Border Security
US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry Gao ID: GAO-07-378T January 31, 2007This testimony summarizes a December 2006 GAO report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.
US-VISIT entry capability had been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology tested (see photo, below right) did not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and thus cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS had not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus could not ensure that the program would meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at land POEs in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success.
GAO-07-378T, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and
Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, January 31, 2007:
Border Security:
US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological
Challenges at Land Ports of Entry:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-378T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-378T, a report to a testimony before the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Committee
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
This testimony summarizes a December 2006 GAO report on the Department
of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports
of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share
data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United
States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric
identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons
against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and
departure. This testimony addresses DHS‘s efforts to (1) implement US-
VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3)
define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security
initiatives. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed
program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels
on both borders.
What GAO Found:
US-VISIT entry capability had been installed at 154 of the 170 land
POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had
improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS
plans to further enhance US-VISIT‘s capabilities by, among other
things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10
fingerprints (see photo, below left). While this may aid border
security, installation could increase processing times and adversely
affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic
congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO‘s work indicated
that management controls in place to identify such problems and
evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered.
For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites
visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT
has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that
uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put
US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for
improvement.
US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-
VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a
major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit
technology tested (see photo, below right) did not meet the statutory
requirement for a biometric exit capability and thus cannot ensure that
visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS had not yet
reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intended to
fully implement a biometric entry/exit program or use nonbiometric
solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in
a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan
for POE facilities modifications.
DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging
land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus could not
ensure that the program would meet strategic program goals and operate
cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with
these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and
others to present passports or other documents at land POEs in 2009, is
important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT
and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications
needed to ensure success.
Figure: US-VISIT entry capability set up with computer and camera
(left); nonbiometric exit identification readers mounted over highway
(right):
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended that DHS improve management controls for US-VISIT;
develop performance measures to assess the impact of US-VISIT at land
POEs; and ensure that a statutorily mandated report describes how DHS
will move to a biometric entry/exit capability and align US-VISIT with
emerging land border security initiatives. DHS generally agreed and
said that it has begun to or plans to implement GAO‘s recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-378T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202)
512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Chairman Feinstein and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide a summary of
our December 2006 report[Footnote 1] on the challenges facing the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as it implements United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) at land
ports of entry (POE).[Footnote 2]
In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the need to secure U.S.
borders has taken on added importance and has received increasing
attention from Congress and the public. In an effort to avoid
repetition of such attacks, and improve overall national security,
Congress and the Administration have sought better ways to record and
track the entry and departure of foreign visitors who pass through U.S.
POEs by air, land, or sea; to verify their identities; and to
authenticate their travel documentation. Pursuant to several statutory
mandates, DHS, in consultation with the Department of State,
established an automated visitor system to integrate information on the
entry and exit from the United States of foreign nationals, called the
US-VISIT Program. According to DHS, the purpose of US-VISIT is to
enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate
legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S.
immigration system, and protect visitors' privacy. The program is
managed by the US-VISIT Program Office, which is headed by the US-VISIT
Director, who currently reports to the DHS Deputy Secretary. US-VISIT
is used in the field by officers with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), a separate DHS component.
US-VISIT is designed to use biographic information (e.g., name,
nationality, and date of birth) and biometric information (e.g.,
digital fingerprint scans and photographs) to verify the identity of
those covered by the program. The program applies to certain visitors
whether they hold a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country
that has a visa waiver agreement with the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program.[Footnote 3] U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents,
and most Canadian and Mexican[Footnote 4] citizens are currently exempt
from being processed under US-VISIT upon entering and exiting the
country.[Footnote 5] When foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT arrive
at a land POE, they are directed by CBP officers from the primary
inspection area to the secondary inspection area for further
processing. Visitors covered by US-VISIT who are determined to be
admissible are issued an I-94 arrival/departure form, which, among
other things, records their date of arrival and the date their
authorized period of admission expires. The requirement that arriving
nonimmigrants admitted to the United States, unless otherwise exempted,
be issued a Form I-94 as evidence of the terms of their admission
predates implementation of US-VISIT and was incorporated into US-VISIT
processing.[Footnote 6]
Many aspects of US-VISIT program implementation have been driven or
defined by various legislative mandates. These include a 2001 statutory
requirement to focus particularly on the use of biometric technology in
developing the integrated entry-exit system subsequently named US-
VISIT; a 2002 statutory requirement to develop biometric identifier
standards to be used to verify the identity of persons seeking to enter
the United States at POEs; and a requirement to install at all POEs
equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and authentication
of U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens, as
well as Visa Waiver Program participant passports. In addition, by law,
an integrated entry and exit data system was to be implemented at all
U.S. POEs, including land POEs, by December 31, 2005, but there was no
specific requirement to collect any new data on foreign nationals
departing at land POEs by that date. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, on the other hand, did require the
collection of biometric exit data for all individuals subject to US-
VISIT, but it did not set a deadline for implementation of this
requirement.
This statement presents a summary of our December 2006 report on the US-
VISIT program, which was requested by the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member of the House Homeland Security Committee and Congressmen Filner,
Grijalva, Hinojosa, Ortiz, and Reyes. My testimony today provides a
summary of our report and will focus on the following issues:
* what the US-VISIT Program Office has done to implement US-VISIT entry
capabilities at land POEs and what impact US-VISIT has had on these
facilities,
* the status of US-VISIT Program Office efforts to implement a US-VISIT
exit capability at land POE facilities, and:
* what DHS has done to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging
border security initiatives.
Summary:
US-VISIT entry capability had been installed, as of November 2006, at
154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites we visited reported
that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify
identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by,
among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning
all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation
could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land
POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays
already exist. We found that management controls in place to identify
such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and
inconsistently administered. For example, we identified computer
processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems
were not always reported to CBP's computer help desk, as required by
CBP guidelines. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but
measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were
not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position
to identify areas for improvement.
Our December 2006 report also stated that US-VISIT officials had
concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit
capability cannot be implemented without incurring a major impact on
land POE facilities. According to these officials, implementing a
biometrically based exit recording system like that used to record
those entering or re-entering the country is potentially costly (an
estimated $3 billion in 2003), would require new infrastructure, and
would produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to
stop their vehicles upon exit to be processed--an option officials
consider unacceptable. US-VISIT officials stated that they believe
technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will enable the
biometric verification of persons exiting the country without a major
impact on facilities. The US-VISIT Program Office has tested radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology as a nonbiometric means of
recording visitors as they exit. RFID technology can be used to
electronically identify and gather information contained on a tag--in
this case, a unique identifying number embedded in a tag on a visitor's
arrival/departure form--which an electronic reader at the POE is
intended to detect. While RFID technology required few facility and
infrastructure changes, US-VISIT's initial testing and analysis of this
technology identified numerous performance and reliability problems,
such as the failure of RFID readers to detect a majority of travelers'
tags during testing. Furthermore, the RFID solution did not meet the
statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability because the
technology as tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT--ensuring that
visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave.
Specifically, the RFID tag in the visitor's arrival/departure form
cannot be physically tied to an individual, which means that while a
document may be detected as leaving the country, the person to whom it
was issued at time of entry may be somewhere else. By statute, DHS was
to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how it intended to fully
implement a comprehensive, biometric entry/exit program, but DHS had
not yet reported how it intended to do so, or use nonbiometric
solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in
a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources, including
funds for any facility modifications that might be needed, plan for the
program's future, or consider trade-offs between traveler convenience
and security.
DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other
land border security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that
these programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost
effectively. As we reported 3 years ago, agency programs need to
properly fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of
program operations, such as what functions are to be performed, what
facility or infrastructure changes will be needed to ensure that they
operate in harmony and as intended, and what standards govern the use
of technology.[Footnote 7] DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an
overall immigration and border management strategy, but had not yet
approved it, and did not provide it to us for review. Meanwhile, new
border security initiatives or mandates are planned or under way that
could potentially have an impact on US-VISIT operations and facilities
at land POEs. For example, no later than June 2009, U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico who enter the United
States at land POEs from within the Western Hemisphere will be
required, for the first time, to present a passport or other documents
deemed sufficient to show identity and citizenship. It is not yet known
what types of documents, other than passports, may be permitted at land
POEs, or whether these documents and the equipment required to read
them can be aligned with US-VISIT technologies. Until decisions for
this and other initiatives are made, it remains unclear how this
program will be integrated with US-VISIT, if at all--raising the
possibility that CBP would be faced with managing differing technology
platforms and border inspection processes at each land POE. Knowing how
US-VISIT is to work in concert with other border security and homeland
security initiatives and what facility or facility modifications might
be needed could help Congress, DHS, and others better understand what
resources and tools are needed to ensure success and ensure that land
POE facilities are positioned to accommodate them.
We made three recommendations to enhance the US-VISIT program at land
POEs. Specifically, with respect to entry capability our report
recommended that DHS (1) improve existing controls for identifying and
reporting computer processing and other operational problems to help
ensure that these controls are consistently administered and (2)
develop performance measures specifically for assessing the impact of
US-VISIT operations at land POEs. With respect to the mandated report
to Congress, we recommended that the Secretary take steps to ensure
that it includes, among other things, (1) information on the costs,
benefits, and feasibility of deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit
capabilities at land POEs; and (2) a description of how DHS plans to
align US-VISIT with other emerging land border security initiatives to
ensure that different technologies and processes work in harmony. DHS
generally agreed and said that it has already begun or plans to
implement our recommendations.
Background:
US-VISIT is a large, complex governmentwide program intended to:
* collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals
who enter and exit the United States;
* identify foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the
terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their
immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law
enforcement officials;
* detect fraudulent travel documents, verify visitor identity, and
determine visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics (digital
fingerprints and a digital photograph); and:
* facilitate information sharing and coordination within the
immigration and border management community.
The US-VISIT Program Office has responsibility for managing the
acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT and has
been delivering US-VISIT capability incrementally based, in part, on
statutory deadlines for implementing specific portions of US-VISIT. For
example, the statutory deadline for implementing US-VISIT at the 50
busiest land POEs was December 31, 2004, and at the remaining POEs,
December 31, 2005.[Footnote 8] From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2007, total funding for the US-VISIT program has been about $1.7
billion.
In reports on US-VISIT over the last 3 years, we have identified
numerous challenges that DHS faces in delivering program capabilities
and benefits on time and within budget. In September 2003, we reported
that the US-VISIT program is a risky endeavor, both because of the type
of program it is (large, complex, and potentially costly) and because
of the way that it was being managed[Footnote 9]. We reported, for
example, that the program's acquisition management process had not been
established, and that US-VISIT lacked a governance structure. In March
2004, we testified that DHS faces a major challenge maintaining border
security while still welcoming visitors. Preventing the entry of
persons who pose a threat to the United States cannot be guaranteed,
and the missed entry of just one can have severe consequences. Also, US-
VISIT is to achieve the important law enforcement goal of identifying
those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas.
Complicating the achievement of these security and law enforcement
goals are other key US-VISIT goals: facilitating trade and travel
through POEs and providing for enforcement of U.S. privacy laws and
regulation[Footnote 10]s. Subsequently, in May 2004, we reported that
DHS had not employed the kind of rigorous and disciplined management
controls typically associated with successful programs[Footnote 11].
Moreover, in February 2006, we reported that while DHS had taken steps
to implement most of the recommendations from our 2003 and 2004
reports, progress in critical areas had been s[Footnote 12]low. As of
February 2006, of 18 recommendations we made since 2003, only 2 had
been fully implemented, 11 had been partially implemented, and 5 were
in the process of being implemented, although the extent to which they
would be fully carried out is not yet known.
US-VISIT Scope, Operations, and Processing at Land POEs:
Currently, US-VISIT's scope includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and
exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter
and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs.
However, most land border crossers--including U.S. citizens, lawful
permanent residents, and most Canadian and Mexican citizens--are, by
regulation or statute, not required to enroll into US-VISIT.[Footnote
13] In fiscal year 2004, for example, U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents constituted about 57 percent of land border
crossers; Canadian and Mexican citizens constituted about 41 percent;
and less than 2 percent were US-VISIT enrollees. Figure 1 shows the
number and percentage of persons processed under US-VISIT as a
percentage of all border crossings at land, air, and sea POEs in fiscal
year 2004.
Figure 1: Persons Processed under US-VISIT as a Percentage of All
Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, Fiscal Year
2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: Persons processed by US-VISIT may include foreign nationals who
were also issued an I-94 valid for multiple entries and who have re-
entered multiple times. Total entering the United States includes U.S.
citizens who may have re-entered the country multiple times and foreign
nationals, including those not issued I-94s, such as Canadian citizens
and Mexicans with BCCs, and those issued multiple entry I-94s who also
may have re-entered multiple times. U.S. citizens do not fall within
the statutory scope of US-VISIT and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT
screening.
[End of figure]
Foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT who intend to enter the country
encounter different inspection processes at different types of POEs
depending on their mode of travel. Those who intend to enter the United
States at an air or sea POE are to be processed, for purposes of US-
VISIT, in the primary inspection area upon arrival. Generally, these
visitors are subject to prescreening, before they arrive, via passenger
manifests, which are forwarded to CBP by commercial air or sea carrier
in advance of arrival.[Footnote 14] By contrast, foreign nationals
intending to enter the United States at land POEs are generally not
subject to prescreening because they arrive in private vehicles or on
foot and there is no manifest to record their pending arrival. Thus,
when foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT arrive at a land POE in
vehicles, they initially enter the primary inspection area where CBP
officers, often located in booths, are to visually inspect travel
documents and query the visitors about such matters as their place of
birth and proposed destination. Visitors arriving as pedestrians enter
an equivalent primary inspection area, generally inside a CBP building.
If the CBP officer believes a more detailed inspection is needed or if
the visitors are required to be processed under US-VISIT,[Footnote 15]
the visitors are to be referred to the secondary inspection area--an
area away from the primary inspection area--which is generally inside a
facility. The secondary inspection area inside the facility generally
contains office space, waiting areas, and space to process visitors,
including US-VISIT enrollees. Equipment used for US-VISIT processing
includes a computer, printer, digital camera, and a two-fingerprint
scanner. Figure 2 shows how U.S. citizens and most Mexicans, Canadians,
and foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT are to be processed at land
POEs.
Figure 2: Overview of US-VISIT Processing at Land POEs for Visitors
with and without Visas Entering the Country:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO (analysis); MapArt (map).
[End of figure]
As of August 2006, there were 170 land POEs that are geographically
dispersed along the nation's more than 7,500 miles of borders with
Canada and Mexico. Some are located in rural areas (such as Alexandria
Bay, New York, and Blaine-Pacific Highway, Washington) and others in
cities (such as Detroit) or in U.S. cities across from Mexican cities,
such as Laredo and El Paso, Texas. The volume of visitor traffic at
these POEs varied widely, with the busiest four POEs characterized by
CBP, in fiscal year 2005, as San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa,
California, and Bridge of the Americas in El Paso, Texas.
DHS Had Installed US-VISIT Biometric Entry Capability at Nearly All
Land POEs, but Faces Challenges Identifying and Monitoring the
Operational Impacts on POE Facilities:
My statement will now focus on what the US-VISIT Program Office had
done to implement US-VISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what
impact US-VISIT has had on these facilities.
At the time of our review, DHS had installed the entry portion of US-
VISIT at 154 of the nation's 170 land POEs,[Footnote 16] usually with
minimal new construction or changes to existing facilities. As required
by law, the US-VISIT entry capability includes biometric features--such
as digital scans of 2 fingerprints--to help verify the identity of
visitors. CBP officials at all 21 land POEs we visited told us that US-
VISIT's entry capability has generally enhanced their ability to
process visitors subject to US-VISIT by providing assurance that
visitors' identities can be confirmed through biometric identifiers and
by automating the paperwork associated with processing I-94 arrival/
departure forms.
Going forward, DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-
VISIT at land POEs intended to further bolster CBP's ability to verify
the identity of individuals entering the country, including a
transition from digitally scanning 2 fingerprints to scanning 10. While
such changes are intended to further enhance border security, deploying
them may have an impact on aging and space-constrained land POE
facilities because they could increase inspection times and adversely
affect POE operations. Our site visits, interviews with US-VISIT and
CBP officials, and the work of others suggest that both before and
after US-VISIT entry capability was installed at land POEs, these
facilities faced a number of challenges--operational and physical--
including space constraints complicated by the logistics of processing
high volumes of visitors and associated traffic congestion. Moreover,
our work over the past 3 years showed that the US-VISIT program office
had not taken necessary steps to help ensure that US-VISIT entry
capability operates as intended. For example, in February 2006 we
reported that the approach taken by the US-VISIT Program Office to
evaluate the impact of US-VISIT on land POE facilities focused on
changes in I-94 processing time at 5 POEs and did not examine other
operational factors, such as US-VISIT's impact on physical facilities
or work force requirements.[Footnote 17] As a result, program officials
did not always have the information they needed to anticipate problems
that occurred, such as problems processing high volumes of visitors in
space-constrained facilities.
Turning to another aspect of our work on US-VISIT entry capability, our
December 2006 report stated that management controls did not always
alert US-VISIT and CBP to operational problems. Our standards for
internal controls in the federal government state that it is important
for agencies to have controls in place to help ensure that policies and
procedures are applied and that managers be made aware of problems so
that that they can be addressed and resolved in a timely
fashion.[Footnote 18] CBP officials at 12 of 21 land POE sites we
visited told us about US-VISIT-related computer slowdowns and freezes
that adversely affected visitor processing and inspection times, and at
9 of the 12 sites, computer processing problems were not always
reported to CBP's computer help desk, as required by CBP guidelines.
Although various controls are in place to alert US-VISIT and CBP
officials to problems as they occur, these controls did not alert
officials to all problems, given that they had been unaware of the
problems we identified before we brought them to their attention. These
computer processing problems have the potential to not only
inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed to
complete the inspection process, but to compromise security,
particularly if CBP officers are unable to perform biometric checks--
one of the critical reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs.
Our internal control standards also call for agencies to establish
performance measures throughout the organization so that actual
performance can be compared to expected results. While the US-VISIT
Program Office established performance measures for fiscal years 2005
and 2006 intended to gauge performance of various aspects of US-VISIT
at air, sea, and land POEs in the aggregate, performance measures
specifically for land POEs had not been developed. It is important to
do so, given that there are significant operational and facility
differences among these different types of POEs. Additional performance
measures that consider operational and facility differences at land
POEs would put US-VISIT program officials in a better position to
identify problems, trends, and areas needing improvements.
DHS Cannot Currently Implement a Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability at
Land POEs and Faces Uncertainties as Testing of an Alternative Exit
Strategy Continues:
My statement will now focus on the challenges facing DHS as it attempts
to implement a biometric exit capability at land POEs.
Various Factors Have Prevented US-VISIT from Implementing a Biometric
Exit Capability:
Various factors have prevented US-VISIT from implementing a biometric
exit capability. Federal laws require the creation of a US-VISIT exit
capability using biometric verification methods to ensure that the
identity of visitors leaving the country can be matched biometrically
against their entry records.[Footnote 19] However, according to
officials at the US-VISIT Program Office and CBP and US-VISIT program
documentation, there are interrelated logistical, technological, and
infrastructure constraints that have precluded DHS from achieving this
mandate, and there are cost factors related to the feasibility of
implementation of such a solution. The major constraint to performing
biometric verification upon exit at this time, in the US-VISIT Program
Office's view, is that the only proven technology available would
necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for US-VISIT at
entry. A mirror image system for exit would, like one for entry,
require CBP officers at land POEs to examine the travel documents of
those leaving the country, take fingerprints, compare visitors' facial
features to photographs, and, if questions about identity arise, direct
the departing visitor to secondary inspection for additional
questioning. These steps would be carried out for exiting pedestrians
as well as for persons exiting in vehicles. The US-VISIT Program Office
concluded in January 2005 that the mirror-imaging solution was "an
infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not limited
to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure requirements,
and potential trade and commerce impacts."[Footnote 20]
US-VISIT officials told us that they anticipated that a biometric exit
process mirroring that used for entry could result in delays at land
POEs with heavy daily volumes of visitors. And they stated that in
order to implement a mirror image biometric exit capability, additional
lanes for exiting vehicles and additional inspection booths and staff
would be needed, though they had not determined precisely how many.
According to these officials, it is unclear how new traffic lanes and
new facilities could be built at land POEs where space constraints
already exist, such as those in congested urban areas. (For example,
San Ysidro, California, currently has 24 entry lanes, each with its own
staffed booth and 6 unstaffed exit lanes. Thus, if full biometric exit
capability were implemented using a mirror image approach, San Ysidro's
current capacity of 6 exit lanes would have to be expanded to 24 exit
lanes.) As shown in figure 3, based on observations during our site
visit to the San Ysidro POE, the facility is surrounded by dense urban
infrastructure, leaving little, if any, room to expand in place. Some
of the 24 entry lanes for vehicle traffic heading northward from Mexico
into the United States appear in the bottom left portion of the
photograph, where vehicles are shown waiting to approach primary
inspection at the facility; the 6ix exit lanes (traffic toward Mexico),
which do not have fixed inspection facilities, are at the upper left.
Figure 3: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Other POE facilities are similarly space-constrained. At the POE at
Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona, for example, we observed that the facility
is bordered by railroad tracks, a parking lot, and industrial or
commercial buildings. In addition, CBP has identified space constraints
at some rural POEs. For example, the Thousand Islands Bridge POE at
Alexandria Bay, New York, is situated in what POE officials described
as a "geological bowl," with tall rock outcroppings potentially
hindering the ability to expand facilities at the current location.
Officials told us that in order to accommodate existing and anticipated
traffic volume upon entry, they are in the early stages of planning to
build an entirely new POE on a hill about a half-mile south of the
present facility. CBP officials at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE in
Washington state said that CBP also is considering whether to relocate
and expand the POE facility, within the next 5 to 10 years, to better
handle existing and projected traffic volume. According to the US-VISIT
program officials, none of the plans for any expanded, renovated, or
relocated POE include a mirror image addition of exit lanes or
facilities comparable to those existing for entry.
In 2003, the US-VISIT Program Office estimated that it would cost
approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry and exit
capability at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be installed and
that such an effort would have a major impact on facility
infrastructure at land POEs. We did not assess the reliability of the
2003 estimate. The cost estimate did not separately break out costs for
entry and exit construction, but did factor in the cost for building
additional exit vehicle lanes and booths as well as buildings and other
infrastructure that would be required to accommodate a mirror imaging
at exit of the capabilities required for entry processing. US-VISIT
program officials told us that they provided this estimate to
congressional staff during a briefing, but that the reaction to this
projected cost was negative and that they therefore did not move ahead
with this option. No subsequent cost estimate updates had been
prepared, and DHS's annual budget requests have not included funds to
build the infrastructure that would be associated with the required
facilities.
US-VISIT officials stated that they believe that technological advances
over the next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize
alternative technologies that provide biometric verification of persons
exiting the country without major changes to facility infrastructure
and without requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles,
thereby precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. US-
VISIT's report assessing biometric alternatives noted that although
limitations in technology currently preclude the use of biometric
identification because visitors would have to be stopped, the use of
the as yet undeveloped biometric verification technology supports the
long-term vision of the US-VISIT program.[Footnote 21] However, no such
technology or device currently exists that would not have a major
impact on facilities. The prospects for its development, manufacture,
deployment, and reliable utilization are currently uncertain or
unknown, although a prototype device that would permit a fingerprint to
be read remotely without requiring the visitor to come to a full stop
is under development.
While logistical, technical, and cost constraints may prevent
implementation of a biometrically based exit technology for US-VISIT at
this time, it is important to note that there currently is not a
legislatively mandated date for implementation of such a solution. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires US-
VISIT to collect biometric exit data from all individuals who are
required to provide biometric entry data.[Footnote 22] The act did not
set a deadline, however, for requiring collection of biometric exit
data from all individuals who are required to provide biometric entry
data. Although US-VISIT had set a December 2007 deadline for
implementing exit capability at the 50 busiest land POEs, US-VISIT has
since determined that implementing exit capability by this date is no
longer feasible, and a new date for doing so has not been set.
The US-VISIT Program Office Tested Nonbiometric Technology to Record
Travelers' Departure, but Identified Numerous Performance and
Reliability Problems:
US-VISIT has tested nonbiometric technology to record travelers'
departure, but testing showed numerous performance and reliability
problems. Because there is at present no biometric technology that can
be used to verify a traveler's exit from the country at land POEs
without also making major and costly changes to POE infrastructure and
facilities, US-VISIT tested radio frequency identification (RFID)
technology as a nonbiometric means of recording visitors as they exit.
RFID technology can be used to electronically identify and gather
information contained on a tag--in this case, a unique identifying
number embedded in a tag on a visitor's arrival/departure form--which
an electronic reader at the POE is intended to detect. While RFID
technology required few facility and infrastructure changes, US-VISIT's
testing and analysis at five land POEs at the northern and southern
borders identified numerous performance and reliability problems, such
as the failure of RFID readers to detect a majority of travelers' tags
during testing. For example, according to US-VISIT, at the Blaine-
Pacific Highway test site, of 166 vehicles tested during a 1-week
period, RFID readers correctly identified 14 percent--a sizable
departure from the target read rate of 70 percent.[Footnote 23]
Another problem that arose was that of cross-reads, in which multiple
RFID readers installed on poles or structures over roads, called
gantries, picked up information from the same visitor, regardless of
whether the individual was entering or exiting in a vehicle or on foot.
Thus, cross-reads resulted in inaccurate record keeping. According to a
January 2006 US-VISIT corrective-action report, remedying cross-reads
would require changes to equipment and infrastructure on a case-by-case
basis at each land POE, because each has a different physical
configuration of buildings, roadways, roofs, gantries, poles, and other
surfaces against which the signals can bounce and cause cross-reads.
Each would therefore require a different physical solution to avoid the
signal interference that triggers cross-reads. Although cost estimates
or time lines had not been developed for such alterations to facilities
and equipment, it is possible that having to alter the physical
configuration at each land POE in some regard and then test each
separately to ensure that cross-reads had been eliminated would be both
time consuming and potentially costly, in terms of changes to
infrastructure and equipment.
However, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and
deadlines set, questions remain about DHS's intentions going forward.
For example, the RFID solution did not meet the congressional
requirement for a biometric exit capability because the technology that
had been tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT--ensuring that
visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave. By design,
an RFID tag embedded in an I-94 arrival/departure form cannot provide
the biometric identity-matching capability that is envisioned as part
of a comprehensive entry/exit border security system using biometric
identifiers for tracking overstays and others entering, exiting, and re-
entering the country. Specifically, the RFID tag in the I-94 form
cannot be physically tied to an individual. This situation means that
while a document may be detected as leaving the country, the person to
whom it was issued at time of entry may be somewhere else.
Our report also noted that DHS was to have reported to Congress by June
2005 on how the agency intended to fully implement a biometric entry/
exit program. As of October 2006, this plan was still under review in
the Office of the Secretary, according to US-VISIT officials. According
to statute, this plan is to include, among other things, a description
of the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a
comprehensive entry and exit screening system--including both biometric
entry and exit--and fulfills statutory obligations imposed on the
program by several laws enacted between 1996 and 2002.[Footnote 24]
Until such a plan is finalized and issued, DHS is not able to
articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together--including any
interim nonbiometric solutions--and neither DHS nor Congress is
positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT exit
capability or plan for the program's future.
DHS Had Not Articulated How US-VISIT Strategically Fits with Other Land
Border Security Initiatives:
My statement will now focus on DHS efforts to define how US-VISIT fits
with other emerging border security initiatives.
DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT strategically fits with other land
border security initiatives. In recent years, DHS has planned or
implemented a number of initiatives aimed at securing the nation's
borders. In September 2003, we reported that agency programs need to
properly fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of
program operations--e.g., what functions are to be performed by whom;
when and where they are to be performed; what information is to be used
to perform them; what rules and standards will govern the application
of technology to support them; and what facility or infrastructure
changes will be needed to ensure that they operate in harmony and as
intended.[Footnote 25] We further stated that DHS had not defined key
aspects of the larger homeland security environment in which US-VISIT
would need to operate. For example, certain policy and standards
decisions had not been made, such as whether official travel documents
would be required for all persons who enter and exit the country,
including U.S. and Canadian citizens, and how many fingerprints would
be collected--factors that could potentially increase inspection times
and ultimately increase traveler wait times at some of the higher
volume land POE facilities. To minimize the impact of these changes, we
recommended that DHS clarify the context in which US-VISIT is to
operate. Our December 2006 report noted that, 3 years later, defining
this strategic context remained a work in progress. Thus, the program's
relationships and dependencies with other closely allied initiatives
and programs were still unclear.
According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, the Program Office drafted
in March 2005 a strategic plan that showed how US-VISIT would be
strategically aligned with DHS's organizational mission and also
defined an overall vision for immigration and border
management.[Footnote 26] According to this official, the draft plan
provided for an immigration and border management enterprise that
unified multiple internal departmental and other external stakeholders
with common objectives, strategies, processes, and infrastructures. As
of October 2006, we were told that DHS had not approved this strategic
plan. This draft plan was not available to us, and it is unclear how it
would provide an overarching vision and road map of how all these
component elements can at this time be addressed given that critical
elements of other emerging border security initiatives have yet to be
finalized.
For example, under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, DHS and the Department of State are to develop and implement a
plan, no later than June 2009, which requires U.S. citizens and foreign
nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico to present a passport or other
document or combination of documents deemed sufficient to show identity
and citizenship to enter the United States (this is currently not a
requirement for these individuals entering the United States via land
POEs from within the Western Hemisphere).[Footnote 27] This effort,
known as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), was first
announced in 2005, and some members of Congress and others have raised
questions about agencies' progress carrying out WHTI. In May 2006, we
issued a report that provided our observations on efforts to implement
WHTI along the U.S. border with Canada.[Footnote 28] We stated that DHS
and the Department of State had taken some steps to carry out the
Travel Initiative, but they had a long way to go to implement their
proposed plans, and time was slipping by. Among other things, we found
that:
* key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a
passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of Canada
enter or return to the United States--a decision critical to making
decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the country,
including what common facilities or infrastructure might be needed to
perform these inspections at land POEs, and:
* a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form
of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help
DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not made
decisions involving a broad set of considerations that included (1)
utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2)
ensuring that proper equipment and facilities are in place to
facilitate crossings at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility
with other border crossing technology already in use.
As of September 2006, DHS had still not finalized plans for changing
the inspection process and using technology to process U.S. citizens
and foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico re-entering or
entering the country at land POEs. In the absence of decisions about
the strategic direction of both programs, it was unclear (1) how the
technology used to facilitate border crossings under the Travel
Initiative would be integrated with US-VISIT technology, if at all, and
(2) how land POE facilities would have to be modified to accommodate
both programs to ensure efficient inspections that do not seriously
affect wait times. This raises the possibility that CBP would be faced
with managing differing technology platforms and border inspection
processes at high-volume land POEs facilities that, according to DHS,
already face space constraints and congestion.
Similarly, our December 2006 report noted that it is not clear how US-
VISIT is to operate in relation to another emerging border security
effort, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a comprehensive DHS
initiative, announced last year, to secure the country's borders and
reduce illegal migration. Under SBI and its CBP component, called
SBInet, DHS plans to use a systems approach to integrate personnel,
infrastructures, technologies, and rapid response capability into a
comprehensive border protection system. DHS reports that, among other
things, SBInet is to encompass both the northern and southern land
borders, including the Great Lakes, under a unified border control
strategy whereby CBP is to focus on the interdiction of cross-border
violations between the ports and at the official land POEs and funnel
traffic to the land POEs. As part of SBI, DHS also plans to focus on
interior enforcement--disrupting and dismantling cross border crime
into the interior of the United States while locating and removing
aliens who are present in the United States in violation of law.
Although DHS has published some information on SBI and SBInet, it
remains unclear how SBInet will be linked, if at all, to US-VISIT so
that the two systems can share technology, infrastructure, and data
across programs.
Also, given the absence of a comprehensive entry and exit system,
questions remain about what meaningful data US-VISIT may be able to
provide other DHS components, such as Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), to ensure that DHS can, from an interior enforcement
perspective, identify and remove foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT
who may have overstayed their visas. In a May 2004 report, we stated
that although no firm estimates were available, the extent of
overstaying is significant.[Footnote 29] We stated that most long-term
overstays appeared to be motivated by economic opportunities, but a few
had been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related
activities. Notably, some of the September 11 hijackers had overstayed
their visas. We further reported that US-VISIT held promise for
identifying and tracking overstays as long as it could overcome
weaknesses matching visitors' entry and exit.
[Footnote 30]Conclusions, Recommendations, and Agency Response:
Developing and deploying complex technology that records the entry and
exit of millions of visitors to the United States, verifies their
identities to mitigate the likelihood that terrorists or criminals can
enter or exit at will, and tracks persons who remain in the country
longer than authorized is a worthy goal in our nation's effort to
enhance border security in a post-9/11 era. But doing so also poses
significant challenges; foremost among them is striking a reasonable
balance between US-VISIT's goals of providing security to U.S. citizens
and visitors while facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
DHS has made considerable progress making the entry portion of the US-
VISIT program at land POEs operational, but our work raised questions
whether DHS has adequately assessed how US-VISIT has affected
operations at land POEs. Because US-VISIT will likely continue to have
an impact on land POE facilities as it evolves--especially as new
technology and equipment are introduced--it is important for US-VISIT
and CBP officials to have sufficient management controls for
identifying and reporting potential computer and other operational
problems that could affect the ability of US-VISIT entry capability to
operate as intended. For example, if disruptions to US-VISIT computer
operations are not consistently and promptly reported and resolved, it
is possible that a critical US-VISIT function--notably, the ability to
use biometric information to confirm visitors' identities through
various databases--could be disrupted, as has occurred in the past. The
need to avoid disruptions to biometric verification is important given
that one of the primary goals of US-VISIT is to enhance the security of
U.S. citizens and visitors, and in light of the substantial investment
DHS has made in US-VISIT technology and equipment. To help DHS achieve
benefits commensurate with its investment in US-VISIT at land POEs and
security goals and objectives, we recommended that DHS (1) improve
existing controls for identifying and reporting computer processing and
other operational problems to help ensure that these controls are
consistently administered and (2) develop performance measures
specifically for assessing the impact of US-VISIT operations at land
POEs.
With respect to DHS's effort to create an exit verification capability,
developing and deploying this capability at land POEs has posed a set
of challenges that are distinct from those associated with entry. US-
VISIT has not determined whether it can achieve, in a realistic time
frame, or at an acceptable cost, the legislatively mandated capability
to record the exit of travelers at land POEs using biometric
technology. Apart from acquiring new facilities and infrastructure at
an estimated cost of billions of dollars, US-VISIT officials have
acknowledged that no technology now exists to reliably record
travelers' exit from the country, and to ensure that the person leaving
the country is the same person who entered, without requiring that
person to stop upon exit--potentially imposing a substantial burden on
travelers and commerce. US-VISIT officials stated that they believe a
biometrically based solution that does not require those exiting the
country to stop for processing, that minimizes the need for major
facility changes, and that can be used to definitively match a
visitor's entry and exit will be available in 5 to 10 years. In the
interim, it remains unclear how DHS plans to proceed. According to
statute, DHS was required to report more than a year ago on its plans
for developing a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system, but DHS
has yet to finalize this road map for Congress. Until DHS finalizes
such a plan, neither Congress nor DHS is likely to have sufficient
information as a basis for decisions about various factors relevant to
the success of US-VISIT, ranging from funding needed for any land POE
facility modifications in support of the installation of exit
technology to the trade-offs associated with ensuring traveler
convenience while providing verification of travelers' departure
consistent with US-VISIT's national security and law enforcement goals.
We recommended that as DHS finalizes the mandated report, the Secretary
take steps to ensure that the report includes, among other things,
information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying
biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs. Our
recommendation also stated that DHS's report should include a
description of how DHS plans to align US-VISIT with other emerging land
border security initiatives and what facilities or facility
modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that different
technologies and processes work in harmony. By showing how these
initiatives are to be aligned, Congress, DHS, and others would be in a
better position to understand what resources and tools are needed to
ensure success and ensure that land POE facilities are positioned to
accommodate them.
DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it either
had begun to take or was planning to take actions to implement them. It
acknowledged that the exit technology tested by DHS would not satisfy
statutory requirements for a biometric exit system and said that it
would perform research and industry outreach to satisfy the mandate.
DHS, however, disagreed with our finding that the US-VISIT Program
Office did not fully consider the impact of US-VISIT on the overall
operations at POEs. It said that US-VISIT impacts are limited to
changes in Form I-94 processing time, which according to officials,
improved, and that issues related to capacity, staffing, and other
factors are "arguably" beyond the scope of US-VISIT. We agree that the
approach taken to do operational assessments of the impact of US-VISIT
land POE facilities focused on changes to I-94 processing time. Our
concern is that the assessments did not examine other operational
factors, such as US-VISIT's impact on physical facilities, to help
ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended. We believe more complete
assessments of the impact of US-VISIT on land POE operations would
better position DHS to anticipate potential problems and develop
solutions, especially as additional US-VISIT capabilities, such as 10-
fingerprint scanning, are introduced at these facilities.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that Members of the Subcommittee may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-8816. John Mortin, Assistant Director; Amy Bernstein; Frances
Cook; Odi Cuero; Richard Hung; Amanda Miller; James R. Russell; and
Jonathan Tumin made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Legislative Overview of the US-VISIT Program:
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
originally required the development of an automated entry and exit
control system to collect a record of departure for every alien
departing the United States and match the record of departure with the
record of the alien's arrival in the United States; make it possible to
identify nonimmigrants who remain in the country beyond the authorized
period; and not significantly disrupt trade, tourism, or other
legitimate cross-border traffic at land border ports of entry. It also
required the integration of overstay information into appropriate
databases of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State, including those used at ports of entry and at
consular offices. The system was originally to be developed by
September 30, 1998; this deadline was changed to October 15, 1998, and
was changed again for land border ports of entry and sea ports to March
30, 2001.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement
Act (DMIA) of 2000 replaced the 1996 statute in its entirety, requiring
instead an electronic system that would provide access to and integrate
alien arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to be
created or collected under law, are in an electronic format, and are in
a database of the Department of Justice or the Department of State,
including those created or used at ports of entry and at consular
offices. The act specifically provided that it not be construed to
permit the imposition of any new documentary or data collection
requirements on any person for the purpose of satisfying its
provisions, but it further provided that it also not be construed to
reduce or curtail any authority of the Attorney General (now Secretary
of Homeland Security) or Secretary of State under any other provision
of law. The integrated entry and exit data system was to be implemented
at airports and seaports by December 31, 2003, at the 50 busiest land
ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and at all remaining ports of
entry by December 31, 2005.
The DMIA also required that the system use available data to produce a
report of arriving and departing aliens by country of nationality,
classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant, and date of arrival in
and departure from the United States. The system was to match an
alien's available arrival data with the alien's available departure
data, assist in the identification of possible overstays, and use
available alien arrival and departure data for annual reports to
Congress. These reports were to include the number of aliens for whom
departure data were collected during the reporting period, with an
accounting by country of nationality; the number of departing aliens
whose departure data were successfully matched to the alien's arrival
data, with an accounting by country of nationality and classification
as an immigrant or nonimmigrant; the number of aliens who arrived
pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa, or as a visitor under the visa waiver
program, for whom no matching departure data have been obtained as of
the end of the alien's authorized period of stay, with an accounting by
country of nationality and date of arrival in the United States; and
the number of identified overstays, with an accounting by country of
nationality.
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act provided that, in developing the
integrated entry and exit data system under the DMIA, the Attorney
General (now Secretary of Homeland Security) and Secretary of State
were to focus particularly on the utilization of biometric technology
and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of
entry. It also required that the system be able to interface with law
enforcement databases for use by federal law enforcement to identify
and detain individuals who pose a threat to the national security of
the United States. The PATRIOT Act also required by January 26, 2003,
the development and certification of a technology standard, including
appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be used to verify
the identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa or persons seeking to
enter the United States pursuant to a visa for the purposes of
conducting background checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a
person has not received a visa under a different name. This technology
standard was to be the technological basis for a cross-agency, cross-
platform electronic system that is a cost-effective, efficient, fully
interoperable means to share law enforcement and intelligence
information necessary to confirm the identity of persons applying for a
U.S. visa or persons seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a
visa. This electronic system was to be readily and easily accessible to
consular officers, border inspection agents, and law enforcement and
intelligence officers responsible for investigation or identification
of aliens admitted to the United States pursuant to a visa. Every 2
years, beginning on October 26, 2002, the Attorney General (now
Secretary of Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State were to
jointly report to Congress on the development, implementation,
efficacy, and privacy implications of the technology standard and
electronic database system.
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 required
that, in developing the integrated entry and exit data system for the
ports of entry under the DMIA, the Attorney General (now Secretary of
Homeland Security) and Secretary of State implement, fund, and use the
technology standard required by the USA PATRIOT Act at U.S. ports of
entry and at consular posts abroad. The act also required the
establishment of a database containing the arrival and departure data
from machine-readable visas, passports, and other travel and entry
documents possessed by aliens and the interoperability of all security
databases relevant to making determinations of admissibility under
section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In implementing
these requirements, the INS (now the Department of Homeland Security
[DHS]) and the Department of State were to utilize technologies that
facilitate the lawful and efficient cross-border movement of commerce
and persons without compromising the safety and security of the United
States and were to consider implementing a North American National
Security Program, for which other provisions in the act called for a
feasibility study.
The act, as amended, also established a number of requirements
regarding biometric travel and entry documents. It required that not
later than October 26, 2004, the Attorney General (now Secretary of
Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State issue to aliens only
machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry
documents that use biometric identifiers and that they jointly
establish document authentication standards and biometric identifiers
standards to be employed on such visas and other travel and entry
documents from among those biometric identifiers recognized by domestic
and international standards organizations. It also required by October
26, 2005, the installation at all ports of entry of the United States
of equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and
authentication of all U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents
issued to aliens and passports issued by visa waiver participants. Such
biometric data readers and scanners were to be those that domestic and
international standards organizations determine to be highly accurate
when used to verify identity, that can read the biometric identifiers
used under the act, and that can authenticate the document presented to
verify identity. These systems also were to utilize the technology
standard established pursuant to the PATRIOT Act.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 did not
amend the existing statutory provisions governing US-VISIT, but it did
establish additional statutory requirements concerning the program. It
described the program as an "automated biometric entry and exit data
system" and required DHS to develop a plan to accelerate the full
implementation of the program and to report to Congress on this plan by
June 15, 2005. The report was to provide several types of information
about the implementation of US-VISIT, including a "listing of ports of
entry and other DHS and Department of State locations with biometric
exit data systems in use." The report also was to provide a description
of the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a
comprehensive entry and exit screening system, "including both entry
and exit biometric;" and fulfills the statutory obligations imposed on
the program by several laws enacted between 1996 and 2002. The act
provided that US-VISIT "shall include a requirement for the collection
of biometric exit data for all categories of individuals who are
required to provide biometric entry data, regardless of the port of
entry where such categories of individuals entered the United States."
The new provisions in the 2004 act also addressed integration and
interoperability of databases and data systems that process or contain
information on aliens and federal law enforcement and intelligence
information relevant to visa issuance and admissibility of aliens;
maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the US-VISIT data system;
using the system to track and facilitate the processing of immigration
benefits using biometric identifiers; the goals of the program (e.g.,
serving as a vital counterterrorism tool, screening visitors
efficiently and in a welcoming manner, integrating relevant databases
and plans for database modifications to address volume increase and
database usage, and providing inspectors and related personnel with
adequate real time information); training, education, and outreach on
US-VISIT, low-risk visitor programs, and immigration law; annual
compliance reports by DHS, State, the Department of Justice, and any
other department or agency subject to the requirements of the new
provisions; and development and implementation of a registered traveler
program.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, D.C.: December 2006), which is the publicly
available version of our report entitled Border Security: US-VISIT
Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at
Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-56SU (Washington, D.C.: November 2006).
[2] A port of entry is generally a physical location, such as a
pedestrian walkway and/or a vehicle plaza with booths, and associated
inspection and administration buildings, at a land border crossing
point, or a restricted area inside an airport or seaport, where entry
into the country by persons and cargo arriving by air, land, or sea is
controlled by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
[3] The Visa Waiver Program enables nationals of certain countries to
travel to the United States for tourism or business for stays of 90
days or less without obtaining a visa. Most western European countries
participate in this program, along with Japan, Singapore, Australia,
Brunei, and New Zealand.
[4] To visit the United States, Mexican citizens generally need either
a Mexican passport and U.S. visa, or a Border Crossing Card (BCC),
which is issued to Mexican visitors who wish to enter the country for
business or pleasure for no more than 6 months. The BCC contains
machine-readable biographic and biometric information. Mexican citizens
with BCCs who are traveling within 25 miles of the border, (75 miles in
Arizona, if entering through certain POEs near Tucson) and who plan to
stay no more than 30 days, are generally not subject to US- VISIT
processing upon entry. A Mexican citizen is subject to US-VISIT
requirements, however, if a CBP officer determines that the entrant
intends to stay more than 30 days or travel beyond the 25-or 75-mile
limit.
[5] On July 27, 2006, DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that,
if finalized, would expand the scope of US-VISIT to include, among
others, lawful permanent residents, aliens seeking admission on
immigrant visas, refugees and asylees, and certain categories of
Canadians. DHS did not report how many additional persons would be
covered by US-VISIT if the rule was adopted.
[6] Visitors traveling on nonimmigrant visas are issued Form I-94 and
visitors from Visa Waiver Program countries are issued Form I-94W. Both
forms show the date of arrival, port of entry, and date the authorized
period of admission expires.
[7] GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation
Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 19, 2003).
[8] See appendix I for a legislative overview of the US-VISIT program.
[9] GAO-03-1083.
[10] GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation
Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-04-569T (Washington, D.C.:
March 2004).
[11] GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration
Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586
(Washington, D.C.: May 2004).
[12] GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Key Border
Security Programs Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2006).
[13] Since the statute governing US-VISIT applies to foreign national
arrival and departure data only, U.S. citizens do not fall within the
scope of the program and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT screening.
Also, in general, regardless of whether they are to be processed into
US-VISIT, Mexican citizens must present either a passport and visa or a
BCC when seeking admission to the United States, while Canadian
citizens generally do not need such documents at this time (Canadian
visitors at land POEs may need passports as early as January 2008,
however, under regulations implementing a new statutory provision on
passport requirements). According to US-VISIT, when a Mexican receives
a BCC, the data on the individual entered into U.S. databases at the
time of their visa application are accessible by US-VISIT--if they are
to be processed into it for any reason.
[14] Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 543, 557-59), commercial
air and sea carriers are to transmit crew and passenger manifests to
appropriate immigration officials before arrival of an aircraft or
vessel in the United States. These manifests are transmitted to CBP
through the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), which helps
officers identify (1) those arrivals for which biometric data are
available and (2) foreign nationals who need to be scrutinized more
closely.
[15] At land border POEs, the Form I-94 issued to foreign nationals
covered by US-VISIT who are deemed admissible is considered issued for
multiple entries, unless specifically annotated otherwise. A multiple
entry I-94 permits them to re-enter the country, generally for up to 6
months, without additional US-VISIT processing during the period
covered by the I-94.
[16] US-VISIT was not installed at 14 of the 16 other POEs because
visitors subject to US-VISIT are not permitted to enter the country at
those locations; at the other 2 POEs, DHS lacked the infrastructure
needed to install the equipment.
[17] GAO-06-296.
[18] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November
1999) and GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management
and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[19] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 7208,
8 U.S.C. § 1365b. See also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
414(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 353 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1365a(b)(2)-(4).
[20] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Virginia: Jan. 31, 2005).
[21] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL
(Rosslyn, Virginia: Jan. 31, 2005).
[22] 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d).
[23] A US-VISIT program official explained that for vehicles exiting
during RFID testing, one could "reasonably expect" a read rate of 70
percent because vehicles are not required to stop upon exit. The
official also cited vehicle speed, safety, and awareness (of optimal
positioning of the arrival/departure form; for example, holding the
form up to the window of the vehicle) as factors that affected RFID
read rates.
[24] 8 U.S.C. §1365b(c)(2)(E).
[25] GAO-03-1083.
[26] In commenting on our December 2006 report, DHS stated that this
plan includes US-VISIT's draft response to the legislative requirement
that DHS produce a report to Congress by June 2005 that describes a
comprehensive US-VISIT entry/exit screening system, as discussed
earlier in this report.
[27] In November 2006, DHS and the Department of State issued a final
rule announcing that, beginning on January 23, 2007, citizens of the
United States, Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda generally are required to
present a passport to enter the United States when arriving by air from
any part of the Western Hemisphere (8 C.F.R. Parts 212 and 235 and 22
C.F.R. Parts 41 and 53). According to DHS, a separate proposed rule
addressing land and sea travel will be published at a later date with
specific requirements for travelers entering the United States through
land and sea POEs. By law, these new requirements are to be in place no
later than June 2009.
[28] GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative on the U.S. Canadian Border, GAO-06-741R (Washington,
D.C.: May 25, 2006).
[29] GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a
Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004).
[30] 8 U.S.C.A. §1365c(2)(A)(ii).
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