Border Security
Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States Gao ID: GAO-06-976T August 2, 2006Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport when entering the United States from countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship to a CBP officer's satisfaction. On its Web site, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) advises U.S. citizens that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo identification document. In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion. Because of Congress's concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, Congress requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation's borders. Specifically, Congress requested that we conduct a follow-up investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior work continue to exist.
Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine crossings. On three occasions--in California, Texas, and Arizona--agents crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations--Texas and Arizona--CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without asking for or inspecting any identification documents. After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June 9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown by our work.
GAO-06-976T, Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, August 2, 2006:
Border Security:
Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations:
GAO-06-976T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our
investigation of the effectiveness of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) in screening entrants into the United States at land
border crossings. Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present
a passport when entering the United States from countries in the
Western Hemisphere.[Footnote 1] However, U.S. citizens are required to
establish citizenship to a CBP officer's satisfaction.[Footnote 2] On
its Web site, CBP advises U.S. citizens that an officer may ask for
identification documents as proof of citizenship, including birth
certificates or baptismal records and a photo identification
document.[Footnote 3]
In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of
identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States
were using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship.
Specifically, our agents were able to easily enter the United States
from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's
licenses and birth certificates.[Footnote 4] Later in 2003 and 2004, we
continued to be able to successfully enter the United States using
counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were denied
entry on one occasion.
Specifically, agents entered the United States using counterfeit
driver's licenses at two land crossings in Washington, one in New York,
one in California, and one in Texas. One agent was also able to enter
the United States through both the California and Texas border
crossings using an expired, altered U.S diplomatic passport. At no time
did CBP officers question the authenticity of any of these agents'
identification. Furthermore, at one of the Washington crossings, agents
were able to walk across the border without passing through any
security checkpoints and without presenting identification. However, at
the New York crossing, one agent was not allowed entry into the United
States after presenting as identification an expired, altered U.S.
tourist passport and a counterfeit driver's license. CBP officers
detained this agent for further screening until he identified himself
as a GAO employee conducting undercover tests. [Footnote 5]
Because of your concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be
exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, you
requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation's
borders. Specifically, you requested that we conduct a follow-up
investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our
prior work continue to exist.
To perform our 2006 follow-up investigation, we created a fictitious
driver's license and birth certificate with the same name that we used
in the tests conducted for the work we did in 2003. We also created
another fictitious license and birth certificate. To create all these
documents, we used commercial software that is available to the public.
As agreed with your offices, we chose to test a nonrepresentative
selection of nine land crossings at both the northern and southern
borders, including one in California, one in Texas, two in Arizona, one
in Michigan, two in New York, one in Idaho, and one in Washington. We
conducted our work from February 2006 through June 2006 in accordance
with the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency Quality
Standards for Investigations.
Summary:
Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's
licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry
on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the
authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine
crossings. On three occasions--in California, Texas, and Arizona--
agents crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations--Texas and
Arizona--CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without
asking for or inspecting any identification documents.
After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on
June 9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all
forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings
and fully supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to
present a passport before entering the United States. We did not assess
whether this initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists
from entering the United States or whether it would fully address the
vulnerabilites shown by our work.
Southern Border Crossings:
The following information provides details about our agents'
experiences and observations entering the United States from Mexico at
border crossings in California and Texas and at two crossings in
Arizona.
California: On February 9, 2006, two agents entered California from
Mexico on foot. One of the agents presented as identification a
counterfeit West Virginia driver's license and the other presented a
counterfeit Virginia driver's license. The CBP officers on duty asked
both agents if they were U.S. citizens and both responded that they
were. The officers also asked the agents if they were bringing anything
into the United States from Mexico and both answered that they were
not. The CBP officers did not request any other documents to prove
citizenship, and allowed both agents to enter the United States.
Texas: On February 23, 2006, two agents crossed the border from Mexico
into Texas on foot. When the first agent arrived at the checkpoint, a
CBP officer asked him for his citizenship information; the agent
responded that he was from the United States. The officer also asked if
the agent had brought back anything from Mexico. The agent responded
that he had not, and the officer told him that he could enter the
Unites States. At this point, the agent asked the CBP officer if he
wished to see any identification. The officer replied "OK, that would
be good." The agent began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver's
license from his wallet and the inspector said "That's fine, you can
go." The CBP officer never looked at the driver's license.
When the second agent reached the checkpoint, another CBP officer asked
him for his citizenship information and he responded that he was from
the United States. The CBP officer asked the agent if he had purchased
anything in Mexico and the agent replied that he had not. He was then
asked to show some form of identification and he produced a counterfeit
West Virginia driver's license. The CBP inspector briefly looked at the
driver's license and then told the agent he could enter the United
States.
Arizona, first crossing: On March 14, 2006, two agents arrived at the
border crossing between Mexico and Arizona in a rental vehicle. Upon
request, the agents gave the CBP officer a counterfeit West Virginia
driver's license and counterfeit Virginia driver's license as
identification. As the CBP officer reviewed the licenses, he asked the
agents if they were U.S. citizens and they responded that they were.
The officer also asked if the agents had purchased anything in Mexico
and they said they had not. The CBP officer then requested that agents
open the trunk of their vehicle. The agents heard the inspector tap on
several parts of the side of the vehicle first with his hand and again
with what appeared to be a wand. The officer closed the trunk of the
vehicle, returned the agents' driver's licenses, and allowed them to
enter the United States.
Arizona, second crossing: On March 15, 2006, two agents again entered
Arizona from Mexico on foot at a different location than the previous
day. One of the agents carried a counterfeit West Virginia driver's
license and a counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The other
carried a counterfeit Virginia driver's license and a counterfeit New
York birth certificate. As the agents were about to cross the border,
another agent who had crossed the border earlier using his genuine
identification phoned to inform them that the CBP officer on duty had
swiped his Virginia driver's license through a scanner. Because the
counterfeit driver's licenses the agents were carrying had fake
magnetic strips, the agents decided that in the event they were
questioned about their licenses, they would tell the CBP officers that
the strips had become demagnetized.
When the agents entered the checkpoint area, they saw that they were
the only people crossing the border at that time. The agents observed
three CBP officers on duty; one was manning the checkpoint and the
other two were standing a short distance away. The officer manning the
checkpoint was sitting at a cubicle with a computer and what appeared
to be a card scanner. The agents engaged this officer in conversation
to distract him from scanning their driver's licenses. After a few
moments, the CBP officer asked the agents if they were both U.S.
citizens and they said that they were. He then asked if they had
purchased anything in Mexico and they said no. He then told them to
have a nice day and allowed them to enter the United States. He never
asked for any form of identification.
Northern Border Crossings:
The following information provides details about our agents'
experiences and observations entering the United States from Canada at
Michigan, New York, Idaho, and Washington border crossings.
Michigan: On May 1, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a
border crossing in Michigan. When asked for identification by the CBP
officer on duty, the agents presented a counterfeit West Virginia
driver's license and a counterfeit Virginia driver's license. As the
CBP officer examined the licenses, he asked the agents if they were
U.S. citizens and they responded that they were. The CBP officer then
asked if the agents had birth certificates. One agent presented a
counterfeit New York birth certificate and the other presented a
counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The agents observed that
the CBP officer checked the birth certificates against the driver's
licenses to see if the dates and names matched. The CBP officer then
asked the agents if they had purchased anything in Canada and they
responded that they had not. The officer also asked what the agents
were doing in Canada and they responded that they had been visiting a
casino in Canada. The CBP officer then returned the agents'
documentation and allowed them to enter the United States.
New York, first crossing: On May 3, 2006, two agents entered New York
in a rental vehicle from Canada. The agents handed the CBP officer on
duty counterfeit driver's licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The
CBP officer asked for the agents' country of citizenship and the agents
responded that they were from the United States. The CBP officer also
asked the agents why they had visited Canada. The agents responded that
they had been gambling in the casinos. The CBP officer told the agents
to have a nice day and allowed them to enter the United States.
New York, second crossing: On the same date, the same two agents
crossed back into Canada and re-entered New York at a different
location. The agents handed the CBP officer at the checkpoint the same
two counterfeit driver's licenses from West Virginia and Virginia. The
officer asked the agents what they were doing in Canada and they
replied that they been gambling at a casino. The officer then asked the
agents how much money they were bringing back into the country and they
told him they had approximately $325, combined. The officer next asked
the agent driving the car to step out of the vehicle and open the
trunk. As the agent complied, he noticed that the officer placed the
two driver's licenses on the counter in his booth. The officer asked
the agent whose car they were driving and the agent told him that it
was a rental. A second officer then asked the agent to stand away from
the vehicle and take his hands out of his pockets. The first officer
inspected the trunk of the vehicle, which was empty. At this point, the
officer handed back the two driver's licenses and told the agents to
proceed into the United States.
Idaho: On May 23, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a
border crossing in Idaho. The agents handed the CBP officer on duty a
counterfeit West Virginia driver's license and a counterfeit Virginia
driver's license. As the CBP officer examined the licenses, he asked
the agents if they were U.S. citizens and they responded that they
were. The CBP officer then asked if the agents had birth certificates.
One agent presented a counterfeit New York birth certificate and the
other presented a counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. The
agents observed that the CBP officer checked the birth certificates
against the driver's licenses to see if the dates and names matched.
The officer also asked what the agents were doing in Canada and they
responded that they had been sightseeing. The CBP officer then returned
the agents' documentation and allowed them to enter the United States.
Washington: On May 24, 2006, two agents drove in a rental vehicle to a
border crossing checkpoint in Washington. When the agents arrived at
the border, they noticed that no one was at the checkpoint booth at the
side of the road. Shortly thereafter, a CBP officer emerged from a
building near the checkpoint booth and asked the agents to state their
nationality. The agents responded that they were Americans. The CBP
officer next asked the agents where they were born, and they responded
New York and West Virginia. The agents then handed the CBP officers
their counterfeit West Virginia and Virginia driver's licenses. The
officer looked at the licenses briefly and asked the agents why they
had visited Canada. The agents responded that they had a day off from a
conference that they were attending in Washington and decided to do
some sightseeing. The CBP officer returned the agents' identification
and allowed them to enter the United States.
Corrective Action Briefing:
We conducted a corrective action briefing with officials from CBP on
June 9, 2006, about the results of our investigation. CBP agreed its
officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit
identification presented at land border crossings. CBP officials also
stated that they fully support the newly promulgated Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative,[Footnote 6] which will require all travelers,
including U.S. citizens, within the Western Hemisphere to have a
passport or other secure identification deemed sufficient by the
Secretary of Homeland Security[Footnote 7] to enter or reenter the
United States. The current timeline proposes that the new requirements
will apply to all land border crossings beginning on December 31, 2007.
The proposed timeline was developed pursuant to the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The act requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to
implement a plan no later than January 1, 2008, to strengthen the
border screening process through the use of passports and other secure
documentation in recognition of the fact that additional safeguards are
needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United
States.[Footnote 8] However, the Senate recently passed a bill to
extend the implementation deadline from January 1, 2008, to June 1,
2009. Additionally, the Senate bill would also authorize the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to
develop a travel document known as a Passport Card to facilitate travel
of U.S. citizens to Canada, Mexico, the countries located in the
Caribbean, and Bermuda.[Footnote 9] We did not assess whether this
initiative would be fully implemented by either the January 2008 or
June 2009 deadline or whether it would be effective in preventing
terrorists from entering the United States.
Conclusion:
The results of our current work indicate that (1) CBP officers at the
nine land border crossings tested did not detect the counterfeit
identification we used and (2) people who enter the United States via
land crossings are not always asked to present identification.
Furthermore, our periodic tests since 2002 clearly show that CBP
officers are unable to effectively identify counterfeit driver's
licenses, birth certificates, and other documents. This vulnerability
potentially allows terrorists or others involved in criminal activity
to pass freely into the United States from Canada or Mexico with little
or no chance of being detected. It will be critical that the new
initiative requiring travelers within the Western Hemisphere to present
passports or other accepted documents to enter the United States
address the vulnerabilities shown by our work.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement.
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this
time.
Contact:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony.
FOOTNOTES
[1] 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b).
[2] 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(b).
[3] See [Hyperlink,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/vacation/documentary_requirements.xml]
.
[4] We also testified in 2003 that agents successfully entered Florida
from Jamaica via air. GAO, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
United States, GAO-03-438T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003).
[5] As part of this investigation, agents also attempted to enter the
Unites States via air. Agents successfully entered the United States
from the Bahamas using counterfeit driver's licenses and birth
certificates. However, agents were not successful when attempting to
enter the United States from Jamaica; CBP officers detained four agents
in Florida until they identified themselves as GAO employees conducting
tests.
[6] See Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 70 Fed Reg. 52037.
[7] Although a passport will be the preferred form of identification
for entry into the United States, the Department of State and CBP
anticipate that other acceptable forms of identification will be the
Border Crossing Card (BCC or laser visa), the Customs and Border
Protection Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection
(SENTRI), NEXUS, and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program cards. BCC
cards have a photo and machine-readable biometric information; SENTRI
cards are used for the automated commuter lanes at the United States/
Mexico border crossings; NEXUS cards are issued to low-risk travelers
for travel between Canada and the United States; and FAST cards are
used by low-risk truck drivers, carriers, and importers at the United
States/Canada border crossings.
[8] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823 (2004).
[9] Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.
§135.
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