Department of Homeland Security
Risk Assessment and Enhanced Oversight Needed to Manage Reliance on Contractors Gao ID: GAO-08-142T October 17, 2007In fiscal year 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated $1.2 billion to procure four types of professional and management support services. While contracting for such services can help DHS meet its needs, using contractors to provide services that closely support inherently governmental functions increases the risk of government decisions being influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments. This testimony summarizes our September 2007 report to this Committee and others and focuses on (1) the types of professional and management support services DHS has contracted for and the circumstances that drove its contracting decisions, and (2) DHS's consideration and management of risk when contracting for such services. GAO analyzed 117 statements of work and 9 case studies in detail for selected contracts awarded in fiscal year 2005 by the Coast Guard, the Office of Procurement Operations, and the Transportation Security Administration.
A broad range of program-related and administrative activities was performed under the four types of professional and management support services contracts we reviewed--program management and support, engineering and technical, other professional, and other management support. DHS decisions to contract for these types of services were largely driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs and operations up and running. While DHS has identified core mission critical occupations and plans to reduce skill gaps in core and key competencies, it is unclear whether this will inform the department's use of contractors for services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. Program officials generally acknowledged that their professional and management support services contracts closely supported the performance of inherently governmental functions, but they did not assess the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments--as required by federal procurement guidance. In addition, none of the program officials and contracting officers we spoke with was aware of these requirements, and few believed that their professional and management support service contracts required enhanced oversight. Federal guidance also states that agency officials must retain control over and remain accountable for policy and program decisions. For the nine cases we reviewed, the level of oversight DHS provided did not always help ensure accountability for decisions or the ability to judge whether contractors were performing as required. DHS's Chief Procurement Officer is implementing an acquisition oversight program--designed to allow flexibility to address specific procurement issues--with potential to address this issue.
GAO-08-142T, Department of Homeland Security: Risk Assessment and Enhanced Oversight Needed to Manage Reliance on Contractors
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Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, October 17, 2007:
Department Of Homeland Security:
Risk Assessment and Enhanced Oversight Needed to Manage Reliance on
Contractors:
Statement of John P. Hutton, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-08-142T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-142T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In fiscal year 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
obligated $1.2 billion to procure four types of professional and
management support services. While contracting for such services can
help DHS meet its needs, using contractors to provide services that
closely support inherently governmental functions increases the risk of
government decisions being influenced by, rather than independent from,
contractor judgments.
This testimony summarizes our September 2007 report to this Committee
and others and focuses on (1) the types of professional and management
support services DHS has contracted for and the circumstances that
drove its contracting decisions, and (2) DHS‘s consideration and
management of risk when contracting for such services.
GAO analyzed 117 statements of work and 9 case studies in detail for
selected contracts awarded in fiscal year 2005 by the Coast Guard, the
Office of Procurement Operations, and the Transportation Security
Administration.
What GAO Found:
A broad range of program-related and administrative activities was
performed under the four types of professional and management support
services contracts we reviewed”program management and support,
engineering and technical, other professional, and other management
support. DHS decisions to contract for these types of services were
largely driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs and
operations up and running. While DHS has identified core mission
critical occupations and plans to reduce skill gaps in core and key
competencies, it is unclear whether this will inform the department‘s
use of contractors for services that closely support the performance of
inherently governmental functions.
Program officials generally acknowledged that their professional and
management support services contracts closely supported the performance
of inherently governmental functions, but they did not assess the risk
that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent
from, contractor judgments”as required by federal procurement guidance.
In addition, none of the program officials and contracting officers we
spoke with was aware of these requirements, and few believed that their
professional and management support service contracts required enhanced
oversight. Federal guidance also states that agency officials must
retain control over and remain accountable for policy and program
decisions. For the nine cases we reviewed, the level of oversight DHS
provided did not always help ensure accountability for decisions or the
ability to judge whether contractors were performing as required. DHS‘s
Chief Procurement Officer is implementing an acquisition oversight
program”designed to allow flexibility to address specific procurement
issues”with potential to address this issue.
Table: Range of Contracted Services and Related Risk Level:
Basic services:
* Custodial;
* Food;
* Landscaping;
* Snow removal;
* Storage;
Low Risk Level.
Professional and management support services that do not closely
support inherently governmental functions:
* Advertising;
* Banking;
* Parking;
* Records maintenance.
Professional and management support services that closely support
inherently governmental functions:
* Acquisition support;
* Budget preparation;
* Developing and interpreting regulations;
* Engineering and technical services;
* Intelligence services;
* Policy development;
* Reorganization and planning;
High Risk Level.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
Our September 2007 report recommended that DHS take actions to improve
its ability to manage risk and ensure government control over and
accountability for decisions resulting from services that closely
support inherently governmental functions. DHS generally agreed with
these recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://GAO-08-142T]. For more information, contact John
Hutton at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) continued and increasing use of contractors
for professional and management support services. When DHS was
established over 4 years ago, it faced an enormous challenge to quickly
set up numerous offices and programs that would provide wide-ranging
and complex services critical to ensuring the nation's security. To
help address this challenge, the department relied on contractors to
perform many mission-related services. For example, in fiscal year 2005
DHS obligated $1.2 billion on four types of professional and management
support services that may closely support the performance of inherently
governmental functions: program management and support, engineering and
technical, other professional, and other management support. The use of
these types of services can increase the risk of contractors unduly
influencing the government's control over programs and accountability
for actions, making them vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. For
this reason, long-standing federal policy requires attention to this
risk.
At your request, we reviewed DHS's use of contracts for four selected
services that closely support inherently governmental functions to
identify the types of activities DHS requested through these contracts
and the associated risks. Our findings are discussed in detail in a
report that we are releasing today.[Footnote 1] My statement will focus
on (1) the types of professional and management support services for
which DHS has contracted and the circumstances that drove its
contracting decisions, and (2) DHS's consideration and management of
risk when contracting for such services. Our findings are based on a
review of 117 judgmentally selected statements of work for professional
and management support services for the Coast Guard, the Office of
Procurement Operations (OPO), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) from fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 2] We selected
nine of the 117 statements as case studies and examined them in detail.
These nine were spread among the three components and represented a
variety of services and dollar values among the three components. We
conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Summary:
More than half of the 117 statements of work we reviewed included
reorganization and planning activities, policy development, and
acquisition support--services that closely support the performance of
inherently governmental functions according to federal acquisition
guidance. For the nine case studies we conducted, decisions to contract
for these services were largely driven by the need for staff and
expertise to get DHS programs and operations up and running quickly.
However, DHS program officials did not assess the risk that contractor
judgments could influence government decisions and did not provide
enhanced oversight, despite federal procurement guidance requiring such
attention. Most contracting and program officials we spoke to were not
only unaware of federal requirements for enhanced oversight, but did
not see a need for it based on the services provided. While DHS's human
capital strategic plan notes the department has identified core mission
critical occupations and plans to reduce skill gaps in core and key
competencies, it is unclear whether it will inform the department's use
of contractors for services that closely support the performance of
inherently governmental functions.
Background:
Inherently governmental functions require discretion in applying
government authority or value judgments in making decisions for the
government; as such, they should be performed by government employees-
-not private contractors.[Footnote 3] The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) provides 20 examples of functions considered to be, or
to be treated as inherently governmental (see Appendix I), including:
* determining agency policy and priorities for budget requests,
* directing and controlling intelligence operations,
* approving contractual requirements, and:
* selecting individuals for government employment.
The closer contractor services come to supporting inherently
governmental functions, the greater the risk of their influencing the
government's control over and accountability for decisions that may be
based, in part, on contractor work. Table 1 provides examples of the
range of services contractors provide to the federal government--from
basic activities, such as custodial and landscaping, to more complex
professional and management support services--and their relative risk
of influencing government decision making.
Table 1: Range of Contracted Services and Related Risk Level:
Basic services:
* Custodial;
* Food;
* Landscaping;
* Snow removal;
* Storage;
* Trash collection;
Low Risk Level.
Professional and management support services[A] that do not closely
support inherently governmental functions:
* Advertising;
* Banking;
* Parking;
* Records maintenance.
Professional and management support services[A] that closely support
inherently governmental functions:
* Acquisition support;
* Budget preparation;
* Developing or interpreting regulations;
* Engineering and technical services;
* Intelligence services;
* Policy development;
* Reorganization and planning;
High Risk Level.
Source: GAO analysis of selected FPDS-NG and FAR subpart 7.5 categories
of services, and OFPP Policy Letter 93-1.
[A] Professional and management support services consists of 42 codes
in the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG).
[End of table]
The potential for the loss of government management control and
accountability for decisions is a long-standing governmentwide concern.
For example, in 1981, we found that the level of contractor involvement
in management functions at the Departments of Energy and Defense was so
extensive that the agencies' ability to develop options other than
those proposed by the contractors was limited.[Footnote 4] More
recently, in 2006, government, industry, and academic participants in
GAO's forum on federal acquisition challenges and
opportunities[Footnote 5] and the congressionally mandated Acquisition
Advisory Panel[Footnote 6] noted how an increasing reliance on
contractors to perform services for core government activities
challenges the capacity of federal officials to supervise and evaluate
the performance of these activities.
FAR and Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) guidance state that
services that tend to affect government decision-making, support or
influence policy development, or affect program management are
susceptible to abuse and require a greater level of scrutiny and an
enhanced degree of management oversight. This would include assigning a
sufficient number of qualified government employees to provide
oversight and to ensure that agency officials retain control over and
remain accountable for policy decisions that may be based in part on a
contractor's performance and work products.[Footnote 7]
DHS Contracting Decisions For A Broad Range Of Activities Were Largely
Driven By A Lack Of Staff And Expertise And Immediacy Of Need:
A broad range of program-related and administrative activities was
performed under the professional and management support services
contracts we reviewed. DHS decisions to contract for these services
were largely driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs
and operations up and running. While DHS has identified core mission-
critical occupations and plans to reduce skill gaps in core and key
competencies, it has not directly addressed the department's use of
contractors for services that closely support the performance of
inherently governmental functions.
DHS Contracts for Selected Services Covered a Broad Range of Activities
Closely Supporting Inherently Governmental Functions:
A broad range of activities related to specific programs and
administrative operations was performed under the professional and
management support services contracts we reviewed. The categories of
policy development, reorganization and planning, and acquisition
support were among the most often requested in the 117 statements of
work, as well as in the nine case studies.
* For example, TSA obligated $1.2 million to acquire contractor support
for its Acquisition and Program Management Support Division, which
included assisting with the development of acquisition plans and hands-
on assistance to program offices to prepare acquisition documents.
* A $7.9 million OPO human capital services order provided a full range
of personnel and staffing services to support DHS's headquarters
offices, including writing position descriptions, signing official
offer letters, and meeting new employees at DHS headquarters for their
first day of work.
Contractor involvement in the nine case studies ranged from providing
two to three supplemental personnel to staffing an entire office.
Figure 1 shows the type and range of services provided in the nine
cases and the location of contractor performance.
Figure 1: Professional and Management Support Services Closely
Supporting Inherently Governmental Functions in Nine Cases Reviewed:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Categories are based on services that approach being inherently
governmental in FAR subpart 7.5 and, therefore, may not include all the
services provided by contractors in each of the nine cases.
[A] Obligations based on information provided by DHS at the time of our
review.
[B] Situations in which contractors might be assumed to be agency
employees or representatives. FAR section 7.503(d)(13).
[End of figure]
DHS Contracting Decisions Were Largely Driven by a Lack of Staff and
Expertise and Immediacy of Need:
Many of the program officials we spoke with said that contracting for
services was necessary because they were under pressure to get program
and administrative offices up and running quickly, and they did not
have enough time to hire staff with the right expertise through the
federal hiring process. For example:
* According to officials at TSA, federal staff limitations was a reason
for procuring employee relations support services. Specifically, the
agency needed to immediately establish an employee relations office
capable of serving 60,000 newly hired airport screeners--an undertaking
TSA Office of Human Resources officials said would have taken several
years to accomplish if they hired qualified federal employees.
* DHS human capital officials said there were only two staff to manage
human resources for approximately 800 employees, and it would have
taken 3 to 5 years to hire and train federal employees to provide the
necessary services.
In prior work, GAO has noted that agencies facing workforce challenges,
such as a lack of critical expertise, have used strategic human capital
planning to develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing,
motivating, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals.[Footnote
8] While DHS's human capital strategic plan notes that the department
has identified core mission-critical occupations and seeks to reduce
skill gaps in core and key competencies, DHS has not determined the
right mix of government performed and contractor performed services or
assessed total workforce deployment across the Department to guide
decisions on contracting for selected services. We have noted the
importance of focusing greater attention on which types of functions
and activities should be contracted out and which ones should not,
while considering other reasons for using contractors, such as a
limited number of federal employees.[Footnote 9] DHS's human capital
plan is unclear as to how this could be achieved and whether it will
inform the Department's use of contractors for services that closely
support the performance of inherently governmental functions.
DHS Did Not Consider Risk Or Provide Enhanced Oversight When
Contracting For Selected Services:
While program officials generally acknowledged that their professional
and management support services contracts closely supported the
performance of inherently governmental functions, they did not assess
the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than
independent from, contractor judgments--as required by federal
procurement policy. In addition, none of the program officials and
contracting officers we spoke with was aware of these requirements, and
few believed that their professional and management support service
contracts required enhanced oversight. Federal guidance also states
that agency officials must retain control over and remain accountable
for policy and program decisions. For the nine cases we reviewed, the
level of oversight DHS provided did not always help ensure
accountability for decisions or the ability to judge whether
contractors were performing as required; however, DHS's Chief
Procurement Officer is implementing an acquisition oversight program
with potential to address this issue.
Selected Cases May Have Been at Risk of Contractors Influencing
Decisions:
To help ensure the government does not lose control over and
accountability for mission-related decisions, long-standing federal
procurement policy requires attention to the risk that government
decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from,
contractor judgments when contracting for services that closely support
inherently governmental functions. The nine cases we reviewed in detail
provided examples of conditions that we have found need to be carefully
monitored to help ensure the government does not lose control over and
accountability for mission-related decisions.
* Contractors providing services integral to an agency's mission and
comparable to those provided by government employees: In seven of the
nine cases, contractors provided such services. For example, one
contractor directly supported DHS efforts to hire federal employees,
including signing offer letters. In another case, a contractor provided
acquisition advice and support while working alongside federal
employees and performing the same tasks.
* Contractors providing ongoing support: In each of the nine case
studies, the contractor provided services for more than 1 year. In some
of these cases, the original justification for contracting had changed,
but the components extended or recompeted services without examining
whether it would be more appropriate for federal employees to perform
the service. For example, OPO established a temporary "bridge"
arrangement without competition that was later modified 20 times, and
extended for almost 18 months, to avoid disruption of critical support
including budget, policy, and intelligence services. Subsequently,
these services were competed and awarded to the original contractor
under six separate contracts.
* Broadly defined requirements: In four of the case studies, the
statements of work lacked specific details about activities that
closely support inherently governmental functions. In addition, several
program officials noted that the statements of work did not accurately
reflect the program's needs or the work the contractors actually
performed. For example, a Coast Guard statement of work for a $1.3
million order initially included services for policy development, cost-
benefit analyses, and regulatory assessments, though program officials
told us the contractors provided only technical regulatory writing and
editing support. The statement of work was revised in a later contract
to better define requirements.
Officials Did Not Assess Risk or Provide Enhanced Oversight of
Contracts for Selected Services as Required:
Federal acquisition guidance highlights the risk inherent in services
contracting--particularly those for professional and management support
services--and federal internal control standards require assessment of
risks.[Footnote 10] OFPP staff we met with also emphasized the
importance of assessing the risk associated with contracting for
services that closely support the performance of inherently
governmental functions. While contracting officers and program
officials for the nine case studies generally acknowledged that their
professional and management support services contracts closely
supported the performance of inherently governmental functions, none
assessed whether these contracts could result in the loss of control
over and accountability for mission-related decisions. Furthermore,
none were aware of federal requirements for enhanced oversight of such
contracts. Contracting officers and program officials, as well as DHS
acquisition planning guidance, did not cite services that closely
support the performance of inherently governmental functions as a
contracting risk and most did not believe enhanced oversight of their
contracts was warranted.
Current DHS initiatives may have the potential to address oversight
when contracting for services that closely support inherently
governmental functions. DHS's Chief Procurement Officer is in the
process of implementing an acquisition oversight program that is
intended to assess contract administration, business judgment, and
compliance with federal acquisition guidance.[Footnote 11] This program
was designed to allow flexibility to address specific procurement
issues and is based on a series of reviews at the component level that
could address selected services.
Control and Accountability Were Limited:
Both the FAR and OFPP policy state that when contracting for services-
-particularly for professional and management support services that
closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions--
a sufficient number of qualified government employees assigned to plan
and oversee contractor activities is needed to maintain control and
accountability. While most contracting officers and program officials
that we spoke with held the opinion that the services they contracted
for did not require enhanced oversight, we found cases in which the
components lacked the capacity to oversee contractor performance due to
limited expertise and workload demands. For example:
* One Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) was
assigned to oversee 58 tasks, ranging from acquisition support to
intelligence analysis to budget formulation and planning, across
multiple offices and locations. Program and contracting officials noted
the resulting oversight was likely insufficient. To provide better
oversight for one of the follow-on contracts, the program official
assigned a new COTR to oversee just the intelligence work and
established monthly meetings between the COTR and the program office.
According to program officials, this change was made to ensure that the
contract deliverables and payments were in order, not to address the
inherent risk of the services performed.
* Similarly, a DHS Human Capital Services COTR assigned to oversee an
extensive range of personnel and staffing services provided by the
contractor lacked technical expertise, which the program manager
believed affected the quality of oversight provided. To improve
oversight for the follow-on contract, the program manager assigned a
COTR with more human resources experience along with an employee with
human resources expertise to assist the COTR.
DHS components were also limited in their ability to assess contractor
performance, which is necessary to ensure control and accountability,
in a way that addressed the risk of contracting for professional and
management support services that closely support the performance of
inherently governmental functions. Assessing contractor performance
requires a plan that outlines how services will be delivered and
establishes measurable outcomes. However, none of the related oversight
plans and contract documents we reviewed contained specific measures
for assessing contractors' performance of the selected services.
Conclusion and Recommendations:
Until the department provides greater scrutiny and enhanced management
oversight of contracts for selected services--as required by federal
guidance--it will continue to risk transferring government
responsibility to contractors. To improve the department's ability to
manage the risk associated with contracting for services that closely
support the performance of inherently governmental functions and help
ensure government control and accountability, the report we are
releasing today recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security take
several actions. These actions include establishing strategic-level
guidance for determining the appropriate mix of government and
contractor employees, assessing the risk of using contractors for
selected services, more clearly defining contract requirements,
assessing the ability of the government workforce to provide sufficient
oversight when using selected services, and reviewing contracts for
selected services as part of the acquisition oversight program.
DHS generally concurred with our recommendations and provided
information on what actions would be taken to address them. However,
DHS partially concurred with our recommendation to assess the risk of
selected services as part of the acquisition planning process and
modify existing guidance and training, noting that its acquisition
planning guidance already provides for the assessment of risk. Our
review found that this guidance does not address the specific risk of
services that closely support the performance of inherently
governmental functions. DHS also partially concurred with our
recommendation to review selected services contracts as part of the
acquisition oversight program. DHS stated that rather than reviewing
selected services as part of the routine acquisition oversight program,
the Chief Procurement Officer will direct a special investigation on
selected issues as needed. We did not intend for the formal oversight
plan to be modified, rather we recognize that the program was designed
with flexibility to address specific procurement issues as necessary.
We leave it to the discretion of the Chief Procurement Officer to
determine how to implement the recommendation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the committee may have
at this time.
Contacts And Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-4841 or (huttonj@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this product. Staff making key contributions to this statement
were Amelia Shachoy, Assistant Director; Katherine Trimble; Jennifer
Dougherty; Karen Sloan; Julia Kennon; and Noah Bleicher.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Examples of Inherently Governmental and Approaching
Inherently Governmental Functions:
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) section 7.503 provides examples of
inherently governmental functions and services or actions that are not
inherently governmental, but may approach being inherently governmental
functions based on the nature of the function, the manner in which the
contractor performs the contract, or the manner in which the government
administers contractor performance. These examples are listed in tables
1 and 2.
Table 2: Examples of Inherently Governmental Functions:
1;
Directly conduct criminal investigations.
2;
Control prosecutions and perform adjudicatory functions other than
arbitration.
3;
Command military forces.
4;
Conduct foreign relations and determine foreign policy.
5;
Determine agency policy, including regulations.
6;
Determine federal program priorities for budget requests.
7;
Direct and control of federal employees.
8;
Direct and control intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.
9;
Select individuals for federal government employment.
10;
Approve position descriptions and performance standards for federal
employees.
11;
Determine the disposal of government property.
12;
In federal procurement activities with respect to prime contracts:
Determine the supplies or services acquired by the government;
participate as a voting member on any source selection boards; approve
contractual documents, including documents defining requirements,
incentive plans, and evaluation criteria; award contracts; administer
contracts; terminate contracts; determine whether contract costs are
reasonable, allocable, and allowable; and participate as a voting
member on performance evaluation boards.
13;
Approve agency responses to Freedom of Information Act requests.
14;
Conduct administrative hearings to determine eligibility for security
clearances, or that affect personal reputation or eligibility to
participate in government programs.
15;
Approve federal licensing actions and inspections.
16;
Determine budget policy, guidance, and strategy.
17;
Collect, control, and disburse public funds, unless authorized by
statute. Does not include: The collection of public charges to mess
halls, national parks, and similar entities; and routine voucher and
invoice examination.
18;
Control treasury accounts.
19;
Administer public trusts.
20;
Draft congressional testimony, responses to congressional
correspondence, or agency responses to audit reports.
Source: GAO analysis of FAR section 7.503(c).
[End of table]
Table 3: Examples of Services That May Approach Being Inherently
Governmental Functions:
1: Involve or relate to budget preparation.
2: Involve or relate to reorganization and planning activities.
3: Involve or relate to analyses, feasibility studies, and strategy
options to be used in developing policy.
4: Involve or relate to developing regulations.
5: Involve or relate to evaluating another contractor's performance.
6: Involve or relate to budget preparation.
7: Assist in contract management.
8: Provide technical evaluation of contract proposals.
9: Assist in developing statements of work.
10: Support the preparation of responses to Freedom of Information Act
requests.
11: Work in situations that may permit access to confidential business
information.
12: Provide information regarding agency policies or regulations.
13: Participate in situations where contractors may be assumed to be
agency employees or representatives.
14: Participate as technical advisors to source selection boards or as
members of a source evaluation board.
15: Serve as arbitrators or provide alternative methods of dispute
resolution.
16: Construct buildings intended to be secure.
17: Provide inspection services.
18: Provide legal advice and interpret regulations and statutes for
government officials.
19: Provide non-law enforcement security activities that do not
directly involve criminal investigations.
Source: GAO analysis of FAR section 7.503(d).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and
Oversight Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services,
GAO-07-990 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2007).
[2] Fiscal year 2005 was the most recent year for which complete data
were available at the time we began our review.
[3] Federal acquisition policy states that contracts shall not be used
for the performance of inherently governmental functions.
[4] GAO, Civil Servants and Contract Employees: Who Should Do What for
the Federal Government?, FPCD-81-43 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 1981).
[5] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisitions Challenges and
Opportunities in the 21ST Century, GAO-07-45SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
6, 2006).
[6] Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress, January 2007; see
Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-136, Title
XIV, §1423.
[7] FAR section 37.114, Special Acquisition Requirements; OFPP Policy
Letter 93-1: Management Oversight of Service Contracting, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy, May 18, 1994.
[8] GAO, Federal Acquisitions and Contracting: Systemic Challenges Need
Attention, GAO-07-1098T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007).
[9] GAO-07-1098T.
[10] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[11] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Challenges in
Implementing the Department's Acquisition Oversight Plan, GAO-07-900
(Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2007).
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