Aviation Security
Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains Gao ID: GAO-07-448T February 13, 2007The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to secure the commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA funding related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air cargo screening. GAO's comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers (TSO).
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas were in response to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic planning framework and identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems. While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security, GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example, as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight--TSA's prospective domestic passenger prescreening program--it will need to employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change will affect the program's development. In addition, while TSA has tested some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems, the agency has identified that under current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo, including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007.
GAO-07-448T, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, February 13, 2007:
Aviation Security:
Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
but More Work Remains:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-448T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-448T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in
November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to
secure the commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA
funding related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion
since fiscal year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
components, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in
securing commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts
TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the
challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger
prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air
cargo screening. My comments are based on issued GAO reports and
testimonies and our preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA‘s
passenger checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, and
staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers (TSO).
What GAO Found:
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation‘s aviation system, and should be commended for
these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional
mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a
tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to,
among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more
efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce;
strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more
effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic
air cargo security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas
were in response to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with
GAO‘s recommendation to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has
developed a strategic planning framework and identified several funding
and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage
screening systems.
While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation
security, GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based
decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For
example, as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight”TSA‘s prospective
domestic passenger prescreening program”it will need to employ a range
of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing,
to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA
has put in place a new management team, but it is too early to know how
this change will affect the program‘s development. In addition, while
TSA has tested some proposed modifications to passenger screening
procedures at airports to help determine whether to implement the
changes, GAO identified that TSA‘s data collection and analyses could
be improved. GAO also found that limited progress has been made in
developing and deploying technologies due to planning and funding
challenges. For example, limited progress has been made in fielding
explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, and
while TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment
of checked baggage screening systems and to identify funding and
financing strategies for installing these systems, the agency has
identified that under current investment levels, installation of
optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until
approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air
cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to
effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as
ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the
delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is
needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo,
including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing
assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA
stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of
U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and
plans to complete this assessment in 2007.
What GAO Recommends:
In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen aviation security, including recommendations related to
passenger prescreening, passenger and checked baggage screening, and
air cargo security. TSA has generally agreed with our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-448T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202)
512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the security of our nation's aviation system. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established in 2001
with the mission to protect the transportation network while also
ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception,
TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to
secure commercial aviation. To implement these efforts, TSA funding for
aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004.
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also plays a role in
securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has responsibility for
conducting passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger
information against terrorist watch lists--for international flights
operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound
air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.[Footnote 1] In
addition, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) is responsible for the research and
development of aviation security technologies. In carrying out its
broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting
challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources within
the aviation system and across all sectors to address threats and
strengthen security.
My testimony today focuses on three key areas of the aviation security
system: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked
baggage screening, and air cargo security. In particular, I will
address the numerous efforts TSA has taken or has planned to strengthen
aviation security in these three key areas, and the challenges that
remain.
My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing
the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system; and our
preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger
checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, air carriers'
domestic passenger prescreening systems, and staffing standards for
Transportation Security Officers (TSO). We plan to report on the
results of this work later this year. We conducted our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
list of our related reports on aviation security is included at the end
of this testimony.
Summary:
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's aviation system. Meeting the congressional
mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked
baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA hired and
deployed a federal workforce of over 40,000 passenger and checked
baggage screeners, and installed equipment at most of the nation's more
than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by
Congress. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other things,
strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating,
deploying, and managing the TSO--formerly known as screener--workforce;
strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more
effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic
air cargo security. More specifically, based on our past work and
preliminary observations from our ongoing work, DHS and TSA have:
* Taken numerous steps to strengthen the management and performance of
the TSO workforce by, for example, developing and implementing a
Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports
that reflect current operating conditions; implementing a variety of
human capital initiatives to help recruit, hire, and retain TSOs (both
full-time and part-time); and providing TSOs with additional training
intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly
improvised explosive devices.
* Proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint
screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability)
information, and pursued several mitigating actions to reduce the need
to use alternative screening procedures for screening checked baggage
that have involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.
* Explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance
the detection of explosives and other threats; and developed a
strategic planning framework and identified several funding and
financing strategies, in collaboration with key stakeholders, for
installing optimal checked baggage screening systems.
* Implemented measures to strengthen air cargo security, such as
conducting threat assessments that identified general and specific
threats related to domestic air cargo; enhancing requirements for air
carriers to randomly inspect air cargo; conducting compliance
inspections of air carriers to ensure that they are complying with
existing air cargo security requirements; and working with DHS's
Science and Technology Directorate to enhance air cargo screening
technologies.
While these efforts should be commended, we also found that DHS and TSA
could strengthen their risk-based decision making efforts, including
planning and program evaluations, and collaboration with stakeholders.
For example, for over 4 years, TSA has been unable to develop Secure
Flight--a government-operated domestic passenger prescreening system--
to the point of implementation on the schedule it had established for
the program due, in part, to not employing a range of management
disciplines to effectively manage program cost, schedule, performance,
and privacy risks. While TSA officials stated that they will be able to
manage these risks--based on putting in place a new management team;
rebaselining the program's goals, capabilities, costs, and schedule;
and establishing more structured and controlled processes to guide
future development--it is too early to know how these changes will
affect the program's development. Further, TSA and CBP, although now
coordinating efforts, have not yet aligned their respective domestic
and international passenger prescreening programs to minimize
duplication and provide a single, integrated interface to the aviation
industry, and key decisions about how the international and domestic
prescreening programs will be integrated have not yet been finalized.
In addition, our ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying
passenger checkpoint screening procedures identified that TSA's efforts
to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed changes to passenger
screening procedures could be improved. For example, while in some
cases TSA has tested proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint
screening procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the
changes would achieve their intended purposes, our preliminary
observations indicate that TSA's data collection and analyses could be
strengthened. In addition, with respect to air cargo, while TSA
conducted a variety of compliance inspections to determine whether air
carriers or indirect air carriers[Footnote 2] were complying with TSA
security requirements, and had begun to analyze the results of these
inspections, it had not developed measures to assess the adequacy of
air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, or
systematically assessed the results of its compliance inspections to
target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers for future
reviews.
We also found that limited progress has been made in developing and
deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For
example, our preliminary work has identified that limited progress has
been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger
screening checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in
coordinating research and development efforts, and TSA does not yet
have a strategic plan in place to assist in guiding its efforts to
acquire and deploy screening technologies. The lack of such a plan
could limit TSA's ability to deploy emerging technologies at those
airport locations deemed at higher risk. In addition, while TSA has
begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked
baggage screening systems--as we recommended in March 2005--and to
identify funding and financing strategies for installing optimal
checked baggage screening systems, TSA has identified that under
current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024.
Moreover, although TSA is working to enhance air cargo screening
technologies, the federal government and the air cargo industry face
several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement
technologies to inspect air cargo. These challenges include ensuring
that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery
time frames of air carriers, and that individuals who inspect cargo are
properly trained to operate the inspection technology. Another
challenge is the funding of inspection technologies, which can range in
the millions of dollars. We also reported that additional work is
needed to fully implement a risk-based management approach to securing
air cargo. We recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule
for finalizing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical
assets that need to be protected. TSA stated that the agency intends to
perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and
activities, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007.
Background:
With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
in November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation
security from the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and
checked baggage screening from air carriers.[Footnote 3] As part of
this responsibility, TSA oversees security operations at the nation's
more than 400 commercial airports, including establishing requirements
for passenger and checked baggage screening, and ensuring the security
of air cargo transported to, from, and within the United
States.[Footnote 4] While TSA has operational responsibility for
conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA has regulatory,
or oversight, responsibility for air carriers who conduct air cargo
screening. While TSA took over responsibility for passenger checkpoint
and baggage screening, as directed by ATSA, air carriers have continued
to conduct passenger prescreening, which includes the process of
checking passenger information against federal watch list data before
flights depart. In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, TSA is developing a program to take
over this responsibility from air carriers for passengers on domestic
flights, and CBP has issued a proposed rule that would enable it to
perform its identity-matching function for passengers on international
flights traveling to or from the United States prior to flight
departure.[Footnote 5]
Airline Passenger Prescreening:
The prescreening of airline passengers--the process of identifying
passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft-
-is one of many important layers of security that is intended to help
officials focus security efforts on those passengers representing the
greatest potential threat to civil aviation. Within DHS, TSA is
responsible for ensuring that passenger prescreening is conducted
before domestic flights--flights operating entirely within the United
States--take off, while CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger
prescreening for international flights operating to or from the United
States.[Footnote 6]
TSA is developing a program, in accordance with ATSA and the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, through which
TSA would assume the watch list matching function currently conducted
by air carriers prior to domestic flight departures.[Footnote 7] TSA
has named this prospective prescreening program Secure Flight.[Footnote
8] In accordance with security directives issued by TSA, air carriers-
-and not the U.S. government--currently match passenger-supplied
reservation information (referred to as passenger name record (PNR)
data), against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers
before domestic flights depart. According to TSA, the No Fly List
includes the names of individuals considered to be known or suspected
threats to civil aviation and are therefore precluded from boarding an
aircraft traveling to, from, or within the United States, while the
Selectee List includes the names of individuals who require additional
security screening--which includes physical inspection of the person
and a hand search of their luggage--prior to being permitted to board
an aircraft. These lists are extracted from the Terrorist Screening
Center's (TSC) consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB) and are
exported to the air carriers through TSA. The current domestic
prescreening process also requires that air carriers operate the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), which
identifies passengers for additional screening based on certain
behavioral characteristics.[Footnote 9]
The existing identity-matching component of DHS's international
aviation passenger prescreening process involves separate matching
activities conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight's departure and
pursuant to TSA requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight's
departure).[Footnote 10] As with domestic passenger prescreening, air
carriers conduct an initial match of self-reported PNR data against the
No Fly and Selectee Lists before international flight departures. CBP's
process, in effect, supplements the air carrier identity matching for
international flights by comparing additional passenger information
collected from passports (this information becomes part of Advanced
Passenger Information System (APIS) data), against the No Fly and
Selectee Lists and other government databases.[Footnote 11] Under
current federal regulations for CBP's prescreening of passengers on
international flights, air carriers are required to provide the U.S.
government with PNR data as well as APIS data to allow the government
to conduct, among other things, identity matching procedures against
the No Fly and Selectee Lists--which typically occur just after or at
times just before the departure of international flights traveling to
or from the United States, respectively.[Footnote 12] To address a
concern that the federal government's identity matching may not be
conducted in a timely manner, in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue
a proposed rule requiring that the U.S. government's identity-matching
process occur before the departure of international flights. CBP
published this proposed rule in July 2006,[Footnote 13] and, if
implemented, it will allow the U.S. government to conduct passenger
prescreening in advance of flight departure, and will eliminate the
need for air carriers to continue performing an identity-matching
function for international flights.
Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening:
One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from
the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening
operations to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs).
Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked baggage screening had been
performed by private screening companies under contract to airlines.
ATSA required TSA to create a federal workforce to assume the job of
conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at commercial
airports. The federal screener workforce was put into place, as
required, by November 2002.[Footnote 14]
Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.[Footnote 15] Passenger
screening personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at
designated screening locations.[Footnote 16] As shown in figure 1, the
four passenger screening functions are:
* X-ray screening of property,
* walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,
* hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and:
* physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their
carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector.
Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm
the walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees--
that is, passengers selected by the CAPPS or other TSA-approved
processes to designate passengers for additional screening--are
screened by hand-wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items
screened for explosives traces or physically searched[Footnote 17].
Figure 1: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation.
Note: Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing
swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine
to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then
chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive
materials.
[A] BDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in
individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should the BDO observe such
behavior, he or she may refer the individual for additional screening
or to a law enforcement officer.
[B] The hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified
or randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met
certain criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector.
[C] Manual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the
passenger is identified or randomly selected for additional screening
or if the TSO identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray.
[End of figure]
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or
weapon onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 2, checked baggage
screening is accomplished through the use of explosive detection
systems[Footnote 18] or explosive trace detection systems,[Footnote 19]
and through the use of alternative means, such as manual searches,
canine teams, and positive passenger bag match,[Footnote 20] when the
explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems are
unavailable.
Figure 2: Checked Baggage Screening Operation:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation.
[End of figure]
The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of
three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the
screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked
baggage, the technology used during the screening process, and the
procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these
elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of
passenger and checked baggage screening.
Air Cargo Security:
TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other
things, establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic
and foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and
foreign all-cargo carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect
air carriers. TSA is also responsible for overseeing the implementation
of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and indirect air
carriers through compliance inspections, while air carriers are
required to inspect air cargo for weapons, explosives, or stowaways.
Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing
TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved
security program that describes the security policies, procedures, and
systems air carriers are required to implement.[Footnote 21] These
requirements include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and
inspection of cargo; training of employees in security and cargo
inspection procedures; testing employee proficiency in cargo
inspection; and access to cargo areas and aircraft. If threat
information or events indicate that additional security measures are
needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue revised or new
security requirements in the form of security directives or emergency
amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers. The air
carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security
directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements
already imposed and enforced by TSA.
Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type
from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry
goods, fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish,
and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including
large containers known as unit loading devices that allow many packages
to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded on an
aircraft, wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/
boxed pieces, known as break bulk cargo.
Participants in the international air cargo shipping process include
shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders or
regulated agents, who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
carriers; air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto
aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and passenger and all-cargo
carriers that store, load, and transport air cargo.[Footnote 22]
International air cargo may have been transported via ship, train, or
truck prior to its loading onboard an aircraft. Figure 3 identifies
cargo being loaded onto an aircraft for transport.
Figure 3: Air Cargo Being Loaded Onto an Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and TSA.
[End of figure]
Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2007 Aviation Security Funding and Fiscal
Year 2008 Budget Request for Aviation Security:
According to DHS's budget execution reports,[Footnote 23] TSA's
appropriations for aviation security have totaled about $20 billion
since fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 24] In fiscal year 2004--the first
year for which data was available--TSA received about $3.9 billion for
aviation security programs. In fiscal year 2007, TSA received about
$5.7 billion. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2008
includes about $5.7 billion to continue TSA's aviation security
efforts. This total includes about $5.0 billion specifically designated
for aviation security and about $0.79 billion for aviation-security
related programs. Figure 4 identifies reported aviation security
funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2007.
Figure 4: DHS's Reported Aviation Security Funding For TSA For Fiscal
Years 2004 through 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSA budget execution reports for fiscal years
2004 to 2007.
Note: Figures for fiscal years 2004 to 2007 are those reported by DHS
in monthly budget execution reports for TSA. We used the September 30th
budget execution reports for our analysis of TSA funding for fiscal
years 2004 through 2006. For fiscal year 2007, we used the October 31
report. According to the reports, figures presented include all
rescissions and supplemental funding for the fiscal years.
[A] Fiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in
research and development funding for aviation security. For fiscal
years 2006 and 2007, research and development funding was consolidated
within the DHS S&T; therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA's
budget documentation, is not included as part of TSA's appropriations
for these two fiscal years.
[B] Fiscal years 2006 and 2007 include approximately $680 million and
$710 million, respectively, in funding for Federal Air Marshals, which
was transferred back to TSA from U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement in October 2005. Federal Air Marshals funding is included
within totals for related aviation security PPAs for fiscal years 2006
and 2007.
[C] Funding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and
activities, as reported by TSA, which were not included in budget
documentation subtotals for aviation security funding.
[End of figure]
Of the approximately $5.7 billion requested for aviation security in
the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, almost $4.4 billion,
or about 77 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage screening.
This includes approximately $4 billion to support passenger and checked
baggage screening operations, such as TSO salaries and training, and
$176 million for the procurement and $259 million for the installation
of checked baggage explosive detection systems. Additional information
on the President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to
airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage
screening, and air cargo security is provided later in this statement.
TSA and CBP Are Working to Strengthen Domestic and International
Passenger Prescreening, but Management and Technical Challenges Remain:
TSA and CBP have separate efforts under way to strengthen domestic and
international passenger prescreening, respectively. However, these
programs are in development and face management and technical
challenges. Further, while TSA and CBP have been developing their
respective identity-matching programs separately, the two agencies are
now taking steps to align their prescreening programs to minimize
duplication and provide a single set of requirements for air carrier
participation. However, key policy and technical decisions have not yet
been made to clarify how these two programs will be aligned.
TSA Has Reported Addressing Challenges That Have Hindered Secure
Flight's Implementation, but It Is Not Yet Known Whether These Efforts
Will Address Past Problems:
For over 4 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in developing
and implementing its advanced passenger prescreening program, now known
as Secure Flight, and has not yet taken the identity-matching function
over from air carriers as mandated by Congress. According to TSA, the
Secure Flight program--which is to perform the functions associated
with determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on the No
Fly and Selectee Lists--is intended to (1) decrease the chance of
compromising watch list data by centralizing its use within the federal
government; (2) provide earlier identification of potential threats,
allowing for the expedited notification of law enforcement and other
organizations responsible for threat management; (3) provide a fair,
equitable, and consistent matching process across all air carriers; and
(4) offer consistent application of an expedited and integrated redress
process for passengers misidentified as a threat. However, during the
past 3 years, we reported on multiple occasions that the Secure Flight
program (and its predecessor, CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or
finalized its goals, objectives, and requirements. Further, in February
2006, we reported that, taken as a whole, the development of Secure
Flight had not been effectively managed and the program was at risk of
failure. We found that TSA had not conducted critical activities in
accordance with best practices for large-scale information technology
programs, and had not followed its own systems development life cycle
guidance in managing the program's development. Former program
officials stated that TSA had instead used a rapid development method
that was intended to enable it to develop the program more quickly.
However, as a result of this approach, the development process had been
ad hoc, with project activities conducted out of sequence. For example,
program officials declared the design phase complete before
requirements needed to guide the design of Secure Flight had been
detailed. In addition, TSA had not maintained up-to-date program
schedules or developed cost estimates for the program. In March 2005,
we recommended that TSA take numerous steps to strengthen the program's
development, such as finalizing system requirements and developing
detailed test plans to help ensure that all Secure Flight system
functionality is properly tested and evaluated. We also recommended
that TSA develop a plan for establishing connectivity among the air
carriers and other stakeholders to help ensure the secure, effective,
and timely transmission of data for use in Secure Flight
operations.[Footnote 25]
In early 2006, acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program,
TSA suspended the development of Secure Flight and initiated a
reassessment, or rebaselining, of the program, to be completed before
moving forward. In January 2007, TSA announced that it had completed
its rebaselining efforts, which included reassessing program goals and
capabilities, and developing a new schedule and cost estimates--actions
that we recommended in March 2005.[Footnote 26] The Assistant Secretary
of Homeland Security for TSA stated that TSA had made significant
progress in upgrading the design and development of the Secure Flight
program, and that program documentation had been revised to reflect
TSA's plans for reliably delivering Secure Flight capabilities. In
December 2006, the DHS Investment Review Board--a group of DHS senior
executives charged with reviewing certain programs at key phases of
development to help ensure they meet mission needs at expected levels
of costs and risks--completed its review of Secure Flight and approved
the program to proceed into capability development and demonstration
phases. According to the Investment Review Board, this approval was
based on rescoping Secure Flight using a new business model better
focused on mission; putting a new team in place with appropriate
technical and management skills; and improving its management approach
to privacy, security, and quality assurance. However, the board also
noted that this important screening capability was needed sooner than
its planned mid-2009 implementation time frame, and requested that TSA
determine the feasibility of accelerating the program schedule to
deliver initial capability by mid-2008. As we have reported, earlier
attempts to accelerate the Secure Flight program have led to
developmental problems and program delays. Accordingly, as TSA moves
forward, it will need to employ a range of program management
disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program
cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. As part of our ongoing
work assessing the Secure Flight program, we will be reviewing DHS's
and TSA's efforts to develop and implement the program, including
progress made during its rebaselining efforts.[Footnote 27]
Regarding TSA's communications with air carriers about Secure Flight
system requirements, we reported in March 2005 that air carriers had
expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of Secure Flight system
and data requirements, and the impact that these requirements may have
on the airline industry and traveling public. Further, based on
preliminary results for our ongoing work, officials from 9 of the 15
air carriers we interviewed from February 2006 to January
2007,[Footnote 28] reported that they were enhancing their respective
identity-matching systems or planned to do so. While these efforts may
improve the accuracy of each air carrier's individual identity-matching
system, the improvements will only apply to their respective systems
and could further exacerbate differences that currently exist among the
air carriers' various identity-matching systems. These differences may
result in varying levels of effectiveness in the matching of passenger
information against the No Fly and Selectee Lists, which was a key
factor that led to the government's effort to take over the identity-
matching function through Secure Flight. Also, officials from 7 of 15
air carriers stated that TSA had not communicated with them about
Secure Flight requirements within the past 6 months while the program
was being rebaselined. TSA officials stated that in October 2006 they
had resumed discussions with air carriers regarding Secure Flight
requirements, and as of January 2007, had discussed plans for Secure
Flight with officials from 8 air carriers and the Air Transport
Association. TSA officials stated that they also plan to take into
account current air carrier capabilities and programs as they proceed
with Secure Flight development, and to update guidance previously
provided to air carriers to reflect the current concept of operations
for the rebaselined Secure Flight program.
In February 2006, we also reported that TSA was in the early stages of
coordinating with TSC and CBP on broader issues of integration and
interoperability related to other people-screening programs used by the
government to combat terrorism. However, TSA needed to provide these
stakeholders with detailed information about its concept of operations
for Secure Flight to enable them to plan for and provide the support
necessary for the program. For example, a TSC official stated that
without specific information on Secure Flight requirements, TSC could
not make decisions about needed resources, such as personnel needed to
operate its call center that would be used to help resolve potential
matches against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. In January 2007, TSC
officials stated that while they had been participating in meetings
with Secure Flight officials, they had not yet received the specific
operational and technical information needed to plan for supporting
Secure Flight operations. During Secure Flight rebaselining efforts,
TSA officials also stated that they were coordinating with CBP to more
closely align their respective identity-matching programs. However,
this collaboration is ongoing and key policy and technical decisions
regarding how the programs will be coordinated have not been announced.
We discuss TSA and CBP's coordination of their domestic and
international prescreening programs later in this statement.
We have also previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements
development process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of
the envisioned system or the full actions it planned to take to
mitigate them. Specifically, because TSA had not made final
determinations about its requirements for passenger data, and Secure
Flight's system development documentation did not fully address how
passenger privacy protections were to be met, it was not possible to
assess potential system impacts on individual privacy protections at
that time. We have also previously reported that TSA violated
provisions of the Privacy Act[Footnote 29] by not fully disclosing its
use of personal information during systems testing.[Footnote 30] In
March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will
protect personal privacy.[Footnote 31] TSA officials stated that they
are aware of, and plan to address, the potential for Secure Flight to
adversely affect passenger privacy protections, and the need to provide
a redress process whereby aviation passengers adversely affected by the
identity matching process may express their concerns, seek correction
of any inaccurate data, and request other actions to reduce or
eliminate future inconveniences. Concurrent with its rebaselining
efforts, TSA reported that it has developed a Secure Flight privacy
program that is rooted in the Fair Information Practices--a set of
internationally recognized privacy principles that underlie the Privacy
Act. TSA officials further stated that the rebaselined Secure Flight
program will result in a more transparent and privacy-enhanced program
by addressing concerns identified by us and others in the following
areas: program oversight, program scope, data collection activities,
redress requirements, relationships with other TSA credentialing
programs, and technical requirements. TSA officials also stated that
they have embedded privacy contractor experts in the program teams to
address privacy issues as they arise. In addition, in January 2007,
officials from Secure Flight and TSA's Office of Transportation
Security Redress stated that Secure Flight will use the TSA redress
process that is currently available for individuals affected by the air
carrier identity-matching processes, but the details of how this
process will be integrated with other Secure Flight requirements have
not yet been completed. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to
manage system privacy protections and establish a redress process for
resolving misidentified passengers as part of our ongoing review of the
program.
We believe that TSA's efforts to reassess Secure Flight's development
and progress was an appropriate step given the problems that faced the
program in early 2006. However, since TSA only recently announced that
it has completed its rebaselining efforts, and just recently provided
more details of its rebaselined program, it is too early to determine
the extent to which TSA has addressed the long-standing issues that
have affected the program. According to DHS's budget execution reports,
TSA received about $126 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006--
including funds spent on the CAPPS II predecessor program--and $15
million for fiscal year 2007 for Secure Flight. For fiscal year 2008,
the President's budget request includes $53 million for TSA to continue
this program. According to the TSA's budget justification, the increase
of $38 million is requested to provide for the development and the
authority to operate the Secure Flight system. Additionally, the
funding request would provide for procuring hardware, starting
operations and training, and developing a network interface between
Secure Flight and CBP. We will continue to monitor Secure Flight's
development as part of our ongoing review of the program.
DHS Intends to Align Domestic and International Prescreening Programs,
but Key Policy and Technical Decisions Have Not Yet Been Made:
As originally envisioned, once Secure Flight became operational, TSA
would be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, while CBP
would be operating an international passenger prescreening system.
However, air carriers raised concerns regarding having to support
different data requirements for two separate government prescreening
programs. Further, we reported that both programs could result in
potentially different results for passengers flying on domestic and
international flights, results that could cause additional costs to air
carriers, and confusion and inconvenience to passengers. For example,
if the programs are not aligned, air carriers might have to implement
different information connections, communications, and programming for
each prescreening program, resulting in added costs and inefficiencies.
Also, if the two separate programs use different passenger data
elements or identity-matching technologies, air carriers may receive
conflicting notifications to handle a passenger differently for an
international than for a domestic flight. Passengers may also be
inconvenienced since a passenger may be delayed on one leg of a
multileg trip, which includes both a domestic and an international
flight segment, and possibly miss a flight.
The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their
efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as
a single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two
separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. In a joint
letter to the Secretary of DHS dated October 27, 2005, the Air
Transport Association of America and the Association of European
Airlines urged DHS to coordinate international and domestic airline
passenger prescreening programs so that air carriers are not unduly
burdened by the costs and inefficiencies posed by working with two
different prescreening programs. The letter also stated that the Air
Transport Association of America and the Association of European
Airlines believed that there had been a lack of coordination between
CBP and TSA in aligning their respective passenger prescreening
programs. Air carrier industry groups reiterated this concern in
comments they provided in response to CBP's proposed rule for
conducting passenger prescreening on international flights. We have
also previously reported that since both agencies are developing and
implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and TSA could
mutually benefit from the sharing of technical testing results and the
coordination of other developmental efforts.[Footnote 32] Coordination
and planning in the development of these two programs would also
enhance program integration and interoperability, potentially limit
redundancies, and increase program effectiveness. We have recently
recommended that DHS take additional steps and make key policy and
technical decisions that are necessary to more fully coordinate these
programs.[Footnote 33]
Recognizing these concerns, DHS has directed TSA and CBP to coordinate
their prescreening activities so that they provide "One DHS Solution"
to the commercial aviation industry consistent with applicable
authorities and statutes. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are
taking steps to coordinate their prescreening efforts, including
meeting routinely with DHS's Office of Screening Coordination and with
aviation and travel industry stakeholders to develop joint data
requirements, processes, and methods for disseminating information to
other government and law enforcement organizations in the event of a
positive identity match against the No Fly and Selectee Lists. DHS
officials told us that they envision a joint approach that will allow
for standardization between the two programs to the extent possible,
reduce unnecessary programming by aircraft operators, and provide
consistent treatment for passengers across all aircraft operators.
However, despite this coordination, key policy and technical decisions
have not yet been made regarding how these programs will be aligned,
including determining how differences in the data used to conduct
identity matching and the identity matching techniques used will be
resolved. Further, it is unclear how the different implementation
schedules for the two programs--CBP has already issued a proposed rule
to implement a new passenger prescreening program for passengers on
international flights, while TSA's schedule shows that Secure Flight
will not begin operations until 2009--will affect coordination efforts.
Given DHS's commitment to align the two prescreening programs, and the
security and efficiency benefits of doing so, it will be important for
CBP and TSA to take the steps necessary to successfully coordinate
these programs. Until international and domestic prescreening efforts
are more fully aligned, the extent to which potential problems of
duplication and conflicting results in international and domestic
passenger prescreening will be addressed remains unclear.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening
Checkpoints and Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to
Face Challenges:
TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the
passenger and checked baggage screening systems--people (TSOs),
screening procedures, and technology--but continues to face management,
planning, and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing
Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that
reflect current operating conditions, and provided TSOs with additional
training intended to enhance the detection of threat objects,
particularly improvised explosives. TSA also proposed modifications to
passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and
vulnerability information), among other factors, but could do more
evaluation of proposed procedures before they are implemented to ensure
they achieve their intended results. Additionally, TSA is exploring new
technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other threats,
but continues to face management and funding challenges. For example,
in May 2006, TSA reported that under current investment levels, the
installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be
completed until approximately 2024. TSA, in collaboration with key
stakeholders, has identified several funding and financing strategies
for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, such as
continued appropriations for the procurement and installation of EDS
machines.
TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Management and Performance
of Its TSO Workforce:
TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the
management and performance of its TSO workforce, which TSA has
identified as its most important asset in accomplishing its mission. We
reported in February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA's hiring
process had hindered the ability of some Federal Security Directors
(FSD)--the ranking authority responsible for leading and coordinating
security activities at airports--to provide sufficient resources to
staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their
checkpoints without using additional measures such as
overtime.[Footnote 34] Since that time, TSA has developed a Staffing
Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. In
determining staffing allocations, the model takes into account the
workload demands unique to each airport based on an estimate of each
airport's peak passenger volume. This input is then processed against
certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers and checked baggage-
-including expected processing rates, required staffing for passenger
lanes and baggage equipment based on standard operating procedures, and
historical equipment alarm rates. In August 2005, TSA determined that
the staffing model contained complete and accurate information on each
airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the agency used the
model to identify TSO allocations for each airport. At that time, the
staffing model identified a total TSO full-time equivalent allocation
need of 42,303--a level within the congressionally mandated limit of
45,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. According to TSA, when TSA runs the
model, it does so without imposing a limitation on the maximum number
of full-time equivalent TSOs, either the 45,000 congressional limit or
any budgetary limits that affect the number of TSOs that can be hired.
In addition to the levels identified by the staffing model, TSA sets
aside TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered
by the staffing model in the annual allocation run for airports. For
example, in order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at airports,
TSA established a National Screening Force of 615 TSOs who can be sent
to airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high
passenger volume, such as the Super Bowl. Additionally, certain
airports may, during the course of the year, experience significant
changes to their screening operations, such as the arrival of a new
airline or opening of a new terminal. TSA established a reserve of 329
TSO full-time equivalents during fiscal year 2006 that can be used to
augment the existing force. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget
request includes $35 million for operational expenses for a National
Deployment Office--an office that would be responsible for deploying
the National Screening Force and other TSOs to those airports
experiencing significant staffing shortfalls.
According to TSA, TSA's approach to allocating TSOs has allowed the
agency to stay within the 43,000 full-time equivalent TSO budgetary
limit for fiscal year 2006--a staffing level that TSA's Assistant
Secretary stated is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage
screening services.[Footnote 35] According to the President's fiscal
year 2008 budget request, the $2.6 billion requested for the federal
TSO workforce represents an increase of about $131 million over fiscal
year 2007 for cost of living adjustments and a travel document checker
initiative. Under this initiative, about 1,330 full-time equivalent
TSOs would be placed at the 40 highest risk category X and I airports
to conduct document checking for passengers approaching the passenger
screening checkpoint.[Footnote 36] According to the budget request, the
$2.6 billion is to fund the personnel, compensation, and benefits of
approximately 43,688 full-time equivalent TSOs and about 1,045 full-
time equivalent Screening Managers. Table 1 shows the total TSO and
Screening Manager full-time equivalents and the funding levels for
fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as reported by TSA.
Table 1: Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full-
time Equivalents and Actual Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation, &
Benefits, by Fiscal Year:
Total TSOs and Screening Managers at airports nationwide;
FY 2004: 45,252;
FY 2005: 45,690;
FY 2006: 42,187;
FY 2007[A]: 43,779.
Actual spending (dollars in thousands);
FY 2004: $2,191,551;
FY 2005: 2,291,572;
FY 2006: 2,251,503;
FY 2007[A]: 2,418,329.
Source: TSA:
[A] Fiscal year 2007 figures are projected.
[End of table]
FSDs we interviewed in 2006[Footnote 37] as part of our ongoing review
of TSA's staffing model generally reported that the model is a more
accurate predictor of staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model,
which took into account fewer factors that affect screening
operations.[Footnote 38] However, FSDs identified that some assumptions
used in the fiscal year 2006 staffing model did not reflect actual
operating conditions. For example, FSDs noted that the staffing model's
assumption of a 20 percent part-time workforce--measured in terms of
full-time equivalents--had been difficult to achieve, particularly at
larger (category X and I) airports, because of, among other things,
economic conditions leading to competition for part-time workers,
remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit, TSO base
pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and part-time workers'
desire to convert to full-time status. TSA data show that for fiscal
years 2005 and 2006, the nation's category X airports had a TSO
workforce composed of about 8 percent part-time equivalents, and the
part-time TSO attrition rate nationwide remains considerably higher
than the rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus
16 percent for full-time TSOs for fiscal year 2006). FSDs also
expressed concern that the model did not specifically account for the
recurrent training requirement for TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged
over a fiscal year quarter. Further, FSDs identified that the model for
fiscal year 2006 did not account for time away from screening to
perform operational support duties. FSDs we interviewed stated that
because they are not authorized to hire a sufficient number of mission
support staff, TSOs are being routinely used to perform certain
operational support functions, such as payroll processing, scheduling,
distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data entry, and workman's
compensation processing. Similarly, in September 2006, the Department
of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General reported that TSA
had not determined the precise number of FSD administrative positions
it needed and was using TSOs to perform administrative work.
In response to FSDs' input and the various mechanisms TSA has
implemented to monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation
outputs, TSA made changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal
year 2007. Our preliminary observations indicate that these revisions
should help address the concerns identified by FSDs. For example, TSA
recognized that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent part-
time full-time equivalent level and others (most likely smaller
airports) may operate more effectively with other levels of part-time
TSO staff. As a result, for fiscal year 2007, TSA modified this
assumption to include a variable part-time goal based on each airport's
historic part-time to full-time TSO ratio. TSA also included an
allowance in the fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation Model for training to
provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the required training
on detecting improvised explosive devices--which TSA has identified as
the most significant threat to commercial aviation. Additionally, TSA
included an allowance for operational support duties in the 2007
Staffing Allocation Model to account for the current need for TSOs to
perform these duties.
Factors outside of the staffing model's determination of overall TSO
staffing levels also affect FSDs' ability to effectively deploy their
TSO workforce. Specifically, FSDs we interviewed as part of our ongoing
review of TSA's staffing model cited difficulties in recruiting and
retaining sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their
full allocations as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints
appropriately given that some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism
and injuries; and managing around physical infrastructure limitations
at some airports, such as lack of room for additional lanes or baggage
check areas despite demand levels that would justify such added
capacity. TSA has made progress in addressing these challenges through
a variety of human capital initiatives. For example, to allow FSDs to
more efficiently address staffing needs, TSA has shifted responsibility
for hiring TSOs from TSA headquarters to FSDs at individual airports
and, according to TSA officials, provided contractor support to assist
in this effort. TSA data show that since local hiring began in March
2006, TSA has increased the number of new hire TSOs from approximately
180 per pay period in February 2006 to nearly 450 each pay period under
the local hiring initiative.
In addition to having an adequate number of TSOs, effective screening
involves TSOs being properly trained to do their job. Since we first
reported on TSO training in September 2003,[Footnote 39] TSA has taken
a number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the
TSO workforce beyond the basic training requirement. For example, TSA
has expanded training available to the TSO workforce, such as
introducing an Online Learning Center that makes self-guided courses
available over TSA's intranet and the Internet, and enhanced training
on explosives detection. This training included both classroom and
hands-on experience, and focused particularly on identifying X-ray
images of improvised explosives device component parts, not just a
completely assembled bomb. According to TSA, as of February 6, 2007,
about 98 percent of the 48,236 TSOs on board had received classroom,
checkpoint, or computer-based improvised explosive device recognition
training. TSA has also developed new training curriculums to support
new screening approaches. For example, TSA recently developed a
training curriculum for TSOs in behavior observation and analysis at
the checkpoint to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors indicative
of stress, fear, or deception. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget
request includes $89.7 million to fully implement TSO training programs
and related TSO workforce development programs.
TSA has also made progress in addressing challenges that made it
difficult for TSOs to access training. We reported in May 2005 that
insufficient TSO staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet
connectivity to access the Online Learning Center made it difficult for
all TSOs at many airports to receive required training, and had limited
TSO access to TSA training tools.[Footnote 40] We stated that without
addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing training, including
installing high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities, TSA
may have difficulty maintaining a screening workforce that possesses
the critical skills needed to perform at a desired level. As previously
discussed, our preliminary observations from our ongoing review of
TSA's staffing model indicate that TSA has taken steps to address the
TSO staffing challenges, including providing an allowance for TSO
training in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007.
However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA's efforts will address
TSA's ability to provide required training while maintaining adequate
coverage for screening operations. TSA established its Online Learning
Center to provide passenger and baggage TSOs with online, high-speed
access to training courses. However, effective use of the Online
Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA
has not been able to provide to all airports. We reported that as of
October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high-
speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. Given the
importance of the Online Learning Center in both delivering training
and serving as the means by which the completion of TSO training is
documented, we recommended that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes and
schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity
to all TSA's airport training facilities to help facilitate the
delivery of TSO training and the documentation of training completion.
Since that time, TSA has made progress in deploying high-speed
connectivity to airports. According to the President's fiscal year 2008
budget request, 95 percent of the nation's airports now have high-speed
connectivity. According to the budget request, TSA expects to meet the
goal of all airports having high-speed connectivity during fiscal year
2007.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Monitoring
of the Procedures:
In addition to TSA's efforts to train and deploy a federal TSO
workforce, steps have also been taken to strengthen passenger and
checked baggage screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities.
However, TSA could improve its evaluation and oversight of these
procedures. With regard to passenger checkpoint screening procedures,
between April and December 2005, proposed modifications were made in
various ways and for a variety of reasons, and a majority of the
proposed modifications--48 of 92--were ultimately implemented at
airports. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's process for
determining whether and how screening procedures should be modified, we
found that TSA officials proposed standard operating procedure (SOP)
modifications based on risk information (threat and vulnerability
information), daily experiences of staff working at airports, and
complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public.[Footnote 41] In
addition to these factors, our preliminary observations indicate that
consistent with its mission, TSA senior leadership made efforts to
balance the impact that proposed SOP modifications would have on
security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding whether
proposed SOP modifications should be implemented. For example, in
August 2006, TSA sought to increase security by banning liquids and
gels from being carried onboard aircraft in response to the alleged
terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft
en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. In September
2006, after obtaining more information about the alleged terrorist
plot--to include information from the United Kingdom and U.S.
intelligence communities, discussions with explosives experts, and
testing of explosives--TSA officials decided to lift the total ban on
liquids and gels to allow passengers to carry small amounts of liquids
and gels onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted the total ban
because banning liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown to affect
both efficiency and customer service. Specifically, following the
implementation of the total ban in August 2006, the number of bags
checked per passenger increased by approximately 27 percent--thus
placing a strain on the efficiency of the checked-baggage screening
system. In addition, TSA recognized that passengers have legitimate
needs that may require them to carry some liquids and gels onboard
aircraft. Moreover, in an effort to harmonize its liquid screening
procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA revised its
procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols
onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount
permitted by the 27 countries in the European Union, as well as
Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. According to TSA, this
means that approximately half of the world's travelers will be governed
by similar measures with regard to this area of security.
In some cases, TSA first tested proposed modifications to screening
procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the changes
would achieve their intended purpose, such as to enhance detection of
prohibited items or free up TSO resources to perform screening
activities focused on threats considered to pose a high risk, such as
explosives. TSA's efforts to collect quantitative data through testing
proposed procedures prior to deciding whether to implement or reject
them is consistent with our past work that has shown the importance of
data collection and analyses to support agency decision making.
However, as part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA's data
collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether
proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their
intended purpose. Specifically, we found that for the tests of proposed
screening procedures TSA conducted during the period April 2005 through
December 2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools
from the prohibited items list,[Footnote 42] although TSA collected
some data on the efficiency of and customer response to the procedures
at selected airports, the agency generally did not collect the type of
data or conduct the necessary analysis that would yield information on
whether proposed procedures would achieve their intended
purpose.[Footnote 43] We will report on the results of our analysis of
TSA's efforts to test proposed modifications to screening procedures
later this year.
Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that
TSA have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with
established procedures. As part of our ongoing review of TSA's process
for revising passenger screening procedures, we identified that TSA
monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs
through its performance accountability and standards system and through
local and national covert testing.[Footnote 44] According to TSA
officials, the performance accountability and standards system was
developed in response to a 2003 report by us that recommended that TSA
establish a performance management system that makes meaningful
distinctions in employee performance,[Footnote 45] and in response to
input from TSA airport staff on how to improve passenger and checked
baggage screening measures. This system will be used by TSA to assess
agency personnel at all levels on various competencies, including,
among other things, technical proficiency. The technical proficiency
component of the performance accountability and standards system will
be used to measure TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening
procedures. In addition to implementing the performance accountability
and standards system, TSA conducts local and national covert tests to
evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with the
SOPs affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in
accessible property or concealed on a person. Our preliminary
observations indicate that TSA airport officials have experienced
resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring
methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking steps
to address these challenges. For example, officials said that they have
automated many of the data entry functions of the performance
accountability and standards system to relieve the field of the burden
of manually entering this information into the online system.
TSA has also taken steps to strengthen checked baggage screening
through reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures. In
addition to screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD, which
TSA had determined to provide the most effective detection of
explosives, TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used
when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security
vulnerabilities or when TSA officials determine that there is a
security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in an
area. These alternative screening procedures include the use of EDS and
ETD machines in nonstandard ways,[Footnote 46] and also include three
procedures that do not use EDS or ETD--screening with explosives
detection canines, physical bag searches, and matching baggage to
passenger manifests to confirm that the passenger and his or her
baggage are on the same plane. TSA's use of alternative screening
procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness.[Footnote
47] However, the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully known
because TSA has not tested the effectiveness of alternative screening
procedures in an operational environment. In our July 2006 report on
TSA's use of alternative screening procedures, we recommended that TSA
conduct local testing of alternative screening procedures to determine
whether checked baggage TSOs can detect simulated improvised explosives
when using these procedures.[Footnote 48] Since then, TSA has conducted
covert testing of alternative screening procedures at some airports.
TSA is pursuing several mitigating actions to reduce the need to use
alternative screening procedures. These actions include deploying more
efficient checked baggage screening systems, strengthening its
coordination with groups such as tour operators to better plan for
increases in baggage screening needs, deploying "optimization teams" to
airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to
determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest
remedies, and deploying additional EDS machines. However, although TSA
has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening
procedures at airports, TSA's oversight of FSDs' use of alternative
screening procedures could be strengthened. For example, in July 2006,
we reported that FSDs and their staff did not always accurately report
the occurrences when a particular alternative baggage screening
procedure was used, impeding TSA's ability to reliably determine how
often and for how long the alternative screening procedures were used.
In addition, FSDs and their staff did not always report the use of
alternative screening procedures as required. TSA officials stated that
they were working with FSDs to correct these reporting problems and had
issued guidance clarifying requirements for reporting alternative
screening procedures.
Additionally, while TSA is working to minimize the need to use
alternative screening procedures at airports, TSA has not created
performance measures or targets related to the use of these procedures.
By creating a performance measure for the use of alternative screening
procedures as part of the checked baggage screening index or as a stand-
alone measure, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress towards
minimizing the need to use these procedures at airports and have more
complete information on how well the overall checked baggage screening
system is performing. Furthermore, performance targets for the use of
alternative screening procedures would provide an indicator of how much
risk TSA is willing to accept in using these procedures, and TSA's
monitoring of this indicator would identify when it has exceeded the
level of risk that it has determined acceptable. We recommended that
TSA develop performance measures and performance targets for the use of
alternative screening procedures. Additionally, in September 2006,
Congress directed TSA to take a variety of actions-
-most of which we recommended in our July 2006 report--to monitor and
assess the use of alternative screening procedures, including (1)
develop performance measures and performance targets for the use of
alternative screening procedures; (2) track the use of alternative
screening procedures at airports; (3) assess the effectiveness of these
measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports that use alternative
screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop alternative screening
procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and (6) report to the
Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on
Homeland Security by January 23, 2007, on implementation of these
requirements.[Footnote 49] According to TSA officials, the agency is
continuing to monitor and track the use of alternative screening
procedures, which has allowed it to identify areas for improvement
nationwide and address local issues to minimize the need for
alternative screening procedures.
TSA is Exploring New Technologies to Enhance Detection of Explosives
and Other Threats, but Faces Management and Funding Challenges in
Fielding Technologies to Airports:
TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to
strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and
funding challenges. For example, TSA and DHS's S&T are exploring new
passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of
explosives and other threats. However, limited progress has been made
in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening
checkpoints, in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in
coordinating research and development efforts. In addition, TSA has
begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked
baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available
to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale
basis.
Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies:
To enhance passenger checkpoint screening, TSA is currently working
with DHS S&T's Transportation Security Laboratory to develop new
passenger checkpoint screening technologies.[Footnote 50] TSA
designated about $80.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to acquire and
deploy emerging screening technologies, and has requested $81.6 million
for similar purposes in fiscal year 2008. Our preliminary work has
found that of the various research and development projects funded by
TSA and DHS S&T, six checkpoint screening projects are currently in the
applied research or advanced development phases.[Footnote 51] Projects
in the applied research phase include liquid bottle screening devices,
explosives trace portals that will reduce the size of the current
explosives trace portals at checkpoints, and shoe scanners. Three other
projects in the advanced development phase include whole body imagers,
cast and prosthesis scanners, and checkpoint explosives detection
systems. TSA plans to place whole body imagers and checkpoint
explosives detection systems at certain airport locations to collect
initial operational data, and plans to continue to conduct similar
tests of the cast and prosthesis scanners during fiscal year 2007.
Table 2 provides a description and status of the passenger checkpoint
screening technologies TSA and DHS S&T are currently researching and
developing.
Table 2: Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies in
the Research and Development Phase, as of January 2007:
Technology: Liquid bottle screening devices;
Description: Screens for liquid explosives;
Status: In the applied research phase. DHS S&T is currently testing
various devices.
Technology: Explosives trace portals II;
Description: Detects trace amounts of explosives on persons (will
reduce the size of the current explosives trace portals at
checkpoints);
Status: In the applied research phase.
Technology: Shoe scanners;
Description: Scans passengers shoes with explosives detection
capability;
Status: In the applied research phase. Private industry developed this
device to be used in combination with other technologies to screen
registered travelers. Vendors requested that TSA assess this technology
for effectiveness.
Technology: Whole body imagers;
Description: Provides two-dimensional, full-body images of all items on
a passenger's body, including plastic explosives and concealed
metallic, non-metallic, and ceramic or plastic objects;
Status: In the advanced development phase. TSA plans to place some
units at collect initial operational data during operational tests
using the whole body imager at one U.S. airport in early 2007.
Technology: Cast and prosthesis scanners;
Description: Provides a 2- dimensional image of the area beneath a cast
or inside a prosthetic device;
Status: In the advanced development phase. TSA placed this equipment at
an airport in September 2006 and collected operational data. TSA is
considering deploying this technology in 2007.
Technology: Checkpoint explosives detection systems;
Description: Creates a three dimensional image of bags to detect
explosives and other nonmetallic items;
Status: In the advanced development phase. TSA plans to place this
equipment at airports and collect operational data in fiscal year 2007.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
Despite TSA's efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening
technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that
limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection
technology at checkpoints. For example, TSA's fiscal year 2007 budget
justification requested $80.5 million in budget authority to acquire
and deploy screening technologies emerging from research and
development programs, including the acquisition of 92 additional
explosives trace portal machines and funds to operate and service
approximately 434 portals. TSA had anticipated that the portals would
be in operation throughout the country during fiscal year 2007.
However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted the
acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006, and the
acquisition of additional portals is contingent on resolution of these
issues. As a result, TSA has fielded less than 25 percent of the 434
portals it projected it would deploy by fiscal year 2007. In addition
to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its projected acquisition of
other emerging screening technologies. For example, the acquisition of
91 Whole Body Imagers has been delayed in part because TSA needed to
develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers screened by this
technology. For fiscal year 2008, TSA has requested an additional $81.6
million to evaluate, acquire, and install emerging technologies. We
will continue to assess DHS S&T and TSA's deployment of checkpoint
screening technologies during our on-going review.
While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research,
development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, our ongoing
work has identified that challenges remain. For example, TSA and DHS
S&T officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating
research and development efforts due to reorganizations of TSA and S&T.
A senior TSA official also stated that while TSA and the DHS S&T have
executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the services that
the Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA,
coordination with S&T remains a challenge because the organizations
have not fully implemented the terms of the memorandum of
understanding. In addition to challenges in coordinating with each
other, our preliminary observations suggest that TSA and DHS S&T also
face challenges in coordinating with external stakeholders.
Specifically, while TSA and DHS S&T have taken steps to coordinate
efforts with external stakeholders, some airport managers we
interviewed in October 2006 stated that TSA did not adequately
communicate with them about when new technologies were to be deployed
in their airports. TSA officials stated that they do not have a master
schedule that establishes milestones for conducting operational tests
and evaluations of emerging technologies or for deploying these
technologies. Lack of such a schedule could limit TSA's ability to
coordinate operational tests and deployments with stakeholders.
Additionally, TSA does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its
efforts to acquire and deploy screening technologies. As part of our
ongoing work, we will assess further TSA's efforts to develop an
overall strategic approach to guide the deployment of checkpoint
technologies. A lack of a strategic plan or approach could limit TSA's
ability to deploy emerging technologies at those airport locations
deemed at highest risk. TSA officials stated that the agency is in the
process of developing a strategic plan for the checkpoint that is
scheduled to be completed in early 2007. TSA officials stated that the
completion of the plan was delayed due to competing priorities,
including ensuring the screening of checked baggage using explosives
detection systems and responding to new and emerging threats, such as
homemade explosives. TSA officials also said that reorganizations at
TSA and DHS S&T have contributed to the delay.
It is important that TSA continue to invest in and develop technologies
for detecting explosives, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006
terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board multiple
commercial aircraft bound for the United States from the United
Kingdom. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request notes that
emerging checkpoint technology will enhance the detection of prohibited
items, especially firearms and explosives, on passengers. We are
currently evaluating DHS's and TSA's progress in planning for,
managing, and deploying research and development programs in support of
airport checkpoint screening operations and will report on the results
of our work later this year.
Checked Baggage Screening Technologies:
At checked baggage screening stations, TSA has been effective in
deploying EDS machines and ETD machines. However, initial deployment of
EDS machines in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD
machines resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as
compared with using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport
baggage conveyor systems. As we reported in March 2005,[Footnote 52] to
initially deploy EDS and ETD equipment to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage for explosives, TSA implemented interim airport lobby solutions
rather than in-line EDS baggage screening systems.[Footnote 53] TSA
officials stated that they used EDS machines in stand-alone mode and
ETD machines as an interim solution in order to meet the congressional
deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives. Officials
stated that they employed these interim solutions because of the
significant costs required to install in-line systems and the need to
reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the
equipment. TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines has required a
greater number of TSOs and resulted in screening fewer bags for
explosives each hour. Additionally, because in-line EDS checked baggage
screening systems can significantly reduce the need for TSOs to handle
baggage, installing them may also reduce the number of TSO on-the-job
injuries. Moreover, screening with in-line EDS systems could also
result in security benefits by reducing congestion in airport lobbies
and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening
procedures.[Footnote 54]
In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed
to help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated
that screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal
government about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA
reported that a savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized
over a period of 20 years by installing optimal checked baggage
screening systems, including in-line EDS machines, at the airports with
the highest checked baggage volumes. However, TSA also reported in
February 2006 that many of the initial in-line EDS systems had not
achieved the degree of anticipated savings initially estimated. TSA has
since determined that recent improvements to the design of the in-line
EDS systems and EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for
higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. In June 2006, TSA
issued guidance to airports to provide options, ideas, and suggestions
for airports to choose from when considering security requirements in
the planning and design of new or renovated airport
facilities.[Footnote 55] This guidance also provides recommendations
for airports in constructing in-line systems.
TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of
checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made
available to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-
scale basis. In March 2005, we reported that while TSA had made
progress in deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a
systematic, prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these
machines to achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and
security. We recommended that TSA systematically evaluate baggage
screening needs at airports. In February 2006, TSA released its
strategic planning framework for checked baggage screening aimed at
increasing security through deploying more EDS machines, lowering
program life-cycle costs, minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and
airline operations, and providing a flexible security infrastructure.
According to TSA, the framework will be used to establish a
comprehensive strategic plan for TSA's checked baggage screening
program. As part of this planning effort, TSA identified, among other
things, the top 25 airports that should first receive federal funding
for projects related to the installation of in-line EDS systems, and
the optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports
with the highest checked baggage volumes.[Footnote 56] DHS's budget
execution reports for TSA for fiscal year 2007 show that TSA received
$524.4 million for the purchase, installation, maintenance, and
operations integration of EDS and ETD machines. The President's fiscal
year 2008 budget request includes $692 million for these activities--an
increase of $167.6 million over the previous year's appropriations.
Most (about 72 percent) of this increase is for installation of EDS and
ETD machines.[Footnote 57]
In February 2006, TSA officials reported that if some of the top 25
airports do not receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they
will require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport
lobbies and additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance
with the mandate for screening all checked baggage using explosive
detection systems. Additionally, in May 2006, TSA reported that under
current investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage
screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024.
According to TSA, as of September 30, 2006, 36 airports had operational
in-line systems--18 airports had airport-wide systems, while the
remaining 18 airports had systems at a particular terminal or
terminals. Over the next 2 years, TSA expects full and partial in-line
systems to become operational at 25 additional airports. This level of
effort, according to TSA, balances resources with other risks to
transportation security.
In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying
on several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage
screening systems. One source of funding airport operators initially
used was the Federal Aviation Administration's Airport Improvement
Program, which traditionally funds grants to maintain safe and
efficient airports. With Airport Improvement Program funds no longer
available after fiscal year 2003 for this purpose, airports turned to
other sources of federal funding to construct in-line systems.[Footnote
58] The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution
approved the use of letter of intent agreements as a vehicle to
leverage federal government and industry funding to support facility
modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage screening
systems.[Footnote 59] TSA also uses other transaction agreements as an
administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,
airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification
projects.[Footnote 60] Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA,
the airport operator provides a portion of the funding required for the
modification. To fund the procurement and installation of explosive
detection systems in-line, TSA uses annual appropriations and the $250
million mandatory appropriation of the Aviation Security Capital
Fund.[Footnote 61] For example, in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007,
TSA received appropriations of $175 million, $180 million, and $141.4
million, respectively, for the procurement of explosive detection
systems. It received appropriations of $45 million in fiscal years 2005
and 2006, and $138 million in fiscal year 2007 for the installation of
explosive detection systems, in addition to the $250 million made
available through the capital fund.[Footnote 62] Congress also
authorized an additional appropriation of $400 million per year through
fiscal year 2007 for airport security improvement projects, including
the installation of in-line EDS systems. However, appropriations have
not been made under this authorization.[Footnote 63] Figure 5 shows TSA
obligated funding levels for EDS installation and integration.
Figure 5: TSA Obligated Funding Levels for EDS Installation and
Integration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee analysis of TSA data.
[A] This is an estimate as of August 2006.
[End of figure]
TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and
financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening
systems. In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
baggage screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a
member, released a study outlining an investment strategy for funding
TSA's checked baggage screening program.[Footnote 64] According to TSA,
this study, which has been provided to the Office of Management and
Budget for review, is the final component of TSA's strategic plan for
checked baggage screening. The investment study recommended four
investment options, including (1) tax credit bonds,[Footnote 65] (2)
continued appropriations for the procurement and installation of EDS
machines, (3) combined line items for the purchase and installation of
EDS machines in order to provide TSA increased flexibility in directing
the funding where it is most needed, and (4) enhanced eligibility for
the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC).[Footnote 66] The working group
estimated that under its recommended approach, the present value cost
of the checked baggage screening program is $23.3 billion over the next
20 years. Of these costs, the aviation industry is projected to bear
$3.6 billion and the federal government is projected to bear $19.7
billion. According to the working group, the net effect of investing in
optimal systems would be to reduce overall life-cycle costs by $1.2
billion relative to the current rate of investment, primarily through
TSO staff cost savings and avoidance of increased TSO staff costs in
the future. In addition, in its August 2006 study, the working group
identified that in order to achieve these cost savings, a formal cost
management process is needed given evolving technology and design
practices, the various parties involved in design and operation, and
the amount of capital investment to be made over the next several
years. The working group identified a variety of actions that should be
taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry, including
implementing a structured process for ongoing government and industry
collaboration and increasing program management resources to provide
for more substantial TSA involvement throughout the planning, design,
and construction process. (App. I includes a complete list of the
specific actions the working group identified for Congress, TSA, and
the aviation industry.)
Federal Action Is Needed to Strengthen Air Cargo Security:
In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions
intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but, as we
reported, factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness.
Since our report was released, TSA has issued an air cargo security
rule that revised some of the requirements air carriers are required to
follow to ensure air cargo security, and has drafted new and revised
security programs for domestic and foreign passenger and all-cargo
carriers that contain more specific security requirements. However,
more work remains to ensure that TSA has a comprehensive strategy to
secure air cargo that fully incorporates risk management principles.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Risk Management Principles into Its
Decision Making to Secure Domestic Air Cargo, but Most Efforts Are in
the Early Stages:
TSA has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach
to addressing domestic air cargo security, including conducting threat
assessments. However, opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts.
Applying a risk management framework to decision making is one tool to
help provide assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are
properly prioritized and focused. TSA has underscored the importance of
implementing a risk-based approach that protects against known threats,
but that is also sufficiently flexible to direct resources to mitigate
new and emerging threats. According to TSA, the ideal risk model would
be one that could be used throughout the transportation sector and
applicable to different threat scenarios. As part of TSA's risk-based
approach, TSA issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that
focused on securing the domestic air cargo supply chain.[Footnote 67]
TSA coordinated with air cargo industry stakeholders representing
passenger and all-cargo carriers to develop this plan. TSA officials
stated that they are revising their existing domestic air cargo
strategic plan, but as of February 5, 2007, agency officials had not
set a timeframe for when TSA will complete this revision. TSA's Air
Cargo Strategic Plan describes, among other things, an approach for
screening or reviewing information on all domestic air cargo shipments
to determine their level of relative risk, ensuring that 100 percent of
cargo identified as posing an elevated risk is physically inspected,
and pursuing technological solutions to physically inspect air cargo.
TSA officials anticipate that the agency's system for targeting
domestic air cargo, referred to as Freight Assessment, will minimize
the reliance on the random physical inspections currently conducted by
air carriers. According to agency plans, air carriers would receive
targeting information from TSA on specific cargo items identified as
posing an elevated risk. Upon notification by TSA's Freight Assessment
System, air carrier personnel would be responsible for conducting the
inspection of cargo identified as elevated risk. In October 2005, we
reported that although TSA had identified data elements that could be
used in its Freight Assessment System, the agency had not yet ensured
that these data are complete, accurate, and current. We recommended
that TSA take steps to do so; however, as of February 2007, TSA has not
yet addressed this recommendation. Further, while TSA planned to phase
in implementation and deployment of the targeting system for cargo
transported on passenger carriers during calendar years 2006 and 2007,
as of February 2007, TSA's system for targeting domestic cargo is still
under development.
In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework
in the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which
typically involve three key elements--threats, vulnerabilities, and
criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments
provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives,
allocating resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September
2005, TSA's Office of Intelligence (formerly known as the
Transportation Security Intelligence Service) completed an overall
threat assessment for air cargo, which identified general and specific
threats to domestic air cargo.[Footnote 68] However, we reported that
TSA had not conducted a vulnerability assessment to identify the range
of security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists.[Footnote
69] TSA plans to conduct this assessment of domestic air cargo
vulnerabilities--as we recommended--and expects it to be completed in
late 2007.
TSA Has Implemented Measures Intended to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo
Security, but More Work Remains:
In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions
intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but that factors
existed that may limit the effectiveness of these actions. For example,
we reported that TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper
database to streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and
businesses) are made known to carriers with whom they conduct
business.[Footnote 70] However, at that time, the information in this
database on the universe of shippers was incomplete, because
participation in this database was voluntary. Moreover, we identified
problems with the reliability of the information in the database. TSA
estimated that the agency's centralized database contained information
on about 400,000 known shippers, or less than one-third of the total
population of known shippers, which is estimated to be about 1.5
million. In May 2006, TSA issued an air cargo security rule that
included a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of air
cargo.[Footnote 71] For example, TSA made participation in the Known
Shipper database mandatory, requiring air carriers and indirect air
carriers to submit information on their known shippers to TSA's Known
Shipper database. However, the May 2006 security rule did not modify
TSA's current process for validating known shippers, which remains the
responsibility of indirect air carriers and air carriers. Accordingly,
passenger, all cargo, and indirect air carriers will continue to be
responsible for determining the integrity of the shipper, which may
allow for potential conflicts of interest because air carriers who
conduct business with shippers will also continue to have the authority
to validate these same shipping customers.
In October 2005, we also reported that TSA had established requirements
for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but had exempted some
cargo from inspection, potentially creating security
weaknesses.[Footnote 72] We recommended that TSA examine the rationale
for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, determine whether such
exemptions leave the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to
terrorist attack, and make any needed adjustments to the exemptions.
TSA established a working group to examine the rationale for existing
air cargo inspection exemptions, and in October 2006, issued a security
directive and emergency amendment to domestic and foreign passenger air
carriers operating within and from the United States that limited the
inspection exemptions. According to TSA officials, the agency is still
considering revisions to the inspection exemptions for cargo being
transported into the United States.
In October 2005, we also reported that TSA conducted compliance
inspections of air carriers to ensure that they were complying with
existing air cargo security requirements. These compliance inspections
ranged from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all air
cargo security requirements by an air carrier or indirect air carrier
to a review of just one or several security requirements.[Footnote 73]
However, TSA had not developed measures to assess the adequacy of air
carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, or assessed
the results of its compliance inspections to target higher-risk air
carriers or indirect air carriers for future reviews. More recently,
TSA reported that the agency has increased the number of inspectors
dedicated to conducting air cargo inspections, and has begun analyzing
the results of the compliance inspections to help focus their
inspections on those entities that have the highest rates of
noncompliance. For fiscal year 2008, the President's budget includes a
request of about $56 million for TSA's air cargo security program,
which includes funding for, among other things, 300 air cargo security
inspectors, TSA-certified canines for air cargo related activities, and
the development and deployment of a Freight Assessment System to target
elevated-risk cargo.
In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA
is working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically,
TSA, together with DHS's S&T, is currently developing and pilot testing
a number of technologies to assess their applicability to inspecting
and securing air cargo. These efforts include:
* an air cargo explosives detection pilot program implemented at three
airports, testing the use of explosive detection systems, explosive
trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams, technologies
that can locate a stowaway through detection of a heartbeat or
increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual inspections of air
cargo;[Footnote 74]
* an EDS pilot program, which is testing the use of computer-aided
tomography to measure the densities of objects in order to identify
potential explosives in air cargo;[Footnote 75]
* an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the viability
of potential security countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security
seals, for use with certain classifications of exempt cargo;
* the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers made
of blast-resistant materials that could withstand an explosion onboard
the aircraft; and:
* the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis, which allows for the
identification of the material signatures of contraband, explosives,
and other threat objects.
According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it will
require the use of any of these technologies once it has completed its
assessments and analyzed the results. However, TSA has not established
a timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA
officials, the federal government and the air cargo industry face
several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement any
of these technologies to inspect or secure air cargo. These challenges
include factors such as the nature, type, and size of the cargo;
environmental and climatic conditions; inspection throughput rates;
staffing and training issues for individuals who inspect air cargo; the
location of air cargo facilities (centralized versus decentralized);
cost and availability; and employee health and safety concerns. To
effectively inspect domestic air cargo that TSA deems to pose an
elevated risk, the agency will need to make decisions regarding which
technologies will be used to inspect such cargo. According to TSA
officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and
effectively inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of
potential terrorist threats, including explosives and weapons of mass
destruction.
We will soon report on the second phase of our review of air cargo
security, which focuses on DHS's efforts to secure air cargo that is
transported into the United States from abroad, referred to as inbound
air cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have
taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts
could be strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and
select foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance
TSA's efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent
to which TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance
their air cargo security efforts.
Concluding Observations:
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for
these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline
passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since
that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger
prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs,
strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more
effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic
air cargo security, among other efforts. TSA has made progress in all
of these areas, but opportunities exist to further strengthen their
efforts, in particular in the areas of risk-based decision making,
program planning and monitoring, and stakeholder collaboration. Our
work has shown--in homeland security and in other areas--that a
comprehensive risk management approach can help inform decision makers
in the allocation of finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We
are encouraged that risk management has been a cornerstone of DHS and
TSA policy, and that TSA has implemented risk-based decision making
into a number of its efforts. Despite this commitment, however, TSA
will continue to face difficult decisions and trade-offs--particularly
as threats to commercial aviation evolve--regarding acceptable levels
of risk and the need to balance security with efficiency and customer
service. We recognize that doing so will not be easy. In implementing a
risk-based approach, DHS and TSA must also address the challenges we
identified in our work related to program planning, risk assessments,
and implementation and monitoring of aviation security programs.
Without rigorous planning and prioritization, and knowledge of the
effectiveness of aviation security programs, DHS and TSA cannot be sure
that they are focusing their finite resources on the areas of greatest
need. Risk-based decision making will be particularly important as TSA
begins to place more focus on the security of non-aviation modes of
transportation, including passenger rail, and resource decisions and
related trade-offs will have to be made not only within aviation, but
across all transportation modes.
TSA must also continue its work to strengthen partnerships with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
international partners to improve the security of the commercial
aviation system. Securing all aspects of commercial aviation is shared
a responsibility among these parties. Accordingly, it is important that
all stakeholders be involved, as appropriate, in coordinating security-
related priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best
practices and developing common security frameworks. Such efforts are
particularly important with international partners due to our
interdependence with foreign nations in securing the aviation system--
as evidenced by the recent alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid
explosives onboard multiple aircraft departing the United Kingdom for
the United States. TSA has strengthened its coordination efforts with
domestic and international partners, which has aided its security
efforts and helped to avoid duplication of effort. Existing risk-based
decision making, program planning and monitoring, and coordination
efforts will need to continue and be strengthened as TSA works to
address continuing challenges and threats facing commercial aviation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, Mike Bollinger, Kristy Brown,
Carissa Bryant, Tony Cheesebrough, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett,
Samantha Goodman, John Hansen, Mike Harmond, Dawn Hoff, Suzanne
Heimbach, Adam Hoffman, Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, Steve Morris,
Katrina Moss, Mona Nichols-Blake, Leslie Sarapu, Brian Sklar, Edith
Sohna, Maria Strudwick, Meg Ullengren, and Candice Wright made
contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Key Actions for Congress, TSA, and the Aviation Industry,
as Recommended by the Baggage Screening Investment Study Working Group:
In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage
screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a member,
released a study outlining an investment strategy for the funding of
TSA's checked baggage screening program.[Footnote 76] The working
group's investment study identified five key actions that should be
taken by Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry, respectively, with
regard to funding these systems. Table 3 provides a summary of the key
actions identified by the working group.
Table 3: Summary of key actions for Congress, TSA, and the aviation
industry, as recommended by the baggage screening investment study
working group:
Congress: Authorize a voluntary tax credit bond program of $3 billion
for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, which airports could access to fund
the infrastructure necessary for automated EDS baggage screening
systems;
TSA: Finalize and publish the draft baggage screening investment study
guidelines developed by the baggage screening investment study
technical team. Include a detailed explanation of the upgraded design
review and approval process in the baggage screening investment study
guidelines. Update the baggage screening investment study guidelines at
least yearly to reflect ongoing lessons learned;
Aviation industry: Use upcoming industry conferences to communicate the
key findings and recommendations of the baggage screening investment
study.
Congress: Permit use of tax credit bonds for refunding by airports or
airlines that have or will self-fund their in-line screening systems
through the tax credit bond authorization period (with the airport
facilitating conduit financing on behalf of airlines as needed, as tax
credit bonds require the issuer to be a public entity);
TSA: Issue detailed funding guidance to the aviation industry
explaining the alternatives available for funding baggage screening
systems and communicate the process and business rules to access
facility modification grants for airports and airlines not wishing or
not able to use the tax credit bond program;
Aviation industry: For those airports and airlines that have already
developed designs for in-line systems but not yet initiated
construction, prepare refined designs consistent with the baggage
screening investment study guidelines.
Congress: Continue or increase the existing rate of annual
appropriations for purchase and installation of EDS equipment ($435
million per year, escalating annually). TSA would be responsible for
prioritizing the use of these funds, which could include provision of
(a) equipment to airports that use the voluntary tax credit bond
program, (b) grants and equipment to airports and airlines that do not
use the voluntary tax credit bond program, (c) grants to airports and
airlines requiring reimbursement for self-funded optimal screening
systems that do not use the tax credit bond program, (d) ongoing
support for expansion of optimal screening systems to accommodate
future traffic growth, and (e) life-cycle replacement and refurbishment
of previously installed equipment;
TSA: Provide Congress with requested information regarding an estimated
deployment timeline on an airport-by-airport basis;
Aviation industry: Create integrated local design teams for individual
design efforts to facilitate stakeholder coordination at the local
level.
Congress: Eliminate any restrictions associated with combining purchase
and installation funds to provide TSA with increased flexibility to
manage the impact of the voluntary tax credit bond program;
TSA: Work with DHS and equipment manufacturers to actively manage the
timely development and deployment of new screening technologies
critical to the costs and performance assumptions in the baggage
screening investment study;
Aviation industry: Develop contracts with baggage handling systems
designers, suppliers, and other associated contractors that require
compliance with the baggage screening investment study guidelines and
the performance standards specified therein.
Congress: Enhance passenger facility charge program flexibility to
include (a) tax credit bond sinking fund payments and (b) modification
or construction of exclusive-use outbound baggage systems to
accommodate EDS screening systems;
TSA: Establish an integrated national deployment team composed of
representatives from TSA, airport, airline, and key industry trade
associations to actively and collaboratively manage the cost and
quality of automated EDS baggage screening systems at a national level;
Aviation industry: Actively participate in the integrated national
deployment team, including providing dedicated representatives to work
with TSA during the initial deployment of optimal screening systems to
all categories X, I, II, and III airports.
Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Airline Passenger Prescreening:
Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence:
Responses to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. GAO-06-1051R.
Washington D.C.: August 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T.
Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully
Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program
Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More
Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: Feb.
23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004.
Airline Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening:
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July
28, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding
Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April
4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security
at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.:
April 4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,
2003.
Air Cargo:
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002.
In-Flight Security:
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28,
2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-
781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and General Aviation:
Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted
Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T.
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-
based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. GAO-04-341R.
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004.
Other Aviation Security:
Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed
to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.: Jan.
24, 2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects
on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 25, 2003.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct.
15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept.
25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.
Note: GAO Products that are not available to the public because they
are considered Security Sensitive Information, Law Enforcement
Sensitive, or National Security Secret are not included in this list of
related products.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] TSA also requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize
the No Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers prior to
conducting operations to, from, or within the United States, in
accordance with TSA security directives.
[2] Indirect air carriers are entities that consolidate air cargo from
multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported.
[3] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[4] Other federal entities involved in securing or safeguarding air
cargo include the Department of Homeland Security-U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the United States Postal Service, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the
Treasury.
[5] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4012(a)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903(j)(2)(C), 44909(a)(6)).
[6] Currently, TSA requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers
utilize the No Fly and Selectee lists to prescreen passengers prior to
conducting operations to, from, or within the United States, in
accordance with TSA security directives.
[7] GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May
Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 9, 2006). GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and
Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further
Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005).
[8] Following the events of September 11, and in accordance with ATSA,
TSA began an effort in March 2003 to develop a new computer-assisted
passenger prescreening system known as CAPPS II. See 49 U.S.C. §
44903(j)(2)(A). Because of a variety of delays and challenges, in
August 2004, DHS cancelled the development of CAPPS II. In its place,
TSA announced that it would develop a new prescreening program called
Secure Flight.
[9] Although the air carriers currently conduct the watch list matching
and CAPPS prescreening functions, these processes are required and
overseen by TSA.
[10] In addition to name matching prescreening activities, CBP also
prescreens travelers by evaluating the authenticity and completeness of
passengers' passports and other travel documents as part of its travel
document review procedures. CBP also attempts to identify high-risk
travelers on international flights through its Automated Targeting
System--Passenger (ATS-P). Under this risk assessment program, CBP
conducts a risk-targeting process by evaluating passenger information
(for both passengers departing from and for the United States) against
risk assessment rules and algorithms within the ATS-P. The ATS-P
compares passenger information against data from numerous national
intelligence and law enforcement databases to identify those travelers
who are likely to present a higher risk, so that CBP can interdict and
further screen these travelers.
[11] As passengers are not required to present a passport to board
domestic flights, the name matching process for domestic flights
primarily uses only PNR data, not APIS data.
[12] See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a (establishing the electronic
manifest transmission requirements for passengers onboard commercial
aircraft arriving in or departing from the United States).
[13] 71 Fed. Reg. 40,035 (July 14, 2006). A notice of proposed
rulemaking provides notice to interested or affected parties of an
agency's anticipated regulatory action and an opportunity for such
parties to comment on this action before implementation.
[14] TSA also allows airports to apply to opt-out of federal screening
and to use private screeners under contract with TSA. See 49 U.S.C. §
44920. Six airports currently have screening operations conducted by
private screening contractors under TSA's Screening Partnership
Program.
[15] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are
provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is
controlled by TSOs (or by non-federal screeners at airports
participating in the Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where
they conduct physical screening of individuals and their carry-on
baggage for weapons and explosives.
[16] TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in
accordance with passenger screening standard operating procedures. If
an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must
not be allowed into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft.
[17] At some airports, some passengers may also be screened by walking
through an explosives trace portal--a machine that detects trace
amounts of explosives on persons.
[18] Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays
to examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. This equipment operates in an
automated mode.
[19] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues
of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials.
[20] Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the
same aircraft as their checked baggage. According to TSA officials,
this procedure is rarely used.
[21] As of January 2007, TSA security programs include (1) Aircraft
Operators Standard Security Program, which applies to domestic
passenger air carriers; (2) Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security
Program, which applies to domestic indirect air carriers; (3) Domestic
Security Integration Program, a voluntary program that applies to
domestic all-cargo carriers; (4) the Twelve-Five Program, which applies
to certain operators of aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in
scheduled or charter service that carry passengers, cargo, or both; (5)
Model Security Program, which applies to foreign passenger air
carriers; and (6) All-Cargo International Security Procedures, which
applies to each foreign air carrier engaged in the transportation of
cargo to, from, within, or overflying the United States in all-cargo
aircraft with a maximum certified takeoff weight of more than 12,500
pounds. TSA drafted new security programs for foreign and domestic all-
cargo carriers with operations to, from, and within the United States.
TSA expects to finalize these programs in early 2007.
[22] The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a regulated
agent as an agent, freight forwarder, or any other entity that conducts
business with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that
are accepted or required by the appropriate government authority with
respect to cargo or mail.
[23] DHS's budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect
the Department's financial activity.
[24] In our analysis of DHS's budget execution reports and the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, we included
funding specifically designated for aviation security and funding for
other programs, projects, and activities related to aviation security,
to the extent they were identifiable. In addition, these aviation
security totals do not reflect funding for activities that may support
TSA's aviation security programs and projects, such as intelligence and
administration, because TSA's documentation does not identify the
proportion of funding dedicated to support aviation security. Also,
during this time period, a number of aviation security related
activities were transferred in or out of TSA's jurisdiction, which
impact TSA funding levels for the affected fiscal years.
[25] GAO-05-356.
[26] GAO-05-356.
[27] The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007,
mandates that GAO review and confirm, upon the department's
certification, that the Secure Flight Program meets the 10 conditions
listed in section 522(a) of Public Law 108-334. See Pub. L. No. 109-
295, § 514, 120 Stat 1355, 1379 (2006). See also Pub. L. No. 108-334, §
522, 118 Stat. 1298, 1319-20 (2004). We are also conducting our ongoing
review in response to requests from the United States Senate: the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and its
Subcommittee on Aviation; Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Homeland Security; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs; Committee on Judiciary; also the House of Representatives:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Committee on Homeland
Security; and the Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform.
[28] We have ongoing work that includes collecting information about
the identity-matching systems currently used by air carriers to match
information for passengers on domestic flights against information on
the No Fly and Selectee Lists derived from the TSDB. Air carriers will
continue to conduct this name matching until Secure Flight becomes
fully operational. Our interviews with officials from the 15 air
carriers is part of this ongoing review of the air carriers' domestic
identity matching efforts. In that we did not use probability sampling
methods to select these 15 air carriers, information provided by
officials from these air carriers cannot be generalized to other air
carriers.
[29] Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
[30] GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did
Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight
Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps
to More Fully Inform the Public, GAO-05-864R (Washington, D.C.: July
22, 2005).
[31] GAO-05-356.
[32] GAO-06-374T and GAO-05-356.
[33] GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International
Passenger Prescreening are Under Way, But Planning and Implementation
Issues Remain, GAO-07-55SU (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). This
report contains information considered to be Security Sensitive
Information.
[34] GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
[35] As part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program, six airports used
private contract screeners in lieu of federal TSOs during fiscal year
2006. Despite the fact that these airports do not use federal
screeners, TSA still used the Staffing Allocation Model to determine
the full-time equivalent screening staff at each of these airports for
fiscal year 2006. These staffing levels, as determined by the model,
were to serve as a limit on the number of private screeners that the
private screening contractors could employ. According to TSA, the 1,702
total full-time equivalent staffing allocation at these airports does
not count against TSA's nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time
equivalents for TSO staff. In addition, according to the President's
fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, TSA is accepting two
additional airports--Key West and Marathon Florida--with a combined
total of 30 full-time equivalent TSOs, into the Screening Partnership
Program.
[36] According to the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request,
under previous passenger checkpoint screening procedures (prior to
August 10, 2006), airport contract employees conducted all document
checking for passengers approaching the checkpoint. TSA has determined
that a security gap exists in verifying the documentation of the
traveling public, and is seeking to close this gap to better meet its
security responsibilities through more rigorous document checking
procedures than those being done by private industry.
[37] We visited 14 airports as part of this ongoing review. We did not
use probability sampling methods to select the airports at which the
FSDs were located; therefore, information provided by these FSDs cannot
be generalized to other airports.
[38] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
enacted in December 2004, required TSA to, among other things, develop
and submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the
aviation security staffing for all airports at which TSA provides or
oversees screening services by March 2005. These standards are to
provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the
average aviation security related delay experienced by passengers is
minimized. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also
mandated that we conduct an analysis of TSA's staffing standards. Pub.
L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 (2004).
[39] GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 24, 2003).
[40] GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2, 2005).
[41] We will report on the results of this work later this year.
[42] In December 2005, TSA revised the prohibited and permitted items
list by removing (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4
inches or less in length as measured from the fulcrum and (2) tools--
such as pliers, screwdrivers, and wrenches--7 inches or less in length
(excluding crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws) from the list. Pursuant
to the change, passengers are able to bring these items onboard
commercial aircraft on domestic flights and international flights
departing the United States. See 70 Fed. Reg. 79,930 (Dec. 8, 2005). In
addition to assessing the December 2005 prohibited items list change as
part of our ongoing review of TSA's process for modifying passenger
checkpoint screening procedures, we recently initiated a mandated
review of the public safety impacts and risks, if any, of TSA's
decision to allow small and tools onboard aircraft, and will report on
the results of this work later this year.
[43] TSA conducted tests of several proposed procedures that officials
believed would have a significant impact on how TSOs perform daily
screening functions, TSO training, and customer acceptance.
[44] Covert testing involves TSA headquarters officials (national
testing) or TSA field staff and other federal employees (local testing)
attempting to carry simulated threat objects through the checkpoint
without the objects being detected by TSOs. The results of the local
covert tests are sensitive security information and the results of
national covert tests are classified, and therefore are not included in
this testimony.
[45] GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to
Build a Results Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January
2003).
[46] The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive
security information.
[47] Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosives
detection technologies and their effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage
screening operations is classified or is considered by TSA to be
sensitive security information. Accordingly, the results of our review
of this information have been removed from this testimony.
[48] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul.
28, 2006).
[49] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 113 (2006) (accompanying H.R.
5441, enacted into law as the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No.109-295, 120 Stat. 1362 (2006)).
[50] DHS's S&T is responsible for research and development of
checkpoint technologies related to aviation security, managing the
activities conducted at the Transportation Security Laboratory, and
coordinating these efforts with TSA. TSA's Passenger Screening Program
is responsible for evaluating and deploying systems to detect
explosives and weapons concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while
strengthening access control, improving screener performance, and
reducing staffing requirements.
[51] Research and development projects generally fall within the
following phases: (1) basic research includes all scientific efforts
and experimentation directed to increase knowledge and understanding in
the fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied
research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems
with a focus on developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed
solutions; (3) advanced development includes efforts directed toward
the development of hardware for field experiments; and (4) operational
testing includes evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating
environment to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of
advanced technology.
[52] GAO-05-365.
[53] TSA was required to provide for the screening of all checked
baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems by December
31, 2003. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d).
[54] TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and
international passengers will rise by about 127 million passengers over
current levels by 2010. If TSA's current estimate of an average of 0.76
checked bags per passenger were to remain constant through 2010, TSA
would be screening about 96 million more bags than it now screens. This
could increase airports' need to rely on alternative screening
procedures in the future in the absence of additional or more efficient
checked baggage screening systems.
[55] TSA, Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design
and Construction, Revised June 15, 2006.
[56] According to TSA, these 250 airports process 99 percent of all
checked baggage transported.
[57] The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request acknowledges that
it does not take into account amounts from the Aviation Security
Capital Fund because the Fund was only authorized through fiscal year
2007. As such, although the amount requested for installation reflects
an increase of $121 million from the amount specifically appropriated
in fiscal year 2007, it also reflects an overall decrease of $129
million in total funding from fiscal year 2007 absent the $250 million
previously available from the Fund.
[58] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, prohibited the use of
Airport Improvement Program funds for activities related to the
installation of in-line explosive detection systems. See Pub. L. No.
108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 283. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005,
and the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 2006,
continued this prohibition. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809,
3203 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396, 2400-01 (2005).
[59] Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, §
367, 117 Stat. 423-24. The letter of intent agreements entered into
between TSA and the airport authorities, though not a binding
commitment of federal funding, represent TSA's intent to reimburse the
airport authority for costs incurred in executing the security
improvement project--in future years and up to the agreed upon amount-
-contingent upon the receipt and availability of sufficient
appropriations to fulfill the agreement.
[60] Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by
TSA to directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification
projects without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions
take many forms and are generally not required to comply with federal
laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements; and enable the federal government and others entering into
these agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually
agreeable.
[61] The Aviation Security Capital Fund provides TSA with a mandatory
appropriation of $250 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through
2007 in support of airport improvement projects related to the
installation of explosive detection systems. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923. A
provision of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2004, precluded the use of
passenger security fees to establish the capital fund in fiscal year
2004, but the capital fund has been made available to TSA in each of
fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Congress must reauthorize the capital
fund for it to continue beyond fiscal year 2007.
[62] Of the $250 million available through the Aviation Security
Capital Fund, $125 million is designated as priority funding to fulfill
letters of intent, with the remaining $125 million available for
allocation in accordance with a formula based on the size of the
airport and risks to aviation security. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(h).
[63] Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization must follow the
same 50 percent split as mandated under the Aviation Security Capital
Fund. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(i).
[64] Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group Report, Baggage
Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, August 9, 2006.
[65] Tax credit bonds are bonds where bondholders receive credit
against their federal income tax liabilities instead of cash interest.
[66] The Passenger Facility Charge Program allows the collection of PFC
fees up to $4.50 for every enplaned passenger at commercial airports
controlled by public agencies. Airports use these fees to fund FAA-
approved projects that enhance safety, security, or capacity; reduce
noise; or increase air carrier competition.
[67] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA's Air Cargo Strategic
Plan, November 2003.
[68] TSA's Office of Intelligence (formerly know as the Transportation
Security Intelligence Service) does not independently gather
intelligence information but rather produces threat assessments using
available intelligence from sources such as DHS's Directorate of
Information Analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The details of TSA's threat assessment are
classified.
[69] At the departmental level, DHS does not have any efforts under way
specifically aimed at assessing the vulnerabilities of inbound air
cargo. However, agency officials stated that the Office of
Infrastructure Protection, an office within DHS charged with
coordinating national critical infrastructure protection efforts, is
coordinating with TSA on conducting risk assessments associated with
U.S. airports.
[70] A known shipper is an individual or business with an established
history of shipping cargo on passenger carriers.
[71] 71 Fed. Reg. 30,478 (May 26, 2006).
[72] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October
2005).
[73] TSA compliance inspections are fundamentally different from air
carriers' inspections of air cargo. TSA inspections are designed to
ensure air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements,
while air carrier inspections focus on ensuring that air cargo does not
contain an improvised explosive device or human stowaway.
[74] The Conference Report accompanying the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub L. No. 109-90, directed $30
million to the Science and Technology Directorate to conduct three
cargo screening pilot programs testing different concepts of operation.
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 53 (2005).
[75] Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-
dimensional image of the internal structures of an object from a large
series of two-dimensional X-ray images taken around a single axis of
rotation.
[76] Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Working Group Report,
Baggage Screening Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, August 9, 2006.
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