Aviation Security
Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA's Passenger Screening Process Gao ID: GAO-08-48T November 15, 2007In August 2006, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) substantially modified its passenger screening policies based on the alleged transatlantic bomb plot uncovered by British authorities. With the aim of closing security gaps revealed by the alleged plot, the revised policies severely restricted the amount of liquids, gels, and aerosols TSA allowed passengers to bring through the checkpoint. At the Committee's request, GAO tested whether security gaps exist in the passenger screening process. To perform this work, GAO attempted to (1) obtain the instructions and components needed to create devices that a terrorist might use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers and (2) test whether GAO investigators could pass through airport security checkpoints undetected with all the components needed to create the devices. GAO conducted covert testing at a nonrepresentative selection of 19 airports across the country. After concluding its tests, GAO provided TSA with two timely briefings to help it take corrective action. In these briefings, GAO suggested that TSA consider several actions to improve its passenger screening program, including aspects of human capital, processes, and technology. GAO is currently performing a more systematic review of these issues and expects to issue a comprehensive public report with recommendations for TSA in early 2008.
GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in their carry-on luggage and on their persons. The components for these devices and the items used to conceal the components were commercially available. Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of concealment GAO used during its covert testing were classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony. Using publicly available information, GAO investigators identified two types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage. Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that GAO performed at a national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in February 2006 that GAO performed in partnership with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited items. By using concealment methods for the components, two GAO investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline flights without being challenged by transportation security officers. In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures and used technology appropriately; however, GAO uncovered weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a result of these tests. For example, although transportation security officers generally enforced TSA's policies, investigators were able to bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this testimony. GAO did not notice any difference between the performance of private screeners and transportation security officers during our tests.
GAO-08-48T, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA's Passenger Screening Process
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, November 15, 2007:
Aviation Security:
Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA's Passenger
Screening Process:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
John W. Cooney, Assistant Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
This testimony was revised on November 16, 2007, to include a link to
digital video. This digital video shows test footage of the improvised
explosive devices (IED) and improvised incendiary device (IID) that GAP
investigators successfully brought through airport security
checkpoints. A link has been added in the Creating Functioning IED and
IID Devices section on page 6.
GAO-08-48T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-48T, a testimony before the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In August 2006, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
substantially modified its passenger screening policies based on the
alleged transatlantic bomb plot uncovered by British authorities. With
the aim of closing security gaps revealed by the alleged plot, the
revised policies severely restricted the amount of liquids, gels, and
aerosols TSA allowed passengers to bring through the checkpoint.
At the Committee‘s request, GAO tested whether security gaps exist in
the passenger screening process. To perform this work, GAO attempted to
(1) obtain the instructions and components needed to create devices
that a terrorist might use to cause severe damage to an airplane and
threaten the safety of passengers and (2) test whether GAO
investigators could pass through airport security checkpoints
undetected with all the components needed to create the devices.
GAO conducted covert testing at a nonrepresentative selection of 19
airports across the country. After concluding its tests, GAO provided
TSA with two timely briefings to help it take corrective action. In
these briefings, GAO suggested that TSA consider several actions to
improve its passenger screening program, including aspects of human
capital, processes, and technology. GAO is currently performing a more
systematic review of these issues and expects to issue a comprehensive
public report with recommendations for TSA in early 2008.
What GAO Found:
GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening
checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive
devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in
their carry-on luggage and on their persons. The components for these
devices and the items used to conceal the components were commercially
available. Specific details regarding the device components and the
methods of concealment GAO used during its covert testing are
classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony.
Using publicly available information, GAO investigators identified two
types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to
an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was
an IED made up of two parts”a liquid explosive and a low-yield
detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED,
investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid
explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device
was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of
which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage.
Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores
and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that GAO performed at a
national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in
February 2006 that GAO performed in partnership with a law enforcement
organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated
that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an
airplane and threaten the safety of passengers.
Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these
devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA
policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited
items. By using concealment methods for the components, two GAO
investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components
for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline
flights without being challenged by transportation security officers.
In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA
procedures and used technology appropriately; however, GAO uncovered
weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a
result of these tests. For example, although transportation security
officers generally enforced TSA‘s policies, investigators were able to
bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by
taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These
weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA
determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are
sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this
testimony. GAO did not notice any difference between the performance of
private screeners and transportation security officers during our
tests.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-48T]. For more information, contact
Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our latest test of airport
security. In March 2006, we reported on the results of covert security
vulnerability testing at 21 airports across the country. These tests
clearly demonstrated that our nation's airlines were vulnerable to a
suicide bomber using commercially available materials to detonate an
explosive device onboard an airplane. During these covert tests, our
investigators passed through airport security checkpoints carrying
prohibited explosive components without being caught by Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) security officers.[Footnote 1] Later that
year, in August 2006, British authorities uncovered the alleged
transatlantic bomb plot. The discovery of this bomb plot, in which
terrorists allegedly sought to detonate improvised explosive devices
(IED)[Footnote 2] in airplanes as they crossed the Atlantic Ocean,
caused TSA to substantially modify its screening procedures--all
liquids, gels, and aerosols with some exceptions were banned from being
carried through passenger screening checkpoints and onto aircraft until
the plot was further investigated. These restrictions were later
relaxed to allow small amounts of liquids, gels, and aerosols through
the checkpoint.
This report responds to your request that we test whether security
vulnerabilities exist in the TSA passenger screening process. To
perform this work, we attempted to (1) obtain the instructions and
components needed to create devices that a terrorist might use to cause
severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers and
(2) test whether investigators could pass through airport security
checkpoints undetected with all the components needed to create the
devices.
To obtain instructions on creating devices a terrorist might use, we
reviewed publicly available information and performed Internet
searches. We obtained components for these devices at local stores and
over the Internet. We devised methods to conceal the prohibited
components using public information about TSA policies and procedures
and obtained items to conceal the components at local stores and over
the Internet. We then conducted our covert tests at a nonrepresentative
selection of 19 airports across the country. The criteria we used to
select the airports resulted in our testing a variety of U.S.
commercial airports, some of which employed private screeners.[Footnote
3]
Our work was not intended to evaluate the overall design and
effectiveness of TSA's airport security program, which contains
multiple layers of security. Rather, our work was performed to test
specific security vulnerabilities related to the three major elements
of TSA's passenger screening process--human capital (i.e., people),
processes, and technology employed at the checkpoint. We tested the
effectiveness of our explosive device at a national laboratory in July
2007. We had previously tested the effectiveness of less powerful
explosive and incendiary devices in the Washington, D.C., metro area
with help of a local law enforcement organization. We conducted work
for this investigation from March 2007 through July 2007 in accordance
with quality standards for investigations as set forth by the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Summary:
Our investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening
checkpoints undetected with components for several IEDs and an
improvised incendiary device (IID)[Footnote 4] concealed in their carry-
on luggage and on their persons. The components for these devices and
the items used to conceal the components were commercially available.
Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of
concealment we used during our covert testing are classified by TSA; as
such, they are not discussed in this testimony.
Using publicly available information, our investigators identified two
types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to
an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was
an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield
detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED,
investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid
explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device
was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of
which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage.
Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores
and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that we performed at a
national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in
February 2006 that we performed in partnership with a law enforcement
organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated
that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an
airplane and threaten the safety of passengers.
Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these
devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA
policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited
items. By using concealment methods for the components, two
investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components
for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline
flights without being challenged by transportation security officers.
In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA
procedures and used technology appropriately; however, we uncovered
weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a
result of these tests. For example, although transportation security
officers generally enforced TSA's policies, investigators were able to
bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by
taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These
weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA
determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are
sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this
testimony. We did not notice any difference between the performance of
private screeners and transportation security officers during our
tests.
We provided TSA officials with two timely briefings to help them take
corrective action. While we understand that TSA faces a significant
challenge in balancing security concerns with efficient passenger
movement, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security
consider several actions to improve aspects of TSA's passenger
screening program, including elements of human capital, processes, and
technology.
Background:
TSA is responsible for securing all modes of transportation while
facilitating commerce and freedom of movement for the traveling public.
In performing its responsibilities, TSA is guided by risk-based
planning, which generally involves a consideration of threats,
vulnerabilities, and the criticality or consequence of an attack if it
were to be carried out. Specifically, in its approach to securing the
domestic aviation sector, TSA maintains numerous programs that provide
a layered approach to security, including intelligence gathering and
analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists, and
assigning undercover air marshals to certain flights. The general
public associates TSA mainly with its security effort at airport
passenger checkpoints. One primary goal of the passenger checkpoint
screening program is to provide for the safety and security of persons
and property on an aircraft against the introduction of an unauthorized
weapon, explosive, or incendiary.[Footnote 5] As we reported in April
2007, TSA continues to modify its checkpoint screening program based on
a number of factors including passenger feedback, risk-based planning,
and its own internal review and testing process.[Footnote 6] TSA's well-
publicized recent policy change in response to the alleged
transatlantic bomb plot of August 2006 is an important example of risk-
based planning. Known as the 3-1-1 rule, this procedural change
prohibits liquid, gel, or aerosol items over 3.4 fluid ounces in carry-
on luggage; in addition, all liquid and gels should be placed in a 1-
quart bag, and only one 1-quart bag is allowed per passenger.
Passenger Screening Process:
TSA focuses on the checkpoint screening process as a primary means of
detecting prohibited items. Items that TSA has prohibited passengers
from bringing aboard an aircraft include, among other things, firearms
and knives; gasoline and lighter fluid; disabling chemicals, including
chlorine and liquid bleach; and many additional items that may be
seemingly harmless but could be used as weapons. During the passenger
screening process, transportation security officers follow standard
operating procedures and utilize technology such as walk-through metal
detectors and X-ray machines to detect prohibited items either on a
passenger's person or in his or her carry-on luggage. The passenger
checkpoint screening process is composed of the following three
elements:
* Transportation security officers (also known as TSOs) screen all
passengers and their carry-on luggage prior to allowing passengers
access to their departure gates. Among other responsibilities,
transportation security officers attempt to detect prohibited items
that passengers may try to carry beyond the security checkpoint.
* Technology is used during the screening process, which primarily
consists of walk-through metal detectors, X-ray machines, handheld
metal detectors, and explosive trace detection (ETD)
equipment.[Footnote 7]
* Standard operating procedures establish the process and standards by
which transportation security officers are to screen passengers and
their carry-on items at screening checkpoints.
The process of screening a passenger who continues to alarm the walk-
through metal detector provides an example of how these three elements
intersect. According to TSA's Screening Checkpoint Standard Operating
Procedures manual, a passenger who continues to alarm the walk-through
metal detector must be screened using a hand-wand search. Passengers
may alternatively request a full-body pat-down search. The manual
describes the process that transportation security officers are to
follow during the additional screening, which includes the use of ETD
swabbing and a pat-down of the passenger to detect any irregularities
in their body contour that could represent concealed items.
TSA Efforts to Improve the Passenger Screening Process:
TSA faces a significant challenge in balancing security concerns with
efficient passenger movement. In our April 2007 report, we described
how TSA monitors transportation security officer compliance with
passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its performance
accountability and standards system and through testing.[Footnote 8]
Compliance assessments include quarterly observations of transportation
security officers' ability to perform particular screening functions in
the operating environment, quarterly quizzes to assess their knowledge
of procedures, and an annual knowledge and skills assessment. TSA
conducts tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which transportation
security officers are able to detect simulated threat items hidden in
accessible property or concealed on a person. TSA modifies its standard
operating procedures based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-
level officials and program-level staff, daily experiences of airport
staff, complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public, and an
analysis of risks to the aviation system. For example, in December
2005, TSA modified its prohibited items list to allow passengers to
carry certain scissors and tools as long as they did not exceed a
certain length. TSA's stated purpose in removing certain scissors and
tools from the prohibited items list was to shift the focus of
transportation security officers from items considered by TSA to pose a
low threat to items considered to pose a high threat.
Creating Functioning IED and IID Devices:
Investigators found instructions on the Internet for creating both an
IED and IID and purchased the components from the Internet and from a
local store for approximately $150. The IED was conceived as a two-part
device--a detonator component that, on its own, could function as an
IED, and a mixture of fuel and oxidizer that would require the
explosion of the detonator.[Footnote 9] Although the detonator
component could be considered an IED, for the purposes of this report,
we are referring to the combination of the detonator and the liquid
explosive as a single IED. Information about liquid explosives was
publicly available on several Web sites and discussed in media articles
related to various terror plots, including the failed London subway
bombing of July 21, 2005, and the transatlantic bomb plot of August
2006. In addition, we obtained information about creating an IID from
the Internet. We also found videos on the Internet of the intense fire
resulting from an IID. One of the components for the IID is a liquid
that TSA prohibits passengers from bringing through security
checkpoints. Specific details regarding the device components and the
methods of concealment we used during our covert testing are classified
by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony.
A group of tests conducted in February 2006 and July 2007 show that the
IED proposed for this investigation functions as intended.[Footnote 10]
In 2006, within the scope of our original covert testing report, we
worked with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C.,
metro area to confirm that the detonator would function as an IED. A
test performed by local law enforcement officials confirmed that the
detonator would cause damage to an aircraft and threaten the safety of
passengers. Because our proposed IED for this investigation was
composed of two parts (the detonator and the liquid explosive), in July
2007 we sought assistance to confirm that this more complex IED would
function as intended. Several tests conducted at a national laboratory
demonstrated that this IED can function as intended, with the initial
explosion by the detonator successfully causing the liquid explosive to
detonate in several tests. Explosion data indicate that this device
exploded with a force sufficient to cause severe damage to an aircraft.
The IID is a far simpler device. Our work with a law enforcement
organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area in February 2006
confirmed that the components of the IID (one of which is a liquid)
could function as intended, causing damage to an aircraft and
threatening the safety of passengers.
Testing at 19 Airport Security Checkpoints:
Our investigators devised methods that would allow them to conceal the
prohibited components for these devices from transportation security
officers. During this planning phase, they considered publicly
advertised TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including
prohibited items. They also judged that some components could be hidden
in either their carry-on luggage or on their persons. They developed
covert test procedures to challenge TSA screening measures using these
components and methods. Specific details regarding the methods of
concealment we used are classified by TSA; as such, these details are
not discussed in this testimony.
By using various concealment methods, our investigators demonstrated
that it is possible to bring the components for several functioning
IEDs and one functioning IID through checkpoints and onto airline
flights without being challenged by transportation security officers.
In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA
procedures and used technology appropriately; however, we uncovered
weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a
result of these tests. For example, although transportation security
officers generally enforced TSA's 3-1-1 rule, we were able to bring a
liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking
advantage of weaknesses we identified in TSA's policies based on a
review of public information. TSA determined that specific details
regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are
therefore not discussed in this testimony. We did not notice any
difference between the performance of private screeners and
transportation security officers during our tests.
Covert Test Series One:
From March 19 through March 23, 2007, two investigators tested the TSA
checkpoint screening process at a number of U.S. airports.
Transportation security officers did not interact with our
investigators at every airport. Interactions that did occur included
the following:
* On March 19 and March 20, 2007, transportation security officers
advised our investigators to use a 1-quart clear plastic bag rather
than the larger bags they were using, but did not require them to do so
before passing through the checkpoint.
* Also at another airport, on March 23, 2007, a transportation security
officer did not allow one investigator to bring a small, unlabeled
bottle of medicated shampoo through the checkpoint. This was a
legitimate toiletry item used by one of our investigators. The officer
cited TSA policy and stated that since the bottle was not labeled, "it
could contain acid." She did not allow our investigator to bring the
unlabeled medicated shampoo bottle through the checkpoint. However, a
liquid component of the IID--despite being prohibited by TSA--was
allowed to pass undetected through the checkpoint. We had identified
this weakness based on a review of public information before performing
our tests.
Covert Test Series Two:
From May 7 through May 9, 2007, two investigators tested the TSA
checkpoint screening process at a number of U.S. airports.
Transportation security officers did not interact with our
investigators aside from the following:
* On May 8, 2007, one investigator deliberately placed coins in his
pockets to ensure that he would receive a secondary inspection. The
transportation security officer used a hand-wand and performed a pat-
down search of our investigator. However, the transportation security
officer did not detect any of the prohibited items our investigator
brought through the checkpoint.
Covert Test Series Three:
From June 5 through June 8, 2007, two investigators tested the TSA
checkpoint screening process at a number of U.S. airports.
Transportation security officers did not interact with our
investigators at every airport. Interactions that did occur included
the following:
* Inclement weather forced our investigators to change their flight
plans at one airport. After changing their plans, they were selected
for secondary inspection at the TSA security checkpoint. Transportation
security officers performed pat-downs at the checkpoint. However, the
transportation security officers did not detect any of the prohibited
items our investigators brought through the checkpoint.
Corrective Action Briefings:
We briefed TSA officials on August 16, 2007, and September 5, 2007, to
discuss our findings. Officials from TSA's Security Operations Office
were present during our second briefing. At these briefings, we
suggested that TSA consider how the results of our covert testing
should affect its risk-based approach to airport security. This could
include implementing one or more measures to reduce the likelihood that
terrorists could successfully bring IED and IID components through
checkpoints using a similar methodology to ours in the future.
The specific nature of our suggestions to TSA is considered sensitive
security information. Put generally, we suggested that, among other
things, TSA (1) establish, depending on airport capacity, one or more
special passenger screening lines to screen individuals based on risk
and individuals with special needs; (2) introduce more aggressive,
visible, and unpredictable deterrent measures into the passenger
screening process at airports nationwide, to potentially include the
implementation of enhanced individual search procedures (e.g., pat-
downs and hand-wand screening) to detect concealed components; and (3)
continue to develop and deploy new technology to be used at passenger
screening checkpoints that would be able to better detect concealed
components.
TSA officials indicated that they did not disagree with our suggestions
in principle and that they would examine them closely to determine
whether and how they should be implemented. They acknowledged
vulnerabilities in human capital, processes, and technology. They also
indicated that they are deploying additional specialized personnel to
enhance security at existing checkpoints and that they are exploring
methods for enhancing transportation security officer training and
transforming the culture of their workforce. Regarding standard
operating procedures, officials said that they are continuously
revisiting and revising their policies. They also indicated that they
were moving forward to develop a "checkpoint of the future" that would
incorporate new and emerging technology to address terror threats. Such
technology could include innovative imaging techniques.
Conclusion:
Our tests clearly demonstrate that a terrorist group, using publicly
available information and few resources, could cause severe damage to
an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers by bringing
prohibited IED and IID components through security checkpoints. Given
our degree of success, we are confident that our investigators would
have been able to evade transportation security officers at additional
airports had we decided to test them. We understand the challenges TSA
faces in balancing security risks with the efficient movement of
passengers; however, from a strict security standpoint, current
policies allowing substantial carry-on luggage and related items
through TSA checkpoints increases the risk of a terrorist successfully
bringing an IED, an IID, or both onto an aircraft undetected. Even if
current carry-on luggage policies are left unchanged, our testing shows
that risks can be reduced through improvements in human capital,
improved processes, and continued advances in technology.
GAO is currently performing a more systematic review of these issues
and expects to issue a comprehensive public report with recommendations
for TSA in early 2008.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, this concludes our
statement. We would be pleased to answer any questions that you or
other members of the committee may have at this time.
GAO Contacts:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Our March 2006 report is classified, but TSA has authorized this
limited discussion.
[2] An IED is an apparatus or contraption placed or fabricated without
detailed manufacturing that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy,
incapacitate, or distract through high-speed projectiles and
overpressure.
[3] Specific details about which airports employed private screeners as
opposed to transportation security officers are considered sensitive
security information and are not included in this testimony. Therefore,
the term transportation security officer is used throughout this
testimony, but may, in some cases, also refer to private screeners that
we tested.
[4] A IID is an apparatus or contraption placed or fabricated without
detailed manufacturing that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy,
incapacitate, or distract by creating intense heat or fire.
[5] 49 C.F.R. §§ 1542.101, 1540.107, and 1540.111.
[6] GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns
Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation
and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007).
[7] ETD works by detecting explosive vapors and residue. Human
operators collect samples by rubbing swabs along an object, such as a
carry-on suitcase. They then place the swabs in an ETD machine. The ETD
machine chemically analyzes the swab to identify traces of explosive
materials.
[8] GAO-07-634.
[9] Many chemical explosives consist of a mixture of oxidizer and fuel.
When heat is added to the mixture, an explosion occurs.
[10] This testimony was revised on November 16, 2007, to include a link
to digital video. This digital video shows test footage of the IEDs and
IID that GAO investigators successfully brought through airport
security checkpoints. The video was shot during the 2006 and 2007
tests: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-08-48t/].
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