Aviation Security
TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed Gao ID: GAO-07-299 February 28, 2007Over 600 million people travel by air each year in the United States, and the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on and checked baggage is vital to securing our transportation security system. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is conducted in the United States. This act removed screening responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a result, TSA hired and deployed about 55,000 federal passenger and baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO)--formerly known as screeners--to more than 400 airports nationwide based largely on the number of screeners that the air carrier contractors had employed. Since August 2002, however, TSA has been statutorily prohibited from exceeding 45,000 full-time equivalent positions available for screening. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in December 2004, required TSA to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the average aviation security related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. TSA submitted these standards, which form the basis of TSA's Staffing Allocation Model on June 22, 2005. The purpose of this optimization model, as identified by TSA, is to estimate the most efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait times. Models, in general, are expected to approximate the real world. These approximations must be validated to assure model users that their predictions are credible within the bounds of specific situations, environments, and circumstances. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. In particular, the congressional committees to which TSA submitted the staffing standards were interested in how TSA is using the Staffing Allocation Model to identify the number of TSOs needed across the more than 400 commercial airports and how the model ensures that TSA has the right number of TSOs at the right checkpoints at the right times. This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does TSA ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? (2) How does TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the model's effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model's outputs. However, TSA faces some challenges to effective implementation of the model, primarily in ensuring that the model's key assumptions reflect operating conditions across airports. The model determines the annual TSO allocation for each airport by first considering the workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked baggage--including expected processing rates, required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. To monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA has both field and headquarters-driven mechanisms in place. However, TSA does not have a mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring that all assumptions are periodically reviewed to help ensure that they are current with and reflect actual operating conditions. Without a plan for periodically validating all of the assumptions, TSA is at risk of assumptions becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations that do not reflect operating conditions. TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their resource allocations. After receiving the annual staffing allocation from TSA headquarters, FSDs must prepare work schedules, which may include use of the Staffing Allocation Model's optional scheduling tool, to deploy TSO staff to meet screening demand. However, Federal Security Directors (FSD) we interviewed identified several challenges they faced in deploying their TSO workforce. These challenges involve factors outside the model's determination of overall TSO staffing levels and affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO staff regardless of their allocation. Specifically, FSDs cited difficulties in achieving a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce, which the model has identified as the optimal ratio for scheduling efficiency; recruiting and retaining sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and managing competing demands on TSOs' time, particularly with regard to operational support functions sometimes performed by TSOs and TSO training requirements. FSDs also had to manage around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having several efforts underway to help address challenges they face in deploying the TSO workforce. TSA officials at individual airports we visited are also working to address these challenges. TSA human capital officials told us that they plan to evaluate the effects of their workforce initiatives and use the results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their approach.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-299, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed
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Systematically Reassessed' which was released on February 28, 2007.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2007:
Aviation Security:
TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among
Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed:
GAO-07-299:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-299, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has identified the
transportation security officer (TSO) workforce as its most important
asset in securing commercial aviation. TSOs screen passengers and
baggage to prevent dangerous items onboard aircraft. In response to an
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requirement to
develop standards for TSO staffing, TSA developed a staffing model to
guide its TSO allocations across airports. The act also required GAO to
analyze TSA‘s staffing standards.
GAO analyzed (1) how TSA ensures its model provides a sufficient TSO
staff to perform screening and (2) how TSA deploys its TSOs and factors
that affect deployment. GAO analyzed data and reviewed documentation
about the model and discussed it with TSA headquarters officials and
TSA officials at 14 airports.
What GAO Found:
TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a
sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage
screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that
are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure
security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring
mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model‘s outputs. However, Federal
Security Directors (FSD)”the ranking TSA authorities responsible for
leading and coordinating security activities at airports”and our own
analysis identified concerns with some of the fiscal year 2006 model
assumptions. Although TSA officials said they plan an annual review of
select assumptions and based changes for fiscal year 2007 on such a
review of selected fiscal year 2006 assumptions, TSA does not have a
mechanism for prioritizing its review and for assuring that all
assumptions are periodically validated to help ensure that they reflect
operating conditions. Without periodic validation, TSA risks basing its
allocations on assumptions that do not reflect operating conditions.
For example, TSA acknowledged that it had not assessed the assumption
that its method of calculating screening demand provides sufficient
surplus staff to account for time away from screening for leave,
training and operational support. Some FSDs told GAO their allocations
did not include sufficient surplus in fiscal year 2006. Moreover,
although TSA officials stated that the fiscal year 2007 model will
include an allowance for time spent on operational support duties, TSA
has not determined under what circumstances it is appropriate to use
TSOs to perform operational support functions or provided FSDs with
guidance on when TSOs can be used this way. Without establishing such
guidance, FSDs may over rely on TSOs to perform operational support
functions.
TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for managing their TSO
allocations in light of local circumstances and challenges.
Nevertheless, factors outside the model‘s determination of overall
staffing levels can affect scheduling effectiveness. For example, FSDs
face scheduling challenges including injuries, absenteeism, and time
spent away from primary screening duties for training and operational
support. Officials described initiatives underway to address some of
these issues. However, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of
these initiatives.
Figure: Annual TSA Allocation Process:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA Staffing Allocation Model.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) direct the Assistant Secretary for Transportation
Security to (1) establish a mechanism to ensure periodic assessment of
model assumptions and (2) establish a policy for when TSOs can be used
to provide operational support. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and
concurred with GAO‘s findings and recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-299].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523, leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
TSA Relies on the Assumptions in Its Staffing Allocation Model, along
with Mechanisms for Monitoring Them, to Help Ensure Sufficient TSO
Staffing Levels, but Some Key Assumptions Do Not Reflect Operating
Conditions:
TSA's FSDs Are Responsible for Deploying TSO Allocations at their
Airports, but Face Workforce and Other Challenges to Effective
Deployment:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
Scope and Methodology:
Data Reliability:
Appendix II: Development and Description of TSA's Staffing Allocation
Model:
TSA's Development of Its Staffing Allocation Model:
Staffing Allocation Model Components:
TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Differences in Screening Operations, at Selected
Airports We Visited, That Resulted in Differing TSO Allocations:
Table 2: Average Peak Wait Times in Minutes, by Airport Category,
Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Table 3: Summary of Changes to the Staffing Allocation Model
Implemented in Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 4: National Human Resource Initiatives by TSA for Its TSO
Workforce:
Table 5: Airports Visited during Design Phase:
Table 6: Airports Visited after the Design Phase:
Table 7: Staffing Allocation Model Assumptions for Fiscal Year 2007:
Figures:
Figure 1: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of April
2006:
Figure 2: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation:
Figure 3: Checked Baggage Screening Operation:
Figure 4: TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model for Annual TSO
Allocations and Scheduling of TSOs for Airports:
Figure 5: Total TSO Allocation, by Airport Category, for Fiscal Years
2004 through 2007:
Figure 6: Percentage of Part-Time TSOs by Airport Category, Fiscal
Years 2004 through 2006:
Figure 7: Percent of TSOs Used for Operational Support Functions, along
with Average Hours Spent by Them on These Functions, by Airport
Category for a 2-Week Period--September 17, 2006, through September 30,
2006:
Figure 8: Airports' On-Board Status, by Airport Category, Compared to
TSO Staffing Allocation, in Full-Time-Equivalent TSOs, as of September
30, 2006:
Figure 9: Attrition Rates for Full-Time and Part-Time TSOs, Fiscal
years 2004 to 2006:
Figure 10: Average Rate of TSO Absenteeism per 100 TSOs, by Airport
Category, for Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006:
Figure 11: TSA Workman's Compensation Claims for Calendar Years 2004 -
2006, through June 2006:
Figure 12: TSO Overtime Hours as a Percentage of Total Hours Worked, by
Airport Category, during Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006:
Abbreviations:
ADASP: Aviation Direct Access Screening Program:
BAO: Bomb Appraisal Officer:
BDO: Behavior Detection Officer:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DTW: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport:
EDS: Explosive Detection System:
ETD: Explosive Trace Detection:
ETP: Explosives Trace Portal:
FSD: Federal Security Director:
FTE: full-time equivalent:
IND: Indianapolis International Airport:
MCO: Orlando International Airport:
N/A: not available:
OSR: on-screen resolution:
SNA: John Wayne Airport:
SPOT: Screening Passengers by Observation Technique:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSO: Transportation Security Officer:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 28, 2007:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Co-Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Mica:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Over 600 million people travel by air each year in the United States,
and the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on and checked
baggage is vital to securing our transportation security system. The
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,
established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is
conducted in the United States.[Footnote 1] This act removed screening
responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted
screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a
result, TSA hired and deployed about 55,000 federal passenger and
baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO)--formerly known as
screeners--to more than 400 airports nationwide based largely on the
number of screeners that the air carrier contractors had employed.
Since August 2002, however, TSA has been statutorily prohibited from
exceeding 45,000 full-time equivalent positions available for
screening.[Footnote 2]
TSA's mission is to protect the nation's transportation systems while
also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. To help
accomplish its security mission, TSA has established standard operating
procedures to ensure that every airline passenger and checked bag
undergoes some level of scrutiny to help ensure that objects and
devices that may threaten public safety are not taken onboard aircraft.
Although, according to TSA officials, these security duties are the
primary objective of its screening efforts, it also attempts to
minimize the effect on the movement of people and commerce by seeking
to keep wait times at airport checkpoints reasonable.
TSA has identified its most important asset in accomplishing its
mission as the TSO workforce. TSA deploys TSOs to screen passengers and
checked baggage at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports.
TSOs, for example, monitor passengers as they walk through metal
detectors, examine carry-on items on X-ray machines, and conduct more
thorough inspections of passengers selected for additional scrutiny at
screening checkpoints. The rapid changes in procedures stemming from
the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives
onboard multiple commercial aircraft departing from the United Kingdom
and bound for the United States highlights the challenge TSA faces in
balancing security with customer service and the vital role TSOs play
in ensuring the security of our commercial aviation system.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted
in December 2004, required TSA to develop and submit to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all
airports at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March
2005.[Footnote 3] These standards are to provide the necessary levels
of aviation security and ensure that the average aviation security
related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. TSA submitted
these standards, which form the basis of TSA's Staffing Allocation
Model on June 22, 2005. The purpose of this optimization
model,[Footnote 4] as identified by TSA, is to estimate the most
efficient balance of TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait
times. Models, in general, are expected to approximate the real world.
These approximations must be validated to assure model users that their
predictions are credible within the bounds of specific situations,
environments, and circumstances.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that
we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. In particular, the
congressional committees to which TSA submitted the staffing standards
were interested in how TSA is using the Staffing Allocation Model to
identify the number of TSOs needed across the more than 400 commercial
airports and how the model ensures that TSA has the right number of
TSOs at the right checkpoints at the right times.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does TSA ensure
that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a sufficient number of TSOs
to perform passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and
what challenges has it faced while implementing the model? (2) How does
TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the model's
effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
To address our objectives, we reviewed TSA's report to the specified
congressional committees on its staffing standards and technical
materials detailing the staffing allocation model's
assumptions,[Footnote 5] and analyzed relevant legislation. We analyzed
screening performance and TSO workforce data, such as passenger wait
times, TSO absenteeism rates, TSO attrition rates, TSO overtime usage,
TSO injury rates, number of TSOs devoted to administrative duties, and
the level of usage of part-time TSOs. We assessed the reliability of
these data for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and concluded that the data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. We also
interviewed officials from various TSA headquarters offices to
ascertain the methodology used in developing the Staffing Allocation
Model. We reviewed TSA's previous staffing model, examined methods used
by TSA for allocating TSOs to the nation's airports, and reviewed TSA's
approach to monitoring the performance of the Staffing Allocation Model
and obtaining feedback from Federal Security Directors--the top ranking
TSA authority responsible for security at each of the nation's
commercial airports--on their staffing allocations. We visited 14
airports selected by nonprobability sampling during our
review.[Footnote 6] We visited 6 of the 14 airports during the design
phase of our review based on several factors including geographic
location and airport category.[Footnote 7] After completing the design
phase of our study, we visited eight additional airports including two
airports from each of categories X, I, II, and III. We selected the two
airports in each category because they had a similar number of annual
passenger boardings, yet had different TSO allocations as determined by
the Staffing Allocation Model. We visited each pair of airports in
order to determine why the model treated seemingly similar airports
differently. At all 14 airports we visited, we met with Federal
Security Directors (FSD) and their staffs to discuss their views on how
well the airport's TSO staffing allocation takes into account the
unique characteristics of the airport and the TSO workforce and to
observe passenger and checked baggage screening operations. We also met
with representatives from the airport governing authority and at least
one of the larger airline operators, based on passenger
enplanements,[Footnote 8] to obtain their perspectives on TSA's
implementation of the Staffing Allocation Model and other relevant
workforce issues. Because we selected a nonprobability sample of
airports to visit, the information we obtained from interviews in our
visits to different airports cannot be generalized to all Federal
Security Directors, airport managers, and air carriers. We also met
with representatives from aviation industry associations to obtain
their perspectives on relevant TSA workforce issues.
We conducted our work from January 2006 through January 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More
details about the scope and methodology of our work are presented in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a
sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage
screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that
are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure
security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring
mechanisms (both headquarters and field driven) for the sufficiency of
the model's outputs. However, TSA faces some challenges to effective
implementation of the model, primarily in ensuring that the model's key
assumptions reflect operating conditions across airports. The model
determines the annual TSO allocation for each airport by first
considering the workload demands unique to each airport based on an
estimate of each airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then
processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers
and checked baggage--including expected processing rates, required
staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard
operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates.[Footnote 9]
Among the model's key assumptions is that establishing TSO allocations
at a level adequate to respond to screening demand on a representative
week during each airports' busiest month should allow most passengers
on most days to experience 10 minutes or less wait time and should
provide enough surplus staffing on lower-volume days to sufficiently
account for leave, training, and other nonscreening duties during less
busy times.[Footnote 10] Another key assumption is that the appropriate
ratio of full-time to part-time TSO staff, expressed in full-time
equivalents, is 80 percent to 20 percent; which, in TSA's view, will
allow FSDs to schedule TSOs to respond to fluctuating passenger volumes
by scheduling part-time TSOs to work only during peak periods--e.g.,
most business travelers fly in the early morning or late afternoon and
are the biggest contributors to these peak volumes. To monitor the
sufficiency of the model's allocation outputs, TSA has both field and
headquarters-driven mechanisms in place. For example, TSA has
established a process for FSDs to request revisions to the assumptions
used for their individual airports. According to TSA officials, during
the first 2 years of the implementation of the Staffing Allocation
Model, TSA granted some, but not all, of FSDs' requests to modify the
assumptions used for their individual airports. In addition, TSA plans
to conduct an annual review of certain assumptions in the Staffing
Allocation Model. Based on the review conducted in 2006, TSA made
several changes to the assumptions in the staffing model for fiscal
year 2007, including allowances for various forms of leave and training
in addition to a variable part-time assumption for each airport. TSA
headquarters officials responsible for the model stated that in
deciding which assumptions to review in 2006--the first annual review
of the model--they considered input they received from FSDs regarding
operational conditions at their airports that may not be adequately
reflected in the model, along with other data and events that may have
a bearing on the validity of the assumptions. However, TSA does not
have a mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and
prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring
that all assumptions are periodically reviewed to help ensure that they
are current with and reflect actual operating conditions. Without a
plan for periodically validating all of the assumptions, TSA is at risk
of assumptions becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations
that do not reflect operating conditions. TSA officials responsible for
the staffing model acknowledged that while they had a general idea of
how they plan to approach future annual reviews of the model, a
documented plan would help provide assurance that the assumptions are
periodically reviewed and validated. Although at the airports we
visited, FSDs reported that the model is a more accurate predictor of
staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model, which took into account
fewer factors that affect screening operations, the FSDs and our own
analysis identified some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006
staffing model that did not reflect operating conditions. For example,
many airports did not achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce in
the first 2 years of the model's implementation. TSA has addressed this
problem in fiscal year 2007 by implementing a variable part-time goal
based on each airport's part-time to full-time TSO ratio. In addition,
some FSDs we visited stated that demand assumptions (using a
representative week of airports' busiest months) did not sufficiently
provide enough time for leave, training, and other operational support
(nonscreening) duties. TSA officials acknowledged that they had not
performed analysis to determine the reliability of this assumption.
Also, FSDs stated the model for fiscal year 2006 did not specifically
account for time away from screening to perform operational support
duties, such as payroll processing. Although TSA officials told us that
they have included an allowance for operational support duties in the
2007 Staffing Allocation Model, TSA has not determined under what
circumstances it is appropriate to use TSOs to perform operational
support functions or provided FSDs with guidance on when TSOs can be
used this way. Without establishing such guidance, FSDs may over rely
on TSOs to perform operational support functions. Overreliance on TSO
staff for operational support could undermine TSA's investment in their
specialized screening skills, reduce their on-the-job training
opportunities, and constrain flexibility in scheduling them for the
most efficient use of available resources.
TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for deploying and managing
to their TSO allocation in light of local circumstances, including
those that might affect scheduling and pose challenges to most
efficiently deploying their resource allocations. Specifically, FSDs
are responsible for ensuring that the right number of TSOs are deployed
to the right screening areas at the right times to meet airport
screening needs. These needs can vary widely throughout the day because
some airports experience greater levels of air traffic at some times of
the day as compared with other times. After receiving the annual
staffing allocation from TSA headquarters, FSDs must prepare work
schedules, which may include use of the Staffing Allocation Model's
optional scheduling tool, to deploy TSO staff to meet screening demand.
However, FSDs we interviewed identified several challenges they faced
in deploying their TSO workforce. These challenges involve factors
outside the model's determination of overall TSO staffing levels and
affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their TSO staff regardless
of their allocation. Specifically, FSDs cited difficulties in achieving
a 20 percent part-time TSO workforce, which the model has identified as
the optimal ratio for scheduling efficiency; recruiting and retaining
sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full
allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints
appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism
and injuries; and managing competing demands on TSOs' time,
particularly with regard to operational support functions sometimes
performed by TSOs and TSO training requirements. FSDs also had to
manage around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports,
such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage check areas
despite demand levels that would justify such added capacity. TSA
headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having several
efforts underway to help address challenges they face in deploying the
TSO workforce. For example, TSA headquarters has several nationwide
efforts underway to address hiring and retention of TSO staff
(including part-time), absenteeism, injuries, and competing demands on
TSO time. TSA officials at individual airports we visited are also
working to address these challenges. For example, 6 of the 14 FSDs we
interviewed said they implemented local initiatives, such as injury
prevention committees and safe lifting demonstrations to help reduce
the number of on-the-job injuries. Given that many of TSA's workforce
initiatives were only recently implemented or are in the planning
stages, we could not assess the extent to which these initiatives
achieved the intended results. TSA human capital officials told us that
they plan to evaluate the effects of their workforce initiatives and
use the results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their
approach.
To assist TSA in its efforts to identify TSO staffing levels that
reasonably reflect the operating conditions at individual airports and
to help ensure that TSOs are effectively utilized, we are recommending
that TSA (1) establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of
the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model on a periodic basis to
ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that
accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time; and
(2) establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to provide operational
support.
We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its
written comments, concurred with our findings and recommendations, and
stated that the findings and recommendations are constructive and
useful. DHS described some actions TSA has initiated to implement these
recommendations, including working to develop a policy that would
define when TSOs might be used to provide operational support. The full
text of DHS's comments, as well as additional comments from TSA
regarding the agency's workforce management initiatives, is included in
appendix III.
Background:
Our Nation's Commercial Airports:
There are more than 400 airports in the United States at which TSA
provides or oversees passenger and checked baggage screening. These
airports, often referred to as the nation's "commercial" airports, each
contain one or more passenger screening checkpoints, and each
checkpoint is composed of one or more screening lanes.[Footnote 11] In
addition, airports have one or more baggage screening areas, either in
airport lobbies or baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for
loading onto aircraft. As of October 31, 2006, the nation's commercial
airports contained a total of 761 checkpoints and 2,002 screening lanes
at which passengers are screened. These airports can vary dramatically,
not just in terms of passenger and flight volume, but in other
characteristics, including physical size and layout. Figure 1
identifies the number of commercial airports by airport security
category, as of April 2006.
Figure 1: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of April
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
[End of figure]
Federal Security Directors (FSD) are the ranking TSA authorities
responsible for leading and coordinating TSA security activities at the
nation's commercial airports. TSA had 122 FSD positions at commercial
airports nationwide, as of October 2006. Although an FSD is responsible
for security at every commercial airport, not every airport has an FSD
dedicated solely to that airport. Most category X airports have an FSD
responsible for that airport alone. Other smaller airports are arranged
in a "hub and spoke" configuration, in which an FSD is located at or
near a hub airport but also has responsibility over one or more spoke
airports of the same or smaller size.
Performance of Screening Functions at Commercial Airports:
Passenger screening is a process by which authorized personnel inspect
individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
aboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.[Footnote 12] Passenger
screening personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at
designated screening locations.[Footnote 13] There are four screening
functions at passenger screening checkpoints. As shown in figure 2, the
four passenger screening functions are:
* X-ray screening of property,
* walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,
* hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and:
* physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their
carry-on items and screening by the walk through metal detector.
Passengers who set off the alarm on the X-ray machine or the walk
through metal detector or who are designated as selectees--that is,
passengers selected by a computer-assisted passenger prescreening
system[Footnote 14] or another TSA-approved process to receive
additional screening--are screened by hand-wand or pat-down and have
their carry-on items screened for explosives traces, or they are
physically searched.
Figure 2: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation.
Note: Bomb Appraisal Officers are available to respond to unresolved
alarms at the checkpoint that involve possible explosive devices. The
Bomb Appraisal Officer may contact appropriate law enforcement or Bomb
Squad officials if review indicates possible or imminent danger, in
which case the officer ensures that the security checkpoint is cleared.
The officer approves reopening of security lane(s) if no threat is
posed.
[A] Behavior Detection Officers are TSOs specially trained to detect
suspicious behavior in individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should
the BDO observe such behavior, he or she may refer the individual for
individual screening or to a law enforcement officer.
[B] The hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified
or randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met
certain criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector.
[C] Manual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the
passenger is identified or randomly selected for additional screening
or if the TSO identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray.
[End of figure]
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or
weapon onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 3, checked baggage
screening is accomplished through the use of explosive detection
systems[Footnote 15] or explosive trace detection systems,[Footnote 16]
and through the use of alternative means, such as manual searches,
canine teams, and positive passenger bag match,[Footnote 17] when the
explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems are
unavailable.
Figure 3: Checked Baggage Screening Operation:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation.
[End of figure]
History of TSO Staffing Levels and Staffing Models:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated that TSA assume
responsibility for passenger and checked baggage screening at the
nation's airports using federal employees within 1 year of
enactment.[Footnote 18] By November 2002, TSA had fully deployed a
federal passenger and checked baggage TSO workforce of about 55,000
full-time equivalents to the nation's commercial airports. This level
of TSOs needed to conduct passenger and checked baggage screening was
identified by a consultant, relying largely on the number of private
sector screeners that had been in place prior to TSA. Subsequently, TSA
decided to develop a staffing model to more effectively determine the
appropriate number of TSOs needed at the nation's airports. TSA
developed a demand driven model--a model based on flight schedules,
connecting flight data, passenger loads,[Footnote 19] passenger arrival
distribution curves,[Footnote 20] and number of passenger bags along
with throughput rates for processing the passengers and bags--in an
effort to make screening operations more efficient.[Footnote 21] This
model identified a TSO staffing level of 49,600 full-time equivalents
based, in part, on the need for 5.5 TSOs per passenger screening lane.
The DHS Appropriations Act, 2004, enacted in October 2003, however,
imposed a 45,000 full-time-equivalent cap specific to the number of
TSOs.[Footnote 22]
In May 2003, TSA set out to develop a tool to better define aviation
security staffing requirements at airports nationwide by accounting for
changes in screening technology, operating conditions, and airline
operations. The result of this effort is the Staffing Allocation Model-
-an optimization model that seeks, within certain TSA
constraints,[Footnote 23] to estimate the most efficient balance of
TSOs needed to ensure security and minimize wait times.
As shown in figure 4, TSA uses the staffing allocation model to
generate (1) an annual full-time-equivalent total for each airport,
known as an "annual allocation run," and (2) TSO work schedules
throughout the course of the year, known as a "production, or
scheduling, run." To determine the annual full-time-equivalent total
for each airport, FSDs must first provide input to the model on their
airports' passenger and checked baggage screening configuration. FSDs
also provide input to the model on their airports' busiest month for
screening demand based on originating passenger load factors. This
"peak month" determination forms the basis of one of the model's key
operating parameters used to compute each airport's full-time-
equivalent staffing allocation. Specifically, for determination of an
airport's annual full-time equivalent level, the model assumes a
screening demand based on the average demand day during the airport's
peak month. This assumption is linked to TSA's 10-minute wait time goal
for processing passengers and baggage through security. According to
TSA officials, the use of the average peak demand day is intended to
ensure that, on an annual basis, 85 percent or more of the total
passengers screened in U.S. airports will not have to wait more than 10
minutes to be screened. Once the peak month is selected for each
airport, TSA performs the annual allocation run on a representative
week within the peak month.
Figure 4: TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model for Annual TSO
Allocations and Scheduling of TSOs for Airports:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, based on discussions with TSA officials.
[A] Use of the model's scheduling component is optional, and some FSD
offices create detailed work schedules using other methods.
[End of figure]
After receiving and reviewing the inputs and assumptions for each
airport, TSA runs the Staffing Allocation Model to determine each
airport's full-time equivalent level for the upcoming year.[Footnote
24] During the run, the model takes each airport's configuration and
peak month screening demand input, combines it with the assumptions
regarding baggage and passenger processing, and uses these factors to
simulate the flow of passengers and baggage through an airport's
screening areas to provide work force requirements. Then it calculates
the total number of TSOs required (expressed in full-time equivalents)
for the year based on the results of running the model for the
representative week of the peak month. This representative week FTE
level is used to calculate the annual FTE estimate for the airport.
After receiving their annual full-time-equivalent allocation, TSA staff
at individual airports may periodically run the model throughout the
year. As shown in figure 4, during these "scheduling" runs, FSD staff
may use the model's optional scheduling tool to determine work
schedules for TSO staff that will satisfy screening demand on a day-to-
day basis.[Footnote 25] Similar to the annual allocation runs, TSA also
inputs various historic data into the model during the scheduling runs.
This input includes originating passenger load factors, estimates of
number of bags per passenger, and passenger arrival distribution
curves.
In order to formulate TSO work schedules, the model monitors the
passenger arrival patterns and recommends opening and closing lanes at
passenger checkpoints to accommodate the demand. The optional
scheduling software recommends a mix of full-time and part-time TSOs to
satisfy the workforce requirements based on projected screening demand.
According to TSA officials responsible for the staffing allocation
model, TSA first ran the Staffing Allocation Model in August 2004 for
fiscal year 2005. The model, which did not yet contain complete data on
each airport, identified a TSO full-time-equivalent level of 47,865
across all airports. To reach the congressionally-mandated limit of
45,000 full-time-equivalent TSOs, TSA applied a 7 percent reduction to
the staffing levels identified by the model across all airport
categories. TSA officials stated that they subsequently questioned this
approach given that smaller (category III and IV) airports have
significantly fewer TSOs and, therefore, were more significantly
impacted by the 7 percent reduction in full-time equivalent positions.
According to TSA officials, because the Staffing Allocation Model was
not centrally hosted[Footnote 26] and did not contain complete data,
the model may have over-estimated the required FTEs for fiscal year
2005. TSA determined that in August 2005, the Staffing Allocation Model
contained complete and accurate data on each airport and the agency
used it to identify TSO FTE allocations for each airport, and the
output reflecting the total number of FTEs required--42,303--required
no adjustment to fall within the congressionally-mandated limit of
45,000 TSO FTEs. According to TSA officials, when TSA ran the model, it
did so without imposing a limitation on the maximum number of full-
time-equivalent TSOs, including either the 45,000 congressional limit
or any budgetary limits. TSA informed FSDs of their TSO full-time-
equivalent allocations in October 2005. Figure 6 shows the total TSO
allocation, by airport category, for fiscal year 2004--the year prior
to implementation of the staffing allocation model--through fiscal year
2007.
Figure 5: Total TSO Allocation, by Airport Category, for Fiscal Years
2004 through 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: The allocations in this figure reflect federal TSOs only and do
not include private screeners employed at the 6 airports across the
nation utilizing these personnel.
[End of figure]
FSDs, air carrier representatives, and airport operators we interviewed
at the 14 airports we visited stated that TSA's efforts to allocate a
sufficient number of TSOs to screen passengers and checked baggage and
minimize wait times have improved over the years. These officials
stated that passenger and checked baggage screening has become more
efficient as TSA has matured and gained a better understanding of the
airport operating environment, and frequent travelers have become more
familiar with the screening process.
TSA's Use of the National Screening Force, Reserve TSO Full-Time
Equivalents, and Private Screeners for Certain Screening Needs:
TSA sets aside TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those
considered by the Staffing Allocation Model in the annual allocation
run for all airports. In order to handle short-term extraordinary needs
at airports, TSA has established the National Screening Force of 615
TSOs who can be sent to airports to augment local TSO staff during
periods of unusually high passenger volume. In addition, certain
airports may, during the course of the year, experience significant
changes to their screening operations (e.g., arrival of a new airline,
opening of a new terminal, etc.) For these airports, TSA established a
reserve of 329 TSO full-time equivalents for fiscal year 2006 that can
be used to augment the existing force. This allocation approach allowed
TSA to stay within the 43,000 full-time-equivalent TSO budgetary limit
for fiscal year 2006--a staffing level that TSA's Assistant Secretary
stated is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage
screening.[Footnote 27]
Lastly, TSA allows certain airports to hire private contract screeners
in lieu of TSOs. Under the Screening Partnership Program,[Footnote 28]
six airports have applied to TSA and received approval to hire private
contract screener forces as of fiscal year 2006. Despite the fact that
these airports do not use federal screeners, TSA still used the
Staffing Allocation Model to determine the full-time equivalent
screening staff at each of these airports for fiscal year 2006. These
staffing levels, as determined by the model, served as a limit on the
number of private screeners that the private screening contractors
could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702 total full-time equivalent
staffing allocation at these airports does not count against TSA's
nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalents for TSO staff.
TSA Relies on the Assumptions in Its Staffing Allocation Model, along
with Mechanisms for Monitoring Them, to Help Ensure Sufficient TSO
Staffing Levels, but Some Key Assumptions Do Not Reflect Operating
Conditions:
TSA aims to ensure that its Staffing Allocation Model provides a
sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and checked baggage
screening by: (1) building assumptions into its allocation model that
are designed to calculate the necessary levels of TSOs to ensure
security and minimize wait times, and (2) employing multiple monitoring
mechanisms for the sufficiency of the model's outputs. TSA's staffing
allocation model determined the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 TSO staffing
level for each airport based on built-in assumptions designed to ensure
the necessary levels of security and to minimize wait times--such as
assumptions regarding processing of passengers and baggage through
security checkpoints and information about each airport's baseline
configuration--e.g., physical infrastructure. During the first 2 years
of the Staffing Allocation Model's use, TSA established several
mechanisms to monitor the sufficiency of the model's outputs and make
adjustments in key model assumptions that do not fully reflect
operating conditions for some airports. For example, TSA established a
process for FSDs to request revisions to the assumptions used for their
individual airports. In fiscal year 2006, TSA granted some, but not
all, requests. TSA headquarters also started an assessment to evaluate
selected Staffing Allocation Model assumptions, an assessment it
expects to perform annually, varying the assumptions it examines each
year. However, TSA does not have a mechanism for selecting and
prioritizing which assumptions to review each year and for assuring
that all assumptions are periodically reviewed. Additionally, FSDs and
our own analysis identified concerns with the appropriateness of some
of the assumptions for the fiscal year 2006 model. For example, some
FSDs stated that TSA's method of calculating screening demand (the 85th
percentile day) to also account for TSO absences from screening did not
provide them with sufficient surplus staffing. In addition, the model
assumed a ratio of 20 percent part time to 80 percent full time
(expressed in full-time equivalents), even in airports that have
consistently been unable to achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO
workforce; and the model had no mechanism to account for use of TSOs to
perform operation support functions.
TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Seeks to Determine the Optimal TSO
Staffing Levels for Each Airport, Relying on Assumptions that Are
Designed to Help Ensure Necessary Levels of Security and to Minimize
Passenger Wait Times:
TSA's Staffing Allocation Model determined the fiscal years 2005 and
2006 TSO staffing level for each airport using several built-in
assumptions regarding security and wait times, in addition to data that
reflect each airports' baseline configuration--e.g., permanent
infrastructure and type of screening equipment.
The key built-in assumptions are adjustable and designed to help ensure
the necessary levels of security while minimizing wait times and
include:
* The minimum number of TSOs needed to staff each passenger screening
checkpoint or baggage screening area based on the standard operating
procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage and throughput
rates for passenger and checked baggage screening equipment (see app.
II).
* A 10-minute maximum wait time for processing passengers and checked
baggage.[Footnote 29]
* Originating passenger and baggage load factors by airport based on a
representative week during each airport's peak month (the 85th
percentile assumption), which TSA expects will give FSDs some time
during less busy periods to allow TSOs to obtain required training,
perform operational support functions, and take annual or other forms
of leave.[Footnote 30]
* A desired ratio of 80 percent full-time to 20 percent part-time TSO
staff, expressed as full time equivalents, at each category X, I, and
II airport to allow for heavier staffing during busier periods (e.g.,
the hours when business travelers typically depart) and to minimize
overstaffing during less busy periods, times during which part-time
TSOs would not be scheduled to work.
* Nonpassenger throughput rate of 4 percent.[Footnote 31]
* Rates at which screening equipment have historically signaled the
possibility of a threat object and the consequent need for additional
screening.
The Staffing Allocation Model used these assumptions, along with other
inputs such as each airport's baseline configuration--e.g., the number
and type of checkpoints, security lanes, baggage screening areas, and
screening equipment at each airport--to determine TSO staffing
allocations for the nation's commercial airports for fiscal years 2005
and 2006. TSA officials stated that the assumptions used in the
staffing allocation model and the other inputs collectively determine
the TSO full-time-equivalent allocation for each airport. For this
reason, airports with similar screening demand but different checkpoint
configurations and types of screening equipment may receive different
allocations. For example, TSA officials identified two category I
airports that have similar screening demand, yet one airport received
almost 50 percent more full-time equivalent TSOs in fiscal year 2006
due to the physical infrastructure differences at these airports.
Specifically, one airport has one terminal building, with three
concourses, which generally enables passengers to be efficiently routed
through one checkpoint in that one terminal. In contrast, the other
airport has two separate terminals that prevent passengers from being
routed through common checkpoints. This airport's separate terminals
make sharing TSOs among the various checkpoints more challenging,
creating a need for additional TSOs, thus the larger TSO allocation.
Additionally, we visited category X and I airports with similar
passenger volumes and differing TSO full-time-equivalent allocations
for fiscal year 2006. According to TSA, in the case of the category X
airports, while the passenger volumes for the two airports were
similar--17.4 and 16.5 million, respectively--the difference in the
type of passengers and the type of baggage screening equipment resulted
in one of these airports receiving 26 percent more full-time-equivalent
TSOs. Table 1 provides a summary of the various factors that influenced
full-time-equivalent TSO allocations for fiscal year 2006 at some of
the airports we visited.
Table 1: Examples of Differences in Screening Operations, at Selected
Airports We Visited, That Resulted in Differing TSO Allocations:
Airport Category: X;
Airports visited: Detroit (DTW);
FY 2006 model allocation: 734;
FY 2005 total enplanements: 17,433,663;
Differences in screening operations resulting in differing allocation:
* Orlando has more originating passengers than Detroit, which results
in more passengers to screen. Detroit has more connecting flights whose
passengers have already been screened at their originating airport;
* Detroit has a partial in-line baggage screening system, which
requires fewer TSOs, and Orlando does not have an in-line system.[A].
Airports visited: Orlando (MCO);
FY 2006 model allocation: 925;
FY 2005 total enplanements: 16,502,499.
Airport Category: I;
Airports visited: Indianapolis (IND);
FY 2006 model allocation: 292;
FY 2005 total enplanements: 4,211,461;
Differences in screening operations resulting in differing allocation:
* Indianapolis has more originating passengers than Orange County.
Indianapolis is a mid-west airport with more connecting passengers that
do not need to be screened;
* Orange County has a full in-line baggage system, and Indianapolis has
a partial in-line system serving only 3 airlines. As a result, Orange
County has a reduced need for baggage- screening TSOs.[A];
* Orange County has 2 checkpoints in its terminal building that are
close enough to one another to allow transferring of TSOs back and
forth as screening demand dictates. This ease of sharing TSOs between
the checkpoints results in a reduced number of TSOs than that called
for by the model. In contrast, Indianapolis has 4 concourses with 3
checkpoints and less ease of movement among them, which the model
recognizes, thus requiring more TSOs.
Airports visited: Orange County (SNA);
FY 2006 model allocation: 217;
FY 2005 total enplanements: 4,791,100.
Source: TSA and GAO observations at airports.
Note: The fiscal year 2005 enplanements data are only a rough indicator
of actual screening demand. However, at the time we selected the
airports to visit, enplanements data were the best available data.
[A] An in-line baggage screening system integrates explosive detection
systems with an airport's existing baggage handling system, requiring
less human intervention (and, correspondingly, less TSO staff) than
stand-alone systems that are not integrated into existing baggage
systems. In a partial in-line system, the airport has some explosive
detection systems integrated with the conveyor belts of the airport's
existing baggage handling system while others are in a stand-alone
setup. An airport with a full in-line system has all of its explosive
detection systems integrated with the baggage handling system.
[End of table]
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required
TSA to develop staffing standards that provide for the necessary levels
of security and minimize delays for passengers. According to TSA
officials responsible for the Staffing Allocation Model, the model
ensures that the staffing allocations provide for the necessary levels
of security because the model is based on TSA's standard operating
procedures for screening passengers and their carry-on items and
checked baggage and on the technology available at the passenger
checkpoints and baggage screening areas. For example, the passenger
checkpoint standard operating procedures require that a minimum of one
TSO be staffed for each of the screening functions at a checkpoint. The
staffing model includes an assumption (for larger airports) of at least
5.5 TSOs per screening lane--which responds to the need for one TSO per
function at every checkpoint and includes a value for supervisors that
typically oversee two lanes.[Footnote 32] In addition, the staffing
model provides an allocation for each airport based, in part, on the
screening technology at the airport. In addition, the model includes
assumptions on alarm rates for various types of passenger and baggage
screening equipment and determines the sufficient number of TSOs needed
to resolve the alarms at the projected rate to be able to achieve the
model's wait time standard of 10 minutes for processing passengers and
checked baggage.[Footnote 33]
Regarding minimizing passenger delays, a key assumption in the staffing
allocation model is that wait times for screening passengers and
checked baggage will not exceed 10 minutes when the model is set at a
level referred to as the airport's 85th percentile day, which TSA
calculates by estimating screening demand at the level required for a
representative week of each airport's busiest month. TSA officials
stated this assumption is based on a goal that was established when TSA
was first created within the Department of Transportation.
Specifically, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation
established a goal that passengers be processed through passenger
screening checkpoints in 10 minutes or less--a standard considered
appropriate to meet the dual needs of ensuring security while
maintaining national mobility. TSA officials stated that they
determined that basing the Staffing Allocation Model's demand level on
the representative demand week of each airport's peak month, coincided
with screening 85 percent of passengers within 10 minutes. TSA
officials told us that some passengers will still have to wait longer
than 10 minutes at certain airports at certain times due, at least in
part, to the fact that about 7 percent of an airport's travel days
(about 25-30 days) during the year are expected to exceed the 85
percentile demand day.
As shown in table 2, TSA data for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 show
that the nation's smaller airports (categories II, III, and IV) had
shorter average wait times than the standard, overall, with a wait time
during peak periods averaging less than 10 minutes, although wait times
exceeded this level at certain airports on certain days.[Footnote 34]
Average peak wait times at the nation's larger airports (category X and
I) generally exceeded the wait time standard, overall, although wait
times were less than 10 minutes at certain airports on certain days.
According to TSA headquarters officials, if airports are consistently
exceeding the 10 minute wait time goal, it is the responsibility of the
Area Directors to reach out to the FSDs at those airports in an effort
to determine whether the root cause relates to staffing, equipment,
capacity, or some other issue and to take appropriate remedial
action.[Footnote 35]
Table 2: Average Peak Wait Times in Minutes, by Airport Category,
Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Average peak wait times in minutes.
FY04;
All categories: 9.4;
Category X: 13.0;
Category I: 11.8;
Category II: 8.5;
Category III: 9.1;
Category IV: 8.6.
FY05;
All categories: 8.9;
Category X: 12.0;
Category I: 11.2;
Category II: 8.3;
Category III: 8.7;
Category IV: 8.2.
FY06;
All categories: 8.2;
Category X: 12.6;
Category I: 10.4;
Category II: 7.7;
Category III: 8.0;
Category IV: 7.2.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
TSA officials cited capacity issues as a factor that contributed to
category X airports generally exceeding the 10-minute wait time goal
during peak periods, as shown in table 2. These airports have higher
screening demand than smaller airports and sometimes lack the capacity,
with regard to space available for additional passenger lanes and
baggage screening areas, to process passengers and baggage quickly
enough to have lower wait times. Smaller airports are more likely to
have a number of passenger lanes and baggage screening areas that are
more commensurate with their screening demand than some larger airports
that have higher screening demand.
TSA Has Four Mechanisms in Place to Monitor the Sufficiency of Its TSO
Allocations and Is Formalizing Its Process for Revising the Model's
Assumptions:
TSA has four mechanisms in place to monitor the sufficiency of the TSO
allocations. First, at individual airports, FSDs and the industrial
engineers assigned to their airports are responsible for monitoring
their passenger and checked baggage screening operations to ensure that
the staffing allocation model's inputs are reliable.[Footnote 36] A
process currently exists to enable FSDs to request revisions to the
assumptions used for their individual airports when they believe that a
model assumption is unrealistic. As part of this process, FSDs are to
submit empirical data to support requests to alter assumptions. Based
on TSA's review of the data, TSA may send an "optimization team" to the
airport in an effort to identify the cause of the staffing
problem.[Footnote 37] Optimization teams are composed of experts in
passenger and baggage screening operations and procedures, the staffing
allocation model, and TSO scheduling. These teams observe screening
operations and seek to maximize efficiencies by applying practices
learned at other airports. The reviews are used to help improve the
design of passenger and baggage checkpoints, evaluate staffing and
scheduling practices, determine compliance with the standard operating
procedures, validate the TSO staffing model at the airport, and make
adjustments to model assumptions, if necessary. TSA officials stated
that they are formalizing a process for systematically collecting
information on best practices identified by optimization teams so that
this information can be disseminated across airports. TSA's
solicitation of input from FSDs regarding changes that need to be made
to the assumptions that guide their TSO allocations is consistent with
our standards for internal control, which call for management to ensure
effective internal communications, for example, by establishing
mechanisms for employees to recommend improvements in
operations.[Footnote 38]
During the first 2 years of the implementation of the Staffing
Allocation Model, TSA granted some, but not all, of FSDs' requests to
modify the assumptions used for their individual airports. TSA provided
several examples of these requests and the final outcome. For example,
an FSD requested a change to passenger screening throughput rates at
some of the passenger lanes in the international terminal due to the
amount and type of carry-on items passengers tended to carry through
this checkpoint. After reviewing the FSD's request and sending an
optimization team to assess the validity of the request, TSA changed
the model's assumption about the passenger throughput rate for this
checkpoint from 200 to 165 passengers per hour at these lanes. TSA
officials told us that, in situations like this, the model will
recommend opening more lanes and adding TSOs, if deemed warranted, to
offset a reduction in the number of passengers screened per hour. In
another example, an FSD requested a change in its non-passenger--flight
crew and airport employees--throughput rate based on data collected at
the checkpoint that showed a higher percentage of nonpassenger
throughput than the model assumes. TSA headquarters officials denied
the request because the higher percentage of nonpassenger throughput
was primarily occurring during off-peak periods and would not have
changed the model's results for that airport.
TSA headquarters officials told us that they did not document all the
previous requests that they received from FSDs, potentially limiting
the agency's ability to learn from past circumstances. TSA officials
acknowledged that it would be helpful to fully document the requests
they receive from FSDs and the outcome of these requests to help ensure
consistency in their decision making, to provide a basis for management
and decision makers to review and evaluate the decision-making process
for potential improvements, and to replicate successful practices when
similar circumstances arise at other airports. Officials stated that
TSA is formalizing its process for revising assumptions based on
airport-specific circumstances. In August 2006, TSA developed and
distributed to FSDs a draft standard form to use when requesting
deviations from the Staffing Allocation Model's standard assumptions.
The form, finalized as of January 2007, captures information such as
the date of the request; the airport for which the request is being
made; the justification for the request; and approvals at various
levels, such as the industrial engineer and TSA headquarters. TSA
stated that FSDs were previously made aware of the draft form and
provided instructions on using this form through various communication
mechanisms, including written instructions provided to FSDs and FSD
conferences held in September 2006. TSA is also developing a database
to record and track the requests made by FSDs, decisions on whether to
approve or deny requests, and the basis for the decisions. TSA
officials stated that they expect the database to be completed by April
30, 2007.
Regarding the second mechanism to monitor the sufficiency of the
model's outputs, TSA headquarters officials said it is the
responsibility of individual FSDs and the industrial engineers assigned
to their airports to ensure that the staffing allocation model reflects
the configuration of and operating conditions at their airports.
Therefore, TSA officials stated that, just prior to the model's annual
allocation run for fiscal year 2006, they systematically solicited
input from the industrial engineers assigned to the more than 400
commercial airports to determine whether the model contains correct
information regarding the configuration of each airport.[Footnote 39]
TSA expects this process to occur annually in order to help ensure the
reliability of the data inputs.
As a third mechanism to monitor the sufficiency of the model's outputs,
TSA headquarters officials stated that they continually monitor
performance data reported by individual airports to identify any
anomalies that may require further investigation such as high wait
times over an extended period of time, lower than expected throughput
at passenger lanes, high overtime rates (in excess of 4 percent), and
airports with onboard TSO staff consistently below their staffing
allocation. In some cases, anomalies identified by TSA may result in an
optimization team visit to an airport in an effort to determine their
cause. For example, TSA headquarters officials stated that an airport
with consistently high wait times (generally greater than 40 minutes
during peak periods) may prompt such a visit. During the visits, the
optimization teams perform analyses (with the assistance of the
staffing allocation model) to determine the causes of the problems the
airport is having and suggest to the local FSD ways to increase
efficiency in the passenger and baggage screening operations to
overcome the problems. In some cases, the optimization team may
conclude that a change to the Staffing Allocation Model's baseline
assumptions for the airport is necessary. For example, the airport may
have lower throughput rates at some of its passenger or baggage
screening areas than the Staffing Allocation Model assumes, due to
different types of screening equipment or the physical layout of the
airport security checkpoints.
Finally, according to TSA officials, in September 2006, TSA completed
its first annual review of certain assumptions in the Staffing
Allocation Model. This review included an assessment of whether the
assumptions under review are still realistic, including assumptions
related to screening procedures, technology, screening throughput, and
nonpassenger alarm rates; and whether adjustments to the model are
needed to make the full-time-equivalent allocation reflect actual
operating conditions at airports. As a result, as shown in table 3, TSA
has changed some assumptions and added others to more realistically
reflect actual operating conditions.[Footnote 40] For example, TSA
headquarters officials responsible for the model stated the fiscal year
2007 model will provide 4.25 TSOs per passenger checkpoint screening
lane rather than the 5.5 TSOs per lane provided in the fiscal year 2006
model--a change TSA officials attributed to the model directly
accounting for collateral duties performed by TSOs, TSO time paid but
not worked,[Footnote 41] and TSO training requirements.
Table 3: Summary of Changes to the Staffing Allocation Model
Implemented in Fiscal Year 2007:
Staffing constants;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Security checkpoint
staffing set at 5.5 for category X, I, and II airports;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Security checkpoint
staffing set at 4.25 for category X, I, and II airports.
Staffing constants;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: EDS machine staffing set at
3;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: EDS machine staffing set at
2.
TSO paid-not-worked hours (annual, sick, and military leave, comp time,
and injury time off);
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Not directly accounted for;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Each airport has a 14.5
percent annual FTE allowance for time paid not worked.
Operational support functions;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Not directly accounted for;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Airports in categories X,
I, and II have a 5 percent collateral duties FTE credit.
TSO training;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Not directly accounted for;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Each airport has a 2
percent annual FTE allowance for training that cannot be completed
during operational down times.
Part-time TSOs;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Set at 20 percent of total
FTEs for all category X, I, and II airports;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: TSA has implemented a
variable part-time goal based on each airport's individual part-time to
full- time ratio.
Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: ETD machine baggage
processing rates (depending on type of equipment and internal/external
screening methodology) set at 60, 90, or 180 seconds);
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: ETD baggage processing
rates set at 55, 98, or 238 seconds.
Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: CTX 2500 EDS machine
screening rate set at 90 bags per hour;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: CTX2500 set at 115 bags per
hour.
Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: CTX5500 EDS screening rate
set at 160 bags per hour;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: CTX5500 EDS screening rate
set at 200 bags per hour.
Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: CT80 machine added with
processing rate of 80 bags per hour.
Baggage/passenger screening equipment processing rates;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Explosives Trace Portal
(ETP) machine added with processing rate of 175 passengers per hour.
Baggage arrival distributions;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: Included 6 different
baggage distributions;
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Number of baggage
distributions reduced to 2.
New security initiatives;
Fiscal year 2006 staffing allocation model: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2007 staffing allocation model: Added line item allocation
for SPOT,[A] BAO,b and ADASPc security initiatives.
Source: TSA.
[A] TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Technique program is
designed to detect individuals who exhibit behavior that indicates they
may be a threat to aviation and/or transportation security.
[B] TSA's Bomb Appraisal Officer initiative designates TSOs to receive
specialized training in the detection of improvised explosive devices
and apply this knowledge at security checkpoints.
[C] TSA's Aviation Direct Access Screening Program involves TSOs
performing security screening for explosives, incendiaries, weapons,
and other prohibited items or improper airport identification media.
This security screening will occur at direct access points to include
secured areas, sterile areas, or aircraft operating areas outside of
TSA's security screening checkpoints.
[End of table]
TSA officials responsible for the staffing allocation model stated that
in deciding which assumptions to review for the fiscal year 2007 model,
they considered input they received from FSDs regarding operational
conditions at their airports that may not be adequately reflected in
the model, along with other data and events that may have a bearing on
the validity of the assumptions. However, TSA does not have a
mechanism, such as a documented plan, for selecting and prioritizing
which assumptions to review each year and for assuring that all
assumptions are periodically reviewed. Without a plan for periodically
validating the assumptions, the agency is at risk of assumptions
becoming outdated, which could result in TSO allocations that do not
reflect actual operating conditions. Moreover, given the ongoing
personnel changes in TSA, a documented plan would help provide future
decision makers with information on which assumptions had historically
been assessed and which ones TSA planned to assess in the
future.[Footnote 42] TSA officials responsible for the staffing model
acknowledged that while they had a general idea of how they plan to
approach future annual reviews of the model, a documented plan would
help provide assurance that the assumptions are periodically reviewed
and validated, and are current with actual operating conditions.
Some Key Assumptions Used in the Fiscal Year 2006 Staffing Allocation
Model Did Not Reflect Operating Conditions at Individual Airports:
FSDs we interviewed reported that the screening allocation model is a
more accurate predictor of their overall staffing needs than previous
models that took into account fewer factors affecting screening
operations. However, these FSDs and our own analysis identified that
some of the key assumptions used in the staffing allocation model,
during the first 2 years of its implementation, did not reflect actual
operating conditions. Specifically, the FSDs identified five weaknesses
in the model for fiscal year 2006.
First, 11 of the 14 FSDs identified concerns related to TSA's basing
its estimate of demand levels for the Staffing Allocation Model on a
representative week of each airport's peak screening demand month to
allow excess time for training, leave, and other factors not directly
considered by the staffing allocation model. Regarding training, 9 of
the 14 FSDs expressed concern that the model did not specifically
account for the training requirement of 3 hours per week averaged over
a fiscal year quarter. Three of these FSDs said they faced challenges
in meeting the minimum training requirements. With respect to annual
and sick leave, 5 of the 14 FSDs stated that in their view the model
did not adequately account for this leave. Two FSDs stated that the use
of the peak demand month to account for training and leave, though
sound in principle, is particularly difficult for smaller airports
because they do not have as much fluctuation between their peak period
and their non-peak period, which leaves little cushion in the
allocation to accommodate TSO absences from screening duties such as
training and annual leave.
TSA headquarters officials stated that TSA determined that using the
85th percentile day concept would more than account for training,
leave, and other factors related to TSOs not being available for work
because, according to TSA, on only about 7 percent of days do passenger
volumes exceed it. Thus, according to TSA officials, the Staffing
Allocation Model is set at a high enough demand level to cover
screening demand for most days during the year and allow for the extra
time needed for necessary nonscreening time needed by TSOs such as
training, leave, and other duties. TSA officials told us that they
believe this method of calculating demand provides the necessary level
of security and, secondarily, reflects their responsibility to be good
financial stewards of taxpayer dollars, as using even higher volume
days would result in higher costs and perhaps lower overall
productivity. Regarding the need for an additional allowance for
various forms of TSO leave needs, TSA had included an allowance, for
fiscal year 2007, in the Staffing Allocation Model for additional full-
time equivalents (14.5 percent full-time-equivalent allowance) to cover
annual, sick, comp, injury, and military leave.
Additionally, TSA headquarters officials have included an allowance in
the fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation Model (an additional 2 percent full-
time equivalent allowance) for training that cannot be completed during
operational down times. TSA specifically intended this allowance to
provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the required training
each month on detecting improvised explosive devices--which TSA has
identified as the highest threat to commercial aviation security.
TSA officials involved in developing the staffing model stated that
they did not plan to assess the extent to which the representative week
of screening demand during each airport's peak month does, in fact,
represent actual screening demand for that week. However, officials
acknowledged that such an assessment could help verify that, for
purposes of the model's annual allocation run, the resulting allocation
provides TSO staffing levels adequate to allow for 85 percent of
airline passengers at the nation's commercial airports to wait 10
minutes or less at security checkpoints.
Second, 7 of the 14 FSDs we interviewed stated that the goal of a 20
percent part-time TSO workforce, as measured by full-time-equivalent
TSOs, is not realistic. TSA data show that the part-time TSO full-time-
equivalent level at 13 airports we visited,[Footnote 43] as of July
2006, ranged from approximately 1 to 38 percent, with an average of 8
percent. FSDs stated that the 20 percent part-time goal for TSOs has
been difficult to achieve for most airports because of, among other
things, economic conditions leading to competition for part-time
workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit
in some locations, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year
2002, the lack of benefits for part-time TSOs, and the large number of
part-time TSOs who convert to full-time status when full-time positions
become available. According to TSA, these factors have made the hiring
and retention of part-time TSOs particularly difficult. As shown in
figure 6, TSA data reflect that, nationwide, part-time levels of TSOs
had not reached 20 percent in the first 2 years of implementation of
the current staffing allocation model (fiscal years 2005 and 2006) with
regard to the nation's larger (category X, I, and II)
airports.[Footnote 44] For example, figure 6 also shows that in fiscal
years 2005 and 2006, the nation's 26 category X airports had a TSO
workforce comprised of about 9 percent part-time equivalents. TSA
officials stated that the number of part-time TSOs had increased in
recent months.
TSA officials originally assumed that the 20 percent TSO part-time
assumption provides the most efficient coverage for airports
(especially those in categories X, I, and II) by enabling FSDs to have
more flexibility in matching the daily peak-load workflow at
airports.[Footnote 45] Nonetheless, figure 6 shows that, on average,
only smaller airports (categories III and IV) came close to or exceeded
the 20 percent part-time TSO workforce goal during fiscal years 2004
through 2006.
Figure 6: Percentage of Part-Time TSOs by Airport Category, Fiscal
Years 2004 through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these
personnel.
[End of figure]
TSA has recognized that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20
percent part-time FTE level and others (most likely smaller airports)
may operate more effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff.
As a result, for fiscal year 2007, TSA has modified this assumption to
include a variable part-time goal based on each airport's historic part-
time to full-time TSO ratio.
Third, 5 of the 14 FSDs stated that the staffing model does not appear
to consider new passenger screening procedures that may require
additional TSOs at the checkpoint. For example, one FSD stated that the
model has yet to incorporate the additional TSOs that will be required
by TSA's new Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program
currently being implemented at the nation's airports.[Footnote 46] TSA
headquarters officials acknowledged that changes to screening
procedures could increase the number of TSOs needed at a checkpoint or,
conversely, increase wait times at the checkpoint. Therefore, TSA has
made changes to the staffing allocation model for fiscal year 2007 to
include line item allocations for the new Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques, Bomb Appraisal Officer, and Aviation Direct
Access Screening Program security initiatives.
Fourth, two of the five FSDs with in-line checked baggage screening
systems stated that in their view TSA overestimated the TSO labor
savings that would be achieved as a result of deploying in-line baggage
screening systems. TSA headquarters officials responsible for the
staffing model stated that some adjustments had to be made to
individual airports' TSO staffing levels to adequately reflect the
configuration of the airports' in-line systems, which permit higher
throughput rates. Specifically, some airports have full in-line
systems, while others have partial in-line systems that are installed
at a particular terminal or terminals. Additionally, TSA officials
cited one example in which a category X airport received a reduction in
TSOs in fiscal year 2005 to account for the in-line baggage screening
system at the airport. However, TSA officials responsible for the
staffing model later learned that the model had incorrectly assumed
that the system was fully operational, when in fact it was still under
construction. Officials stated that the FSD at this airport was
consequently allocated additional TSO positions. TSA officials stated
that the model validation process currently underway should help ensure
that the model adequately reflects the actual operating conditions at
the airport, which highlights the importance of a mechanism to provide
assurance that all assumptions periodically undergo validation.
Finally, FSDs identified that the model does not account for TSOs being
used in operational support functions. Eleven of the 14 FSDs we
interviewed stated that because they are not authorized to hire a
sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely
used to perform certain operational support functions such as payroll
processing, scheduling, distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data
entry, and workman's compensation processing. At 13 airports[Footnote
47] we visited between January and August 2006, out of a total of 4,710
TSOs on-board at those airports, TSA was using 242 TSOs (about 5
percent) for operational support functions. FSDs and their staffs
stated that these TSOs were spending varying amounts of time on
operational support duties, some on a nearly full-time basis.[Footnote
48] As shown in figure 7, nearly 7 percent of TSOs nationwide performed
operational support (on at least a part-time basis) during a specific 2-
week pay period in fiscal 2006. This percentage was slightly higher for
the smaller airport categories. Also, as shown in figure 7, the TSOs
performing operational support functions at the nation's airports spent
approximately half their time on these duties--38 out of 80 possible
hours--during the 2-week period. In addition, TSOs performing
operational support functions at Category X airports spent
significantly more time on these duties (approximately 63 out of 80
hours) than TSOs in the other airport categories.
Figure 7: Percent of TSOs Used for Operational Support Functions, along
with Average Hours Spent by Them on These Functions, by Airport
Category for a 2-Week Period--September 17, 2006, through September 30,
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these
personnel.
[End of figure]
In September 2006, in reporting on its review of TSA administrative
positions, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector
General found that TSA had not determined the precise number of FSD
administrative positions it needs and was using TSOs to perform
administrative work due to a lack of other personnel to perform this
work.[Footnote 49] The Inspector General reported that during a 15-week
period from October 2, 2005, through January 21, 2006, TSOs performed
operational support work equivalent to 1,441 full-time-equivalent TSO
positions, which is equivalent to about 78 percent of the 1,850 support
staff formally assigned to do this work. Moreover, the Inspector
General reported that TSOs were working overtime to perform these
duties. The Inspector General recommended that, among other actions,
TSA conduct a workforce analysis of FSD administrative staff and
develop a staffing model to determine the number of administrative
employees needed at airports, and take into consideration the time and
nature of administrative work performed by TSOs when assessing its
workforce requirements. In May 2006, TSA headquarters officials told us
that they were conducting a survey of FSDs to identify the number of
hours their staffs, including TSOs, spend each week on a variety of
operational support functions. These officials stated that they will
review the FSD responses to determine the time it takes to perform each
function and the level of staffing needed. The number of operational
support staff provided to each airport will be based on the types of
administrative functions performed at the airport and the availability
of funding. TSA headquarters officials stated that they have not made a
decision on whether permanent operational support staff would be
provided in the form of additional TSOs or full-time administrative
staff. In the interim, TSA contracted with three private companies in
September 2006 to provide temporary operational support services to
FSDs that request this assistance from TSA headquarters. According to
TSA, these contractors supplement FSD administrative staff so that TSOs
performing operational support functions can return to their primary
screening duties.
Additionally, in order to account for additional TSO time needed for
operational support, TSA included a "collateral duties credit" in the
Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007. This credit will
increase each airport's fiscal year 2007 allocation identified by the
staffing model by 5 percent at category X, I, and II airports. TSA
officials stated that the agency is not providing this credit to
category III and IV airports because the extended periods of low
screening demand at these airports offsets the need for such an
allowance.
TSA's use of TSOs to perform operational support functions may
contribute to scheduling challenges because these TSOs are unavailable
for their primary responsibilities to screen passengers and their
checked baggage. For example, an FSD at a category X airport stated
that he would have less of a problem scheduling checkpoints during peak
passenger volume if he did not have to use TSOs to provide operational
support. Additionally, the use of TSOs to perform operational support
functions may undermine TSA's investment in training them for screening
functions since the TSO is not performing the job for which they were
trained. Moreover, TSA has stated that TSO performance improves with
experience. Consequently, TSOs who are not conducting passenger or
checked baggage screening are not gaining the additional experience to
help enhance their performance. An FSD we interviewed at a category X
airport stated that having to use TSOs to perform operational support
duties at his airport has created challenges in keeping these TSOs
proficient in screening duties. However, TSA headquarters' officials
stated that using TSOs to perform operational support functions does
not adversely impact TSO performance because the agency has various
methods in place to ensure that all TSOs, including those performing
nonscreening duties, meet minimum security standards. For example, all
TSOs have to meet the recurrent training requirement of 3 hours of
training per week averaged over a calendar quarter to maintain
proficiency and remain current on procedural changes and new threat
items and all TSOs are subject to the various components of TSA's
performance accountability and standards system.[Footnote 50]
Additionally, TSA officials stated that an April 2006 management
directive requires TSOs who have not performed screening functions for
15 or more consecutive days to complete a return to duty training
program. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that the agency has
not examined the impact of using TSOs to perform operational support
duties on cost, scheduling efficiency, and TSO performance. In
addition, TSA has not determined under what circumstances it is
appropriate to use TSOs to perform operational support functions or
provided FSDs with guidance on when TSOs can be used this way. Without
establishing such guidance, FSDs may over rely on TSOs to perform
operational support functions.
TSA's FSDs Are Responsible for Deploying TSO Allocations at their
Airports, but Face Workforce and Other Challenges to Effective
Deployment:
TSA has vested its FSDs with responsibility for managing their TSO
allocations while considering local circumstances that can affect the
staffing allocation model's effectiveness in deploying the TSO
workforce. After receiving the annual FTE allocation from TSA
headquarters, the FSD and his or her staff must prepare TSO work
schedules, by using the staffing model's optional scheduling tool or
some other method, to ensure that adequate numbers of TSOs are
conducting passenger and baggage screening operations, at all times, to
ensure adequate security and attempt to meet the 10 minute wait time
standard. However, factors outside the model's determination of overall
staffing levels can affect FSDs' ability to effectively schedule TSOs
at passenger lanes and baggage check areas. For example, as previously
discussed, few airports have been able to achieve a 20 percent FTE
level for part-time staff as assumed by the staffing allocation model
in its first 2 years of implementation (fiscal years 2005 and 2006)--
forcing FSDs to adjust the scheduling tool based on actual part-time
TSOs on board. Also, as of September 30, 2006, approximately one-third
of airports had less than 90 percent of their overall TSO positions
filled, and nine of the 14 airports we visited were similarly below
their staffing allocation. FSDs cited certain other challenges in
scheduling TSO staff including injuries and absenteeism, in addition to
time spent away from screening duties due to training requirements and
operational support needs--factors that the scheduling tool did not
directly consider in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. As previously
discussed, to address some of these difficulties, TSA has revised some
of the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year
2007. To address other difficulties, TSA has implemented several human
capital initiatives to improve hiring and retention of TSO staff,
lessen the impact of injuries and absenteeism, and study the impact of
training and operational support demands on TSO time. TSA has not yet
assessed the impact of these initiatives on hiring and retention, but
plans to do so during fiscal year 2007.
FSDs Are Responsible for Managing to Their TSO Staffing Allocation in
Light of Local Circumstances:
FSDs are responsible for deploying and managing to their TSO allocation
in light of local circumstances, including those that might affect
scheduling and pose challenges to most efficiently deploying their
resource allocations. At the beginning of each fiscal year, the
staffing allocation model identifies the annual allocation of TSOs
needed at each airport based on projected demand levels and other
factors that make up the model. Nonetheless, this stated allocation is
only a starting point. Throughout the fiscal year, FSDs are responsible
for preparing TSO work schedules that adapt to changing circumstances
at the local level. Specifically, FSDs are responsible for scheduling
TSOs to ensure that a sufficient number of TSOs are deployed, from
available staff, to meet airport screening needs.
TSA has provided FSDs with an optional tool they can use to facilitate
the management of their TSO allocation. Specifically, the Staffing
Allocation Model includes a scheduling component that uses the various
inputs to and assumptions of the model, including the number of
checkpoints, lanes, and checked baggage screening machines needed to
respond to the passenger and checked baggage load and the minimum TSO
staffing levels identified in the standard operating procedures for
passenger and checked baggage screening. This tool is then to produce
daily workforce requirements and calculates a work schedule for each
airport. The schedule identifies a recommended mix of full-time and
part-time staff and a total number of TSO FTEs needed to staff the
airport on a given day, consistent with a goal of 10 minutes maximum
wait time for processing passengers and baggage. In addition, there are
several areas where TSA adjusts the scheduling tool to most accurately
reflect actual conditions and needs. These areas include:
* Flight schedule changes.
* TSO training requirements (based on available times identified by the
scheduling tool).
* Number of TSOs needed for operational support associated with
operating the checkpoint and baggage screening areas.
* New passenger and checked baggage screening procedures that affect
TSO utilization.
FSDs stated that because the scheduling tool does not contain this
information, they must modify the input to the tool, or use an
alternative scheduling tool, to deploy their TSO workforce. For
example, FSDs and their staffs stated that the scheduling tool does not
contain the most current flight schedule data due to the reporting
practices of various airlines. During our airport visits, TSA
scheduling officers reported that the scheduling tool includes data
from as much as 90 days in advance, but some airlines provide their
final flight schedules and anticipated passenger volume as late as 1
week in advance--sometimes leaving FSDs little time to ensure adequate
TSO availability. TSA officials said that in order to keep their flight
offerings competitive, airlines seek to protect their flight data from
public disclosure as long as possible. For this reason, TSA
headquarters officials said they expect FSDs to work with airport
operators and airline officials to obtain the most current data
available on which to base their scheduling efforts and to make
adjustments to the scheduling tool to ensure that their deployment of
TSOs most effectively meets the screening demand.
The nine FSDs we interviewed at category X and I airports reported that
the scheduling tool was useful as a starting point for developing their
schedules. However, all six FSDs who said they used the scheduling tool
regularly reported making adjustments to the schedule output to more
accurately reflect their local conditions primarily because, according
to these FSDs, the scheduling tool does not automatically take into
account the actual composition of the TSO workforce at each individual
airport or, in some cases, unique work schedules that may be
implemented at some airports (other than a standard 5-day work week).
For example, the scheduling tool is based on the model's assumption of
a 20 percent part-time force expresses as a full-time-equivalent level
among available staff, although few of the larger airports have been
able to achieve this level of part-time staff. Specifically, only 2 of
the 26 category X airports had a workforce composed of at least 20
percent part-time staff in July 2006. Because the scheduling tool
assumes a 20 percent part-time level for TSOs, FSDs at airports we
visited with lower levels of part-time TSOs stated that they make
adjustments to the scheduling tool's output to more accurately reflect
the airport's actual mix of full-time and part-time TSOs and then
develop a work schedule accordingly. In addition, as of September 30,
2006, TSA data showed that approximately one-third of the nation's
airports had less than 90 percent of their annual TSO positions filled.
According to FSDs we interviewed, however, the scheduling tool assumes
that each airport has its full TSO allocation on board. Moreover,
according to TSA, the scheduling tool assumes that TSOs across all
airports have standard 5-day work weeks, although individual airports
may require TSOs to work varying schedules. For example, an FSD for a
category III airport told us that he requires TSOs to work a sixth day
once every 4 weeks. However, the FSD at this airport stated that the
scheduling tool cannot account for this schedule.
In response, TSA headquarters officials stated that the scheduling tool
can indeed account for the actual number of onboard TSOs, the actual
mix of full-time and part-time TSOs, and most scheduling anomalies FSDs
encounter.[Footnote 51] The TSA headquarters officials attributed the
FSDs' comments to misunderstandings regarding the full capabilities of
the scheduling tool. The officials further explained that the agency
has done a better job recently in training field staff in the use of
the scheduling tool than was done earlier in the Staffing Allocation
Model's implementation.[Footnote 52]
FSDs at the four smaller (category II and III) airports we visited
stated that the scheduling tool was more useful for larger airports
with more complex scheduling challenges given the size of the
workforce, the higher passenger volumes, and the larger number of
checkpoints and terminals. These FSDs stated that smaller airports can
more easily predict their screening demand and generally said they did
not believe that the staffing model's scheduling tool added value to
their scheduling process--especially since they are dealing with small
numbers of TSO staff and limited passenger and baggage check
facilities, for example, having only one checkpoint with few lanes.
Therefore, they have chosen to continue to use such locally developed
tools, such as spreadsheets. However, TSA headquarters officials stated
that use of the scheduling tool by all airports will eliminate
applications, such as these spreadsheets, that are inconsistent with
the Staffing Allocation Model and TSA's time and attendance reporting
system, thereby enhancing efficiency in scheduling TSOs.
While TSA headquarters officials stated that the scheduling tool is
capable of preparing schedules for any size airport and accounting for
all the issues noted as problems by the FSDs we visited, officials are
currently permitting each FSD to determine whether to use the
scheduling tool. TSA officials stated that technical improvements
planned for the scheduling tool will improve its usefulness in
preparing TSO schedules. For example, installation of high-speed
internet connectivity and implementation of electronic time and
attendance reporting will allow the scheduling tool to efficiently
maintain up-to-date rosters of available TSO staff to schedule,
according to TSA officials. After these technical improvements are
made, which TSA expects to be completed in fiscal year 2007, TSA
officials told us they may consider making the tool mandatory.
According to TSA, electronic time and attendance will improve
scheduling by providing connectivity between the scheduling tool and
TSA's timekeeping system. This automation is to enable the automatic
linking of scheduling and timekeeping information and provide planned
schedules and actual time worked.
FSDs Cited Challenges in Deploying Their TSO Workforce to Perform
Screening, and Several Efforts Are Underway to Address These
Challenges:
All 14 FSDs we interviewed identified challenges they faced in
deploying their TSO workforce. Nine of the 14 airports we visited were
below their allocation for TSOs as determined by the staffing model.
FSDs at these airports cited the inability of TSA's centralized hiring
process to replace TSOs quickly. However, attrition, particularly by
part-time TSOs, was also cited as a barrier to achieving and
maintaining their TSO staffing levels. TSA has stated a goal of each
FSD maintaining a TSO staffing level of not less than 90 percent of
each individual airport's TSO allocation. Based on TSA data,
approximately 53 percent (237) of commercial airports were either at,
or no less than 10 percent below, their respective TSO allocations at
the end of fiscal year 2006. Approximately 31 percent of airports (140)
were below 90 percent of their allocation, and 16 percent (71) of
airports were 110 percent or more above their allocation.[Footnote 53]
Sixty-nine of the 71 airports above their allocation were among the
small category III and IV airports. Conversely, as also shown in figure
8, 131 of the 140 airports below 90 percent of their TSO allocations
are airports in categories II, III, and IV. These smaller airports have
correspondingly smaller numbers of TSOs; therefore, even small staff
fluctuations have a greater impact on being above or below their TSO
allocations. Overall, more large airports (categories X and I) have
succeeded in meeting their TSO allocations determined by the Staffing
Allocation Model.
Figure 8: Airports' On-Board Status, by Airport Category, Compared to
TSO Staffing Allocation, in Full-Time-Equivalent TSOs, as of September
30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these
personnel.
[End of figure]
According to TSA officials, airports that are above their allocation
must reduce their TSO staffing levels by either (1) attrition or (2)
transferring their excess TSOs to airports that are below their
allocation. TSA officials also stated that airports grouped together
under TSA's "hub and spoke" organizational structure often share TSO
resources as needs dictate.[Footnote 54]
FSDs we interviewed cited various reasons for attrition, including
limited advancement opportunities, need for higher paying job, work
hours, difficulty of work, and job dissatisfaction. At the same time,
as shown in figure 9, TSO attrition rates, for both full-time and part-
time staff, decreased from approximately 24 percent to 21 percent from
fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2006. However, as previously discussed,
the part-time TSO attrition rate remains considerably higher than the
rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16
percent for fiscal year 2006).
Figure 9: Attrition Rates for Full-Time and Part-Time TSOs, Fiscal
years 2004 to 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these
personnel.
[End of figure]
According to the Office of Personnel Management, an important principle
behind maintaining a quality workforce is employee retention, and an
analysis of workforce trends is essential to determine what factors
most affect retention. To this end, in August 2005, TSA hired a
contractor to administer exit surveys during fiscal year 2006 to
employees who voluntarily separated from TSA. While the response rate,
as of July 2006, was too low (15 percent) to draw overall conclusions
about the results, TSA stated that the most common reasons cited by
TSOs for separating from TSA include better job opportunities,
dissatisfaction with TSA leadership, and personal reasons. For part-
time TSOs, the most common reasons were better job opportunity,
personal reasons, dissatisfaction with their supervisor and undesirable
work schedule. TSA plans to conduct further analysis of the responses
based on whether the TSO was a full-time or part-time employee in an
effort to determine the unique issues facing each group. TSA officials
stated that nearly half (47%) of the survey respondents said that they
would consider returning to TSA.[Footnote 55] TSA has acknowledged that
the high attrition rates drive up hiring and training costs. TSA
officials stated that it costs about $10,000 to assess, hire, and train
a TSO. Officials estimated that for every 2,500 TSOs that TSA retains,
including part-time TSOs, TSA could save about $25 million.
Five of the 14 the FSDs we interviewed cited either generally high
levels of absenteeism[Footnote 56] or injuries as factors that affect
their ability to schedule TSOs to passenger lanes and baggage screening
areas. The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA has also
identified high absenteeism and injury rates as major causes of
staffing shortages. While absenteeism and injuries remain prevalent
among the TSO workforce, TSA data indicate overall improvement in these
problem areas. As shown in figure 10, TSO absenteeism rates, across all
airport categories, have improved from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year
2006.
Figure 10: Average Rate of TSO Absenteeism per 100 TSOs, by Airport
Category, for Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these
personnel.
[End of figure]
In addition, as shown in figure 11, TSO injuries (as represented by
workman's compensation claims) have improved over the same period
(fiscal year 2004 to 2006). TSA headquarters officials attributed this
improvement to the agency's initiatives to reduce injuries among the
TSO workforce.
Figure 11: TSA Workman's Compensation Claims for Calendar Years 2004 -
2006, through June 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of Labor data.
Note: The data in this figure include all workman's compensation claims
received by the Department of Labor from TSA and are not limited
exclusively to TSOs. However, TSA officials stated that the vast
majority of these claims are from their TSO workforce.
[End of figure]
Despite the acknowledgement of problems with attrition and absenteeism,
TSA headquarters officials stated that, nationwide, excessive use of
overtime has not been a problem and is mostly used to address
attrition, one-time events, unexpected delays, and holidays. Figure 12
shows that TSA's use of overtime, which does not count against the full-
time-equivalent rate at airports, has remained relatively stable-
-4 to 5 percent--during fiscal years 2004 through 2006 with larger
airports generally having higher overtime rates each year.
Figure 12: TSO Overtime Hours as a Percentage of Total Hours Worked, by
Airport Category, during Fiscal Years 2004 - 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: This figure includes data on federal TSOs only and not on private
screeners employed at the 6 airports across the nation utilizing these
personnel.
[End of figure]
FSDs we spoke to cited a need to use TSOs for various operational
support functions on either a full-time or part-time basis due to a
lack of sufficient administrative staff to perform these functions. As
previously noted, these functions included such activities as payroll
and workman's compensation processing, various data input related to
screening operations, uniform management and control, and managing and
distributing supplies for the checkpoints. As a result of devoting at
least a portion of their time to these activities, FSDs could not rely
on these TSOs to perform all of their other passenger and baggage
screening activities during these periods.
Another challenge to using the model to deploy TSOs, according to TSA
headquarters officials and FSDs, is that some airports have physical
infrastructure configurations that limit their capacity for processing
passengers and checked baggage that cannot necessarily be accounted for
in the Staffing Allocation Model. At these airports, longer wait times
are due, at least in part, to limitations on the number of screening
lanes available, a limitation imposed by the layout of the checkpoint.
TSA officials stated that in some of these instances, airports have
made capital improvements to increase capacity and help minimize wait
time. Of the 14 airports we visited, 7 had made, or were in the process
of making, capital improvements to expand the passenger processing
capacity of their security screening checkpoints. For example, during
the period of October 2004 to June 2005, a category I airport
experienced wait times exceeding 40 minutes on 40 separate occasions.
TSA determined that wait times could not be reduced at the airport,
even if it deployed more TSOs, due to the physical construction of the
checkpoint, which only allowed for four screening lanes. In June 2005,
the airport removed a wall to enable the installation of additional
screening lanes. As a result of the additional lanes staffed with TSOs
during peak periods, the airport only experienced one instance of a
reported wait time exceeding 40 minutes as of October 2006.
In addition to airports making capital improvements to help address
capacity issues, airports and air carriers have also taken action to
assist with increasing the efficiency of the screening process. For
example, an air carrier at a category X airport was concerned about
wait times at the airport. The air carrier established a security
process improvement team consisting of representatives of TSA, air
carriers, and the airport authority to examine checkpoints and suggest
ways to make the screening process more efficient. One initiative that
resulted from this effort is that the air carrier provided staff at
passenger screening checkpoints to assist passengers in removing cell
phone, keys, change, and other metal objects from their person before
going through the walk through metal detector. According to the air
carrier, it spent about $15,000 to $18,000 of its own money each month
in personnel costs to staff the checkpoints over a 12-hour period most
days. In another case, a representative of an airport board for a
category X airport told us that in response to concerns about high wait
times--wait times exceeding 30 minutes--the airport board spent $1
million to hire a consultant to simulate existing checkpoint
configurations and conditions to determine where and how improvements
could be made to increase passenger throughput, thereby reducing wait
times. As a result of this effort, several improvements were made,
including posting a TSO at the front of each checkpoint to facilitate
the screening process, posting signage at checkpoints to explain the
items that passengers should remove from their person; adding space at
end of the x-ray screening belt so that passengers can easily pick up
their items without holding up the line; and providing more room for
passengers to remove items from their person before they get to the x-
ray machines. According to this airport official, these improvements
collectively resulted in an increase in passenger throughput from 175
to 200 passengers per hour at relatively low cost. However, the
official expressed concern that most airports are not in a position to
fund similar projects because they do not have the resources.
TSA Reported Several Efforts Underway to Help Address Challenges in
Deploying the TSO Workforce:
TSA headquarters officials and FSDs we interviewed reported having
several efforts underway to help address some of the challenges they
face in deploying the TSO workforce. For example, to allow FSDs to more
efficiently address staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility for
hiring TSOs from TSA headquarters to FSDs at individual airports and,
according to TSA officials, provided contractor support to assist in
this effort. TSA data show that since local hiring began in March 2006,
TSA has increased the number of new hire TSOs from approximately 180
per pay period in February 2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under the
local hiring initiative. Additionally, TSA officials stated that prior
to the implementation of the local hiring initiative, TSA was able to
support hiring at only about 30 airports during any given period
compared to more than 100 airports each pay period since the local
hiring initiative was implemented. Table 4 provides a summary of the
national human resource-related initiatives intended to help increase
TSO retention, utilization, and effectiveness.
Table 4: National Human Resource Initiatives by TSA for Its TSO
Workforce:
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Local hiring;
Description: In March 2006, TSA shifted responsibility for hiring TSOs
from TSA Headquarters to the FSDs at individual airports. TSA
headquarters has provided contract personnel to assist airports in all
aspects of the hiring process.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: TSO Career Progression Program;
Description: Recognizing that the screener workforce had few upward
mobility opportunities within their profession, TSA reclassified the
agency's 43,000 screeners as TSOs. This new classification gives TSOs
an opportunity for career progression and to apply for DHS law
enforcement positions. Through this program, TSA has implemented new
pay bands that broaden TSO career opportunities and include "technical"
and "leadership" career track options for the TSOs.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Performance-based pay;
Description: In April 2006, TSA deployed a pay-for-performance system.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Retention incentive payments;
Description: During fiscal year 2006, TSA offered bonus payments in
installments to TSOs who stay with the agency for a certain period of
time. TSA is also providing a $500 separate retention incentive for
full-time TSOs at 22 hard-to-hire airports. TSA made the first of these
payments in May 2006.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Full-time to part-time conversion bonus;
Description: In fiscal year 2006, TSA provided bonus payments in May
and September to full-time TSOs who decided to convert to part-time
status by May 1, 2006.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: TSO Incentive Awards;
Description: In fiscal year 2006, TSA provided monetary support to FSDs
to assist them in retaining TSOs with good performance records. During
the year, FSDs received $20 million to be paid to TSOs' to reward
superior performance.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Part-time health benefits pilot;
Description: TSA has implemented a pilot program at 6 airports
providing part-time TSOs with the same benefits as full-time TSOs .
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Career coaching/skills inventory;
Description: TSOs can speak one-on-one with a career counselor and
complete a self-assessment to determine their needs for advancement.
Human resource challenge: Hiring and retention of adequate numbers of
TSO staff (including part-time);
TSA initiative: Lifecare;
Description: TSA offers this service, free- of-charge, to TSOs to
assist them with eldercare, daycare, or other issues that can affect
their work life and keep them from performing effectively.
Human resource challenge: Absenteeism;
TSA initiative: Performance- based pay;
Description: TSO pay based, in part, on attendance.
Human resource challenge: Absenteeism;
TSA initiative: TSO Career Progression Program;
Description: By enhancing the motivation of TSOs, TSA believes this
program will help improve attendance.
Human resource challenge: Injuries;
TSA initiative: Nurse case management program;
Description: TSA acknowledged that TSO injuries were a significant
drain in its workforce and responded by creating an agencywide nurse
case management program based on the recommendations of the TSO Injury
Task Force. This program assists TSOs in getting the medical attention
they need to return to work as soon as possible.
Human resource challenge: Injuries;
TSA initiative: Industrial engineer visits to problem airports;
Description: TSA Headquarters is in the process of sending teams of
industrial engineers to evaluate the 25 airports with the worst injury
rates and make recommendations for improvements, including simple
configuration changes and small equipment purchases (like roller tables
and floor mats) that could significantly reduce injury rates. .
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
In addition to these workforce initiatives, TSA also continues to use
TSOs from the national screening force to address short-term needs at
individual airports nationwide. According to TSA, the national
screening force is generally deployed only to those airports
experiencing significant staffing shortfalls associated with increased
seasonal traffic or when a special event--such as a Super Bowl or a
large national conference--occurs requiring an immediate influx of
additional, though temporary, TSO support. Of the 14 FSDs we
interviewed, 6 stated that they had used the national screening force
at least once. All but one of these FSDs told us that the national
screening force was used to meet short-term screening demand associated
with special events and unexpected circumstances, such as heavy
passenger loads stemming from hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In the other
instance, at a category X airport, the FSD stated that, because of
challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he has had to
rely on about 60 members of the National Screening Force deployed to
his airport since 2004. However, in November 2006, TSA officials stated
that as of November 1, 2006, there were no National Screening Force
TSOs assigned to this airport, which they attributed to TSA's local
hiring initiative.
TSA officials stated that they are examining methods for addressing
hiring and retention challenges at specific airports where these
problems are particularly acute. For example, as shown in table 4
above, TSA has implemented a $500 retention incentive for TSOs at 22
"hard-to-hire" airports who were on-board as of April 15, 2006. As also
shown in the table, to help with hiring and retention of part-time
TSOs, TSA is piloting a program that offers full health benefits to
part-time TSOs at six airports. At these airports, part-time TSOs
receive the same health benefits as full-time TSOs. At all other
airports, part-time TSOs do not receive health benefits. In addition to
incentives and expanding health benefits, TSA is considering other
options for attracting and retaining TSOs. For example, these options
include (1) parking allowances, (2) child care, (3) elder care, and (4)
tuition assistance.
In addition to the national initiatives underway, several FSDs at the
14 airports we visited were implementing their own local initiatives to
address some of the staffing challenges they faced at their airports.
For example, after receiving local hiring authority under the
nationwide local hiring initiative, one FSD we spoke to stated that he
puts brand-new TSO hires out on the passenger lanes as "helpers" so
that they may better understand what the job entails. He expects that
this will cut down on attrition at his airport and help reduce wasted
training resources for TSOs who leave within short periods of being
hired. Regarding absenteeism, all the FSDs we spoke to stated that they
monitored unscheduled absences and counseled TSOs as needed. To help
reduce the number of on the job injuries, 6 of the 14 FSDs we
interviewed said they had local initiatives, such as injury prevention
committees and detailed instruction on safe lifting techniques. To help
mitigate inadequate numbers of part-time TSOs, two TSA managers we
interviewed said that they asked some of their full-time TSOs to work
"split" shifts to cover demands in peak periods that would normally go
to part-time TSOs, one of whom might work the first peak period shift
and another who might work the second peak period shift. The result was
that it eliminated the staffing of full-time TSOs during non-peak
periods when they were most likely to be idle. The experience of these
managers illustrates an attempt at an efficient use of TSOs and also
the primary reason that TSA has tried to achieve a mix of 20 percent
part-time to 80 percent full-time TSOs. Specifically, using part-time
TSOs can help to permit adequate staffing during peak periods while
avoiding the consequent overstaffing stemming from having the same
number of TSOs on duty during non-peak periods. Additionally, to
maximize the flexibility in staffing passenger and checked baggage
screening checkpoints, 3 of the 10 FSDs whose TSOs were not all dual-
trained stated that they were working to increase the number of dual-
trained TSOs--TSOs trained and certified in both passenger and checked
baggage screening. Four of the 14 airports we visited already had dual-
trained TSOs at the time of our visits.
Given that many of TSA's workforce initiatives were only recently
implemented or are in the planning stages, we could not assess the
extent to which these initiatives achieved the intended results. TSA
human capital officials told us that they plan to establish performance
metrics to use in evaluating their workforce initiatives and use the
results of the evaluations to make any needed changes to their
approach.
Conclusions:
TSA's use of a staffing allocation model to help allocate its finite
TSO resources in a manner that ensures security and minimizes wait
times has helped guide its allocation of resources. While we recognize
the difficulty in developing precise assumptions given the dynamic
nature of the aviation industry, the assumptions used in the staffing
allocation model should reasonably reflect actual operating conditions.
We are encouraged that TSA has established several mechanisms to
monitor the sufficiency of the model's outputs and make adjustments in
key model assumptions, for specific airports, that are not accurate for
those airports. We also recognize that TSA has reviewed and changed
several key assumptions for fiscal year 2007 that affect all the
nation's airports. While TSA has taken steps in the right direction,
without a management control for selecting and prioritizing which
assumptions to systematically review each year and for assuring that
all assumptions are periodically reviewed--a particular concern
considering the dynamic nature of the aviation industry and the ongoing
personnel changes experienced by the agency--TSA is missing an
opportunity to increase its assurance that the model reflects actual
operating conditions over time.
Given the extent to which TSOs have been used to perform operational
support functions at airports, TSA has directly accounted for this for
the first time in the staffing allocation model for fiscal year 2007.
We recognize that FSDs may have to rely on TSOs to perform operational
support duties at some times. However, overreliance on TSOs for
operational support limits the availability of TSOs to perform the
functions they were hired to perform, contributes to challenges in
scheduling TSOs so that the right number of TSOs are at the right
checkpoints at the right times, undermines the investment TSA has made
in training them in screening functions, and could over time limit on-
the-job training opportunities. Therefore, it is important for TSA to
determine under what circumstances it is appropriate to use TSOs to
perform operational support functions and to provide FSDs with guidance
on when TSOs can be used this way.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist TSA in its efforts to identify TSO staffing levels that
reasonably reflect the operating conditions at individual airports and
to help ensure that TSOs are effectively utilized, we recommend that
the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for
Transportation Security to take the following two actions:
* Establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of the
assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model on a periodic basis to
ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that
accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time.
* Establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to provide operational
support.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On
February 26, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report,
which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred with our
findings and recommendations and stated that the findings and
recommendations are constructive and useful.
TSA also provided comments on our draft report, which are also
reproduced in full in appendix III. In its comments, TSA stated that
the conclusions of our study are valuable, but TSA wants to ensure that
a full and current picture of the state of its workforce management is
portrayed. TSA highlighted several of the workforce management
initiatives it has implemented. These initiatives were already
discussed in the draft report provided to DHS and TSA for comment.
Regarding our recommendation that TSA establish a formal, documented
plan for reviewing all of the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation
Model on a periodic basis, DHS concurred and stated that TSA has
already begun implementing this recommendation as part of its review of
the Staffing Allocation Model assumptions for fiscal year 2007. DHS
also stated that TSA has begun developing a formal and systematic
process that would identify and prioritize the staffing model
assumptions for periodic review. We are encouraged that, as part of
this process, TSA plans to use formal studies and empirical data to
validate the staffing model's assumptions--methods that should enhance
the validity of TSA's efforts. TSA also plans to document this new
assumption validation process and have it approved by senior
leadership.
DHS also concurred with our recommendation to establish a policy for
when TSOs can be used to provide operational support. DHS stated that
TSA's Offices of Security Operations and Human Capital are working
together to develop a policy that would define when TSOs might be used
to provide operational support. DHS also stated that TSA expects that
the final policy will provide a greater degree of structure and
guidance to FSDs concerning the use of TSOs in operational support
positions.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security; the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for
Transportation; and interested congressional committees as appropriate.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore:
Acting Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted
in December 2004, required the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to develop and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the
aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or
oversees screening services by March 2005.[Footnote 57] These standards
are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure
that the average aviation security-related delay experienced by
passengers is minimized. This provision of the act also mandated that
we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. To assess TSA's
efforts in developing a staffing allocation model that ensures that it
provides the necessary levels of aviation security and that the average
aviation security-related delay experienced by passengers is minimized,
we addressed the following questions:
* How does TSA ensure its Staffing Allocation Model provides a
sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to perform
passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what
challenges has it faced while implementing the model?
* How does TSA deploy its TSO allocation and what factors affect the
model's effectiveness in helping TSA accomplish this deployment?
Scope and Methodology:
Our work generally focused on the two major components of TSA's
determination of TSO staffing at the nation's airports. First, at the
TSA headquarters level, we interviewed (and reviewed documentation
provided by) officials responsible for the development, implementation,
and ongoing monitoring of the Staffing Allocation Model and its
determination of the annual allocation of TSOs to each of the nation's
commercial airports. Second, at the field level, we interviewed TSA
staff at selected airports who were responsible for working within
their allocation to deploy sufficient TSO staff to their airports'
passenger and checked baggage screening operations.
During our design phase, we visited six airports selected based on
location, airport category,[Footnote 58] and participation in TSA's
Screening Partnership Program.[Footnote 59] Table 5 provides
information on the airports we visited during the design phase.
Table 5: Airports Visited during Design Phase:
Geographic location: Texas:
1. Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport;
Airport category: X;
Screening Partnership program participation: No.
Geographic location: Texas:
2. William P. Hobby Airport;
Airport category: I;
Screening Partnership program participation: No.
Geographic location: Texas:
3. Waco Regional Airport;
Airport category: III;
Screening Partnership program participation: No.
Geographic location: Washington, D.C. (Metro):
1. Washington-Dulles International Airport;
Airport category: X;
Screening Partnership Program participation: No.
Geographic location: Washington, D.C. (Metro):
2. Washington-Reagan National Airport;
Airport category: X;
Screening Partnership Program participation: No.
Geographic location: California:
1. San Francisco International Airport;
Airport category: Yes;
Screening Partnership Program participation: Yes.
Source: GAO review of TSA data.
[End of table]
After completing the design phase of our study, we visited eight
additional airports, shown in table 6, representing a geographic mix of
large and small airports. We selected these airports by choosing two
airports in each of categories X, I, and II with a similar number of
annual passenger enplanements,[Footnote 60] but which have
significantly different passenger wait times and full time equivalent
allocations under the Screening Allocation Model. We also selected two
additional airports in category III based solely on their geographic
proximity to two of the airports we visited in the larger airport
categories. All of the nation's airports in the categories we selected
(categories X, I, II, and III) to visit collectively comprise more than
90 percent of TSA's total TSO allocation nationwide.
Table 6: Airports Visited after the Design Phase:
Geographic location: Florida: Orlando International;
Airport category: X;
2005 total enplanements: 16,502,499;
2006 SAM allocation: 925.1;
2006 average peak wait time: 16.98.
Geographic location: Michigan: Detroit Metro Wayne County;
Airport category: X;
2005 total enplanements: 17,433,663;
2006 SAM allocation: 733.9;
2006 average peak wait time: 7.85.
Geographic location: Indiana: Indianapolis International;
Airport category: I;
2005 total enplanements: 4,211,461;
2006 SAM allocation: 292.1;
2006 average peak wait time: 8.27.
Geographic location: California: John Wayne;
Airport category: I;
2005 total enplanements: 4,791,100;
2006 SAM allocation: 217.4;
2006 average peak wait time: 17.99.
Geographic location: South Carolina: Columbia Metropolitan;
Airport category: II;
2005 total enplanements: 725,267;
2006 SAM allocation: 58.9;
2006 average peak wait time: 16.18.
Geographic location: Maine: Portland International;
Airport category: II;
2005 total enplanements: 734,084;
2006 SAM allocation: 101.4;
2006 average peak wait time: 7.49.
Geographic location: Georgia: Augusta Bush Field MBS;
Airport category: III;
2005 total enplanements: 155,146;
2006 SAM allocation: 24.9;
2006 average peak wait time: 7.22.
Geographic location: Michigan: Saginaw International;
Airport category: III;
2005 total enplanements: 213,595;
2006 SAM allocation: 21.0;
2006 average peak wait time: 3.08.
Source: GAO based on review of TSA data.
[End of table]
In total, since we selected a limited nonprobability sample of 14
airports, the information and results obtained cannot be generalized to
all airports nationwide. Rather, the results from our airport visits
were designed to help identify aspects of the Screening Allocation
Model that may not be adequately addressing unique airport
characteristics. Also, on a year-to-year basis, TSA may change the data
inputs and assumptions used to calculate TSO allocations nationwide and
at individual airports.
In reviewing TSA's Staffing Allocation Model, we did not (1) review the
statistical algorithm used in the model, (2) verify the model's
computer programming, or (3) run test data through the model.
More details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding each
of the objectives are presented in the following sections,
respectively.
Objective One: Use of the Staffing Allocation Model to Provide a
Sufficient Number of TSOs to Perform Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening at Each Airport and Challenges Faced While Implementing the
Model:
To determine how TSA ensures its Staffing Allocation Model provides a
sufficient number of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to perform
passenger and checked baggage screening at each airport and what
challenges it has faced while implementing the model, we first sought
to obtain an understanding of how the Staffing Allocation Model works
to provide the appropriate number of TSO staff at the nation's
airports. We interviewed key officials in TSA headquarters responsible
for the development and implementation of the model about the inputs
and assumptions to the model and how these elements are used to
determine appropriate TSO staffing levels. We also reviewed
documentation, provided by these officials, on the design and operation
of the model. Additionally, we interviewed Federal Security Directors
(FSD) and their staff at the 14 airports about how the Staffing
Allocation Model considers factors unique to their airports in
determining the allocation of TSOs to perform passenger and baggage
screening functions. In addition, we asked FSDs and staff about the
adequacy of their allocation and their ability to make changes to the
model input, for their airport, if necessary. During the visits to
category X, I, and II airports, we also interviewed representatives of
each airport's governing authority and one or more of each airport's
significant airline operators, to obtain their perspectives on the
adequacy of TSA's staffing allocations and TSO scheduling practices at
the respective airports. In addition, we interviewed representatives of
two airline industry associations--the Air Transport Association and
the Regional Airline Association--about their perspectives on TSO
staffing levels at the nation's commercial airports.
We also met with TSA headquarters officials to ascertain the
methodology used in developing the Screening Allocation Model--
including the extent of input from FSDs and other airport stakeholders-
-and compared/contrasted the model to previous staffing models and
methods used by TSA for allocating TSOs to the nation's airports. We
interviewed these same officials to determine details on the
functioning of the Screening Allocation Model, the various data inputs
and assumptions built into the model, how the model uses these factors
to determine specific TSO staffing at individual airports, and what
feedback, if any, is obtained from FSDs regarding their allocations. In
addition, we reviewed relevant documentation from TSA regarding the
Screening Allocation Model's assumptions, requirements, and components,
along with TSA's policies and procedures guiding the allocation of TSO
staff at airport passenger checkpoints and checked baggage screening
areas. We also obtained data on the changes in nationwide TSO
allocations since 2004 and examined how TSA, using the model, ensures
that it has a sufficient number of TSOs to perform passenger and
checked baggage screening.
We also examined how TSA ensures the model complies with statutory
requirements--specifically, whether the model (1) provides the
necessary levels of passenger and baggage security, (2) minimizes
average passenger wait times, and (3) ensures that TSA remains in
compliance with the congressionally mandated full-time-equivalent TSO
cap. To that end, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials and
reviewed Screening Allocation Model-related documentation to ascertain
TSA's approach to monitoring performance of the model. We also analyzed
TSA's airport-specific performance data to determine how, if at all,
various workforce indicators have changed since the model was
implemented. These indicators include passenger wait times, TSO
absenteeism rates, TSO attrition rates, TSO overtime usage, TSO injury
rates, number of TSOs devoted to administrative duties, level of usage
of part-time TSOs, and use of the National TSO force.
At the 14 airports, we met with FSDs and other TSA officials to
determine details on the extent to which they participated in the
development of the Staffing Allocation Model and their level of input
into the model's annual TSO allocation process. During our discussions
with the FSDs, we discussed how well the airport's allocation, as
determined by the model, takes into account the unique characteristics
of the airport and the TSO workforce. These characteristics include
airport layout, passenger checkpoint configuration, and passenger and
baggage screening procedures and equipment. We also examined how the
Staffing Allocation Model addresses changes in air traffic and airport
layout, changes in security screening procedures, and changes in
screening equipment.
In addition to the discussions with FSDs and other TSA officials,
during our airport visits we also physically observed the airport's
passenger checkpoints and baggage screening areas in order to better
understand any unique situations or airport characteristics that affect
screening operations and assessed the impact of these situations on the
model's allocation of TSOs to the airport.
During the visits to the two similar airports in each of categories X,
I, and II, we attempted to determine (1) why one airport received a
larger TSO allocation under the Screening Allocation Model, (2) reasons
for differences in passenger wait times, and (3) how the SAM
allocations at these two airports affected the FSD's ability to
schedule TSOs to perform required security screening
activities.[Footnote 61]
Objective Two: TSA's Deployment of Its TSO Allocation at Individual
Airports and Factors That Impact the Allocation Model's Effectiveness
in Helping TSA Accomplish This Deployment:
To determine how TSA deploys its allocation of TSOs at individual
airports and addresses other factors affecting the deployment, we
interviewed TSA staff at headquarters and at the airports we visited,
regarding TSO scheduling and workforce-related factors that can affect
these efforts. We also obtained and reviewed various TSO workforce-
related data from TSA headquarters pertaining to these factors than can
affect TSA's scheduling efforts at individual airports. These data
include airport-specific information on the number of part-time TSOs,
absenteeism rates, attrition, overtime, workman's compensation injury
claims, and number of TSOs being used for operational support. In
addition, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials, and FSDs at
individual airports, about various human capital initiatives TSA is
implementing to address TSO workforce issues (e.g., TSO attrition, lack
of sufficient part-time staff, TSO absenteeism, injuries, etc.) that
affect the deployment of TSOs allocated to individual airports.
At the 14 airports we visited, we met with FSDs and other TSA officials
to determine details on their methods for scheduling TSOs allocated to
them by the model and their use of the model for this purpose. During
our discussions with the FSDs, we discussed challenges they face in
scheduling the required number of TSOs to perform screening functions.
These challenges include airport layout and associated physical
infrastructure limitations, type of passenger and baggage screening
procedures employed and type of equipment available, number and mix of
available full-time/part-time TSOs, number of TSOs unavailable for work
(including those on leave, absent, injured, in training, or performing
administrative duties), and experience level of TSOs. We also examined
how each airport's scheduling operation addresses changes in air
traffic and airport layout, changes in security screening procedures,
and changes in screening equipment.
We also analyzed certain TSA airport-specific performance data to
determine how these factors impact FSDs' ability to effectively
schedule their TSO allocation. Finally, we interviewed TSA airport and
human capital officials to determine workforce actions TSA has taken to
improve or enhance the Screening Allocation Model's ability to
effectively allocate TSOs to the nation's airports and what other
efforts, if any, TSA has underway to enhance its ability to deploy
TSOs--specifically with respect to the indicators noted above.
Data Reliability:
In addressing our objectives, we obtained the following data from TSA:
* Staffing by airport, in full-time equivalents, as of September 30,
2006.
* TSO staffing allocation, by airport, for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and
2006.
* TSO full-time and part-time full-time equivalents levels for fiscal
years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
* TSO absenteeism for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
* Workman's compensation historical claims activity for calendar years
2004, 2005, and first half of 2006.
* TSO attrition data for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
* TSO overtime rates for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
* Number and percentage of TSOs used for operational support for 2-week
period ending September 30, 2006.
* Deployment of the National Screening Force TSOs as of October 10,
2006.
* Airport passenger wait times for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.
We discussed the sources of the data with the appropriate TSA officials
and obtained written responses to questions about TSA data quality
control efforts for several of these data sets. We determined that the
data for all were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
We conducted our work from January 2006 through January 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Development and Description of TSA's Staffing Allocation
Model:
TSA's Development of Its Staffing Allocation Model:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,
significantly changed how passenger and checked baggage screening is
conducted in the United States.[Footnote 62] ATSA removed screening
responsibility from air carriers and the contractors who conducted
screening for them, and placed this responsibility with TSA. As a
result, TSA hired and deployed approximately 55,000 federal passenger
and baggage Transportation Security Officers (TSO) (formerly known as
screeners) to more than 400 airports nationwide. This initial
deployment was based on input from a contract consultant and the number
of private sector screeners that had been in place prior to TSA. After
this initial roll-out of TSOs, TSA developed a demand-driven staffing
model called the "GRA" model in order to improve screening operations
and make them more efficient. To derive a TSO staffing allocation for
each airport, the GRA model used flight schedules, load
factors[Footnote 63] and connecting flight data, passenger arrival
distribution curves, and the number of passenger baggage. However,
according to TSA, the GRA model did not provide flexibility to react to
dynamic changes in the transportation industry. An initial run of the
GRA model in 2003 called for an overall staffing level of 49,600
despite a congressionally imposed 45,000 full-time-equivalent cap on
the number of TSOs TSA could hire. As a result, TSA had to impose a 7
percent TSO reduction across the board to comply with the congressional
cap by the end of the year. TSA decided it needed to improve its
existing demand-driven staffing model--the GRA model--to create a more
dynamic model that takes into account information about each airport's
configuration,[Footnote 64] as well as assumptions about passenger and
baggage processing.
TSA developed its new model, the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), with
the assistance of a contractor, Regal Decisions (the model was
originally called the "Regal" model). As part of the contract
requirements, Regal staff and TSA industrial engineers visited airports
and met with their Federal Security Directors (FSD) to collect baseline
information such as number of lanes, and number of checked baggage
processing nodes, along with unique characteristics (physical
configuration) of the airports. FSDs had some input (mostly
verification of the model input data specific to their airports) into
the process, but were not directly involved in creating the
model.[Footnote 65] Overall, it took Regal and TSA almost a year to get
the new Staffing Allocation Model stabilized and ready for initial roll-
out. TSA obtained data for,[Footnote 66] developed, and began deploying
the model for testing in the summer of 2004 and first used it for the
fiscal year 2005 TSO staffing allocation for the nation's airports. The
latest TSO staffing numbers based on the model (for fiscal year 2006)
were sent out to the field in October 2005. TSA was in the process of
developing allocations for fiscal year 2007 at the time of our report.
Staffing Allocation Model Components:
The Staffing Allocation Model consists of three different components.
The first is the "GRA" flight data, which provides information to the
model on flight schedules and passenger and baggage volume. These data
are fed into the "Regal" software (from Regal Decision Systems), which
is a simulation model that replicates each airport's configuration and
screening process. Finally, the "Sabre" software is a scheduling tool
that takes the Regal output, expressed in numbers of TSOs needed to
staff security checkpoints in 5-minute increments during the day, and
produces an FTE requirement and corresponding TSO work schedules for
each airport. Below is a detailed description of the three components
that combine to make up TSA's Staffing Allocation Model.
GRA Flight Data:
The GRA flight data uses historical data[Footnote 67] to determine
screening demand at each airport. These historical data include baggage
volume, flight and passenger distribution curves, size/type of
aircraft, and load factors. The GRA firm obtains these data mainly from
the various airport authorities and from published sources such as the
Official Airlines Guide. The guide's flight schedules are provided to
the airports 60-90 days in advance. This allows airports enough time to
react to potential changes in their passenger flow, and for the FSDs to
make any needed changes to the flight schedules listed in the model, so
as to account for last minute scheduling changes or added flights that
were not originally published in the guide. The updated flight
schedules and passenger loads (which represent the screening demand)
from the GRA model serve as the input for the Regal software, which
determines the number of open lanes and the amount of baggage equipment
needed.
Regal Software:
The annual staffing allocation for each airport is based on the peak
month demand level (derived by reviewing historical flight and
passenger/baggage load data available from the GRA software) input into
the Regal software, together with data on airport configurations and
assumptions about passenger and baggage processing (that were not a
part of the old GRA demand-driven model). The Regal software uses these
input data to simulate the actual flow of passengers and baggage
through the airport. The final output--each airport's requirements (in
number of TSO staff for all passenger lanes and baggage pods, expressed
in 5 minute increments throughout the day)--is determined based on the
various assumptions outlined in table 7 and discussed as follows:
* Nonpassenger screening demand--This is the additional demand for
personnel screening checkpoints created by nonpassengers (e.g., airline
crews, concession staff, and airport vendors). Based on discussions
with TSA leadership and estimates by industrial engineers, the model
constant for nonpassenger screening demand was set at 4 percent of
passenger lane volume.
* Passenger processing wait time--This is the amount of time passengers
have to wait to undergo screening at the security checkpoint. The model
sets a threshold of a 10-minute wait before opening additional lanes,
if available, based on passenger volumes.
* Peak month screening demand--TSA derives the Staffing Allocation
Model's allocations based on originating passenger load factors for the
85th percentile day of each airport's peak month. In determining the
85th percentile day, TSA must first determine each airport's peak month
by reviewing historical monthly passenger load data for each month in
the airport's year. According to TSA industrial engineers, selection of
the peak month is based on the average demand day (based on passenger
load) for each month with the peak month being the month with the
highest average demand day. Since daily screening demand data are not
reported by the airlines (and, is therefore, not available) TSA must
approximate each month's average demand day by dividing the monthly
passenger load data by the number of days in the month. This assumption
is linked to TSA's 10-minute wait time goal for processing passengers
and baggage through security. That is, according to TSA industrial
engineers, basing the Staffing Allocation Model on the average peak
demand day is intended to ensure that, on an annual basis, 85 percent
or more of the total passengers screened in U.S. airports will not have
to wait more than 10 minutes to be screened. Further, based on TSA's
analysis, basing the model on this level of demand may result in TSA
taking longer than 10 minutes to screen passengers during 7 percent of
an airport's days during the year. According to TSA, these 25 to 30
days are typically the exceptionally high travel days such as the days
before the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays. Conversely, for
purposes of the annual allocation, TSA industrial engineers added that
basing the model's demand level on the average peak demand day may
result in TSA screening passengers in 10 minutes or less during 93
percent of the airport's days during the year (approximately 335 to 340
travel days over the airport's year). Lastly, when determining the
annual allocation, TSA officials run the model on a representative week
during the peak month.[Footnote 68]
By basing airports' staffing allocations on their peak month passenger
volume, TSA intends to ensure that airports will have some staff to
accommodate nonscreening activities such as training and annual leave
during off-peak periods. In addition, the peak month-based allocation
is intended to provide airports with excess staffing capacity to
respond to unforeseen events such as changes in flight schedules,
injuries, and sick leave. In addition to nonpassenger screening demand,
passenger processing wait time, and the calculation of demand, the
following assumptions were included in the fiscal year 2007 model:
* Line item full-time-equivalent allocation for TSO time paid but not
worked--In fiscal year 2007, TSA, for the first time, provided a
separate line item allocation for the various categories of TSO time
paid not worked. These categories include vacation, sick, comp, injury,
and military leave. Prior to fiscal year 2007, TSO time paid not worked
was indirectly accounted for within the peak month screening demand/
85th percentile day assumption.
* Part-time staff--TSA sets the SAM to run at a staffing mix of full-
time and part-time TSO full-time equivalents based on each airport's
individual part-time to full-time TSO ratio. Prior to fiscal year 2007,
TSA assumed the same part-time goal for all category X, I, and II
airports--regardless of their actual ratios.
* Passenger checkpoint throughput--The passenger checkpoint throughput
is the number of passengers that are processed per security checkpoint
lane, per hour. The model assumes this to be 200.
* Checked baggage processing rates--The checked baggage processing rate
is the number of bags that various types of screening equipment will
process per hour. Table 7 shows baggage processing rates based on type
of screening equipment and whether the baggage screening system is in-
line[Footnote 69] or stand-alone.[Footnote 70]
* Baggage staffing requirements--This is the number of TSO FTEs
required to adequately staff screening equipment. As with checked
baggage processing rates, baggage staffing requirements vary by
screening equipment, whether the equipment is stand-alone or inline,
and by airport category.
* Staffing per lane by airport category--The model allocates staffing
by airport category and by lane type. A standard checkpoint lane is a
lane that processes only passengers who are not selectees (i.e., those
passengers selected for more intense screening). An integrated
checkpoint lane is a lane that processes both standard passengers and
selectees. A dedicated checkpoint lane is a lane that processes only
passengers who are selectees.
* Standard alarm rates--The model assumes specific rates for alarms on
screening equipment used at both passenger checkpoints and baggage
check areas. The model also assumes a selectee rate for passenger
checkpoints.
Table 7: Staffing Allocation Model Assumptions for Fiscal Year 2007:
[See PDF for table - did not compute]
Source: TSA.
Legend: EDS = explosive detection system; ETD = explosive trace
detection; ETP = explosive trace portal; OSR = on-screen resolution; N/
A = not available.
[A] Staffing is number of TSO staff per piece of equipment or passenger
checkpoint lane.
[B] A selectee is a passenger who meets certain criteria based on the
Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System or some other TSA-
approved process and is, therefore, subject to more intense screening
such as wanding and bag checks.
[End of table]
In addition to the model assumptions shown in table 7, the Regal
software also incorporates adjustments to flight schedules (increases
or decreases), variable arrival patterns, and each airport's
configuration including making any allowances for projected expansions
to the airport's configuration. Regal also determines, based on input
from the GRA software, when TSA airport officials need to open more
passenger processing lanes in response to increased passenger flow (not
to exceed the total number of TSOs available). An individual airport
FSD cannot change either the model assumptions or the baseline
configuration for their assigned airport without TSA headquarters
approval, but can petition TSA headquarters to change assumptions and
baseline configuration data if it is believed they are not reflective
of his/her airport.
Sabre Software:
Sabre Airline Solutions, Inc., provides the commercial, off-the-shelf
software for the staffing allocation model's scheduling tool. The Sabre
scheduling tool has three features--Staff Admin, Staff Manager, and
Staff Plan. (TSA did not purchase the Staff Manager component.) Staff
Admin rosters an airport's employee group in a database (shifts,
schedules, personal information, training, etc.) while Staff Plan
recommends a mix of full-time and part-time TSOs and generates a daily
work schedule based on the Regal software's staffing requirement
output. Sabre takes the Regal output and converts it into an full-time-
equivalent figure and it determines scheduling plans based on that
figure (if the airport uses Sabre for scheduling) using the 80/20 full-
time/part-time TSO mix for category X, I, and II airports.
TSA's Use of the Staffing Allocation Model:
TSA uses the Staffing Allocation Model in three different ways--first,
it is run once a year to determine the staffing allocation for all
airports (annual allocation run). Second, it is run at other times to
perform capacity analysis for both lanes required and number and types
of baggage equipment required. Third, it is run at other times of the
year where airports can tweak certain aspects of the model for
scheduling runs without approval from TSA headquarters--for example, to
conduct "what-if" scheduling scenarios by changing different inputs,
such as passenger flow, or flight schedules. However, they cannot do so
for an annual allocation run unless TSA headquarters grants approval to
change an assumption for a specific airport. The baseline for an annual
allocation run always stays the same and cannot be changed by an
airport without TSA headquarters approval. TSA models each airport
according to its unique configuration--that is, no two airports are
modeled the same because no two airports look the same (nor do they
have the same airline traffic profile). FSDs and their staffs typically
meet with airline carriers on a continuing basis to obtain updated
flight schedules. The scheduling runs to determine TSO schedules
incorporate these updated flight schedules whereas, the fiscal runs to
determine overall full-time-equivalent allocation, using peak month
passenger volumes from historical flight data. If the historical flight
schedule used for an annual allocation run is significantly different
from current flight schedules at an airport (e.g., a new airline
carrier joins the airport), the FSD can submit an appeal to TSA
headquarters to re-run the model using the current flight schedule in
order to obtain a more accurate staffing allocation for his or her
airport. (This has been done on an annual basis or when a significant
change in the airport's flight schedule occurs.) Unlike for annual
allocation runs, updated flight schedules are used more frequently for
scheduling runs at the local airports without headquarters
intervention.
The Staffing Allocation Model can be adjusted to account for the
uniqueness of a particular airport's security checkpoints and airline
traffic patterns. However, FSDs are responsible for ensuring that all
data elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports and
bringing to headquarters' attention any factors that should be reviewed
to determine if changes to the model for their airports may be
appropriate.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
February 26, 2007:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Acting Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-07-
299, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for
Allocating Staff Among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be
Systematically Reassessed. The Department's Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) values GAO's work in planning, conducting and
issuing this report.
TSA appreciates GAO's conclusion that the Staffing Allocation Model
(SAM), which allocates Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) in a
manner that ensures security and minimizes wait times, is a useful tool
for allocating TSO resources. TSA understands the importance of using a
robust staffing model that effectively and efficiently manages the
large number of TSOs at more than 400 airports. We also understand that
any model, over time, must be continuously improved and enhanced. In
2004, after experimenting with other systems, TSA management officials,
industrial engineers, information management specialists, and industry
stakeholders collaborated to develop a new SAM. This new system has
served as the primary staffing allocation and scheduling tool and has
been the focus of continued refinement and increasing levels of
staffing precision. The GAO report validates these efforts by noting
that Federal Security Directors (FSDs) believe SAM has become a more
accurate predictor of staffing needs compared to previous models. The
continuing challenge, for any modeling involving the dynamic aviation
industry, will be refining model assumptions.
TSA has a number of initiatives under way which are intended to address
workforce staffing challenges. It is essential that TSA recruit,
retain, and maintain a steady workforce that is highly trained,
motivated, smart, and flexible. In 2006, TSA deployed a pay-for-
performance system for TSOs, Lead and Supervisory TSOs, and Screening
Managers called the Performance Accountability and Standards System
(PASS). PASS facilitates clear expectations and understanding of
performance standards for Security Officers and Managers. This system
ensures that the staff knows how performance will be evaluated, and
what rewards are associated with achieving the standards of
performance. PASS informs staff that outstanding performance is
required, recognized, and rewarded. It reinforces the challenge and
seriousness of the jobs performed by TSA's frontline employees. TSA is
fully committed to PASS and believes it will be a major factor in
attracting and retaining a professional, high performing workforce.
TSA is also implementing a number of other programs to help improve
recruitment and retention. For example, TSA has developed a local,
decentralized hiring process to give FSDs control over key aspects of
hiring. Local hiring empowers FSDs to find the best-qualified
candidates. FSDs and staff receive the training and tools needed to
direct recruitment activities, serve as the primary points-of-contact
for TSO applicants, and shepherd applicants throughout the application,
testing, and assessment cycles. Local hiring also provides applicants
with more site-specific information relevant to their decision to apply
for a position. As a result, the percentage of new full-time TSOs
leaving TSA employment voluntarily in the first 3 months after hire
declined from 26.7 percent in the fourth quarter of FY 2005 to 11
percent in the fourth quarter of FY 2006, a reduction of 58.8 percent.
Also, the percentage of new part-time TSOs leaving TSA employment
voluntarily in the first 3 months after hire declined from 27 percent
in the fourth quarter of FY 2005 to 12.6 percent in fourth quarter of
FY 2006, a reduction of 53.3 percent. Before implementing the local
hiring initiative, the agency average hiring rate for new TSOs was
about 180 each pay period. The local hiring initiative has demonstrated
the capability to on-board 800 or more new TSOs in a single pay period,
with an average of 350 TSOs being hired every pay period.
These new staffing programs are also contributing to an increase in the
number of part-time TSOs which make up the workforce. In recent months
the average number of part-time TSOs has continued to increase and is
now closer to TSA's operational goal of a full-time equivalent (FTE)
workforce that is 20 percent part-time. At the 14 airports mentioned in
the report, the average number of part-time TSO FTEs has increased from
7 percent to 14 percent subsequent to GAO's visits. Nationally, this
number has also increased from 15.6 percent at the beginning of FY 2007
to 16.9 percent. While GAO reports that a 20 percent part-time mix of
TSOs may be difficult to achieve at some airports, TSA continues to
look at how best to utilize its personnel based upon operational
demands. The utilization of part-time and full-time shift workers is
critical as we move forward and refine our recruitment, retention, and
management efforts to optimize our workforce. TSA has recognized that
each airport may face different workforce challenges and no longer uses
a standard 20 percent part-time SAM assumption for all airports. TSA
now customizes SAM part-time staffing assumptions to the unique needs
and circumstances at individual airports. Moreover, TSA is initiating
an Optimization Program which will help FSDs identify the right mix of
part-time and full-time TSOs needed to meet their airports' specific
needs. The program will teach FSDs and staff the techniques and best
practices that will maximize their efforts. For example, the
Optimization Program will help some FSDs evaluate the utility and
flexibility of split shifts.
The GAO report indicates that using TSOs in operational support
positions may undermine TSA's investment in training. TSA is vigorously
working to reduce the number of TSOs performing operational support
functions and has contracted with three private companies to provide
operational support when requested by the FSD. These contractors
supplement FSD administrative staff so that those TSOs assigned to
these functions may return to their primary screening duties. Further,
TSA has implemented several solutions to ensure that TSOs performing
operational support functions maintain sharp security screening skills.
PASS and recurrent training requirements set a very clear standard for
acceptable TSO screening skills.
TSA has implemented several training and certification requirements
which require TSOs periodically to perform screening duties and
demonstrate that their ability to detect prohibited items on passengers
and in baggage remains at acceptable levels. As part of PASS, TSA has
implemented a policy requiring all TSOs to perform screening functions
every week and requires TSOs to receive at least three hours of
screener training per week, with an additional 4 hours per month
designated exclusively for the detection of improvised explosive
devices.
TSA appreciates GAO's recommendation that we should systematically and
periodically ensure SAM assumptions continue to reflect actual
operating conditions that may change over time. TSA considers this
recommendation to be a validation of the direction in which we are
already headed. As noted in the GAO report, TSA has already performed
its first annual reassessment of select assumptions as part of SAM
refinements for 2007. As a result of this reassessment, TSA has made
several enhancements to the staffing model. For example, the modeling
now provides additional TSO resources for leave (annual, sick and
military), training, operational support, and new screening procedures.
Also, as noted earlier, TSA now customizes SAM to match the unique part-
time/full-time TSO mix at individual airports. The next step in TSA's
refinement of SAM is to develop and formalize a plan and prioritization
scheme which ensures all assumptions are systematically validated on a
periodic basis. TSA has already begun work in this area.
The following represents our responses to the recommendations.
Recommendation 1: Establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all
of the assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model on a periodic basis
to ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that
accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time.
TSA Concurs. TSA has already begun implementing this recommendation. As
part of the SAM '07 process, the Office of Security Operations (OSO)
worked in conjunction with the Chief Technology Office (CTO) to review
baseline Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) and Explosives Detection
System (EDS) processing rates. TSA also conducted a detailed review of
baggage distribution patterns. Both reviews resulted in enhancements to
our staffing model.
Moving forward, OSO, CTO, and other stakeholders have begun
collaborating to develop a formal and systematic process which will
identify and prioritize SAM assumptions for periodic review. A joint
action team, composed of a diverse group of subject matter experts from
different disciplines, will develop a process that includes the use of
formalized studies and empirical data to validate model assumptions. It
is important to note that any modeling assumption and validation
process must include flexibilities to allow for unexpected and
immediate changes in the security operational environment. As TSA
develops this new process, we plan to make full use of lessons learned
during prior year model-runs and seek and receive input from both field
and headquarters personnel. TSA is committed to developing a final
process that is dynamic, comprehensive, well-documented, and approved
by OSO senior leadership. Further, TSA recognizes the importance of the
continued use of performance metrics to determine trends across our
network. When we identify concerns at airports, we will be able to
determine quickly if the problem is staffing or operational and
continue to modify the Staffing Allocation Model.
Recommendation 2: Establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to
provide operational support.
TSA Concurs. OSO and the Office of Human Capital (OHC) are working
together to develop a policy which would define when TSOs might be used
to provide operational support. While this effort is currently in its
beginning stages, the final policy will provide a greater degree of
structure and guidance to FSDs concerning the use of TSOs in
operational support positions. The policy will help the FSD decide how
best to meet their security and operational staffing needs. Development
of the policy will evaluate key roles and responsibilities and analyze
appropriate situations for the use of TSOs as operational support.
TSA is committed to implementing the report's recommendations. The
findings and recommendations resulting from this audit are constructive
and useful. Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this
draft report and we look forward to working with you on future homeland
security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Draft Report GAO-07-299 "TSA's Staffing Allocation Model (SAM) is
Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, But Its Assumptions Should
be Systematically Reassessed."
Executive Summary:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has screened more
people with a flat headcount the past 3 years and has done so with
active workforce management.
2006-2007 With increased enplanements and flat staffing, TSA has
implemented and self-funded major initiatives to increase security
through better workforce quality and performance 70,000 T 70,000,000:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Toward that end, TSA changed the entire staffing management system that
GAO originally was asked to study and implemented a wide array of
significant changes in its workforce management during the time that
this GAO study was underway. This highlights the challenge for GAO
which had to study a topic that is in the midst of major process
change. The conclusions of the study are valuable, but TSA wants to
ensure that a full and current picture of the state of TSA's workforce
management is portrayed. Some of the major aspects are highlighted
below:
* Federal Security Directors (FSDs) now have local hiring authority and
the tools to tailor their headcount to meet their dynamic operating
needs - including getting the right part-time mix of Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs). This is completely new since the study was
commissioned.
* FSDs now have numerous additional tools to drive better retention,
fewer injuries, higher attendance, and better performance. Those are
new since the study was commissioned.
* TSA has taken the position - and provided the tools - to move TSOs
from administrative functions where possible and deploy them to front-
line security duties. This is new since the study was commissioned.
* The staffing methodolgy has been changed from a top-down Headquarters
(HQ) driven model that worked from the TSO full-time equivalent (FTE)
cap downwards to a bottoms-up approach based on airport input which
includes actual airline operations and checkpoint and baggage
information. That change alone eliminates many of the issues with the
old model.
* There were many other significant changes in the SAM including:
building in specific time into the model for training, operational
support, collateral duties, and leave (i.e. sick, military leave,
annual leave); an addition of a variable part-time component; as well
as recognizing other security initiatives, such as Bomb Appraisal
Officers, and Screening Passengers by Observation Technique, etc.
* TSA actively evaluates the work that is done by TSOs and the way is
the work is done with an eye toward focusing TSA resources to the
changing security environment. Not only is the model constantly
updated, but the underlying business processes that drive the model are
constantly reviewed for improvement.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant Director;
David Alexander; Richard Ascarate; Philip Caramia; Kathryn Godfrey;
Michael Harmond; Thomas Lombardi; Enemencio Sanchez; Edith Sohna;
Pamela Valentine; Vaughn Williams; and Greg Wilmoth made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T. Washington,
D.C.: February 13, 2007.
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed
to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.:
January 24, 2007.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July
28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding
Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T.
Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April
4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security
at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.:
April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: November
28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-
781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully
Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight Program
Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More
Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. GAO-
05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed to
Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 28,
2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,
D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-
based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. GAO-04-341R.
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24,
2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities
to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. Washington, D.C.: April
10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,
2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.:
October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[2] Beginning in August 2002 and continuing through fiscal year 2003,
Congress prohibited TSA from recruiting or hiring personnel that would
cause it to exceed a staffing level of 45,000 full-time-permanent
positions. See Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820, 880 (2002); Pub. L.
No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 386 (2003). Since fiscal year 2004, Congress
has specifically prohibited TSA from recruiting or hiring personnel
that would cause it to exceed a staffing level of 45,000 full-time
equivalent screeners. See Pub L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1142
(2003); Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1304 (2004); Pub. L. No.
109-90, 119 Stat. 2064, 2070 (2005); and Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat.
1335, 1363 (2006). One full-time equivalent equals 1 work year or 2,080
non-overtime hours.
[3] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004).
[4] An optimization model is a decision-making tool that recommends an
answer (the goal to be optimized) based on analyses of information
(constraints and decision variables). It consists of three components:
(1) the goal to be optimized, (2) constraints, and (3) decision
variables. In the case of TSA's Staffing Allocation Model, the goal to
be optimized is the minimum number of TSOs to perform the necessary
security functions at each airport within the stated wait time goal of
10 minutes. The constraints include passenger and baggage volume, and
arrival distributions. The decision variables include the configuration
of each airport (concourses, lanes, screening equipment, etc), staffing
requirements, etc. TSA officials can alter decision variables to allow
the model's outcome to meet the goal. For example, more screening lanes
can be opened to meet demand and faster screening equipment could be
installed. Decision variables have bounds within which the model must
operate; these include, for example, how many lanes currently exist
that could be opened.
[5] In the context of models, the term assumption means any value in
the model that is based on a belief or decision rather than on actual
data. The term assumption is generally used with models because the
components of a model are assumed to realistically represent events
that the model is trying to explain or predict.
[6] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from
nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a
population because in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being
selected as part of the sample.
[7] TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into
one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I,
II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the nation's
air traffic.
[8] Enplanements are the number of passengers who board a plane.
[9] Alarm rates refer to the number of persons or bags per hour/day
that set off an alarm in the screening device and consequently require
additional screening.
[10] Screening demand refers to the volume of passenger and
nonpassenger traffic expected to require screening at an airport's
checkpoint(s) within a specified time period. Screening demand does not
include domestic passengers who board connecting flights at airports
since they have already been screened at their airport of origin.
Therefore, with regard to passengers, screening demand only refers to
those who are originating at each airport.
[11] According to TSA, the total number of commercial airports
regulated for security in the United States varies depending on various
factors such as the type and level of commercial operations that an
aircraft operator conducts at that particular airport, the time of year
or season where a particular airport is located, and the economic
stability of that airport's region.
[12] TSOs conduct passenger and baggage screening at all but six
commercial airports. These six airports have opted out of federal
screening and, instead, utilize screeners employed by private screening
companies under contract to TSA to perform these services.
[13] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are
provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is
controlled by screening personnel at checkpoints where they conduct
physical screening of individuals and their accessible property for
weapons, explosives, and other prohibited items. Screeners must deny
passage beyond the screening location (into the sterile area) to any
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in
accordance with law, regulation, and passenger screening standard
operating procedures.
[14] The computer-assisted passenger prescreening system is a system
that, based on information obtained from airline reservation systems,
identifies passengers that may pose a higher risk to aviation security.
These higher-risk passengers and their baggage are subject to
additional screening.
[15] Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine
objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of
threat explosives. This equipment operates in an automated mode.
[16] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues
of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials.
[17] Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the
same aircraft as their checked baggage. According to TSA, this
procedure is rarely used.
[18] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110(b)-(c), 115 Stat. at 614-16 (enacted
on November 19, 2001). See also 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).
[19] According to TSA, historical data on the number of passengers on
each flight are known as "load factors" or passenger loads. Using
historic data on passenger load factors, TSA estimated the number of
passengers to be screened at each airport.
[20] According to TSA, the rate at which passengers arrive at security
checkpoints in anticipation of specific flights, is known as "passenger
arrival distribution curves." These distribution curves show, based on
historical data, how many passengers will arrive for the flights at
different intervals of time prior to the flight.
[21] We were limited in the extent to which we could assess TSA's prior
staffing models because the TSA personnel responsible for overseeing
the development of the earlier model are no longer employed by TSA and
limited documentation on the models was available.
[22] According to TSA, private screeners do not count against the
45,000 full-time-equivalent ceiling. TSA currently contracts private
screening companies to perform passenger and checked baggage screening
at six commercial airports as part of its Screening Partnership
Program, which allows commercial airports to opt to use private
screeners in lieu of TSOs. TSA provides private screening companies
with their full-time-equivalent levels based on the levels identified
by the staffing allocation model. See GAO-06-166.
[23] Some of the constraints include the number of checkpoints and
screening lanes at an airport, and the distribution of arriving and
departing flights throughout the day.
[24] TSA has established assumptions in the model that are largely
uniform for all airports while recognizing that slight variances may
exist due to differing conditions among airports.
[25] FSDs may choose to use the Staffing Allocation Model's optional
scheduling tool or an alternative method to prepare work schedules for
their TSOs. In some cases, FSDs and their staff may choose to use the
scheduling tool as is, modify its output, or use a scheduling method
completely independent of the scheduling tool.
[26] According to TSA officials, "centrally hosted" refers to the fact
that the Staffing Allocation Model was not maintained on a database
server accessible by both headquarters and field TSA personnel.
Instead, in fiscal year 2005, TSA personnel at each airport ran the
model on standalone computers. Therefore, TSA headquarters' oversight
of inputs to the model by field personnel was not as effective prior to
the advent of central hosting in fiscal year 2006.
[27] Appropriations received by TSA in fiscal year 2006 were sufficient
to employ up to 43,000 full-time equivalent TSOs.
[28] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA and
assigned TSA with the responsibility of building a federal workforce to
conduct screening of airline passengers and their checked baggage. See
49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a), 44901(a). ATSA also required that TSA allow
commercial airports to apply to TSA to transition from a federal to a
private screener workforce. See § 44920. To support this effort, TSA
created the Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial
airports an opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use qualified
private screening contractors and private screeners. There are
currently 6 airports participating in the Screening Partnership
Program, including Jackson Hole, Kansas City International, Greater
Rochester International, San Francisco International, Sioux Falls
Regional, and Tupelo Regional.
[29] The wait time (e.g., 10, 20, or 30 minutes) set in the model will
influence the number of lanes and baggage equipment required; and,
therefore, the TSO staffing required to process 85 percent of the
annual passengers in less than the wait time that is set.
[30] TSA determines this assumption by selecting the month with the
highest average passenger demand day (calculated by dividing total
monthly passenger loads, reported by airlines, by the number of days in
the month) as the peak month. According to TSA, only about 7 percent of
an airport's days during the year will have greater passenger demand
than this average peak demand day. TSA's industrial engineers have
determined that running the model with a level of demand based on a
representative week during this peak month will provide enough TSA
staff to process 85 percent of passengers through security checkpoints
in 10 minutes or less annually.
[31] Examples of non-passengers going through security checkpoints
include flight crews and other airline employees, vendors at the
airport, and other airport personnel.
[32] Based on their review of selected model assumptions, TSA has
changed the number of TSOs, per lane, for fiscal year 2007 from 5.5 to
4.25 (at category X, I, and II airports).
[33] We currently have an ongoing review of the Department of Homeland
Security's and TSA's efforts to research, develop, and deploy airport
screening operations. As part of this review, we are determining the
extent to which DHS and TSA have deployed technologies to mitigate
terrorist threats effectively at airport passenger checkpoints while
ensuring the efficient movement of passengers. We expect to report our
results in August 2007.
[34] TSA is to collect wait time data every 30 minutes during peak
hours (e.g., weekdays between 5:00 am-8:00 am and 3:00 pm-7:00 pm and
Sundays between 4:00-9:00 pm) and every hour during non-peak periods of
time. During each data collection period, a TSO is to stamp wait time
cards with the current time, provide the cards to the last three
passengers in line during off-peak periods and the last four passengers
during peak periods. The passengers are to give the cards to a TSO once
they reach the front of the line and are directed to a lane for
screening. The TSO is to record the time on the card. At the end of
each day, a supervisory TSO is to collect the wait time cards from his
or her checkpoint and enter the wait time data into the Performance
Management Information System.
[35] FSDs report to one of three Area Directors, based on their
geographic regions, on administrative matters. The Area Directors
oversee transportation security at airports and in other modes of
transportation for the East Coast, Central, and Western regions,
respectively.
[36] TSA employs industrial engineers and assigns them to airports
throughout the country based on the geographic region. Each of the
industrial engineers is assigned to TSA headquarters and reports to one
of TSA's three Area Directors. These engineers are responsible for
assisting and monitoring airports in their use of the Staffing
Allocation Model.
[37] According to TSA officials, an optimization team is not sent to an
airport in response to every FSD request for a revision to an
assumption for their airport. For example, if TSA determines that it is
readily apparent from the request that a change is not needed, TSA
would not send an optimization team to visit the airport.
[38] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November
1999); Internal Control: Internal Control Management and Evaluation
Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[39] TSA assigns industrial engineers to assist these airports with
their use of the staffing model based on the region of the country
where they are located. However, TSA does not have sufficient levels of
industrial engineers to locate one at each of these airports. As a
result, a single industrial engineer may be responsible for assisting
multiple airports.
[40] According to TSA, as part of the process of reviewing the staffing
allocation model assumptions, TSA headquarters officials responsible
for the model held conferences with FSD staff responsible for preparing
TSO work schedules to help ensure that they understood the model and
the changes implemented in fiscal year 2007.
[41] This time includes annual, sick, and military leave in addition to
compensatory time and injury time off.
[42] Since its inception in November 2001, TSA has had multiple
Assistant Secretaries (originally titled Under Secretaries of
Transportation for Security). In addition, between January 2005 and
August 2006, TSA issued seven press releases regarding senior-level
personnel changes within the agency.
[43] The 14TH airport we visited, San Francisco, had private screeners
instead of TSOs.
[44] This ratio of part-time to full-time is based on annualized full-
time-equivalent data. According to TSA, an annualized number represents
an estimate of the usage of FTEs over the fiscal year assuming that the
usage in a given pay period remains constant over all future pay
periods.
[45] TSA officials stated that they conducted sensitivity analysis
around various mixes of full-time to part-time TSOs at category X
airports and identified that no additional efficiency was gained at
these airports with a full-time-equivalent level of part-time TSOs
greater than about 20 percent.
[46] The "Screening Passengers by Observation Technique" involves
specially trained TSOs observing the behavior of passengers and
resolving any suspicious behavior through casual conversation with
passengers and referring suspicious passengers to selectee screening.
[47] We excluded one airport we visited, San Francisco, from this
discussion since it employed private contractors as screeners. TSA data
on use of TSOs in operational support functions do not include airports
with private screeners.
[48] According to a TSA management directive dated December 4, 2006,
TSOs must perform screening duties at least 8 hours per week.
[49] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Review of TSA Non-Screener Administrative Positions, OIG-06-65,
September 2006.
[50] TSA's performance accountability and standards system, which was
implemented in April 2006, will be used by TSA to assess agency
personnel at all levels on various competencies, including training and
development, readiness for duty, management skills, and technical
proficiency. There are three elements of the TSO technical proficiency
component of the performance and accountability standards system: (1)
quarterly observations of TSOs' ability to perform particular screening
functions in the operating environment to ensure they are complying
with checkpoint screening standard operating procedures; (2) quarterly
quizzes given to TSOs to assess their knowledge of the procedures; and
(3) an annual, multi-part knowledge and skills assessment (known as
recertification testing).
[51] TSA officials acknowledged that the scheduling tool cannot be
adjusted to reflect more than a 5-day work week. However, other
variations within the 5 days are possible.
[52] We did not assess the adequacy of training of FSDs because it was
outside the scope of our work.
[53] Due to TSA's expectation that FSDs maintain on-board TSO staffing
of at least 90 percent of their TSO allocation, in addition to
significant numbers of airports falling marginally above and below 100
percent, we used a 20 percent range (90 to less than 110 percent) to
determine how many airports were above and below their allocation in
terms of on-board TSOs. That is, airports with less than 90 percent of
their allocation were "below" their allocation and airports with 110
percent or more of their allocation were "above" their allocation.
[54] TSA implemented its "hub and spoke" organizational structure in
fiscal year 2006 to allow for sharing of management, TSO and
operational support staff, and other resources among individual
category X and I airports and other smaller airports in their
geographic vicinity.
[55] According to TSA, the survey respondents were from all of TSA's
employees, not just TSOs. However, TSA did isolate certain responses by
TSOs.
[56] TSA defines absenteeism in terms of unscheduled absences and
tardiness among the TSO workforce. Unscheduled absences include calling
in sick the day of work, arriving two or more hours late, being AWOL,
or otherwise failing to show. Absenteeism does not include those TSOs
previously approved to be on any kind of leave or TDY such as, annual
leave, pre-arranged sick leave, military leave, jury duty, training,
etc. TSOs are "tardy" when they are 1 or more minutes late for their
designated shift. TSOs who are more than 2 hours late are counted as
unscheduled absences.
[57] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004).
[58] TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into
one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest.
[59] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,
115 Stat. 597 (2001), established TSA and assigned TSA with the
responsibility of building a federal workforce to conduct screening of
airline passengers and their checked baggage. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a),
44901(a). The act also required that TSA allow commercial airports to
apply to TSA to transition from a federal to a private screener
workforce. See § 44920. To support this effort, TSA created the
Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial airports an
opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to use qualified private
screening contractors and private screeners. There are currently six
airports participating in the Screening Partnership Program, including
Jackson Hole, Kansas City International, Greater Rochester
International, San Francisco International, Sioux Falls Regional, and
Tupelo Regional.
[60] Enplanements are the number of airplane passengers boarding
planes.
[61] We excluded category IV airports from our study because they make
up less than 3 percent of TSOs allocated nationwide under the SAM and
passenger boardings at these airports are much more limited and
sporadic.
[62] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[63] The percentage of seats filled on a plane. For example, a plane
with a load factor of 0.831 has 83.1 percent of its seats filled.
[64] An airport's configuration entails the layout, design, and number
of its checked baggage screening areas and passenger screening
checkpoints and lanes.
[65] FSDs we interviewed had mixed views on the extent to which they
were provided an opportunity to provide input to the initial
development of the staffing allocation model. Nine of the 14 FSDs we
interviewed stated that they provided little, if any, input to the
Staffing Allocation Model's fundamental assumptions and did not know
how their allocations were derived. However, 10 FSDs said TSA
headquarters did give them an opportunity to provide input specifically
on their airports' configuration. TSA officials responsible for the
Staffing Allocation Model acknowledged that all FSDs were not directly
involved in creating the model. Officials stated that industrial
engineers were responsible for visiting the airports to which they are
assigned and meeting with FSDs, or their designated staff member, to
obtain basic information about screening operations and any unique
aspects of their airports.
[66] During this period, TSA officials at individual airports provided
data input to the model regarding their airports' profiles--including
number of checkpoints, number of lanes, and number of checked baggage
processing nodes.
[67] The GRA consulting firm engages in an ongoing data collection
effort. It gathers future flight schedules, historical passenger loads,
and connecting percentages--all of which can be adjusted with
appropriate approval. Passenger loads and baggage counts are purely
historical data that can't be routinely adjusted.
[68] TSA officials stated that, for the annual allocation run, they
must run the model based on a full week (as if trying to schedule for
that week) since it is not practical to run the model based on only 1
day.
[69] A bag screening methodology that employs the automated movement of
a bag in and out of an explosive detection system machine.
[70] A bag screening methodology that employs a manual (as opposed to
an automated) movement of bag in and out of an explosive detection
system machine.
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