the capital fund. A provision of that
act precluded the use of funds to establish the capital fund in fiscal
year 2004. Congress must reauthorize the capital fund for it to
continue beyond fiscal year 2007.
[37] The pending fiscal year DHS Appropriations Act, as passed by the
House of Representatives, proposes to eliminate the funding formula as
applied to the Aviation Security Capital Fund and other appropriations
authorized under 49 U.S.C. § 44923. See H.R. 5441, 109th Cong. (2006).
[38] These additional authorized appropriations are to follow the same
50 percent split as mandated under the Aviation Security Capital Fund.
See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(i).
[39] The Aviation Security Advisory Committee's mission is to examine
areas of civil aviation security as tasked by TSA with the aim of
developing recommendations for the improvement of civil aviation
security methods, equipment, and procedures. Its membership includes
government officials and private sector organizations representing key
constituencies affected by aviation security requirements.
[40] Section 4019(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
complete a cost-sharing study in collaboration with industry
stakeholders to review the benefits and cost of in-line checked baggage
screening systems, innovative financing approaches, formulas for cost
sharing among different government entities and the private sector, and
potential cost-saving approaches.
[41] The Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) Program allows the collection
of PFC fees up to $4.50 for every enplaned passenger at commercial
airports controlled by public agencies. Airports use these fees to fund
FAA-approved projects that enhance safety, security, or capacity;
reduce noise; or increase air carrier competition.
[42] Tax credit bonds are bonds where bondholders receive credit
against their federal income tax liabilities instead of cash interest.
[43] The DHS Science and Technology Directorate took over R&D from TSA
in October 2005.
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