Coast Guard
Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance Appears Mixed Gao ID: GAO-06-979 September 22, 2006The marine transportation system is a critical part of the nation's infrastructure. To facilitate the safety and efficiency of this system, the Coast Guard maintains aids-to-navigation (ATON), such as buoys and beacons, and conducts domestic icebreaking in the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway, and northeast coast. To conduct these missions, the Coast Guard has a fleet of more than 200 vessels, ranging from 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders and 140-foot domestic icebreakers to 21-foot boats. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many of these assets took on additional responsibilities for security patrols and other homeland security duties. Although some assets have been recently acquired, many others are reaching or have exceeded their design service lives, raising concerns about how well and for how much longer these older assets may be able to carry out their missions. In response, GAO examined (1) recent trends in the amount of time these assets have spent performing missions; (2) asset condition and its effect on mission performance; and (3) the actions taken by the Coast Guard to continue to achieve the missions of these assets. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, interviewed Coast Guard officials, and made site visits to various locations around the country. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Many ATON vessels and domestic icebreakers have operated more hours in recent years than in previous years, with the increase coming mainly in homeland security missions. Domestic icebreakers are now used more for homeland security than for icebreaking, reflecting their availability at times of the year when no icebreaking is needed. While not designed for homeland security, the assets can perform such duties acceptably, according to the Coast Guard. Most ATON vessels are used primarily for ATON activities. Newer ATON assets receive the greatest use on other missions, reflecting their greater multi-mission capabilities. Trends are mixed with regard to asset condition and mission performance. Available evidence, such as the amount of maintenance conducted, suggests condition is declining for some assets, though not precipitously. Coast Guard officials said some assets, while being operated for more hours, are still largely being operated within planned limits. Against this backdrop, indicators for measuring performance show mixed results: some have declined, while others have not. The current measure for asset condition is not clearly linked to mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working on developing a measure that links the two. Actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to achieve the missions of these assets include revising maintenance approaches and developing a new analytical tool for deciding which projects provide the most capability for the dollars invested. The Coast Guard continues to acquire some new vessels to replace aging ones, but proposals to rehabilitate or replace other aging vessels have not been implemented, largely because of other funding priorities. The Coast Guard also studied the feasibility of contracting out some activities. While some possibilities for outsourcing were identified in the study, the Coast Guard has identified potential disadvantages to outsourcing these activities.
GAO-06-979, Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance Appears Mixed
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Report to the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Coast Guard, Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Coast Guard:
Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels
Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance Appears Mixed:
Coast Guard:
GAO-06-979:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-979, a report to the Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The marine transportation system is a critical part of the nation‘s
infrastructure. To facilitate the safety and efficiency of this system,
the Coast Guard maintains aids-to-navigation (ATON), such as buoys and
beacons, and conducts domestic icebreaking in the Great Lakes, St.
Lawrence Seaway, and northeast coast. To conduct these missions, the
Coast Guard has a fleet of more than 200 vessels, ranging from 225-foot
seagoing buoy tenders and 140-foot domestic icebreakers to 21-foot
boats. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many of these
assets took on additional responsibilities for security patrols and
other homeland security duties. Although some assets have been recently
acquired, many others are reaching or have exceeded their design
service lives, raising concerns about how well and for how much longer
these older assets may be able to carry out their missions. In
response, GAO examined (1) recent trends in the amount of time these
assets have spent performing missions; (2) asset condition and its
effect on mission performance; and (3) the actions taken by the Coast
Guard to continue to achieve the missions of these assets. To conduct
this work, GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, interviewed Coast Guard
officials, and made site visits to various locations around the
country. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Coast Guard
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
Many ATON vessels and domestic icebreakers have operated more hours in
recent years than in previous years, with the increase coming mainly in
homeland security missions. Domestic icebreakers are now used more for
homeland security than for icebreaking, reflecting their availability
at times of the year when no icebreaking is needed. While not designed
for homeland security, the assets can perform such duties acceptably,
according to the Coast Guard. Most ATON vessels are used primarily for
ATON activities. Newer ATON assets receive the greatest use on other
missions, reflecting their greater multi-mission capabilities.
Trends are mixed with regard to asset condition and mission
performance. Available evidence, such as the amount of maintenance
conducted, suggests condition is declining for some assets, though not
precipitously. Coast Guard officials said some assets, while being
operated for more hours, are still largely being operated within
planned limits. Against this backdrop, indicators for measuring
performance show mixed results: some have declined, while others have
not. The current measure for asset condition is not clearly linked to
mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working on developing a
measure that links the two.
Actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to achieve the missions
of these assets include revising maintenance approaches and developing
a new analytical tool for deciding which projects provide the most
capability for the dollars invested. The Coast Guard continues to
acquire some new vessels to replace aging ones, but proposals to
rehabilitate or replace other aging vessels have not been implemented,
largely because of other funding priorities. The Coast Guard also
studied the feasibility of contracting out some activities. While some
possibilities for outsourcing were identified in the study, the Coast
Guard has identified potential disadvantages to outsourcing these
activities.
Figure: Coast Guard Buoy Tender (left) and Domestic Icebreaker (right):
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-979].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at
(202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Icebreaking and ATON Assets Show Significant Increases in Time Spent on
Homeland Security Missions since 2001:
Available Evidence Indicates Condition of Assets Varies Greatly and
Mixed Impact on Mission Performance:
To Continue to Achieve the Missions of Its ATON and Domestic
Icebreaking Assets, the Coast Guard Has Taken Actions, Made Proposals,
and Studied Outsourcing Possibilities:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of ATON and Domestic Icebreaking
Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005:
Appendix III: Condition Measure of ATON and Domestic Icebreaking
Assets, Fiscal Years 2000 to 2005:
Appendix IV: Maintenance Trends of ATON Cutter and Domestic Icebreaking
Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area:
Table 2: Aids-to-Navigation Assets:
Table 3: Domestic Icebreaking Assets:
Table 4: Comparison of Features of the 87-foot Patrol Boats and
Domestic Icebreakers:
Table 5: Condition of Domestic Icebreakers and ATON Cutters as Measured
by Coast Guard's Standard of 72 Percent or More of Time Free of Major
Casualties, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004:
Table 6: Availability of Navigational Aids, Fiscal Years 2001 through
2005:
Table 7: Approaches to Replace or Rehabilitate ATON and Domestic
Icebreaking Assets under the Integrated ATON Platform Modernization
Project:
Table 8: Resource Hour Usage and Percent, by Asset Type and Mission
Program, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005:
Table 9: Percent of Time Free of Major Casualties for ATON and Domestic
Icebreaking Cutters, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004:
Table 10: Condition of ATON Boats as Evidenced by POTF and Internal
Coast Guard Assessment:
Table 11: Maintenance Costs for ATON Cutters and Domestic Icebreakers,
Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of a Buoy and a Fixed Aid-to-Navigation:
Figure 2: Resource Hours for Domestic Icebreakers, Fiscal Years 2001
through 2005:
Figure 3: Resource Hours for ATON Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 through
2005:
Figure 4: Domestic Icebreaking Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years
2001 through 2005:
Figure 5: ATON Cutter Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years 2001
through 2005:
Figure 6: Antiquated Circuit Card Rack, Which Serves as Part of the
Main Propulsion Control System, on the 140-foot Icebreaking Tug:
Figure 7: Average Number of Collisions, Allisions, and Groundings,
Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005:
Figure 8: Chain-in Haul Winch:
Abbreviations:
AOPS: Abstract of Operations:
ATON: Aids-to-Navigation:
CAMS: Capital Asset Management Strategy:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ELC: Engineering Logistic Center:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
POTF: Percent of Time Free of major casualties:
PWCS: Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security:
SSMEB: ship structure and machinery evaluation boards:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 22, 2006:
The Honorable Olympia Snowe:
Chair:
The Honorable Maria Cantwell:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Fisheries and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The marine transportation system, which allows for the transportation
of people and goods on the water, is a vast and critical part of the
nation's infrastructure. The system includes coastal ports and shipping
channels; 25,000 miles of navigable inland and coastal channels and
waterways like the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, Columbia and Snake
rivers; and shipping on the Great Lakes. Ninety-five percent of the
United States' overseas trade tonnage moves by water, and the cargo
moving through the U.S. marine transportation system contributes
hundreds of billions of dollars to the U.S. gross domestic product.
This system also enables the swift mobilization and supply of America's
military as well as providing recreational value to millions of
boaters, fishermen, and cruise passengers.
The Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things, providing a
safe, efficient, and navigable waterway system, and it carries out this
role through its aids-to-navigation (ATON) and domestic icebreaking
missions. In its ATON mission, the Coast Guard establishes and
maintains over 53,000 navigational aids, such as buoys and beacons, to
assist mariners and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks. To carry
out this mission, the Coast Guard uses a diverse fleet of more than 200
vessels ranging from 225-foot buoy tenders to 21-foot boats that can be
transported on trailers by truck. In its domestic icebreaking mission,
the Coast Guard breaks ice in the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway,
and the northeast U.S. coast.[Footnote 1] This activity is intended to
facilitate navigation for commerce, conduct search and rescue missions,
and prevent flooding. To carry out this mission, the Coast Guard
largely relies on 11 65-foot and 9 140-foot icebreaking
cutters.[Footnote 2]
While some of these vessels have come on line in the past few years,
many are old and are reaching or have exceeded their designed service
lives. Their age has raised concerns within the Coast Guard as to how
well and for how much longer they will be able to carry out their
missions. In addition, after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, many ATON and icebreaking vessels took on additional
responsibilities for security patrols and other homeland security
activities. In this context, this report examines (1) the recent trends
in the amount of time ATON and domestic icebreaking assets have spent
performing various missions and the impact of these trends on their
primary missions; (2) the condition of the ATON and domestic
icebreaking assets and the impact of their condition on performing
their primary missions; and (3) the actions the Coast Guard has taken
to continue to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic
icebreaking assets.
To address the first two objectives, we analyzed a variety of Coast
Guard data and records, focusing on fiscal years 2001 through 2005. We
also made site visits to assets located on the West and East Coasts,
Gulf Coast, Great Lakes, and inland rivers and met with the assets'
crews to obtain their views on the condition of their assets. These
assets were selected to provide diversity in terms of type, age of
asset, and geographic location. To address the third objective, we met
with Coast Guard officials at headquarters to discuss recent
acquisitions and specific management actions they have taken or are in
the process of taking. We also obtained and reviewed information and
documents on the Coast Guard's plans to rehabilitate or replace the
assets or study outsourcing to carry out missions. More details on our
scope and methodology can be found in appendix I of this report. We
conducted our work between July 2005 and August 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Many of the Coast Guard's ATON vessels and domestic icebreakers saw a
sharp increase in use for homeland security missions after the attacks
of September 11, 2001, and while this trend has moderated somewhat, the
use of some assets in these missions continues well above pre-September
11 levels. This increase was most prominent for domestic icebreakers,
which continue to be used more for homeland security than for
icebreaking. Rather than being diverted from icebreaking activities
when needed for this mission, these icebreakers are basically being
operated more extensively at other times of the year when no
icebreaking needs to be done. In some cases, this more extensive use
has caused some assets to be operated at levels exceeding the
recommended levels. Coast Guard officials said that while these
icebreakers are not specifically designed for security patrols and
other homeland security activities, they can perform such duties
acceptably, though at less than optimal levels. In contrast to the
icebreakers, most ATON vessels continue to be used primarily for ATON
activities, reflecting the greater year-round nature of ATON activity.
ATON vessels have devoted additional hours to other missions and this
reflects primarily an overall increase in the number of hours the ATON
vessels are used, especially the larger assets. Newer ATON vessels,
which generally have greater multiple-mission capabilities than older
ATON vessels, tend to be the ATON assets used the most for other
missions.
Available evidence shows mixed trends with regard to both the condition
of these assets and the impact this condition has on the Coast Guard's
ability to perform its ATON and domestic icebreaking missions. The
Coast Guard's current measure of a vessel's condition-- the percentage
of time it is free of major casualties--is inadequate to link the
assets' condition to any degradation in mission capabilities or
performance and, therefore, may reflect a more positive condition. The
Coast Guard is currently working on a new measure that should better
link condition with mission degradation. Other evidence, such as the
amount of maintenance conducted and anecdotal evidence we gathered,
suggests that as these assets continue to age, their condition is
declining, though not precipitously. For example, according to a
program official who previously served as a commanding officer on an
icebreaker, stated that the decline in condition of those assets has
not been beyond what would be expected of assets 20 years or more of
age. Our site visits showed that, on these older assets, crew members
are spending increasing amounts of time and resources to troubleshoot
and resolve maintenance issues. They indicated that because the systems
and parts are outdated compared with the technology and equipment
available today, it can be challenging and time consuming to diagnose a
maintenance issue and find parts or determine what corrective action to
take. For example, the propulsion control system on the 140-foot
icebreaking tugs uses circuit cards that are no longer manufactured and
have been superseded by computer control systems. While some assets are
being operated more extensively than in the past to meet additional
responsibilities, particularly homeland security, Coast Guard officials
said that overages can have an impact on some assets, especially those
with more complex systems and subsystems. The officials said that
exceeding planned usage limits may leave less time to maintain these
systems. They said that the deterioration of an asset and its systems
from usage consistently above the limits would be reflected in periodic
engineering assessments of the assets. Against this backdrop,
performance indicators for the two missions show mixed results. A
milder winter in 2005 may have contributed to the Coast Guard's ability
to meet its primary domestic icebreaking performance target, which aims
for limiting the number of days critical waterways are closed due to
ice to 2 days during average winters. For the ATON mission, the main
performance measure (the number of collisions, allisions, and
groundings) has been declining for the past 5 years, indicating
continual improvement, while a secondary measure (the percentage of
time an aid-to-navigation system is performing) has been declining over
the same period--a negative trend.[Footnote 3] In previous work, we
found that many other factors, such as severity of weather, also
affected outcome on performance measures.
To continue to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic
icebreaking assets, the Coast Guard has taken a number of actions to
develop program management tools or acquire new assets, made proposals
to address aging assets, and conducted a study of what makes the best
business case for outsourcing:
* Actions taken or underway include developing a better measure for
linking an asset's condition and its ability to carry out missions, a
revised maintenance approach for newer assets, and a centralized system
for tracking the condition and maintenance of smaller ATON boats. In
addition, to better link asset conditions and funding decisions, the
Coast Guard has developed a benefit-cost analysis tool to analyze the
trade-offs involved in upgrading assets or continuing to maintain them,
thereby helping the Coast Guard decide on the combinations of projects
that will provide the most capability for the dollars invested. The
Coast Guard has also acquired some newer assets: in 2004, it acquired
the last of 30 new buoy tenders to replace older coastal and seagoing
buoy tenders and in 2005, and it acquired a new icebreaker for the
Great Lakes. These acquisitions have brought improved features to the
fleet, such as computerized systems for positioning and propulsion
control, enhanced multimission capabilities, and improved equipment for
servicing navigation aids.
* Proposals made include steps to address the remaining aging assets,
but these steps have not been implemented, largely because of other
funding priorities. To determine whether to rehabilitate or replace
assets, Coast Guard officials stated that they use a process that
considers things such as the condition of the assets and trends in
maintenance costs. In 2002, the Coast Guard proposed a project to
systematically rehabilitate or replace its other aging ATON and
domestic icebreaking assets. Requests for funding this project have
been denied or deferred by the Department of Homeland Security or the
Office of Management and Budget since fiscal year 2004, apparently due
to competition for limited resources with other Coast Guard
initiatives, such as the Deepwater project for replacing cutters and
aircraft used far out at sea. As a result, parts of the project have
been separated into smaller components with lower funding requirements.
For example, in 2006, the Coast Guard began acquiring new trailerable
ATON boats to replace 80 boats currently in use. Of these smaller
components, only this new boat acquisition has received funding.
* The study conducted looked at what activities make the best business
case for being outsourced to the private sector. While recognizing
that, at the time of the study some ATON activities were being
contracted to commercial sources on a limited basis, the study
suggested that some asset classes related to the Coast Guard's ATON
activities might be outsourced and merited further examination.
However, according to the Coast Guard, potential disadvantages to
outsourcing exist such as reduction of the Coast Guard's capacity to
respond to hurricanes and other emergencies and disruption of the Coast
Guard's personnel structure and ability to attract and retain
personnel.
We provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of Homeland
Security and the Coast Guard for review. The Coast Guard provided
technical comments, which have been incorporated where appropriate.
Background:
The US Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within
the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard has
responsibilities that fall under two broad missions--homeland security
and non-homeland security.[Footnote 4] (See table 1.)
Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area:
Mission and program: Homeland security missions: Ports, waterways, and
coastal security;
Activities and functions of each program: Conducting harbor patrols,
vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and
other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage
form attacks that occur.
Mission and program: Homeland security missions: Undocumented migrant
interdiction;
Activities and functions of each program: Deploying cutters and
aircraft to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the
United States by maritime routes.
Mission and program: Homeland security missions: Defense readiness;
Activities and functions of each program: Participating with the
Department of Defense (DOD) in global military operations, deploying
cutters and other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force
mobilization operations.
Mission and program: Homeland security missions: Illegal drug
interdiction;
Activities and functions of each program: Deploying cutters and
aircraft in high drug trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to
reduce the flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes.
Mission and program: Homeland security missions: Other law enforcement
(foreign fish enforcement);
Activities and functions of each program: Protecting US fishing grounds
by ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally harvest US fish
stocks.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security missions: Search and rescue;
Activities and functions of each program: Operating multi-mission
stations, and a national distress and response communication system,
conducting search and rescue operations for mariners in distress.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security missions: Living marine
resources;
Activities and functions of each program: Enforcing domestic fishing
laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security missions: Aids-to-
navigation;
Activities and functions of each program: Managing US waterways and
providing a safe, efficient and navigable marine transportation system;
maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids;
monitoring marine traffic through vessel traffic service centers.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security missions: Ice operations;
Activities and functions of each program: Conducting polar operations
to facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in support
of scientific and national security activity;
conducting domestic icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round
commerce;
conducting international ice operations to track icebergs below the
48th north latitude.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security missions: Marine
environmental protection;
Activities and functions of each program: Preventing and responding to
marine oil and chemical spills;
preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and garbage in US waters;
preventing biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security missions: Marine safety;
Activities and functions of each program: Setting standards and
conducting vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers
and crew aboard commercial vessels;
partnering with states and boating safety organizations to reduce
recreational boating deaths.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
One of the Coast Guard's strategic goals is maritime mobility, that is,
to facilitate maritime commerce, eliminate interruptions and
impediments to the movement of goods and people, and maximize access to
and enjoyment of the water. The two non-homeland security missions
through which the Coast Guard achieves this goal are aids-to-navigation
(ATON) and domestic icebreaking, which is part of ice operations.
Aids-to-Navigation Mission:
Through its ATON mission, the Coast Guard promotes safe waterways and
an efficient Marine Transportation System. The Coast Guard has
statutory responsibility to operate and maintain a system of maritime
aids to facilitate navigation and to prevent disasters, collisions, and
wrecks.[Footnote 5] To fulfill this mission, the Coast Guard operates
over 53,000 aids. These aids-to-navigation are like road signs of the
waterways and are placed along coasts and navigable waters as guides to
mark safe water and to assist mariners in determining their position in
relation to land and hidden dangers. These aids consist of both
floating aids, such as buoys, and fixed aids, such as lights or signs
mounted on pilings. See figure 1 for an example of a buoy and fixed aid-
to-navigation.
Figure 1: Examples of a Buoy and a Fixed Aid-to-Navigation:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
The Coast Guard uses several types of vessels to place and service its
aids-to-navigation such as buoy tenders, construction tenders, and
boats that make up its ATON fleet. These vessels are used to perform
both periodic routine maintenance of aids and discrepancy response,
when, for example, a light is extinguished or a buoy is moved from its
intended location. The assets are shown in table 2.
Table 2: Aids-to-Navigation Assets:
Asset type: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
Number of assets: 16;
Asset description: The seagoing buoy tenders service and maintain
coastal and offshore aids to navigation in exposed locations. They have
a crew size of 40 to 48, a maximum speed of 15 knots and a range of
6,000 nautical miles. They have a lifting capacity of 20 tons and a
cargo capacity of 75 tons. These tenders were commissioned between 1996
and 2004;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
Number of assets: 14;
Asset description: The coastal buoy tenders service and maintain
coastal and offshore aids to navigation. They have a planned crew size
of 19 to 26 and a maximum speed of 13 knots. They have a lifting
capacity of 10 tons and a cargo capacity of 40 tons. These tenders were
commissioned between 1997 and 2000;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 160-foot/ 100-foot/ 75-foot inland construction tenders;
Number of assets: 13;
Asset description: The inland construction tenders construct, maintain,
and remove aids to navigation along the Intra-coastal waterway system.
They have a planned crew size of 13 to 14, a maximum speed of 9 to 11
knots, and a range of 1,300-5,350 nautical miles. The 100-foot and 75-
foot tenders push construction barges. These tenders were commissioned
between 1944 and 1976;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 75-foot/ 65-foot river buoy tenders;
Number of assets: 18;
Asset description: The river tenders push 90-foot to 130-foot barges
and maintain short-range aids to navigation in the Mississippi River,
its tributaries, and other rivers that flow into the Gulf of Mexico.
They have a crew size of 12 to 13, a maximum speed of 9 to 11 knots,
and an operating range of 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles. These tenders
were commissioned between 1960 and 1990;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 100-foot/ 65-foot inland buoy tenders;
Number of assets: 15;
Asset description: The inland buoy tenders service and maintain aids to
navigation in remote waterways far from readily accessible logistics
support. They have a planned crew size of 8 to 18, a maximum speed of 9
to 10 knots, and an operating range of 600-1,200 nautical miles. The
100-foot cutters have a lifting capacity of 5 tons and a cargo capacity
of 56,000 lbs. The 65-foot cutter has a lifting capacity of 2 tons and
a cargo capacity of 13,500 lbs. These tenders were commissioned between
1944 and 1963;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 72-foot cable laying boat;
Number of assets: 11;
Asset description: The cable boat maintains shore power to offshore
aids to navigation that cannot be powered by solar means. It has a
planned crew size of 4, a maximum speed of 11 knots, and an operating
range of up to 225 nautical miles. It has a cargo capacity of 20,000
lbs. This boat was commissioned in 1953;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 64-foot aids-to-navigation boats;
Number of assets: 13;
Asset description: The 64-foot boats conduct aids to navigation work on
the inland rivers. They have a planned crew size of four, a maximum
speed of 9 knots, an operating range of 500 nautical miles, and a
lifting capacity of 4,500lbs. The cargo capacity of these vessels is
30,000 lbs. These vessels were built in 1995;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 63-foot aids-to-navigation boats;
Number of assets: 11;
Asset description: The 63-foot boat is designed to work small floating
aids to navigation. It has a planned crew size of six, a maximum speed
of 15 knots, and an operating range of 300 nautical miles. It also has
a lifting capacity of 14,000 lbs and a cargo capacity of 16,000 lbs.
This asset was constructed in 1975;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 55-foot aids-to-navigation boats;
Number of assets: 20;
Asset description: The 55-foot boats service small buoys and service
fixed structures. They have a planned crew size of 4, a maximum speed
of 21.5 knots, and an operating range of 175 nautical miles. They have
a lifting capacity of 2,000/3,000 lbs and a cargo capacity of 8,000
lbs. These vessels were constructed from 1977 to 1988;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 49-foot buoy stern loading boats;
Number of assets: 26;
Asset description: The 49-foot boats service buoys on the intra-coastal
waterway and in coastal areas. They have a planned crew size of four, a
maximum speed of 10 knots, an operating range of 300 nautical miles,
and a lifting capacity of 4,500 lbs. The last boat in this fleet
completed construction in 2001;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 45-foot buoy boats;
Number of assets: 12;
Asset description: The 45-foot boats service buoys have a planned crew
size of 4, maximum speed of 8.5 knots, and an operating range of 550
nautical miles. They have a lifting capacity of 4,000 lbs and a cargo
capacity of 20,800lbs. These assets have been in service since the
1950s;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boat;
Number of assets: 80;
Asset description: The 21-foot boats are used to provide discrepancy
response in semi-exposed and protected waters and to service many of
the aids located in shallow water. They have a planned crew size of 3
and a maximum speed of 20 knots. They have a lifting capacity of 250
lbs and a cargo capacity of 3,500 lbs. These boats were built from 1980
to 1992, have an average age of 10-22 years, and have exceeded their
original estimated service life of 5 to 7 years;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data. Photographs of the 21-
foot trailerable aids to navigation boat and inland construction tender
are by GAO. All other photographs are courtesy of the Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Domestic Icebreaking Mission:
Domestic icebreaking is a key component of the Coast Guard's ice
operations mission, which facilitates the safe and efficient navigation
on lakes, rivers, channels, and harbors during the winter season. The
Coast Guard has statutory icebreaking responsibilities that are
additionally addressed by an executive order that directs the Coast
Guard to break ice in channels and harbors in order to keep them open
to navigation.[Footnote 6] Like plowing snow-covered roads, the Coast
Guard keeps areas of water open as much as is reasonably possible for
commercial traffic in winter. It also performs icebreaking for search
and rescue and prevention of flooding by ice. To conduct this mission,
the Coast Guard uses assets that are specially designed with
strengthened hulls. The key icebreaker types the Coast Guard uses are
shown in table 3.
Table 3: Domestic Icebreaking Assets:
Asset type: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
Number of assets: 19;
Asset description: The icebreaking tugs are specially configured for
breaking ice on the Great Lakes, rivers, and coastal waters, and
support aids to navigation. They have a crew size of 17 to 27, a
maximum speed of 14.7 knots and an operating range of 4,000 nautical
miles. Two of these assets are augmented by a 120-foot ATON barge and
perform mostly ATON mission activities. These vessels were commissioned
between 1979 and 1988;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Asset type: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
Number of assets: 11;
Asset description: The small harbor tugs perform shallow water
icebreaking services and maintain short-range ATON in rivers and near-
shore areas. They also perform port security and search and rescue
missions. They have a planned crew size of 6, a maximum speed of 10
knots, and an operating range of 850 nautical miles. These vessels were
built between 1962 and 1967;
Asset photograph: [See PDF for Image].
Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data. Photographs are
courtesy of the Coast Guard.
Note: In June 2006, the Coast Guard commissioned a new 240-foot Great
Lakes icebreaker that has multi-mission capabilities and will perform
both domestic icebreaking and aid-to-navigation as its primary mission
activities. It replaces a 290-foot icebreaker that was commissioned in
1944. Because the new Great Lakes icebreaker has not yet completed ice
trials, we did not include it in this table.
[End of table]
The Coast Guard classifies its vessel assets, such as those used in the
ATON and domestic icebreaking missions, as cutters (assets 65 feet long
or longer with adequate accommodations for crew to live on board) or
boats (assets less than 65 feet in length that usually operate near
shore and on inland waterways). For purposes of this report, the three
main asset groups are ATON cutters, ATON boats, and domestic
icebreakers.
Icebreaking and ATON Assets Show Significant Increases in Time Spent on
Homeland Security Missions since 2001:
Since 2001, the Coast Guard's domestic icebreakers and ATON cutters
have experienced significant increases in the time spent conducting
missions related to homeland security. Most of this increase has come
in the Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission, which
involves such activities as conducting security patrols and escorting
vessels. The increase was greatest for domestic icebreakers, which
continue to be used more for homeland security missions than for
icebreaking because of their availability during months when no
icebreaking is needed. By contrast, ATON cutters and boats still spend
most of their time on ATON-related activities, reflecting the year-
round nature of the ATON mission. Some newer ATON cutters with greater
multi-mission capabilities, however, continue to have a more diverse
workload. Coast Guard officials said icebreakers and ATON vessels,
while less than ideal for carrying out security missions, can perform
these missions adequately.
Domestic Icebreakers Show the Largest Increase in Time Spent on
Homeland Security Missions:
During fiscal years 2001 through 2005, the domestic icebreakers divided
their time between several of the Coast Guard's 11 missions, but PWCS
activities accounted for roughly half of all resource hours during
fiscal years 2002 through 2005.[Footnote 7] PWCS activities grew
quickly from 15 percent of total resource hours in fiscal year 2001 to
53 percent in fiscal year 2002, and they have remained at 44 percent or
more of total hours through fiscal year 2005. At the same time,
icebreaking hours began at 41 percent in fiscal year 2001 and then
dropped down to 13 percent in 2002, but ended at 26 percent in fiscal
year 2005. The vast majority of this increase in PWCS has occurred in
the New York City area with smaller increases in other East Coast
ports.[Footnote 8] As figure 2 shows, the increase came about largely
by adding to the total number of hours these assets were operated. The
total number of resource hours for these assets grew from about 12,000
hours in fiscal year 2002 to a high of about 20,000 the following year.
Figure 2: Resource Hours for Domestic Icebreakers, Fiscal Years 2001
through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[End of figure]
The increase in PWCS hours for domestic icebreakers mainly reflects
their availability during those months when no icebreaking needs to be
done. Icebreaking needs are typically greatest from December 15 to
April 15. Coast Guard officials said that because icebreakers do not
have a primary summertime mission, using them to conduct PWCS missions
during slack periods has not limited the Coast Guard's ability to
conduct routine icebreaking missions.[Footnote 9] Icebreaking hours,
however, did see some marked shifts during this period--most notably a
decrease in fiscal year 2002 followed by a substantial increase in
fiscal year 2003. The decrease in 2002 appears related to two main
factors: a mild winter, during which the Great Lakes region was
virtually free of ice throughout December and most of January, and a
change in the way the Coast Guard accounted for its use of icebreakers.
The Coast Guard does not record resource hours under two mission
categories simultaneously, and prior to the attacks on September 11,
2001, resource hours used to break ice while escorting a vessel with
hazardous cargo would only have been recorded as ice operations. After
the attacks, these same hours could be logged either as PWCS or
icebreaking at the discretion of the vessel's commanding officer. The
increase in ice operations hours for fiscal year 2003 reflected an
unusually severe winter in the Great Lakes.
Increased workloads have placed some icebreakers above the maximum
number of recommended operating hours for the assets. The maximum
recommended operating level, called an "underway hours limit," reflects
maximum use established from planning documents, missions, and
maintenance requirements, and historic use. In particular, the 65-foot
small harbor tug fleet exceeded their underway hours limit from fiscal
years 2001 to 2003 by increasingly more hours, starting with being 10
hours over the underway limit in 2001 and progressing to nearly 2,000
hours over the underway limit in 2003. In contrast, the 140-foot
icebreaking tugs were operated within their underway hours limit from
2001 to 2005.
Coast Guard officials said domestic icebreakers, while not their vessel
of choice for maritime security missions, can perform all PWCS missions
adequately except for shore side patrols.[Footnote 10] The Coast
Guard's 87-foot coastal patrol boats are the preferred assets for PWCS
missions. Commissioned since 1998, these boats can travel at up to 25
knots and have a system that allows the crew to launch and recover
small boats.[Footnote 11] Relative to these vessels, domestic
icebreakers show both advantages and disadvantages (see table 4).
Icebreakers are more capable of operating in cold weather, and their
substantial size provides a significant presence on the waterways, but
they are slower, less able to launch small boats, and pose increased
training challenges for training crews in law enforcement.[Footnote 12]
Table 4: Comparison of Features of the 87-foot Patrol Boats and
Domestic Icebreakers:
Feature: [Empty];
Patrol boats: 87-foot coastal patrol boat;
Domestic icebreakers: 140-foot icebreaking tug;
Domestic icebreakers: 65-foot small harbor tug.
Feature: Maximum speed;
Patrol boats: 25 knots;
Domestic icebreakers: 14.7 knots;
Domestic icebreakers: 10 knots.
Feature: Cold weather capability;
Patrol boats: Limited;
Domestic icebreakers: Yes;
Domestic icebreakers: Yes.
Feature: Date commissioned;
Patrol boats: 1998-2006;
Domestic icebreakers: 1979-1988;
Domestic icebreakers: 1962-1967.
Feature: Requires additional training of crew for maritime security
missions;
Patrol boats: No;
Domestic icebreakers: Yes;
Domestic icebreakers: Yes.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Increase in Homeland Security Missions Is Less Extensive for ATON
Assets:
ATON assets also experienced an increase in use for homeland security
missions after September 11, 2001, but to a much lesser degree than for
domestic icebreakers. Overall, ATON assets were used for several of the
Coast Guard's missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005, but ATON
remained the primary mission, accounting for more than 85 percent of
the fleet's total resource hours for fiscal years 2001 to 2005. Time
spent in PWCS activities increased from 4 percent of total resource
hours in fiscal year 2001 to 10 percent in fiscal year 2002;
since then, PWCS mission hours have steadily decreased (see fig. 3).
Overall, PWCS activities accounted for 6 percent of resource hours
during the period.
Figure 3: Resource Hours for ATON Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 through
2005:
[See PDF for image]
GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[End of figure]
When resource hours are analyzed more closely by type of ATON asset,
there are significant differences in the amount of hours used for the
PWCS mission. The increase in PWCS resource hours came primarily from
cutters (vessels ranging in length from 65 to 225 feet). Overall, ATON
activities account for about 79 percent of total resource hours for the
cutters, compared with about 90 percent for ATON boats (vessels less 65
feet in length). ATON boats were the only vessels that did not have as
much of an increase in PWCS resource hours immediately after the
attacks on September 11, 2001, though their use in PWCS activities did
rise in fiscal year 2003. Among the ATON cutters, the newer cutters
have greater multiple mission capabilities and consequently tend to be
used more often in other missions. For example, ATON cutters acquired
between 1944 and 1976 performed an average of 4 of the Coast Guard's 11
missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005, while the 225-foot
seagoing buoy tender, which the Coast Guard completed the acquisition
of in 2004, was used in all 11 of the Coast Guard's missions in fiscal
years 2004 through 2005.
Available Evidence Indicates Condition of Assets Varies Greatly and
Mixed Impact on Mission Performance:
The available evidence does not give a consistent picture of how usage
trends may be affecting the condition of these assets and, ultimately,
the Coast Guard's ability to meet performance goals for icebreaking and
ATON missions. We analyzed three types of evidence related to
condition--the Coast Guard's primary measure for reporting asset
condition, overall trends in maintenance expenditures on each type of
asset, and a body of anecdotal evidence gathered primarily through
interviews with Coast Guard personnel and site visits to various
installations. The Coast Guard's primary condition measure shows some
assets meeting the operating standard and others falling below it.
However, the current measure for asset condition is not clearly linked
to mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working on developing a
measure that links the two. Trends in maintenance costs and the
anecdotal evidence we gathered tend to indicate that asset conditions
are declining, though not substantially beyond what Coast Guard
officials said they would expect for vessels of this age. Performance
indicators for the icebreaking and ATON missions likewise show mixed
results, with the Coast Guard meeting some performance goals and not
meeting others. In part, these mixed results can be explained by the
many other factors besides asset condition, such as the severity of
weather in any given year.
Current Condition Measure Is Limited and Does Not Show a Clear Pattern
in Asset Condition:
For icebreaking and ATON cutter assets, the Coast Guard's key summary
measure of condition shows mixed results. This measure-- percent of
time free (POTF)--of major casualties has been mixed.[Footnote 13] The
Coast Guard's standard is 72 percent or better. Measured against this
standard for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the various types of
icebreakers and ATON cutters vary considerably.[Footnote 14] As table 5
shows, some assets, such as the 65-foot small harbor icebreaking
tugboat and the 65-and 75-foot river buoy tenders met the standard
nearly every year, while others such as the 140-foot icebreaking
tugboat and the 75-foot, 100-foot, and 160- foot inland construction
tenders met it either not at all or only once during the 5-year period.
Fiscal year 2004 was the worst of the 5 years, with only two of the
eight types of cutters meeting the standard.
Table 5: Condition of Domestic Icebreakers and ATON Cutters as Measured
by Coast Guard's Standard of 72 Percent or More of Time Free of Major
Casualties, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004:
Asset type: Domestic icebreakers: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet.
Asset type: Domestic icebreakers: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Met.
Asset type: ATON cutters: 75-foot river buoy tenders;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet.
Asset type: ATON cutters: 65-foot river buoy tenders;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Met.
Asset type: ATON cutters: 65/100-foot inland buoy tenders;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet.
Asset type: ATON cutters: 75/100/160-foot inland construction tenders;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet.
Asset type: ATON cutters: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet.
Asset type: ATON cutters: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
2000: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2001: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2002: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet;
2003: Domestic icebreakers: Met;
2004: Domestic icebreakers: Did not meet.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Legend:
Filled in circle = Met or exceeded 72-percent standard:
Empty circle = Did not meet 72- percent standard:
[End of table]
The Coast Guard's condition measure for these assets, while
instructive, needs to be viewed with some caution. As we have reported
in our analysis of the condition of the Coast Guard's legacy deepwater
assets, the measure captures only major equipment casualties, which
degrade mission capabilities but does not capture minor equipment
casualties that may also degrade mission capabilities.[Footnote 15] As
such, this measure may underestimate the decline in asset condition.
The Coast Guard has acknowledged the limitations of this measure and is
working on a replacement for it, which will better determine specific
mission impacts.
The POTF condition measure applies to cutters;
the Coast Guard only recently started tracking POTF data for assessing
condition trends on ATON small boats. During the fiscal year 2000
through 2004 period we reviewed, the Coast Guard did not have a
centralized system for tracking the condition of these boats. Its
internal assessment of the condition of the boats was based on two
approaches, as follows:
* For standard boats, which are purchased by Coast Guard headquarters
and have similar capabilities and equipment for all boats of a
particular type, the Coast Guard assessed condition by determining the
boats' remaining service lives through a process referred to as ship
structure and machinery evaluation boards (SSMEB). The SSMEB, which is
conducted 10 years after a boat is commissioned and is repeated at 5-
year intervals, applied to two of the six types of ATON boats we
reviewed.
* For nonstandard boats, which are purchased by individual Coast Guard
units for individual needs, the Coast Guard's assessment was based on
anecdotal information from district boat managers, maintenance
managers, annual boat inspection reports, and site visits. This
approach was used on four of the six types of boats we reviewed.
Using these approaches, the Coast Guard characterized most of these
asset types as in fair to poor condition. By contrast, however, when
the Coast Guard assembled POTF data for a portion of these boats in
fiscal year 2005, the data did not support this assessment. The boats
analyzed had average scores above the Coast Guard's goal of 72 percent.
(App. III provides further details on condition measures for each of
the ATON and domestic icebreaking assets.)
Increasing Maintenance Costs Indicate Possible Condition Issues:
For our second measure--trends in maintenance expenditures--the picture
with regard to condition is more consistent than for our first measure:
maintenance expenditures for domestic icebreaking and ATON cutters are
increasing, even after taking inflation into account. We analyzed three
types of maintenance costs[Footnote 16]:
* Scheduled maintenance costs, which are planned for in advance and
include such things as repainting the vessel;
* Unscheduled maintenance costs, which are for unforeseen emergencies;
and:
* Engineering Logistic Center (ELC) costs, which include fleetwide
projects that require engineering assistance (such as checking for
watertight integrity) and therefore cannot be handled at the unit
level. These projects, such as replacing a generator, help sustain
capability but do not enhance it, according to Coast Guard officials.
While there are some asset-by-asset variations, total maintenance costs
for domestic icebreakers and ATON cutters increased during the period
we examined (fiscal years 2001 through 2005).[Footnote 17] As figure 4
shows, total annual maintenance costs for domestic icebreakers nearly
doubled, from slightly more than $3 million to slightly more than $6
million. The increase came primarily in two of the three categories in
most years--scheduled maintenance costs and ELC costs. Although
maintenance costs are also affected by the amount of funding available
in any given year, according to Coast Guard officials, maintenance
managers have discretion to move some funds to those assets most in
need of maintenance money. Coast Guard officials have also said that
these costs are indicative of condition issues. For example, an ELC
official said that the increase in ELC costs was related to condition
because the money was used for the overhaul of domestic icebreakers. In
addition to the amount of funding available in any given year, these
maintenance costs can also be impacted by a variety of other factors
such as the pace of operations. For example, maintenance costs can be
expected to increase as the pace of operations increases.
Figure 4: Domestic Icebreaking Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years
2001 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: The figures presented above have been adjusted for inflation
using 2005 dollars.
[End of figure]
Total annual cost increases for ATON cutters showed a similar trend,
more than doubling from over $13 million to over $32 million during the
5-year period (see fig. 5). For ATON cutters, cost increases were
greatest in ELC maintenance and unscheduled maintenance. As with
icebreakers, Coast Guard officials considered these expenditures to be
related to asset condition.
Figure 5: ATON Cutter Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years 2001
through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: The figures presented above have been adjusted for inflation
using 2005 dollars.
[End of figure]
Evidence Gathered from Interviews, Site Visits, and Other Records also
Indicate Condition Issues:
Evidence we gathered during our discussions with maintenance personnel,
our visits to various Coast Guard installations, and our review of
other Coast Guard records also pointed to declining condition of a
number of these assets. However, according a program manager who
previously served as a commanding officer on an icebreaker, for some of
the older assets, the decline in condition of those assets has not been
beyond what would be expected of assets 20 years or more in age. During
our interviews and site visits, Coast Guard personnel reported to us
that crew members have had to spend increasingly more time and
resources to troubleshoot and resolve maintenance issues on older
domestic icebreaking and ATON assets. They indicated that because the
systems and parts are outdated compared with the technology and
equipment available today, it can be challenging and time consuming to
diagnose a maintenance issue and find parts or determine what
corrective action to take. For example, the propulsion control system
on the 140-foot icebreaking tugs uses circuit cards that were state-of-
the-art when the tugs were commissioned in the late 1970s to 1980s but
are no longer manufactured today and have been superseded by computer
control systems (see fig. 6). Coast Guard personnel said the lack of a
readily available supply of these parts has forced maintenance
personnel to order custom made parts or refurbish the faulty ones,
increasing the time and money it takes to address maintenance problems.
Finding knowledgeable individuals to identify problems with outdated
equipment is difficult, they said, which further complicates
maintenance. Crews of other assets we visited also confirmed the
difficulty of diagnosing problems and obtaining replacement parts for
other critical subsystems such as the main diesel engines.
Figure 6: Antiquated Circuit Card Rack, Which Serves as Part of the
Main Propulsion Control System, on the 140-foot Icebreaking Tug:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Since at least 2002, the Coast Guard has been on record as saying these
assets are in decline. In a mission needs analysis issued that year,
the Coast Guard concluded that its domestic icebreaking and ATON assets
were affected in varying degrees with respect to safety,
supportability, environmental compliance, and habitability, and that
addressing these issues would require replacing or rehabilitating the
assets.[Footnote 18] The analysis noted that the need to replace or
rehabilitate inland buoy tenders and 45-foot buoy boats had been
identified as early as 1993 but had not yet been addressed.[Footnote
19] It also noted that the 21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boats
and the 55-foot aids-to-navigation boats--most of which have yet to be
replaced--had been extended beyond their projected service lives.
When we asked Coast Guard officials if current usage patterns were
precipitating the decline of these assets, they said that overages can
have an impact on some assets, especially those with more complex
systems and subsystems. The officials said that exceeding planned usage
limits may leave less time to maintain these systems. They said that
the deterioration of an asset and its systems from usage consistently
above the limits would be reflected in periodic engineering
assessments, known as SSMEBs, of the assets. In our site visits, we did
learn of one example in which increased use of assets for security-
related purposes may be affecting condition. The example involves the
140-foot icebreakers, which currently are being used extensively for
security-related activities when they are not engaged in icebreaking
activity. According to Coast Guard personnel, these icebreakers were
designed to operate at maximum power for icebreaking; however, maritime
security missions typically require several hours of idling, which is
detrimental to the engine. Extended periods of idling, they said,
causes oil discharge and sludge build up in the engine and mufflers.
Thus, running assets in ways for which they were not designed could
result in faster degradation of their condition.
Performance Indicators for Icebreaking and ATON Missions Show Mixed
Results:
Against this backdrop of condition indicators, the Coast Guard's
measures of performance for domestic icebreaking and ATON missions show
mixed results, with several indicators showing that mission performance
has been improving or largely unchanging, while at least one other
indicator indicates a decline.
* For domestic icebreaking, the Coast Guard's performance indicator is
the number of days that ice leads to closures of waterways in the Great
Lakes region--the region in which most domestic icebreaking activity
occurs.[Footnote 20] The Coast Guard's performance goal is to have 2 or
fewer closure days during average winters.[Footnote 21] During fiscal
years 2001 through 2005 the Coast Guard met this goal every year but 1.
The exception was fiscal year 2004, when waterways were closed for 4
days. According to Coast Guard officials, however, vessel condition was
not a factor in waterway closures; instead, they were related to an
icebreaker's being diverted to free a stuck vessel and to a response to
a commercial aircraft crash.
* For ATON, the Coast Guard's primary performance indicator is the
number of collisions, allisions, and groundings.[Footnote 22] Since
these events can cause deaths and injuries, environmental and property
damage, and lead to waterway closures that limit commercial and
recreational activity, a decline in this measure is an improvement.
During fiscal years 2001 through 2005, this measure declined--a
positive development (see fig. 7).
Figure 7: Average Number of Collisions, Allisions, and Groundings,
Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[End of figure]
While the Coast Guard's primary ATON performance indicator was showing
improvement, however, an important secondary measure was showing an
adverse effect. This indicator, which measures the probability that an
aid to navigation or a system of aids-to-navigation is performing its
specified function at any randomly chosen time and is expressed as a
percentage of total time, is the leading performance measure used in
managing the ATON program, according to Coast Guard officials.[Footnote
23] This measure has steadily declined since fiscal year 2002 (see
table 6), and since a smaller percentage means fewer aids are
available, a decline in this measure is an adverse development. Coast
Guard officials said some of this decline was attributable to the
condition of ATON cutters and boats for servicing the navigational
aids, but they were not able to estimate how much of the decline could
be attributed to this cause.[Footnote 24]
Table 6: Availability of Navigational Aids, Fiscal Years 2001 through
2005:
Fiscal year: 2001;
Percent of aids available: 98.3.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Percent of aids available: 98.4.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Percent of aids available: 98.2.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Percent of aids available: 97.6.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Percent of aids available: 97.3.
Source: Coast Guard.
Note: Coast Guard's goal is 99.7 percent of all aids to navigation
available.
[End of table]
In other work, we have noted that the Coast Guard's performance
indicators can be affected by multiple factors and that there are
challenges to using such measures in linking resources to
results.[Footnote 25] The ability to meet icebreaking goals, for
example, can be affected by the severity of the winter. In fact, when
the Coast Guard met its goal for waterway closures in fiscal year 2005,
Coast Guard officials attributed the result in part to less severe
average ice conditions than in previous years. Similarly, the ability
to keep navigational aids in working order can be adversely affected by
such uncontrollable factors as the severity of a hurricane or winter
storm season.
The Coast Guard has launched a number of initiatives designed to
address challenges in linking resources to results of these
missions.[Footnote 26] These initiatives followed program assessments
conducted by the Office of Management and Budget, which completed an
assessment of the ATON program in 2002 and the domestic icebreaking
program in 2004.[Footnote 27] For the ATON program, the assessment
determined that the program did not demonstrate results and recommended
that the program have specific long-term performance goals that focus
on outcomes. The assessment of the domestic icebreaking program
determined that the program was effective, but that more ambitious
performance targets needed to be set. In response to these findings,
the Coast Guard has worked to set long-term performance targets and
develop new measurement frameworks to align with OMB's recommendations.
To Continue to Achieve the Missions of Its ATON and Domestic
Icebreaking Assets, the Coast Guard Has Taken Actions, Made Proposals,
and Studied Outsourcing Possibilities:
The Coast Guard has considered or proposed a wide variety of actions to
continue to achieve the missions that its domestic icebreaking and ATON
assets perform and is moving ahead with several of them. Actions under
way include developing new ways to measure asset condition, manage boat
and cutter maintenance, and make choices about which maintenance
projects to conduct. The Coast Guard has also acquired some new buoy
tenders and a new icebreaker, though the bulk of its icebreaking and
ATON fleet remains at or beyond projected service lives. Coast Guard
officials stated that to determine whether and when to replace or
rehabilitate aging assets, factors such as the assets' condition and
trends in maintenance costs, among other things, are taken into
account. Proposals to systematically rehabilitate or replace these
assets have been denied or deferred by DHS or the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), apparently due to competition from initiatives such
as the $24-billion Deepwater project for replacing or renovating other
Coast Guard vessels and aircraft. In response, the Coast Guard has
separated the proposals into smaller parts and is trying to fund some
projects from within the Coast Guard's budget. Finally, the Coast Guard
studied what mission activities make the best business case for
outsourcing of functions to the private sector, but states that
potential disadvantages to outsourcing exist such as loss of
capabilities and inability to retain personnel.
Actions Have Been Taken to Manage Assets and Acquire Some New Ones:
Three main steps to manage assets are under way, and several
acquisitions have been completed in both the icebreaking and ATON
fleets.
Coast Guard Is Developing a More Robust Condition Measure:
The Coast Guard is working on the development of a new measure to track
an asset's condition. As mentioned above, the Coast Guard's previous
measure, percent of time free of major casualties, did not capture the
extent to which equipment casualties degraded mission capabilities.
Called "percent of time fully mission capable," this new measure is
intended to more directly link a cutter's condition to its mission
capability. Developed after our examination of the condition of
deepwater assets, this measure will be used for ATON and domestic
icebreaking assets as well.[Footnote 28] For the new measure, the Coast
Guard is developing codes that rank the degree of importance of each
piece of a cutter's equipment to each mission that the cutter could
perform. The Coast Guard plans to use these codes in casualty reports,
providing engineers and operators with information about the impact of
equipment casualties on each possible mission. This information will
then be used in calculating the condition measure for each cutter class
and mission. This information would allow Coast Guard officials to
determine, for example, the degree of icebreaking capability of its
domestic icebreaking fleet at any given time. Coast Guard officials
said they expect final approval of this measure this year.
Coast Guard Is Implementing New Approaches to Manage ATON Boat and
Cutter Maintenance:
The Coast Guard is implementing a centralized boat maintenance
initiative to improve the management of its boat fleet, which includes
many ATON boats. In contrast to the previous approach in which local
boat operators managed boat maintenance and oversaw the spending of
maintenance funds, the new initiative places management of boat
maintenance and expenditures with naval engineers. According to the
Coast Guard, the key advantages of this initiative include standardized
maintenance practices for the boats, better oversight of maintenance
funding, and enhanced tracking and analysis of casualties. In addition,
it should improve the tracking of the condition of the Coast Guard's
small boat fleet, which has lacked a centralized tracking system. Known
as Centralized Boat Maintenance Management, this initiative is expected
to be rolled out Coast Guard-wide by fiscal year 2008 if adequate
resources and personnel are available.
Since 2002, the Coast Guard has also been gradually implementing a
maintenance approach called "condition based maintenance" for select
subsystems and parts of its newer coastal and seagoing buoy tending
cutters.[Footnote 29] Under this approach, the condition of a part or
subsystem, such as the main diesel engine, is evaluated or assessed at
regular intervals to determine whether it needs to be replaced or have
maintenance performed. Parts or systems would be replaced or receive
maintenance only if their condition showed excessive wear or did not
perform at an acceptable level. Under the previous approach,
maintenance occurred at time-based intervals even if the part showed no
excessive wear or performed acceptably. The key advantage of the
change, according to Coast Guard officials, is reduced costs. For
example, the Coast Guard estimated that it reduced drydock costs
related to maintaining newer coastal and seagoing buoy tenders $2
million in fiscal year 2005. The Coast Guard is considering expanding
the use of this maintenance approach to other subsystems of the newer
buoy tending assets and the new Great Lakes icebreaker commissioned in
2006.
Coast Guard Is Developing a Tool to Better Prioritize Upgrades and
Maximize Asset Capabilities:
In 2002, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a long-term
strategy to set and assess levels of mission performance.[Footnote 30]
We found this was an important step to take because it links
investments to asset capabilities and mission priorities so that the
Coast Guard can better decide how limited budget dollars should be
spent. The Coast Guard has been working to apply the principles behind
such a strategy to (1) better prioritize the projects needed to upgrade
assets such as aging ATON and domestic icebreakers and (2) obtain the
greatest overall mix of capabilities for its assets within its budget
in order to maximize mission performance. The tool it is developing is
called the Capital Asset Management Strategy (CAMS).
CAMS is designed to analyze the capability trade-offs for upgrades and
maintenance projects across asset classes, allowing the Coast Guard to
determine which combination of projects will provide the most
capability for the dollars invested. These analyses take into account
such factors as asset condition, the asset's importance to specific
missions, and the relative importance of missions. The Coast Guard
continues to refine CAMS and expects to have it in full use beginning
with the budget for fiscal year 2009. The recommendations stemming from
CAMS are intended to augment the information currently provided to
decision makers in the budget development process.
Coast Guard Acquired Some New Assets:
Since the 1990s, the Coast Guard has been able to replace buoy tenders
with new assets that represent about 15 percent of its current ATON
fleet. From 1996 to 2004, the Coast Guard commissioned 14 new 175-foot
coastal buoy tenders and 16 new 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders to
replace an aging fleet of 11 coastal and 27 seagoing buoy tenders that
were built between 1942 and 1971. The new buoy tenders have improved
capabilities such as the following:
* A computerized positioning system that automates the task of holding
the vessel in place while working on a navigational aid. Previously,
this task had to be done manually, requiring the crew to constantly
monitor and maintain the vessel's position, sometimes for up to 10
hours at a time. The system relieves the crew of this task and reduces
safety concerns associated with crew fatigue.
* Bow and stern thrusters to enhance the vessels' maneuverability and
improve the crew's ability to maintain position.
* Hydraulic chain stoppers and winches to reduce the number of crew
members required to do the work and enhance safety (see fig. 8).
* Accommodations that allow for dual gender crews, increasing the Coast
Guard's ability to allow women to serve on the vessels.
Figure 8: Chain-in Haul Winch:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
These and other features also allow the newer buoy tenders to carry out
other missions, according to a Coast Guard official involved in their
design and acquisition. Their size, stability, and maneuverability are
useful for such missions as search and rescue, homeland security, and
law enforcement, and they have specific capabilities for dealing with
other duties as skimming oil or mounting machine guns for security
patrols. With their sizeable fuel tanks and storage capacity, they can
also serve as logistics support platforms to restock vessels involved
in drug interdiction and other activities. For 7 weeks in 2005, for
example, one tender served as a supply platform for a Coast Guard
vessel conducting drug interdiction patrols. According to Coast Guard
officials, this enabled the patrol vessel to remain on patrol in the
area for a longer period of time than it would have otherwise with its
limited fuel and storage capacities.
Besides the buoy tenders, the Coast Guard commissioned a new 240-foot
multimission icebreaker in 2006 to replace a 62-year-old icebreaker and
an aging buoy tender on the Great Lakes. The new icebreaker has
enhanced icebreaking capabilities and the same ATON capabilities as the
newer seagoing buoy tenders, enabling it to work on navigational aids
in ice conditions as well as during other times of the year when no
icebreaking is needed.
Additional Proposals to Rehabilitate or Replace Aging Assets Remain
Largely Unfunded:
Despite the new acquisitions, more than half of the assets in the
domestic icebreaking and ATON fleet have reached or are nearing the end
of their service lives. Coast Guard officials stated that they use a
process that considers information such as how close the assets are to
the end of their design life, the condition of the assets as determined
by periodic assessments, and trends in maintenance costs, among other
things to determine whether to rehabilitate or replace these aging
assets. This information is used to identify the asset types that are
most in need of replacement or major maintenance, and therefore should
be given greater consideration in maintenance planning and budgeting.
In 2002, the Coast Guard proposed options for systematically
rehabilitating or replacing 164 cutters and boats in these
fleets.[Footnote 31] According to Coast Guard officials, these options
were proposed after determining that the age, condition, and cost of
operating these assets would diminish the capability of the Coast Guard
to carry out ATON and domestic icebreaking missions over time without
rehabilitation or replacement of some or all of the assets. In 2004, it
completed a preliminary analysis of four approaches, including the
status quo--that is, maintaining the existing fleet. This analysis
provided an estimate of the total life-cycle costs for each approach
over a 33-year period from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
2037.[Footnote 32] (See table 7 for a description of each approach.)
Estimated costs ranged as high as $8.5 billion;
however, Coast Guard officials emphasized that these estimates were
preliminary and are not reliable. As a result, we are not reporting
these numbers in detail.
Table 7: Approaches to Replace or Rehabilitate ATON and Domestic
Icebreaking Assets under the Integrated ATON Platform Modernization
Project:
Status quo: The existing fleet of ATON and domestic icebreaking assets
would receive maintenance as needed to maintain current operations.
Rehabilitation: Nearly all existing assets[A] would undergo major
rehabilitation projects whose effect is expected to last 15 years for
most vessels after which another major rehabilitation would be
required.
Replace: All existing assets would be replaced with a system of new
standardized assets.
Rehabilitate/replace: Depending on the condition of certain asset
types, the assets would be either replaced with new assets or
rehabilitated.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[A] Under this alternative, trailerable aids-to-navigation boats and
the 45-foot buoy boats would be replaced.
[End of table]
No funds have been allocated to pursue this project further, apparently
due to competing funding requests for replacing or rehabilitating other
Coast Guard assets. According to a Coast Guard program official,
although resource proposals to carry out this project were made during
the budget planning processes for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the
requests were either deferred or denied by DHS or the Office of
Management and Budget. Coast Guard officials involved in the program
said they were not aware of the exact reasons why the requests were
terminated or deferred. The officials said that the funding demands
from other major Coast Guard programs already underway (such as the
Deepwater program for replacing or rehabilitating aircraft and cutters
with greater at-sea capability) that likely had higher priority in the
competition for limited resources combined with the large scope and
size of the proposed project, may have prevented the project from being
funded.
Without specific funding to move the project forward, the Coast Guard
has attempted to break the project into smaller components and pursue
potential funding from within the Coast Guard's budget, focusing on the
assets most in need of maintenance or replacement. In February 2006,
the Coast Guard began a project to replace its fleet of 80 trailerable
aids-to-navigation boats with new boats that have enhanced capabilities
to do ATON work as well as other missions.[Footnote 33] The enhanced
capabilities include equipment to lift navigational aids out of the
water for service, more deck space for working on these aids, an
elevated work platform for working on aids that are high in the water,
and faster speeds to reduce transit times. The Coast Guard intends for
the new boats to be more multimission capable. For example, their added
speed and deck space will help with search and rescue missions, and
they will have gun mounts for use in law enforcement or maritime
security missions.
According to a Coast Guard official, this acquisition would cost
approximately $14.4 million if all 80 boats are purchased and would
bring on new boats over a 5-year period as funds allow.[Footnote 34]
The Coast Guard official responsible for the project said the Coast
Guard intends to make the purchases using a funding stream appropriated
for the maintenance of nonstandard boats that can be allocated to the
boats with the most pressing maintenance or recapitalization needs.
Availability of these funds, however, depends on the condition and
maintenance needs of other nonstandard boats; if this funding has to be
applied to meet other needs, such as unanticipated problems, it may not
be available for purchasing these boats.
Separate from this effort to acquire new trailerable boats, the Coast
Guard has made a request as part of the budget process to begin
rehabilitating aging river buoy and construction tenders. This project,
which will focus on rehabilitating the systems within the engine rooms
of the assets, is estimated to cost approximately $75 million. The
Coast Guard plans to include this project in future budget requests.
Coast Guard officials indicated that they were submitting this request
because these assets were determined to be in the worst condition.
Study Identified Outsourcing Possibilities but May Face Disadvantages
to Implement:
In 2004, the Coast Guard examined possibilities for outsourcing
missions in response to an OMB assessment of the ATON program.[Footnote
35] As a result of that assessment, Coast Guard and OMB officials
agreed to study which ATON activities make the best business case for
being performed by contractors outside of the Coast Guard with minimal
impact on the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its other
missions.[Footnote 36] The subsequent study, completed in April 2004,
found that inland construction tenders spent most of their resource
hours on the ATON mission with minimal impact or use in other missions
and provided one of the best opportunities for further study of
outsourcing.[Footnote 37] However, the study did not quantify the
potential benefits that could be derived from outsourcing these
activities.
In August 2006 the Coast Guard completed an analysis as to whether ATON
functions could feasibly be outsourced, and which parts, if any, were
inherently governmental in nature.[Footnote 38] The objective of this
analysis was to compare the Coast Guard's inland construction and river
buoy tender operating costs with representative private sector marine
industry costs and make recommendations regarding the feasibility to
commercially support and operate the inspection, servicing, and
contingency response capability of the ATON mission and assets.
According to Coast Guard officials, the results will be incorporated
into future acquisition plans for replacing the current capabilities
represented by inland construction tenders and river buoy tenders. This
Coast Guard analysis was finalized after we had completed our audit
work. Therefore, we were unable to obtain and review the study in time
for the final preparation of this report.
Although possibilities for outsourcing were identified, outsourcing
also carries potential disadvantages, according to Coast Guard program
officials. Potential disadvantages they mentioned include the
following:
* Outsourcing could lead loss of "surge" capability--that is, the
capacity to respond to emergencies or unusual situations. In part, this
capability may be needed within the ATON or icebreaking mission itself,
such as when a hurricane or ice destroys or damages a large number of
navigation aids. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard
officials stated that because the Coast Guard had ATON assets such as
construction tenders, crews were able to begin working immediately to
repair damaged aids and get the waterways open to maritime traffic
again. This "surge" capability may also be needed for other missions,
such as occurs when ATON assets can be used to support search and
rescue efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example,
some ATON assets provided logistical support for first responders or
transported stranded individuals.
* Outsourcing may disrupt the Coast Guard's personnel structure and
weaken the agency's ability to attract and retain personnel.
Specifically, they are concerned that outsourcing would likely reduce
opportunities that provide important experience for personnel to
advance in their careers and eliminate positions that typically have
more predictable work schedules than positions in some of the other
Coast Guard's missions.
Concluding Observations:
The Coast Guard has been using its domestic icebreaking vessels and its
ATON assets to a lesser extent, to accommodate the need for additional
homeland security activities in the post-September 11 environment, and
it is doing so thus far largely without curtailing ATON or domestic
icebreaking activities or unduly straining these assets past their
designed workloads. The available evidence also indicates that despite
some decline in the condition of some asset types, the Coast Guard's
ability to meet its aids-to-navigation and domestic icebreaking
missions, as indicated by mixed outcomes of its key mission performance
measures, has not shown clear trends of decline. Efforts by Coast Guard
personnel to troubleshoot operational problems and to take other steps
to keep assets operating appear to be one reason mission performance
has not been further affected, and many other factors, such as the
harshness of a winter or the severity of storm damage on navigation
buoys and beacons, can also affect performance results. For the
present, however, the impact of these additional mission
responsibilities does not appear to be a cause for alarm.
That said, the future of these assets bears close watching. The fact
that many of the assets have or will be approaching the end of their
design service lives could mean the need for rehabilitated or new
assets may become more pressing in the future. Another issue is whether
current operations, both in level and types of usage, are adding to
these costs and incidents beyond what the Coast Guard would normally
expect. For example, operating domestic icebreakers beyond their
underway hours limit--could potentially accelerate the level of
decline. If this is the case, using these assets to meet security
missions could be meeting the Coast Guard's immediate needs but
accelerating the need for replacement or rehabilitation. According to
Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard's attempt to systematically
rehabilitate or replace its ATON and domestic icebreaking fleet was
proposed at a time when competing demands likely caused postponements
of requests for the needed funds. These competing demands, reflected
largely in the Coast Guard's expensive and lengthy Deepwater asset
replacement program, will continue for some time, as will other
pressures on the federal budget. The Coast Guard is moving to improve
the process it uses to set budget priorities through actions such as
its new tool to link asset condition and funding decisions to better
identify the projects that will provide the most capability with the
limited funds that are available. Given that many of these actions are
recent and need a chance to work, it is too early to evaluate their
effectiveness. However, even as the Coast Guard takes steps to
determine how best to replace or rehabilitate its assets, limited
budgetary resources combined with other competing asset replacement
programs already in process will likely continue to challenge the Coast
Guard to find sufficient resources to carry out the options identified.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of
Homeland Security and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this
report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of
Homeland Security; the Commandant of the Coast Guard; and other
interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines the time spent by the U.S. Coast Guard's domestic
icebreaking and ATON assets on various missions, the condition of these
assets, and the actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to
achieve the missions of these assets. Our work focused on three key
questions: (1) What are the recent trends in the amount of time these
assets have performed various missions? (2) What is the condition of
the Coast Guard's ATON and domestic icebreaking assets and how has
their condition impacted the performance of their primary missions? (3)
What actions has the Coast Guard taken to continue to achieve the
missions of its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets?
In identifying trends in the amount of time spent on missions and the
impact of these trends, we analyzed data from the Coast Guard's
Abstract of Operations (AOPS) database, which tracks resource hours for
each asset. For each asset type within our scope, we examined trends in
the number of resource hours spent between fiscal years 2001 and 2005
conducting each of the Coast Guard's missions.[Footnote 39] To
determine the reliability of this data, we (1) reviewed the results of
previous reliability assessments we have conducted of this data for
other work and (2) confirmed with the AOPS program manager that the
data and the manner in which it is managed has not changed since the
previous assessment that would affect its reliability. We determined
that the data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We supplemented our analysis of these resource hours with
documentation from interviews with asset program managers and crews of
ATON and domestic icebreaking assets.
In assessing the condition of the assets during fiscal years 2001 to
2005, we analyzed what Coast Guard officials identified as the best
available condition measures. We obtained concurrence from the Office
of Naval Engineering and the Office of Cutter Forces that the
appropriate measures to use for the condition of assets were percent of
time free of major casualties, scheduled/unscheduled/Engineering
Logistics Center maintenance costs, and estimated deferred maintenance
costs. To determine the reliability of this data, we (1) reviewed the
results of previous reliability assessments we have conducted of this
data for other work and (2) examined responses the Coast Guard provided
to a questionnaire we sent requesting updated information on the
administration and oversight of the databases. We determined that the
data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We
supplemented our analysis of these measures with documentation from
internal Coast Guard reports, as well as from interviews of asset
program managers at Coast Guard headquarters and crewmembers of the
assets located in the field. In addition to talking with crewmembers,
we directly observed the condition of various assets during our site
visits to Alameda, Calif; Bayonne, N.J; Buchanan, Tenn; Baltimore, Md;
Mobile, Ala; Seattle, Wash; Sault St. Marie, Mich; and Atlantic Beach,
N.C. These assets were selected to provide diversity in terms of type
and age of asset and geographic location. In addition, we interviewed
Coast Guard officials with the Area Commands in Alameda, Calif., and
Portsmouth, Va., as well as in Districts 5 and 13.
To determine the actions that the Coast Guard has undertaken to
continue to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic icebreaking
assets, we interviewed officials with the Coast Guard's Engineering and
Logistics Center, Engineering and Logistics Directorate, Office of
Naval Engineering, Office of Boat Forces, and Office of Cutter Forces.
To obtain information on newer assets the Coast Guard has acquired, we
also made site visits to interview personnel and observe the assets in
San Francisco, Calif; Atlantic Beach, N.C; Baltimore, Md; Cheboygan,
Mich; and Mobile, Ala. To determine what proposals the Coast Guard has
made to rehabilitate or replace its ATON and domestic icebreaking
assets, we reviewed Coast Guard project documents and interviewed
officials at Coast Guard headquarters. We did not, however, verify the
accuracy of the cost estimates provided for those proposals. Finally,
to determine the work the Coast Guard has done to study the outsourcing
of ATON and domestic icebreaking mission activities and the potential
impact of outsourcing those activities, we interviewed Coast Guard
officials at headquarters as well as officials and crew members in the
field. We also reviewed the completed business case analysis of
outsourcing opportunities for ATON mission activities.
We performed our review from July 2005 to August 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of ATON and Domestic Icebreaking
Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005:
Appendix II provides information on the number of resource hours Coast
Guard ATON and domestic icebreaking assets have spent on various Coast
Guard missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005. The Coast Guard
maintains information, on a program-by-program basis, about how
resources, such as vessels, boats, and aircraft, are used. Each hour
that these resources are used is called a resource hour. Resource hours
are accumulated and reported by quarter and represent the time spent by
the Coast Guard's major assets to conduct its programs. The table 8
shows by asset type, the hours ATON and domestic icebreaking assets
have spent on each of Coast Guard's missions for each fiscal year, from
2001 through 2005. The percentage of each asset types' total fiscal
year resource hours that these hours represent is shown in parenthesis.
Table 8: Resource Hour Usage and Percent, by Asset Type and Mission
Program, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005:
225-foot seagoing buoy tenders:
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 80 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 4,366 (61%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 447 (6%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 918 (13%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 171 (2%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 58 (1%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 948 (13%);
Homeland security: Defense: 216 (3%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 407 (4%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 5,139 (48%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 1,066 (10%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 254 (2%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 3,547 (33%);
Homeland security: Defense: 200 (2%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 75 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 48 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 9,189 (55%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 65 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 24 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 1,774 (11%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 33 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 181 (1%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 2,113 (13%);
Homeland security: Defense: 3,170 (19%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 435 (2%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 13 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 13,039 (59%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 746 (3%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 78 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 2,852 (13%);
Homeland security: Drug: 40 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 293 (1%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 1,617 (7%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 1,363 (6%);
Homeland security: Defense: 1,763 (8%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 631 (3%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 195 (1%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 13,118 (62%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 622 (3%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 1,171 (6%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 1,606 (8%);
Homeland security: Drug: 234 (1%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 765 (4%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 175 (1%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 618 (3%);
Homeland security: Defense: 1,962 (9%).
175-foot coastal buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 129 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 12,158 (87%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 82 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 35 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 339 (2%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 56 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 3 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 1,202 (9%);
Homeland security: Defense: 7 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 36 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 10,735 (74%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 32 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 216 (1%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 10 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 3,389 (23%);
Homeland security: Defense: 21 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 122 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 28 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 12,422 (78%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 478 (3%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 17 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 1 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 298 (2%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 2,345 (15%);
Homeland security: Defense: 265 (2%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 4 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 13,402 (85%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 446 (3%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 16 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: DRug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 159 (1%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 358 (2%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 1,341 (9%);
Homeland security: Defense: 25 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 136 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 14,375 (90%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 120 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 30 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 34 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 585 (4%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 749 (5%);
Homeland security: Defense: 18 (0%).
160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 19 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 1 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 12,929 (99%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 3 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 165 (1%);
Homeland security: Defense: 5 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 4 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 13,430 (90%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 9 (0%);
Homeland security: 1,403 (9%);
Homeland security: 73 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 2 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 119 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 13,896 (92%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 97 (1%);
Homeland security: 1,034 (7%);
Homeland security: 8 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 5 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 41 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 13,510 (90%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 1,368 (9%);
Homeland security: 11 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 1 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 17,272 (93%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 1,296 (7%);
Homeland security: 12 (0%).
140-foot icebreaking tugs.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 52 (1%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 57 (1%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 2,031 (28%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 4,064 (55%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 316 (4%);
Homeland security: Drug: 13 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 47 (1%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 681 (9%);
Homeland security: Defense: 121 (2%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 93 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 166 (3%);
Non-homeland security: 1,071 (19%);
Non-homeland security: 1,174 (21%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 33 (1%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 158 (3%);
Homeland security: 12 (0%);
Homeland security: 2,849 (50%);
Homeland security: 225- foot seagoing buoy tenders: 89 (2%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 273 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 158 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 952 (9%);
Non-homeland security: 4,770 (43%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 19 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 120 (1%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 4,695 (42%);
Homeland security: 225- foot seagoing buoy tenders: 72 (1%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 84 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 264 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 1,081 (10%);
Non-homeland security: 3,749 (35%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 343 (3%);
Homeland security: 84 (1%);
Homeland security: 283 (3%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 4,655 (44%);
Homeland security: 225- foot seagoing buoy tenders: 93 (1%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 159 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 116 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 732 (8%);
Non-homeland security: 2,866 (30%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 602 (6%);
Homeland security: 133 (1%);
Homeland security: 27 (0%);
Homeland security: 7 (0%);
Homeland security: 4,795 (51%);
Homeland security: 225- foot seagoing buoy tenders: 22 (0%).
100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 22 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 4,735 (99%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 13 0%;
Non-homeland security: MEP: 3 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Defense: 1 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 5 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 43 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 3,234 (89%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 363 (10%);
Homeland security: 7 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 57 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 6 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 3,336 (95%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 24 (1%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 84 (2%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 4 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 38 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 2,250 (98%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 7 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 42 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 2,364 (98%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
75-foot river buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 9 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 13,325 (99%);
Non-homeland security: Ice ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Defense: 78 (1%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 31 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 14,406 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 14 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 10 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 1 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 15,022 (99%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 70 (0%);
Homeland security: 17 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 1 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 12,109 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 17 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 4 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 12,448 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 17 (0%).
65-foot river buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 6 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 6,389 (99%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 2 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 27 (0%);
Homeland security: Defense: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 8 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 6,087 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 6 (0%);
Homeland security: 4 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 5 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 6,385 (99%);
Non-homeland security: 9 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 10 (0%);
Homeland security: 27 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 1 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 14 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 6,771 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 8 (0%);
Homeland security: 3 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 2 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 6,671 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 4 (0%).
65-foot small harbor tugs.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 95 (2%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 365 (6%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 1,372 (23%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 1,401 (24%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 188 (3%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 94 (2%);
Homeland security: Drug: 2 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 627 (11%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 1,345 (23%);
Homeland security: Defense: 369 (6%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 77 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 114 (2%);
Non-homeland security: 1,558 (23%);
Non-homeland security: 449 (7%);
Non-homeland security: 2 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 10 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 721 (11%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 3,795 (56%);
Homeland security: 83 (1%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 80; (1%);
Non-homeland security: 17 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 962 (11%);
Non-homeland security: 2,269 (26%);
Non-homeland security: 1 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 800 (9%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 4,695 (53%);
Homeland security: 28 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 62 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 64 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 755 (12%);
Non-homeland security: 1,586 (25%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 13 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 978 (16%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 2,823 (45%);
Homeland security: 22 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 26 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 598 (10%);
Non-homeland security: 1,254 (21%);
Non-homeland security: 1,092 (18%);
Non-homeland security: 376 (6%);
Non-homeland security: 260 (4%);
Homeland security: 179 (3%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 2,043 (34%);
Homeland security: 162 (3%).
64-foot aids-to-navigation boats.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 1,216 (100%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Defense: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 635 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 747 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 580 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 1,109 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
63-foot aids-to-navigation boat.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 199 (100%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Defense: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 7 (6%);
Non-homeland security: 4 (4%);
Non-homeland security: 98 (90%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 179 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 195 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 197 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
55-foot aids-to-navigation boats.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 100 (2%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 17 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 4,182 (94%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 12 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 53 (1%);
Homeland security: Drug: 12 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 19 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 75 (2%);
Homeland security: Defense: 2 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 155 (3%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 80 (2%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 3,985 (87%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 35 (1%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 24 (1%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 301 (7%);
Homeland security: Defense: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 45 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 3,820 (74%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 9 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 20 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 320 (6%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 970 (19%);
Homeland security: 13 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 45 (1%);
Non-homeland security: 5 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 3,643 (91%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 211 (5%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 89 (2%);
Homeland security: 3 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 196 (4%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 4,338 (92%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 80 (2%);
Homeland security: 86 (2%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
49-foot stern loading buoy boats.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 23 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 9,477 (87%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 8 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 4 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 17 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 1,373 (13%);
Homeland security: Defense: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 18 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 14 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 6,863 (91%);
Non-homeland security: 3 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 30 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 638 (8%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 5 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 8 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 8,079 (89%);
Non-homeland security: 11 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 14 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 852 (9%);
Homeland security: 94 (1%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 7 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 7,883 (96%);
Non-homeland security: 26 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 18 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 283 (3%);
Homeland security: 31 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 18 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 6,588 (96%);
Non-homeland security: 19 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 9 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 233 (3%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
45-foot buoy boats.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 1,024 (100%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: LMR: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: Defense: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 494 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 248 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 373 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 526 (100%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non- homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boats.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Non-homeland security: SAR: 48 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MS: 9 (0%);
Non-homeland security: ATON: 25,429 (98%);
Non-homeland security: Ice Ops: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: MEP: 12 (0%);
Non-homeland security: LMR: 1 (0%);
Homeland security: Drug: 1 (0%);
Homeland security: Other LE: 64 (0%);
Homeland security: Migrant: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: PWCS: 401 (2%);
Homeland security: Defense: 2 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2002;
Non-homeland security: 23 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 2 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 23,798 (97%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 79 (0%);
Homeland security: 7 (0%);
Homeland security: 590;
(2%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2003;
Non-homeland security: 55 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 4 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 20,961 (96%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 29 (0%);
Homeland security: 4 (0%);
Homeland security: 687 (3%);
Homeland security: 7 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2004;
Non-homeland security: 52 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 12 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 22,616 (94%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 62 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 1347 (6%);
Homeland security: 7 (0%).
Fiscal year: 2005;
Non-homeland security: 89 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 20,105 (97%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 5 (0%);
Non-homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 26 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%);
Homeland security: 407 (2%);
Homeland security: 0 (0%).
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Notes: Due to rounding, percentages may not add to 100 percent for each
fiscal year.
The Coast Guard's mission categories are as follows:
SAR: Search and Rescue:
MS: Marine Safety:
ATON: Aids-to-Navigation:
Ice ops: Ice operations such as domestic icebreaking:
MEP: Marine Environmental Protection:
LMR: Living Marine Resources:
Drug: Illegal Drug Interdiction:
Migrant: Migrant Interdiction:
Other LE: Foreign Fisheries Enforcement:
PWCS: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security:
Defense: Defense Readiness:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Condition Measure of ATON and Domestic Icebreaking
Assets, Fiscal Years 2000 to 2005:
Condition Measure for ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Cutters:
Appendix III provides information on the condition of the Coast Guard's
ATON and domestic icebreaking assets. The Coast Guard's key summary
measure of condition--percent of time free (POTF)--of major casualties
shows a mixed picture of condition for ATON and domestic icebreaking
cutters. However, the measure captures only major equipment casualties,
which degrade mission capabilities but does not capture minor equipment
casualties that may also degrade mission capabilities. As such, this
measure may underestimate the decline in asset condition. The Coast
Guard has acknowledged the limitations of this measure and is working
on a replacement for it. Because the Coast Guard is in the process of
developing a new condition metric and did not have fiscal year 2005
data available, our analysis covers fiscal years 2000 through 2004. See
table 9 for individual POTF figures for the ATON and domestic
icebreaking cutter assets for fiscal years 2000 through 2004.
Table 9: Percent of Time Free of Major Casualties for ATON and Domestic
Icebreaking Cutters, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004:
225-foot seagoing buoy tenders:
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 100.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 16.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 49.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 55.
175-foot coastal buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 86.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 78.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 64.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 66.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 65.
160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 86.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 53.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 67.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 52.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 59.
140-foot icebreaking tugs.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 69.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 50.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 67.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 45.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 47.
100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 97.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 97.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 91.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 87.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 69.
75-foot river buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 92.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 86.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 77.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 83.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 71.
65-foot river buoy tenders.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 100.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 71.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 75.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 90.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 89.
65-foot small harbor tugs.
Fiscal year: 2000;
POTF: 89.
Fiscal year: 2001;
POTF: 70.
Fiscal year: 2002;
POTF: 83.
Fiscal year: 2003;
POTF: 76.
Fiscal year: 2004;
POTF: 82.
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of table]
Condition Measure for ATON Boats:
The Coast Guard has less data for ATON boats, with POTF figures
available for only fiscal year 2005. Based on these figures most boats
appear to be in fair to poor condition. In addition to these figures,
the Coast Guard has performed an internal assessment of condition using
two approaches, one for standard and another for nonstandard boats. For
standard boats the Coast Guard assessed condition through a process
referred to as ship structure and machinery evaluation boards (SSMEB).
While, for nonstandard boats the Coast Guard assessed condition by
obtaining anecdotal evidence from district managers, maintenance
managers, annual boat inspection reports, and site visits. This
internal assessment, however, seems to further support our original
finding that the Coast Guard's POTF figure may be underestimating
condition. As you will see in table 10 below, while the 45-foot buoy
boat and 21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boat had POTF
percentages above 90 percent, their internal assessment of condition
was rated at poor.
Table 10: Condition of ATON Boats as Evidenced by POTF and Internal
Coast Guard Assessment:
Asset: Standard boats: 55-foot aids-to-navigation boat;
POTF for FY 2005: Standard boats: 90.1%;
Coast Guard assessment of condition: Standard boats: Fair.
Asset: Standard boats: 49-foot buoy stern loading boat;
POTF for FY 2005: Standard boats: 88.1%;
Coast Guard assessment of condition: Standard boats: Good.
Asset: Nonstandard boats: 64-foot aids-to-navigation boat;
POTF for FY 2005: Standard boats: 88.6%;
Coast Guard assessment of condition: Standard boats: Good.
Asset: Nonstandard boats: 63-foot aids-to-navigation boat;
POTF for FY 2005: Standard boats: 79.5%;
Coast Guard assessment of condition: Standard boats: Fair.
Asset: Nonstandard boats: 45-foot buoy boat;
POTF for FY 2005: Standard boats: 97.1%;
Coast Guard assessment of condition: Standard boats: Poor.
Asset: Nonstandard boats: 21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boat;
POTF for FY 2005: Standard boats: 90.7%;
Coast Guard assessment of condition: Standard boats: Poor.
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Maintenance Trends of ATON Cutter and Domestic Icebreaking
Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005:
Maintenance Trends:
Appendix IV provides information on the maintenance costs spent on the
Coast Guard's ATON cutter and domestic icebreaking assets during fiscal
years 2001 to 2005. Maintenance cost data for domestic icebreakers and
ATON cutters shows a consistent increasing trend. The cost figures are
broken out by scheduled (planned maintenance), unscheduled (unforeseen
maintenance), and Engineering Logistic Center (ELC) (fleetwide projects
that require engineering assistance) amounts, which allow for a more
specific analysis as to the type of increase being incurred. Table 11
shows the individual maintenance cost data, adjusted for inflation
using 2005 dollars, for ATON cutters and domestic icebreakers for
fiscal years 2001 through 2005.
Table 11: Maintenance Costs for ATON Cutters and Domestic Icebreakers,
Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005:
Cutter Type: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: $197,500;
Scheduled cost: $2,300,492;
ELC cost: $1,057,645;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: $3,555,637.
Cutter Type: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 605,637;
Scheduled cost: 3,372,110;
ELC cost: 2,868,107;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 6,845,853.
Cutter Type: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 798,994;
Scheduled cost: 5,167,818;
ELC cost: 1,625,370;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 7,592,182.
Cutter Type: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 914,750;
Scheduled cost: 5,703,552;
ELC cost: 2,946,798;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 9,565,099.
Cutter Type: 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 4,313,387;
Scheduled cost: 6,715,405;
ELC cost: 2,631,631;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 13,660,422.
Cutter Type: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 246,665;
Scheduled cost: 3,288,053;
ELC cost: 294,868;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 3,829,585.
Cutter Type: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 316,694;
Scheduled cost: 7,054,995;
ELC cost: 821,725;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 8,193,414.
Cutter Type: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 806,494;
Scheduled cost: 7,490,459;
ELC cost: 674,800;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 8,971,752.
Cutter Type: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 591,828;
Scheduled cost: 5,141,464;
ELC cost: 495,708;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 6,229,000.
Cutter Type: 175-foot coastal buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 555,245;
Scheduled cost: 2,672,709;
ELC cost: 1,014,257;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 4,242,210.
Cutter Type: 160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 124,735;
Scheduled cost: 1,943,315;
ELC cost: 343,346;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,411,396.
Cutter Type: 160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 366,968;
Scheduled cost: 2,889,575;
ELC cost: 192,786;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 3,449,329.
Cutter Type: 160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 251,036;
Scheduled cost: 3,781,760;
ELC cost: 1,366,811;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 5,399,607.
Cutter Type: 160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 356,726;
Scheduled cost: 3,966,089;
ELC cost: 3,318,928;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 7,641,742.
Cutter Type: 160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 437,112;
Scheduled cost: 2,605,441;
ELC cost: 8,316,939;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 11,359,492.
Cutter Type: 100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 39,425;
Scheduled cost: 554,900;
ELC cost: 9,970;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 604,295.
Cutter Type: 100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 14,219;
Scheduled cost: 595,933;
ELC cost: 6,391;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 616,543.
Cutter Type: 100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 35,661;
Scheduled cost: 813,977;
ELC cost: 94,620;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 944,258.
Cutter Type: 100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 94,856;
Scheduled cost: 1,168,921;
ELC cost: 17,748;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,281,525.
Cutter Type: 100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 81,453;
Scheduled cost: 177,082;
ELC cost: 63,294;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 321,828.
Cutter Type: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 343,902;
Scheduled cost: 1,885,671;
ELC cost: 192,131;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,421,703.
Cutter Type: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 190,010;
Scheduled cost: 2,789,443;
ELC cost: 206,031;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 3,185,483.
Cutter Type: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 225,959;
Scheduled cost: 1,748,739;
ELC cost: 850,783;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,825,481.
Cutter Type: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 344,080;
Scheduled cost: 2,954,156;
ELC cost: 1,245,042;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 4,543,277.
Cutter Type: 140-foot icebreaking tugs;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 449,911;
Scheduled cost: 3,339,509;
ELC cost: 1,258,332;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 5,047,752.
Cutter Type: 75-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 102,701;
Scheduled cost: 2,587,246;
ELC cost: 0;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,689,947.
Cutter Type: 75-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 308,977;
Scheduled cost: 1,808,732;
ELC cost: 0;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,117,709.
Cutter Type: 75-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 141,748;
Scheduled cost: 1,309,262;
ELC cost: 0;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,451,010.
Cutter Type: 75-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 259,143;
Scheduled cost: 1,591,882;
ELC cost: 6,870;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,857,895.
Cutter Type: 75-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 355,520;
Scheduled cost: 2,122,927;
ELC cost: 50,251;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,528,697.
Cutter Type: 65-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 77,169;
Scheduled cost: 387,648;
ELC cost: 0;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 464,816.
Cutter Type: 65-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 81,662;
Scheduled cost: 2,140,323;
ELC cost: 3,031;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 2,225,017.
Cutter Type: 65-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 80,862;
Scheduled cost: 1,449,003;
ELC cost: 30,480;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,560,344.
Cutter Type: 65-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 127,692;
Scheduled cost: 904,538;
ELC cost: 0;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,032,230.
Cutter Type: 65-foot river buoy tenders;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 55,117;
Scheduled cost: 343,930;
ELC cost: 69,701;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 468,748.
Cutter Type: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Unscheduled cost: 100,009;
Scheduled cost: 724,359;
ELC cost: 46,244;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 870,612.
Cutter Type: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Unscheduled cost: 36,852;
Scheduled cost: 1,086,856;
ELC cost: 95,173;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,218,882.
Cutter Type: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
Fiscal year: 2003;
Unscheduled cost: 81,196;
Scheduled cost: 1,056,155;
ELC cost: 136,783;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,274,133.
Cutter Type: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
Fiscal year: 2004;
Unscheduled cost: 125,441;
Scheduled cost: 1,098,967;
ELC cost: 83,688;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,308,096.
Cutter Type: 65-foot small harbor tugs;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Unscheduled cost: 110,001;
Scheduled cost: 1,136,472;
ELC cost: 9,919;
Total (scheduled, unscheduled, ELC) cost: 1,256,392.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: The numbers presented in this table have been adjusted for
inflation using 2005 dollars.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the above, individuals making key contributions to this
report include Chuck Bausell, Melanie Brown, Steve Calvo, Michele
Fejfar, Geoffrey Hamilton, Christopher Hatscher, Stephanie Sand, Stan
Stenersen, Gladys Toro, and Friendly Vang-Johnson.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally
Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816. Washington,
D.C.: August 16, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,
D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-
315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Coat Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally
Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816, Washington,
D.C.: August 16, 2006.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Coast Guard is also responsible for operating and maintaining
the nation's fleet of polar icebreakers. We did not examine those polar
icebreaking assets as part of this review.
[2] The Coast Guard defines a cutter as any Coast Guard vessel 65 feet
in length or greater, having adequate accommodations for crew to live
on board. Boats are defined as those vessels under 65 feet in length
that usually operate near shore and on inland waterways.
[3] An allision is a collision between a vessel against a fixed or
stationary object.
[4] The Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security
missions are delineated in section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (2002)). Starting with the
fiscal year 2007 budget, however, OMB has designated the Coast Guard's
drug interdiction and other law enforcement programs as non-homeland
security missions for budgetary purposes.
[5] The Coast Guard's statutory aids-to-navigation authorities include,
for example, 14 U.S.C. § 2, and 14 U.S.C. § 81.
[6] 14 U.S.C. § 2; Exec. Order No. 7521, 1 Fed. Reg. 2184 (1936).
[7] The Coast Guard maintains information, on a program-by-program
basis, about how resources (assets such as ships and boats) are used to
conduct its program missions. Each hour that these resources are used
is called a resource hour. Resource hours do not include things such as
the time that the resource stands idle or the time that is spent in
maintaining it. "Support" was also a mission identified by the Coast
Guard; however, because this mission accounted for time spent on non-
mission activities such as public affairs and training, we did not
consider these hours recorded as "Support" to be "resource hours."
[8] In addition the Coast Guard also has several icebreakers stationed
at locations along the East Coast. Of the locations these icebreakers
are stationed, the demand for additional presence and patrols has been
greatest in New York City. Sector New York has a requirement of 116
hours per day of PWCS patrols. Other sectors have little or no hours
required.
[9] According to a Coast Guard official, maintenance on the icebreakers
is often done during the summer period and PWCS missions that occur
during this time can result in planned maintenance being rescheduled.
Although the assets have been ready to break ice when needed so far,
the Coast Guard official stated that depending on how much the
maintenance is delayed as well as whether there are any additional
maintenance problems discovered, the potential exists for the assets
not being ready if icebreaking is needed earlier than expected.
[10] Shore-side patrols typically involve visiting a maritime facility
and providing a law enforcement presence on land. The patrols are
typically conducted by a Coast Guard shore unit.
[11] A knot is equivalent to 1 nautical mile per hour, approximately
1.85 kilometers or 1.15 miles-per-hour.
[12] To qualify for these crews, team members and officers must attend
training in maritime law enforcement, where they are trained in the use
of weapons including firearms.
[13] A major casualty is a deficiency in mission-essential equipment
that causes the major degradation of a primary mission or loss of at
least one primary mission.
[14] The Coast Guard is in the process of developing a new condition
metric and did not have fiscal year 2005 data available. Consequently,
our analysis covers fiscal years 2000 through 2004.
[15] GAO, Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater
Legacy Asset Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition
Challenges Remain, GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005). The
Deepwater fleet consists of 186 aircraft and 88 cutters of various
sizes and capabilities, which play a critical role in all Coast Guard
homeland and non-homeland security missions.
[16] We also examined a fourth category--deferred maintenance, which is
the amount of scheduled maintenance that must be postponed in order to
pay for unscheduled repairs. A previous GAO study found that a drop in
this account is not necessarily an indicator that the condition of the
assets are improving but rather a result of the Coast Guard having more
money to address the maintenance needs. Due to this limitation we did
not include our analysis of a sub-account within deferred maintenance
which indicated a declining trend. Data to conduct an analysis on ATON
small boats are not available.
[17] Given the limitations of the Coast Guard data, we could not
analyze maintenance costs for ATON small boats, and were unable to draw
any conclusions about the condition of the ATON boats based on their
maintenance costs. Starting in fiscal year 2003, the districts began
shifting responsibility of boat maintenance from the district level to
a centralized area level. Due to the segregated approach in which boat
maintenance was carried out previously, maintenance data for the period
we examined is inconsistent. Further complicating the analysis of this
data is the fact that it is not broken out by scheduled and unscheduled
costs, which would allow for identification of trends in unplanned
maintenance and better reflect issues with condition. Finally, the
maintenance cost figures reflect only half of the costs for standard
boats, which is less than 40 percent of the total boat fleet.
[18] Absent from the analysis were the newer 49-foot stern loading buoy
boats, and the 175-foot and 225-foot seagoing buoy cutters.
[19] This need was to be met by acquiring a new 49-foot buoy stern
loading boat, but the existing 45-foot buoy boat assets were continued
in service when the Coast Guard determined that the 49-foot boats could
not support the needs for all locations across the country.
[20] In our recent review of the performance measures for non-homeland
security missions, we found that although the Coast Guard breaks ice in
many East Coast ports and waterways, according to Coast Guard
officials, the measure focuses on the Great Lakes region because it is
a large commerce hub where the icebreaking season tends to be longer
and where ice has a greater impact on maritime transportation. Coast
Guard program officials at agency headquarters said that they are in
the early stages of developing a new primary performance measure that
will incorporate domestic icebreaking activities in areas beyond the
Great Lakes. For more information, see GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland
Security Performance Measures Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities
for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-816 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006).
[21] The Coast Guard has a goal of 8 or fewer days during severe
winters.
[22] The Coast Guard defines an "allision" as a vessel collision with a
fixed object.
[23] The Coast Guard's primary indicator--collisions, allisions, and
groundings--is the measure included in external performance reports,
but it reflects many factors outside the aids to navigation mission,
such as weather, dredging, and vessel equipment standards.
[24] Coast Guard officials also said that, in some cases, the lack of
availability was related not to vessel's condition but to its use in
other missions. For example, seagoing and coastal buoy tenders may be
called upon to respond to unexpected events like hurricanes, precluding
their use in fixing navigational aids.
[25] See, for example, GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources
Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 22, 2004).
[26] For more information on these initiatives, see GAO, Coast Guard:
Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally Sound, but
Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-816 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
16, 2006).
[27] These assessments were done using OMB's Program Assessment Rating
Tool (PART), which is a diagnostic rating tool meant to provide a
consistent approach to evaluating federal programs as part of the
executive budget formulation process. It applies 25 questions to
"programs" under four broad topics: (1) program purpose and design; (2)
strategic planning; (3) program management; and (4) program results
(i.e., whether a program is meeting its long-term and annual goals) as
well as additional questions that are specific to one of seven
mechanisms or approaches used to deliver the program.
[28] GAO-05-757.
[29] A form of this approach was first adopted by the Navy in the late
1970s and most Coast Guard "condition based maintenance" capability is
derived from proven Navy programs. According to Coast Guard officials,
the Coast Guard is in the process of evaluating what other assets and
systems for which such a maintenance approach may be effective. They
stated that this approach is not a replacement for preventative
maintenance work but is intended to complement it.
[30] GAO, Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and
Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-
544T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2003); and GAO, Coast Guard: Strategy
Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions,
GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002).
[31] The scope of this proposal considered rehabilitating or replacing
the following asset types: 21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation
boats; 45-foot buoy boats; 55-foot aids-to-navigation boats; 63-foot
aids-to-navigation boat; 72-foot cable laying boat; 65-foot and 75-foot
river buoy tenders; 65-foot small harbor tugs; the 65-foot and 100-foot
inland tenders; the construction tenders (75-foot, 100-foot, and 160-
foot); and the 140-foot icebreaking tugs.
[32] These life-cycle costs include costs associated with planning and
design, procurement, management and use, and disposal of the assets at
the end of their service lives. We did not assess the reasonableness of
the estimates provided in this analysis.
[33] These boats can be placed on trailers and transported on land by
truck.
[34] According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard is purchasing
these boats under a 5-year "indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity"
contract that allows the Coast Guard to order as many boats from the
vendor at any given time at a cost of $180,000 per boat. The official
stated that this price includes delivery, spare parts, trailers, and
crew training and that the Coast Guard's obligation under the contract
was to purchase at least one boat, which it has already met. Currently,
the Coast Guard has 24 more boats on order and expects to order a total
of 80 over the course of the contract to replace its existing fleet.
According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard hopes to have all
new boats in place by 2011. This official also stated that under this
contract, other DHS agencies also have the option of purchasing up to
20 boats of similar design.
[35] This assessment was done using OMB's Program Assessment Rating
Tool (PART), which is a diagnostic rating tool meant to provide a
consistent approach to evaluating federal programs as part of the
executive budget formulation process. The assessment of the ATON
program was completed in 2002.
[36] According to Coast Guard officials, a limited amount of ATON work
is currently contracted out in cases where the capabilities are needed
only occasionally or the work cannot be done by the Coast Guard's
assets. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some ATON
work was contracted to commercial providers that fixed navigational
aids in waters too shallow for the Coast Guard's construction tenders
to reach.
[37] BearingPoint, United States Coast Guard Aids to Navigation
Business Case Analysis, April 2004.
[38] This study was commissioned by OMB in July 2006 and directed the
Coast Guard to provide a conceptual analysis regarding ATON assets
operating in the Western Rivers Waterways System. To accomplish this
directive, the Coast Guard conducted an economic analysis of the Coast
Guard's inland construction tender and river buoy tender assets.
[39] Due to a lack of data, we did not perform this analysis for the 72-
foot cable laying boat.
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