Coast Guard
Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina Gao ID: GAO-06-903 July 31, 2006Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history. Significant federal, state, and local resources were mobilized to respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including those of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard played a key role in the planning, response, and recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina in three mission areas: search and rescue, marine pollution response, and management of maritime commerce. This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast Guard, as well as the challenges and lessons learned as a result of the agency's efforts. More specifically, it focuses on (1) the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform these three mission areas in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; (2) the Coast Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate these challenges; and (3) the implications and lessons learned, as identified by the Coast Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina surge operations on its people, assets, financial resources, and operations. To determine the Coast Guard's preparation factors, the challenges and lessons learned we interviewed officials responsible for preparing, and responding to disasters, and reviewed the Coast Guard's disaster guidance and plans. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard. Precisely identifying why the Coast Guard was able to respond as it did may be difficult, but underpinning these efforts were factors such as the agency's operational principles. These principles promote leadership, accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility and action, based on relevant authorities and guidance. Another key factor was the agency's reliance on standardized operations and maintenance practices that provided greater flexibility for using personnel and assets from any operational unit for the response. Up-to-date and regularly exercised hurricane plans were also key--preserving Coast Guard personnel and resources first, so they could then respond to search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and facilitation of commerce needs after the storm. These various factors are consistent with previous GAO findings on lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters. GAO's work shows that the Coast Guard was most relevant in search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and management of maritime commerce missions. While the Coast Guard performs these missions daily, the severity of Hurricane Katrina presented the agency with several challenges that required innovative approaches. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina's damage as a result of planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members. According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as a result of sending people and assets to the Gulf region. Although continuing operations at ports nationwide while conducting Katrina operations presented challenges, these challenges have been addressed to mitigate negative impacts on the Coast Guard. Finally, the Coast Guard has collected after-action reports from Hurricane Katrina and has made them available to Coast Guard personnel through an internal database.
GAO-06-903, Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2006:
Coast Guard:
Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions
Related to Hurricane Katrina:
Coast Guard:
GAO-06-903:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-903, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our
nation‘s history. Significant federal, state, and local resources were
mobilized to respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including those
of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard played a key role in the
planning, response, and recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina in three
mission areas: search and rescue, marine pollution response, and
management of maritime commerce. This report discusses the activities
undertaken by the Coast Guard, as well as the challenges and lessons
learned as a result of the agency‘s efforts. More specifically, it
focuses on (1) the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform
these three mission areas in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; (2)
the Coast Guard‘s response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it
faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate these
challenges; and (3) the implications and lessons learned, as identified
by the Coast Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina surge
operations on its people, assets, financial resources, and operations.
To determine the Coast Guard‘s preparation factors, the challenges and
lessons learned we interviewed officials responsible for preparing, and
responding to disasters, and reviewed the Coast Guard‘s disaster
guidance and plans.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found:
Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over
33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard. Precisely identifying why the
Coast Guard was able to respond as it did may be difficult, but
underpinning these efforts were factors such as the agency‘s
operational principles. These principles promote leadership,
accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility and action,
based on relevant authorities and guidance. Another key factor was the
agency‘s reliance on standardized operations and maintenance practices
that provided greater flexibility for using personnel and assets from
any operational unit for the response. Up-to-date and regularly
exercised hurricane plans were also key”preserving Coast Guard
personnel and resources first, so they could then respond to search and
rescue, marine environmental protection, and facilitation of commerce
needs after the storm. These various factors are consistent with
previous GAO findings on lessons learned from past catastrophic
disasters.
GAO‘s work shows that the Coast Guard was most relevant in search and
rescue, marine environmental protection, and management of maritime
commerce missions. While the Coast Guard performs these missions daily,
the severity of Hurricane Katrina presented the agency with several
challenges that required innovative approaches. The Coast Guard was
able to mitigate challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina‘s damage as a
result of planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard
Auxiliary members.
According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant
damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as a
result of sending people and assets to the Gulf region. Although
continuing operations at ports nationwide while conducting Katrina
operations presented challenges, these challenges have been addressed
to mitigate negative impacts on the Coast Guard. Finally, the Coast
Guard has collected after-action reports from Hurricane Katrina and has
made them available to Coast Guard personnel through an internal
database.
Figure: Helicopter Rescue and Stranded Vessel in the greater New
Orleans Area:
[see PDF for Image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard and GAO.
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-903].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at
(202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina Operations:
Coast Guard Performed Hurricane Katrina Missions and Faced Several
Challenges It Was Largely Able to Mitigate:
Coast Guard Managed the Impact of the Hurricane Response and Collected
Information to Improve Future Responses:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary
Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in the Gulf Coast
region during Peak Response, August 26--September 16, 2005:
Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That Responded to
the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak Response, August 26-September 16,
2005:
Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for
Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of
April 12, 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication Platform,
Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport Food, Water, and Supplies
to the Gulf Coast Region:
Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, Detail of
Gulf Coast Region:
Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana:
Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area:
Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation:
Abbreviations:
ARSC: Aircraft Repair and Supply Center:
ATC: Aviation Training Center:
COTP: Captain of the Port:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
NRP: National Response Plan:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 31, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our
nation's history. In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and
disruption to the population, environment, and economy, Hurricane
Katrina was clearly a catastrophe and arguably the most devastating
natural disaster in United States history. More than 1,300 people lost
their lives; damage stretched over a 90,000 square mile area; more than
a million people were driven from their homes; buildings, bridges,
roads, and power and communications infrastructure were destroyed or
severely damaged; and millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the
environment. We may never fully know the financial cost of Hurricane
Katrina, but one projection has put it at more than $200 billion.
Two congressional committees that investigated and reported on
Hurricane Katrina activities were critical of several federal agencies'
response.[Footnote 1] In contrast to some other federal agencies, the
Coast Guard has generally escaped criticism by these two
investigations. Our work indicates that the Coast Guard's major
response to Hurricane Katrina was in three mission areas: search and
rescue, marine pollution response, and management of maritime commerce.
This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast Guard, as
well as the challenges and lessons learned as a result of the agency's
efforts. More specifically, it focuses on:
* the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform in these three
mission areas during Hurricane Katrina;
* the Coast Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it
faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate the
challenges; and:
* the implications and lessons learned, as identified by the Coast
Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina operations on its
people, assets, financial resources, and operations.
In addition, we have undertaken a large body of work to address
preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to
Hurricane Katrina. Because of the widespread congressional interest in
these subjects, our work is being completed under the Comptroller
General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative.[Footnote 2]
To determine the factors used by the Coast Guard to prepare for
Hurricane Katrina, we interviewed officials responsible for planning,
preparing for, and responding to disasters, including Hurricane
Katrina, as well as city and state officials in areas affected by
Hurricane Katrina and assisted by the Coast Guard. In addition, we
reviewed documents provided by two Coast Guard districts, the Atlantic
Area Command, and Coast Guard headquarters, including national plans;
Coast Guard severe weather, continuity-of-operation, and mission-
specific response plans; and Coast Guard guidance and directives.
To obtain a more detailed understanding of the Coast Guard's response
and challenges related to Hurricane Katrina, we visited and conducted
interviews at Coast Guard locations, including districts and units that
supported the Hurricane Katrina response effort, as well as the
affected district and units in the Gulf Coast region. We also spoke
with local government and port officials. We selected these specific
locations based on several factors, including the proportion of Coast
Guard assets allocated to respond to Hurricane Katrina; proximity to
the area physically affected by the hurricane, specifically the Gulf
Coast region; and the Coast Guard's responsibility for response,
including the Atlantic Area Command and Coast Guard headquarters.
Finally, to determine the implications of sending people and assets to
respond to Hurricane Katrina and lessons learned, we spoke to officials
responsible for identifying and prioritizing the people and assets to
send to the Gulf Coast region, to personnel sent to the region to
respond to Hurricane Katrina, and to personnel who were stationed in
the region. We reviewed resource allocation data, and financial
guidance and documents, and spoke with officials responsible for these
areas within the Coast Guard. To assess the reliability of the
personnel, asset, and financial data, we spoke with agency officials
knowledgeable in these specific areas. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters to afflict
the United States. Of the estimated 60,000 people needing to be rescued
from rooftops and flooded homes, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast
Guard. Precisely identifying why the Coast Guard was able to respond as
it did to this disaster may be difficult, but underpinning these
efforts were the agency's operational principles that promote
leadership, accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility
and action, based on relevant authorities and guidance. Another
significant factor that allowed the Coast Guard to confront the
destruction brought on by Hurricane Katrina was the agency's reliance
on standardized operations and maintenance practices that allowed the
Coast Guard to respond with greater flexibility using a mix of
personnel and assets from any operational unit. Having up-to-date and
regularly exercised hurricane plans was another factor that the Coast
Guard employed to prepare for Hurricane Katrina enabling the agency to
implement its plans to confront the hurricane by first preserving Coast
Guard personnel and resources and then quickly responding with search
and rescue assistance, marine environmental protection response, and
facilitation of commerce measures--missions that the Coast Guard
conducts every day. GAO findings on lessons learned from past
catastrophic disasters have highlighted similar factors including such
things as the critical importance of (1) clearly defining and
communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of
authority; (2) conducting strong planning and robust training and
exercise programs; and (3) strengthening response and recovery
capabilities.
The Coast Guard's mission response to Hurricane Katrina centered most
on three mission areas: search and rescue, marine environmental
protection and management of maritime commerce. While the Coast Guard
performs these missions daily, the severity of Hurricane Katrina
presented the agency with several challenges that required innovative
approaches--for example, conducting a full scale search and rescue
mission without its full communications capacity. The Coast Guard was
able to mitigate the communication challenges caused by Hurricane
Katrina's damage as a result of advance planning and preparation, as
well as assistance from the Coast Guard Auxiliary. For example, to
overcome challenges resulting from communications outages following the
storm, Coast Guard personnel implemented plans that they had developed
prior to the storm that were not dependent upon communication systems
to execute, and they also relied on pre-staged communications
equipment, pre-distributed satellite and cell phones. In addition,
Coast Guard auxiliarists provided a critical communications relay for
search and rescue operations.
According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant
losses to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as it
moved people and assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to
Hurricane Katrina. The Coast Guard conducted surge operations--which
are high-intensity efforts often launched at short notice to address an
emergency situation--in response to Hurricane Katrina while it
continued operations at the homeports from where personnel and assets
were borrowed. To address the health effects stemming from the mental
stress that Coast Guard personnel experienced responding to Hurricane
Katrina, the Coast Guard deployed Critical Incident Stress Management
teams. These teams provided treatment to Coast Guard response personnel
as well as to other Coast Guard personnel from the region whose homes
had been damaged or destroyed. Finally, the Coast Guard has developed
after action reports related to the Hurricane Katrina response and has
disseminated this information to its personnel for use on other
contingency planning efforts through the agency's Contingency
Preparedness System database--known as CG SAILS.
Background:
There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that
support preparation for and response to emergency situations. The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the
Stafford Act)[Footnote 3] primarily establishes the programs and
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and
emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations,
individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), part of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), has responsibility for administering the provisions of
the Stafford Act.
For Hurricane Katrina, the President issued emergency declarations
under the Stafford Act for Louisiana on August 27, 2005, and
Mississippi and Alabama on August 28, 2005. The President made major
disaster declarations for Florida on August 28, 2005, and Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005, the same day that
Hurricane Katrina made final landfall in the affected states.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the DHS to consolidate
existing federal government emergency response plans into a single,
coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the
National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all-
hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the
management of domestic incidents where federal involvement is
necessary. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the NRP applied only to
incidents of national significance, defined as actual or potential high-
impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by an
appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal,
nongovernmental, or private sector entities in order to save lives and
minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery
and mitigation activities.[Footnote 4] The NRP includes planning
assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic
Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national
response to a "catastrophic incident"--defined as any natural or
manmade incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or
government functions.[Footnote 5]
The Coast Guard's authority under federal law to conduct maritime
operations, such as search and rescue and port security, is
continuously in effect, rather than dependent upon a presidential
Stafford Act declaration or the implementation of the NRP. This ongoing
authority uniquely positioned the Coast Guard to respond to Hurricane
Katrina before the President made emergency or major disaster
declarations under the Stafford Act, or the Secretary of Homeland
Security designated Katrina an incident of national significance under
the NRP. Concurrent with the Coast Guard's historical missions and
authorities, the NRP identifies the Coast Guard as a primary agency in
the oil and hazardous materials response, and the support agency in six
other emergency support functions, including urban search and rescue,
and aspects of clearing waterways.
The Coast Guard is responsible for performing a variety of homeland and
non-homeland security missions, including ensuring security in
territorial and international waters, and within U.S. ports, conducting
search and rescue, interdicting illegal drug shipments and illegal
aliens, enforcing fisheries laws, ensuring the safety and facilitation
of commerce, and responding to reports of marine pollution. According
to Coast Guard officials, they train for and perform these missions
every day, in units located all over the United States.
To conduct these missions, the Coast Guard employs a wide range of
personnel. In 2005, the Coast Guard consisted of about 39,000 active
duty, 7,000 civilian, and 8,100 reserve members, for a total of
approximately 54,100 personnel. The Coast Guard also has access to
approximately 31,000 volunteer auxiliary members.[Footnote 6] During
the peak response time period for Hurricane Katrina, August 26--
September 16, 2005, the Coast Guard had approximately 5,600 personnel
in the Gulf Coast region. About 53 percent of these were active duty
and civilian personnel who came from other parts of the United States
to assist in the response.
Table 1 shows the total number of personnel within the Coast Guard by
type, compared to the number of personnel who responded in the Gulf
Coast region during the August through September 2005 period.
Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary
Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in the Gulf Coast
region during Peak Response, August 26--September 16, 2005:
Coast Guard personnel: Active duty;
Approximate total number of personnel: 39,000;
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 4,026;
This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana (2,045); and the number of Coast Guard personnel sent to
Gulf Coast region from other geographical areas (1,981).
Coast Guard personnel: Civilian;
Approximate total number of personnel: 7,000;
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 733;
This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana (170); and number of Coast Guard personnel sent to Gulf
Coast region from other geographical areas (563).
Coast Guard personnel: Reserve;
Approximate total number of personnel: 8,100;
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 541.
Coast Guard personnel: Auxiliary;
Approximate total number of personnel: 31,000;
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 305.
Coast Guard personnel: Total;
Approximate total number of personnel: 85,100;
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 5,605.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: The number of auxiliary personnel is an estimate based on a total
of 13,510 hours (563 days based on a 16-hour day) of operational and
administrative support for Hurricane Katrina operations.
[End of table]
Of the Coast Guard's 11 mission program areas identified in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 7] three are particularly
relevant to the Hurricane Katrina response.[Footnote 8] They are the
following:
² Finding and rescuing mariners in distress--a mainstay of Coast Guard
operations under its search and rescue mission. To conduct this
mission, the Coast Guard operates aircraft and boats throughout the
nation's coastlines and interior waterways. The Coast Guard also
operates a national distress and response communication system that
facilitates communication with mariners in danger.
² Marine environmental protection--a program area focused on preventing
and responding to oil and chemical spills in the maritime environment,
preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and garbage, and preventing
biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species. The Coast Guard
typically conducts this mission with locally based staff but also has
specially trained and equipped teams that travel nationally and
worldwide to attend to this mission when needed.
² Managing waterways and providing a safe, efficient, and accessible
marine transportation system--a mission area that includes such
activities as maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids and
monitoring and inspecting merchant vessels, among other
activities.[Footnote 9]
Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina Operations:
Several factors, including operational principles, the use of
standardized practices, and planning, contributed to preparing the
Coast Guard to conduct its missions following Hurricane Katrina. The
Coast Guard promotes principles of leadership and accountability,
whereby personnel are trained to take responsibility and action, as
needed, based on relevant authorities and guidance. Organizational
structure and standardization--of training, assets, and exercises--
allowed the Coast Guard to send personnel and assets to the Gulf Coast
region from units across the United States. Also, the Coast Guard's
focus on planning enabled personnel to learn emergency processes and
procedures to respond to situations like that of Hurricane Katrina.
These factors, which prepared the Coast Guard to conduct its Hurricane
Katrina missions, are also reflected in previous GAO findings on
lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters.[Footnote 10]
Coast Guard Operational Principles Aided in Hurricane Katrina
Preparations:
The Coast Guard response was aided by basic operational principles.
Throughout our fieldwork, Coast Guard officials referred to the seven
principles of Coast Guard operations that guide the agency's
operations, and though they were not necessarily always referred to by
name, the themes were relayed to our staff frequently, and Coast Guard
personnel view these principles as instrumental in their preparation
for Hurricane Katrina. These principles collectively form the
foundation of Coast Guard culture and actions during
operations.[Footnote 11]
* The Principle of Clear Objective directs every operation toward a
clearly defined and attainable objective. The Commander's Intent, a
commanding officer's general instruction to his/her subordinates,
defined the objectives for Coast Guard units with regard to hurricanes,
including to ensure the safety of personnel and assets, respond to
statutory responsibilities (e.g., search and rescue), and reopen
waterways as soon as possible.
* The Principle of Effective Presence requires that the right assets
and capabilities be at the right place at the right time. This also
reflects the importance of assigning units depending on the anticipated
need. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina response, the Coast
Guard recognized the need to send security units to address security
concerns during rescue operations.
* The Principle of Unity of Effort describes the performance of
cooperative operational objectives, by working in concert with
different Coast Guard units and coordinating these efforts with a
diverse set of governmental and nongovernmental entities. For example,
the Coast Guard units worked with members of local area maritime
security committees to address maritime-related issues and coordinate
security planning efforts.[Footnote 12]
* The Principle of On-Scene Initiative involves Coast Guard personnel
being given latitude to act quickly and decisively within the scope of
their authority, without waiting for direction from higher levels in
the chain of command. For example, during the initial response to
Hurricane Katrina, a junior-level C-130 pilot, who first arrived on-
scene in New Orleans with the planned mission of conducting an
environmental inspection overflight, recognized that search and rescue
helicopters in the area could not communicate with officials on the
ground, including those located at hospitals and at safe landing areas.
This pilot took the initiative to redirect her planned mission,
changing it from an environmental flight to creating the first airborne
communication platform in the area. Doing so helped ensure that
critical information was relayed to and from helicopter pilots
conducting search and rescue so that they could more safely and
efficiently continue their vital mission. Figure 1 is a picture of the
type of aircraft flown by this Coast Guard pilot.
Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication Platform,
Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport Food, Water, and Supplies
to the Gulf Coast Region:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
* The Principle of Flexibility describes how the Coast Guard pursues
multiple missions with the same people and assets by adjusting to a
wide variety of tasks and circumstances. Following this principle
allows the Coast Guard to conduct "surge operations," which are high-
intensity efforts often launched at short notice in response to an
emergency situation. The effect of surge operations is not only on
people and units directly involved; it demands that the entire service
adapt to find the resources to meet the needs of the surge operation
while still continuing critical day-to-day operations. During the
response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard found ways to send
people and assets to the Gulf Coast region while maintaining required
levels of readiness in homeports. For example, in District 1, Air
Station Cape Cod, worked with Canadian counterparts to cover search and
rescue needs in the area to minimize the impact of sending some air
assets to respond to Hurricane Katrina.
* The Principle of Managed Risk involves two dimensions: First, the
commander is obligated to ensure that units are properly trained,
equipped, and maintained, and second, the commander is obligated to
assess the crew and equipment capabilities against the operational
situation to determine whether and how to execute a mission. For
example, Coast Guard units in District 8 are required to develop and
exercise hurricane plans. Figure 2 illustrates Coast Guard Area
Commands and Districts. In the face of an oncoming storm, the District
Commander will order Coast Guard personnel and dependents to evacuate.
Finally, once the storm passes, commanding officers have the discretion
to assess the safety of deploying Coast Guard personnel and assets.
* The Principle of Restraint reflects the obligation of Coast Guard
personnel to act with good judgment and treat American citizens and
foreign visitors with dignity. For example, Coast Guard rescue swimmers
we spoke to indicated that they made efforts to keep evacuated families
together and to handle frustrated evacuees with sensitivity.
Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, Detail of
Gulf Coast Region:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard and GAO.
[End of figure]
Coast Guard Organizational Structure and Standardization Practices
Supported Hurricane Katrina Preparations:
Building upon its principles of operations, the Coast Guard's
organization and practice of standardization streamlines operations
processes and works to efficiently maintain assets. The Coast Guard has
a broadly dispersed organization and asset structure--that is, having
personnel and assets located throughout the United States to expedite
the movement of assets to respond to disasters.[Footnote 13] This
organizational structure, coupled with the Coast Guard's standardized
training, allows the mixing of personnel and assets from anywhere in
the country to form operational response teams. For Coast Guard asset
mechanics, standardization means that they can assess, repair, and
maintain the same type of Coast Guard asset at any unit at any time
because they are required to have a common understanding of the Coast
Guard's standard maintenance and repair requirements for its assets.
To ensure this consistency, the Coast Guard conducts on-site
inspections--called standardization reviews--at air and boat stations
to evaluate crew members' skills and knowledge and to inspect air and
boat assets. Standardization review teams are composed of experienced
operators whose mission it is to teach, examine, and evaluate the
principles of sound operations. For air operations, teams review
standardized training to ensure that flight operations are conducted in
the safest possible manner consistent with flight mission requirements,
Coast Guard-wide. According to the Coast Guard's air operations manual,
standardization also permits randomly selected aviators to form a
disciplined, coordinated crew on any aircraft. This directly supports
the Coast Guard's ability to provide a surge capability to meet rapidly
escalating situations. Similarly, for boat operations, teams conduct
inspections to evaluate the condition of boats and to review crew
member proficiency in boat operations. For the Hurricane Katrina
response, standardization enabled Coast Guard personnel from anywhere
in the country to form unified crews to perform operations and
maintenance. For example, a helicopter pilot from Florida, a copilot
from Alabama, and a rescue swimmer from Alaska formed a crew to perform
numerous search and rescue operations. Additionally, mechanics arriving
at Aviation Training Center (ATC) Mobile in the days after Hurricane
Katrina's landfall were able to perform maintenance on air assets
deployed to the Gulf Coast region from various Coast Guard units.
Coast Guard Contingency Planning and Exercises Contributed to Hurricane
Katrina Preparations:
Based on the Coast Guard's organizational structure and its practice of
standardization, plans and complementary exercises are developed to
clarify processes and procedures (to learn which elements of a plan
work or need to be made more efficient) and to identify opportunities
that benefit from the Coast Guard's unique characteristics. According
to Coast Guard officials, prior to every hurricane season, specific
severe weather guidance is provided to Coast Guard units to describe
procedures for responding to a hurricane. For example, in the Gulf
Coast region, units within District 8 rely on guidance from their
leadership (known as the Commander's Intent), as well as the District
Severe Weather/Hurricane Plan and their own unit-focused hurricane
plans, which would include plans for continuity of operations in the
event of an ordered evacuation.[Footnote 14] Coast Guard officials
stated that these plans are reviewed annually in the spring to ensure
an opportunity to practice evacuation, continuity of operations, and
personnel and facility preparedness.
According to the guidance, during a pending storm situation, the Coast
Guard maintains its ability to conduct search and rescue missions until
it is unsafe to do so; efforts are made to warn boaters of the
impending bad weather; dependents of Coast Guard personnel are
evacuated in accordance with the continuity of operations plans; units
and their equipment are secured; and assets (e.g., aircraft, including
helicopters and planes, and cutters, and other smaller boats) are moved
away from the storm. Once the storm clears the area, personnel and
assets that were scattered will reconstitute forces and return to the
affected area to begin search and rescue, homeland security, and other
mission activities.
Consistent with these plans, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall,
Coast Guard units in the Gulf Coast region moved their command and
control centers out of the threat area, and staged assets and crews
outside the predicted storm path. For example, District 8 headquarters
moved from New Orleans, Louisiana, to St. Louis, Missouri, and Sector
New Orleans Command moved from New Orleans to Alexandria, Louisiana.
Air assets were moved from Coast Guard air stations in the Gulf Coast
region to locations in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Jacksonville,
Florida. Cutters located in the Gulf Coast region moved to avoid the
storm and into positions to assist with poststorm efforts. The Coast
Guard also activated its mission-specific plans in preparation for
Hurricane Katrina. For example, in the marine environmental protection
area, the Coast Guard activated its area contingency plan and
integrated the assistance of a Coast Guard Strike Team with its
specialized environmental response capabilities. In particular, the
Strike Team provided assistance in the response to Hurricane Katrina,
using its inventory of specialized pollution response equipment and
highly trained first response teams to combat environmental pollution.
Previous GAO work identifies critical disaster preparation factors:
Many of the lessons emerging from Hurricane Katrina are similar to
those GAO identified in past work on Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed
much of South Florida. Based on our previous review of preparing for
and responding to catastrophic disasters, we noted several critical
factors necessary to confront catastrophic disasters: (1) clearly
defined and communicated leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines
of authority; (2) strong planning and robust training and exercise
programs; and (3) strong response and recovery capabilities.[Footnote
15] In our review of the Coast Guard's hurricane preparation practices,
it seems many of the factors we raised in the past, have been addressed
by the Coast Guard.
Coast Guard Performed Hurricane Katrina Missions and Faced Several
Challenges It Was Largely Able to Mitigate:
During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard performed
several functions, including search and rescue, marine pollution
response, and management of maritime commerce--missions it performs
every day. As the most destructive natural disaster in American
history, Hurricane Katrina caused tens of thousands of people to be
rescued during several weeks after the storm made landfall; spilled
over 8 million gallons of oil, and produced considerable debris, which
polluted the Gulf Coast region; and in the days following the storm,
threatened maritime commerce. While conducting its missions during
Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard experienced several unique
challenges that required quick and innovative thinking. The Coast Guard
was able to mitigate communication challenges caused by Hurricane
Katrina's damage to communications infrastructure as a result of
planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary
members. Another challenge included the need to provide security
protection, particularly for search and rescue operations. Logistics
also proved a challenge as the Coast Guard worked to address food and
water needs of rescuees, as well as its own need for fuel.
Search and Rescue Was Coast Guard's Initial Hurricane Katrina Mission:
After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the primary mission was search
and rescue. As Hurricane Katrina caused damage and destruction for
90,000 square miles and precipitated an overwhelming flood in New
Orleans, Louisiana, tens of thousands of people needed to be rescued
from their homes. Some estimates are that about 60,000 people were
rescued by federal, state, and local officials after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall, and approximately 33,500 of them were rescued by the
Coast Guard.[Footnote 16] The military, of which the Coast Guard is a
member, sent massive resources to the Gulf Coast region to assist in
Hurricane Katrina's response and recovery.[Footnote 17] According to
data from Coast Guard officials, during the peak response period, the
Coast Guard deployed approximately 4,000 of its 39,000 active duty
personnel and deployed more than 45 percent of its air assets to the
Gulf Coast region from across the United States. Notably, Coast Guard
officials reported that air and boat operations, which involved
rescuing or evacuating over 33,500 people, were conducted over a period
of 17 days without any accidents or casualties. Rescue operations began
quickly, with the first rescue occurring approximately 9 hours
following Hurricane Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005. By 12 hours
after landfall, approximately 29 Coast Guard helicopters were
conducting rescues over New Orleans.
Search and rescue operations, including both air and boat rescues, were
conducted by a number of agencies. Coast Guard officials involved in
boat operations told us that they worked closely with federal, state,
and local officials to conduct rescues. According to Coast Guard
officials, the agency leveraged approximately 130 boats and worked with
FEMA teams to conduct urban rescues in flooded New Orleans
neighborhoods. Attempts were also made to partner local responders with
out-of-area responders in order to share local knowledge and facilitate
rescues. According to Coast Guard officials involved in boat
operations, personnel used Zephyr Field in Jefferson Parish, as a base
of operations and deployed boat convoys from launching points such as
bridges and highway overpasses. The boat rescues that they were
involved with continued through September 16, 2005, almost 3 weeks
after the storm.
Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana:
[See PDF for image]
Source: USGS.
[End of figure]
Coast Guard officials operating in the Gulf Coast region told us that 3
days into the response, approximately 43 aircraft and over 2,000
personnel had arrived at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile,
Alabama, from other parts of the United States to join the Hurricane
Katrina response. Rescue swimmers--80 of whom were operating out of Air
Station New Orleans at the peak of air operations--worked among power
lines, flying debris, and other obstacles not routine to maritime
rescues to hoist individuals from rooftops. Helicopter crews also
conducted search and rescue operations in Mississippi, which, according
to officials at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, were
completed within the first 36 hours following Hurricane Katrina's
landfall. Pilots who conducted rescues in Mississippi explained that
the first responder infrastructure in Mississippi was not destroyed, as
it was in New Orleans, and thus Mississippi police and fire personnel
were able to conduct many of the ground search and rescue operations--
allowing for quicker completion of the mission.
Coast Guard officials told us that they coordinated closely with
various responders for search and rescue operations. Specifically, the
Louisiana State Police provided police escorts and shared information
regarding 911 calls, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries provided local knowledge of areas to be searched. The
Louisiana Department of Transportation also assisted response
operations by providing two ferries that were used to evacuate
individuals across the Mississippi River to higher ground. Coast Guard
officials also explained that the Louisiana Air National Guard provided
assistance with transportation of evacuees by air in some locations,
and both were located at Zephyr Field delivering large quantities of
ready-to-eat meals and water to survivors at various locations. Coast
Guard officials explained that at the local level, the New Orleans fire
and police personnel accompanied search teams to provide assistance and
local knowledge. In addition, sheriff's office officials from Jefferson
Parish provided police escorts, and St. Bernard Parish police and fire
departments provided boat assets to Coast Guard disaster assistance
teams. On the north side of Lake Pontchartrain, the Coast Guard
coordinated search and rescue operations with the St. Tammany Parish
Sheriff. Figure 4 shows a Coast Guard helicopter hoisting a rescuee to
safety.
Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
However, some aspects of search and rescue operations were not as
efficient as they could have been.[Footnote 18] For example, different
organizations involved in search and rescue did not always coordinate
with each other. In New Orleans, there were two separate command
centers for search and rescue operations, one being run by the
Louisiana National Guard and one being run by the Coast Guard. In
addition, there was a lack of clear search and rescue guidance across
agencies because the National Response Plan and the National Search and
Rescue Plan had never been fully integrated.[Footnote 19]
Coast Guard Responded and Continues to Address Environmental Concerns:
The Coast Guard oversaw the cleanup of over 8 million gallons of oil
spilled as a result of Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 20] As the oil and
chemical manufacturing industries have a significant presence in the
Gulf Coast region, particularly in Louisiana, the potential for an
unprecedented level of oil and hazardous substance contamination,
especially in and around New Orleans, grew as Hurricane Katrina
approached. To manage this response, unified commands were set up with
the Coast Guard and its partners in advance of the storm.[Footnote
21]These commands were involved in a range of decisions that allowed
them to collectively assess the environmental situation and make
tactical decisions. Coast Guard and state officials noted that persons
representing federal, state, local, and industry entities were involved
in these commands, and they worked together to manage the marine
environmental protection response. As a result, Coast Guard officials
told us that they were as prepared as possible to manage pollution
events stemming from Hurricane Katrina.
According to Coast Guard and Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality officials, the initial response to environmental concerns
following Hurricane Katrina involved multi-agency assessment teams.
Following the hurricane's landfall, these teams surveyed the entire
coastal zone, including all area ports, marinas, and related
facilities. A state official noted that assessment teams recorded the
location and size of oil spills and assessed the damage.[Footnote 22]
He stated that it took two helicopters, flying full-time for 3 weeks,
to document all the debris to be cleaned up. Coast Guard officials said
they coordinated their environmental mission priorities with other
pressing Coast Guard missions by contracting for rented commercial
planes for their pollution assessment overflights, rather than
competing for aircraft needed to conduct pressing search and rescue
missions. In addition, boat crews involved in search and rescue
missions collected water samples to help document the damage to
infrastructure and threats to human health, such as sewage plant
flooding.
Oil cleanup efforts were complicated by the magnitude of the spills and
the location of the spills. According to the Coast Guard, the oil
appeared as black film, covering dozens of neighborhoods and protected
marshes and swamps along the Mississippi River. Most spills occurred
south of New Orleans as a result of ruptured and spilled oil tanks. The
Coast Guard estimated that 8 million gallons of oil were released,
including 6 major spills, 4 medium spills, and about 1,000 minor
spills.[Footnote 23] For example, 1 spill in the city was notable
because it affected approximately 1,800 homes. The oil residue could be
seen on vacated homes months later, when the odor of oil in the earth
and debris still permeated the air. Another significant spill came from
the discharge of about 3 million to 4 million gallons of oil dispersed
into remote marshes, which were difficult to reach and therefore
difficult to clean up. In addition, the storm destroyed 115 oil
platforms offshore, significantly damaged 52, and set 19 adrift.
Although, according to Coast Guard officials, there were no spills of
significance offshore.
To address the many spills, the Coast Guard reported that each
pollution incident was prioritized, investigated, and resolved either
through a private owner taking action to get it cleaned up or a rapid
response team providing on-site mitigation. However, clean up in many
cases was complicated by a number of environmental conditions,
according to the Coast Guard. For example, responders faced heat stress
and dehydration as well as a profusion of insects, poisonous snakes,
and alligators as they conducted clean up operations in remote
locations. Responders also faced uncertain communications, impassible
roadways, and clogged waterways.
Overall, about 1,000 personnel from federal, state, and local agencies
and private industry were involved in the response to oil spills
resulting from Hurricane Katrina. At one sector, Mobile, Alabama, over
400 active duty and reserve personnel were brought in from Coast Guard
commands throughout the United States, at various times, to assist with
marine environmental protection response. Recognizing the Coast Guard's
role in the prevention of spills, a Coast Guard official reported that
numerous medium and major hazardous material releases and oil spills
were prevented by response personnel. For example, response personnel
removed oil and hazardous materials with the potential to be released
into navigable waters from grounded vessels. In addition, Coast Guard
Strike team members repaired piping, and multi-agency entry teams
conducted entries into laboratories and chemical plants to recover
hazardous materials.[Footnote 24] Larger issues were addressed first,
such as leaking propane tanks that posed a threat to human health.
Coast Guard officials also noted that response personnel disposed of
thousands of containers and drums, some filled with petroleum products
and pesticides.
In addition to undertaking the oil pollution response, the Coast Guard
also helped to address marine debris problems resulting from the over
620 commercial and recreational vessels that were sunk or grounded in
the aftermath of the storm. A Coast Guard official described "piles" of
shrimping vessels on dry ground. Figure 5 shows a damaged vessel
stranded on a front lawn. The Coast Guard established a Vessel Recovery
Branch to address those vessels leaking oil or having the potential to
release oil into navigable waters. A vessel database was also developed
and provided current information regarding vessel status and tracking
information on vessel owners. At the height of the vessel recovery
operations, 82 Coast Guard personnel supported this mission.
Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
According to Coast Guard officials, marine pollution response, which
began after Hurricane Katrina moved through the region, is ongoing,
with full recovery not expected until at least 2007. For example, as of
spring 2006, in Mississippi, marine pollution cleanup was 50 percent
complete. According to Coast Guard personnel, members of the Gulf
Strike Team continue to support marine hazardous material recovery
operations involving abandoned drums and containers in Mississippi and
Alabama. The Coast Guard is also participating in an Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)-led oil and hazardous waste removal and
disposal effort inland along coastal states. As of February 2006, a
Coast Guard official estimated that multi-agency environmental teams
(consisting of Coast Guard, EPA, FEMA, and state and local agencies)
had addressed over 5,100 hazardous material cases.
In addition, the Coast Guard has the mission assignment to remove all
marine debris from along the entire coast of Mississippi. A team of
federal and state partners identified over 235 sites in residential
canals that required marine debris removal action. Cleanup work on the
9 worst sites has begun and is estimated to continue until at least
2007.
Limited Maritime Commerce Restored in Four Days:
Despite the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard
reopened a few ports and restored the movement of some commerce within
days after Hurricane Katrina struck. This quick response was important
because U.S. ports and waterways handle over 2 billion tons of cargo
annually. Much of that commerce flows through Louisiana, Texas,
Alabama, and Mississippi--the same coastal areas affected by Hurricane
Katrina. For example, the Port of New Orleans serves as the focal point
for waterborne transportation of cargo to 28 states, and its cargo
activity supported $37 billion in economic benefits to the country and
generated $2.8 billion in federal tax revenue, according to the
American Association of Port Authorities. Senior Coast Guard officials
commanding certain Coast Guard units possess broad authorities in their
role as the Captain of the Port (COTP). This authority includes the
power to close or reopen ports within their jurisdiction--an action
taken by COTPs at Sector New Orleans, Mobile, and Miami. To do this, a
COTP typically works collaboratively with key stakeholders, including
the local Area Maritime Security Committee, Harbor Safety Committee,
port authorities, and industry officials to determine when it is
appropriate to close and then reopen a port for commerce. In
preparation for Hurricane Katrina, COTPs in the Gulf Coast region
issued Marine Safety Information Bulletins to provide information
regarding hurricane conditions at the various ports and projected
timelines for port closures. The bulletins informed the port
communities of specific time frames for prohibited and authorized
operations at the ports.
Before a port is reopened, the COTP is to ensure that the waterways are
safe and navigable. One element of ensuring the safe facilitation of
commerce is the Coast Guard's Aids to Navigation program and its system
of aids. The aids to navigation system assists mariners in determining
their position and a safe course of travel, and warns them of dangers
and obstructions. The system typically consists of a series of devices,
such as buoys, beacons, and lighthouses that facilitate safe
navigation. Coast Guard officials reported that approximately 1,800
aids to navigation were missing, relocated, or destroyed because of
Hurricane Katrina. The aids to navigation teams, which specialize in
the maintenance of aids to navigation equipment, were deployed to
assess the damage and repair the aids. Additionally, surveys conducted
of the underwater and surface areas along the Gulf Coast were
coordinated with the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Navy and
helped to determine the conditions of the waterways. According to Coast
Guard officials, the aids to navigation teams assisted the COTPs to
reopen the ports. The criteria used to close or reopen ports consisted
of a combination of factors such as the status of the aids to
navigation system, the status of various dock facilities, and the
availability of electrical power and marine pilots.[Footnote 25] The
Coast Guard's Standard Operating Procedures for District 8 call for a
prioritized list of aids to navigation in that district to help
identify important repair decisions to ensure that the aids to
navigation most critical to the waterways/facilitation of commerce are
repaired first.
The damaged aids to navigation from Hurricane Katrina were a
contributing factor in the temporary closure of 11 ports in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.[Footnote 26] Meanwhile, the Coast
Guard was aware of the importance of the Mississippi River to the
nation's economy, particularly the export of bulk grain. Despite the
shipping disruptions along the Gulf Coast, the Coast Guard reopened
three ports 4 days after Hurricane Katrina struck. Both the Ports of
New Orleans and Mobile reopened Friday, September 2, 2005, under travel
restrictions.[Footnote 27] As of September 29, 2005, about 4 weeks
after Hurricane Katrina struck, 850 of the 1,350 aids to navigation
discrepancies identified by the Coast Guard were repaired with
permanent or temporary aids, and as of late June 2006, Coast Guard
officials stated that 149 aids to navigation discrepancies still needed
to be permanently or temporarily repaired. Of the 149 outstanding aids
to navigation discrepancies, Coast Guard officials reported that 67
temporary repairs have been completed. The remaining discrepancies are
planned for repair by the end of July 2006, contingent upon the
completion of waterway dredging, calm weather, and availability of an
appropriate inland construction cutter. Figure 6 shows the Coast Guard
repairing aids to navigation.
Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Coast Guard Confronted Several Challenges in Conducting Hurricane
Katrina Operations:
The Coast Guard experienced personnel security, communications, and
logistics challenges during the Hurricane Katrina response. However, it
was able to adapt its existing capabilities to confront those
challenges.
* Personnel security concerns. District 8 officials explained that as
the days of operations lengthened and citizens remained stranded,
security capabilities became an important component of rescue
operations. For example, Coast Guard rescue swimmers we interviewed
told us that their own personal security became a concern as stranded
individuals became increasingly frustrated because they had no food or
water. In some instances, tensions among survivors became heated when
rescue swimmers had to prioritize rescues of children, women, and the
elderly over able-bodied men. To address such concerns, rescue swimmers
employed various tactics, including deploying 2 swimmers at one time
(which is not standard procedure)--one swimmer to triage victims, and
the other swimmer to assist in hoisting victims into the helicopter.
Rescue swimmers also learned to use their skills as negotiators by
assigning a citizen leader from within a group of irritated survivors
to promote order. For boat operations, officials explained that they
deployed Coast Guard security teams to provide security coverage for
both Coast Guard and FEMA search and rescue personnel.[Footnote 28]
* Communication challenges. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate
communications challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina's damage to
communications infrastructure as a result of planning, preparation, and
assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members. Aware that
communications systems could be heavily damaged or destroyed during a
natural disaster, Coast Guard officials had developed plans that were
not reliant on communications systems and allowed personnel to act
independently or with limited guidance from commanding officers. In
addition, Coast Guard personnel prestaged emergency communications
equipment--such as a mobile communications unit--and distributed
satellite phones and cell phones to mitigate communications
infrastructure breakdowns.[Footnote 29] After the storm passed, Coast
Guard personnel procured two-way radios, utilized text messaging when
cell phones could not make calls, and opened commercial e-mail accounts
when the agency's own data network was down. In addition, the Coast
Guard auxiliarists provided communications capabilities after the storm
passed, including establishing a communications relay critical for
conducting search and rescue operations.
* Lack of food and water. According to Coast Guard officials,
addressing food and water shortages in the days following Katrina's
landfall became an important part of rescue operations. To address
these shortages, Coast Guard personnel from other regions flew food and
water to New Orleans, and personnel at Air Station New Orleans
distributed their own emergency food and water supplies to survivors.
Helicopter crews loaded food and water onto helicopters and distributed
these supplies to individuals awaiting rescue. According to Air Station
New Orleans' commanding officer, shipments of water were also delivered
to the Superdome on a daily basis. Coast Guard responders also provided
food and water to individuals at evacuation sites.
* Difficulties securing fuel. Coast Guard officials we interviewed
explained that securing fuel was challenging in the days following
Hurricane Katrina's landfall. According to a senior official at Sector
Mobile, fuel shortages presented a major obstacle to moving supplies
into Mississippi. One response by the Coast Guard to the lack of fuel
was to send responding units into the Gulf Coast Region with adequate
fuel to conduct their missions. For example, aids to navigation teams
sent from District 7, arrived in the Gulf Coast region as self-
contained units with sufficient fuel, food, and other supplies to
immediately begin work addressing compromised buoys and other
navigational aids. Concurrent with this fuel shortage was the lack of
electrical power, which rendered fuel pumps--dependent on electricity-
-inoperable. As part of their lessons learned, officials told us that
in the future, emergency vehicles and first responders need to bring
fuel with them in order to be self-sufficient. Officials also explained
that having battery-operated fuel pumps could address problems
associated with power outages and that this lesson would be applied to
future contingency planning.
Coast Guard Managed the Impact of the Hurricane Response and Collected
Information to Improve Future Responses:
Because Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in
our nation's history, significant federal resources were mobilized to
respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including resources of the
Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, they managed the surge
of people and assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to Hurricane
Katrina without significant damage to personnel, assets, operations, or
financial resources. The Coast Guard is also reviewing its actions
during the Hurricane Katrina response in order to address challenges
and prepare for future hurricane seasons.
Response to Hurricane Katrina Seemed to Have Had Limited Impact on
Coast Guard:
As of late September 2005, Coast Guard personnel sent to respond to
Hurricane Katrina had returned to their homeports, with the exception
of Coast Guard personnel specially trained in environmental protection
issues, who remained in the Gulf Coast region. Coast Guard officials
told us that personnel were certainly exhausted during the surge
response, but at no time did they violate required safety standards.
For example, they said all pilots adhered to aviation standards, flying
no more than the maximum 8 hours within a 24-hour period. However,
Coast Guard personnel did report several health-related issues as a
result of their response to Hurricane Katrina. For example, during the
Katrina response rescue swimmers reported that they suffered an
assortment of medical problems, including pink eye, respiratory issues,
skin rashes, infections, cuts, and scratches from nails, flying
fiberglass (from the helicopter swirling around homes with loose
insulation), and other windswept articles. Although the rescue swimmers
we spoke to noted that most of these medical concerns seemed to clear
up a week or two after their experiences in the Gulf Coast region, it
remains uncertain whether some ailments (e.g., respiratory issues)
could have long-term effects.
Health effects stemming from mental stress may also be a long-term
issue for the Coast Guard Katrina responders. During the Katrina
efforts, the Coast Guard recognized that personnel responding to
Hurricane Katrina, as well as those personnel who experienced the loss
of their homes, suffered from mental stress. Therefore, Critical
Incident Stress Management teams were mobilized to treat those
personnel who worked in or lived in the ravaged Gulf Coast region. For
example, after every flight, the rescue swimmers underwent an
assessment for stress, including a stress debriefing, in addition to a
physical decontamination because of the pollutants they encountered in
the flood waters of New Orleans. We were told that Critical Incident
Stress Management teams also provided support to several District 8
staff who had lost their homes or had assisted colleagues in cleaning
out their destroyed homes and are only now beginning to deal with the
mental stress effects of the Katrina tragedy.
Coast Guard officials also told us that they complied with asset
maintenance standards. For example, they said all required maintenance
of aircraft took place at one of the maintenance hubs set up in either
Mobile, Alabama; Houston, Texas; or Elizabeth City, North Carolina.
According to an engineering official we spoke to at the Aviation
Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, visiting Coast Guard aircraft from
around the country were returned to their homeports with updated
maintenance completed. One Coast Guard official did note a concern for
the future availability of replacement parts. For example, hoists that
pulled up rescuees are usually replaced every 3 to 5 years. However,
given the number of hoist rescues performed during the Hurricane
Katrina response, the Coast Guard official speculated that replacement
may need to occur in 2 years, affecting the number of hoists in Coast
Guard inventory. Coast Guard officials also noted that for the
Hurricane Katrina response the agency complied with vessel maintenance
standards, adding that some maintenance can be accomplished by the crew
while ships are under way. However for responses that require surging
assets from around the country, like that of Hurricane Katrina,
officials said that only ships that are ready and able to be deployed
or those that can safely delay maintenance are sent. For example, Coast
Guard officials told us that the cutter Oak delayed its maintenance for
10 days while it responded to Hurricane Katrina, because it could
safely do so.
Data show that in fiscal year 2005, during which the Hurricane Katrina
response occurred, operational hours for Coast Guard assets (ships and
aircraft) increased over the previous year's total. For the fourth
quarter of 2004, Coast Guard operational hours totaled 287,725 hours,
while in the fourth quarter of 2005, they totaled 302,112 hours--a
difference of 14,387 hours, due in part to the Hurricane Katrina
response. According to a senior Coast Guard official, no Coast Guard
asset was affected by Hurricane Katrina, meaning that assets were
returned to their homeports able to perform routine missions.
A number of Coast Guard resources responded to Hurricane Katrina in the
Gulf Coast region. Table 2 summarizes the types and total number of
assets that the Coast Guard currently maintains, along with the number,
name, and homeports of those assets that responded to the Gulf Coast
region.[Footnote 30]
Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That Responded to
the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak Response, August 26-September 16,
2005:
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Medium-endurance cutter, 270-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 13;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3;
Assets and homeport: Harriet Lane from LANT[A] Portsmouth, Va.
Northland from LANT/ Portsmouth, Va. Spencer from LANT/Boston, Mass.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Seagoing buoy tender, 225-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 16;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2;
Assets and homeport: Cypress from D8[B] /Mobile, Ala. Oak from
D7/Charleston, SC.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Medium-endurance cutter, 210-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 14;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2;
Assets and homeport: Confidence from LANT/Cape Canaveral, Fla. Decisive
from LANT/ Pascagoula, Miss.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Coastal buoy tender, 175-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 14;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3;
Assets and homeport: Barbara Mabrity from D8/Mobile, Ala. Harry
Claiborne from D8/Galveston, Tex. Joshua Appleby from D7/St.
Petersburg, Fla.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Patrol coastals, 179-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 4;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2;
Assets and homeport: Tornado from D8/Pascagoula, Miss. Shamal from
D8/Pascagoula, Miss.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Inland construction tenders, 160-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 4;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3;
Assets and homeport: Hudson from D7/Miami Beach, Fla. Pamlico from
D8/New Orleans, La. Saginaw from D8/Mobile, Ala.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Inland construction tenders, 75-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 8;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3;
Assets and homeport: Clamp from D8/Galveston, Tex. Hatchet from
D8/Galveston, Tex. Mallet from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Coastal patrol boat, 87-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 65;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 9;
Assets and homeport: Bonito from D8/Pensacola, Fla. Coho from D8/Panama
City, Fla. Pelican from D8/ Abbeville, La. Pompano from D8/Gulfport,
Miss. Razorbill from D8/ Gulfport, Miss. Seahawk from D8/Carrabelle,
Fla. Stingray from D8/ Mobile, Ala. Sturgeon from D8/Grand Isle, La.
Cobia from D8/Mobile, Ala.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: River buoy tender, 75-foot;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 12;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2;
Assets and homeport: Greenbrier from D8/Natchez, Miss. Wedge from
D8/Demopolis, Ala.
Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Total cutters;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 150;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 29;
Assets and homeport: [Empty].
Coast Guard asset: Small Boats: Boats under 65 feet;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 825;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 131;
Assets and homeport: Districts 8 and 9.
Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HC-130 long-range surveillance
aircraft;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 27;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 18;
Assets and homeport: 4 from D5/Elizabeth City, NC 5 from D7/Clearwater,
Fla. 3 from D11/Sacramento, Calif. 1 from D17/Kodiak, Ark. 5 from
ARSC[D] / Elizabeth City, NC.
Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HU-25 medium-range surveillance
aircraft;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 23;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 19;
Assets and homeport: 5 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass. 5 from D7/Miami, Fla. 3
from D8/ Corpus Christi, Tex. 2 from D11/San Diego, Calif. 4 from ATC
Mobile/ Mobile, Ala.
Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HH-60 medium-range recovery helicopter;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 41;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 19;
Assets and homeport: 4 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass. 3 from D5/Elizabeth
City, NC 9 from D7/ Clearwater, Fla. 3 from ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala.
Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HH-65 multimission cutter helicopter;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 95;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 30;
Assets and homeport: 2 from D5/Atlantic City, NJ 1 D7/Savannah, Ga. 6
from D7/Miami, Fla. 1 from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex. 5 from D8/New
Orleans, La. 5 from D8/ Houston, Tex. 2 from D9/Detroit, Mich. 7 from
ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala. 1 from ARSC Elizabeth City, NC.
Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: Auxiliary aircraft;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: unknown;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 14
aircraft;
Assets and homeport: Primarily from District 8.
Coast Guard asset: Total aircraft;
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 186
Coast Guard operational plus any Auxiliary aircraft;
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 86 Coast
Guard, 14 Auxiliary, which totals 100 responding aircraft;
Assets and homeport: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Coast Guard.
[A] LANT refers to assets owned by Atlantic Area Command.
[B] The Coast Guard is divided into geographical areas, or districts.
D8 refers to District 8, which includes the Gulf Coast region and moves
up the Mississippi River. D1 refers to Coast Guard's District 1, in the
New England area; D5 refers to District 5, the mid-Atlantic region; D7
refers to District 7, southeastern region; D9 refers to District 9,
Great Lakes region; and D11 refers to District 11, west coast area.
[C] Number of aircraft as of February 2006.
[D] The Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (ARSC) in
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, overhauls and makes major repairs and
modifications to all Coast Guard aircraft and associated equipment.
[End of table]
With regard to operational impact, Coast Guard officials told us that
in some cases, stations that sent personnel and assets to the Gulf
Coast region experienced challenges in maintaining operations. Relative
to other military services, the Coast Guard is small,[Footnote 31] and
when resources are shifted to any one specific mission area, other
mission areas may suffer. Although Coast Guard officials noted that
they were generally able to continue with their various missions across
the nation, including boarding high-interest vessels approaching United
States ports, there were instances where the movement of Coast Guard
assets out of their normal areas of operation affected activity levels
in these locations. For example, Coast Guard units in Florida sent many
air and surface assets to the Gulf Coast region to respond to Hurricane
Katrina, and while these assets were deployed to the Gulf Coast region,
the Coast Guard observed a spike in the level of illegal migration
activity off of the Florida coast. In response, according to Coast
Guard officials, once the assets returned to the Florida region, the
Coast Guard initiated a more intensive air and sea patrol schedule to
markedly announce its return to the area and focus on interdicting
illegal migrants.
Coast Guard Satisfied with Reimbursement of Hurricane Katrina Mission
Costs:
Part of Hurricane Katrina's impact on Coast Guard personnel, assets,
and operations at its districts nationwide was that the Coast Guard
incurred unexpected costs conducting Hurricane Katrina
missions.[Footnote 32] When we discussed the amount of funding
requested to reimburse the Coast Guard for its Hurricane Katrina
activities, Coast Guard officials told us they were satisfied with the
reimbursement process with both FEMA and EPA. According to these
officials, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard had received "dollar
for dollar" the amounts requested for reimbursement, meaning that for
every bill submitted and processed, the Coast Guard received the same
amount in reimbursement. Coast Guard officials added that the review of
billing documentation by FEMA and EPA officials can take 30 to 60 days.
Coast Guard officials also stated that they met with representatives
from FEMA this year to reconcile Hurricane Katrina mission assignments,
funding ceilings, and costs, and these accounting lines and totals were
consistent.
As table 3 shows, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard reported that
it had spent $98,811,320 in its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
and had billed FEMA and EPA $66,746,961 and received $48,634,090 in
reimbursements, given the 30-to 60-day delay in FEMA/EPA review of
Coast Guard billing documentation. However, even with the delay, Coast
Guard officials we spoke to were satisfied with the reimbursement
process with both FEMA and EPA.
Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for
Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of
April 12, 2006:
Stafford Act funding: Coast Guard mission assignments (reimbursement
from FEMA);
Description of mission assignments: Search and rescue, wreck and debris
removal, and deployment of strike forces, among other activities;
Amount of Coast Guard expenditures: $49,746,004;
Amount of reimbursement request submitted: $34,701,729;
Amount of reimbursement funding received as of April 12, 2006:
$16,588,858.
Stafford Act funding: Coast Guard mission assignments (reimbursement
from the EPA);
Description of mission assignments: Marine pollution response effort,
including technical assistance, and direct support to EPA, among other
activities;
Amount of Coast Guard expenditures: 49,065,316;
Amount of reimbursement request submitted: 32,045,232;
Amount of reimbursement funding received as of April 12, 2006:
32,045,232.
Stafford Act funding: Total;
Description of mission assignments: [Empty];
Amount of Coast Guard expenditures: $98,811,320;
Amount of reimbursement request submitted: $66,746,961;
Amount of reimbursement funding received as of April 12, 2006:
$48,634,090.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard and FEMA data.
Note: Tables 1 and 2 focused exclusively on the Coast Guard response to
only Hurricane Katrina; table 3 focuses on the financial impact of the
Coast Guard response to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita missions.
Coast Guard officials noted when accounting for costs associated with
Hurricane Katrina, they included costs associated with Hurricane Rita.
Note that table 3 does not include damages suffered by the Coast Guard,
including the destruction of several stations, and damage to assets
suffered during the storms. These infrastructure costs continue to be
identified and updated by the Coast Guard, and supplemental funding has
been requested to address these damages. Also note that the amount of
reimbursement request submitted to EPA, and the amount of reimbursement
funding received as of April 12, 2006, is the same. Coast Guard
officials reported that the process of reimbursement from EPA allows
for quick reimbursement because the missions are more typical of the
types of environmental response conducted by the Coast Guard. We did
not verify the accuracy of the data provided by the Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Coast Guard Collected Information to Improve Future Storm Preparations:
According to Coast Guard officials, the agency has collected
information regarding its response to Hurricane Katrina and included it
in a Coast Guard database. In addition, while we conducted site visits
for this review, we met with a wide range of Coast Guard personnel who
participated in the response to Hurricane Katrina who shared with us
their views on certain actions that the Coast Guard could take in the
future to further improve the agency's response to an event like
Hurricane Katrina. These actions include efforts to (1) improve the
agency's systems to track Coast Guard personnel in real time in order
to better recall personnel when an evacuation is over and forces are
sent to respond to the emergency event; (2) become more "expeditionary"
in nature by having evacuating forces remove such things as certain
tools and equipment that would allow them to be more self-sustaining in
order to assist in a disaster response; (3) be more flexible in
identifying safe places for Coast Guard personnel to relocate to in the
event of an evacuation; and (4) be flexible in drafting orders for
personnel to report for duty at a specific time and place in order to
respond to contingencies that may arise during the course of an
emergency.
Furthermore, a senior Coast Guard official reported that the Coast
Guard has developed a number of after-action reports that it has
incorporated into its Contingency Preparedness System database--known
as CG SAILS--the official Coast Guard database for lessons learned.
According to this official, having these reports in this system allows
Coast Guard personnel to access this information and incorporate it
into other agency planning and contingency efforts.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, including the Coast Guard,
for comment. DHS and the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which
have been incorporated into the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Commandant of the
Coast Guard; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other
interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors
to this report are listed in appendix I.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Co-Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe:
Chair:
The Honorable Maria Cantwell:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard:
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Don Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bob Filner:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Chairman:
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Individuals making key contributions to this report include Joel
Aldape, Nancy Briggs, Lisa Canini, Billy Commons, Christine Davis, Josh
Diosomito, Michele Fejfar, Kathryn Godfrey, Dawn Hoff, and Lori Kmetz.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,
D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-
315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final
Report of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for And Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington, D.C.:
February 15, 2006), and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006). These committees were also critical of
nonfederal entities, including state and nongovernmental organizations.
[2] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1).
[3] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.
[4] On May 25, 2006, DHS revised the NRP to address certain weaknesses
or ambiguities identified following Hurricane Katrina. The revised NRP
makes clear that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for
declaring and managing incidents of national significance such as
Hurricane Katrina. Incidents of lesser severity requiring federal
involvement are also subject to the NRP, but implementation of the NRP
is to be scaled and flexible depending on the nature of the event.
[5] The responsibility for determining whether an incident of national
significance meets the NRP's definition of a "catastrophic incident"
rests with the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary makes a
"catastrophic incident" designation to activate the provisions of the
annex. The Secretary declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national
significance on August 30, 2005, but never declared it a catastrophic
incident. The revised NRP makes explicit that the Secretary could
activate the annex to address events that are projected to mature to
catastrophic proportions, such as strengthening hurricanes.
[6] The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a nonmilitary volunteer organization
administered by the Commandant of the Coast Guard under the direction
of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard Auxiliary was
created to assist the Coast Guard to promote safety and effect rescues
on and over the high seas and on navigable waters; promote efficiency
in the operation of motorboats and yachts; foster a wider knowledge of,
and better compliance with, the laws, rules, and regulations governing
the operation of motorboats and yachts; and facilitate other operations
of the Coast Guard.
[7] See 6 U.S.C. § 468(a). The Coast Guard's 11 mission program areas
include ports, waterways, and coastal security; illegal drug
interdiction; undocumented migrant interdiction; defense readiness;
other law enforcement; search and rescue; living marine resources; aids
to navigation; ice operations; marine environmental protection; and
marine safety.
[8] The Coast Guard noted that activities associated with its ports,
waterways, and coastal security mission program--which focus on
protecting the maritime domain, preventing terrorist attacks, and
responding to and recovering from those that do occur--were also
heightened following Hurricane Katrina. Activities performed under this
mission program include aerial, waterborne and shore surveillance
patrols, vessel security boardings, vessel escorts, and enforcement of
international and domestic security standards and regulations.
According to the Coast Guard, ports, waterways, and coastal security
program activities were heightened, both within the Gulf region and
elsewhere, in recognition of the increased regional vulnerability and
national risk that could have resulted from the consequences of an
attack on the oil and chemical sector during this time. However, the
scope of our review focused on the three mission programs that were
most closely aligned and directly involved with the immediate response
to the natural disaster presented by Hurricane Katrina.
[9] One of the Coast Guard's key functions involves the facilitation of
maritime commerce and ensuring the security of waterways and waterside
facilities. These activities are typically conducted under several
Coast Guard mission programs, including marine safety; ports,
waterways, coastal security; and aids to navigation. Port security and
commerce functions within ports resides with the Coast Guard Captain of
the Port, whose responsibilities are summarized at 33 C.F.R. §1.01-30.
[10] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006).
[11] U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S.
Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, (Washington, D.C.: 2002).
[12] Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the
Secretary of Homeland Security has authority to create area maritime
security committees at ports across the country to assist the Coast
Guard in addressing vulnerabilities and risks at the port level. See 46
U.S.C. § 70112(a) (2), 33 C.F.R. § 103.310. Composed of representatives
from the federal, state, local and private sector, these committees
provide a forum for sharing information on issues related to port
security. See 33 C.F.R. § 103.305.
[13] The Coast Guard is organized into two major commands that are
responsible for overall mission performance: one in the Pacific area
and the other in the Atlantic area, including the Gulf of Mexico
region. These commands are divided into nine districts, which in turn
are organized into over 20 air stations and 35 sectors that provide
more localized command and control of field units and resources,
including approximately 188 multimission stations and 119 patrol boats.
[14] The Coast Guard mandates annual exercises for these Severe
Weather/Hurricane plans. For example, Districts 1 (New England), 5 (mid-
Atlantic), 7 (Florida), and 8 (Gulf Coast region) must exercise their
Hurricane Plan; while District 9 (Great Lake region) must exercise its
Heavy Weather/Flood Plan.
[15] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006).
[16] Beginning on August 29, 2005 and continuing for about 17 days,
Coast Guard officials reported conducting 24,135 rescues of people by
boat and helicopter, and evacuating 9,409 people from hospitals, as a
result of Hurricane Katrina. By comparison, for all of 2004, the Coast
Guard responded to more than 32,000 calls for rescue assistance and
saved nearly 5,500 lives.
[17] To learn more about the Department of Defense and the National
Guard response to Hurricane Katrina, please see GAO, Hurricane Katrina:
Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2006).
[18] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[19] The National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) describes the roles and
responsibilities of federal agencies during different search and rescue
situations. The National Response Plan (2004), also provides guidance
regarding search and rescue; it did not fully incorporate the roles
previously described in the National Search and Rescue Plan.
[20] To put this amount into perspective, the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill
was around 11 million gallons.
[21] Unified command is a unified team that manages an incident by
establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. It is
a structure that brings together the incident commanders of all major
organizations involved in an incident and provides a forum for these
agencies to coordinate an effective response and make consensus
decisions. This is accomplished without loss or abdication of agency or
organizational authority, responsibility, or accountability.
[22] Photographs of the oil spills and debris were taken to document
their location and size. The photographs not only showed the progress
of the cleanup but established a record of the pollution and
discouraged illegal dumping of oil or hazardous material that could be
intentionally released and then attributed to the storm.
[23] A major spill contains at least 100,000 gallons, and a medium
spill contains at least 10,000 gallons, while amounts less than 10,000
gallons would be considered minor spills.
[24] The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force is composed of 168
highly trained professionals with specialized skills for combating
environmental pollution from oil discharges, hazardous substance and
biological releases, and weapons of mass destruction events. The Strike
Force is composed of three Strike Teams located in the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Gulf Coast regions to allow for rapid deployment.
[25] For the purposes of this report, a marine pilot is a person
licensed under state or federal law who assumes responsibility for a
vessel at a particular place for the purpose of navigating it through a
river or a channel or from or into a port.
[26] Affected ports included New Orleans, Mobile, Gulfport, Baton
Rouge, Pensacola, Panama City, Pascagoula, Biloxi, Bayou La Batre, Port
Fourchon, and Morgan City.
[27] The COTP will activate maritime travel restrictions when waterways
are difficult to navigate. These restrictions might include travel of
ships only in the daytime or allowing only certain size ships to travel
on the waterways.
[28] The security teams consisted of Maritime Safety and Security Teams
(MSSTs), which were established after September 11, 2001, and designed
to provide quick-response capabilities to protect U.S. ports and
waterways; and Port Security Units (PSUs), which are composed of Coast
Guard reserve personnel and trained to provide port security and harbor
defense duties for military assets overseas.
[29] Although Coast Guard after-action reports indicate that mobile
communications units did not provide communications capabilities needed
for operations, officials in District 8 told us that these units were
useful in providing communications support.
[30] Along with assets, a wide range of Coast Guard operational and
support teams were sent to assist in the response to Hurricane Katrina.
Port Security Units, Law Enforcement Detachment teams, and Maritime
Safety and Security Teams assisted in security and force protection
missions. Strike Teams addressed pollution concerns. Transportable
Multi-Mission Communication Center and Transportable Multi-Agency
Communication Center assets mitigated some of the communications
challenges the Coast Guard experienced. Other teams deployed during the
peak Coast Guard response included several Emergency Response Teams,
Civil Engineering Unit Damage Assessment Teams, and Incident Management
Assist Teams.
[31] Consisting of approximately 39,000 active duty personnel, the
Coast Guard is a multimission agency with a long-standing federal
leadership role in protecting life and property at sea, such as
directing search and rescue operations. Furthermore, the Coast Guard is
a military service responsible for protecting U.S. ports and waterways.
As of December 2005, other U.S. military branches were the U.S. Army,
with approximately 489,000 active duty personnel; the U.S. Navy, with
approximately 359,000 active duty personnel; the U.S. Air Force, with
approximately 352,000 active duty personnel; and the U.S. Marines, with
approximately 179,000 active duty personnel.
[32] Coast Guard officials reported that as of April 12, 2006, its FEMA-
directed missions in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had a
funding ceiling of $191,913,001, meaning FEMA authorized the Coast
Guard to spend up to this amount to conduct missions in response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, the EPA authorized the Coast
Guard to spend up to $171,327,000 to conduct specific pollution
response missions. According to Coast Guard officials, this amount is
likely to grow as mission assignments in the area of pollution response
continue to be added, and could take at least a year to complete.
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