Secure Border Initiative
Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation Gao ID: GAO-08-131T October 24, 2007In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet--the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment is underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule. The SBInet contractor delivered the components (i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson, Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities. According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software integration problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the Project 28 contractor was making progress in correcting the problems, but DHS was unable to specify a date when the system would be operational. Due to the slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is revising the SBInet implementation schedule for follow-on technology projects, but still plans to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest border by December 31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its contract management for Project 28. SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense military personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. DHS officials also reported other challenging factors they will continue to face for infrastructure deployment, including community resistance, environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring rights to land along the border. The impact of SBInet on CBP's workforce needs and operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into their operating procedures. The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed long-term human capital planning.
GAO-08-131T, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation
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Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and
Oversight, and Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee
on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, October 24, 2007:
Secure Border Initiative:
Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
For Official Use Only Draft:
GAO-08-131T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-131T, a testimony before the subcommittee on
Management, Investigation, and Oversight, and Border, Maritime and
Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar
program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet”the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing
a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security
infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication
technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones).
The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS
progress in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides
GAO‘s observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet
infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has
determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its
workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI
Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and
the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO‘s observations are
based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules,
contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS
officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border
where SBInet deployment is underway. GAO performed the work from April
2007 through October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO‘s
What GAO Found:
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28”the first segment of
SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind
its planned schedule. The SBInet contractor delivered the components
(i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson,
Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4
months after it was to become operational”at which point Border Patrol
agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their
activities. According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software
integration problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the
Project 28 contractor was making progress in correcting the problems,
but DHS was unable to specify a date when the system would be
operational. Due to the slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is
revising the SBInet implementation schedule for follow-on technology
projects, but still plans to deploy technology along 387 miles of the
southwest border by December 31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to
strengthen its contract management for Project 28.
SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on
schedule, but meeting CBP‘s goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence
and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be
challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal
to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average
cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that
deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus
far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor
costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense military
personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use
commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of
commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs
suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. DHS
officials also reported other challenging factors they will continue to
face for infrastructure deployment, including community resistance,
environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring rights to
land along the border.
The impact of SBInet on CBP‘s workforce needs and operating procedures
remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified
or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents
required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but
until the system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the
change is unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being
deployed, Border Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to
integrate SBInet into their operating procedures.
The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of
its staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns
that staffing shortfalls could affect the agency‘s capacity to provide
adequate contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet
completed long-term human capital planning.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-08-131T. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202)
512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov
[End of section]
Chairman Sanchez, Mr. Souder, Chairman Carney, Mr. Rogers and Members
of the Subcommittees:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss observations on selected
aspects of the Secure Border Initiative's SBInet program
implementation.
Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and
contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction,
continues to be a major concern. Much of the United States' 6,000 miles
of international borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to
illegal entry. Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
apprehends hundreds of thousands of people entering the country
illegally each year, several hundreds of thousands of individuals also
enter the United States illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS
announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a
multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders
and reducing illegal immigration. Elements of SBI will be carried out
by several organizations within DHS. One element of SBI is SBInet.
Under SBInet, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is
responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system.
You requested that we monitor the SBInet program and provide periodic
updates on the status of the program. My testimony today is the first
in a series of interim reports on SBInet implementation and focuses on
the following issues:
* SBInet's technology implementation;
* SBInet's infrastructure implementation;
* the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet
technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating
procedures; and:
* how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO)[Footnote 1] has
defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve
these goals.
To address these issues, we analyzed DHS documents, including program
schedules and status reports, and workforce data. We interviewed DHS
and CBP headquarters and field officials, including representatives of
the SBInet PMO, Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science
and Technology Directorate. We also visited the Tucson and Yuma,
Arizona Border Patrol sectors[Footnote 2]--two sites where SBInet
deployment was underway at the time of our review. We performed our
work from April 2007 through October 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. (App. I provides a detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology.)
We also have work underway to review other components of the SBInet
program. Specifically, we are conducting work for the House Committee
on Homeland Security to assess the development and deployment of
SBInet's command, control, and communications systems, and surveillance
and detection systems and expect to issue a report next year. In
addition, we are reviewing DHS's use of performance-based services
acquisition, an acquisition method structured around the results to be
achieved instead of the manner by which the service should be
performed. We expect to issue a report on this effort in January 2008.
Summary:
DHS has made some progress to implement the first segment of SBInet
technology, Project 28--a $20 million project to secure 28 miles along
the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule.
Boeing--the prime contractor that DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and
sustain systems of new surveillance and communications technology
across U.S. borders--delivered and deployed the system components
(i.e., radars, sensors, computers) to the Project 28 site in the Tucson
sector on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4
months after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol
agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their
activities, and CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation
phase. According to CBP and Boeing officials, the delays are primarily
attributed to software integration problems--such as long delays in
radar information being displayed in command centers. In September
2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was making progress in
correcting the system integration problems, but CBP was unable to
provide us with a specific date on when Boeing would complete the
necessary corrections to make Project 28 operational. CBP reports that
it is in the early stages of planning for additional SBInet technology
projects along the southwest border; however, Boeing's delay in
completing Project 28 has led CBP to extend timelines for deploying
some technology projects scheduled for calendar years 2007 and 2008.
CBP reports that it has taken steps to strengthen its contract
management for this project.
Deploying SBInet's infrastructure along the southwest border is on
schedule, but meeting the SBInet program's goal to have 370 miles of
pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December
31, 2008, may prove challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met
its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year
2007 and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO
estimates that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar
to those thus far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure
construction labor costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department
of Defense (DOD) military personnel. However, CBP officials report that
they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing projects. The
additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases
in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly than
planned. Also, while deployment of tactical infrastructure is on
schedule, CBP officials reported that meeting deadlines has been
challenging because of factors the officials will continue to face,
including conducting outreach necessary to address border-community
resistance, identifying and completing steps necessary to comply with
environmental regulations, and addressing difficulties in acquiring
rights to border lands.
The impact of SBInet on the Border Patrol's workforce's needs and
operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is
not fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of
Border Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from the
current projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the
direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. In addition, for the
Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, the Border Patrol is
developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into its operating
procedures. Moreover, the delays in deploying Project 28 will require
revising the SBInet's training curriculum, and trainers and operators
will be retrained.
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its
staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns
that staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide
adequate contractor oversight. In addition, the SBI PMO has not yet
completed its long-term human capital planning.
In their oral comments on a draft of this statement, DHS generally
agreed with our findings and provided clarifying information that we
incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
The SBInet program is responsible for identifying and deploying an
appropriate mix of technology (e.g., sensors, cameras, radars,
communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent
vehicles), tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing, vehicle barriers,
roads,), rapid response capability (e.g., ability to quickly relocate
operational assets and personnel) and personnel (e.g., program staff
and Border Patrol agents) that will enable CBP agents and officers to
gain effective control[Footnote 3] of U.S. borders. SBInet technology
is also intended to include the development and deployment of a common
operating picture (COP) that provides uniform data through a command
center environment to Border Patrol agents in the field and all DHS
agencies and to be interoperable with stakeholders external to DHS,
such as local law enforcement. The initial focus of SBInet is on the
southwest border areas between ports of entry[Footnote 4] that CBP has
designated as having the highest need for enhanced border security
because of serious vulnerabilities. Through SBInet, CBP plans to
complete a minimum of 387 miles of technology deployment across the
southwest border by December 31, 2008. Figure 1 shows the location of
select SBInet projects underway on the southwest border.
Figure 1: Select SBInet Projects Under Way on the Southwest Border:
This figure is a map of locations where select SBInet projects are
underway.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company
for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime
contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and
sustaining selected SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure
projects. In this way, Boeing has extensive involvement in the SBInet
program requirements development, design, production, integration,
testing, and maintenance and support of SBInet projects. Moreover,
Boeing is responsible for selecting and managing a team of
subcontractors that provide individual components for Boeing to
integrate into the SBInet system.[Footnote 5] The SBInet contract is
largely performance-based--that is, CBP has set requirements for SBInet
and Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop solutions to
meet these requirements--and designed to maximize the use of commercial
off-the-shelf technology.[Footnote 6] CBP's SBInet PMO oversees and
manages the Boeing-led SBInet contractor team. The SBInet PMO workforce
includes a mix of government and contractor support staff. The SBInet
PMO reports to the CBP SBI Program Executive Director.
CBP is executing part of SBInet activities through a series of task
orders to Boeing for individual projects. As of September 30, 2007, CBP
had awarded five task orders to Boeing for SBInet projects. These
include task orders for (1) Project 28, Boeing's pilot project and
initial implementation of SBInet technology to achieve control of 28
miles of the border in the Tucson sector; (2) Project 37, for
construction approximately 32 miles of vehicle barriers and pedestrian
fencing in the Yuma sector along the Barry M. Goldwater Range
(BMGR);[Footnote 7] (3) Program Management, for engineering, facilities
and infrastructure, test and evaluation, and general program management
services; (4) Fence Lab, a project to evaluate the performance and cost
of deploying different types of fences and vehicle barriers; and (5) a
design task order for developing the plans for several technology
projects to be located in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors.
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the
SBInet PMO plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing
and 200 miles of vehicle barriers by December 31, 2008. Whereas
pedestrian fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing
the border, vehicle barriers are other physical barriers meant to stop
the entry of vehicles. The SBInet PMO is utilizing the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE) to contract for fencing and supporting
infrastructure (such as lights and roads), complete required
environmental assessments, and acquire necessary real estate.[Footnote
8]
DHS has estimated that the total cost for completing the deployment for
the southwest border--the initial focus of SBInet deployment--will be
$7.6 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DHS has not yet
reported the estimated life cycle cost for this program, which is the
total cost to the government for a program over its full life,
consisting of research and development, operations, maintenance, and
disposal costs.[Footnote 9] For fiscal year 2007, Congress appropriated
about $1.2 billion for SBInet, about which 40 percent DHS had committed
or obligated as of September 30, 2007. For fiscal year 2008, DHS has
requested an additional $1 billion.[Footnote 10]
SBInet Technology Deployment Delays May Increase Schedule Risks:
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment
of technology on the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its
planned schedule. Project 28 is the first opportunity for Boeing to
demonstrate that its technology system can meet SBInet performance
requirements in a real-life environment.[Footnote 11] Boeing's
inability thus far to resolve system integration issues has left
Project 28 incomplete more than 4 months after its planned June 13
milestone to become operational--at which point, Border Patrol agents
were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities, and
CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation phase. Boeing
delivered and deployed the individual technology components of Project
28 on schedule.[Footnote 12] Nevertheless, CBP and Boeing officials
reported that Boeing has been unable to effectively integrate the
information collected from several of the newly deployed technology
components, such as sensor towers, cameras, radars, and unattended
ground sensors. Among several technical problems reported were that it
was taking too long for radar information to display in command centers
and newly deployed radars were being activated by rain, making the
system unusable. In August 2007, CBP officially notified Boeing that it
would not accept Project 28 until these and other problems were
corrected. In September 2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was
making progress in correcting the system integration problems; however,
CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date when Boeing would
complete the corrections necessary to make Project 28 operational. See
figures 2 and 3 below for photographs of SBInet technology along the
southwest border.
Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in Tucson Sector:
This figure is two photos of a Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: At Left, Mounted Laptop Installed in Border Patrol Vehicle;
at Right, Project 28 Command and Control Center:
This figure is two photos of a mounted laptop in a border patrol
vehicle, and a Project 28 command and control center.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The SBInet PMO reported that is in the early stages of planning for
additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border;
however, Boeing's delay in completing Project 28 has led the PMO to
change the timeline for deploying some of these projects. In August
2007, SBInet PMO officials told us they were revising the SBInet
implementation plan to delay interim project milestones for the first
phase of SBInet technology projects, scheduled for calendar years 2007
and 2008.[Footnote 13] For example, SBInet PMO officials said they were
delaying the start dates for two projects[Footnote 14] that were to be
modeled on the design used for Project 28 until after Project 28 is
operational and can provide lessons learned for planning and deploying
additional SBInet technology along the southwest border. According to
the SBInet master schedule dated May 31, 2007, these projects were to
become operational in December 2007 and May 2008. Despite these delays,
SBInet PMO officials said they still expected to complete all of the
first phase of technology projects by the end of calendar year 2008. As
of October 15, 2007, the SBInet PMO had not provided us with a revised
deployment schedule for this first phase.
CBP reports that it is taking steps to strengthen its contract
management for Project 28. For example, citing numerous milestone
slippages by Boeing during Project 28 implementation, in August 2007,
CBP sought and reached an agreement with Boeing to give it greater
influence in milestone setting and planning corrective actions on the
Project 28 task order. While CBP had selected a firm-fixed-price
contract to limit cost overruns on Project 28,[Footnote 15] CBP
officials told us that the firm-fixed-price contract CBP used for
Project 28 had limited the government's role in directing Boeing in its
decision making process. For example, CBP and contractor officials told
us they expressed concern about the timeline for completing Project 28,
but CBP chose not to modify the contract because doing so would have
made CBP responsible for costs beyond the $20 million fixed-price
contract.[Footnote 16] In mid-August 2007, CBP organized a meeting with
Boeing representatives to discuss ways to improve the collaborative
process, the submission of milestones, and Boeing's plan to correct
Project 28 problems. Following this meeting, CBP and Boeing initiated a
Change Control Board.[Footnote 17] In mid-September representatives
from Boeing's SBInet team and its subcontractors continued to
participate on this board and vote on key issues for solving Project 28
problems. Although CBP participates on this committee as a non-voting
member, a senior SBInet official said the government's experience on
the Change Control Board had been positive thus far. For example, the
official told us that the Change Control Board had helped improve
coordination and integration with Boeing and for suggesting changes to
the subcontractor companies working on Project 28.
SBInet Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Track but May Be
Challenging and More Costly than Planned:
Deploying SBInet's tactical infrastructure along the southwest border
is on schedule, but meeting the SBInet program's goal to have 370 miles
of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by
December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP
set an intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new pedestrian fencing
by the close of fiscal year 2007 and, having deployed 73 miles by this
date, achieved its goal. Table 1 summarizes CBP's progress and plans
for tactical infrastructure deployment.
Table 1: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of September
30, 2007:
Infrastructure type: Pedestrian fencing;
Miles in place before SBInet: 78;
Miles deployed through SBInet: 73;
Total miles in place: 151;
Target for 12/31/08: 370;
Miles remaining to meet 12/31/08 target: 219.
Infrastructure type: Vehicle barriers;
Miles in place before SBInet: 57;
Miles deployed through SBInet: 53;
Total miles in place: 110;
Target for 12/31/08: 200;
Miles remaining to meet 12/31/08 target: 90.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of table]
Costs for the 73 miles of fencing constructed in fiscal year 2007
averaged $2.9 million per mile and ranged from $700,000 in San Luis,
Arizona, to $4.8 million per mile in Sasabe, Arizona. CBP also deployed
11 miles of vehicle barriers and, although CBP has not yet been able to
provide us with the cost of these vehicle barriers, it projects that
the average per mile cost for the first 75 miles of barriers it deploys
will be $1.5 million. Figure 4 presents examples of fencing deployed.
Figure 4: At Left, SBInet Fencing Being Deployed at Sasabe, Arizona; at
Right, SBInet Fencing Deployed at Yuma, Arizona:
This figure is two photos of SBInet fencing in Sasabe, Arizona, and
SBInet fencing at Yuma, Arizona.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
CBP estimates costs for the deployment of fencing in the future will be
similar to those thus far. However, according to CBP officials, costs
vary due to the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, who
performs the construction, and the need to meet an expedited schedule.
Although CBP estimates that the average cost of remaining fencing will
be $2.8 million per mile, actual future costs may be higher due to
factors such as the greater cost of commercial labor, higher than
expected property acquisition costs, and unforeseen costs associated
with working in remote areas. To minimize one of the many factors that
add to cost, in the past DHS has used Border Patrol agents and DOD
military personnel. However, CBP officials reported that they plan to
use commercial labor for future infrastructure projects to meet their
deadlines. Of the 73 miles of fencing completed to date, 31 were
completed by DOD military personnel and 42 were constructed through
commercial contracts. While the non-commercial projects cost an average
of $1.2 million per mile,[Footnote 18] the commercial projects averaged
over three times more--$4 million.[Footnote 19] According to CBP
officials, CBP plans to utilize exclusively commercial contracts to
complete the remaining 219 miles of fencing. If contract costs for
deployment of remaining miles are consistent with those to deploy
tactical infrastructure to date and average $4 million per mile, the
total contract cost will be $890 million, considerably more than CBP's
initial estimate of $650 million.
Although deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP
officials reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because
factors they will continue to face include conducting outreach
necessary to address border community resistance, devoting time to
identify and complete steps necessary to comply with environmental
regulations,[Footnote 20] and addressing difficulties in acquiring
rights to border lands. As of July 2007 CBP anticipated community
resistance to deployment for 130 of its 370 miles of fencing. According
to community leaders, communities resist fencing deployment for reasons
including the adverse effect they anticipate it will have on cross-
border commerce and community unity. In addition to consuming time,
complying with environmental regulations, and acquiring rights to
border land can also drive up costs. Although CBP officials state that
they are proactively addressing these challenges, these factors will
continue to pose a risk to meeting deployment targets.
In an effort to identify low cost and easily deployable fencing
solutions, CBP funded a project called Fence Lab. CBP plans to try to
contain costs by utilizing the results of Fence Lab in the future.
Fence Lab tested nine fence/barrier prototypes and evaluated them based
on performance criteria such as their ability to disable a vehicle
traveling at 40 miles per hour (see fig. 5), allowing animals to
migrate through them, and their cost-effectiveness. Based on the
results from the lab, SBInet has developed three types of vehicle
barriers and one pedestrian fence that meet CBP operational
requirements (see fig. 6). The pedestrian fence can be installed onto
two of these vehicle barriers to create a hybrid pedestrian fence and
vehicle barrier. CBP plans to include these solutions in a "toolkit" of
approved fences and barriers,[Footnote 21] and plans to deploy
solutions from this toolkit for all remaining vehicle barriers and for
202 of 225 miles of remaining fencing. Further, CBP officials
anticipate that deploying these solutions will reduce costs because
cost-effectiveness was a criterion for their inclusion in the toolkit.
SBInet officials also told us that widely deploying a select set of
vehicle barriers and fences will lower costs through enabling it to
make bulk purchases of construction and maintenance materials.
Figure 5: Fence Lab crash testing conducted in May 2007:
This is figure is a photo of a fence lab crash testing conducted in May
2007.
[See PDF for image]
Source: CBP.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Vehicle Barriers and Fencing Developed by Fence Lab That Meet
Performance Requirements and Are Included in SBInet's "Toolbox" of
Approved Fences and Barriers.
This figure is a collection of photos. The photos are of the Jersey
Vehicle Barrier, and Post on Rail Vehicle Barrier, which are Fence Lab
solutions that can be turned into hybrid vehicle barriers and
pedestrian fencing when a welded wire mesh fence is mounted on top of
them. The Normandy vehicle barrier, also pictured, is also a Fence Lab
solution. It cannot accommodate pedestrian fencing and will be used
where no other vehicle barriers can be installed because of terrain or
environmental concerns.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data; photos by CBP.
[End of figure]
SBInet Impact on Border Patrol's Workforce Needs and Operating
Procedures Remains Unclear:
While SBInet Program officials expect SBInet to greatly reduce the time
spent by CBP enforcement personnel in performing detection
activities,[Footnote 22] a full evaluation of SBInet's impact on the
Border Patrol's workforce needs has not been completed. The Border
Patrol currently uses a mix of resources including personnel,
technology, infrastructure, and rapid response capabilities to
incrementally achieve its strategic goal of establishing and
maintaining operational control of the border.[Footnote 23] Each year
through its Operational Requirements Based Budget Program (ORBBP), the
Border Patrol sectors outline the amount of resources needed to achieve
a desired level of border control.[Footnote 24] Border Patrol officials
state this annual planning process allows the organization to measure
the impact of each type of resource on the required number of Border
Patrol agents. A full evaluation of SBInet's impact on the Border
Patrol's workforce needs is not yet included in the ORBBP process;
however, the Border Patrol plans to incorporate information from
Project 28 a few months after it is operational.
According to agency officials, CBP is on track to meet its hiring goal
of 6,000 new Border Patrol agents by December 2008, but after SBInet is
deployed, CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents
required to meet mission needs to change from current projections,
although the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. In
addition, in June 2007, we expressed concern that deploying these new
agents to the southwest sectors coupled with the planned transfer of
more experienced agents to the northern border will create a
disproportionate ratio of new agents to supervisors within those
sectors--jeopardizing the supervisors' availability to acclimate new
agents.[Footnote 25] Tucson Sector officials stated CBP is planning to
hire from 650 to 700 supervisors next year. To accommodate the
additional agents, the Border Patrol has taken initial steps to provide
additional work space through constructing temporary and permanent
facilities, at a projected cost of about $550 million from fiscal year
2007 to 2011.
The SBInet PMO expects SBInet to support day-to-day border enforcement
operations; however, analysis of the impact of SBInet technology on the
Border Patrol's operational procedures cannot be completed at this time
because agents have not been able to fully use the system as intended.
Leveraging technology is part of the National Border Patrol Strategy
which identifies the objectives, tools, and initiatives the Border
Patrol uses to maintain operational control of the borders. The Tucson
sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, is developing a plan on how
to integrate SBInet into its operating procedures. Border Patrol
officials stated they intend to re-evaluate this strategy, as SBInet
technology is identified and deployed, and as control of the border is
achieved.
According to agency officials, 22 trainers and 333 operators were
trained on the current Project 28 system, but because of deployment
delays and changes to the COP software, the SBInet training curriculum
is to be revised by Boeing and the government. Training is continuing
during this revision process with 24 operators being trained each week.
According to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are receiving "hands
on" training during evening and weekend shifts at the COP workstations
to familiarize themselves with the recent changes made to the Project
28 system. However, training is to be stopped once a stabilized version
of the COP can be used and both trainers and operators are to be
retrained using the revised curriculum. Costs associated with revising
the training material and retraining the agents are to be covered by
Boeing as part of the Project 28 task order; however, the government
may incur indirect costs associated with taking agents offline for
retraining.
SBI PMO Did Not Meet All of Its Staffing Goals and Has Not Yet
Completed Long-Term Human Capital Planning:
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its
staffing goal of 270 employees.[Footnote 26] As of September 30, 2007,
the SBI PMO had 247 employees onboard, with 113 government employees
and 134 contractor support staff. SBI PMO officials also reported that
as of October 19, 2007, they had 76 additional staff awaiting
background investigations. In addition, these officials said that a
Human Capital Management Plan has been drafted, but as of October 22,
2007, the plan had not been approved. In February 2007, we reported
that SBInet officials had planned to finalize a human capital strategy
that was to include details on staffing and expertise needed for the
program.[Footnote 27] At that time, SBI and SBInet officials expressed
concern about difficulties in finding an adequate number of staff with
the required expertise to support planned activities about staffing
that shortfalls could limit government oversight efforts. Strategic
human capital planning is a key component used to define the critical
skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve programmatic
goals and outlines ways the organization can fill gaps in knowledge,
skills, and abilities.[Footnote 28] Until SBInet fully implements a
comprehensive human capital strategy, it will continue to risk not
having staff with the right skills and abilities to successfully
execute the program.
Concluding Observations:
Project 28 and other early technology and infrastructure projects are
the first steps on a long journey towards SBInet implementation that
will ultimately require an investment of billions of taxpayer dollars.
Some of these early projects have encountered unforeseen problems that
could affect DHS's ability to meet projected completion dates, expected
costs, and performance goals. These issues underscore the need for both
DHS and Boeing, as the prime contractor, to continue to work
cooperatively to correct the problems remaining with Project 28 and to
ensure that the SBInet PMO has adequate staff to effectively plan and
oversee future projects. These issues also underscore Congress's need
to stay closely attuned to DHS's progress in the SBInet program to make
sure that performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and
the nation's border security needs are fully addressed.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that members of the Subcommittees may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at
(202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this
statement were Robert E. White, Assistant Director; Rachel Beers; Jason
Berman; Katherine Davis; Jeanette Espínola; Taylor Matheson; and Sean
Seales.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the progress that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has made in implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)
SBInet's technology deployment projects, we analyzed DHS documentation,
including program schedules, project task orders, status reports, and
expenditures. We also interviewed DHS and the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) headquarters and field officials, including
representatives of the SBInet Program Management Office (PMO), Border
Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate, as well as SBInet contractors. We visited the Tucson
Border Patrol sector--the site where SBInet technology deployment was
underway at the time of our review.
To determine the progress that Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has made in infrastructure project implementation, we analyzed DHS
documentation, including schedules, contracts, status reports, and
expenditures. In addition, we interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and
field officials, including representatives of the SBInet PMO, and
Border Patrol. We also interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers and the Department of the Interior. We visited the Tucson
and Yuma, Arizona Border Patrol sectors--two sites where tactical
infrastructure projects were underway at the time of our review. We did
not review the justification for infrastructure project cost estimates
or independently verify the source or validity of the cost information.
To determine the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of
SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and
operating procedures, we reviewed documentation of the agency's
decision to hire an additional 6,000 agents and the progress hiring
these agents. We also interviewed headquarters and field officials to
track if and how CBP (1) is hiring and training its target number of
personnel, (2) it is planning to train new agents on SBInet technology,
and (3) it will incorporate the new system into its operational
procedures, and any implementation challenges it reports facing in
conducting this effort.
To determine how the SBInet PMO defined its human capital goals and
progress it has made in achieving these goals, we reviewed the office's
documentation on its hiring efforts related to SBInet, related
timelines, and compared this information with agency goals. We
determined that the workforce data were sufficiently reliable for
purposes of this report. We also interviewed SBI and SBInet officials
to identify challenges in meeting the goals and steps taken by the
agency to address those challenges.
We performed our work from April 2007 through October 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The SBInet PMO is part of the CBP SBI PMO. The SBInet PMO is
responsible for overseeing all SBInet activities; for acquisition and
implementation, including establishing and meeting program goals,
objectives, and schedules; for overseeing contractor performance; and
for coordinating among DHS agencies.
[2] The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting,
interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt illegal entry or
smuggle people--including terrorists or contraband, including weapons
of mass destruction--across U.S. borders between official ports of
entry.
[3] DHS defines effective control of U.S. borders as the ability to
consistently: (1) detect illegal entries into the United States; (2)
identify and classify these entries to determine the level of threat
involved; (3) respond to these entries; and (4) bring events to a
satisfactory law enforcement resolution.
[4] At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people
and cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate
travel and trade.
[5] Boeing employs several companies as subcontractors on the SBInet
project. These companies provide Boeing with a variety of services. For
example, Boeing has used a subcontractor to install laptops into CBP
vehicles, while it has used another to develop and deploy mobile sensor
towers.
[6] Commercial off-the-shelf is a term for software or hardware,
generally technology or computer products, that are available for sale,
lease, or license to the general public.
[7] Project 37 consists of three phases, which when complete are to
provide control over 37 miles of border in the Yuma sector. The first
two phases focus on deployment of tactical infrastructure. The third
phase will focus on technology systems.
[8] The SBInet PMO contracted with Boeing Company to construct 32 miles
of fencing in the BMGR. Deployment of this fencing has been completed,
and the SBInet PMO plans to use USACE to contract for all remaining
pedestrian fencing and vehicle barriers to be deployed through December
31, 2008.
[9] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for
Supporting Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements, GAO-07-
430 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
[10] DHS and DOD appropriations bills for fiscal year 2008 that include
additional funding for border security are awaiting final action in
Congress.
[11] CBP has established performance requirements for SBInet
technology. These include requirements for (1) probability of
detection; (2) correctly identifying threats; (3) apprehension; (4)
system availability; and (5) false alarm rate.
[12] Project 28 components include: 9 mobile radar/sensor towers; 4
underground sensors, 70 small hand-held satellite phones for agents to
communicate throughout the Tucson sector; and 50 CBP agent vehicles
with secure-mounted laptop computers and communications capabilities.
[13] The SBInet PMO plans to deploy SBInet projects in three phases.
Phase one projects are scheduled between April 2007 and December 2008;
phase two projects are scheduled between May 2008 and early 2010; and
phase three projects are scheduled to begin in May 2009.
[14] The two projects are Project 37 BMGR phase three technology
deployment, and the Texas Mobile System, technology deployment for
about 70 miles of border in the El Paso sector.
[15] A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not
subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost
experience in performing the contract. This contract type places
maximum risk upon the contractor and full responsibility for all costs
and resulting profit or loss.
[16] In April 2007, CBP and Boeing reached an agreement to modify the
terms of the Project 28 contract, increasing it to about $20.66
million. CBP modified the contract to add several project design
requirements that the existing task order did not address.
[17] The Change Control Board is a voting body that represents the
interests of program and project management by ensuring that a
structured process is used to consider proposed changes and incorporate
them into a specified release of a product.
[18] CBP's estimates of non-commercial fencing projects do not include
labor costs associated with using government personnel.
[19] According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), DHS
predicts that the San Diego fence will have a total cost of $127
million for its 14-mile length when it is completed--roughly $9 million
a mile. Construction of the first 9.5 miles of fencing cost $31
million, or roughly $3 million a mile, while construction of the last
4.5 miles of fencing is projected to cost $96 million, or roughly $21
million a mile. DHS is proposing to hire private contractors to
expedite the construction of the remaining 4.5 miles of fencing;
according to CRS this fact, and the complexity of the construction, may
account for part of the difference in cost.
[20] Although the REAL ID Act of 2005 gives DHS the authority to waive
all legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious construction of
certain specified barriers and roads along the southern border (Pub. L.
No. 109-13, div. B, § 102, 119 Stat. 302, 306), DHS officials told us
that they only plan to use this authority after they have pursued
alternatives.
[21] As the SBInet PMO uses testing and evaluation to identify tactical
infrastructure and technology components that effectively secure the
border, the SBInet PMO is approving them for inclusion in a master
"toolkit" of approved solutions. In addition to vehicle barriers and
fences, the toolkit will include technology components such as radars
and satellite phones as well as a list of approved vendors. In the
future, the SBInet PMO plans to choose among its toolkit components to
craft border security solutions.
[22] SBI PMO expects SBInet to provide the capability to predict,
deter, detect, identify, classify, track, respond to, and resolve
border incursion; and the operational enhancements of SBInet will
provide efficiencies by reducing the time agents spend performing
detection and characterization activities.
[23] CBP defines operational control as the ability to detect, respond,
and interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for
threat potential or other national security objectives.
[24] The Border Patrol defines five levels of border security ranging
from "controlled"--the highest sustainable level of control to "remote/
low activity"--the lowest level of control.
[25] GAO, Border Patrol Costs and Challenges Related to Training New
Agents, GAO-07-997T (Washington, D.C.: June 2007).
[26] GAO, SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support Oversight and
Accountability, GAO-07-309 (Washington, D.C.: February 2007).
[27] GAO-07-309.
[28] See GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003) and
GAO, Framework for Accessing the Acquisition Function at Federal
Agencies GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
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