Maritime Security
Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving Gao ID: GAO-06-933T July 10, 2006Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. This testimony is a summary and update to our April 2005 report, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394. It discusses the impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and identifies any barriers that have hindered information sharing.
Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these committees continue to be useful forums for information sharing. Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard has developed its own centers--called sector command centers--at 35 port locations to monitor information and to support its operations planned for the future. As of today, the relationship between the interagency operational centers and the sector command centers remains to be determined. In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role in obtaining clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. As of June 2006, guidance was put in place and according to the Coast Guard, was responsible for an increase in security clearance applications under consideration by the Coast Guard. Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 467 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees with a need to know received some type of security clearance. This is an improvement from February 2005, when no security clearances were issued to 359 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees members with a need to know security information.
GAO-06-933T, Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance,
and Accountability, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:
Monday, July 10, 2006:
Maritime Security:
Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving:
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director Homeland Security and
Justice Issues:
Maritime Security:
GAO-06-933T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-933T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Government Management, Finance, and Accountability of the Committee on
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in
federal efforts to secure the nation‘s ports against a potential
terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in
coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has
established area maritime security committees”forums that involve
federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a
port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance
information sharing and port security operations by establishing
interagency operational centers”command centers that tie together the
efforts of federal and nonfederal participants.
This testimony is a summary and update to our April 2005 report,
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-
394. It discusses the impact the committees and interagency operational
centers have had on improving information sharing and identifies any
barriers that have hindered information sharing.
What GAO Found:
Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved
information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port
locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that
the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous
information-sharing efforts. The types of information shared included
assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the
Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO‘s
ongoing work indicates that these committees continue to be useful
forums for information sharing.
Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information
sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they
receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and
sensors. The Coast Guard has developed its own centers”called sector
command centers”at 35 port locations to monitor information and to
support its operations planned for the future. As of today, the
relationship between the interagency operational centers and the sector
command centers remains to be determined.
In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the
lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of
committees or centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to
field offices that clarified their role in obtaining clearances for
nonfederal members of committees or centers. In addition, the Coast
Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to
monitor application trends. As of June 2006, guidance was put in place
and according to the Coast Guard, was responsible for an increase in
security clearance applications under consideration by the Coast Guard.
Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 467 nonfederal members of
area maritime security committees with a need to know received some
type of security clearance. This is an improvement from February 2005,
when no security clearances were issued to 359 nonfederal members of
area maritime security committees members with a need to know security
information.
Figure: Harbor Patrols Coordinated by Interagency Operational Centers:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO>
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at
(202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the improvements made in the
practice of sharing maritime-related security information. Securing the
nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack has become one of
the nation's security priorities since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist
attack include their location near major urban centers, their inclusion
of critical infrastructures such as oil refineries and terminals, and
their importance to the nation's economy and trade. Although no port-
related terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States,
terrorists overseas have demonstrated their ability to access and
destroy infrastructure, assets, and lives in and around seaports.
Ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional
boundaries; therefore, the need to share information among federal,
state, and local agencies is central to effective prevention and
response. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal
government has taken a number of approaches designed to enhance
information sharing.[Footnote 1] One of these approaches provides the
Coast Guard with the authority to create area maritime security
committees at the port level.[Footnote 2] These committees--with
representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors--
offer a venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around
ports, as well as a forum for sharing information on issues related to
port security. Another approach developed to share information is the
creation of interagency operational centers at certain port
locations.[Footnote 3] These centers are command posts that tie
together intelligence and operational efforts of various federal and
nonfederal participants. Often information regarding port security is
classified, and requires security clearances for those who need access
to this information. Lacking access to such information through a
security clearance can disadvantage officials in their efforts to
respond to or combat a terrorist threat.
My testimony today is a summary of and update to our April 2005 report,
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-
394. That report provides additional background and examples related to
our findings. Specifically, my testimony provides an examination of the
efforts that the Coast Guard and other federal agencies have made in
improving information sharing among federal, state, local, and industry
stakeholders, including (1) the impact of area maritime security
committees on information sharing, (2) the impact of interagency
operational centers on information sharing, and (3) the barriers, if
any, that have hindered improvements in information sharing among port
security stakeholders.
To obtain this information, we reviewed the activities of area maritime
security committees at four ports, selected to provide a diverse sample
of security environments and perspectives. The ports were Baltimore,
Maryland; Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle,
Washington. To review the activities of the interagency operational
centers, we visited and interviewed participants at the three centers
in operation at the time of our published report. We also discussed
information-sharing issues with nonfederal stakeholders, including
private sector officials, officials from port authorities, and local
law enforcement. We examined the Coast Guard's procedures for
processing security clearances for members of area maritime security
committees. We reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports
related to information sharing, interviewed agency officials, and
reviewed numerous other documents and reports on the issue. We
interviewed Coast Guard officials involved in sharing information and
received updated information about their efforts in 2006. All of our
work has been conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary:
Judging from the four ports we visited for our 2005 report, area
maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the
timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing between
federal and nonfederal stakeholders. Stakeholders said the newly formed
committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing
efforts because they established a formal structure for communicating
information and established new procedures for sharing information.
Stakeholders stated that, among other things, the committees have been
used as a forum for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing
information on illegal or suspicious activities, and providing input on
portwide security plans--called area maritime security plans--that
describe the joint strategies of the Coast Guard and its partner
agencies for protecting key infrastructure against terrorist
activities. Nonfederal stakeholders, including state officials, local
port authority operators, and representatives of private companies,
said the information sharing had increased their awareness of security
issues around the port and allowed them to identify and address
security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard officials
said the information they received from nonfederal participants had
helped in mitigating and reducing risks. While committees at each of
the locations we visited had the same guidance, they varied in such
ways as the size of the membership and the types of stakeholders
represented.
The three interagency operational centers we visited for our 2005
report allow for even greater information sharing because the centers
operate 24 hours a day and receive real-time operational information
from radars, sensors, and cameras, as well as classified data on
personnel, vessels, and cargo, according to center participants. In
contrast, the area maritime security committees, while they have a
broader membership, primarily provide information through meetings,
documents, and other means that are often used for long-term planning
purposes rather than day-to-day operations. The three operational
interagency centers and two additional centers under construction
should fulfill varying missions and operations, and thus share
different types of information. For example, the center in Charleston,
South Carolina, focuses on port security alone and is led by the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In contrast, the center in San Diego
supports the Coast Guard's missions beyond port security, including
drug interdiction, alien migrant interdiction, and search and rescue
activities, and is led by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard also has
developed its own operational centers--called sector command centers--
at 35 port locations, including four sector command centers with
enhanced surveillance and collaboration capabilities,[Footnote 4] to
monitor maritime information and to support Coast Guard operations.
One barrier to sharing information--the lack of security clearances
among nonfederal officials--is being addressed by the Coast Guard. In
our April 2005 report, we noted that while information sharing has
generally improved, a major barrier mentioned most frequently by
stakeholders as hindering information sharing was the lack of federal
security clearances among port security stakeholders. This lack of
security clearances may limit the ability of state, local, and industry
officials, such as those involved in area maritime security committees
or interagency operational centers, to deter, prevent, and respond to a
potential terrorist attack. By February 2005--or over 4 months after
the Coast Guard had developed a list of 359 nonfederal area maritime
security committee participants as having a need for a security
clearance--only 28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for the
background check. As of June 2006, Coast Guard identified 467
nonfederal area maritime security committee participants with a need to
know security information. Of the 467 nonfederal participants, 197
security clearance applications were received--20 received interim
clearances, and 168 received final security clearances. Therefore,
according to the Coast Guard, 188 out of 467 area maritime security
committee participants with a need to know have received some type of
clearance. Although we reported in 2005 that progress in moving these
officials through the application process had been slow, it appears
that as of June 2006, the Coast Guard's efforts have improved
considerably. However, continued management attention and guidance
about the security clearance process would strengthen the program, and
it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete
information as they carry out their law enforcement activities.
Background:
Ports Are Important and Vulnerable:
Ports play an important role in the nation's economy and security.
Ports are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of
dollars; generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans
and our trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are
used to move cargo containers, and bulk agricultural, mineral,
petroleum, and paper products. Ports are also important to national
security by hosting naval bases and vessels and facilitating the
movement of military equipment and supplying troops deployed overseas.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation's 361 seaports
have been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist
attacks. Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven
with complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan
areas, and easily accessible. Ports contain a number of specific
facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including military
vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams and
locks, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports
complexes, and other critical infrastructure.
Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved:
The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a
shared responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with
federal, state, and local organizations involved. For example, at the
federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall
homeland security responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the
department, has lead responsibility for maritime security. Port
authorities provide protection through designated port police forces,
private security companies, and coordination with local law enforcement
agencies. Private sector stakeholders play a major role in identifying
and addressing the vulnerabilities in and around their facilities,
which may include oil refineries, cargo facilities, and other property
adjacent to navigable waterways.
Information Sharing Is Important:
Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is
central to port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
recognizes that the federal government relies on state and local
personnel to help protect against terrorist attacks, and these
officials need homeland security information to prevent and prepare for
such attacks.[Footnote 5]
Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials
can involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In
order to gain access to classified information, state and local law
enforcement officials generally need to apply for and receive approval
to have a federal security clearance. As implemented by the Coast
Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified
information is an individual's need to know, which is defined as the
determination made by an authorized holder of classified information
that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified
information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized
governmental function.[Footnote 6] To obtain a security clearance, an
applicant must complete a detailed questionnaire that asks for
information on all previous employment, residences, and foreign travel
and contacts that reach back 7 years. After submitting the
questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of screenings and
checks.
Area Maritime Security Committees:
The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of
the September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain
many potential security targets, provided for area maritime security
committees--composed of federal, state, local, and industry members--to
be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country.[Footnote
7] A primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of
the Port--the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee--to
develop a security plan--called an area maritime security plan--to
address the vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone.[Footnote 8]
The committees also serve as a link for communicating threats and
disseminating security information to port stakeholders. As of June
2006, the Coast Guard organized 46 area maritime security committees,
covering the nation's 361 ports.[Footnote 9]
Interagency Operational Centers:
Another approach at improving information sharing and port security
operations involves interagency operational centers--command centers
that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various
federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide
intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors,
radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal
participants 24 hours a day. These interagency operational centers
represent an effort to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port
facilities, and port operations. In general, these centers are jointly
operated by federal and nonfederal law enforcement officials. The
centers can have command and control capabilities that can be used to
communicate information to vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and
stations involved in port security operations.
Port-Level Information Sharing Supported by National-Level
Intelligence:
While area maritime security committees and interagency operational
centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and
provide support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure.
National-level departments and agencies in the intelligence and law
enforcement communities may offer information that ultimately could be
useful to members of area maritime security committees or interagency
operational centers at the port level. These intelligence and law
enforcement agencies conduct maritime threat identification and
dissemination efforts in support of tactical and operational maritime
and port security efforts, but most have missions broader than maritime
activities as well. In addition, some agencies also have regional or
field offices involved in information gathering and sharing.[Footnote
10]
Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing:
Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and
Usefulness of Shared Information:
Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve
the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. A
primary function served by the committees was to develop security plans
for port areas--called area maritime security plans. The goal of these
plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in and
around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide
range of facilities and infrastructure. In doing so, the committees
established new procedures for sharing information by holding meetings
on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on suspicious
activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents, including
vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself,
according to committee participants. Also, participants noted that
these committees allowed for both formal and informal stakeholder
networking, which contributes to improvements in information sharing.
Our continuing work on the Coast Guard and maritime security, while not
specifically focused on information sharing, has continued to indicate
that area maritime security committees are a useful tool for exchanging
information. For example, we have done work at eight additional ports
and found that stakeholders were still using the committees as a
structured means to regularly share information about threat conditions
and operational issues. In addition, Coast Guard personnel and port
stakeholders are using the area maritime security committees to
coordinate security and response training and exercises. Also, in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials shared information
collaboratively through their area maritime security committees to
determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen a port for
commerce.
Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which
They Share Information:
While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding
their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is
allowed the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects
the needs of its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including
the geographic area covered and the type of operations that take place
there. These port-specific differences influence the number of members
that participate, the types of state and local organizations that
members represent, and the way in which information is shared.
Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing:
Centers Process and Share Information on Operations:
Information sharing at interagency operational centers represents a
step toward further improving information sharing, according to
participants at the centers we visited. They said maritime security
committees have improved information sharing primarily through a
planning process that identifies vulnerabilities and mitigation
strategies, as well as through development of two-way communication
mechanisms to share threat information on an as-needed basis. In
contrast, interagency operational centers can provide a continuous flow
of information about maritime activities and involve various agencies
directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar,
sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities.
Other data are available from intelligence sources and include data on
vessels, cargo, and crew.
Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has
also enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants.
Unlike the area maritime security committees, these centers are
operational in nature--that is, they have a unified or joint command
structure designed to receive information and act on it. At the centers
we visited, representatives from the various agencies work side by
side, each having access to databases and other sources of information
from their respective agencies. Officials said such centers help
leverage the resources and authorities of the respective agencies. For
example, if the Coast Guard determines that a vessel should be boarded
and inspected, other federal and nonfederal agencies might join in the
boarding to assess the vessel or its cargo, crew, or passengers for
violations relating to their areas of jurisdiction or responsibility.
Variations across Centers Affect Information Sharing:
The types of information and the way information is shared vary at the
centers we visited, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership
and organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to
officials at the centers. In our report of April 2005, we detailed
three interagency operational centers at Charleston, South Carolina;
Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. As of June 2006, the
Coast Guard has two additional interagency command centers under
construction in Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Both
are being established as Sector Command Centers--joint with the U.S.
Navy--and are expected to be operational in 2006.
Of the interagency centers we visited, the Charleston center had a port
security purpose, so its missions were all security related. It was led
by DOJ, and its membership included 4 federal agencies and 16 state and
local agencies. The San Diego center had a more general purpose, so it
had multiple missions to include not just port security, but search and
rescue, environmental response, drug interdiction, and other law
enforcement activities. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its
membership included 2 federal agencies and 1 local agency. The Norfolk
center had a port security purpose, but its mission was focused
primarily on force protection for the Navy. It was led by the Coast
Guard, and its membership included 2 federal agencies and no state or
local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shared information
that focused on law enforcement and intelligence related to port
security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency
officials. The San Diego center shared information on a broader scope
of activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and
local agency officials. The Norfolk center shared the most focused
information (security information related to force protection) among
two federal agencies.
The centers also shared different information because of their
technologies and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers had an
array of standard and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to
Coast Guard and various national databases, while the Charleston center
had these as well as additional systems and databases. For example, the
Charleston center had access to and shared information on Customs and
Border Protection's databases on incoming cargo containers from the
National Targeting Center. In addition, Charleston had a pilot project
with the Department of Energy to test radiation detection technology
that provided additional information to share. The Charleston center
was funded by a special appropriation that allowed it to use federal
funds to pay for state and local agency salaries. This arrangement
boosted the participation of state and local agencies, and thus
information sharing beyond the federal government, according to port
stakeholders in Charleston. While the San Diego center also had 24-hour
participation by the local harbor patrol, that agency was paying its
own salaries.
Coast Guard Continues to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports:
In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard planned to develop up
to 40 of its own operational centers--called sector command centers--at
additional ports. These command centers would provide local port
activities with a unified command and improve awareness of the maritime
domain through a variety of technologies. As of June 2006, the Coast
Guard reported to us that 35 sector command centers have been created,
and that these centers are the primary conduit for daily collaboration
and coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partner agencies.
The Coast Guard also reported that it has implemented a maritime
monitoring system--known as the Common Operating Picture system--that
fuses data from different sources.[Footnote 11] According to the Coast
Guard, this system is the primary tool for Coast Guard commanders in
the field to attain maritime domain awareness.
In April 2005, we also reported that the Coast Guard requested in
fiscal year 2006 over $5 million in funding to improve awareness of the
maritime domain by continuing to evaluate the potential expansion of
sector command centers to other port locations, and requested
additional funding to train personnel in Common Operating Picture
deployment at command centers and to modify facilities to implement the
picture in command centers.[Footnote 12] In June 2006, the Coast Guard
reported to us that no additional funding for this program was
requested for fiscal year 2007.
Coast Guard Report on Interagency Operational Centers:
Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the existing interagency
operational centers, covering such matters as the composition and
operational characteristics of existing centers and the number,
location, and cost of such new centers as may be required to implement
maritime transportation security plans and maritime intelligence
activities.[Footnote 13] This report, called for by February 2005, was
issued by the Coast Guard in April 2005. While the report addresses the
information sought by Congress, the report did not define the
relationship between interagency operational centers and the Coast
Guard's own sector command centers.
Port stakeholders reported to us the following issues as important
factors to consider in any expansion of interagency operational
centers: (1) purpose and mission--the centers could serve a variety of
overall purposes, as well as support a wide number of specific
missions; (2) leadership and organization--the centers could be led by
several potential departments or agencies and be organized a variety of
ways; (3) membership--the centers could vary in membership in terms of
federal, state, local, or private sector participants and their level
of involvement; (4) technology deployed--the centers could deploy a
variety of technologies in terms of networks, computers,
communications, sensors, and databases; and (5) resource requirements-
-the centers could also vary in terms of resource requirements, which
agency funds the resources, and how resources are prioritized.
Other Ad Hoc Arrangements for Interagency Information-Sharing:
Our work identified other interagency arrangements that facilitate
information sharing and interagency operations in the maritime
environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task force,
which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the Homeland
Security Task Force, South-East--a working group consisting of federal
and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional
responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration
of immigrants affecting southeast Florida. When a mass migration event
occurs, the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency
effort to share information and coordinate operations to implement a
contingency plan.
Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing
can occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency
to respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own
command centers for both District Seven and Sector Miami, located in
Miami, Florida. While these centers normally focus on a variety of
Coast Guard missions and are not normally interagency in structure,
they have established protocols with other federal agencies, such as
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident command structure should
it be needed. These Coast Guard centers make it possible to host
interagency operations because they have extra space and equipment that
allow for surge capabilities and virtual connectivity with each partner
agency.
Interagency Information-Sharing Concerns Go Beyond Maritime Area:
While our findings on maritime information sharing are generally
positive, we have some concerns regarding interagency information
sharing that go far beyond the maritime issue area. In January 2005, we
designated information sharing for homeland security as a high-risk
area because the federal government still faces formidable challenges
in gathering, identifying, analyzing, and disseminating key information
within and among federal and nonfederal entities.[Footnote 14] While we
recognize the efforts that some agencies have undertaken to break out
of information "silos" and better share information, we reported in
2006 that more than 4 years after September 11, the nation still lacks
comprehensive policies and processes to improve the sharing of
information that is critical to protecting our homeland.[Footnote 15]
We made several recommendations to the Director of National
Intelligence, who is now primarily responsible for this effort, to
ensure effective implementation of congressional information sharing
mandates.
We continue to review agencies and programs that have the goal of
improving information sharing among federal, state, and local partners.
For example, we have ongoing work assessing DHS' efforts to enhance
coordination and collaboration among interagency operations centers
that operate around the clock to provide situational awareness. We plan
to report on this later this year. Also, we have just begun work on
state fusion centers--which are locations where homeland security-
related information can be collected and analyzed--and their links to
their relevant federal counterparts, which we plan to report on in
2007.
Coast Guard Making Progress Granting Security Clearances:
Lack of Security Clearances May Limit Ability to Confront Terrorist
Threats:
According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted
for our 2005 report, the shared partnership between the federal
government and state and local entities may fall short of its potential
to fight terrorism because of the lack of security clearances. If state
and local officials lack security clearances, the information they
possess may be incomplete. According to Coast Guard and nonfederal
officials, the lack of access to classified information may limit these
officials' ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a potential
terrorist attack.
While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in
interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast
Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime
security committees. For the purposes of our 2005 report, we examined
in more detail the Coast Guard's efforts to address the lack of
security clearances among members of area maritime security committees.
Coast Guard Continues to Take Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to
State, Local, and Industry Officials:
In April 2005, we reported that as part of its effort to improve
information sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in
July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime
security committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in
submitting their applications for a security clearance. We also
reported that as of February 2005, only 28 of 359 nonfederal committee
members who had a need to know had submitted the application forms for
a security clearance. As shown in table 1, as of June 2006, of the 467
nonfederal committee members who had a need to know, 197 had submitted
security clearance applications--20 received interim clearances, and
168 were granted a final clearance, which allows access to classified
material.
Table 1: Comparison of February 2005 Coast Guard Data Regarding
Security Clearances and June 2006 Coast Guard Data Regarding Security
Clearances:
Security clearance totals: Nonfederal committee members verified as
needing clearances;
February 2005: 359;
June 2006: 467.
Security clearance totals: Members who had submitted security clearance
case paperwork;
February 2005: 28 (8 percent of 359);
June 2006: 197 (42 percent of 467).
Security clearance totals: Members granted interim clearances pending
final investigations from Office of Personnel Management;
February 2005: 24 (7 percent of 359);
June 2006: 20 (4 percent of 467).
Security clearance totals: Members with final clearances at Secret
level;
February 2005: 0 (0 percent of 359);
June 2006: 168 (36 percent of 467).
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Data Are Being Used to More Effectively Manage the Security Clearance
Program:
A key component of a good management system is to have relevant,
reliable, and timely information available to assess performance over
time and to correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two
databases that contain information on the status of security clearances
for state, local, and industry officials. The first database is a
commercial off-the-shelf system that contains information on the status
of all applications that have been submitted to the Coast Guard
Security Center, such as whether a security clearance has been issued
or whether personnel security investigations have been conducted. We
reported in April 2005 that the Coast Guard was testing the database
for use by field staff, but had not granted field staff access to the
database. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard granted access to this
database--named Checkmate--to field staff. The second database--an
internally developed spreadsheet on the area maritime committee
participants--summarizes information on the status of the security
clearance program, such as whether officials have submitted their
application forms and whether they have received their clearances.
We reported in 2005 that these Coast Guard has databases could be used
to manage the state, local, and industry security clearance program,
but that formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to
follow up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify
the status of clearances had not been developed by the Coast Guard.
While it is unclear that the Coast Guard developed formal procedures,
as of June 2006, the Coast Guard reported that it has developed
guidance for using its data on committee participants. According to the
Coast Guard, the guidance released to field commands regarding the
state, local, and industry security clearance program clarified the
process for nonfederal area maritime security committee members to
receive clearances and specifically outlined responsibilities for
working with applicants on completing required paperwork, including the
application packages. The Coast Guard reported that as a result of this
guidance, the number of received and processed security clearance
packages for area maritime security committee members has increased.
Concluding Observations:
As we reported in April 2005, and reaffirm today, effective information
sharing among members of area maritime security committees and
participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the
partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can
improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries
for deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack
at the nation's ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of
granting security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to
improve information sharing, and although we reported in 2005 that
progress in moving these officials through the application process had
been slow, it appears that as of June 2006 the Coast Guard's efforts to
process security clearances to nonfederal officials has improved
considerably. However, continued management attention and guidance
about the security clearance process would strengthen the program, and
it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete
information as they carry out their law enforcement activities.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that
you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L.
Caldwell Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at
(202) 512-9610, or at caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found at the last
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Susan Quinlan, David Alexander, Neil Asaba, Juliana
Bahus, Christine Davis, Kevin Heinz, Lori Kmetz, Emily Pickrell, Albert
Schmidt, Amy Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,
D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-
315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this testimony, "homeland security information
sharing" is defined as an exchange of information, including
intelligence, critical infrastructure, and law enforcement information,
among federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector
(industry) to establish timely, effective, and useful communications to
detect, prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist attacks.
[2] The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), P.L.107-
295, contains many of the homeland security requirements related
specifically to port security. The area maritime security committees
are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified at 46 U.S. C. §
70112(a)(2) and implemented at 33 C.F.R. Part 103.
[3] We use the term "interagency operational centers" to refer to
centers where multiple federal (and in some cases, state and local)
agencies are involved in monitoring maritime security and planning
related operations. Members of these interagency operational centers
include the Department of Homeland Security (through the U.S. Coast
Guard), the Department of the Navy, and the Department of Justice.
[4] The four sector command centers with enhanced surveillance and
collaboration capabilities are Miami, Florida; San Diego, California;
Charleston, South Carolina; and Hampton Roads, Virginia. The Coast
Guard told us that the long-term goal is to provide all sector command
centers with enhanced surveillance and collaboration capabilities.
[5] P.L. 107-296, § 891 (Nov. 25, 2002).
[6] Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, Section
1.1(h).
[7] See 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2). Prior to MTSA, some port locations had
harbor safety committees that had representatives from federal, state,
and local organizations. In addition, port security committees had been
organized and still exist at ports where substantial out-load and in-
load of military equipment occurs.
[8] See 33 C.F.R. § 103.500.
[9] Because some ports are located close to one another, some
committees cover several ports. For example, the Puget Sound area
maritime security committee includes the ports of Seattle, Tacoma,
Bremerton, Port Angeles, and Everett.
[10] For a more detailed description of the departments and agencies/
components involved in maritime information sharing at the national and
port levels, see appendix II of Maritime Security: New Structures Have
Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing
Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2005).
[11] The Coast Guard reported to us that some of the data systems
included in its maritime monitoring system include data from the
Department of Defense, Shipboard Command and Control System; data from
Integrated Deepwater Systems; imagery from aircraft; data from Vessel
Traffic Service, Ports and Waterways Safety Stems, Joint Harbor
Operations Commands, Automated Identification Systems, Inland Rivers
Vessel Movement Center, and the Vessel Monitoring System. However,
according to the Coast Guard, not all of these data are available to
all units; full integration is a future goal of the Coast Guard.
[12] The Common Operational Picture is primarily a computer software
package that fuses data from different sources, such as radar, sensors
on aircraft, and existing information systems.
[13] See the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, P.L.
108-293, § 807 (August 9, 2004). While the statute uses the term "joint
operational centers," we are using the term "interagency operational
centers" to denote centers where multiple agencies participate.
According to Coast Guard officials, the term "joint" refers to command
centers where the Coast Guard and Navy are involved in carrying out the
responsibilities of the center.
[14] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington D.C.:
January 2005).
[15] GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and
Sensitive but Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.:
March 2006).
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