Influenza Pandemic
Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector Coordination Gao ID: GAO-08-36 October 31, 2007An outbreak of pandemic flu would require close cooperation between the public and private sectors to ensure the protection of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as drinking water and electricity. Because over 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is vital that both sectors effectively coordinate to successfully protect these assets. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating a national protection strategy and government and private sector councils have been created as a collaborating tool. GAO was asked to assess how the federal and private sectors are working together at a national level to protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of a pandemic, the challenges they face, and opportunities for addressing these challenges. GAO reviewed 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors. These 5 sectors are energy (electricity), food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation (highway and motor carrier), and water.
Federal agencies and the private sector have worked together to (1) develop general pandemic preparedness guidance, such as checklists for continuity of business operations during a pandemic; (2) identify the number of critical workers essential to the critical infrastructure sectors' operations during a pandemic; and (3) conduct pandemic preparedness presentations, workshops, forums, and some exercises. In some instances, the federal and private sectors are working together through sector-specific and cross-sector councils as the primary means of coordinating government and private sector efforts at the national level to protect critical infrastructure. Federal and private sector representatives from the councils in the five sectors reviewed told GAO that they have taken some initial pandemic preparedness actions within their respective sectors. Additionally, each of the sectors is collaborating with DHS and other sector-specific agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop sector-specific pandemic guidance. The federal government and the private sector face several challenges that may impede their efforts to protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of a pandemic. Maintaining a focus on pandemic planning efforts is difficult in the face of more immediate priorities, such as responding to outbreaks of foodborne illnesses. Private sector officials are concerned about the lack of clarity on the federal versus state roles in areas such as state border closures and pandemic vaccine distribution. They are also concerned about receiving consistent messages from various government entities providing pandemic-related information. Another challenge is identifying and developing strategies for addressing crucial cross-sector interdependencies that will be important for the continued operation of the nation's economy and society during a pandemic, such as the transportation sector to deliver critical supplies. Obtaining needed investments for training and infrastructure and potential legal and regulatory issues also present challenges. Increased use of the critical infrastructure coordinating councils could help address issues relating to a pandemic. These councils bring together multiple sectors and levels of governments, linking activities between these entities. Despite their potential, the councils' efforts thus far have focused mostly on the development of sector-specific plans to address all hazards. With regard to a pandemic specifically, DHS has used the councils primarily to share information across sectors and government levels rather than to address many of the identified challenges. Because an outbreak could begin at any time, there may be insufficient time and resources to adequately plan and prepare their members for changes in how their sectors may operate and continue to provide essential services during a pandemic. DHS officials acknowledge that they could encourage greater federal and private sector use of the councils and that the councils could be used to initiate and facilitate pandemic preparedness initiatives. DHS, because it is responsible for coordinating national critical infrastructure protection efforts, is well positioned to lead efforts to use these councils to help address these challenges.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2007:
Influenza Pandemic:
Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection
Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector Coordination:
Critical Infrastructure Protection for a Pandemic:
GAO-08-36:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-36, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
An outbreak of pandemic flu would require close cooperation between the
public and private sectors to ensure the protection of our nation‘s
critical infrastructure, such as drinking water and electricity.
Because over 85 percent of the nation‘s critical infrastructure is
owned and operated by the private sector, it is vital that both sectors
effectively coordinate to successfully protect these assets. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating a
national protection strategy and government and private sector councils
have been created as a collaborating tool.
GAO was asked to assess how the federal and private sectors are working
together at a national level to protect the nation‘s critical
infrastructure in the event of a pandemic, the challenges they face,
and opportunities for addressing these challenges. GAO reviewed 5 of
the 17 critical infrastructure sectors. These 5 sectors are energy
(electricity), food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation
(highway and motor carrier), and water.
What GAO Found:
Federal agencies and the private sector have worked together to (1)
develop general pandemic preparedness guidance, such as checklists for
continuity of business operations during a pandemic; (2) identify the
number of critical workers essential to the critical infrastructure
sectors‘ operations during a pandemic; and (3) conduct pandemic
preparedness presentations, workshops, forums, and some exercises. In
some instances, the federal and private sectors are working together
through sector-specific and cross-sector councils as the primary means
of coordinating government and private sector efforts at the national
level to protect critical infrastructure. Federal and private sector
representatives from the councils in the five sectors reviewed told GAO
that they have taken some initial pandemic preparedness actions within
their respective sectors. Additionally, each of the sectors is
collaborating with DHS and other sector-specific agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, to develop sector-specific pandemic
guidance.
The federal government and the private sector face several challenges
that may impede their efforts to protect the nation‘s critical
infrastructure in the event of a pandemic. Maintaining a focus on
pandemic planning efforts is difficult in the face of more immediate
priorities, such as responding to outbreaks of foodborne illnesses.
Private sector officials are concerned about the lack of clarity on the
federal versus state roles in areas such as state border closures and
pandemic vaccine distribution. They are also concerned about receiving
consistent messages from various government entities providing pandemic-
related information. Another challenge is identifying and developing
strategies for addressing crucial cross-sector interdependencies that
will be important for the continued operation of the nation‘s economy
and society during a pandemic, such as the transportation sector to
deliver critical supplies. Obtaining needed investments for training
and infrastructure and potential legal and regulatory issues also
present challenges.
Increased use of the critical infrastructure coordinating councils
could help address issues relating to a pandemic. These councils bring
together multiple sectors and levels of governments, linking activities
between these entities. Despite their potential, the councils‘ efforts
thus far have focused mostly on the development of sector-specific
plans to address all hazards. With regard to a pandemic specifically,
DHS has used the councils primarily to share information across sectors
and government levels rather than to address many of the identified
challenges. Because an outbreak could begin at any time, there may be
insufficient time and resources to adequately plan and prepare their
members for changes in how their sectors may operate and continue to
provide essential services during a pandemic. DHS officials acknowledge
that they could encourage greater federal and private sector use of the
councils and that the councils could be used to initiate and facilitate
pandemic preparedness initiatives. DHS, because it is responsible for
coordinating national critical infrastructure protection efforts, is
well positioned to lead efforts to use these councils to help address
these challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security lead efforts to
encourage the councils to consider and address the range of identified
challenges for a potential influenza pandemic. DHS concurred with this
recommendation and generally agreed with the report.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-36]. For more information, contact
Bernice Steinhardt at (202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Federal and Private Sectors Are Working Together on Initial Pandemic
Preparedness Activities:
Federal Government and Private Sector Face Challenges in Coordinating
Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic in Critical Infrastructure
Sectors:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Government Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as
of September 4, 2007:
Appendix III: Private Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as
of September 4, 2007:
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Abbreviations:
BENS: Business Executives for National Security:
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
CIPAC: Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FDA: Food and Drug Administration:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HSC: Homeland Security Council:
HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7:
NIAC: National Infrastructure Advisory Council:
NIPP: National Infrastructure Protection Plan:
PCIS: Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security:
Y2K: Year 2000 computer conversion:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 31, 2007:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Budget:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The government's response to recent disasters, such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, and past national challenges, such as the Year 2000
computer conversion (Y2K), which posed significant threats to the
nation's critical infrastructure, have shown the importance of
coordination and collaboration within and across both government and
nongovernmental organizations to respond to catastrophic events such as
an influenza pandemic. An influenza pandemic is a real and significant
threat facing the United States and the world. There is widespread
agreement that it is not a question of if but when such a pandemic will
occur. The issues associated with the preparation for and responses to
a pandemic flu are similar to those for any other type of disaster or
hazard. However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Unlike many
catastrophic events, an influenza pandemic will not damage power lines,
banks, or computer networks; it will ultimately threaten all critical
infrastructure by removing essential personnel from the workplace for
weeks or months. In a severe pandemic, absences attributable to
illness, the need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection
may, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
reach 40 percent during the peak weeks of a community outbreak.
Moreover, an influenza pandemic is likely to occur in several waves,
each lasting months, with outbreaks occurring simultaneously across the
country.
An outbreak of influenza pandemic will require close cooperation
between the private and public sectors at all levels of government to
ensure the protection of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as
drinking water, electricity, and telecommunications. Because over 85
percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated
by the private sector, the federal government has a limited ability to
directly influence appropriate preparedness and mitigation actions.
Unless the private sector takes actions to prevent, protect against,
respond to, and recover from an act of terrorism or natural disaster,
such as a pandemic, the country will be poorly prepared to deal with
these possibilities. Therefore, it is vital that the public and private
sectors form effective partnerships to successfully protect the
nation's critical infrastructure. Such partnerships will be key in
helping ensure the continuing delivery of critical public and private
services.
A key player in these partnerships is the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and gave
it wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and coordinating the
overall national critical infrastructure protection effort.[Footnote 1]
Under the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the
Secretary of Homeland Security, among other responsibilities, is to
establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies
to help ensure that critical infrastructures within and across the 17
designated sectors are protected, and is to use a risk management
approach to coordinate protection efforts.[Footnote 2] The Homeland
Security Act also required DHS to develop a comprehensive national plan
for securing the nation's critical infrastructure. In response, DHS
developed a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP
describes a set of sector-specific and cross-sector coordinating
councils as the primary means of bringing together the government and
private sectors to protect critical infrastructure. HSPD-7 further
defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS and
those federal agencies given responsibility for particular industry
sectors, such as transportation, energy, and telecommunications, known
as sector-specific agencies. DHS serves as the sector-specific agency
for 10 of the sectors: information technology; telecommunications;
transportation systems; chemical; emergency services; commercial
nuclear reactors, materials and waste; postal and shipping; dams;
government facilities; and commercial facilities.
In response to your interest in how the federal and private sectors are
coordinating their efforts to prepare for an influenza pandemic, we
assessed (1) how the federal government is working with the private
sector to ensure protection of the nation's critical infrastructure in
the event of an influenza pandemic, particularly in the transportation
(highway and motor carrier), food and agriculture, water, energy
(electricity), and telecommunications sectors, and (2) the challenges
facing the federal government and private sector in coordinating
protection of the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an
influenza pandemic, particularly in these same five sectors, and what
the federal government could do to help to address these challenges.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed critical
infrastructure protection regulations, plans, and guidance, including
the NIPP; the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (the National
Strategy); the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation
Plan (the Implementation Plan); the Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources; and the Homeland Security Council's (HSC) 6-month and 1-year
summary reports on the Implementation Plan. We also interviewed
officials from DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services'
(HHS) CDC with responsibility for leading and coordinating the overall
national critical infrastructure protection effort and for working with
the private sector to prepare for a possible pandemic.
We reviewed 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors in depth. (See
app. II for government council membership by sector and app. III for
private sector council membership by sector.) These sectors were
selected because, in addition to the public health and healthcare
sector,[Footnote 3] they would provide the services most basic to the
continued operation of the economy and society during an emergency such
as a pandemic. We also gathered documentation from and conducted
interviews with representatives of each of the federal agencies with
critical infrastructure protection responsibility for these 5 sectors:
DHS's Transportation Security Administration (highway and motor
carrier); the National Communications System (telecommunications); the
Department of Agriculture and HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
(food and agriculture); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(water); and the Department of Energy (DOE) (electricity). In addition,
we interviewed representatives from the Department of Transportation
(DOT) (highway and motor carrier). We also gathered documentation from
and interviewed representatives of companies and associations in each
of the 5 sectors as well as representatives from business trade
associations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), the
Business Executives for National Security (BENS), the Business
Roundtable (Roundtable), and the Center for Health Transformation.
Because the focus of our work was on the pandemic planning and
coordinating efforts between the federal government and the private
sector at a national level, we did not examine individual state, local,
or private sector initiatives, such as private sector continuity of
operations plans, unless they were connected with federal initiatives.
We conducted our work from June 2006 through September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology is in
appendix I. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of
this report.
Results in Brief:
The federal government and private sector are working together to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an
influenza pandemic. Federal agencies--particularly DHS and CDC--and the
private sector have worked together at the national level to (1)
develop general pandemic preparedness guidance, such as checklists for
continuity of business operations during a pandemic; (2) identify the
number of critical workers essential to the critical infrastructure
sectors' operations during a pandemic; and (3) conduct pandemic
preparedness presentations, workshops, forums, and some exercises. In
some instances the federal and private sectors are working together
through a set of councils as the primary means of coordinating
government and private sector efforts to protect critical
infrastructure. These councils are part of DHS's framework for a
coordinated national approach to address the full range of physical,
cyber, and human threats and vulnerabilities, including a potential
pandemic, that pose risks to the nation's critical infrastructure.
Federal and private officials from the councils in the five sectors we
reviewed told us that while their efforts within these councils have
mostly been focused on information sharing and developing sector-
specific plans required by the NIPP to enhance protection and
resiliency in an all-hazards environment, they have also taken some
initial pandemic preparedness actions within their respective sectors.
For example, the Communications Sector Coordinating Council has
established a working group to identify and address telecommuting
issues for a pandemic. In addition, the sectors are collaborating with
DHS and other sector-specific agencies, such as EPA, to develop
additional pandemic planning guidelines for each sector.
The federal and private sector representatives we interviewed
identified several key challenges they face in working together and
coordinating federal and private sector efforts to protect the nation's
critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic. The
following challenges extend across the critical infrastructure sectors
and addressing them will require coordinated federal and private sector
efforts.
* Maintaining a focus on pandemic planning efforts due to the
uncertainty of when a pandemic may occur and the emergence of other
more immediate sector priorities, such as responding to outbreaks of
foodborne illnesses.
* Lack of clarity on the federal and state roles and responsibilities
in areas such as state border closures and pandemic influenza vaccine
distribution.
* Multiple and potentially confusing or conflicting messages coming
from the many agencies, at all levels of government, that are
responsible for providing current and ongoing pandemic communications
and information.
* Identifying and developing strategies for addressing the crucial
cross-sector interdependencies that will be important for the continued
operation of our nation's economy and the free flow of goods and
services during a pandemic, such as the electricity and
telecommunications capabilities that are necessary to support all the
other sectors.
* Additional investments for training and infrastructure and potential
legal and regulatory issues--which the federal government and the
private sector have not yet fully addressed.
While some discussion has occurred, there are opportunities to further
address these issues through the increased federal and private sector
use of the sector-specific and cross-sector coordinating councils.
Despite the potential of these entities, the councils have mostly
focused their efforts to date on the development of sector-specific
plans to address all hazards rather than on pandemic-specific
activities. With regard to pandemic activities, DHS has used the
councils primarily to share information across sectors and government
levels, but not to address many of the challenges presented above
because DHS needs to more fully involve the federal and private sectors
to reach over and beyond traditional sector boundaries to help solve
problems that may affect multiple as well as individual sectors. The
sector-specific and cross-sector council structure would provide a
useful vehicle for accomplishing such a goal. Because an outbreak could
begin at any time, there may be insufficient time and resources to
adequately plan and prepare their members for changes in how their
sectors may operate during a pandemic unless these discussions take
place now. Since DHS is responsible for coordinating national critical
infrastructure protection efforts and is the lead agency for over half
of the critical infrastructure sectors, it is well positioned to lead
federal and private sector efforts, using these existing coordinating
mechanisms, to help identify and address the challenges involved in
preparing for a potential influenza pandemic.
To help the nation better protect critical infrastructure in the event
of an influenza pandemic and to build on the progress made thus far, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with sector-
specific agencies, lead efforts to encourage the government and private
sector members of the councils to consider and help address the
challenges that will require coordination between the federal and
private sectors involved with critical infrastructure and within the
various sectors in advance of, as well as during, a pandemic.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.
DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV. In
commenting on the draft report, DHS generally agreed with the contents
of the report and concurred with our recommendation. We also provided a
draft of this report to federal and private sector representatives of
the five sectors we reviewed. FDA (HHS); DOE; DOT; and representatives
of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) and the
Electricity and Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Representatives of the Food and Agriculture Coordinating Council and
TSA informed us that they had no comments on the draft report.
Background:
Sector-Specific Agencies Are to Coordinate Protection Efforts and
Develop Plans:
The protection of the nation's critical infrastructure against natural
and man-made catastrophic events has been a concern of the federal
government for over a decade. Several federal policies address the
importance of coordination between the government and the private
sector in critical infrastructure protection. HSPD-7, issued in
December 2003, defined responsibilities for DHS, the sector-specific
federal agencies that are responsible for overseeing the 17 specific
critical infrastructure sectors, and other departments and agencies.
HSPD-7 makes DHS responsible for, among other things, coordinating
national critical infrastructure protection efforts and establishing
uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for
integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk management
activities within and across sectors. Sector-specific agencies are
responsible for infrastructure protection activities in their assigned
sectors, which include coordinating and collaborating with relevant
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector
to carry out sector protection responsibilities. DHS developed and
issued its NIPP in June 2006. The NIPP--along with more detailed
guidance issued by DHS--required the individual sector-specific
agencies, working with relevant government and private sector
representatives, to submit sector-specific plans to DHS by the end of
December 2006 detailing the application of the NIPP's core elements to
each of their respective sectors. These individual plans, which DHS
released on May 21, 2007, are to establish the means by which the
sectors will identify critical assets within the sector, assess risks
of terrorist attacks or other hazards, assess and prioritize those
which have national significance, and develop protective measures for
the sector.
Sector-Specific and Cross-Sector Councils Govern Federal and Private
Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts:
The NIPP relies on a set of sector-specific and cross-sector councils
as the primary means of coordinating government and private sector
critical infrastructure protection efforts, as seen in figure 1.
Figure 1: Cross-Sector and Sector-Specific Councils for Critical
Infrastructure Protection:
This figure is an illustration of cross-sector and sector-specific
councils for critical infrastructure protection.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[A] Each of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors has a government
coordinating council and a sector coordinating council.
[End of figure]
Under this framework, each of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors
has both a government council and a private sector council to address
sector-specific planning and coordination. DHS provides guidance,
tools, and support to enable these groups to work together to carry out
their respective roles and responsibilities. The councils are to work
in tandem to create the context, framework, and support for
coordination and information-sharing activities required to implement
and sustain that sector's critical infrastructure protection efforts.
These councils create the structure through which representative groups
from all levels of government and the private sector can collaborate in
planning and implementing efforts to protect critical infrastructure.
Government coordinating councils are to coordinate strategies,
activities, policies, and communications across government entities
within each sector. DHS chairs the government council for sectors where
it is the sector-specific agency. In the other sectors, DHS serves as
co-chair with the designated sector-specific agency. Private sector
councils are encouraged under the NIPP to be the principal entities for
coordinating with the government on a wide range of critical
infrastructure protection activities and issues. Under the NIPP,
critical asset owners and operators are encouraged to be involved in
the creation of private sector councils that are self-organized and
self-governed, with a spokesperson designated by the sector
membership.[Footnote 4] Specific membership can vary from sector to
sector, but is supposed to be representative of a broad base of owners,
operators, associations, and other entities--both large and small--
within the sector.[Footnote 5] We reported in October 2006 on the
extent to which these councils have been established, and we noted that
one of the factors assisting the formation of the government and sector
councils was the existence of long-standing working relationships
within the sectors and with the federal agencies that regulate them. We
found that the more mature councils, such as banking and finance and
telecommunications, were able to focus on strategic issues, such as
recovering after disasters, while the newer councils--including public
health and healthcare and commercial facilities--were focusing on
getting organized.[Footnote 6]
The NIPP also identified cross-sector councils that are to promote
coordination, communications, and the sharing of key practices across
sectors. On the government side, the government cross-sector council is
composed of two subcouncils: (1) the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership
Council, composed of representatives of each of the sector-specific
agencies, that is to enhance communication and coordination between and
among these agencies and (2) the State, Local, and Tribal Government
Coordinating Council--composed of state, local, and tribal homeland
security advisors--that is to serve as a forum for coordination across
these jurisdictions on protection guidance, strategies, and programs.
On the private sector side, the PCIS, composed of one or more members
and alternates from each of the sector councils, is to, among other
things, provide senior-level, cross-sector strategic coordination
through partnership with DHS and the sector-specific agencies and to
identify and disseminate protection best practices across the sectors.
Another cross-sector council, the Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (CIPAC), created in 2006 by DHS, provides the
framework for members of the government and private sector councils to
engage in intragovernmental and public-private cooperation, information
sharing, and engagement across the entire range of critical
infrastructure protection activities. CIPAC, which has been exempted
from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,[Footnote
7] is a nondecisional body and includes both private sector and
government members drawn from both the government and private sector-
specific councils. An additional council, the National Infrastructure
Advisory Council (NIAC), was created by the President in 2001 to
support a coordinated effort by the public and private sectors to
advise the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security on
issues related to security of the nation's critical infrastructure.
NIAC, whose members are appointed by the President from the private
sector as well as from state and local government, is also tasked with
advising the federal government lead agencies that have critical
infrastructure responsibilities.
National Strategy and Implementation Plan Articulate Importance of
Federal Coordination with the Private Sector and Others:
Government pandemic planning efforts are part of an all-hazards
preparedness strategy that recognizes that emergency prevention,
protection, response, and recovery can be applied to numerous disaster
scenarios, both natural and man-made. However, an influenza pandemic
has unique features that may require additional or different
preparedness and planning processes since it would affect the workforce
rather than physical assets and could come in waves, each lasting weeks
or months. To address the threat of an influenza pandemic, the
President's HSC issued two planning documents. The first of these, the
National Strategy, was issued in November 2005 and is intended to
provide a high-level overview of the approach that the federal
government will take to prepare for and respond to an influenza
pandemic. The National Strategy recognizes that preparing for and
responding to a pandemic cannot be viewed as a purely federal
responsibility, stating that in addition to the federal government,
states and communities, the private sector, individual citizens, and
global partnerships all play a role in addressing the pandemic threat.
Among other things, it calls for the federal government to provide
guidance to the private sector and critical infrastructure entities in
their role in a pandemic response, and considerations necessary to
maintain essential services and operations. According to the National
Strategy, movement of essential personnel, goods, and services and
maintenance of critical infrastructure are necessary during an outbreak
of influenza pandemic that could span months in any given community. It
also states that the private sector and critical infrastructure
entities must respond in a manner that allows them to maintain the
essential elements of their operations for a prolonged period of time,
in order to prevent severe disruption of life in U.S. communities. To
ensure this, the National Strategy calls for (1) the development of
coordination mechanisms across American industries to support
activities during a pandemic; (2) guidance to activate contingency
plans to ensure that personnel are protected, the delivery of goods and
services is maintained, and sectors remain functional despite
significant and sustained worker absenteeism; and (3) the establishment
of partnerships within sectors to provide mutual support and
maintenance of essential services during a pandemic.
The Implementation Plan was issued in May 2006. It is intended to
support the broad framework and goals articulated in the National
Strategy by outlining specific steps that federal departments and
agencies should take to achieve these goals. According to the
Implementation Plan, federal, state, and local governments; tribal
nations; and the private sector have important and interdependent roles
in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a pandemic and
ensuring that critical infrastructure is protected and sustained. The
Implementation Plan includes 324 action items related to these
requirements, responsibilities, and expectations. Since then, HSC has
issued two progress reports on the implementation of the plan--a 6-
month and a 1-year summary report.[Footnote 8]
Federal and Private Sectors Are Working Together on Initial Pandemic
Preparedness Activities:
To protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an
influenza pandemic, the federal and private sectors are working
together to prepare for a pandemic. Multiple organizations, federal and
private, have collaborated to develop guidance, identify critical
employees, and hold workshops and training. To some extent, they have
been working through sector-specific and cross-sector councils--that
were created to bring together the government and private sector to
coordinate and collaborate for critical infrastructure protection--for
pandemic preparedness. The five critical infrastructure sectors we
reviewed--transportation (highway and motor carrier), food and
agriculture, water, energy (electricity), and telecommunications--have
also taken initial preparedness steps within their respective sectors.
In addition, they are working with DHS and the sector-specific agencies
to develop sector-specific pandemic planning guidance.
Federal Government and Private Sector Have Taken Preliminary Actions to
Prepare for a Pandemic:
The federal government--particularly DHS and CDC--and the private
sector have worked together, to some extent through the councils, to
develop pandemic preparedness guidance and also to conduct
presentations and workshops on pandemic preparedness. DHS, working
collaboratively with partners in the public and private sectors,
released a Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources. According to HSC's
1-year summary issued in July 2007, this business continuity guidance,
tailored to national goals and capabilities and to the specific needs
identified by the private sector, represented an important first step
in working with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure to
prepare for a potential severe pandemic outbreak. HSC's summary stated
that the guide supports private sector planning by "complementing and
enhancing, not replacing" existing continuity planning efforts and that
DHS developed the guide to assist businesses, whose existing continuity
plans generally did not include strategies to protect human health
during emergencies, such as those caused by pandemic influenza. HSC's
summary further explained that the guide was designed to enhance the
existing private sector business continuity planning already in place.
In addition to this guidance, the federal government has produced
several tools for businesses of all types and sizes to assist them in
planning for a pandemic. For example, CDC has issued planning guidance,
including a "Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist" and also a
community strategy for pandemic influenza mitigation.[Footnote 9] The
community guide introduces the pandemic severity index that assigns
response actions for a pandemic based on expected levels of severity.
All of this pandemic guidance has been made available on [hyperlink,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov]. Additional federal government pandemic
planning efforts and related guidance for business continuity can be
found at [hyperlink, http://www.ready.gov].
According to HSC's summary and documents received from DHS, multiple
workshops and forums, attended by more than 30 stakeholders with
critical infrastructure entities, were held in 2006. During these
events, essential functions and critical planning elements were
identified and continuity of business operations during a pandemic were
discussed. DHS officials told us that these information-sharing
sessions were intended to provide practical action-oriented information
to identify essential functions and critical planning elements and to
assist businesses in protecting the health of employees and maintaining
continuity of business operations during a pandemic. HSC's 1-year
summary also states that the federal government has conducted a number
of pandemic preparedness exercises that included financial institution
officials, public health officials, and other relevant federal, state,
and local officials.
A number of business trade associations are working to advance pandemic
preparedness and response initiatives with the federal sector to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure. For example, the
Executive Director of the Chamber's Homeland Security Policy Division
told us that the Chamber has hosted several regional business pandemic
roundtables with DHS and CDC to discuss the role of business in
pandemic planning and response. In addition, the Chamber has convened a
pandemic planning work group to address pandemic policy issues and to
provide private sector input into government strategies, and is
planning legal-and human-capital-related pandemic seminars in
conjunction with DHS. The Center for Health Transformation, which is a
collaboration of public and private sector leaders, led a simulation
with almost 100 leaders from the private and public sectors to work
through an influenza pandemic exercise in March 2006. According to a
center project director, the exercise looked at the consequences of
such a disaster for the United States and the strategies that might
best mitigate these impacts. According to documentation from the
exercise, simulation participants concluded that the effects would
overwhelm the efforts of any one agency or sector and that the
government will need to drive the national response strategy and engage
all sectors early.
While not directed specifically toward a pandemic outbreak, two major
business entities have taken steps to enhance public-private disaster
response efforts. BENS is a nationwide, nonpartisan organization
composed of senior business executives working together to help enhance
the nation's security. In January 2007, a BENS-chartered task force
issued recommendations on better integrating business resources and
capabilities with those of the government's disaster response plans.
According to the BENS task force chairperson, BENS did so primarily in
response to the federal government's recognition of a pressing need for
an integrated response capability in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. The report used lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and
other disasters to highlight its recommendations in three broad
categories: (1) public-private collaboration, (2) public-private
resource coordination, and (3) legal and regulatory environment. A BENS
representative told us that its report and recommendations represent an
action plan for public-private disaster response coordination,
including a pandemic.[Footnote 10] Further, a representative of the
Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S.
companies, told us that the organization, frustrated with the lack of
good government logistics to coordinate assistance during the Katrina
disaster relief effort, is attempting to leverage existing capabilities
of the private sector to create a more effective response to natural
disasters, including an influenza pandemic. The Roundtable has created
a task force to promote coordination of disaster response and recovery
efforts, as well as long-term rebuilding initiatives, and also to
provide tools and guides for businesses to develop a comprehensive
disaster response program. In December 2006, members of the task force
met with HSC and DHS officials, including the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to discuss improving private-public collaboration to
strengthen the nation's system for disaster preparedness and response.
According to the Roundtable, the federal government and private sector
representatives identified several areas for better collaboration,
including the identification of needs for private sector resources,
increased private sector representation in state emergency management
operations, and collaboration on improved communication, technology,
and supply chain logistics.
Five Sectors Reviewed Are Working through Councils and Have Taken Some
Actions to Prepare for a Pandemic:
DHS officials from the agency's Office of Infrastructure Protection
within the Directorate for National Protection and Programs, as well as
federal and private sector representatives from the five critical
infrastructure sector councils we interviewed, told us that they are
using DHS's sector partnership framework, which consists of sector-
specific and cross-sector councils, to coordinate critical
infrastructure pandemic preparedness efforts. DHS's Director of the
Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and Outreach Division, told
us that the agency's role is to convene and facilitate interaction with
the private sector through these councils.
The five sectors we reviewed have taken initial pandemic preparedness
actions within their respective councils. According to HSC, movement of
essential personnel, goods, and services and maintenance of critical
infrastructure are necessary during an event that spans months in any
given community, and critical infrastructure entities that provide
essential services, such as food, water, electricity, and
telecommunications, have a special responsibility to prepare and plan
for continued operation during a pandemic. The National Strategy states
that the private sector and critical infrastructure entities must
respond in a manner that allows them to maintain the essential elements
of their operations for a prolonged period of time, in order to prevent
severe disruption of life in our communities. Much of the recent
efforts of councils in the sectors we reviewed have focused on
completing the sector-specific plans required by the NIPP, which are
not pandemic specific. All of the five sector councils we reviewed
reported that preparing these plans was their overriding priority and
took a majority of their time but that they have also initiated
pandemic planning efforts in their sectors.
In recognition of the pandemic threat, the five sectors we reviewed all
were conducting activities to help them plan and prepare for a
potential pandemic. For example, Communications Sector Coordinating
Council members told us the council has established a working group to
identify and address issues related to the resilience of the
telecommunications sector during a pandemic (i.e., strengthening the
telecommunications sector's ability to function in the event of a
disaster or incident). According to the Chairperson of the
Communications Sector Coordinating Council, the group is working with
the National Communications System, the sector-specific agency for the
telecommunications sector, to review the potential consequences of
predicted, extraordinarily high telecommuting levels during an
influenza pandemic.[Footnote 11] Specifically, the group is attempting
to gauge telecommuting requirements in the event of a pandemic and has
developed models to represent how users would behave in accessing the
Internet, as well as models of how network infrastructure users would
behave during a pandemic. As part of this effort, the National
Communications System is working with industry and other sectors to
develop a set of best practices for businesses regarding preparedness-
related telework, as well as developing a list of preparedness
activities, also for businesses, that may be useful to mitigate
potential telecommunications challenges. Examples of such activities
include staggering work schedules for optimal capacity and potentially
providing temporary work centers where businesses could conduct
operations during contingency situations.
The Electricity Sector Coordinating Council Chairperson said that the
council began its pandemic planning effort in early November 2005.
Shortly thereafter, the council formed a pandemic planning committee
and proceeded to develop a two-page electricity sector influenza
pandemic threat summary that introduced the threat, framed it for
discussion, and provided general information, and an eight-page
electricity sector pandemic planning, preparation, and response
reference guide that it has distributed to its members. EPA officials
said that EPA's Water Security Division gave a presentation on EPA's
Pandemic Preparedness for the Water Sector at a meeting of the Water
Sector Government Coordinating Council, which highlighted EPA's actions
in response to the pandemic threat and also provided information on
pandemic preparedness tools and guidance. According to the Water Sector
Coordinating Council Chairperson, a number of individual utilities have
developed their own pandemic planning and response guides. The Food and
Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council developed a pandemic
preparedness plan, which it distributed throughout the sector.
Representatives from the Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating
Council, which is part of the Transportation Sector Coordinating
Council and one of the last private sector coordinating councils to
form, said that they have recently formed a pandemic working group.
As directed by the Implementation Plan, DHS, in collaboration with the
appropriate representatives from the sector-specific councils, such as
EPA, has taken steps to develop sector-specific pandemic planning
guidelines. According to a DHS official with responsibility for
overseeing this activity, DHS is collaborating with the appropriate
government and private sector representatives to develop, evaluate,
enhance, and support their respective sector's pandemic planning
guidelines. The DHS official explained that these guidelines, developed
jointly by the government and private sectors, extend beyond the
general pandemic guidance already available and are intended to be a
tactical checklist specific to each sector for pandemic planning
purposes. For example, with the water sector-specific guidance, any
waste water manager in the country would have the necessary information
to make his or her own pandemic plan as comprehensive as possible.
Documentation from DHS indicates that by September 2007, the agency had
engaged 13 sectors in the development of the guidance and had draft
guidelines in various phases of development.
Federal Government and Private Sector Face Challenges in Coordinating
Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic in Critical Infrastructure
Sectors:
A number of challenges face the federal and private sectors as they
attempt to coordinate efforts to plan and prepare for a potential
influenza pandemic in the critical infrastructure sectors. These
include continuity of attention on pandemic preparedness and response,
lack of clearly defined federal and state roles, need for consistent
messages from the federal government and adequate information-sharing
mechanisms within sectors, need to consider cross-sector
interdependencies for a pandemic, needed investments in training and
additional infrastructure capabilities, and potential legal and
regulatory issues.
Federal and Private Sector Acknowledge Challenge of Sustaining
Attention on the Pandemic Threat:
According to federal and private sector representatives, sustaining
preparedness and readiness efforts for an influenza pandemic is a major
challenge. Federal and private sector officials with responsibility for
pandemic planning and preparedness efforts in their sectors said they
are challenged to continue and maintain these efforts primarily because
of the uncertainty associated with a pandemic, limited financial and
human resources, and the need to balance pandemic preparedness with
other priorities.
The federal government has communicated the importance of remaining
vigilant and sustaining pandemic preparedness. For example, the HSC 1-
year summary states that although the visibility of avian influenza
pandemic preparedness has waned in the media, the threat of avian
influenza and the potential for an influenza pandemic are still
imminent. While acknowledging the uncertainty of a potential pandemic,
the report reaffirms the inevitable occurrence of a pandemic at some
point in the future and states that it is everyone's responsibility to
remain vigilant and to continue to take the threat of a pandemic very
seriously.
According to DHS's Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office,
Infrastructure Partnerships Division, the critical infrastructure
sector councils have not designated pandemic planning as a priority.
The current Chairperson of the Food and Agriculture Sector Government
Coordinating Council told us that pandemic preparedness has not been a
major focus of the council, and that the council has been working on
addressing issues related to the contamination of the food and
agricultural system and supply. He further explained that the food and
agriculture sector's all-hazards approach to emergency planning, which
encompasses threats posed by terrorism as well as natural disasters,
would ensure its ability to effectively meet the challenges posed by a
potential pandemic. Similarly, representatives of the Communications
Sector Government Coordinating Council cited the difficulty with
funding pandemic preparedness efforts versus other, more immediate,
organizational priorities, such as protecting against cyberattacks and
their consequences. An electricity sector representative said that it
is very difficult to maintain up-to-date plans and preparedness
materials over time as people move, information becomes out of date,
and circumstances change.
The Chairperson of the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council
recognized that even though the public's interest in pandemic influenza
may have waned, the private sector has fiduciary and ethical
responsibilities that require continued maintenance of pandemic
planning efforts even though pandemic influenza may not be a current
priority of the public. Private sector representatives from the
transportation (highway and motor carrier) sector said they do not see
a sense of urgency in the federal government's interaction with
businesses in their sector regarding pandemic preparedness efforts.
They explained that they had met with officials from DOT 1 year earlier
to discuss legal and regulatory concerns related to interstate
transportation that could facilitate pandemic response activities, but
that there have not been further discussions or resolution of the
issues raised.
Private Sector Perceives a Lack of Clarity on Federal and State Roles
and Responsibilities:
According to the private sector council chairpersons and other
representatives we interviewed, the roles and responsibilities of the
federal and state governments are unclear on issues such as pandemic
vaccine distribution and state border closures. Given the multitude of
organizations within the federal, state, and local governments, and in
the private sector, that are involved in planning and preparing for a
potential influenza pandemic, it is important to ensure that the
leadership, roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clear.
The National Strategy emphasizes the need for coordination across
different government and private sector organizations. The
Implementation Plan contains a number of critical infrastructure-
related action items that involve coordinating roles and
responsibilities for various government and private sector
organizations, a number of which have been reported as completed by
HSC. In its 1-year summary, HSC reported that at the beginning of a
pandemic, the scarcity of vaccine will require the limited supply to be
prioritized for distribution and administration and noted that the
federal government has begun a process to revise previous interim
guidance for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial planning
about which groups to target for earlier access to pandemic vaccines.
In August 2007, we reported that the National Strategy and the
Implementation Plan do not specify how the leadership roles and
responsibilities will work in addressing the unique characteristics of
an influenza pandemic.[Footnote 12] According to the Chairperson of the
President's Council on the Year 2000 Conversion, one lesson learned in
the government's response to the Y2K computer challenge was that the
federal "facilitative" or "convener" role is key in supporting the
necessary government and private sector coordination related to
preparedness, and that clearly defining the government role in
interacting with the private sector is necessary. We have previously
reported that in a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels
must be clearly defined and effectively communicated to facilitate
rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in
the early hours and days after the event.[Footnote 13]
The private sector council representatives from the sectors we reviewed
told us that they were unclear regarding federal, state, and local
coordination efforts related to vaccine distribution. An Electricity
Sector Coordinating Council member described the federal-state
coordination in this area as potentially "falling between the cracks."
A January 2007 report by NIAC on vaccine pandemic prioritization
revealed that critical infrastructure owners and operators involved in
its study were confused about the roles of the multiple federal, state,
and local officials both now and in the future.[Footnote 14] NIAC's
report recommended that the federal government continue to work with
critical infrastructure owners and operators to educate them on the
framework detailing how, when, and in what capacity state, local, and
private-sector response participants will engage the federal government
before, during, and after a pandemic. The NIAC report also recommended
that the federal government continue developing a clearly defined
vaccine and antiviral medication distribution strategy. According to
minutes from a NIAC meeting held in July 2007, the Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response at HHS stated that NIAC's report and
recommendations will help HHS guide vaccine and antiviral distribution
plans for all 50 states and 5 United States territories.
Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council representatives
expressed concerns to us that state governments, during an influenza
pandemic, could potentially close their borders, which would have a
great impact on the national highway system and hinder the delivery of
essential goods and services. They explained that the federal
government has yet to address these and related issues that may be
relevant during the potential panic that may occur following an
influenza pandemic outbreak.
Private Sector Concerned about Receiving Consistent Messages and the
Adequacy of Information-Sharing Mechanisms:
According to several private sector representatives we interviewed,
receiving consistent messages and having adequate information-sharing
mechanisms remains a major challenge for federal and private sector
coordination efforts. Effective communications between the federal and
private sectors will be vital during a pandemic. It is essential for
the federal government to be a trusted source of information, and
communicating accurately and often will be necessary. Pandemic
preparedness involves information sharing across all critical
infrastructure sectors, government agencies, private businesses, and
federal and state information sources. Because an influenza pandemic is
expected to occur in multiple waves over a span of several months,
effective communications networks must be sustained over time despite
complications presented by a reduced workforce.
The Implementation Plan emphasizes the importance of and the need for
timely, accurate, credible, and consistent information that is tailored
to specific audiences. According to the Implementation Plan, this
requires coordinated messaging by spokespersons across government at
the local, state, tribal, and federal levels, and by our international
partners. The Implementation Plan includes a number of action items
directed toward enhancing communications, and in its 1-year summary,
HSC reported that several of these actions have been completed. The
summary states that over 150 information-sharing workshops were held
with industry over the last year, particularly with stakeholders from
critical infrastructure sectors. According to the HSC 1-year summary,
these information-sharing sessions have provided practical, action-
oriented information for identifying essential functions and critical
planning elements and assisting businesses in protecting the health of
employees and in maintaining continuity of businesses operating during
a pandemic.
Despite these actions, the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating
Council Chairperson stated that there remains a great need to establish
viable communication links between the federal and private sectors to
ensure that accurate and consistent messages are provided and received.
He explained that because a potential pandemic will involve public
health agencies as well as agencies with critical infrastructure
responsibilities, information will be coming from numerous sources and
coordination among those providing the information will be vital to
ensure the consistency of information provided. The Chairperson of the
Electricity Sector Coordinating Council told us that working toward a
strong, single pandemic preparedness message across federal, state, and
local levels of government was and would continue to be a top challenge
and priority. We reported in our 2007 biennial high-risk update that
the federal government still faces formidable challenges in analyzing
and disseminating key information among federal, state, local, and
private partners in a timely, accurate, and useful manner.[Footnote 15]
Several private sector representatives from the five sectors we
reviewed also expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of the
councils as a medium for sharing information. Although the critical
infrastructure coordinating councils are designed to allow members to
freely share sensitive information, a member of the Electricity Sector
Coordinating Council said that much of the information that the council
members receive comes from DHS and not from the council.
Representatives from DOT voiced a similar concern. They stated that the
Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council's information-
sharing efforts may not include all of the many small trucking
companies that exist. They explained that as a result, small trucking
companies may not be aware of pandemic planning and preparedness
requirements, and that this could represent a major problem in the
trucking industry because more than 90 percent of businesses in the
industry are small-scale operators (fewer than 10 trucks). DHS's
Director of the Partnership and Outreach Division, Office of
Infrastructure Protection, agreed that effective communications with
small trucking companies is a challenge. DHS officials in this office
explained that there is a substantial role for outreach, communication,
and education by state and local governments to keep smaller companies,
in particular, properly informed. They further stated that many of the
sector councils, to be truly representational, include trade
associations consisting of smaller companies as members. According to
the Highway and Motor Carrier Coordinating Council, the combined small
carrier membership of just three of the council's member associations
represent nearly 200,000 of the nation's smallest trucking companies.
These trade associations are expected to act as channels of
communication from the sector councils to smaller businesses,
complementing the communication and information provided by general
business and state and local government information and coordination.
Federal and Private Sector Consideration of Cross-Sector
Interdependencies for an Influenza Pandemic Is a Continuing Challenge:
Private sector and federal representatives cited consideration of cross-
sector interdependencies as a key challenge for pandemic preparedness
efforts. Crucial interdependencies exist among the five sectors that we
reviewed. For example, because nearly every sector of the economy
depends on telecommunications and electricity, how well those sectors
can continue to provide services will affect every other critical
sector. Lessons from Hurricane Katrina demonstrate how overwhelmed
critical resources can become when agencies fail to adequately plan for
requirements in goods and services, and to clearly communicate
predisaster responsibilities to ensure that these goods and services
are available when needed. Due to the interconnected nature of critical
infrastructure sectors and the comprehensive challenge posed by an
influenza pandemic, failing to address cross-sector interdependencies
effectively could place all sectors of the nation's critical
infrastructure at risk.
The Implementation Plan includes an action item that instructs DHS to
map and model critical infrastructure interdependencies across and
within sectors to share critical information with sectors and identify
national challenges during a pandemic. The HSC 6-month status report
showed this action item as complete and stated that DHS maintains a
critical infrastructure modeling capability and that this capability
drives the mapping of critical infrastructure interdependencies. The
report also noted that an ongoing effort using these capabilities is
examining the potential impact of a pandemic. HSC's 1-year summary
explained that one large business invited more than 300 of its top
suppliers to a pandemic preparedness workshop so it could pass along
pandemic planning information and encourage each one of the attending
companies to start to prepare. The summary also highlights a financial
institution that "is assessing all of its vendors to determine whether
or not they have pandemic plans that can support the organization's
supply chain during a pandemic" and also notes that the Financial
Services Sector Coordinating Council has established working groups and
convenes regular meetings to discuss preparations and identify
interdependencies in other critical sectors.
Coordinating councils in several sectors we reviewed identified cross-
sector interdependencies, although not pandemic specific, in their
sector-specific plans required by the NIPP. However, we recently
reported that given the disparity in the plans, it is unclear the
extent to which DHS will be able to use the plans to identify security
gaps and critical interdependencies across the sectors in order to plan
future protective measures.[Footnote 16] As previously mentioned, DHS
officials also held workshops with business and government continuity
planners, operations center operators, and retail and distribution hub
owners/operators where they discussed issues that cut across sectors,
as well as supply chains. DHS officials also said that the planned
sector-specific pandemic planning guides are expected to include a
section on cross-sector dependencies to consider for a pandemic.
Additionally, federal and private sector representatives told us that
some preliminary and limited discussions regarding interdependencies
had occurred within sector-specific and cross-sector councils and some
had taken place in other forums. For example, the Electricity Sector
Coordinating Council Chairperson stated that he had participated in
limited discussions in coordinating council meetings about the
electricity sector's interdependencies with representatives from other
sectors, such as water, telecommunications, and healthcare.
Communications Government Coordinating Council representatives said
that they had participated in several collaborative cross-sector
meetings that considered interdependencies. On the other hand, Highway
and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council representatives told us
that they had been involved in cross-sector discussions with the
pharmaceutical industry and food and grocery representatives, but
stated that they had initiated these talks through their own contacts
and that they had not participated in significant discussions of cross-
sector interdependencies through the sector-specific and cross-sector
coordinating council structure.
Federal and Private Sector Identified Needed Investments in Training
and Infrastructure:
According to federal and private sector representatives in the five
sectors that we reviewed, investment in private sector capabilities is
necessary for businesses to prepare for and respond to an influenza
pandemic. According to Communications Sector Coordinating Council
members, the amount of resources required to address these issues and
the inability of some businesses--particularly those that are smaller
in size--to meet these needs present a challenge to pandemic
preparedness. They explained that if the resource requirements for
private sector preparedness are not clearly identified and addressed,
businesses in the critical infrastructure sectors studied could
potentially lack the staffing, skills, and other assets to effectively
deal with an influenza pandemic.
Private and federal sector council representatives that we interviewed
identified a number of areas where additional investment in private
sector capabilities may be needed to prepare for and respond to a
potential pandemic. The government has recognized the need for
investment in private sector critical infrastructure preparedness
efforts. HSC's 1-year summary states that "The scale and scope of a
pandemic necessitate a dedicated effort and investment beyond typical
business continuity planning." Representatives from the Electricity
Sector Coordinating Council explained that additional investments in
coal stockpiles might be needed to ensure that electricity producers
have sufficient fuel if current supplies are exhausted during a
pandemic. Federal and private sector representatives from both the
Electricity and Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Councils told
us that companies and agencies, anticipating significant workforce
absenteeism in the event of pandemic, were cross-training employees to
better ensure continuity of operations. Electricity sector
representatives also described other types of investment. For example,
one company established redundant physical facilities where multiple
shifts of workers could continue operations at a temporary location
during a pandemic.
DHS officials we spoke with from the National Communications System
described challenges related to adequate investment in network
infrastructure required to support the needs of the large telecommuting
workforce and other demands that would occur during an influenza
pandemic. The officials suggested that telecommunications companies
have little incentive for investing in excess capacity for a pandemic
that may not occur. They explained that small businesses that lack the
resources and staff face even greater challenges, as they are more
limited in their ability to allocate resources toward business
continuity investments.
Federal and Private Sector Noted That Potential Legal and Regulatory
Issues Should Be Considered in Advance of a Pandemic:
Federal and private sector officials also identified potential legal
and regulatory issues that could hinder the private sector's ability to
adequately respond to a pandemic outbreak and provide essential
services, and suggested that these issues should be considered in
advance of a pandemic. Past lessons and current industry views indicate
that if key legal and regulatory issues are not identified and
addressed in advance of an emergency, businesses in critical
infrastructure sectors may be unable to effectively prepare for and
respond to an influenza pandemic.
Lessons learned from previous emergency response challenges involving
critical infrastructure have highlighted the importance of addressing
legal and regulatory challenges in advance of emergency response
efforts as was done in the case of the Y2K challenge. For example,
according to the Chairperson of the President's Council on the Year
2000 Conversion, an important aspect of the government's successful
preparation for the Y2K computing challenge was the passage of
legislation limiting the liability of companies engaged in preparedness
actions.[Footnote 17] BENS reported in January 2007 that a key
challenge in prior disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina involved
"significant regulatory barriers" that hindered businesses' ability to
execute their own continuity plans and assist in supporting their
communities. For example, nearly all businesses included in the BENS
study reported the permitting and credentialing process imposed by
public authorities in the aftermath of Katrina as a major impediment to
restoring business continuity. They said that resolving the
restrictions on professionals licensed in one state from practicing in
another and granting access into the disaster area for owners and
businesses to inspect, repair, and reestablish their services were the
key issues. The BENS report recommends that agencies with oversight and
regulatory authority over the private sector need to clarify and
promulgate procedures that allow the agencies to quickly implement
discretionary authorities for the relaxation of regulations in the
event of an emergency. The Implementation Plan contains an action item
that directs DHS to "coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal
efforts, including legislative and regulatory additions/changes and
waivers, to develop and implement tailored support packages to address
critical infrastructure systems and essential operational requirements
at each phase of the pandemic." Although this action item is due to be
completed in May 2007, the July 2007 HSC summary did not provide a
summary of progress for this action item.
In March 2007, we reported that financial market participants are
collecting information on the types of and circumstances under which
regulatory relief may be needed during an outbreak of pandemic
influenza. Although willing to consider regulatory relief, Securities
and Exchange Commission staff indicated that market participants should
not expect wide-scale waivers of important securities regulatory
requirements. They said that although some form of regulatory relief
would most likely be part of the process for enabling the financial
system to keep operating during a pandemic, such relief should be one
of the last stages in continuity planning and preparation, not the
first.[Footnote 18] DHS's Director of the Partnership and Outreach
Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, told us that predisaster
agreement on terms of relief was unreasonable, due to potentially
diverse circumstances that could be encountered at the time of a
crisis. The official suggested that companies that were interested in
regulatory relief should discuss these issues directly with their
specific regulatory agencies.
Sector council representatives in the transportation (highway and motor
carrier), food and agriculture, electricity, and water sectors all
expressed concerns related to legal and regulatory issues in their
respective sectors. Transportation (highway and motor carrier) sector
representatives stated that to facilitate response efforts, regulatory
waivers related to hours of service, oversized weight restrictions, and
types of fuel mix were issued during the Hurricane Katrina emergency.
They said that they had previously met, post-Katrina, with officials
from DOT to discuss how these types of regulatory relief could be
applied in the future, but to date DOT had not responded regarding the
issues. Although DOT officials noted that existing regulations already
provide for relief during emergencies, sector council representatives
said that there are issues that remain unaddressed by these regulatory
relief provisions which they believe require further
discussion.[Footnote 19] Representatives from the food and agriculture
and water sectors told us that they may be unable to provide needed
services during a pandemic outbreak while adhering to regulations
requiring certified plant operators and food inspectors if, as
estimated, up to 40 percent of their workforces are unable to work
during a pandemic. For example, representatives from the Water Sector
Coordinating Council told us that in the event of a pandemic there may
not be enough certified equipment operators available. Similarly, the
Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council's Chairperson told us
that the number of certified food inspectors may be limited during a
pandemic.
Sector-Specific and Cross-Sector Coordinating Councils Could Be Used
More to Address These Challenges:
There are opportunities to build on the actions already taken to
further address the identified challenges through increased federal and
private sector use of the sector-specific and cross-sector coordinating
councils. DHS recognized that critical infrastructure owners and
operators should be involved in the critical infrastructure decision-
making processes and that a real partnership between these individuals
and the federal government was needed. As a result, DHS created a
framework for the federal and private sectors to interact and to
establish the necessary level of public-private cooperation needed to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure. Although DHS has
established this structure for collaboration among the federal and
private sectors involved with critical infrastructure, to date its
activities have had a limited focus on pandemic preparedness.
PCIS, which is composed of private sector leaders, and CIPAC, which is
composed of government and private sector leaders, provide a framework
for owner and operator members of the government and private sector
councils to engage in intragovernmental and public-private cooperation
across the entire range of critical infrastructure protection
activities. According to DHS, these councils have been used primarily
to distribute information across sectors and government levels but not
to address many of the identified challenges related to an influenza
pandemic. We reported in October 2006 that the councils could utilize
their existing relationships to help develop a strategic focus, such as
planning for an influenza pandemic.[Footnote 20] In particular, because
they bring together public and private sector critical infrastructure
leaders across the various sectors and levels of government, PCIS and
CIPAC can aid in addressing identified federal and private sector
challenges related to pandemic planning.
According to the outgoing chair of PCIS, its members are actively
involved in pandemic planning within their sectors, but have only
recently begun to share their pandemic planning assumptions,
approaches, and issues with each other. During their April 2007
meeting, PCIS members held a roundtable discussion of the status of
their pandemic planning efforts. The outgoing PCIS Chair told us that
PCIS members believe that these discussions were helpful in identifying
common issues and sharing effective approaches for pandemic planning,
and that the PCIS membership is interested in exploring in greater
detail items of cross-sector importance, in particular, influencing
government policy matters such as social distancing strategies[Footnote
21] and antiviral availability and distribution.
CIPAC provides the framework for the public and private sectors to
jointly discuss relevant critical infrastructure issues such as a
potential pandemic and allows the various sector participants to reach
over and beyond traditional sector boundaries. According to DHS's
Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and
Outreach Division, CIPAC's focus over the last year has been on
completing and issuing the sector-specific plans required by the NIPP.
Although the consequences and vulnerabilities of a pandemic may have
been discussed to a limited extent at CIPAC meetings, the Director
acknowledged that the sectors need to work together on
interdependencies and cross-sector issues related to the pandemic
threat. Our review of CIPAC meeting agendas showed that 8 of the 49
CIPAC meetings held since the spring of 2006, when CIPAC was created,
included "influenza pandemic" as an agenda item, and only one agenda
included a joint discussion of cross-sector interdependencies.
DHS, because it is responsible for coordinating national critical
infrastructure protection efforts and is the sector-specific agency for
over half of the critical infrastructure sectors, is well positioned to
help ensure that federal entities take advantage of these existing
coordinating mechanisms to further plan and prepare for a potential
influenza pandemic. DHS could develop and specify agenda items for the
government and cross-sector councils that address many of the
challenges that cut across the sectors and levels of government we
identified. DHS, along with other sector-specific agencies, could
encourage the private sector councils to do likewise. These
organizations can discuss issues, make and test realistic plans, and
develop workable solutions to potential challenges before an outbreak
occurs. Otherwise, there may be insufficient time and resources to
adequately prepare their members for changes in how their sectors may
operate during a pandemic.
DHS, sector-specific agencies, and their counterparts among the
critical infrastructure sectors are responsible for convening CIPAC
meetings, typically upon request from sector members, but DHS's
Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and
Outreach Division, acknowledged that the department could encourage
greater appropriate federal and sector utilization of CIPAC. According
to this official, DHS has responsibility for communicating the
structure, process, and purpose of CIPAC for public and private
collaboration. DHS is encouraging appropriate use of CIPAC by (1)
developing an internal DHS management directive that highlights the
benefits of and requirements for using the current council framework,
(2) highlighting relevant NIPP guidance that encourages the use of the
various councils through a NIPP outreach and awareness program, and (3)
creating a critical infrastructure/key resources annex to the draft
revised National Response Plan, now called the National Response
Framework,[Footnote 22] that discusses use of the councils.
Conclusions:
Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an
influenza pandemic requires an increased amount of coordination,
collaboration, and in some cases, partnerships, between the federal and
private sectors. Private sector planning must be well coordinated
across the interdependent critical infrastructures in the nation and
between all appropriate public and private entities. The federal
government encourages critical asset owners and operators to be
involved in private sector councils that are self-organized, self-run,
and self-governed. The critical infrastructure's coordinating and
advisory committees, along with the National Strategy and
Implementation Plan, bring together government and business owners and
operators of critical infrastructure to plan and prepare for all
disasters, including a potential influenza pandemic. Because a pandemic
may last for weeks or months, these public and private sector
relationships must be developed and sustained over extended periods of
time. A pandemic will likely reduce dramatically the number of
available workers in all sectors, and significantly disrupt the
movement of people and goods, which will threaten essential services
and operations within and across the nation's critical infrastructure.
Without working effectively together, the public and private sectors
risk being insufficiently prepared to sustain the operations of
critical infrastructure during an outbreak of influenza pandemic.
Although the federal and private sectors have taken initial steps to
prepare for a pandemic, they face several key challenges that require
coordination among multiple sectors and all levels of government.
Opportunities exist to help address these challenges through increased
use of the critical infrastructure sector-specific and cross-sector
councils. These councils and their members are important because they
provide a structure and forum for the public and private sectors to
collaborate on appropriate planning and preparedness activities to
prepare and respond to a pandemic, particularly for those issues that
require cross-sector discussions and involvement of government at all
levels.
To date, these councils have been used primarily for information
sharing among members, to develop the sector-specific plans for all
hazards, and are developing sector-specific plans for a pandemic.
However, they could be better utilized to have a more strategic focus
and to initiate and facilitate pandemic preparedness activities. Now is
the time, before a pandemic emerges, to leverage these coordinating
mechanisms to ensure that challenges and solutions are identified and
cross-sector capabilities are well understood by all. Discussing and
addressing relevant pandemic concerns and challenges prior to an
outbreak would allow critical infrastructure sectors and their
organizations to provide training to their employees and conduct tests
and exercises that could provide valuable insights into how to further
improve their readiness. DHS acknowledges that it could encourage
greater appropriate federal and private sector utilization of the
councils to help address coordination challenges and solve common
problems for pandemic and other hazards. DHS is well positioned to
encourage federal and private entities to take advantage of these
coordinating mechanisms to further plan and prepare for a potential
influenza pandemic before an outbreak may occur.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help the nation better protect critical infrastructure in the event
of an influenza pandemic and to build on the progress made thus far, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with sector-
specific agencies, lead efforts to encourage the government and private
sector members of the councils to consider and help address the
challenges that will require coordination between the federal and
private sectors involved with critical infrastructure and within the
various sectors in advance of, as well as during, a pandemic.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.
DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV. In
commenting on the draft report, DHS generally agreed with the contents
of the report and concurred with our recommendation. We also provided a
draft of this report to federal and private sector representatives of
the five sectors we reviewed. FDA (HHS); DOE; DOT; and representatives
of PCIS and the Electricity and Highway and Motor Carrier Sector
Coordinating Council provided technical comments, which we incorporated
as appropriate. Representatives of the Food and Agriculture
Coordinating Council and TSA informed us that they had no comments on
the draft report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Bernice Steinhardt:
Director, Strategic Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this engagement are to identify (1) how the federal
government is working with the private sector to ensure protection of
the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza
pandemic, particularly in the transportation (highway and motor
carrier), food and agriculture, water, energy (electricity), and
telecommunications sectors, and (2) the challenges facing the federal
government and private sector to coordinate protection of the nation's
critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic,
particularly in these same five sectors, and what the federal
government could do to help to address these challenges.
To address both of our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed critical
infrastructure protection regulations, plans, and guidance, including
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan, and the Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources. We assessed the status of the action items in the
implementation plan related to critical infrastructure protection, and
specifically to the challenges that were identified by the federal and
private sector representatives we interviewed. In order to do this, we
reviewed the Homeland Security Council's 6-month and 1-year progress
reports on the implementation plan, and received updates from
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials on the status of these
action items. We also interviewed officials from DHS and the Department
of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) with responsibility for leading and coordinating the
overall national critical infrastructure protection effort and for
working with the private sector to prepare for a possible pandemic.
Within DHS, we met with the Chief Medical Officer; the Assistant
Secretary for the Private Sector Office, Office of Policy; the Director
of the Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and Outreach
Division; and the Director of the Partnership and Outreach Division,
Office of Infrastructure Protection, and their staff. Within CDC, we
interviewed the Director, Business Partnerships and Chief of the
Private and Public Partners Branch, Division of Partnerships, and other
CDC staff. We also interviewed representatives from business trade
associations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business
Executives for National Security, the Business Roundtable, and the
Center for Health Transformation.
We reviewed 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors for our study.
The sectors are energy (electricity), food and agriculture,
telecommunications, transportation (highway and motor carrier), and
water. These sectors were selected because, in addition to the public
health and healthcare sector, they will provide the services most basic
to the continued operation of the economy and society during an
emergency such as a pandemic. We reviewed sector-specific plans and
guidance for the 5 sectors we studied in depth. We also interviewed
representatives of each of the sector-specific federal agencies with
critical infrastructure protection responsibility for the 5 sectors we
reviewed: DHS's Transportation Security Administration (highway and
motor carrier) and National Communications System Agency
(telecommunications); the Department of Agriculture and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) (food and agriculture); the Environmental
Protection Agency (water); and the Department of Energy (electricity).
The membership of the 5 government sector coordinating councils is
provided in appendix II. In addition, we also interviewed
representatives from the Department of Transportation (highway and
motor carrier). We interviewed private sector representatives for each
of the 5 sectors, including the chairpersons of the respective sector
coordinating councils. These representatives presented their views on
how their respective councils are working with the federal government
to protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of a
pandemic, the challenges they face, and opportunities for addressing
those challenges; but they did not necessarily represent the views of
each member of their respective councils. The membership of the 5
private sector coordinating councils is provided in appendix III.
In addition to these interviews, and to address both objectives, we
reviewed charters, meeting agendas and minutes, and other planning
documents and guides for the various coordinating councils. We also
gathered relevant documentation from the officials and representatives
we interviewed. In addition, we attended pandemic planning workshops
and conferences sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. As part of
our effort to identify possible challenges in the critical
infrastructure area, we reviewed the following sources:
* prior GAO work on critical infrastructure protection, Year 2000
computer conversion, emergency response, federal collaboration
practices, and public and private partnerships;
* related studies and reports by other government, nonprofit, and
private sector organizations; and:
* business consulting, practitioner, and academic literature and
studies in the areas of emergency management and governance.
The results of our review of these five sectors cannot be generalized
to the other critical infrastructure sectors given the limited number
of sectors we reviewed and their nonprobabilistic selection. However,
our general review of related literature suggests that the other
sectors face similar challenges in how the federal and private sectors
are coordinating their efforts to prepare for an influenza pandemic.
Because the focus of our work was on the pandemic planning and
coordinating efforts between the federal government and the private
sector at a national level, we did not examine individual state, local,
or private sector initiatives on their own, such as private sector
continuity of operations plans, except in the case where these efforts
were connected with federal initiatives.
We conducted our work from June 2006 through September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Government Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as
of September 4, 2007:
Table: Government Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as of
September 4, 2007:
Council and sector: Energy;
Government council members: U.S. Department of Energy, Chair;
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners;
National Association of State Energy Officials;
U.S. Department of Agriculture;
U.S. Department of Defense;
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
U.S. Department of the Interior;
U.S. Department of State;
U.S. Department of Transportation;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Council and sector: Food and Agriculture;
Government council members: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Food and Drug Administration, Chair[A];
U.S. Department of Agriculture;
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials;
Intertribal Agriculture Council;
National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials;
National Association of County and City Health Officials;
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture;
National Science Foundation;
U.S. Department of Commerce;
U.S. Department of Defense;
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
U.S. Department of the Interior;
U.S. Department of Justice;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Council and sector: Communications (Telecommunications);
Government council members: U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
National Communications Center, Chair;
Federal Communications Commission;
General Services Administration;
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners;
U.S. Department of Commerce;
U.S. Department of Defense;
U.S. Department of Justice.
Council and sector: Transportation;
Government council members: U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Transportation Security Administration, Chair;
U.S. Department of Defense;
U.S. Department of Energy;
U.S. Department of Transportation.
Council and sector: Water;
Government council members: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Chair;
Association of State & Interstate Water Pollution Control;
Administrators;
Association of State Drinking Water Administrators;
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
U.S. Department of Agriculture;
U.S. Department of Defense;
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
U.S. Department of State;
U.S. Department of the Interior.
Sources: Government council representatives and DHS.
[A] FDA is the current Chair. Chair position rotates on a yearly basis
among FDA, DHS, and USDA.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Private Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as
of September 4, 2007:
Table: Private Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as of
September 4, 2007:
Council and sector: Electricity (Energy);
Sector council members: Independent Electricity System Operator,
Ontario Canada, Chair;
Arizona Public Service Company;
Exelon Corporation;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association;
New York Independent System Operator;
North American Electric Reliability Corporation,;
Reliability First Corporation;
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Council and sector: Food and Agriculture;
Sector council members: International Dairy Foods Association, Chair;
Agricultural Retailers Association;
American Farm Bureau Federation;
CF Industries, Inc;
CropLife America;
Food Marketing Institute;
Food Processors Association;
International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses;
International Food Service Distributors Association;
International In- flight Food Service Association;
International Warehouse Logistics Association;
McCormick & Company, Inc;
National Association of Convenience Stores;
National Cattlemen's Beef Association;
National Corn Growers Association;
National Milk Producers Federation;
National Pork Producers Association;
National Restaurant Association;
National Retail Federation;
National Food Service Security Council;
United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association.
Council and sector: Communications (Telecommunications);
Sector council members: Verizon, Chair;
Alcatel-Lucent;
Americom-GS;
Association of Public Television Stations;
AT&T;
BellSouth Corporation;
Boeing;
Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association;
Cincinnati Bell;
Cingular;
Cisco;
Comcast;
Computer Sciences Corporation;
Hughes Network Systems;
Internet Security Alliance;
Intrado;
Level 3;
Nortel;
Qwest;
Rural Cellular Association;
SAVVIS;
Satellite Industry Association;
Sprint-Nextel;
Telcordia;
Telecommunications Industry Association;
United Telecom Council;
U.S. Telecom Association;
U.S. Internet Service Provider Association;
VeriSign.
Council and sector: Highway and Motor Carrier (Transportation);
Sector council members: American Trucking Associations, Chair;
American Bus Association;
American Chemistry Council;
American Petroleum Institute;
American Road and Transportation Builders Association;
Border Trade Alliance;
Chemtron Corporation;
Con-Way, Inc;
Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry;
Institute of Makers of Explosives;
Intelligent Transportation Society of America;
Intermodal Association of North America;
International Bridge Tunnel and Turnpike Association;
Kenan Advantage Group;
Laidlaw Education Services;
Mid-States Express, Inc;
National Association of Small Trucking;
National Association of Truck Stop Operators;
National Industrial Transportation League;
National School Transportation Association;
National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc;
Owner- Operator Independent Drivers Association;
Schneider National, Inc;
Taxicab, Limousine and Paratransit Association;
The BusBank;
Tri-State Motor Transit Company;
Truck Manufacturers Association;
Truck Rental and Leasing Association;
United Motorcoach Association.
Council and sector: Water;
Sector council members: Columbus Water Works, Chair;
Alexandria Sanitation Authority;
American Water;
American Water Works Association;
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies;
AWWA Research Foundation;
Bean Blossom Patricksburg Water Corporation;
Boston Water and Sewer Commission;
Breezy Hill Water and Sewer Company;
City of Portland Bureau of Environmental Services;
Fairfax Water;
Greenville Water System;
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power;
Manchester Water Works;
Milwaukee Water Works;
National Association of Clean Water Agencies;
National Association of Water Companies, National Rural;
Water Association;
New York City Department of Environmental Protection;
Pima County Wastewater Management Department;
United Water;
Water Environment Federation;
Water Environment Research Foundation.
Sources: Sector council representatives and DHS.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
October 15, 2007:
Mr. Norman J. Rabkin:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Rabkin:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report GAO-08-36 entitled Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist
to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges that Require
Federal and Private Sector Coordination (GAO Job Code 450489). We
generally agree with the contents of the report.
We concur with the recommendation that to help the nation better
protect critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with sector-specific
agencies, build on the progress made thus far and use the coordinating
councils as a mechanism to help ensure that critical infrastructure
stakeholders are adequately prepared for a pandemic outbreak.
Specifically, the Secretary should encourage the government and private
sector members of the councils to consider and help address the
challenges that will require coordination between the federal and
private sectors involved with critical infrastructure and within the
various sectors in advance of, as well as during, a pandemic.
As a Government entity, DHS is unable to "ensure" private sector
preparedness. We believe the appropriate language is that DHS continue
to support and facilitate private sector preparedness. We believe that
a strong architectural framework and multiple initiatives are in place
and in progress to facilitate that goal. Further strengthening and
utilization of the security partnership model will support the overall
achievement of the Department of Homeland Security's objectives for
pandemic preparedness.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future strategic issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Bernice Steinhardt, (202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Sarah Veale, Assistant
Director; Clifton G. Douglas, Jr; Gwyneth Blevins; S. Mike Davis; David
Dornisch; Karin Fangman; Carolyn Samuels; and members of GAO's Pandemic
Working Group made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Collaboration:
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,
D.C.: October 21, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure:
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils
Continue to Evolve. GAO-07-706R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2007.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government
and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors Characteristics. GAO-07-
39. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006.
Emergency Response:
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Continuity of Operations: Agencies Could Improve Planning for Telework
during Disruptions. GAO-06-740T. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006.
Influenza Pandemic:
Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer
Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy. GAO-07-
781. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk
Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Important Steps to Prepare for
Outbreaks, but Better Planning Could Improve Response. GAO-07-652.
Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007.
Financial Market Preparedness: Significant Progress Has Been Made, but
Pandemic Planning and Other Challenges Remain. GAO-07-399. Washington,
D.C.: March 29, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but
Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and
Focused Departmentwide. GAO-06-1042. Washington, D.C.: September 21,
2006.
Y2K:
Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Lessons Learned Can Be Applied to Other
Management Challenges. GAO/AIMD-00-290. Washington, D.C.: September 12,
2000.
Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential Widespread Disruption Calls for
Strong Leadership and Partnerships. GAO/AIMD-98-85. Washington, D.C.:
April 30, 1998.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
[2] The 17 critical infrastructure and key resource sectors are: food
and agriculture; banking and finance; chemical; commercial facilities;
commercial nuclear reactors, materials and water; dams; defense
industrial base; drinking water and water treatment systems; emergency
services; energy; government facilities; information technology;
national monuments and icons; postal and shipping; public health and
healthcare; telecommunications; and transportation systems. Critical
infrastructure are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would
have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic
security, and national public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled
resources essential to minimal operations of the economy or government,
including individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital
systems but could create a local disaster or profoundly damage the
nation's morale or confidence. For purposes of this report, we will use
the term critical infrastructure to also include key resources.
[3] GAO has engagements under way to examine the public health and
healthcare aspects of preparing for and responding to a pandemic,
including efforts looking at (1) global strategies to forestall
pandemic influenza, (2) HHS's pandemic influenza planning efforts, and
(3) medical surge capacity and capability for emergency preparedness.
[4] Owners and operators of these assets include private sector
entities and, in some cases, state and local governments.
[5] According to DHS guidance, government agencies may suggest the
inclusion of various parts of a sector but it is the responsibility of
each private sector coordinating council to identify the sector's
boundaries, establish the criteria for membership, seek broad
participation and representation of the diversity of the sector, and
establish the governance, business case, and work process of the
sector's coordinating council.
[6] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating
Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors'
Characteristics, GAO-07-39 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 2006).
[7] The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
App. 2) was enacted, in part, to control the advisory committee process
and to open to public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies
obtain advice from private individuals and groups. See 648 F. Supp.
1353, 1358-59 (D.D.C. 1986). Pursuant to authority conferred by the
Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 451, DHS established the CIPAC as a
FACA-exempt body to support the free flow of information and the need
for regular, interactive discussions concerning threats and
vulnerabilities. See 71 Fed. Reg. 14,930 (Mar. 24, 2006).
[8] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan Summary of Progress (December 2006), and Homeland
Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza:
Implementation Plan One Year Summary (July 2007).
[9] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Community Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation (February 2007).
[10] Business Executives for National Security, Getting Down to
Business: An Action Plan for Public-Private Disaster Response
Coordination (January 2007).
[11] House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee
on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, Hearing on
Leveraging the Private Sector to Strengthen Emergency Preparedness and
Response, July 19, 2007.
[12] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure
Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy, GAO-07-781
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007).
[13] GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1,
2006).
[14] National Infrastructure Advisory Council, The Prioritization of
Critical Infrastructure for a Pandemic Outbreak in the United States
(Jan. 16, 2007).
[15] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
[16] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector
Councils Continue to Evolve, GAO-07-706R (Washington, D.C.: July 10,
2007).
[17] Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No.
105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (Oct. 20, 1998), and Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
37, 113 Stat. 185 (July 20, 1999).
[18] GAO, Financial Market Preparedness: Significant Progress Has Been
Made, but Pandemic Planning and Other Challenges Remain, GAO-07-399.
Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2007.
[19] 49 C.F.R. sections 390.23 and 390.25 provide automatic relief from
certain truck safety regulations during an emergency, including hours
of service for any motor carrier and driver providing emergency relief.
[20] GAO-07-39.
[21] Social distancing is focused measures to increase social distance,
or to restrict activity. Depending on the situation, this may include
cancellation of public events (concerts, sports events, movies, plays)
and closure of recreational facilities and schools.
[22] The draft National Response Framework was released for public
comment on September 10, 2007.
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