Border Security
Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program Gao ID: GAO-06-854 July 28, 2006The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million people entered the country under the program. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the risks that aliens would exploit the program to enter the United States became more of a concern. In this report, we (1) describe the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examine the U.S. government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assess actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six program countries, and reviewed relevant laws, procedures, and reports on participating countries.
The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country. The U.S. government's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years, DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process, preparation for the in-country site visits was not consistent, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, DHS cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the U.S. government has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries participate with Interpol's database, four do not. DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border screening tool because DHS does not automatically access the data at primary inspection.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-854, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2006:
Border Security:
Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver
Program:
Visa Waiver Program:
GAO-06-854:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-854, a report to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to
the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without
obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million people
entered the country under the program. After the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the risks that aliens would exploit the program to
enter the United States became more of a concern. In this report, we
(1) describe the Visa Waiver Program‘s benefits and risks, (2) examine
the U.S. government‘s process for assessing potential risks, and (3)
assess actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy
officials in six program countries, and reviewed relevant laws,
procedures, and reports on participating countries.
What GAO Found:
The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent
risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular
workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when
screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack
time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from
visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists,
criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk.
While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many
fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged
that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the
United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver
country.
The U.S. government‘s process for assessing the risks of the Visa
Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2
years, DHS review the effect that each country‘s continued
participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security
interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS
established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We
identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key
stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process,
preparation for the in-country site visits was not consistent, and the
final reports were untimely. Furthermore, DHS cannot effectively
achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement
and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient
resources.
DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program‘s risks; however,
the U.S. government has faced difficulties in further mitigating these
risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames
and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting”a
program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require
the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has
not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While
most visa waiver countries participate with Interpol‘s database, four
do not. DHS is not using Interpol‘s data to its full potential as a
border screening tool because DHS does not automatically access the
data at primary inspection.
Figure: Visa Waiver Program Admissions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making a series of recommendations to DHS to strengthen its
ability to assess and mitigate the program‘s risks, such as providing
more resources to the program‘s monitoring unit and issuing standards
for the reporting of lost and stolen passport data. Congress should
also consider establishing a deadline for the mandated biennial report
to Congress.
DHS and State generally agreed with the report. DHS either agreed with,
or said that it would consider, all of our recommendations, but did not
agree that Congress should establish a deadline for the biennial
report.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks:
Process for Assessing Program Risks Has Weaknesses:
DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Map of Visa Waiver Program Countries:
Appendix III: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program,
Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VI: Comments from the International Criminal Police
Organization:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Fraudulent Passport Intercepts, January through June 2005:
Figures:
Figure 1: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program,
from Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
Figure 2: Visa Waiver Program Admissions as a Percentage of Total
Nonimmigrant Admissions into the United States, Fiscal Years 2002
through 2004:
Figure 3: Comparison of Screening for U.S. Visas versus Arrival
Inspection Screening at U.S. Air Ports of Entry:
Figure 4: Timeline of 2004-2005 Country Assessment Process and Other
Key Milestones:
Figure 5: CBP's Access to Interpol's Lost and Stolen Travel Document
Database:
Abbreviations:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
Interpol: International Criminal Police Organization:
OIE: Office of International Enforcement:
OIG: Office of the Inspector General:
US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 28, 2006:
The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million travelers entered the United
States under the Visa Waiver Program. This program facilitates
international travel and commerce, and eases consular workload at
overseas posts, by enabling citizens of 27 participating countries to
travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less
without first obtaining a visa[Footnote 1] from U.S. embassies and
consulates.[Footnote 2] The Visa Waiver Program was created as a pilot
program in 1986,[Footnote 3] and it became a permanent program in
2000,[Footnote 4] about 1 year prior to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Participating countries were selected because their
citizens had demonstrated a pattern of compliance with U.S. immigration
laws, and the governments of these countries granted reciprocal visa-
free travel to U.S. citizens. After the terrorist attacks, the
potential risks of the program became more of a concern. In particular,
convicted terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui and "shoe-bomber" Richard Reid
both boarded flights to the United States with passports issued by Visa
Waiver Program countries. In May 2002, Congress mandated that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) evaluate and report to Congress
at least biennially on the effect that each country's continued
participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security
interests.[Footnote 5] Effective oversight of the Visa Waiver Program
is essential to find the right balance between facilitating legitimate
travel and screening for potential terrorists, criminals, and others
that may pose law enforcement and immigration concerns.
In response to your request, this report (1) describes the Visa Waiver
Program's benefits and potential risks; (2) examines the U.S.
government's process for assessing the program's risks; and (3)
assesses actions taken to mitigate these risks.
To identify the benefits of the program, we reviewed relevant
documentation, including DHS's Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
reports and our 2002 report on the implications of eliminating the
program.[Footnote 6] We also interviewed political, economic, consular,
commercial, and law enforcement officials at U.S. embassies in six Visa
Waiver Program countries. To determine the risks the Visa Waiver
Program, we interviewed officials from DHS's National Targeting Center,
Intelligence and Analysis Directorate, and Forensic Document
Laboratory. In addition, we observed fraudulent document detection
training of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center. To evaluate the U.S. government's
efforts to assess and mitigate these risks, we analyzed the laws
governing the program, relevant regulations and agency operating
procedures, and OIG reports. We also examined 15 of the 25 completed
reports from the 2004 review process assessing the participation of
Visa Waiver Program countries.[Footnote 7] As of June 2006, the
remaining 10 assessments were pending classification review. We met
with officials from several DHS component agencies and offices, the
Department of State's (State) Consular Affairs Bureau and its Europe
and Eurasia Bureau, and the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol) in Lyon, France. We also met with the Department of
Justice's (Justice) Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau in
Washington, D.C., which facilitates international law enforcement
cooperation among the United States and Interpol and its other member
countries. In addition to U.S. officials in the six Visa Waiver Program
countries, we spoke with foreign government officials in three of these
countries. We conducted our evaluation from September 2005 through June
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
The Visa Waiver Program provides many benefits to the United States;
however, travelers attempting to enter the United States under the
program may pose security or law enforcement risks, including
immigration law violations, because they are not subject to the same
degree of screening as non-visa-waiver travelers. The program was
designed to boost international business and tourism, and allows State
to shift its consular resources to posts with higher-risk visa
applicants. However, travelers visiting the United States under the
Visa Waiver Program are not subject to the same degree of screening as
travelers with visas because they need not be interviewed by a consular
officer before arriving at a U.S. port of entry. In addition, border
inspectors at U.S. ports of entry are disadvantaged in screening visa
waiver travelers because they may not know the alien's language or
local fraudulent document trends in the alien's home country, nor have
the time to conduct an extensive interview. In contrast, visa-issuing
officers at U.S. embassies generally have more time to interview
applicants--often in the applicants' native language--and have more
country-specific knowledge of passports and fraud trends. Furthermore,
lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are highly prized
among those travelers seeking to conceal their true identities or
nationalities, creating an additional program risk. In our discussions
with DHS officials, they acknowledged that an undetermined number of
inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen
or lost passport from a visa waiver country, and, in fact, passports
from Visa Waiver Program countries have been used illegally by
travelers attempting to enter the United States. For example, from
January through June 2005, at U.S. ports of entry, DHS confiscated 298
passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries that travelers were
attempting to use fraudulently for admission into the United States.
Thus, there is a potential risk that the program could be exploited for
illegal entry into the United States.
DHS, in coordination with State and Justice, has developed a process
for assessing the law enforcement and security risks of the Visa Waiver
Program; this process has weaknesses, however. In 2002, Congress
mandated that DHS review the security risks posed by each visa waiver
country's participation in the program at least every 2 years. In 2004,
DHS established the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit within the
Office of International Enforcement (OIE).[Footnote 8] DHS conducted
its first mandated biennial reviews in 2004, and determined that all of
the countries it reviewed should remain in the program.[Footnote 9] In
general, the reviews contained an analysis of issues, such as
individual countries' border controls, security over passports and
national identity documents, and other matters relevant to law
enforcement, immigration, and national security. However, we identified
several problems with the country review process. Specifically, key
interagency stakeholders,[Footnote 10] such as embassies overseas,
State's regional bureaus, and forensic document analysts were left out
of portions of the 2004 country review process; preparation for the in-
country site visits was not always consistent; and, the review process
lacked clear criteria and guidance to make key judgments. Also, the
country assessments prepared by DHS were not completed in a timely
fashion and contained some dated information that did not necessarily
reflect the current risks posed by a country's continued participation
in the program. In particular, interagency teams conducted site visits
as part of the country assessments from May through September 2004, and
transmitted the final report to Congress more than 1 year later, in
November 2005. Moreover, DHS has not provided sufficient resources to
OIE to effectively monitor the risks posed by visa waiver countries on
an ongoing basis. While the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit
developed a strategic plan to monitor the program, it has been unable
to implement this plan with its current staff of two full-time
employees. In addition, DHS has not established points of contact
within the U.S. embassies so it can communicate directly with foreign
government contacts and field officials, who are best positioned to
monitor compliance with the program's requirements and report on
current events and issues of potential concern. Without this outreach,
DHS is not able to leverage the existing resources at U.S. embassies in
all visa waiver countries to obtain current information on potential
risks, as well as countries' progress in addressing these risks.
DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa Waiver
Program, including terminating the use of the German temporary passport
under the program; however, the department has faced difficulties in
further mitigating the risks of the program, particularly regarding
lost and stolen passport reporting--a key vulnerability. For example,
not all countries have consistently reported their data to the United
States on stolen blank passports, even though reporting such data is
vital to mitigating program risks. In one instance, a visa waiver
country reported to the United States the theft of nearly 300 blank
passports more than 9 years after the theft occurred. In 2002, timely
reporting of such thefts became a statutory requirement for continued
participation in the program, but DHS has not issued standard operating
procedures for obtaining these data. DHS has also sought to expand this
requirement to include the reporting of data, to the United States and
Interpol,[Footnote 11] about lost and stolen issued[Footnote 12] (as
well as blank) passports; however, the United States lacks a
centralized mechanism for foreign governments to report all stolen
passports, and DHS has not identified the U.S. government entity to
which participating countries should report this information. While
most visa waiver countries contribute to Interpol's database, four do
not. Moreover, some countries that do contribute do not do so on a
regular basis, according to Interpol officials. In addition, Interpol's
data on lost and stolen travel documents is not automatically
accessible to U.S. border inspectors at primary inspection--one reason
why it is not an effective border screening tool, according to DHS,
State, and Justice officials. According to the Secretary General of
Interpol, until DHS can automatically query Interpol's data, the United
States will not have an effective screening tool for checking
passports. However, DHS has not yet finalized a plan to acquire this
systematic access to Interpol's data.
We are making a series of recommendations to DHS to strengthen its
ability to assess the risks of the Visa Waiver Program, including a
recommendation to create real-time monitoring mechanisms to improve
communication between the department and overseas posts, and to provide
additional resources for the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit. We are
also making a series of recommendations to mitigate the program's
risks, including communicating clear standard operating procedures for
the reporting of lost and stolen, blank and issued, passport data.
Finally, we are including a matter for congressional consideration: to
improve the timeliness of DHS's assessments of the risks of each
country's continued participation in the program, Congress should
consider establishing a deadline by which the department must complete
its biennial country assessments and report to Congress.
We received written comments from DHS, State, and Interpol, which we
have reprinted in appendices IV, V, and VI, respectively. DHS either
agreed with, or stated that it is considering, all of our
recommendations. Regarding our matter for congressional consideration,
DHS did not appear to support the establishment of a deadline for the
biennial report to Congress. Instead, DHS suggested that Congress
should require continuous and ongoing evaluation of the risks of each
country's continued participation in the program. We agree that
continuous and ongoing evaluation is necessary, which is why we
recommended that DHS create real-time monitoring arrangements and
provide additional resources to the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit
to achieve this goal. Regarding the mandated biennial country
assessments, we believe that they can serve a useful purpose if they
are completed in a timely fashion. State agreed with our report, and
welcomed our recommendations calling for enhanced communication to and
from DHS, and for the timely reporting of lost and stolen passport
data. Interpol did not comment on our recommendations, but provided
information about its lost and stolen travel document database and
tools that it has developed to allow law enforcement officers to
instantly check this database at airports and other border entry
points.
Background:
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Visa Waiver
Program as a pilot program.[Footnote 13] It was initially envisioned as
an immigration control and economic promotion program, according to
State. Participating countries were selected because their citizens had
a demonstrated pattern of compliance with U.S. immigration laws, and
the governments of these countries granted reciprocal visa-free travel
to U.S. citizens. In 2000, the program became permanent under the Visa
Waiver Permanent Program Act.[Footnote 14] In 2002, we reported on the
legislative requirements to which countries must adhere before they are
eligible for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 15] In
general, these are the requirements:
* A low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate. To qualify for visa waiver
status, a country must maintain a refusal rate of less than 3 percent
for its citizens who apply for business and tourism visas.
* A machine-readable passport program. The country must certify that it
issues machine-readable passports to its citizens. As of June 26, 2005,
all travelers are required to have a machine-readable passport to enter
the United States under this program.
* Reciprocity. The country must offer visa-free travel for U.S.
citizens.
Figure 1 shows the number of foreign nationals admitted to the United
States under the program in recent years (see app. III for more
detailed admissions statistics). Persons entering the United States
under the Visa Waiver Program must:
* have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a
national of that country;
* be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for
business or tourism;[Footnote 16]
* have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to represent no
threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United
States;
* have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the
program (for example, individuals must have stayed in the United States
for 90 days or less during prior visa waiver visits);
* if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket
issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S.
government to participate in the program, and must have arrived in the
United States aboard such a carrier; and:
* if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile
abroad to which they intend to return.
Figure 1: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program,
from Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: As of June 2006, CBP officials stated that admissions data from
fiscal year 2005 are not yet available.
[End of figure]
Following the events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed additional
laws to strengthen border security policies and procedures, and DHS and
State instituted other policy changes that have affected a country's
qualifications for participating in the Visa Waiver Program. For
example, all passports issued after October 26, 2005, must contain a
digital photograph printed in the document; passports issued to visa
waiver travelers after October 26, 2006, must be electronic (e-
passports).[Footnote 17] E-passports aim to enhance border security by
making it more difficult to misuse the passport to gain entry into the
United States. Travelers with passports issued after the deadline that
do not meet these requirements must obtain a visa from a U.S. embassy
or consulate overseas before departing for the United States. In
addition, the May 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act
required that participating countries certify that the theft of their
blank passports is reported to the U.S. government in a timely manner.
Moreover, the act increased the frequency--from once every 5 years to
once every 2 years--of mandated assessments of the effect of each
country's continued participation in the Visa Waiver Program on U.S.
security, law enforcement, and immigration interests.
Visa Waiver Program Has Benefits and Risks:
The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits, including facilitating
international travel for millions of foreign citizens seeking to visit
the United States each year, creating substantial economic benefits to
the United States, and allowing State to allocate resources to visa-
issuing posts in countries with higher-risk applicant pools. However,
there are inherent security and law enforcement risks in the program
that pose challenges to the United States.
Visa Waiver Program Facilitates Travel to the United States:
The Visa Waiver Program was created to facilitate international travel
without jeopardizing the welfare or security of the United States,
according to the program's legislative history. In fact, visa waiver
travelers have represented about one-half of all nonimmigrant
admissions to the United States in recent years, as demonstrated by
figure 2 below. According to economic and commercial officers at
several of the U.S. embassies we visited, visa-free travel to the
United States boosts international business travel and tourism, as well
as airline revenues, and creates substantial economic benefits to the
United States. In its report accompanying the 2000 bill to make the
program permanent, the House Committee on the Judiciary acknowledged
the program's importance to the U.S. travel and tourism industry, and
the benefit it provides to American citizens by allowing reciprocal
visa-free travel to visa waiver countries. As we reported in 2002, any
decision to eliminate the program could discourage some business and
tourism in the United States.[Footnote 18] In addition, visa waiver
countries could begin requiring visas for U.S. citizens traveling to
the 27 participating countries for temporary business or tourism
purposes, which would impose a burden of additional cost and time on
U.S. travelers to these countries.
Figure 2: Visa Waiver Program Admissions as a Percentage of Total
Nonimmigrant Admissions into the United States, Fiscal Years 2002
through 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: Data on total nonimmigrant admissions are derived from DHS's 2004
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. These data do not include visa-free
entries by citizens of Canada or travelers entering the U.S. territory
of Guam under its visa waiver program.
[End of figure]
Moreover, the program allows State to allocate its resources to visa-
issuing posts in countries with higher-risk applicant pools. In 2002,
we reported that eliminating the program would increase State's
resource requirements.[Footnote 19] Specifically, if the program were
eliminated, we estimated that State's initial costs at that time to
process the additional workload would likely range between $739 million
and $1.28 billion and that annual recurring costs would likely range
between $522 million and $810 million. For example, millions of visa
waiver travelers who have benefited from visa-free travel would need to
obtain a visa to travel to the United States if the program did not
exist. Furthermore, we reported that U.S. officials, including those
from State as well as from some law enforcement agencies, said that
eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could have negative implications
for U.S. relations with governments of participating countries and
could impair their cooperation in efforts to combat terrorism.
Visa Waiver Program Can Pose Risks to U.S. Security, Law Enforcement,
and Immigration Interests:
The Visa Waiver Program can pose risks to U.S. security, law
enforcement, and immigration interests because some foreign citizens
may exploit the program to enter the United States. In particular, visa
waiver travelers are not subject to the same degree of screening as
those travelers who must first obtain a visa before arriving in the
United States. Furthermore, lost and stolen passports from visa waiver
countries could be used by terrorists, criminals, and immigration law
violators to gain entry into the United States.
Visa Waiver Travelers and Visa Applicants Face Different Levels of
Screening:
Since September 11, 2001, the visa issuance process has taken on
greater significance as an antiterrorism tool, as we have previously
reported.[Footnote 20] Those travelers who must apply for visas before
traveling to the United States receive two levels of screening before
entering the country (see fig. 3).[Footnote 21] However, visa waiver
travelers are first screened in person by a CBP inspector once they
arrive at the U.S. port of entry, perhaps after having already boarded
an international flight bound for the United States with a fraudulent
travel document. For visa waiver travelers, CBP primary inspectors
observe the applicant, examine his or her passport, collect the
applicant's fingerprints as part of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT),[Footnote 22] and check
his or her name against automated databases and watch lists, which
contain information regarding the admissibility of aliens, including
known terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators. However,
according to the DHS OIG, primary border inspectors are disadvantaged
when screening Visa Waiver Program travelers because they may not know
the alien's language or local fraud trends in the alien's home country,
nor have the time to conduct an extensive interview. In contrast, non-
visa-waiver travelers, who must obtain a visa from a U.S. embassy or
consulate, undergo an interview by consular officials overseas, who
conduct a rigorous screening process when deciding to approve or deny a
visa. As we have previously reported, State has taken a number of
actions since 2002 to strengthen the visa issuance process as a border
security tool.[Footnote 23] Moreover, consular officers have more time
to interview applicants and examine the authenticity of their
passports, and may also speak the visa applicant's native language,
according to consular officials. Inadmissible travelers who need visas
to enter the United States may attempt to acquire a passport from a
Visa Waiver Program country to avoid the visa screening process.
Figure 3: Comparison of Screening for U.S. Visas versus Arrival
Inspection Screening at U.S. Air Ports of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO; Nova Development (clip art).
[End of figure]
Lost and Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Program Countries Are Highly
Valued:
One of the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit's primary concerns is the
potential exploitation by terrorists, immigration law violators, and
other criminals of a visa waiver country's lost or stolen passports.
DHS intelligence analysts, law enforcement officials, and forensic
document experts all acknowledge that misuse of lost and stolen
passports is the greatest security problem posed by the Visa Waiver
Program. Lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are
highly prized travel documents, according to the Secretary General of
Interpol. Moreover, Visa Waiver Program countries that do not
consistently report the losses or thefts of their citizens' passports,
or of blank passports, put the United States at greater risk of
allowing inadmissible travelers to enter the country.
Fraudulent passports from Visa Waiver Program countries have been used
illegally by travelers seeking to disguise their true identities or
nationalities when attempting to enter the United States. For example,
from January through June 2005, DHS reported that it confiscated, at
U.S. ports of entry, 298 fraudulent or altered passports issued by Visa
Waiver Program countries that travelers were attempting to use for
admission into the United States (see table 1).[Footnote 24] Two more
recent cases demonstrate continued attempts to enter the United States
with fraudulent passports issued by visa waiver countries:
* In December 2005, a Pakistani citizen attempted to enter the United
States under the program with a counterfeit United Kingdom passport
that she had purchased. During secondary inspection, the CBP officer
detected flaws in the passport.
* In March 2006, an Albanian citizen attempted to enter the United
States using a Belgian passport that he had purchased. The traveler
confessed to this upon questioning by CBP officers during secondary
inspection.
Table 1: Fraudulent Passport Intercepts, January through June 2005:
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: France;
Number of passports: 67.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Italy;
Number of passports: 52.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: United Kingdom;
Number of passports: 38.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Japan;
Number of passports: 29.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Singapore;
Number of passports: 24.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Spain;
Number of passports: 19.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Portugal;
Number of passports: 19.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Slovenia;
Number of passports: 14.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Netherlands;
Number of passports: 9.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Germany;
Number of passports: 6.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Austria;
Number of passports: 5.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Belgium;
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Norway;
Number of passports: 4.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Ireland;
Number of passports: 3.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Sweden;
Number of passports: 2.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Switzerland;
Number of passports: 2.
Visa Waiver Program country of issuance: Total;
Number of passports: 298.
Source: CBP.
[End of table]
In 2004, the DHS OIG reported that aliens applying for admission to the
United States using lost or stolen passports have little reason to fear
being caught. DHS's OIG reported that a lack of training hampered
border inspectors' ability to detect passport fraud among Visa Waiver
Program travelers, and recommended that CBP inspectors receive
additional training in fraudulent document detection.[Footnote 25] At
that time, the 12-week training course for new inspectors at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center devoted 1 day to passport
fraud, according to the OIG. Currently, CBP dedicates 16 hours out of
the 16-week basic training program to fraudulent document detection
training for new border inspectors, and provides additional courses for
inspectors throughout their assignments at ports of entry.
Nevertheless, training officials said that fraudulent and counterfeit
passports are extremely difficult to detect, even for the most
experienced border inspectors--which makes it imperative that lost and
stolen passports are reported on a timely basis.
Although DHS has intercepted some travelers with fraudulent passports
at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined
number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using
a lost or stolen passport from a visa waiver country. According to
State, these aliens may have been inadmissible because they were
immigration law violators, criminals, or terrorists. Following are
several examples:
* In July 2005, two aliens successfully entered the United States using
lost or stolen Austrian passports. DHS was not notified that these
passports had been lost or stolen prior to this date; the aliens were
admitted, and there is no record of their departure, according to CBP.
In October 2005, CBP referred this case to DHS Immigration and Customs
Enforcement for further action.
* In June 2005, CBP inspectors admitted into the United States two
aliens using Italian passports that were from a batch of stolen
passports. CBP was notified that this batch was stolen; however, the
aliens altered the passport numbers to avoid detection by CBP officers.
DHS has no record that these individuals departed the United States.
* Also in June 2005, three aliens traveling together--all using
fraudulent Italian passports--were interviewed at primary inspection.
CBP referred one alien, an Albanian citizen, to secondary inspection
because she was reluctant to answer the inspector's questions. In
secondary inspection, CBP determined that her passport had been
altered. CBP admitted the other two aliens, but subsequently determined
that their passports were part of the batch of stolen Italian passports
cited in the previous example.
Process for Assessing Program Risks Has Weaknesses:
In July 2004, DHS created the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit within
OIE to monitor the Visa Waiver Program. Its mission is to oversee Visa
Waiver Program activities and monitor countries' adherence to the
program's statutory requirements, ensuring that the United States is
protected from those who wish to do it harm or violate its laws,
including immigration laws. In 2004, DHS reviewed the law enforcement
and security risks posed by the continued participation of 25 of the 27
countries in the program. However, we identified problems with the
country review process by which DHS assesses these risks. For example,
DHS did not involve key interagency stakeholders in certain portions of
the review process, and did not establish transparent protocols for the
country assessments--including internal milestones or deadlines for
completing the final country assessments, the goals of the site visits,
and an explanation of the clearance process. Furthermore, OIE is unable
to effectively monitor the immigration, law enforcement, and security
risks posed by visa waiver countries on a continuing basis because of
insufficient resources.
Initial Steps Taken to Assess Risk of Visa Waiver Program:
In April 2004, the DHS OIG identified significant areas where DHS
needed to strengthen and improve its management of the Visa Waiver
Program.[Footnote 26] For example, the OIG found that it was unclear
who was managing the program following the dissolution of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. In addition, the OIG found that
a lack of funding, trained personnel, and other issues left DHS unable
to comply with the mandated biennial country assessments. In response
to these findings, DHS established OIE's Visa Waiver Program Oversight
Unit in July 2004, and named a director to manage the office. Since its
establishment, DHS, and particularly OIE, has made strides to address
concerns raised by the 2004 OIG review. Specifically, DHS has:
* conducted site visits in all 27 participating countries;
* completed comprehensive assessments of 25 participating countries,
examining the effect of continued participation in the Visa Waiver
Program on U.S. security and law enforcement interests, including the
enforcement of immigration laws;
* identified risks in some of the countries and brought the concerns to
the attention of host-country governments in five visa waiver
countries;[Footnote 27]
* submitted a six-page report to Congress in November 2005 that
summarized the findings from the 2004 assessments; and:
* initiated assessments for the remaining two countries in August and
September 2005.
In addition, in September 2005, DHS and State organized a technical
conference in Washington, D.C., with representatives from Visa Waiver
Program countries, to discuss the passport requirements for visa waiver
travelers, and the October 2005 and 2006 deadlines for digital
photographs and e-passports, respectively. Together, these actions
demonstrate significant improvements since the April 2004 OIG report.
DHS Lacks a Clearly-Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to Assess
Risks of Visa Waiver Program:
Despite these steps to strengthen and improve the management of the
program, we identified several problems with the process DHS uses to
assess the risks posed by each of the visa waiver countries' continued
participation in the program--namely the mandated biennial country
assessment process. For the 2004 assessments, we found the following:
* some key stakeholders were excluded from the decision-making process;
* the reviews lacked clear criteria to make key judgments;
* there was inconsistent preparation for the in-country site visits for
the reviews; and:
* DHS and its interagency partners neither completed the 25 country
assessments nor issued the summary report to Congress in a timely
manner.
OIE has acknowledged such weaknesses and has begun to make adjustments;
however, concerns remain.
Review Process Did Not Involve Key Stakeholders:
We found that the review process lacked clear protocols, as key
stakeholders were left out of the report development process.
Specifically, after conducting the site visits and contributing to the
reports on the site visits, DHS and the interagency working group did
not seek input from all site visit team members while drafting and
clearing the final country assessments and subsequent report to
Congress. For example, DHS's forensic document analysts, who
participated in the site visits in 2004, told us that they did not see,
clear, or comment on the draft country assessments, despite repeated
attempts to obtain copies of them. Thus, these analysts questioned the
integrity of the process because they had not seen how their analyses
were incorporated into the final assessments. Additionally, State's
headquarters officers who cover diplomatic relations in Visa Waiver
Program countries, as well as embassy officials in all of the posts we
visited, stated that they were not asked to review or provide comments
on the draft assessments, nor had they seen the final assessments. CBP
officials also stated that they repeatedly requested copies of the
country assessments and subsequent report to Congress, but did not
receive them. According to State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, DHS did
not seek feedback from U.S. embassies and State's regional bureaus on
the draft site visit or individual country assessments. Because these
assessments contained classified information, OIE officials told us
that they were not broadly distributed in draft or final form.
Nevertheless, without this information, key stakeholders could not be
effective advocates for U.S. concerns.
Review Process Lacked Clear Criteria to Make Key Judgments:
We found that DHS did not have clear criteria when assessing each
country's participation in the program to determine at what point
security concerns would trigger discussions with foreign governments
about these concerns and an attempt to resolve them. As previously
mentioned, the DHS-led interagency working group identified five
countries from its 2004 assessment with significant security concerns,
and DHS, in coordination with State, discussed these concerns with
government officials. Furthermore, U.S. embassies issued a formal
diplomatic demarche to the five governments regarding the concerns in
March 2005.[Footnote 28] However, while the working group also had
concerns with a sixth country, it decided not to issue a demarche to
this government. According to State, the working group determined that
the concerns identified in this country were not directly related to
the Visa Waiver Program and the country's participation in the program.
However, OIE officials and other working group members stated that they
did not use any standard criteria in making this determination. State
officials agreed that qualitative and/or quantitative criteria would be
useful when making these determinations, although DHS stated that the
criteria should be flexible. During our visit to the U.S. embassy in
the sixth country, which was not issued a demarche, U.S. officials told
us they were unaware that the working group had discussed security
concerns in the context of the country assessment. While embassy
officials had already been addressing these issues as part of their
mission, they said that they would have likely seen greater progress
made in discussions with foreign government officials if all parties
had known that there was a potential link between these security
concerns and visa waiver requirements.
Inconsistent Preparation for Site Visits:
The site visits associated with each country review were not always
well-prepared and lacked a consistent approach, according to the site
visit team members. Several team members representing different
agencies stated that they did not receive adequate information and
guidance prior to conducting the site visits and, thus, were not well-
prepared to conduct the visits. DHS did not brief or train the site
visit team members prior to conducting the 2004 reviews, and many said
that the goals of the in-country visits were not clear. One team member
stated that the site visits were largely "fact-finding trips," as
opposed to a targeted analysis of law enforcement and security
concerns. Moreover, prior to conducting the site visits, DHS sent each
country a background questionnaire; however, OIE and team members
stated that some countries did not provide responses to the
questionnaire prior to the site visit, which would have been useful for
preparation. Furthermore, senior U.S. officials in each of the
embassies we visited stated that the goals and priorities of the 2004
DHS-led site visit teams were not clear to them. Consular officials at
half of the posts we visited also said that the site visit teams
arrived on short notice and did not give them adequate time to prepare.
As a result, the teams may not have made the most efficient use of
their time in-country, and may not have gathered their information on a
consistent basis.
Reporting Untimely:
DHS did not issue, in a timely manner, the summary report to Congress
that generally described the overall findings from the 25 country
assessments. Although DHS is mandated to conduct the country
assessments every 2 years, Congress did not establish a deadline by
which the assessments must be completed or the summary report issued.
OIE, State, and Justice officials acknowledged that the assessments
took too long to complete. The interagency teams conducted site visits
as part of the country assessments from May through September 2004, and
transmitted the final summary report to Congress more than 1 year
later, in November 2005. The report to Congress was a six-page summary
that did not include detailed descriptions of the law enforcement and
security risks identified during the review process, which were
discussed at length in the individual country assessments. According to
interagency working group members, DHS did not establish internal
milestones or deadlines for completing the final country assessments.
OIE officials attributed the lengthiness of the assessment process to
the multiple rounds of clearances for each of the 25 assessments and
the summary report.
While the country assessments were awaiting clearance, there were
missed opportunities to capture more recent developments, and the final
assessments contained dated information or were incomplete. For
example, in May 2005, a post in one visa waiver country was notified
there had been a large-scale, high-profile theft of blank passports.
While the U.S. government was aware of this theft, this information was
not captured in that country's assessment as it was being cleared.
Moreover, the teams collecting information about the visa waiver
countries' risks in 2004 used, in some cases, information from 2 years
prior; by the time the summary report was issued in November 2005, some
of the data was over 3 years old. As a result of this lengthy process,
the final report presented to Congress did not necessarily reflect the
current law enforcement and security risks posed by each country, or
the positive steps that countries had made to address these risks (see
fig. 4).
Figure 4: Timeline of 2004-2005 Country Assessment Process and Other
Key Milestones:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Despite Adjustments to Process, Weaknesses Remain:
OIE officials acknowledged weaknesses in the 2004 reviews, and made
some adjustments for the 2005 country assessments for Italy and
Portugal, the two remaining countries. For the 2005 reviews, DHS
conducted a 1-day training seminar to explain the objectives of the
visit and share information about the countries to the site visit
teams, including findings from prior country assessments. Additionally,
the team members met prior to conducting the site visits, and
reconvened upon returning to Washington, D.C., to ensure consensus on
their report on the site visit. However, the 2005 country review
process still lacked consistency and transparency. In particular, DHS
has not finalized its operating procedures for site visits. The site
visit teams traveled to the remaining two countries in August and
September 2005; however, as of June 2006, DHS had neither updated the
interagency working group team members on the status of the reviews of
Italy and Portugal, nor provided them with a timeline for proceeding
with the review. Furthermore, stakeholders continued to express concern
about DHS's lack of communication about the process and the findings,
and no changes have been made to the review process that would make the
final report to Congress timely. Therefore, there are no assurances
that the next biennial assessment round will proceed more quickly than
the previous round.
DHS Cannot Effectively Monitor Ongoing Concerns in Visa Waiver
Countries:
DHS cannot effectively monitor the law enforcement and security risks
posed by visa waiver countries on a consistent, ongoing basis because
it has not provided OIE with adequate staffing and resources.
Furthermore, we found weaknesses in communication between DHS and
overseas posts and other agencies.
Lack of Staffing and Funding Impedes Ability to Assess Risks:
OIE is limited in its ability to achieve its mission because of
insufficient staffing and funding. The office has numerous
responsibilities, including:
* conducting the mandated biennial country reviews;
* monitoring law enforcement, security, and immigration concerns in
visa waiver countries on an ongoing basis;
* working with countries seeking to become members of the Visa Waiver
Program;[Footnote 29] and:
* briefing foreign government representatives from participating visa
waiver countries, as well as those countries that are seeking admission
into the program, on issues related to program membership.
In 2004, the DHS OIG found that OIE's lack of resources directly
undercut its ability to assess a security problem inherent in the
program--lost and stolen passports. The office received funding to
conduct the country reviews in 2004 and 2005; however, OIE officials
indicated that a lack of funding and full-time staff has made it
extremely difficult to conduct additional overseas fieldwork, as well
as track ongoing issues of concern in the 27 visa waiver countries--a
key limitation in DHS's ability to assess and mitigate the program's
risks. According to OIE officials, the unit developed a strategic plan
to monitor the program, but has been unable to implement its plan with
its current staffing. As of June 2006, the office was staffed with two
full-time employees, as well as one temporary employee from another DHS
component. Moreover, OIE does not have a separate budget, but must
request funds (for example, to conduct travel related to the Visa
Waiver Program) from the Office of Policy Development. In addition,
program officials stated that they have paid for their own office
supplies using their personal savings due to funding constraints.
Without adequate resources, OIE is unable to monitor and assess
participating countries' compliance with the Visa Waiver Program's
statutory requirements.
Gaps in DHS's Communications with its Overseas Posts and Other
Agencies:
DHS has not clearly communicated its mission to stakeholders at
overseas posts, nor identified points of contact within U.S. embassies,
so it can communicate directly with field officials positioned to
monitor countries' compliance with Visa Waiver Program requirements and
report on current events and issues of potential concern. In
particular, within DHS's various components, we found that OIE is
largely an unknown entity and, therefore, is unable to leverage the
expertise of DHS officials overseas. Specifically, only 3 of the 15 DHS
field officials with whom we spoke in the six visa waiver countries we
visited were aware of the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit and its
mission. A senior DHS representative at one post showed us that her
organizational directory did not contain contact information for OIE.
In addition, an official from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
Office of International Affairs acknowledged that DHS needs a better
communication plan for the Visa Waiver Program. He stated that DHS had
not prioritized the workload for all its officials overseas, including
their role in overseeing the Visa Waiver Program; he also told us that
OIE had not yet articulated what information it needed, designated a
mechanism to share that information, or gained agency-wide acceptance
of procedures for monitoring the compliance of visa waiver countries.
In fact, a senior DHS official in Washington, D.C., told us that he may
find out about developments--either routine or emergent--in visa waiver
countries by "happenstance." Without an outreach strategy, DHS is not
able to leverage its existing resources at U.S. embassies in all visa
waiver countries.
Furthermore, key stakeholders, who are in a position to influence and
monitor visa waiver countries' compliance with the program's
requirements, were not informed of the major findings of the country
assessments. In fact, at the time of our visits, ambassadors or deputy
chiefs of mission in each of the six posts told us that they were not
fully aware of the extent to which the country assessments discussed
law enforcement and security concerns posed by the continued
participation of the country in the program. The Deputy Chief of
Mission at one post stated that without the appropriate information,
such as was contained in the assessments, embassy officials could not
be effective agents for the U.S. government with regard to these
issues. Bureau of Consular Affairs officials in Washington, D.C.,
agreed that any concerns identified in the assessments should be
brought to the attention of the embassy, so that the posts can address
the concerns accordingly. Due to the lack of outreach and clear
communication about its mission, OIE is limited in its ability to
monitor the day-to-day law enforcement and security concerns posed by
the Visa Waiver Program, and the U.S. government is limited in its
ability to influence visa waiver countries' progress in meeting
requirements.
We also found gaps in interagency communication. According to OIE,
State plays a significant role in conveying information relevant to the
Visa Waiver Program to U.S. embassy officials and their host government
counterparts. Therefore, it is important that State and DHS have clear
lines of communication. For example, in October 2005, one government
expressed willingness to share data on lost and stolen issued passports
with the United States, and asked for technical specifications on how
to do so. However, at the time of our February 2006 visit, the post in
that country had not received direction from headquarters on how this
passport information should be shared. Moreover, OIE officials told us
that they were unaware that this country was willing to share this data
until we brought it to their attention in early March 2006. As a
result, the United States missed opportunities to potentially deter the
fraudulent use of passports from this country, which in fact has the
highest rate of misuse among all visa waiver countries, according to
DHS. Additionally, a senior consular official in another participating
country expressed frustration that DHS had not fully explained to
embassy officials why visa waiver countries needed to report lost and
stolen passport information directly to the United States and Interpol,
which maintains a global database of lost and stolen travel documents.
Several other senior consular officials also expressed the need for
more information about OIE's mission and goals, as well as the desired
role for overseas posts.
DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks:
DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa Waiver
Program, such as terminating the use of the German temporary passport
for travel under the program. Since 2002, the law has required the
timely reporting of passport thefts for continued participating in the
Visa Waiver Program, but DHS has not established and communicated time
frames and operating procedures to participating countries. In
addition, DHS has sought to expand this requirement to include the
reporting of data, to the United States and Interpol, on lost and
stolen issued passports; however, participating countries are resisting
these requirements, and DHS has not yet issued guidance on what
information must be shared, with whom, and within what time frame.
Furthermore, U.S. border inspectors are unable to automatically access
Interpol's data on reported lost and stolen passports, which makes it
more difficult to detect reported lost or stolen passports at U.S.
ports of entry.
DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver
Program:
As previously mentioned, during the 2004 assessment process, the
working group identified security concerns in several participating
countries, and DHS took actions to mitigate some of these risks. For
example, DHS determined that several thousand blank German temporary
passports[Footnote 30] had been lost or stolen, and that Germany had
not reported some of this information to the United States. In March
2005, at the working group's request, the U.S. embassy in Berlin
conveyed these concerns to the German government to seek a solution. In
March 2006, DHS determined that sufficient progress had not been made
to address the concern over German temporary passports, and, as of May
1, 2006, German temporary passport holders are not allowed to travel to
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program without a visa.
DHS has also made some progress in enforcing new passport security
measures. For example, DHS has enforced an October 26, 2005, deadline
requiring travelers under the Visa Waiver Program to have digital
photographs in their passports. Specifically, Italian and French
citizens with noncompliant passports issued after October 26, 2005,
must first obtain a visa before traveling to the United States because
these countries did not meet the deadline. Furthermore, as previously
mentioned, by October 26, 2006, visa waiver travelers must have e-
passports for travel under the program. E-passports aim to enhance the
security of travel documents, making it more difficult for imposters or
inadmissible aliens to misuse the passport to gain entry into the
United States. DHS and State officials told us that nearly all 27
participating countries report that they are on schedule to meet this
deadline.[Footnote 31] According to US-VISIT, DHS will deploy machines
to read the e-passports at 33 airports by the October 2006 deadline,
covering about 98 percent of all visa waiver travelers. While US-VISIT
intends to deploy e-passport readers to all ports of entry in the
future, it has not articulated clear timeframes to do so.[Footnote 32]
Therefore, until this is achieved, it will not be possible for DHS to
read the information on the chips embedded in the passports for the
remaining ports of entry.
DHS Lacks Standard Procedures for Obtaining Stolen Blank Passport Data:
A key risk in the Visa Waiver Program is stolen blank passports from
visa waiver countries, because detecting these passports at U.S. ports
of entry is extremely difficult, according to DHS. Some thefts of blank
passports have not been reported to the United States until years after
the fact, according to DHS intelligence reports. For example, in 2004,
a visa waiver country reported the theft of nearly 300 stolen blank
passports to the United States--more than 9 years after the theft
occurred. In addition, in 2004, a visa waiver country reported the
theft of 270 blank passports more than 8 months after the theft
occurred. The 2002 Enhanced Security and Visa Entry Reform Act provides
that the Secretary of Homeland Security must terminate a country from
the Visa Waiver Program if he and the Secretary of State jointly
determine that the country is not reporting the theft of its blank
passports to the United States on a timely basis. DHS and State have
chosen not to terminate from the program countries that have failed to
report these incidents.
DHS officials told us that the inherent political, economic, and
diplomatic implications associated with removing a country from the
Visa Waiver Program make it difficult to enforce the statutory
requirement in the broadest terms. Moreover, DHS has not established
time frames or operating procedures to enforce this requirement. In
April 2004, the DHS OIG recommended that the then-Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security, in coordination with State, develop
standard operating procedures for the routine and proactive collection
of stolen passport information from host governments for dissemination
to U.S. agencies. While the statute requires visa waiver countries to
certify that they report information on the theft of their blank
passports to the United States on a timely basis, as of June 2006, DHS
has not defined what constitutes "timely." Moreover, the United States
lacks a centralized mechanism for foreign governments to report all
stolen passports. In particular, DHS has not defined to whom in the
U.S. government participating countries should report this information.
Some Participating Visa Waiver Program Countries Are Resisting
Additional Reporting to United States and Interpol:
In addition to blank passports, lost or stolen issued passports also
pose a risk because they can be altered. In June 2005, DHS issued
guidance to participating Visa Waiver Program countries requiring that
they certify their intent to report lost and stolen passport data on
issued passports by August 2005. However, DHS has not yet issued
guidance on what information must be shared, with whom, and within what
time frame. Some visa waiver countries have not yet agreed to provide
this information to the United States, due in part to concerns over the
privacy of their citizens' biographical information. In addition,
several consular officials expressed confusion about the current and
impending requirements about sharing this data, and felt they were
unable to adequately explain the requirements to their foreign
counterparts.
In June 2005, the U.S. government also announced its intention to
require visa waiver countries to certify their intent to report
information on both lost and stolen blank and issued passports to
Interpol. In 2002, Interpol developed a database of lost and stolen
travel documents to which its member countries may contribute on a
voluntary basis. The United States has endorsed Interpol's database,
and, since May 2004, State has been contributing U.S. data from lost
and stolen blank passports to it. In 2005, State reported to Congress
that it also instructed all U.S. embassies and consulates to take every
opportunity to persuade host governments to share this data with
Interpol. While most visa waiver countries use and contribute to
Interpol's database, four do not. Moreover, some countries that do
contribute do not do so on a regular basis, according to Interpol
officials. Interpol stated that it continues to encourage countries to
send this information more systematically. In addition, participating
countries have expressed concerns about reporting this information,
citing privacy issues; however, Interpol's database on lost and stolen
travel documents does not include the passport bearers' biographical
information, such as name and date of birth.[Footnote 33] According to
the Secretary General of Interpol, in light of the high value
associated with passports from visa waiver countries, it is a priority
for his agency to encourage these countries to contribute to the
database.
Inefficient Access to Interpol's Database on Lost and Stolen Passports:
Though information from Interpol's database could potentially stop
inadmissible travelers from entering the United States, CBP's border
inspectors do not have automatic access to the database at primary
inspection at U.S. ports of entry--the first line of defense against
those who might exploit the Visa Waiver Program to enter the United
States. The inspection process at U.S. ports of entry can include two
stages--a primary and secondary inspection. If, during the primary
inspection, the inspector suspects that the traveler is inadmissible
either because of a fraudulent passport or other reason, the inspector
refers the traveler to secondary inspection. At secondary inspection,
border inspectors can contact officials at the National Targeting
Center, who can query Interpol's stolen-travel-document database to
determine if the traveler is attempting to enter the United States with
a passport that had been previously reported lost or stolen, but is not
yet on CBP's watch list (see fig. 5).[Footnote 34] However, Interpol's
data on lost and stolen travel documents is not automatically
accessible to border inspectors at primary inspection--one reason why
it is not currently an effective border screening tool, according to
DHS, State, and Justice officials. According to the Secretary General
of Interpol, until DHS can automatically query Interpol's data, the
United States will not have an effective screening tool for checking
passports.
Figure 5: CBP's Access to Interpol's Lost and Stolen Travel Document
Database:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO (data and photos); Nova Development (clip art).
[End of figure]
According to Interpol officials, the United States is working actively
with Interpol on a potential pilot project that would allow for an
automatic query of aliens' passport data against Interpol's database at
primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry. However, DHS has not yet
finalized a plan to do so. In December 2005, Interpol began a similar
program at all border stations in Switzerland. Through this program,
Swiss border agents query Interpol's database as soon as travelers
appear at a border station. According to the Secretary General of
Interpol, in a 2-month period, Switzerland encountered 282 potential
instances of travelers attempting to enter the country with a
previously reported lost or stolen passport. In addition, during this
time frame, Swiss border agents queried Interpol's database more than
all other member countries combined because it was the only country
accessing the database automatically.
In commenting on a draft of this report, Justice's Interpol-U.S.
National Central Bureau stated that from April through June 2006,
Justice, CBP's National Targeting Center, and Interpol compared records
from certain passengers arriving in the United States against
Interpol's lost and stolen travel document database. According to the
National Central Bureau, the test's objectives were to simulate an
automatic query of passenger records against Interpol's database and
analyze discrepancies between that database and U.S. watch lists. The
National Central Bureau stated that, by early August 2006, it and the
National Targeting Center will finalize a report on this test to help
facilitate a pilot program for real-time, systematic queries of
passenger records against Interpol's data at U.S. ports of entry.
Conclusions:
The Visa Waiver Program aims to facilitate international travel for
millions of people each year and promote the effective use of
government resources. Effective oversight of the program entails
balancing these benefits against the program's potential risks. To find
this balance, the U.S. government needs to fully identify the
vulnerabilities posed by visa waiver travelers, and be in a position to
mitigate them. However, we found weaknesses in the process by which the
U.S. government assesses these risks, and DHS's Visa Waiver Program
Oversight Unit is not able to manage the program with its current
resource levels. Moreover, DHS has not communicated clear reporting
requirements for lost and stolen passports--a key risk--nor can it
automatically access all stolen passport information when it is most
needed--namely, at the primary inspection point at U.S. points of
entry. It is imperative that DHS commit to strengthen its ability to
promptly identify and mitigate risks to ensure that the Visa Waiver
Program does not jeopardize U.S. security interests.
Recommendations:
To improve the U.S. government's process for assessing risks in the
Visa Waiver Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with State and other appropriate agencies,
take the following five actions:
* Provide additional resources to strengthen OIE's visa waiver
monitoring unit.
* Finalize clear, consistent, and transparent protocols for the
biennial country assessments and provide these protocols to
stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and overseas. These
protocols should provide timelines for the entire assessment process,
including the role of a site visit, an explanation of the clearance
process, and deadlines for completion.
* Create real-time monitoring arrangements, including the
identification of visa-waiver points of contact at U.S. embassies, for
all 27 participating countries; and establish protocols, in
coordination with appropriate headquarters offices, for direct
communication between points of contact at overseas posts and OIE's
Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit.
* Require periodic updates from points of contact at posts in countries
where there are law enforcement or security concerns relevant to the
Visa Waiver Program.
* Provide complete copies of the most recent country assessments to
relevant stakeholders in headquarters and overseas posts.
To improve the U.S. government's process for mitigating the risks in
the Visa Waiver Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with State and other appropriate agencies,
take the following three actions:
* Require that all visa waiver countries provide the United States and
Interpol with non-biographical data from lost or stolen issued
passports, as well as from blank passports.
* Develop and communicate clear standard operating procedures for the
reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued passport data, including
a definition of timely reporting and to whom in the U.S. government
countries should report.
* Develop and implement a plan to make Interpol's stolen travel
document database automatically available during primary inspection at
U.S. ports of entry.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
The May 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
mandated DHS to conduct country assessments of the effect on U.S. law
enforcement and security interests of each country's continued
participation in the Visa Waiver Program at least every 2 years. Given
the lengthy time it took for DHS to issue the November 2005 summary
report to Congress, and to ensure future reports contain timely
information when issued, Congress should consider establishing a
biennial deadline by which DHS must complete the country assessments
and report to Congress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DHS, State, and Interpol provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see apps. IV, V, and VI). DHS, State, Interpol, and Justice's
Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau provided technical comments,
which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
DHS either agreed with, or stated that it is considering, all of our
recommendations. Regarding our matter for congressional consideration,
DHS did not appear to support the establishment of a deadline for the
biennial report to Congress. Instead, DHS suggested that Congress
should require continuous and ongoing evaluation. With continuous
review, DHS stated that it would be able to constantly evaluate U.S.
interests and report to Congress on the current 2-year reporting cycle
on targeted issues of concern, rather than providing a historical
evaluation. We agree that continuous and ongoing evaluation is
necessary, and that is why we recommended that DHS create real-time
monitoring arrangements and provide additional resources to the Visa
Waiver Program Oversight Unit to achieve this goal. Regarding the
mandated biennial country assessments, we believe that they can serve a
useful purpose if they are completed in a timely fashion. In addition,
DHS provided information on actions that it has taken to improve the
management of the biennial country assessment process.
State agreed that efforts by U.S. embassies and consulates to monitor
and assess the Visa Waiver Program would benefit from enhanced
communication to and from DHS, and endorsed our recommendation that DHS
provide more information to these stakeholders on Visa Waiver Program
issues. In addition, State acknowledged the risk of misuse of
previously lost or stolen passports, particularly by persons who are
not eligible for a visa. With regard to timely reporting on lost and
stolen passports, State welcomed our recommendation calling for clear
guidelines and reporting mechanisms to achieve this goal.
Interpol provided information about its lost and stolen travel document
database and tools that it has developed to allow law enforcement
officers to instantly check this database at airports and other border
entry points. In addition, Interpol noted that many developing
countries lack the resources necessary to implement these tools.
Therefore, Interpol urged the United States and other countries to
provide funding to facilitate access for all countries to its lost and
stolen travel document database. It also provided its views on the
risks associated with lost and stolen passports.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this
report to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, as well as
the Attorney General and the Secretary General of Interpol. We will
also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or
fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the benefits of the Visa Waiver Program, we reviewed
relevant documentation, including Office of Inspector General (OIG)
reports and our 2002 report on the implications of eliminating the
program.[Footnote 35] We also interviewed political, economic,
consular, commercial, and law enforcement officials at U.S. embassies
overseas to discuss the advantages of the program for U.S. business and
tourism. To describe the risks in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined
documentation on the screening process at U.S. ports of entry for
travelers from Visa Waiver Program countries. In addition, we analyzed
data from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on interceptions of
fraudulent, lost, or stolen passports from participating countries. We
also observed fraudulent document detection training of CBP agents at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and spoke with training
officials regarding the difficulty in detecting fraudulent passports.
We also interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) National Targeting Center, Intelligence and Analysis
Directorate, and Forensic Document Laboratory on the risks posed by
Visa Waiver Program travelers.
In particular, we analyzed data on the number of nonimmigrants that
entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program from fiscal
years 2002 though 2004. While we did not fully assess the reliability
of these statistics because we used them for background purposes, we
conducted interviews and obtained other corroborating evidence that
confirmed the importance of the Visa Waiver Program in terms of the
broad numbers of admissions to the United States in recent years.
Regarding DHS's data on fraudulent passports, DHS reported that these
data are limited to those cases in which the fraudulent document from
the Visa Waiver Program country was intercepted at a port of entry, and
do not include instances when fraudulent passports were used to enter
the United States but were not detected. While we could not fully
assess the reliability of the data, we found them sufficiently reliable
to establish that hundreds of fraudulent documents from a broad range
of Visa Waiver Program countries were intercepted in 2005. In addition,
the number of documents that DHS reports by country is not necessarily
indicative of the extent of the problem in that country, as these data
only cover instances when fraudulent documents were intercepted.
To evaluate the U.S. government's efforts to assess and mitigate these
risks, we analyzed the laws governing the program, relevant agency
operating procedures, and DHS OIG reports. We also examined 15 of the
25 completed reports assessing the participation of Visa Waiver Program
countries.[Footnote 36] As of June 2006, the remaining 10 assessments
were pending classification review by DHS's Office of International
Enforcement. These assessments contained, among other things, detailed
analyses of an individual country's:
* political, social, and economic conditions;
* security over its passport and national identity documents;
* border controls;
* immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and
practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement, immigration,
and national security;
* patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse;
* assessments of terrorism, by the country's nationals, within or
outside the country, and;
* evaluations of the impact of the country's participation in the Visa
Waiver Program on U.S. national security and law enforcement.
To discuss these assessments and actions taken in response to their
findings, we met with officials from several DHS component agencies and
offices, the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs and its
Europe and Eurasia Bureau, and the International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol) in Lyon, France. In addition, we met with
officials from the Department of Justice's U.S. National Central Bureau
in Washington, D.C., which facilitates international law enforcement
cooperation among the United States and Interpol and its other member
countries. We also spoke with U.S. Embassy officials in six Visa Waiver
Program countries, as well as foreign government officials in three of
these countries. During these visits, we observed visa operations and
interviewed embassy management, consular staff, and representatives
from law enforcement agencies regarding their roles and
responsibilities in overseeing the Visa Waiver Program.
We conducted our evaluation from September 2005 through June 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Map of Visa Waiver Program Countries:
[See PDF for Image]
Sources: GAO; MapArt(image).
[End of Figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Foreign Nationals Admitted under the Visa Waiver Program,
Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004:
Country of citizenship: Andorra;
Fiscal year: 2002: 386;
Fiscal year: 2003: 478;
Fiscal year: 2004: 654.
Country of citizenship: Australia;
Fiscal year: 2002: 445,242;
Fiscal year: 2003: 484,086;
Fiscal year: 2004: 577,161.
Country of citizenship: Austria;
Fiscal year: 2002: 107,636;
Fiscal year: 2003: 115,164;
Fiscal year: 2004: 136,050.
Country of citizenship: Belgium;
Fiscal year: 2002: 166,286;
Fiscal year: 2003: 155,693;
Fiscal year: 2004: 185,836.
Country of citizenship: Brunei;
Fiscal year: 2002: 303;
Fiscal year: 2003: 323;
Fiscal year: 2004: 404.
Country of citizenship: Denmark;
Fiscal year: 2002: 124,819;
Fiscal year: 2003: 141,880;
Fiscal year: 2004: 165,190.
Country of citizenship: Finland;
Fiscal year: 2002: 71,338;
Fiscal year: 2003: 73,585;
Fiscal year: 2004: 89,190.
Country of citizenship: France;
Fiscal year: 2002: 932,847;
Fiscal year: 2003: 920,774;
Fiscal year: 2004: 1,121,824.
Country of citizenship: Germany;
Fiscal year: 2002: 1,208,121;
Fiscal year: 2003: 1,254,490;
Fiscal year: 2004: 1,446,806.
Country of citizenship: Iceland;
Fiscal year: 2002: 17,733;
Fiscal year: 2003: 19,810;
Fiscal year: 2004: 26,727.
Country of citizenship: Ireland;
Fiscal year: 2002: 297,496;
Fiscal year: 2003: 328,769;
Fiscal year: 2004: 392,938.
Country of citizenship: Italy;
Fiscal year: 2002: 515,126;
Fiscal year: 2003: 576,346;
Fiscal year: 2004: 693,628.
Country of citizenship: Japan; [Empty]; Fiscal year: 2002: 3,347,900;
Fiscal year: 2003: 3,303,878; Fiscal year: 2004: 4,044,284.
Country of citizenship: Liechtenstein;
Fiscal year: 2002: 996;
Fiscal year: 2003: 995;
Fiscal year: 2004: 1,182.
Country of citizenship: Luxembourg;
Fiscal year: 2002: 6,001;
Fiscal year: 2003: 6,447;
Fiscal year: 2004: 7,287.
Country of citizenship: Monaco;
Fiscal year: 2002: 377;
Fiscal year: 2003: 432;
Fiscal year: 2004: 614.
Country of citizenship: Netherlands;
Fiscal year: 2002: 486,672;
Fiscal year: 2003: 498,528;
Fiscal year: 2004: 560,403.
Country of citizenship: New Zealand;
Fiscal year: 2002: 187,235;
Fiscal year: 2003: 180,572;
Fiscal year: 2004: 202,904.
Country of citizenship: Norway;
Fiscal year: 2002: 110,713;
Fiscal year: 2003: 119,846;
Fiscal year: 2004: 140,015.
Country of citizenship: Portugal;
Fiscal year: 2002: 57,245;
Fiscal year: 2003: 64,330;
Fiscal year: 2004: 82,089.
Country of citizenship: San Marino;
Fiscal year: 2002: 279;
Fiscal year: 2003: 300;
Fiscal year: 2004: 375.
Country of citizenship: Singapore;
Fiscal year: 2002: 49,713;
Fiscal year: 2003: 54,539;
Fiscal year: 2004: 71,579.
Country of citizenship: Slovenia;
Fiscal year: 2002: 6,951;
Fiscal year: 2003: 9,703;
Fiscal year: 2004: 11,643.
Country of citizenship: Spain;
Fiscal year: 2002: 350,044;
Fiscal year: 2003: 375,021;
Fiscal year: 2004: 487,715.
Country of citizenship: Sweden;
Fiscal year: 2002: 198,532;
Fiscal year: 2003: 220,577;
Fiscal year: 2004: 273,007.
Country of citizenship: Switzerland;
Fiscal year: 2002: 228,298;
Fiscal year: 2003: 221,757;
Fiscal year: 2004: 244,921.
Country of citizenship: United Kingdom;
Fiscal year: 2002: 3,938,842;
Fiscal year: 2003: 4,189,906;
Fiscal year: 2004: 4,639,055.
Country of citizenship: Total;
Fiscal year: 2002: 12,857,131;
Fiscal year: 2003: 13,318,229;
Fiscal year: 2004: 15,603,400.
Source: CBP.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 12, 2006:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
Re: Department of Homeland Security Response to GAO Report (GAO-06-854)
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
of the Visa Waiver Program. The Office of International Enforcement
(OIE) has reviewed the draft report and welcomes this evaluation of our
program and the Office. Our comments below concern several areas of
confusion in the report, particularly with regard to management of the
2004 country review process, the elements of the review process, and
changes made to the process since 2004. In addition we have provided
comments on GAO's recommendations and an issue proposed for
congressional consideration.
I. Management of 2004 Review Process:
The draft report incorrectly characterizes OIE's role in the 2004
review process, in some places implying that OIE conducted the reviews
and made determinations that countries should continue in the program
(e.g. page 6) The report correctly notes that the 2004 reports were
initiated by the former Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Office
of Policy in April 2004 and that OIE was created in July 2004, when the
2004 review process was well underway, to institutionalize coordination
and oversight of VWP compliance activities. While OIE participated in
the interagency working group process and immediately assumed oversight
in July, the BTS Office of Policy continued to manage the preparation
for and coordination of the site visits and site visit reports, the
involvement of key interagency stakeholders, the gathering of
information and the compilation of the country reports and related
recommendations, and convening the meetings and preparing the agendas
for the interagency working group where the information was discussed
and evaluated and decisions made. When the reports were finalized, OIE
assumed responsibility for coordinating clearance and evaluating the
entire process.
The 2004 country review process was an enormous undertaking to develop
and finalize 25 comprehensive, baseline reports with limited staff and
support in a short period of time. The 2004 reports are largely the
outcome of an interagency working group process which included the
Departments of Justice and State from the beginning to end and
incorporated comments on every document produced during the 2004 review
cycle. As the GAO draft report correctly notes, the interagency working
group did not use qualitative or quantitative standards in determining
which countries were considered countries of concern. The review
process had not been institutionalized at the time it was initiated and
relied on a draft (and continually redrafted) protocol. While the 2004
process was a significant achievement, involving scores of individuals
and organizations in a complex review process, and notable for what it
accomplished, OIE agrees there were problems with that process; the
Oversight Unit was in fact created to improve the process and
recognized the need for improved organization and clarification of
roles and responsibilities from the onset.
As noted below, in some cases we do not agree with GAO's description of
the problems encountered in the 2004 review. For example, key
interagency stakeholders were in fact involved in the review process as
appropriate to their area of expertise (GAO suggest that this was not
the case). As GAO notes, the protocols for the country assessments,
including internal milestones or deadlines for completing the final
reports, the goals of a site visit and an explanation of the clearance
process, which were unclear at the start of the process were developed
by the interagency working group and continued to change during the
2004 review process. However, since the completion of the 2004 review,
most of these problems have been corrected.
II. Elements of the VWP Periodic Country Review Process:
The GAO draft report does not fully characterize the review process for
VWP countries. As a result, some comments and statements contained in
the report are not entirely accurate. One of OIE's first tasks was to
develop a clear set of standard operating procedures for the periodic
review process and the following overview demonstrates how this lengthy
and complex process currently works.
1) Review of relevant, previously obtained or collected and baseline
country specific information (including any prior reports) Information
pertaining to key VWP issues in all participating countries continually
comes to OIE from many sources, where it is collected and evaluated
continually. This information and information in previous country
reports, if any, is reviewed as an initial step to assess and
prioritize issues of interest and concern.
2) Collect and review information obtained from the host country
through a pre-site visit questionnaire submitted to posts Specific
questions are often posed to the host government in a questionnaire
submitted to posts so that the host government may directly respond and
provide information; this process is not always necessary. At this
stage, where this process is necessary, OIE seeks to narrow its focus
and provide more explicit guidelines and directions for the site-visit
team.
3) Collection and analysis of current background information collected
from relevant USG offices Numerous offices in the USG are asked to
provide specific data and information in their areas of expertise to
assist in evaluating specific VWP countries. For example, the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center provides information on country
specific issues and the intelligence community provides intelligence
information.
4) Select, train, and deploy the site visit team to collect information
from host government and USG officials, and collect the site team's
completed draft site-visit report When the issues to be assessed are
clarified, a team is selected to conduct a site visit based on their
relevant expertise. The site visit team is able to directly question
host government officials on issues of concern. Usually a site visit
team will include an expert on immigration and border control issues
(representative from Customs and Border Protection), an expert on
forensic document and document security issues (representative from the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, Forensic Document
Laboratory), an expert on intelligence issues (representative from DHS
Intelligence Analysis) and an expert from State's Office of Consular
Affairs.
However, site visit teams are tailored to the issues of concern on the
site visit (indeed, if there are no issues that need to be addressed
directly with host government officials, a site visit may not be
necessary) and may include fewer or additional participants, e.g., if
investigative matters are involved, a representative from ICE will be
included. Site visit team members are expected and instructed to be
curious, to ask questions and deliver complete factual analyses,
without personal interpretations (they are not asked nor expected to
make an evaluation of VWP compliance). The team's responsibilities are
completed once the site visit report is delivered, and are not expected
to be involved in any further aspects of the larger and more intensive
final country report which involves the evaluation of a great deal of
additional information.
GAO's draft report incorrectly suggests that this consultative process
is inadequate and that additional review is necessary. Scores of
individuals and organizations are involved in the review process and it
would be extraordinarily cumbersome and ultimately not helpful for us
to consult with each of them beyond their described functions to
support the review process.
5) Analyze all information and attempt to fill in any "gaps" After the
conclusion of the site visit, OIE will take into account all
information and data obtained, including the site-visit report, and
determine whether or not additional information will be necessary to
complete the full country report. In addition to reaching out to
components and other to fill any information "gaps," at this juncture
OIE begins to draft the congressionally required evaluation of US
security, law enforcement and immigration interests. This stage of the
review process necessitates the comparison and verification of
information and approaches, sifting through concerns to discern what
concerns are paramount, and making final draft recommendations. This
evaluation cannot be conducted at earlier stages of the review process
(e.g., at the site visit as GAO appears to suggest) or before all the
best information available is gathered and can be evaluated
collectively.
6) Prepare the draft individual country report and recommendations The
individual country report includes a summary and OIE's preliminary
recommendations (made in consultation as necessary with appropriate
components) concerning the status of the country's participation in the
VWP, and will include the site visit report as well as other baseline,
background and analytical information. The individual country reports
are prepared for the Secretary of DHS to help him make a decision
whether to continue or terminate the country at issue in the VWP. The
country reports are not intended for widespread distribution which is
inappropriate because they contain sensitive foreign government
information and are classified. The fact that an individual or agency
was involved in collecting information on which a particular report is
based does not mean that individual or agency has the requisite "need
to know" the classified report.
7) Consultation with DOS (and as necessary with DOJ) on country report
and recommendations A draft of the final report is forwarded to DOS for
consultation. If there is agreement, the draft is finalized. If there
are substantive differences between DHS and DOS, these will be included
in the final report. While an interagency working group process was
included as part of the 2004 periodic reviews, this was necessary
because of the issues involved. An interagency group will be used only
when there is a clear need for further discussion and consultation.
8) Prepare the final individual country report and summary report to
Congress In the draft report, GAO repeatedly states that the 2004
reports were not completed in a "timely fashion and contained dated
information that did not necessarily reflect the current risks posed by
a country's continued participation in the program." However, the
statutory requirement is to review countries every two years and, to do
this and take the steps necessary to complete a report, reports cannot
continue to incorporate data indefinitely. The information that was
used in the 2004 reports was the best information available at the time
the reports were finalized.
9) Determination of security classification of report (paragraphing)
using the Classification Guide Countries are open and forthcoming in
the review process, providing extremely sensitive foreign government
information because of their trust and confidence that the USG will not
expose their vulnerabilities and concerns. This information, which is
essential to the integrity of the country review process, is classified
in accordance with our need to protect and maintain this level of trust
and confidence.
10) Clear through relevant components and forward summary report to
Congress The draft report notes the length of the clearance process in
2004. In that review process which involved extensive consultations,
OIE was encouraged by National Security Council senior leadership to
engage with countries with whom we had issues of concern proactively
before the submitting the report to Congress. This collaboration boded
well and enabled OIE to develop solutions with most countries in which
concerns were raised. While such proactive engagement no doubt
contributes to the length of the clearance process, it is in the USG's
best interest for DHS to engage with countries on global concerns
discerned in the course of these reviews and move forward with
solutions, rather than to simply target problems. In defining deadlines
and placing limitations on the clearance process, GAO may inhibit this
kind of proactive consultation and engagement. Finally, it should be
stressed that OIE involves stakeholders in the VWP review process as
necessary, appropriate and relevant; statements to the contrary are
simply incorrect. For example, site visit team members and posts are
not expected or required to participate in reviewing, drafting or
clearing the full country report; they do not have access to all the
information that is provided in the country review process and their
participation would only further contribute to delay these processes.
III. Improvements Since 2004:
The draft report provides an outdated examination of the country review
process, evaluating the 2004 process when that process was assessed,
evaluated and significantly overhauled upon its completion. The
assessment of the 2004 review process identified many problems, some of
which are noted in the draft report, and these have already been
corrected by OIE. Among these changes are:
* Training for site visit team participants: Starting in 2005, OIE
implemented a one-day training seminar for all site-visit teams before
they are deployed. This training session describes the review process,
as well as what is expected and not expected of participants before,
during and after the site-visit. For example, the team leader is
responsible for drafting the site-visit report and each participant
contributes to his or her share of that report. This training session
includes a DOS desk officer briefing, an intelligence briefing by
Intelligence and Analysis, and extensive discussion of site-visit
procedures and issues of concern.
* Communication with overseas officials: Communication with posts is
critical to the country review process. Communication with DHS overseas
components is increasing and OIE consults frequently with headquarters
components and has issued a series of cables and memos to provide
information on VWP requirements and concerns. However, communication
will remain an issue until we are able to implement our plan for
continuous information management and communication outlined in our
response to Recommendation 3, below.
* Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) for the Visa Waiver Program
Oversight Unit's operations and ongoing assessments to improve the
process: Starting with the 2004 review, each review is assessed for
lessons learned. SOPS describing procedures for each portion of the
review process were developed by the VWP Oversight Unit after the 2004
review and are continually improved and updated as our operations
progress. While procedures must be tailored to individual country
issues, needs and requirements, these SOPS guide all the processes that
are involved in the country review process and already include
suggested timelines as recommended by GAO. Every effort is made to
continue to streamline and improve this process.
IV. Matter for Congressional Consideration:
GAO suggests that, given the length of time it took for DHS to issue
the 2004 country reports and to ensure that they include timely
information when issued; Congress may wish to consider establishing a
biennial deadline by which DHS must report to Congress. Considerable
thought needs to be given to the question of whether such deadlines
will in fact serve to safeguard US security, law enforcement and
immigration interests or whether they will be better served by
requiring continuous engagement and review. OIE and the VWP Oversight
Unit believe that rather than focus on imposing deadlines for
evaluating US security, law enforcement and immigration interests that
exist in a given prior 2-year period, Congress should require
continuous and ongoing evaluation of US interests so that concerns, if
discerned, are evaluated and resolved immediately and continuously in a
time-sensitive manner and so that information is available to DHS
component agencies to assist in efforts to make our borders more
secure. The many reasons for the length of the country review process
have been outlined above (see response to Recommendation 2, below).
With continuous review and information management in place, OIE would
be able to constantly evaluate US interests and report to Congress on
the current 2-year reporting cycle on targeted issues of concern,
rather than providing a biennial, or historical, "rearview mirror"
evaluation.
V. Responses to Specific Recommendations:
OIE has the following comments on the draft report's recommendations.
The draft report recommends that the Secretary of DHS, in coordination
with the Department of State and other appropriate agencies:
Recommendation:
Provide additional resources to strengthen OIE's visa waiver monitoring
unit.
Response:
OIE appreciates the recommendation and is confident that the
Administration will seek resources appropriate for the task.
Recommendation:
Finalize clear, consistent, and transparent protocols for biennial
country assessments and provide these protocols to stakeholders at
relevant agencies at headquarters and overseas. These protocols should
provide timelines for the entire assessment process, including the role
of a site visit, an explanation of the clearance process, and deadlines
for completion.
Response:
As noted above, OIE has established procedures for the Visa Waiver
Program Oversight Unit's operations and the Oversight Unit is using
them as flexible tools, tailored and revised for each review as
necessary. These guidelines provide timelines for the specific portions
of the clearance process, explain the role of the site visit and
provide an explanation of the clearance process. We will consider
providing these procedures to relevant stakeholders and USG agencies.
However, the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit's procedures are
designed with flexibility in mind and this flexibility is necessary to
effectively evaluate the law enforcement, security and immigration
concerns on a country-by-country basis. The Oversight Unit's SOPS
provide internal guidance for this office and are not designed to be
shared with overseas entities. Where deadlines are not able to be met
by any entity involved in the review process (see the description in
II, above), a note is made of this fact. The Oversight Unit's SOPS do
not provide a deadline for the completion of a country review for
several reasons -:
a. First, the length of each review is extremely variable, depending on
such factors as the nature of the country under review, its history,
geography and political issues; the issues of concern to USG security,
law enforcement and immigration interests and their complexity and
sensitivity; the availability of experts detailed to this office from
other components to participate in site visits, who often have
substantial obligations; the schedules and activities (e.g., holidays)
at posts and in host countries and the availability of USG and host
government officials; the work involved in preparing each report and
the clearance process.
b. Secondly, annual or biennial VWP reviews provide an ineffective
"rearview mirror" (backward looking) examination of issues in lengthy
reports that are almost immediately out of date, and OIE needs to move
towards continual, ongoing review of issues of concern that come to its
attention so that it is immediately responsive and engaged with
countries on issues of concern to USG interests. In a "continual
review" operation, reports can be generated for the USG at any time on
general or more focused issues of concern. To be effective, the VWP
Oversight Unit should stay current and engaged on issues of immediate
concern, developing reports as needed, rather than be focused on
developing lengthy reports on historical issues for specified trends.
Recommendation:
Create real-time monitoring arrangements, including identifying visa
waiver points of contact at U.S. embassies for all 27 participating
countries and establishing protocols, in coordination with appropriate
headquarters offices, for direct communication between points of
contact at overseas posts and the Office of International Enforcement's
Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit.
Response:
OIE and the VWP Oversight Unit agree completely with this
recommendation and have developed a strategy for continuous engagement
with countries and overseas posts that would assign OIE/VWP Oversight
Unit desk officers responsible for all VWP-related issues to countries
within specific geographic areas. Under this plan, these OIE/VWP
Oversight Unit desk officers are responsible for information management
(continuous collection, evaluation and reporting) and for monitoring,
coordination, outreach and continuous communication with embassies and
posts within their designated areas. When appropriate resources are
available, this platform for continuous engagement will be implemented
immediately. It should be noted that these desk officers will be a
critical part of answering questions, explaining requirements and
engaging with countries on such issues as lost and stolen passport
reporting.
Recommendation:
Provide complete copies of the most recent country assessments to
relevant stakeholders in headquarters and overseas post.
Response:
The country reports are classified as SECRET documents, and therefore
subject to the rules surrounding such documents. OIE has already
established a classified sharing system which will allow access for
appropriate agencies over the SIPRA-NET. As already noted above,
country reports contain sensitive information and countries share this
information openly during our reviews because they have trust and
confidence that this information on their vulnerabilities, which might
potentially harm them, is maintained and safeguarded appropriately. We
need to continue to do everything we can to protect and safeguard
sensitive foreign government information while making it available to
those stakeholders with a need to know this information.
Recommendation:
Require periodic updates from points of contact at posts in countries
where there are law enforcement or security concerns relevant to the
Visa Waiver Program.
Response:
OIE agrees with this recommendation and notes that this will be easily
accomplished when desk officers are assigned as stated in the response
to Recommendation 3, above.
Recommendation:
Require that all visa waiver countries provide the United States and
Interpol with non-biographical data from lost and stolen issued
passports, as well as that from blank passports.
Response:
DHS issued such policy in 2005 and the VWP Oversight Unit has developed
and established the standards necessary to implement this policy,
including the reporting of non-biographical data from lost and stolen
issued and blank passports. Procedures for implementing the standards
are currently in clearance. We agree that this issue is of paramount
importance and, once standards are issued, noncompliance by VWP
countries may lead to their termination from the program. However, to
achieve compliance on this issue, we will need to work closely with the
VWP countries that do not report on a regular basis at this time and
monitor their cooperation and progress on this issue.
Recommendation:
Develop and communicate clear standard operating procedures for the
reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued passport data, including
a definition of timely reporting and to who in the U.S. government
countries should report.
Response:
The VWP Oversight Unit has developed and established the standards
necessary to implement this policy, including a definition of timely
reporting, procedures for reporting, and to whom the information is
reported in the USG. Procedures for DHS implementation of the standards
are currently in clearance.
Recommendation:
Develop and implement a plan to make Interpol's stolen travel document
database automatically available during primary inspection at U.S.
ports of entry.
Response:
DHS, in coordination with DOJ and DOS, has been working with Interpol
to identify the best methodology for screening travelers using the
Interpol system. In January 2006, DHS met with Interpol in Lyon, France
to assess the viability and capabilities of the Interpol system. DHS
has also spoken with Interpol and US National Central Bureau (USNCB) in
Washington, D.C. and we have a process underway to develop connections
and determine the rules and procedures that are necessary so that
Interpol's stolen travel document database is made automatically
available to immigration officers. DHS continues to maintain contact
with Lyon and the US USNCB on these efforts and to take steps to
develop a process that would allow Interpol information to be available
to immigration officers. DHS will continue to work with Interpol and,
while we cannot control Interpol functions at this time, we will help
them move toward standards that will ensure regular and timely
reporting.
We thank you again for the opportunity to review the report and provide
comments.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
GAO Comments:
1. We understand that DHS's organizational structure changed during the
2004 review process. To avoid confusion regarding the DHS units that
had some involvement in this process, we have replaced references to
the Office of International Enforcement (OIE) with DHS, as appropriate.
2. Our review focused on the 2004 biennial review process for 25 of the
27 Visa Waiver Program countries. We agree that DHS has taken some
steps to improve the 2005 process for Italy and Portugal, whose reviews
are still in process, and we discuss these improvements in our report.
However, we disagree that DHS has corrected most of the problems
associated with the 2004 review process. As we note in our report, as
of June 2006, DHS had neither updated the interagency working group
team members on the status of the reviews of Italy and Portugal, nor
provided them with a timeline for proceeding with the review.
Furthermore, stakeholders continued to express concern about DHS's lack
of communication about the process and the findings. Therefore, we
recommended that DHS finalize clear, consistent, and transparent
protocols for biennial country assessments and provide these protocols
to stakeholders at relevant agencies at headquarters and overseas.
3. We did not intend to suggest that the evaluation of U.S. security
and law enforcement interests needed to be conducted or finalized
during the in-country site visits. Our point is that important events
may take place while the country assessments are in the clearance
process. We believe that DHS should update the country assessments to
reflect these events, such as large scale thefts of blank passports
like the May 2005 theft that we noted in our report, to ensure that
Congress has a comprehensive analysis of the current law enforcement
and security risks posed by each country.
4. We agree that DHS cannot continue to incorporate data indefinitely
into the country assessments. However, as we reported, the teams
collecting information about the visa waiver countries' risks in 2004
used, in some cases, information from 2 years prior; by the time the
summary report was issued in November 2005, some of the data was more
than 3 years old. Indeed, as DHS noted elsewhere, the 2004 country
assessments provided a "rearview mirror" and "backward-looking"
evaluation. Thus, the assessments may not necessarily have contained
the best information available at the time the assessments were
finalized. Given the lengthy time it took for DHS to issue the November
2005 summary report to Congress, and to ensure future reports contain
timely information when issued, we believe that Congress should
consider establishing a biennial deadline by which DHS must complete
the country assessments and report to Congress.
5. We agree that continuous and ongoing evaluations of Visa Waiver
Program countries are needed and recommended that DHS create real-time
monitoring arrangements and provide additional resources to the Visa
Waiver Program Oversight Unit to achieve this goal. However, as long as
DHS is required to report biennially to Congress, DHS should ensure
that future reviews are conducted in a timely fashion. Based on our
review of the 2004 country assessment process, the assessments may not
necessarily have contained the best information available at the time
the assessments were finalized given the lengthy time it took for DHS
to finalize its reviews.
6. We agree that it is in the U.S. government's best interest to engage
with countries on global concerns identified during the course of the
country assessment process. It is not our intention to inhibit this
kind of consultation. Furthermore, we acknowledge that a consultative
process may involve tradeoffs between timely reporting and complete
information gathering and analysis. Our concern is that key
stakeholders in headquarters and at overseas posts, as well as members
of the in-country site visit teams, expressed concerns about their
roles in the 2004 country assessment process, and stated that they had
not received enough detail from DHS about the process and the findings.
Thus, we recommended that DHS provide transparent protocols to all
stakeholders that provide timelines for the entire assessment process,
including the role of a site visit, an explanation of the clearance
process, and deadlines for completion. We believe it is important that
DHS finalize its standard operating procedures, and share these
procedures with relevant stakeholders at headquarters and overseas. As
we noted in our report, due to the lack of outreach and clear
communication about its mission, OIE is limited in its ability to
monitor the day-to-day law enforcement and security concerns posed by
the Visa Waiver Program, and the U.S. government is limited in its
ability to influence visa waiver countries' progress in meeting
requirements.
7. We strongly agree that classified and sensitive information should
be protected. However, we also believe that cleared U.S. officials at
overseas posts in Visa Waiver Program countries, including ambassadors
and deputy chiefs of mission, have a need to know the extent to which
law enforcement and security concerns were identified during the
mandated biennial reviews, and should receive copies of the final
country assessments. Without the appropriate information, such as was
contained in the assessments, embassy officials can not be effective
agents for the U.S. government with regard to these issues. We believe
that the establishment of a classified sharing system that allows U.S.
government agencies to access the country assessments is a positive
step.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
July 13, 2006:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Border
Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the
Visa Waiver Program," GAO Job Code 320389.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Debbie Lopes da Rosa, Consular Officer, Bureau of Consular Affairs,
at (202) 663-1175.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Jess Ford:
CA - Maura Harty:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
of the Visa Waiver Program (GAO-06-854, Job Code 320389):
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your report Stronger
Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program.
The Department of State concurs with the GAO that a strong and secure
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) offers substantial benefits to the United
States in the areas of international travel, trade, and commerce. The
VWP also allows the Department to deploy limited consular resources to
locations where the risk of immigration and other border security
violations is higher. A properly administered VWP is a strong component
of the U.S. "Secure Borders, Open Doors" commitment.
The Department of State has worked closely with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies in a joint effort to
strengthen the VWP. As noted by the GAO, these efforts over the past
five years have included the removal of two countries from VWP
membership, greatly enhanced requirements for document security and
integrity, and the imposition of VWP travel conditions on countries
that have failed to meet the new requirements or satisfy other U.S.
border security concerns. The Department continues to maintain an
active and productive dialogue with its VWP partners on border
security, recognizing that international travel, by its very nature,
requires mutual cooperation. U.S. Embassies and Consulates in VWP
countries, as well as Department offices in Washington, have provided
substantial support to DHS' efforts to monitor and assess the VWP, and
we will continue to do so. The Department agrees with the GAO that
these efforts would benefit from enhanced communication to and from DHS
and endorses an expansion of DHS information-sharing on VWP issues.
The Department of State also acknowledges the risk of misuse of
previously lost or stolen passports to seek admission to the United
States, particularly, in our experience, by persons who are not
eligible for a visa. With regard to ensuring timely reporting on lost
and stolen passports, we welcome the report's recommendations related
to establishing clear guidelines and reporting mechanisms. Good
communication with the VWP countries to articulate U.S. objectives and
concerns related to lost and stolen passport reporting is absolutely
critical for ensuring compliance with program requirements and
guidelines and to address legitimate outstanding country concerns
related to such reporting. Lost and stolen passport reporting is an
especially complex matter, involving such issues as different legal
restrictions on sharing data among VWP participating countries, varying
passport numbering schemes, and the need for clear identification of
data elements and personal information not currently collected in some
VWP countries. Implementing data-sharing measures relative to lost and
stolen passports is further complicated by the potential difficulties
of lost and stolen passport hits for legitimate travelers, mechanisms
to facilitate government-to-government sharing of appropriate
information in such cases to resolve such hits, and the limitations on
the ability of Interpol's reporting system to assist border inspectors
in the admissions process. Again, the nature of international travel
requires dialogue and mutual cooperation to find effective solutions to
these challenges, and the Department is working actively with DHS to
address all these concerns.
In its report, the GAO took issue with delays in finalizing the DHS
report to Congress on the Visa Waiver Program. The Department would
emphasize, however, that actions taken to address vulnerabilities in
the VWP were not dependent on final publication of the report and were
in fact undertaken soon after the Inter-agency Working Group identified
them - more than six months before completion of the final report. We
will continue to work with DHS to address any identified VWP security
concerns as quickly as possible, irrespective of publication schedules.
Our mantra is that border security is a 24/7 responsibility, and we act
accordingly.
[End of section]
Appendix VI Comments from the International Criminal Police
Organization:
International Criminal Police Organization:
Organizacion Internacional de Policia Criminal:
Organisation internationale de police criminelle:
200, quai Charles de Gaulle:
69006 Lyon France:
Telephone +33 4 72 44 70 05:
secretary.general @interpol.int:
The Secretary General:
Ronald K. Noble:
13 July 2006:
Our Ref.: 2006/1432/OS/JG/sf:
Subject:
GAO report on the Visa Waiver Program:
Dear Director Ford,
I would like to thank the GAO for its interest in the tools that
Interpol makes available to help its member countries secure safer
borders for their citizens.
Background:
By 2001, Interpol had identified the use of falsified stolen passports
by terrorists and other criminals as a significant threat to
international border security. No global central repository for
information on stolen and lost travel documents existed at that time.
This resulted in a situation with serious loopholes in national border
security systems, which were being exploited by terrorists and other
criminals.
As the world's only global law enforcement organization, with 184
Member Countries, Interpol took the view that it was in the best
position to address this challenge, and we made it one of our highest
priorities to create a global database of stolen and lost travel
documents.
The SLTD Database:
We launched our Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database in
2002. It contains passport numbers and information about the place and
date of the theft or loss of the passports. It does not contain any
nominal information that might implicate any privacy concerns. Interpol
made this database available to all of the world's police forces
through our global secure police communications system, called I-2417.
This meant that it was available at the Interpol National Central
Bureau in each country.
At the time we implemented the database, only a handful of countries
actively contributed information, but participation has since grown to
107 countries, including 23 out of the 26 Interpol Member Countries
that participate in the US Visa Waiver program. Similarly, the number
of documents recorded in the SLTD database has increased dramatically.
In just four years time, that number has grown from less than 3,000 to
over 11.6 million, and continues to grow daily.
The United Nations Security Council, the G-8, the European Union, and
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) have all endorsed the use of this database
as an effective tool against terrorism. The reason is straightforward.
As the 9/11 Commission found - "For terrorists, travel documents are as
important as weapons. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet,
train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack." After a
terrorist attack, police frequently discover that the perpetrators were
known suspects who had been traveling around the world plotting and
executing their attack, while concealing their identities through the
use of false passports. Stolen passports, particularly those stolen in
blank form, present the greatest threat because they can be made into
false passports that are among the most difficult to detect. They are
highly prized by terrorists, commanding high prices on the black
market, and arrested terrorists are often found in possession of them.
It has been reported, for example, that Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind
behind the first World Trade Center bombing, entered the US using a
falsified stolen Iraqi passport. Had the authorities known this at the
time, that. bombing may have been prevented.
Even with the heightened security following 9/11, the US government has
documented cases in which aliens have entered the country using
falsified stolen passports, including some from a foreign city that was
home to an al Qacda cell that played a significant role in supporting
the 9/11 terrorists.
An individual named Ante Gotovina was wanted for War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity. He used a falsified stolen passport to conceal his
identity. The passport was listed in Interpol's database, but because
border authorities were not checking this database, Gotovina's passport
was stamped in 16 countries before he was finally apprehended in 2005.
In 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Loran Djindic was assassinated by a man
who was charged with having used a falsified stolen passport to travel
extensively in planning and carrying out the assassination. His
passport was stamped 26 times before he was finally captured.
Automated Access to the SLTD Database at Primary Inspection:
To address this threat, Interpol developed technology that allows law
enforcement officers to instantly check the Interpol Stolen and Lost
Travel Document (SLTD) database at airports and other border entry
points. There are no extra steps; the same swipe of the passport
automatically checks the Interpol database in parallel with the check
of the national database. This technology (called MIND/FIND), which is
revolutionizing the way countries conduct border security, was launched
in December in Switzerland. Using this technology, the Swiss conduct
more than 300,000 database searches per month. And these searches get
results --each month the Swiss detect over 100 persons travelling with
false passports. These numbers bear witness to the urgent need for all
countries to implement Interpol's MIND/FIND technology.
France (Charles de Gaulle), Belgium and Lithuania have recently
implemented it, and a small, but growing number of other countries are
in the process of doing so as well. The US is among these countries,
along with Spain, The Netherlands, Turkey, Croatia, The Bahamas, Saint
Lucia, Jamaica and South Africa. As more countries implement this
technology, more terrorists and other dangerous criminals will be
apprehended at airports and other border entry points.
The best way for a country to protect its citizens from terrorists is
to prevent the terrorists from entering the country in the first place.
Unfortunately, in conducting border security, most countries check only
their own national database, and do not check Interpol's global
database. This should no longer be considered acceptable. Now that the
global database exists, as well as the technology to access it at
airports and other border entry points, doing so should be considered a
moral imperative.
Just imagine if a terrorist were to enter your country using a passport
that is listed in Interpol's SLTD database, but your country failed to
check this database, and this failure allowed the terrorist to
perpetrate a deadly attack. How could that failure ever be justified?
To ask this question is to answer it. The time has come for all
countries to implement automated access to Interpol's SLTD database at
all airports and other border entry points where passports are checked.
The more countries that implement such access, the more effective the
global law enforcement community will be in preventing terrorists from
travelling throughout the world in order to plan and execute their
attacks. For this reason, we will continue to engage with the US and
other member countries, working with them to roll out primary border
control access to this database whenever possible.
Worldwide Implementation:
Unfortunately, many countries lack the resources to implement this
technology. This means that there will be dangerous gaps in global
security unless other countries devote resources to help plug these
gaps. In other words, the wealthier countries must help the poorer
countries as a matter of enlightened self interest. The poorer
countries are often in possession of information that could be of great
interest to law enforcement in other countries. In addition, it is in
the interest of all countries to work together to enhance the
likelihood of the detection and apprehension of terrorists wherever
they may be found. Terrorists arrested in another country are thereby
prevented from appearing in your country.
Keeping citizens safe from terrorists and other dangerous international
criminals requires a comprehensive global approach. For the world's
wealthier countries, it is no problem to implement automated access to
Interpol's SLTD database. The problem is that the poorer countries
cannot afford to do so. Interpol believes that this technology can be
implemented at all of the world's poorer countries for approximately
$65 million. This is an exceedingly small price for wealthy countries,
such as the US, to pay in order to gain this heightened security. I
would urge the US and other wealthy countries to provide this funding
so that Interpol can implement this important law enforcement tool
worldwide.
I look forward to continuing to work with law enforcement in the US and
elsewhere towards our shared objective of keeping the world's citizens
safe from terrorists and other dangerous international criminals.
Yours sincerely,
Signed by:
Ronald K. Noble:
Secretary General:
cc: Mr Martin Renkiewicz:
Head US NCB:
Mr Jess T. Ford:
Director International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548, United States:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, John Brummet, Assistant
Director; Kathryn H. Bernet, Joseph C. Brown, Joseph Carney, Richard
Hung, Jane S. Kim, Mary Moutsos, and Jena Sinkfield made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The United States also issues visas to those who intend to
immigrate to the United States. In this report, we use the term "visa"
to refer to nonimmigrant visas only.
[2] The participating countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (see app. II for a map of these
countries). Canada and Bermuda are not participants in the Visa Waiver
Program; however, nationals of Canada and Bermuda may, under certain
circumstances, qualify for visa-free travel to the United States.
[3] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99-603.
[4] The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, P.L. 106-396.
[5] Prior to this change, DHS was required to report at least once
every 5 years. See the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act, P.L 107-173.
[6] See GAO, Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).
[7] As of June 2006, the reviews of the remaining two participating
countries--Italy and Portugal--were in process.
[8] OIE is located in the Office of Policy Development under the
direction of the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Policy.
[9] DHS's Office of Policy began this review in early 2004, several
months before the Visa Waiver Program Oversight Unit was established in
July of that year.
[10] The interagency working group charged in 2004 with assessing
participating countries' adherence to the program's statutory
requirements comprised officials from Justice's Office of International
Affairs, State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, and several components
within DHS, including the Intelligence and Analysis Directorate, CBP's
Office of Field Operations, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
Forensic Document Laboratory, among others. Representatives from some
of these agencies formed the in-country site visit teams.
[11] Interpol is the world's largest international police organization,
with 184 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border
police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations,
authorities, and services whose mission is to prevent or combat
international crime. In July 2002, Interpol established a database on
lost and stolen travel documents. As of June 2006, the database
contained about 11.6 million records of lost and stolen passports.
[12] Issued passports have been officially personalized with the
bearer's biographical information.
[13] P.L. 99-603.
[14] P.L. 106-396.
[15] GAO-03-38.
[16] According to State, the Visa Waiver Program is a substitute entry
mechanism for nonimmigrant, short-term, business, and tourism visas
only; it does not apply to students, temporary workers, and others who
require visas to enter the United States.
[17] In general, e-passports will contain a chip embedded in the
passport that will store the same information that is printed on the
data page of the passport, such as name, date of birth, gender, place
of birth, dates of passport issuance and expiration, place of issuance,
passport number, and a photo image of the bearer. In addition, e-
passports will hold a unique identification number and a digital
signature to protect the stored data from alteration. E-passports
provide two key pieces of information: the digital signature and the
digital image of the passport holder. Digital signatures provide a
higher level of security for the passport by providing a means to
electronically verify the authenticity of the data on the chip,
including the traveler's photograph and biographical information.
[18] GAO-03-38.
[19] GAO-03-38.
[20] GAO has issued a series of reports on how the visa issuance
process serves as an antiterrorism tool, including: GAO, Border
Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in
Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
13, 2005); Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of
Department of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005); and, Border Security: Visa Process
Should be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[21] All foreign visitors, whether they have visas or are seeking to
enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, undergo
inspections by CBP inspectors at U.S. air, sea, and land ports of entry
to ensure that only admissible persons enter the United States.
[22] The US-VISIT program is a government-wide program to collect,
maintain, and share information on foreign nationals, and better
control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit of visitors. Under
the program, foreign visitors are required to submit to fingerprint
scans of their right and left index finger and have a digital
photograph taken upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry.
[23] GAO-05-859 and GAO-03-132NI.
[24] In 2005, CBP established a Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit to
conduct trend analyses on travel documents used to enter the United
States. The unit's first statistical report covered fraudulent document
trends from January through June 2005, primarily focusing on passport
statistics.
[25] GAO has also reported on inspections at land ports of entry. GAO,
Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the
Inspections Process, GAO-03-1084R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 18, 2003).
[26] Prior to the establishment of DHS in 2003, Justice's Office of the
Inspector General examined visa waiver operations in 1999 and 2001,
when the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service managed the
program. Justice's Inspector General identified several chronic and
recurring problems and made a series of recommendations to strengthen
implementation of the program.
[27] In this report, we do not name the specific Visa Waiver Program
countries where DHS identified security concerns because the department
determined that this is sensitive information.
[28] In coordination with DHS, U.S. embassy officials communicated
these concerns through an official demarche to each government. A
demarche presents a formal U.S. government position or request to a
foreign government. Demarches are generally presented in writing, but
can also be transmitted orally. According to diplomatic protocol, a
demarche requires an official, formal response from the other
government.
[29] See GAO, Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa
Waiver Program, GAO-06-835R (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).
[30] German temporary passports are valid for one year, and are less
expensive than standard German passports. In addition, they are issued
at more than 6,000 locations across Germany, whereas the Ministry of
Interior issues the standard passports centrally.
[31] According to a US-VISIT official, as of June 2006, it had verified
e-passports from 12 of 27 visa waiver countries.
[32] In May 2006, a US-VISIT official stated that DHS had not yet
decided from which company the department would procure the e-passport
readers. DHS still needs to decide how it will use the digital image
from the e-passport, including whether the image will be displayed on
the US-VISIT screen during inspection, and if so, whether it will be
displayed in place of or in addition to the photo already stored in US-
VISIT. Furthermore, countries have the option to store other biometric
information, such as fingerprints or iris images, on the chip, and DHS
will need to make decisions about whether it will use such information,
if available, during inspections. According to US-VISIT, it will deploy
e-passport readers to the remaining ports of entry at a future date to
take advantage of anticipated improved reader technology, while
minimizing procurement and training costs.
[33] Interpol's database includes the passport's identity number, the
country of issuance, and the country where the loss or theft occurred.
According to officials from Justice's Interpol-U.S. National Central
Bureau, it is particularly important that countries report this
information, as well as the date of the theft and the issuance date.
[34] Interpol's data on lost and stolen passports are not available
when border inspectors screen travelers against US-VISIT or the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), unless Interpol has
shared this information with the United States in separate reports and
it has been manually entered into TECS by DHS. TECS maintains watch
list data, interfaces with other agencies' databases, and is used by
inspectors at ports of entry to verify traveler information and update
traveler data. TECS's watch list data sources include DHS' CBP and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI); State; and the Drug Enforcement Agency, among
others.
[35] See GAO, Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 22, 2002).
[36] As of June 2006, the reviews of the remaining two participating
countries--Italy and Portugal--were in process.
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