Border Security
Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Two Locations Gao ID: GAO-06-940T July 7, 2006Given today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment and the resulting widespread congressional and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, GAO conducted an investigation testing whether radioactive sources could be smuggled across U.S. borders. Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land border ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. GAO's testimony provides the results of undercover tests made by its investigators to determine whether monitors at U.S. ports of entry detect radioactive sources in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. GAO also provides observations regarding the procedures that CBP inspectors followed during its investigation. GAO has also issued a report on the results of this investigation (GAO-06-545R).
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of GAO's investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO's investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. Subsequently, the company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington D.C. The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, GAO's investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
GAO-06-940T, Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Two Locations
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and
Nonproliferation, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. MDT:
Friday, July 7, 2006:
Border Security:
Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's
Borders at Two Locations:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
Border Security:
GAO-06-940T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-940T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Given today‘s unprecedented terrorism threat environment and the
resulting widespread congressional and public interest in the security
of our nation‘s borders, GAO conducted an investigation testing whether
radioactive sources could be smuggled across U.S. borders.
Most travelers enter the United States through the nation‘s 154 land
border ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at ports of entry are responsible
for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their
admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to
preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass
destruction.
GAO‘s testimony provides the results of undercover tests made by its
investigators to determine whether monitors at U.S. ports of entry
detect radioactive sources in vehicles attempting to enter the United
States. GAO also provides observations regarding the procedures that
CBP inspectors followed during its investigation.
GAO has also issued a report on the results of this investigation (GAO-
06-545R).
What GAO Found:
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a
small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to
safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over
the telephone. One of GAO‘s investigators, posing as an employee of a
fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose
of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate
personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged
because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective
buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers
required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in
small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO‘s investigator
sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. Subsequently, the
company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington,
D.C.
The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of
radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted
simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators‘ vehicles were
inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the
northern and southern borders. However, GAO‘s investigators, using
counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough
radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty
bombs. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a
dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive
powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off,
the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. The
direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business
in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are
generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of
weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to
successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company
present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document
during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors
never questioned the authenticity of the investigators‘ counterfeit
bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to
receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-940T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202)
512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential
security weaknesses associated with the installation of radiation
detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. To address the threat of
dirty bombs and other nuclear material, the federal government has
programs in place that regulate the transportation of radioactive
sources and to prevent illegal transport of radioactive sources across
our nation's borders. The Department of Homeland Security through the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses radiation detection
equipment at ports of entry to prevent such illicit entry of
radioactive sources. The goal of CBP's inspection program is to
"—thwart the operations of terrorist organizations by detecting,
disrupting, and preventing the cross-border travel of terrorists,
terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their precursors." Deploying radiation detection
equipment is part of CBP's strategy for thwarting radiological
terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal
of screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the
United States.
Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land
border ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible
for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their
admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to
preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass
destruction.
Our investigation was conducted as a result of widespread congressional
and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, given
today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment. Our investigation
was conducted under the premise that given today's security
environment, our nation's borders must be protected from the smuggling
of radioactive sources by terrorists.
This testimony will provide the results of our work related to testing
whether the radiation portal monitors installed at the U.S. ports of
entry would detect radioactive sources transported in vehicles
attempting to enter the United States. We will also provide our
observations regarding the procedures that CBP inspectors followed when
the radiation portal monitors detected such material. In addition, at
the request of the Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, we issued in March 2006 a detailed report with corrective
action briefings to CBP and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on
the results of our undercover border crossing tests.[Footnote 1]
We selected two land ports of entry that had radiation portal monitors
installed: one at the U.S.-Canadian border and one at the U.S.-Mexican
border. Radiation portal monitors are large pieces of stationary
equipment that CBP uses as part of its overall strategy to thwart
radiological terrorism by detecting the presence of radioactive sources
by screening people, vehicles, and cargo as they pass through ports of
entry. In order to safely plan and execute our undercover operation,
several of our investigators attended training at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland.
Our investigators received training on the safe handling, storage, and
transport of radioactive sources.
When considering the type of radioactive sources to use in our
undercover operation, we decided to use one of the most common
radioisotopes used in industry for its strong radioactivity and also
used in medical therapy to treat cancer. After consulting with an
outside expert, we used an amount of radioactive sources that we
determined was sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb.[Footnote 2] A
dirty bomb would most likely result in small radiation exposures and
would typically not contain enough radiation to kill people or cause
severe illnesses. However, by scattering the radioactive material, the
dirty bomb has the effect of contaminating an area. The extent of local
contamination depends on several factors, including the size of the
explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and
weather conditions. While there could be an increase in the cancer risk
among those exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb, the more
significant effect of a dirty bomb could be the closing of contaminated
areas. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and
business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs
are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of
weapons of mass destruction.
As part of our investigation, we purchased a small quantity of the
radioactive sources from a commercial source by posing as an employee
of a fictitious company. This was to demonstrate that anyone can
purchase small quantities of radioactive sources for stockpiling
because suppliers are not required to exercise due diligence to
determine whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive
sources and suppliers are not required to ask the buyer to produce an
NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. We then
deployed two teams of investigators to the field to make simultaneous
border crossings at the northern and southern borders in an attempt to
transport radioactive sources into the United States.
While making our simultaneous crossings, we focused our investigation
on whether the radiation portal monitors would detect the radioactive
sources we carried and whether CBP inspectors exercised due diligence
to determine the authenticity of paperwork presented by individuals
attempting to transport radioactive sources across our borders.
Although we offer observations on the procedures that CBP inspectors
followed for our two border crossings, we did not evaluate the adequacy
of the design or effectiveness of those procedures. Our investigation
also tested whether an NRC document could be counterfeited using data
easily accessible and available to the public. We conducted our
investigation from July 2005 through December 2005 in accordance with
quality standards for investigations as set forth by the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Summary:
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small
amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and
transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One
of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company
located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase
was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation
detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are
not required to determine whether a buyer has a legitimate use for the
radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to
produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities.
The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of
radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted
simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were
inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the
northern and southern borders. However, our investigators, using
counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough
radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty
bombs. Specifically, they were able to successfully represent
themselves as employees of a fictitious company and present a
counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the
secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never
questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of
lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive,
acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
Documentation Was Produced to Support Undercover Investigation:
As part of our undercover investigation, we produced counterfeit
documents before sending our two teams of investigators out to the
field. We found two NRC documents and a few examples of the documents
by searching the Internet.[Footnote 3] We subsequently used commercial,
off-the-shelf computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC
documents authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and
transfer radioactive sources.
To support our investigators' purported reason for having radioactive
sources in their possession when making their simultaneous border
crossings, a GAO graphic artist designed a logo for our fictitious
company and produced a bill of lading using computer software.
With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported
Radioactive Sources Across Both Borders:
Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of
radioactive sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making
their recent, simultaneous border crossings. In support of our earlier
work, we had obtained an NRC document and had purchased radioactive
sources as well as two containers to store and transport the material.
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small
amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and
transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone.
One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious
company, stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the
radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detectors.
Suppliers are not required to exercise any due diligence in determining
whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor
are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when
making purchases in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources
our investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document.
The company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington,
D.C.
Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.-
Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border:
Northern Border Crossing:
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of
radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our
investigators - acting in an undercover capacity - drove to an official
port of entry between Canada and the United States. They also had in
their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive
through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at
the booth for their primary inspection. As our investigators drove past
the radiation portal monitors and approached the primary checkpoint
booth, they observed the CBP inspector look down and reach to his right
side of his booth. Our investigators assumed that the radiation portal
monitors had activated and signaled the presence of radioactive
sources. The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification
and asked them where they lived. One of our investigators on the two-
man undercover team handed the CBP inspector both of their passports
and told him that he lived in Maryland while the second investigator
told the CBP inspector that he lived in Virginia.
The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they
were transporting in their vehicle. One of our investigators told the
CBP inspector that they were transporting specialized equipment back to
the United States. A second CBP inspector, who had come over to assist
the first inspector, asked what else our investigators were
transporting. One of our investigators told the CBP inspectors that
they were transporting radioactive sources for the specialized
equipment. The CBP inspector in the primary checkpoint booth appeared
to be writing down the information. Our investigators were then
directed to park in a secondary inspection zone, while the CBP
inspector conducted further inspections of the vehicle.
During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP
inspector that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the
radioactive sources. The CBP inspector asked if he could make copies of
our investigators' counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery
as well as their counterfeit NRC document. Although the CBP inspector
took the documents to the copier, our investigators did not observe him
retrieving any copies from the copier.
Our investigators watched the CBP inspector use a handheld Radiation
Isotope Identifier Device (RIID), which he said is used to identify the
source of radioactive sources, to examine the investigators' vehicle.
He told our investigators that he had to perform additional
inspections. After determining that the investigators were not
transporting additional sources of radiation, the CBP inspector made
copies of our investigators' drivers' licenses, returned their drivers'
licenses to them, and our investigators were then allowed to enter the
United States. At no time did the CBP inspector question the validity
of the counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document.
Southern Border Crossing:
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of
radioactive sources into the trunk of their vehicle. Our investigators
drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also
had in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our two-person undercover team was signaled
by means of a traffic light signal to drive through the radiation
portal monitors and stopped at the primary checkpoint for their primary
inspection. As our investigators drove past the portal monitors and
approached the primary checkpoint, they observed that the CBP inspector
remained in the primary checkpoint for several moments prior to
approaching our investigators' vehicle. Our investigators assumed that
the radiation portal monitors had activated and signaled the presence
of radioactive sources.
The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked
them if they were American citizens. Our investigators told the CBP
inspector that they were both American citizens and handed him their
state-issued drivers' licenses. The CBP inspector also asked our
investigators about the purpose of their trip to Mexico and asked
whether they were bringing anything into the United States from Mexico.
Our investigators told the CBP inspector that they were returning from
a business trip in Mexico and were not bringing anything into the
United States from Mexico.
While our investigators remained inside their vehicle, the CBP
inspector used what appeared to be a RIID to scan the outside of the
vehicle. One of our investigators told him that they were transporting
specialized equipment. The CBP inspector asked one of our investigators
to open the trunk of the rental vehicle and to show him the specialized
equipment. Our investigator told the CBP inspector that they were
transporting radioactive sources in addition to the specialized
equipment. The primary CBP inspector then directed our investigators to
park in a secondary inspection zone for further inspection.
During the secondary inspection, the CBP inspector said he needed to
verify the type of material our investigators were transporting, and
another CBP inspector approached with what appeared to be a RIID to
scan the cardboard boxes where the radioactive sources was placed. The
instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources.
When asked again about the purpose of their visit to Mexico, one of our
investigators told the CBP inspector that they had used the radioactive
sources in a demonstration designed to secure additional business for
their company. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them
to transport the equipment to Mexico. One of our investigators provided
the counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery, as well as
their counterfeit NRC document. The CBP inspector took the paperwork
provided by our investigators and walked into the CBP station. He
returned several minutes later and returned the paperwork. At no time
did the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of
lading or the counterfeit NRC document.
Corrective Action Briefings:
We conducted corrective action briefings with CBP and NRC officials
shortly after completing our undercover operations. On December 21,
2005, we briefed CBP officials about the results of our border crossing
tests. CBP officials agreed to work with the NRC and CBP's Laboratories
and Scientific Services to come up with a way to verify the
authenticity of NRC materials documents.
We conducted two corrective action briefings with NRC officials on
January 12 and January 24, 2006, about the results of our border
crossing tests. NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive
material we determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that
NRC's "concern threshold" is significantly higher. We continue to
believe that our purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to
counterfeit an NRC document are matters that NRC should address. We
could have purchased all of the radioactive sources used in our two
undercover border crossings by making multiple purchases from different
suppliers, using similarly convincing cover stories, using false
identities, and had all of the radioactive sources conveniently shipped
to our nation's capital.
Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were
able to transport into the United States during our operation would be
sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons
of mass disruption. Finally, NRC officials told us that they are aware
of the potential problems of counterfeiting documents and that they are
working to resolve these issues.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other
members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported
Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations,
GAO-06-545R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006).
[2] According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a
dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive
powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off,
the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area.
[3] None of these documents were available on NRC's Web site.
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