Aviation Security
DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-08-139T October 16, 2007Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to protect the nation's transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. GAO examined (1) the progress DHS and TSA have made in securing the nation's commercial aviation system, and (2) challenges that have impeded the Department's efforts to implement its mission and management functions. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the security of the nation's commercial aviation system, including a recently issued report (GAO-07-454) that highlights the progress DHS has made in implementing its mission and management functions.
In August 2007, GAO reported that DHS had made moderate progress in securing the commercial aviation system, but that more work remains. Specifically, DHS generally achieved 17 of the 24 performance expectations that GAO identified in the area of aviation security but had generally not achieved 7 of them. DHS and TSA have made progress in many areas related to securing commercial aviation. For example, to meet congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage, TSA initially hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners and installed equipment at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation security officer (TSO)------formerly known as screener------workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. While these efforts have helped strengthen the security of the commercial aviation system, DHS and TSA still face a number of key challenges in further securing this system. For example, TSA has faced difficulties in developing and implementing its advanced passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed development efforts. In addition, DHS's efforts to enhance perimeter security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for effective security. TSA has also initiated efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems, but has not developed a plan for implementing new technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports. TSA has also not yet effectively deployed checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. GAO also reported that a number of issues have impeded DHS's efforts in implementing its mission and management functions, including not always implementing effective strategic planning or fully adopting and applying a risk management approach with respect to commercial aviation security.
GAO-08-139T, Aviation Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-139T
entitled 'Aviation Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the
Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain' which was
released on October 16, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection, House Committee on Homeland Security:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, October 16, 2007:
Aviation Security:
DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but
Key Challenges Remain:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-08-139T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-139T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, House Committee
on Homeland Security.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation
Security Administration‘s (TSA) mission is to protect the nation‘s
transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed
and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure
commercial aviation. GAO examined (1) the progress DHS and TSA have
made in securing the nation‘s commercial aviation system, and (2)
challenges that have impeded the Department‘s efforts to implement its
mission and management functions. This testimony is based on issued GAO
reports and testimonies addressing the security of the nation‘s
commercial aviation system, including a recently issued report (GAO-07-
454) that highlights the progress DHS has made in implementing its
mission and management functions.
What GAO Found:
In August 2007, GAO reported that DHS had made moderate progress in
securing the commercial aviation system, but that more work remains.
Specifically, DHS generally achieved 17 of the 24 performance
expectations that GAO identified in the area of aviation security but
had generally not achieved 7 of them. DHS and TSA have made progress in
many areas related to securing commercial aviation. For example, to
meet congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and 100
percent of checked baggage, TSA initially hired and deployed a federal
workforce of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners and
installed equipment at the nation‘s more than 400 commercial airports
to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive
detection systems. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other
things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently
allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation security officer
(TSO)--formerly known as screener--workforce; strengthening screening
procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient
screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security.
While these efforts have helped strengthen the security of the
commercial aviation system, DHS and TSA still face a number of key
challenges in further securing this system. For example, TSA has faced
difficulties in developing and implementing its advanced passenger
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed
development efforts. In addition, DHS‘s efforts to enhance perimeter
security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for effective
security. TSA has also initiated efforts to evaluate the effectiveness
of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification
systems, but has not developed a plan for implementing new technologies
to meet the security needs of individual airports. TSA has also not yet
effectively deployed checkpoint technologies to address key existing
vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies
needed to screen air cargo. GAO also reported that a number of issues
have impeded DHS‘s efforts in implementing its mission and management
functions, including not always implementing effective strategic
planning or fully adopting and applying a risk management approach with
respect to commercial aviation security.
What GAO Recommends:
In prior reports, GAO made a number of recommendations to DHS and TSA
to strengthen their efforts to secure the commercial aviation system.
DHS and TSA generally agreed with the recommendations and have taken
steps to implement some of them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-139T]. For more information, contact
Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today‘s hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) progress and
challenges in securing our nation‘s aviation system. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), originally established as an agency
within the Department of Transportation in 2001 but now a component
within DHS, is charged with securing the transportation network while
also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. TSA has primary
responsibility for security in all modes of transportation and since
its inception has developed and implemented a variety of programs and
procedures to secure the commercial aviation system. Other DHS
components, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the
private sector also play a role in aviation security. For example, the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has responsibility for
conducting passenger prescreening”in general, the matching of passenger
information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft‘s
departure”for international flights operating to or from the United
States, as well as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the
United States. In accordance with TSA requirements, airport authorities
are responsible for implementing measures to secure access to
restricted airport areas as well as airport perimeters, while air
carriers are responsible for inspecting air cargo, among other things.
My testimony today will focus on: (1) the progress TSA and other DHS
components have made in securing the nation‘s commercial aviation
system and (2) challenges that have impeded DHS‘s (and, as they relate
to transportation security, TSA) efforts to implement its mission and
management functions. My comments are based on issued GAO reports and
testimonies addressing the security of the nation‘s aviation system,
including an August 2007 report that highlights the progress DHS has
made in implementing its mission and management functions. [Footnote 1]
In this report, we reviewed the extent to which DHS has taken actions
to achieve performance expectations in each of its mission and
management areas that we identified from legislation, Homeland Security
Presidential Directives, and DHS strategic planning documents. Based
primarily on our past work, we made a determination regarding whether
DHS generally achieved or generally did not achieve the key elements of
each performance expectation. An assessment of ’generally achieved“
indicates that DHS has taken sufficient actions to satisfy most
elements of the expectation; however, an assessment of ’generally
achieved“ does not signify that no further action is required of DHS or
that functions covered by the expectation cannot be further improved or
enhanced. Conversely, an assessment of ’generally not achieved“
indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most elements
of the performance expectation. In determining the department‘s overall
level of progress in achieving performance expectations in each of its
mission and management areas, we concluded whether the department had
made limited, modest, moderate, or substantial progress. [Footnote 2]
These assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they intended to
reflect, the extent to which actions by DHS and its components have
made the nation more secure. We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Within DHS, TSA is the agency with primary responsibility for securing
the transportation sector and has undertaken a number of initiatives to
strengthen the security of the nation‘s commercial aviation system. In
large part, these efforts have been driven by legislative mandates
designed to strengthen the security of commercial aviation following
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In August 2007, we reported
that DHS had made moderate progress in securing the aviation
transportation network, but that more work remains. [Footnote 3]
Specifically, of the 24 performance expectations we identified for DHS
in the area of aviation security, we reported that it has generally
achieved 17 of these expectations and has generally not achieved 7
expectations.
DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in many areas related to
securing commercial aviation, and their efforts should be commended.
Meeting statutory mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent
of checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA
initially hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 50,000
passenger and checked baggage screeners, and installed equipment at the
nation‘s more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to
screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as
mandated by law. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other
things, strengthening passenger prescreening”in general, the matching
of passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to an
aircraft‘s departure; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and
managing the transportation security officer (TSO)”formerly known as
screener”workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and
deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and
improving domestic air cargo security. In addition to TSA, CBP has also
taken steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for passengers on
international flights operating to or from the United States, as well
as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.
DHS‘s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken actions
to research and develop aviation security technologies.
While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the
commercial aviation system, DHS still faces a number of key challenges
that need to be addressed to meet expectations set out for them by the
Congress, the Administration, and the Department itself. For example,
TSA has faced challenges in developing and implementing its passenger
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed
development efforts. As planned, this program would initially assume
from air carriers the responsibility for matching information on
airline passengers traveling domestically against terrorists watch
lists. In addition, while TSA has taken actions to enhance perimeter
security at airports, these actions may not be sufficient to provide
for effective security. TSA has also begun efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric
identification systems. However, TSA has not developed a plan for
implementing new technologies to meet the security needs of individual
airports and the commercial airport system as a whole. Further, TSA has
not yet deployed checkpoint technologies to address key existing
vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies
needed to screen air cargo.
A variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS‘s and, as they
relate to transportation security, TSA‘s efforts in implementing its
mission and management functions. These key issues include agency
transformation, strategic planning and results management, risk
management, information sharing, and stakeholder coordination. In
working towards transforming the department into an effective and
efficient organization, DHS and its components have not always been
transparent, which has affected our ability to perform our oversight
responsibilities in a timely manner. They have also not always
implemented effective strategic planning efforts, fully developed
performance measures, or put into place structures to help ensure that
they are managing for results. In addition, DHS and its components can
more fully adopt and apply a risk management approach in implementing
its security mission and core management functions. [Footnote 4] They
could also better share information with federal, state, and local
governments and private sector entities, and more fully coordinate its
activities with key stakeholders.
Background:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in
November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation. [Footnote 5] TSA‘s aviation security mission
includes strengthening the security of airport perimeters and
restricted airport areas; hiring and training a screening workforce;
prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening
passengers, baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports
nation-wide, among other responsibilities. While TSA has operational
responsibility for physically screening passengers and their baggage,
TSA exercises regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for the security
of airports and air cargo. Specifically, airports, air carriers, and
other entities are required to implement security measures in
accordance with TSA-issued security requirements, against which TSA
evaluates their compliance efforts. Background TSA also oversees air
carriers‘ efforts to prescreen passengers”in general, the matching of
passenger information against terrorist watch lists”prior to an
aircraft‘s departure. TSA plans to take over operational responsibility
for this function with the implementation of its Secure Flight program
initially for passengers traveling domestically. CBP has responsibility
for conducting passenger prescreening for airline passengers on
international flights departing from and bound for the United States,
[Footnote 6] while DHS‘s Science and Technology Directorate is
responsible for researching and developing technologies to secure the
transportation sector.
DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation‘s Commercial Aviation
System, but More Work Remains:
DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken numerous
initiatives since its inception to strengthen the security of the
nation‘s commercial aviation system. In large part, these efforts have
been affected by legislative mandates designed to strengthen the
security of commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. These efforts have also been affected by events
external to the department, including the alleged August 2006 terrorist
plot to blow up commercial aircraft bound from London to the United
States. For example, TSA has undertaken efforts to hire, train, and
deploy a screening workforce; and screen passengers, baggage, and
cargo. Although TSA has taken important actions to strengthen aviation
security, the agency has faced difficulties in implementing an
advanced, government-run passenger prescreening program for domestic
flights, and in developing and implementing technology to screen
passengers at security checkpoints and cargo placed on aircraft, among
other areas. As shown in table 1, we identified 24 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security, and found that
overall, DHS has made moderate progress in meeting these expectations.
Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance
expectations and has generally not achieved 7 performance expectations.
We identified these performance expectations through reviews of key
legislation, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and DHS
strategic planning documents.
Table 1: Performance Expectations and Progress Made in Aviation
Security:
Performance expectation:
Aviation security strategic approach: Implement a strategic approach
for aviation security functions;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Establish standards and
procedures for effective airport perimeter security;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Establish standards and
procedures to effectively control access to airport secured areas;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Establish procedures
for implementing biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas
access control;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Airport perimeter security and access controls: Ensure the screening of
airport employees against terrorist watch lists;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Hire and deploy a federal screening
workforce;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Develop standards for determining aviation
security staffing at airports;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Establish standards for training and
testing the performance of airport screener staff;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Establish a program and requirements to
allow eligible airports to use a private screening workforce;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Train and deploy federal air marshals on
high-risk flights;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Establish standards for training flight
and cabin crews;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Aviation security workforce: Establish a program to allow authorized
flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or
criminal acts;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Passenger prescreening: Establish policies and procedures to ensure
that individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk or
threat to security are identified and subjected to appropriate action;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Passenger prescreening: Develop and implement an advanced prescreening
system to allow DHS to compare domestic passenger information to the
Selectee List and No Fly List;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Passenger prescreening: Develop and implement an international
passenger prescreening process to compare passenger information to
terrorist watch lists before aircraft departure;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Checkpoint screening: Develop and implement processes and procedures
for physically screening passengers at airport checkpoints;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Checkpoint screening: Develop and test checkpoint technologies to
address vulnerabilities;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Checkpoint screening: Deploy checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Checked Baggage screening: Deploy explosive detection systems (EDS) and
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems to screen checked baggage for
explosives;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Checked Baggage screening: Develop a plan to deploy in-line baggage
screening equipment at airports;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Checked Baggage screening: Pursue the deployment and use of in-line
baggage screening equipment at airports;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Air cargo security: Develop a plan for air cargo security;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Air cargo security: Develop and implement procedures to screen air
cargo;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Check];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation:
Air cargo security: Develop and implement technologies to screen air
cargo;
Assessment: Generally achieved; [Empty];
Assessment: Generally not achieved; [Check];
Assessment: No assessment made; [Empty].
Performance expectation: Total;
Assessment: Generally achieved; 17;
Assessment: Generally not achieved; 7;
Assessment: No assessment made; 0.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Aviation Security Strategic Approach. We concluded that DHS has
generally achieved this performance expectation. In our past work, we
reported that TSA identified and implemented a wide range of
initiatives to strengthen the security of key components of the
commercial aviation system. These components are interconnected and
each is critical to the overall security of commercial aviation.
[Footnote 7] More recently, in March 2007, TSA released its National
Strategy on Aviation Security and six supporting plans that provided
more detailed strategic planning guidance in the areas of systems
security; operational threat response; systems recovery; domain
surveillance; and intelligence integration and domestic and
international outreach. According to TSA officials, an Interagency
Implementation Working Group was established under TSA leadership in
January 2007 to initiate implementation efforts for the 112 actions
outlined in the supporting plans.
Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. We concluded that DHS
has generally achieved one, and has generally not achieved three, of
the performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA has taken
action to ensure the screening of airport employees against terrorist
watch lists by requiring airport operators to compare applicants‘ names
against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. [Footnote 8] However, in June
2004, we reported that although TSA had begun evaluating commercial
airport perimeter and access control security through regulatory
compliance inspections, covert testing of selected access procedures,
and vulnerability assessments at selected airports, TSA had not
determined how the results of these evaluations could be used to make
improvements to the nation‘s airport system as a whole. We further
reported that although TSA had begun evaluating the controls that limit
access into secured airport areas, it had not completed actions to
ensure that all airport workers in these areas were vetted prior to
being hired and trained. [Footnote 9] More recently, in March 2007, the
DHS Office of Inspector General, based on the results of its access
control testing at 14 domestic airports across the nation, made various
recommendations to enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that
limit access to airport secured areas. [Footnote 10] In March through
July 2007, DHS provided us with updated information on procedures,
plans, and other efforts it had implemented to secure airport
perimeters and strengthen access controls, including a description of
its Aviation Direct Access Screening Program. This program provides for
TSOs to randomly screen airport and airline employees and employees‘
property and vehicles as they enter the secured areas of airports for
the presence of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other items of
interest as well as improper airport identification. However, DHS did
not provide us with evidence that these actions provide for effective
airport perimeter security, nor information on how the actions
addressed all relevant requirements established by law and in our prior
recommendations.
Regarding procedures for implementing biometric identification systems,
we reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new
technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports and the
commercial airport system as a whole. [Footnote 11]
In December 2004 and September 2006, we reported on the status of the
development and testing of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential program (TWIC) [Footnote 12] – DHS‘s effort to develop
biometric access control systems to verify the identity of individuals
accessing secure transportation areas. Our 2004 report identified
challenges that TSA faced in developing regulations and a comprehensive
plan for managing the program, as well as several factors that caused
TSA to miss initial deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. In our September
2006 report, we identified the challenges that TSA encountered during
TWIC program testing, and several problems related to contract planning
and oversight. Specifically, we reported that DHS and industry
stakeholders faced difficult challenges in ensuring that biometric
access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime
environment where the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program is being initially tested. In October 2007, we testified that
TSA had made progress in implementing the program and addressing our
recommendations regarding contract planning and oversight and
coordination with stakeholders. For example, TSA reported that it added
staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee
the contract and developed plans for conducting public outreach and
education efforts. [Footnote 13] However, DHS has not yet determined
how and when it will implement a biometric identification system for
access controls at commercials airports. We have initiated ongoing work
to further assess DHS‘s efforts to establish procedures for
implementing biometric identifier systems for airport secured areas
access control.
Aviation Security Workforce. We concluded that DHS has generally
achieved all 7 performance expectations in this area. For example, TSA
has hired and deployed a federal screening workforce at over 400
commercial airports nationwide, and has developed standards for
determining TSO staffing levels at airports. TSA also established
numerous programs to train and test the performance of its TSO
workforce, although we reported that improvements in these efforts can
be made. Among other efforts, in December 2005, TSA reported completing
enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 TSOs, and
increased its use of covert testing to assess vulnerabilities of
existing screening systems. TSA also established the Screening
Partnership Program which allows eligible airports to apply to TSA to
use a private screening workforce. In addition, TSA has trained and
deployed federal air marshals on high-risk flights; established
standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a
Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow
authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any
terrorist or criminal acts. Related to flight and cabin crew training,
TSA revised its guidance and standards to include additional training
elements required by law and improve the organization and clarity of
the training. TSA also increased its efforts to measure the performance
of its TSO workforce through recertification testing and other
measures.
Passenger Prescreening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved
one, and has not generally achieved two, of the performance
expectations in this area. For example, TSA established policies and
procedures to ensure that individuals known to pose, or suspected of
posing, a risk or threat to security are identified and subjected to
appropriate action. Specifically, TSA requires that air carriers check
all passengers against the Selectee List, which identifies individuals
that represent a higher than normal security risk and therefore require
additional security screening, and the No Fly List, which identifies
individuals who are not allowed to fly. [Footnote 14] However, TSA has
faced a number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, which will allow TSA to
take over the matching of passenger information against the No Fly and
Selectee lists from air carriers, as required by law. [Footnote 15] In
2006, we reported that TSA had not conducted critical activities in
accordance with best practices for large-scale information technology
programs and had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach in
developing Secure Flight. [Footnote 16] In March 2007, DHS reported
that as a result of its rebaselining efforts, more effective government
controls were developed to implement Secure Flight and that TSA was
following a more disciplined development process. DHS further reported
that it plans to begin parallel operations with the first group of
domestic air carriers during fiscal year 2009 and to take over full
responsibility for watch list matching in fiscal year 2010. We are
continuing to assess TSA‘s efforts in developing and implementing the
Secure Flight program. We have also reported that DHS has not yet
implemented enhancements to its passenger prescreening process for
passengers on international flights departing from and bound for the
United States. [Footnote 17] Although CBP recently issued a final rule
that will require air carriers to provide passenger information to CBP
prior to a flight‘s departure so that CBP can compare passenger
information to the terrorist watch lists before a flight takes off,
this requirement is not scheduled to take effect until February 2008.
In addition, while DHS plans to align its international and domestic
passenger prescreening programs under TSA, full implementation of an
integrated system will not occur for several years.
Checkpoint Screening. We reported that DHS has generally achieved two,
and has not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in
this area. For example, we reported that TSA has developed processes
and procedures for screening passengers at security checkpoints and has
worked to balance security needs with efficiency and customer service
considerations. [Footnote 18] More specifically, in April 2007, we
reported that modifications to standard operating procedures were
proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level
officials and program-level staff, as well as threat information and
the results of covert testing. However, we found that TSA‘s data
collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether
proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their
intended purpose. We also reported that DHS and its component agencies
have taken steps to improve the screening of passengers to address new
and emerging threats. For example, TSA established two recent
initiatives intended to strengthen the passenger checkpoint screening
process: (1) the Screening Passenger by Observation Technique program,
which is a behavior observation and analysis program designed to
provide TSA with a nonintrusive means of identifying potentially high-
risk individuals; and the (2) Travel Document Checker program which
replaces current travel document checkers with TSOs who have access to
sensitive security information on the threats facing the aviation
industry and check for fraudulent documents. However, we found that
while TSA has developed and tested checkpoint technologies to address
vulnerabilities that may be exploited by identified threats such as
improvised explosive devices, it has not yet effectively deployed such
technologies. In July 2006, TSA reported that it installed 97
explosives trace portal machines”which use puffs of air to dislodge and
detect trace amounts of explosives on persons”at 37 airports. However,
DHS identified problems with these machines and has halted their
deployment. TSA is also developing backscatter technology, which
identifies explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape and form
and allowing them to be visually interpreted. [Footnote 19] However,
limited progress has been made in fielding this technology at passenger
screening checkpoints. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), enacted in August 2007,
restates and amends a requirement that DHS issue a strategic plan for
deploying explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints and
requires DHS to expedite research and develop efforts to protect
passenger aircraft from explosives devices. [Footnote 20] We are
currently reviewing DHS and TSA‘s efforts to develop, test and deploy
airport checkpoint technologies. [Footnote 21]
Checked Baggage Screening. We concluded that DHS has generally achieved
all three performance expectations in this area. Specifically, from
November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace
Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at
over 400 commercial airports. [Footnote 22] In response to mandates to
field the equipment quickly and to account for limitations in airport
design, TSA generally placed this equipment in a stand-alone
mode”usually in airport lobbies”to conduct the primary screening of
checked baggage for explosives. [Footnote 23] Based in part on our
previous recommendations, TSA later developed a plan to integrate EDS
and ETD machines in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. The
installation of in-line systems can result in considerable savings to
TSA through the reduction of TSOs needed to operate the equipment, as
well as increased security. Despite delays in the widespread deployment
of in-line systems due to the high upfront capital investment required,
TSA is pursuing the installation of these systems and is seeking
creative financing solutions to fund their deployment. In March 2007,
DHS reported that it is working with airport and air carrier
stakeholders to improve checked baggage screening solutions to enhance
security and free up lobby space at airports. The installation of in-
line baggage screening systems continues to be an issue of
congressional concern. For example, the 9/11 Commission Act reiterates
a requirement that DHS submit a cost-sharing study along with a plan
and schedule for implementing provisions of the study, and requires TSA
to establish a prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects
such as the installation of in-line baggage screening systems.
[Footnote 24]
Air Cargo Security. We reported that TSA has generally achieved two,
and has not generally achieved one, of the performance expectations in
this area. Specifically, TSA has developed a strategic plan for
domestic air cargo security and has taken actions to use risk
management principles to guide investment decisions related to air
cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country, referred to
as inbound air cargo, but these actions are not yet complete. For
example, TSA plans to assess inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and
critical assets”two crucial elements of a risk-based management
approach”but has not yet established a methodology or time frame for
how and when these assessments will be completed. [Footnote 25] TSA has
also developed and implemented procedures to screen domestic and
inbound air cargo. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had
significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections
conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with
security requirements. However, we also reported that TSA exempted
certain cargo from random inspection because it did not view the
exempted cargo as posing a significant security risk, although air
cargo stakeholders noted that such exemptions may create potential
security risks and vulnerabilities since shippers may know how to
package their cargo to avoid inspection. [Footnote 26] In part based on
a recommendation we made, TSA is evaluating existing exemptions to
determine whether they pose a security risk, and has removed some
exemptions that were previously allowed. The 9/11 Commission Act
requires, no later than 3 years after its enactment, that DHS have a
system in place to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft. [Footnote 27] Although TSA has taken action to develop plans
for securing air cargo and establishing and implementing procedures to
screen air cargo, DHS has not yet developed and implemented screening
technologies. DHS is pursuing multiple technologies to automate the
detection of explosives in the types and quantities that would cause
catastrophic damage to an aircraft in flight. However, TSA acknowledged
that full development of these technologies may take 5 to 7 years. In
April 2007, we reported that TSA and DHS‘s S&T Directorate were in the
early stages of evaluating and piloting available aviation security
technologies to determine their applicability to the domestic air cargo
environment. We further reported that although TSA anticipates
completing its pilot tests by 2008, it has not yet established time
frames for when it might implement these methods or technologies for
the inbound air cargo system. [Footnote 28]
Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS‘s Efforts in Implementing Its
Mission and Management Functions:
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across
DHS‘s mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded
the department‘s progress since its inception and will continue as DHS
moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to
strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, to
include aviation security, it is equally important that these key
issues be addressed from a comprehensive, department-wide perspective
to help ensure that the department has the structure and processes in
place to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face
the nation. These issues include: (1) transforming and integrating
DHS‘s management functions; (2) establishing baseline performance goals
and measures and engaging in effective strategic planning efforts; (3)
applying and strengthening a risk management approach for implementing
missions and making resource allocation decisions; (4) sharing
information with key stakeholders; and (5) coordinating and partnering
with federal, state and local, and private sector agencies. We have
made numerous recommendations to DHS to strengthen these efforts, and
the department has made progress in implementing some of these
recommendations.
DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform
into a fully functioning department. We designated DHS‘s implementation
and transformation as high-risk in part because failure to effectively
address this challenge could have serious consequences for our security
and economy. DHS continues to face challenges in key areas, including
acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology
management. This array of management and programmatic challenges
continues to limit DHS‘s ability to effectively and efficiently carry
out its mission. In addition, transparency plays an important role in
helping to ensure effective and efficient transformation efforts. We
have reported that DHS has not made its management or operational
decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is
effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of
dollars in funding it receives annually. More specifically, in April
2007, we testified that we have encountered access issues during
numerous engagements at DHS, including significant delays in obtaining
requested documents that have affected our ability to do our work in a
timely manner. [Footnote 29] The Secretary of DHS and the Under
Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us to
resolve access issues and to provide greater transparency. It will be
important for DHS and its components to become more transparent and
minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its
programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can
independently assess its efforts.
In addition, DHS has not always implemented effective strategic
planning efforts and has not yet fully developed performance measures
or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing
for results. We have identified strategic planning as one of the
critical success factors for new organizations, and reported that both
DHS‘s and TSA‘s efforts in this area have been mixed. For example, with
regards to TSA‘s efforts to secure air cargo, we reported that TSA
completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a
threat-based risk management approach to securing the nation‘s domestic
air cargo system, and that this plan identified strategic objectives
and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security based on risk,
cost, and deadlines. However, we reported that TSA had not developed a
similar strategy for addressing the security of inbound air cargo”cargo
transported into the United States from foreign countries, including
how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders.
In another example, we reported that TSA had not yet developed outcome-
based performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs, such as the percentage of security
deficiencies that were addressed as a result of TSA‘s on-site
assistance and recommendations, to identify any aspects of these
programs that may need attention. We recommended that DHS direct TSA
and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including specific goals and
objectives, for securing air cargo; [Footnote 30] and develop outcome-
based performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs. [Footnote 31] DHS generally concurred with
GAO‘s recommendations.
DHS has also not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach
in implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk
management has been widely supported by the President and Congress as
an approach for allocating resources to the highest priority homeland
security investments, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security have made it a
centerpiece of DHS and TSA policy. Several DHS component agencies and
TSA have worked towards integrating risk-based decision making into
their security efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be
strengthened. For example, TSA has incorporated certain risk management
principles into securing air cargo, but has not completed assessments
of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets”two crucial elements of
a risk-based approach without which TSA may not be able to
appropriately focus its resources on the most critical security needs.
TSA has also incorporated risk-based decision making when making
modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to include
modifying procedures based on intelligence information and
vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport
checkpoints. However, in April 2007 we reported that TSA‘s analyses
that supported screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For
example, TSA officials decided to allow passengers to carry small
scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat
information”which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to
the aviation system”so that TSOs could concentrate on higher threat
items.32 However, TSA officials did not conduct the analysis necessary
to help them determine whether this screening change would affect TSO‘s
ability to focus on higher-risk threats. [Footnote 33]
We have further reported that opportunities exist to enhance the
effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private sector entities. In August 2003, we
reported that efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing
need to be strengthened, and in 2005, we designated information sharing
for homeland security as high-risk. [ Footnote 34] In January 2005, we
reported that the nation still lacked an implemented set of government-
wide policies and processes for sharing terrorism-information, but DHS
has issued a strategy on how it will put in place the overall
framework, policies, and architecture for sharing information with all
critical partners”actions that we and others have recommended.
[Footnote 35] DHS has taken some steps to implement its information
sharing responsibilities. States and localities are also creating their
own information ’fusion“ centers, some with DHS support. With respect
to aviation security, the importance of information sharing was
recently highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Act, which requires DHS to
establish a plan to promote the sharing of transportation security
information among DHS and federal, state and local agencies, tribal
governments, and appropriate private entities. [Footnote 36] The Act
also requires that DHS provide timely threat information to carriers
and operators that are preparing and submitting a vulnerability
assessment and security plan, including an assessment of the most
likely methods that could be used by terrorists to exploit weaknesses
in their security. [Footnote 37]
In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland
security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of
key stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. To secure
the nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between
legacy component agencies and a range of other entities, including
other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private and
nonprofit sectors, and international partners. We have reported that
successful partnering and coordination involves collaborating and
consulting with stakeholders to develop and agree on goals, strategies,
and roles to achieve a common purpose; identify resource needs;
establish a means to operate across agency boundaries, such as
compatible procedures, measures, data, and systems; and agree upon and
document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report to the public on
the results of joint efforts. [Footnote 38] We have found that the
appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and
between the levels of government, and with the private sector, are
evolving and need to be clarified. For example, we reported that
opportunities exists for TSA to work with foreign governments and
industry to identify best practices for securing air cargo, and
recommended that TSA systematically compile and analyze information on
practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the
department‘s overall security efforts. [Footnote 39] Further, regarding
efforts to respond to in-flight security threats, which”depending on
the nature of the threat”could involve 15 federal agencies and agency
components, we recommended that DHS and other departments document and
share their respective coordination and communication strategies and
response procedures. [Footnote 40]
Concluding Observations:
The magnitude of DHS‘s and more specifically TSA‘s responsibilities in
securing the nation‘s commercial aviation system is significant, and we
commend the department on the work it has done and is currently doing
to secure this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA
plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that its programs and
initiatives operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the
almost 6 years since its creation, TSA has had to undertake its
critical mission while also establishing and forming a new agency. At
the same time, a variety of factors, including threats to and attacks
on aviation systems around the world, as well as new legislative
requirements, has led the agency to reassess its priorities and
reallocate resources to address key events, and to respond to emerging
threats. Although TSA has made considerable progress in addressing key
aspects of commercial aviation security, more work remains in the areas
of checkpoint and air cargo technology, airport security, and passenger
prescreening. As DHS and TSA and other components move forward, it will
be important for the department to work to address the challenges that
have affected its operations thus far, including developing results-
oriented goals and measures to assess performance; developing and
implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource decisions; and
establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing
information and coordinating with homeland security partners. A well-
managed, high-performing TSA is essential to meeting the significant
challenge of securing the transportation network. As TSA continues to
evolve, implement its programs, and integrate its functions, we will
continue to review its progress and performance and provide information
to Congress and the public on its efforts.
Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen
Berrick at (202) 512- 3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Steve D. Morris, Assistant
Director, Gary Malavenda, Susan Langley, and Linda Miller.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, D.C.: August 2007); GAO, Department of Homeland Security:
Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,
GAO-07-1081T (Washington, D.C.: September 2007); and GAO, Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and
Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T (Washington, D.C.: September 2007).
[2] Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25
percent or less of the identified performance expectations. Modest
progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 25
percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance
expectations. Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally
achieve more than 50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified
performance expectations. Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions
to generally achieve more than 75 percent of the identified performance
expectations.
[3] GAO-07-454.
[4] A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing
risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting
initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those
initiatives.
[5] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[6] Currently, air carriers departing the United States are required to
transmit passenger manifest information to CBP no later than 15 minutes
prior to departure but, for flights bound for the United States, air
carriers are not required to transmit the information until 15 minutes
after the flight‘s departure (in general, after the aircraft is in
flight). See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a. In a final rule published
in the Federal Register on August 23, 2007, CBP established a
requirement for all air carriers to either transmit the passenger
manifest information to CBP no later than 30 minutes prior to the
securing of the aircraft doors (that is, prior to the flight being
airborne), or transmit manifest information on an individual basis as
each passenger checks in for the flight up to but no later than the
securing of the aircraft. See 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007). This
requirement is to take effect on February 19, 2008.
[7] For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made
in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO-
06-371T (Washington, D.C: April 2006).
[8] For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation
Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal
Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but
Challenges Remain, GAO-06-597T, (Washington, D.C.: April 2006) and GAO,
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-728
(Washington, D.C.: June 2004).
[9] GAO-06-597T and GAO-04-728.
[10] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Audit
of Access to Airport Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary), OIG-07-35
(Washington, D.C.: March 2007).
[11] GAO-06-597T and GAO-04-728.
[12] GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate
Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106 (Washington,
D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation Security: DHS Should Address
Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2006).
[13] GAO, Maritime Security: The Safe Port Act and Efforts to Secure
Our Nation's Seaports, GAO-08-86T (Washington, D.C. October 4, 2007).
[14] In accordance with TSA-issued security requirements, passengers on
the No Fly List are denied boarding passes and are not permitted to fly
unless cleared by law enforcement officers. Similarly, passengers who
are on the Selectee List are issued boarding passes, and they and their
baggage undergo additional security measures.
[15] See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C).
[16] GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration‘s Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[17] GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to
Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T
(Washington, D.C.: February 2007) and GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts
to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but
Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2007).
[18] For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Risk,
Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger
Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed
Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007);
GAO, Aviation Security: TSA‘s Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has
Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the
Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007); GAO, Airport Passenger Screening:
Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-
03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: September 2003); and GAO, Aviation Security:
Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but
Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
[19] GAO-06-371T.
[20] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§1607, 1610, 121 Stat. 266, 483-85
(2007).
[21] For more information, see GAO-06-371T.
[22] Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to detect
characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it
moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by
detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect
samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object
that TSOs determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD
machine, which then chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any
traces of explosive materials.
[23] For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of
Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869
(Washington, D.C.: July 2006), GAO-06-371T, and GAO-07-448T.
[24] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1603-04, 121 Stat. at 480-81.
[25] For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action
Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76,
(Washington, D.C.: October 2005) and GAO, Aviation Security: Federal
Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and
Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
[26] GAO-06-76.
[27] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. at 477-79.This provision
defines screening as a physical examination or non-intrusive method of
assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security that
includes the use of technology, procedures, personnel, or other methods
to provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security
for the screening of passenger checked baggage. Methods such as solely
performing a review of information about the contents of cargo or
verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo, including whether a
known shipper is registered in TSA‘s known shipper database, do not
constitute screening under this provision.
[28] GAO-07-660.
[29] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access
to Information on Programs and Activities, GAO-07-700T, (Washington,
D.C.: April 2007).
[30] GAO-07-660.
[31] GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These
Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-729 (Washington, D.C.: May 11,
2007).
[32] GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns,
GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007).
[33] GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns
Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation
and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634
(Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007).
[34] GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing
Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-760 (Washington, D.C.: August 2003) and
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).
[35] GAO-07-454.
[36] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1203, 121 Stat. at 383-86.
[37] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1512(d)(2), 1531(d)(2), 121 Stat. at
430, 455.
[38] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-833T (Washington,
D.C.: May 2007)
[39] GAO-07-660
[40] GAO,Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-
flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-07-891R (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Susan Becker, Acting Manager, BeckerS@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
