Coast Guard
Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts Gao ID: GAO-06-764 June 23, 2006The Coast Guard has been pursing a replacement vessel for its aging and deteriorating patrol boats as part of the Integrated Deepwater System (or Deepwater) acquisition. Originally, all 49 of the Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats were to be converted into 123-foot patrol boats as a bridging strategy until a replacement vessel, the 140-foot Fast Response Cutter (FRC) came on line beginning in 2018. The initial conversions of the 110-foot patrol boats proved unsuccessful, though, and this prompted the Coast Guard to cancel further patrol boat conversions and accelerate the design and delivery of the FRC from 2018 to 2007. Early design efforts called for the FRC's hull, decks, and bulkheads to be made from composite materials rather than steel. Recently, design problems with the FRC's hull shape and weight have raised questions about the viability of the FRC design and use of composite materials. This report examines (1) the factors that went into the decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull, (2) the types of composite materials that have been selected for the FRC hull, (3) the extent of contingency plans developed for use if the prototype hull fails to meet Coast Guard performance requirements, and (4) the status of design efforts for the FRC.
The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, decided to use composite materials for the FRC's hull because, according to contractor analyses, use of such materials instead of steel generally offers several advantages, including lower maintenance and life cycle costs, a longer service life, and reduced weight. Other potential advantages, according to the Office of Naval Research, include corrosion prevention and decreased damage from impacts. The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite materials: (1) a solid laminate form to be used for the hull and (2) a "sandwich" form which is to be used on decks and bulkheads. Composite materials are not commonly used for vessels with comparable naval operations and have not been used on any prior Coast Guard vessels. The Coast Guard does not have a formal, documented contingency plan should the FRC fail to meet performance requirements. However, Coast Guard officials said it plans to pursue certain mitigation strategies, such as repairing deteriorated hull structures and replacing obsolete or unsupportable equipment and systems, to keep the current patrol boats operating longer. The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 because of design risks, such as excessive weight and horsepower requirements. To address these and other risks, the Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies. The first strategy involves the system integrator purchasing design plans for and building an off-the-shelf patrol boat that could be adapted for Coast Guard use as a way to increase patrol hours until the FRC design is finalized. The first of these replacement patrol boats is to be operational in late 2009. The second strategy is to revise the necessary capabilities of the FRC in order to allow for modifications to the current FRC design. The third strategy is to have a third party reassess the analyses used in the decision to use composite materials for the FRC to determine if the use of composite materials will, in fact, reduce total ownership costs.
GAO-06-764, Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2006:
COAST GUARD:
Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts:
GAO-06-764:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-764, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Coast Guard has been pursing a replacement vessel for its aging and
deteriorating patrol boats as part of the Integrated Deepwater System
(or Deepwater) acquisition. Originally, all 49 of the Coast Guard‘s 110-
foot patrol boats were to be converted into 123-foot patrol boats as a
bridging strategy until a replacement vessel, the 140-foot Fast
Response Cutter (FRC) came on line beginning in 2018. The initial
conversions of the 110-foot patrol boats proved unsuccessful, though,
and this prompted the Coast Guard to cancel further patrol boat
conversions and accelerate the design and delivery of the FRC from 2018
to 2007. Early design efforts called for the FRC‘s hull, decks, and
bulkheads to be made from composite materials rather than steel.
Recently, design problems with the FRC‘s hull shape and weight have
raised questions about the viability of the FRC design and use of
composite materials.
This report examines (1) the factors that went into the decision to use
composite materials for the FRC hull, (2) the types of composite
materials that have been selected for the FRC hull, (3) the extent of
contingency plans developed for use if the prototype hull fails to meet
Coast Guard performance requirements, and (4) the status of design
efforts for the FRC.
The Coast Guard concurred with the findings in this report.
What GAO Found:
The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems,
decided to use composite materials for the FRC‘s hull because,
according to contractor analyses, use of such materials instead of
steel generally offers several advantages, including lower maintenance
and life cycle costs, a longer service life, and reduced weight. Other
potential advantages, according to the Office of Naval Research,
include corrosion prevention and decreased damage from impacts.
The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite
materials: (1) a solid laminate form to be used for the hull and (2) a
’sandwich“ form which is to be used on decks and bulkheads. Composite
materials are not commonly used for vessels with comparable naval
operations and have not been used on any prior Coast Guard vessels.
The Coast Guard does not have a formal, documented contingency plan
should the FRC fail to meet performance requirements. However, Coast
Guard officials said it plans to pursue certain mitigation strategies,
such as repairing deteriorated hull structures and replacing obsolete
or unsupportable equipment and systems, to keep the current patrol
boats operating longer.
The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 because
of design risks, such as excessive weight and horsepower requirements.
To address these and other risks, the Coast Guard is pursuing three
strategies. The first strategy involves the system integrator
purchasing design plans for and building an off-the-shelf patrol boat
that could be adapted for Coast Guard use as a way to increase patrol
hours until the FRC design is finalized. The first of these replacement
patrol boats is to be operational in late 2009. The second strategy is
to revise the necessary capabilities of the FRC in order to allow for
modifications to the current FRC design. The third strategy is to have
a third party reassess the analyses used in the decision to use
composite materials for the FRC to determine if the use of composite
materials will, in fact, reduce total ownership costs.
Figure: One of the Current Patrol Boats to be Replaced by a Fast
Response Cutter:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Stephen Caldwell at (202)
512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Briefing Section:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Abbreviations:
FRC: Fast Response Cutter:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
ICGS: Integrated Coast Guard Systems:
RFI: request for information:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 23, 2006:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman:
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Coast Guard has been pursuing a replacement vessel for its aging
and deteriorating patrol boats as part of the Integrated Deepwater
System (or Deepwater) acquisition. The Deepwater program utilizes a
system of systems acquisition strategy that would replace its
deteriorating Deepwater aircraft and vessels with a single, integrated
package of new or modernized assets. This system of systems approach is
designed to provide an improved, integrated system of aircraft,
cutters, and unmanned aerial vehicles to be linked effectively through
systems that provide command, control, communications, computer,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and supporting logistics.
As of May 2006, the Coast Guard had spent approximately $26.7 million
on design and test efforts for a replacement vessel for its patrol
boats. Under the original 2002 Deepwater Implementation Plan, all 49 of
the Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats were to be converted into 123-
foot patrol boats, with increased capabilities, as a bridging strategy
until a replacement vessel, the 140-foot Fast Response Cutter (FRC),
came on line beginning in 2018. The initial conversions of the 110-foot
patrol boats proved unsuccessful, though, prompting the Coast Guard to
revise this part of the Deepwater program.[Footnote 1] The 2005 Revised
Deepwater Implementation Plan reflected the fact that the Coast Guard
canceled further patrol boat conversions and accelerated design and
delivery of the FRC, with the first FRC scheduled to come on line in
2007--11 years earlier than originally planned.
During the early design efforts, the Deepwater program's system
integrator[Footnote 2] proposed building the FRC's hull, decks, and
bulkheads out of composite materials rather than steel. Composite
materials, as used in shipbuilding, are typically fiber-reinforced
plastic laminates consisting of plies of various reinforcing fabrics
laminated together. While design problems with the FRC's hull shape and
weight have only recently been made public, Coast Guard engineering
officials raised concerns about the viability of the FRC design
beginning in January 2005.
In response to your request, we have been reviewing and analyzing the
design efforts for the FRC. This is part of a large body of work GAO
has undertaken since 1998 regarding the Deepwater program.[Footnote 3]
On April 12, 2006, we briefed your offices on four topics, as follows:
* the factors that went into the decision to use composite materials
for the FRC hull,
* the types of composite materials that have been selected for the FRC
hull,
* the extent of contingency plans developed for use if the prototype
hull fails to meet Coast Guard performance requirements, and:
* the status of design efforts on the FRC.
This report summarizes the findings we addressed at that briefing, as
well as provides more current information on the Coast Guard's FRC
design efforts to supplement the detailed briefing slides that we
presented to your offices. Appendix I provides a copy of those slides.
In addressing the four topics, we reviewed and analyzed a variety of
Coast Guard and contractor documents, briefings, and studies. We
supplemented these document reviews by holding discussions with
officials from the Coast Guard, the Office of Naval Research, and the
Naval Surface Warfare Center. We conducted our work from February 2006
through May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results:
The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems
(ICGS)[Footnote 4] decided to use composite materials for the FRC's
hull form after an analysis of alternatives found that the use of such
materials instead of steel generally offers several advantages, such as
lower maintenance and life cycle costs, a longer service life, and
reduced weight. While these were the main reasons given for considering
composites, the Coast Guard and ICGS have also leveraged information
from research performed by the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Research,
which shows other potential advantages, such as corrosion prevention
and decreased damage from impacts.
The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite
materials: (1) a solid laminate form consisting of layers of glass-
reinforced plastic and (2) a "sandwich" form consisting of two thinner
layers of glass-reinforced plastic surrounding a core of either balsa
wood or synthetic foam. The solid laminate form is to be used for the
hull, which is to be constructed from a mold in a single process. The
sandwich form, which weighs less than the solid form, is to be used on
decks and bulkheads. Composite materials are not commonly used for
vessels with comparable U.S. naval operations and have not been used on
any prior Coast Guard vessels.
Even though composite materials are not commonly used in the
construction of U.S. naval vessels used in military operations, the
Coast Guard does not have a formal, documented contingency plan should
the FRC fail to meet performance requirements. However, according to
Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard plans to pursue certain
mitigation strategies to keep the current patrol boats operating
longer, such as repairing deteriorated hull structures and replacing
obsolete or unsupportable equipment and systems. Coast Guard officials
also stated that they are pursuing the option of selecting design plans
for a patrol boat that is already on the market that could be adapted
for Coast Guard use as an interim measure until the FRC design is
finalized. In addition, according to Coast Guard officials, the Coast
Guard has taken steps designed to help ensure the FRC's reliability.
First, because the FRC is to employ composite materials for the hull,
the Coast Guard undertook a series of risk mitigation efforts, which
are often part of a naval shipbuilding program, during the FRC's
preliminary design phase. These efforts included fatigue testing of
composite material panels and joint configurations, as well as testing
a scale model of the hull, and conducting a third-party design review.
Second, the Coast Guard intends to conduct a 12-month performance
evaluation when the first FRC is delivered, though there are currently
no detailed plans as to what the evaluation will entail.
The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 because
of high technical risks associated with the emerging design. In
particular, an independent design review by third-party consultants
preliminarily demonstrated, among other things, that the FRC would be
far heavier and less efficient than a typical patrol boat of similar
length, in part, because it would need four engines to meet Coast Guard
speed requirements. As a result, the Coast Guard is pursuing three
strategies for moving forward with the FRC acquisition. The first
strategy involves ICGS purchasing design plans for and building an "off-
the-shelf" patrol boat as a way to increase patrol hours currently
unmet by the patrol boat fleet. The first of these boats is projected
to be ready for Coast Guard operations in 2009. However, according to
Coast Guard officials, the off-the-shelf patrol boat may not meet Coast
Guard performance requirements. The Coast Guard issued a request for
information (RFI) in April 2006 to assess the off-the shelf options.
According to Coast Guard Deepwater Program Officials, in response to
the RFI, the Coast Guard received 26 distinct patrol boat design
submissions from 17 vendors and is currently in the process of
reviewing these submissions. They further stated that its senior
leadership plans to make a decision regarding the off-the-shelf design
in September 2006. According to the Coast Guard, a second strategy it
is pursuing is to revise the necessary capabilities of the FRC in order
to allow for modifications to the current FRC design. Concurrent with
the first two strategies, the Coast Guard's third strategy is to have a
third party reassess the analyses used in the decision to use composite
materials for the FRC to determine if the use of composite materials
will, in fact, reduce total ownership costs. The result of the Coast
Guard pursuing these strategies is that the Coast Guard would end up
with two classes of FRCs. The first class of FRCs to be built would be
based on an adapted design from a patrol boat already on the market, to
expedite delivery, and a follow-on class that would be based on
revisions made to address the problems identified in the original FRC
design plans.
Pursuant to these three strategies, Coast Guard officials now estimate
that the first FRC will likely not be delivered until late fiscal year
2009, at the earliest, rather than 2007 as outlined in the 2005 Revised
Deepwater Implementation Plan. Coast Guard officials have not yet
determined how changes in the design and delivery date for the FRC will
affect the overall system of systems approach. However, because the
delivery of Deepwater assets are interdependent within this acquisition
approach, schedule slippages and uncertainties associated with
potential changes in the design and capabilities of the new assets have
increased the risks that the Coast Guard may not meet its expanded
homeland security performance requirements within given budget
parameters and milestone dates.
Concluding Observations:
A number of factors are tied to the uncertainty surrounding the FRC
program. First, the unanticipated problems associated with the 110-foot
to 123-foot patrol boat conversion program prompted the Coast Guard to
accelerate the FRC program by more than a decade. In addition, the
system integrator has chosen to use a relatively new technology, namely
composite materials, for the FRC hull form. As of May 2006, the Coast
Guard has spent approximately $26.7 million for design and test efforts
on the FRC, although it has yet to produce a viable design. Because of
this, the first FRC will not be delivered until late fiscal year 2009,
at the earliest, rather than in fiscal year 2007 as outlined in the
2005 Deepwater Revised Implementation Plan. This means the Coast Guard
will have to continue to rely on its aging and deteriorating patrol
boats. Moreover, because of the schedule slippage and uncertainties
associated with potential changes in the design and capabilities of the
FRC, the Coast Guard has increased the risks associated with the system-
of-systems concept.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of
Homeland Security. The Department referred to the U.S. Coast Guard
which generally concurred with the findings of the report and provided
technical comments, which have been incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast
Guard, and interested congressional committees. This report will also
be made available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be made available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
For information about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9610,
or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Briefing Section:
This appendix contains the briefings slides presented to your staffs on
April 12, 2006. While we have not modified the briefing slides, we have
provided updated information in the accompanying letter regarding the
Coast Guard's three strategies and cost information in an effort to
provide the most current information. For example, slides 17 and 18
provide information on the Coast Guard's strategies to move forward
with the FRC acquisition and associated program cost data but the
letter provides updated information.
U.S. Coast Guard's Fast Response Cutter: Status of Design:
Presented to House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
April 12, 2006:
Introduction:
The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) is slated to replace the 110' and 123'
patrol boats under the Deepwater system:
The FRC is projected to provide greater speed, endurance, and
operational hours than current patrol boats:
As of the 2006 update submitted with the Administration's fiscal year
2007 budget request, the Coast Guard plans to acquire 58 FRCs:
Researchable Questions:
What factors went into the decision to use composite materials for the
FRC hull form?
What types of composite materials have been selected for the FRC hull
form?
What contingency plans have been formulated should the prototype hull
form fail to meet Coast Guard performance requirements?
What is the status of the FRC design?
GAO's Approach:
Reviewed the decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull form,
to include:
* Relevant Coast Guard and contractor documents, trade studies, and
briefings:
* Discussions with staff from the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program and
the Engineering Logistics Center, the Office of Naval Research, and the
Naval Surface Warfare Center:
Reviewed the decision regarding the types of composites to be used on
the FRC hull form, to include:
* Relevant Coast Guard and contractor documents and trade studies:
* Discussions with staff from the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program, as
well as an Office of Naval Research official:
Discussed Coast Guard mitigation efforts and contingency plans with
relevant Coast Guard Deepwater Program and test and evaluation
officials:
Reviewed the current status of the FRC design effort, to include:
* Coast Guard documents, studies, briefings; contractor documents and
briefings; and independent design review materials:
* Discussions with Coast Guard Deepwater Program and Engineering and
Logistics Center officials:
We conducted our work between February and April 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted governmental auditing standards:
Briefing Overview:
Decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull form:
Types of composite materials planned for use on the FRC hull form:
Risk mitigation and contingency plans should the first hull form fail
to meet Coast Guard's performance requirements:
Recent history of FRC design concerns:
FRC re-design options:
FRC program costs to date:
Decision to use Composite Materials for the FRC:
In July 2004, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) decided to use
composite materials for the FRC hull form:
ICGS's analysis of alternatives for the FRC found that the use of
composite materials instead of steel offered advantages such as:
* Reduced Total Ownership Costs:
* Increased operational availability (extended time between depot-level
maintenance, decreased maintenance requirements):
* Increased performance through weight savings (higher speed, extended
range):
An official with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) also cited
additional advantages such as:
* Corrosion prevention:
* Impact damage - less likely than steel to result in a hole in the
cutter:
Decision to use Composite Materials for the FRC:
According to ONR, some examples of successful use of composite material
hulls include:
* European naval vessels including British, Dutch, Swedish
* U.S. Navy Minesweepers:
However, a Naval Surface Warfare Center official also cited the
following disadvantages of using composite versus steel materials:
* Far less stiff than a steel hull, thereby making it more likely to
bend under weight:
* Level of confidence in performance and service experience less than
that of steel:
Planned Use of Composite Materials on the FRC:
Two types of composite materials are to be used on the FRC:
A solid laminate form consisting of layers of glass-reinforced plastic
for the hull:
[See PDF for image]
Photos courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
[See PDF for image]
Photos Courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
A "sandwich" form consisting of two thinner layers of glass-reinforced
plastic surrounding a core of either balsa wood or synthetic foam for
deck and bulkhead:
Solid laminate:
* Solid, single-skin glass-reinforced plastic hull shell with attached
stiffeners:
* Entire hull would be molded into form in one process:
* Low maintenance and life cycle costs, longer service life, lower
weight than comparable steel hulls:
[See PDF for image]
Graphic & photo courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard:
[End of figure]
Sandwich form:
Thin glass-reinforced plastic "skins" separated by a core material:
* Core material will consist of either synthetic foam or balsa wood,
depending on location:
Reduced structural weight with built-in insulation due to core
material:
[See PDF for image]
Graphic & photo courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard:
[End of figure]
Risk Mitigation and Contingency Plans:
Risk mitigation efforts during the Preliminary Design Phase (January
2005-February 2006) included:
* Model testing of the current design:
* Independent Design Review (IDR) of the FRC design:
* Testing of proposed composite material panels and joint
configurations:
Because of potential use of composite materials, Coast Guard intends to
conduct a 12-month performance evaluation on the first FRC before
ordering follow-on cutters:
* Although the first FRC was to be delivered in 2007, per the revised
2005 Deepwater plan, there are currently no detailed plans as to what
this evaluation will entail:
While there is no documented contingency plan, according to a Coast
Guard Deepwater Program official, should the first FRC fail to meet
performance requirements, the Coast Guard would pursue further
sustainment of the current 110-ft patrol boat fleet while reviewing
other alternatives to reduce risk by exploring existing designs:
Recent History of FRC Design Concerns:
Concerns about the FRC design have been raised since January 2005:
January 2005:
* Coast Guard Engineering Logistics Center (ELC) provided significant
comments to ICS's initial Concept Design Report, outlining concerns
about the hull form, potential speed, and propulsion plant studies,
among others:
April 2005:
* Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office and ICGS held a Systems
Requirements Review:
* Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office focused on weight reduction
strategies, with little to no attention on design concerns:
May 2005:
* Coast Guard ELC published a white paper formally outlining design
concerns, such as the design process, estimated weight increases, hull
form and propulsion:
* According to Deepwater Program officials, they acknowledged ELC's
concerns and determined further testing was necessary to validate them:
August 2005:
* Due to its continued design concerns, Coast Guard Deepwater Program
Office asked for an IDR:
* ICGS contracted with John J. McMullen & Associates to perform an IDR:
September 2005:
* Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office and ICGS held a Preliminary
Design Review (PDR) and ICGS was authorized to award a contract for
detailed design:
* PDR considered by Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office to be
"successful" because ICGS met contractual requirements:
October 6, 2005:
* After PDR, Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office sent a letter to ICGS
highlighting design concerns such as the hull design and inconsistent
total ownership cost data, to be addressed prior to Critical Design
Review:
January 2006:
* Due to preliminary model test observations ICGS identified cavitation
(which can lead to engine inefficiencies and potential structural
damage) as a concern with the FRC's hull form and presented an issue
paper and briefing to Coast Guard officials:
* Coast Guard authorized additional testing to explore potential
cavitation problems:
February 14, 2006:
* John J. McMullen & Associates provided a briefing on preliminary IDR
results that, among other things, noted:
- FRC preliminary design was unlike those typically found for patrol
boats. For example, at 330 tons, FRC is 52% heavier than a standard
patrol boat of similar length; thereby driving hull proportions,
required power, structural design, fuel load and costs.
* IDR preliminary results validated concerns raised in ELC's May 2005
white paper, as well as the initial concerns raised in early 2005:
February 28, 2006:
* According to Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, FRC design work
has been temporarily suspended because of high technical risks
associated with current design:
- Risks include excessive weight, excessive horse power, and the
likelihood of additional problems:
* According to the Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, ICGS maintains
that its FRC design has met contractual requirements and is withholding
any judgment about the design until final IDR and model test results
are available:
FRC Re-design Options:
The Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies to mitigate FRC design
technical risks:
Market survey:
* ICGS would purchase an "off-the-shelf" patrol boat design and if
necessary, make modifications to meet Coast Guard requirements:
* The Coast Guard recently released a request for information to obtain
data about the state of the market for proven patrol boat designs:
Modify current design:
* Coast Guard would revise planned FRC capabilities to allow for
alterations to the FRC design:
Re-assessment of the composite versus metal business case analysis:
* Coast Guard would have a third party, reassess the composite v. metal
business case analysis to determine if the use of composite materials
is still appropriate in terms of Total Ownership Cost:
Estimated delivery date of first FRC: 4th quarter fiscal year 2009 or
4th quarter fiscal year 2010:
* Please see pages 1 and 4 for updated information.
FRC Program Costs To Date:
Table: Costs of FRC design n efforts to date:
FRC design efforts: Concept and preliminary design;
Total obligation$18,504,593;
Total expenditure$17,250,000;
Percent unexpended: 7%.
FRC design efforts: Proposal preparation for Long Lead Time Materials;
Total obligations: $76,380;
Total expenditures: $67,065;
Percent unexpended: 12%.
FRC design efforts: Contract and detail design;
Total obligations: $14,520,000;
Total expenditures: $6,390,000;
Percent unexpended: 56%.
FRC design efforts: Proposal preparation for contract and detail
design;
Total obligations: $1,441,036;
Total expenditures: $611,991;
Percent unexpended: 58%.
FRC design Efforts: Total;
Total obligations: $34,542,009;
Total expenditures: $24,319,056;
Percent unexpended: 30%.
[End of Table]
Costs of all FRC test efforts to date:
FRC test efforts: Composite material testing;
Total obligations: $1,830,289;
Total expenditures: $455,000;
Percent unexpended: 75%.
FRC test efforts: Hydrodynamic model testing;
Total obligations: $1,989,782;
Total expenditures: $230,000;
Percent unexpended: 88%.
FRC test efforts: Total;
Total obligations: $3,820,071;
Total expenditures: $685,000;
Percent unexpended: 82%.
[End of table]
*Fiscal Year 2007 budget request includes approximately $41.6 million
for production of the first FRC:
* Please see page 3 for updated cost information.
Concluding Observations:
The Coast Guard has expended about $25 million and does not have a
viable FRC design to date:
Because the first FRC may not be delivered until fiscal year 2009 or
fiscal year 2010, the Coast Guard has lost time in acquiring the new
capabilities it needs in a post 9/11 environment:
The longer it takes for the Coast Guard and ICGS to get an acceptable
replacement for the 110-ft and 123-ft patrol boat fleets, the more the
Coast Guard will have to rely on aging, deteriorating vessels:
The Coast Guard may have increased the risks associated with the
"system of systems" concept due to schedule slippages and uncertainties
associated with potential changes in the design and capabilities of the
replacement assets:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Steve Caldwell (202) 512-8777 or caldwells@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Steve Calvo, Assistant
Director; Christopher Conrad, Adam Couvillion, Julie Leetch, and Stan
Stenersen made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management &
Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623 (Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2006).
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted, GAO-06-
546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006).
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset
Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges
Remain, GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005).
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-651T
(Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005).
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-307T
(Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005).
Coast Guard: Observations and Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request, GAO-05-364T (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005).
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed, GAO-
04-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004).
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005
and Beyond, GAO-04-636T (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004).
Coast Guard: Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine, GAO-04-595
(Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2004).
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380
(Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004).
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003).
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T
(Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of
Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002).
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks, GAO-
01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks
Remain, GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001).
Coast Guard: Budget Challenges for 2001 and Beyond, GAO/T-RCED-00-103
(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000).
Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, GAO/RCED-99-6
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Coast Guard converted 8 of the 110-foot patrol boats to 123-
foot boats, but discontinued further conversions because the patrol
boats were experiencing technical difficulties, such as hull buckling
on the Matagorda, and were not able to meet post-September 11, 2001
mission requirements.
[2]Under the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard is relying on a prime
contractor--called the system integrator--to identify and deliver the
assets needed to meet Coast Guard mission requirements.
[3] Please see the Related Products section for a list of prior GAO
products on the Deepwater program.
[4] In 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a contract to ICGS as the system
integrator for the Deepwater program. ICGS is a joint venture between
two contractors--Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman--that in turn
contract with other subcontractors.
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