Homeland Security
Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security Gao ID: GAO-07-452T February 7, 2007The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading and coordinating--with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors--the nation's homeland security efforts. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as programs including transportation and border security, immigration enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and response. This testimony addresses: (1) why GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as a high-risk area, (2) management challenges facing DHS, (3) programmatic challenges facing DHS, and (4) actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and transformation efforts.
GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with existing program and management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management functions. DHS has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure success. While DHS has developed a strategic plan, the plan does not link resource requirements to goals and objectives, and its creation did not involve key stakeholders to ensure resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its integration efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS's financial statements revealed 10 material internal control weaknesses and confirmed that DHS's financial management systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information management, and its human capital--the centerpiece of its transformation efforts--and acquisition systems will require continued attention to ensure that DHS allocates its resources efficiently and effectively. Since GAO's January 2005 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to strengthen program activities. However, DHS continues to face programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure that its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to cargo, transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advanced contracting for goods and services necessary for emergency response. DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will address its existing management challenges. Such a plan should define the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts.
GAO-07-452T, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security
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Testimony before the:
House Homeland Security Committee:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
1 pm EST:
Wednesday, February 7, 2007:
Homeland Security:
Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of
Homeland Security:
Statement of David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States U.S. Government Accountability
Office:
GAO-07-452T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-452T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading
and coordinating”with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and
private sectors”the nation‘s homeland security efforts. GAO has
conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as
programs including transportation and border security, immigration
enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and
response. This testimony addresses:
* why GAO designated DHS‘s implementation and transformation as a high-
risk area,
* management challenges facing DHS,
* programmatic challenges facing DHS, and
* actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and
transformation efforts.
What GAO Found:
GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003
because DHS had to transform 22 agencies”several with existing program
and management challenges”into one department, and failure to
effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for
our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation
remains high risk.
Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and
complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of
key management functions that will likely span a number of years. DHS
has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is
required to help ensure success. While DHS has developed a strategic
plan, the plan does not link resource requirements to goals and
objectives, and it does not involve key stakeholders to ensure resource
investments target the highest priorities. DHS has also issued guidance
and plans to assist management integration on a function by function
basis, but lacks a comprehensive integration strategy with overall
goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its efforts. The
latest independent audit of DHS‘s financial statements revealed 10
material weaknesses and confirmed that DHS‘s financial management
systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not
institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information
management, and its human capital and acquisition systems require
further attention to ensure that DHS allocates resources efficiently
and effectively.
Since GAO‘s 2005 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to strengthen
program activities. However, DHS continues to face programmatic and
partnering challenges. To help ensure its missions are achieved, DHS
must overcome continued challenges related to cargo, transportation,
and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the
employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset
capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and
responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities;
accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting
against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advanced
contracting for emergency response goods and services.
DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it
will address its management challenges. Such a plan should define the
root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have
management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective
measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics
and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also
be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring
delays in providing access to information on its programs and
operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess
its efforts. DHS may ultimately require a chief management official
dedicated to the overall transformation process in order to expedite
and help ensure sustainable success over time.
What GAO Recommends:
This testimony contains no recommendations. However, GAO has made
numerous prior recommendations to DHS in reports addressing the issues
identified in this statement. Although DHS generally concurred with
these recommendations, it has not identified whether it has taken
corrective actions to address most of the recommendations made.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-452T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Norman Rabkin at (202)
512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee to address
management and programmatic challenges facing the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). I have spoken extensively about the fiscal
crisis our nation faces with the coming retirement of the baby boom
generation and the related growth in entitlement spending. The current
financial condition in the United States is worse than is widely
understood and is not sustainable. Meeting the long-term fiscal
challenge will require (1) significant entitlement reform to change the
path of those programs; (2) reprioritizing, restructuring and
constraining other spending programs; and (3) additional revenues--such
as through a reformed tax system. These efforts will require bipartisan
cooperation and compromise.
Irrespective of our fiscal situation, it is important for federal
departments--including DHS--to operate as efficiently and effectively
as possible in carrying out their missions. At the same time, we also
face new and uncertain threats to our security, both overseas and at
home, that require continued attention. Without this focus, the
consequences can be catastrophic. We designated the implementation and
transformation of DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that
designation in our 2005 update. In my testimony today, I will explain
why we have decided to maintain this area on our 2007 high risk list. I
will focus on four areas:
* why we originally designated DHS's implementation and transformation
as a high-risk area,
* specific management challenges that DHS continues to face,
* examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and:
* actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and
transformation efforts.
My comments today are based on our wide-ranging work on DHS since the
2005 high-risk update, as well as our institutional knowledge of
homeland security and various government organizational and management
issues. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. A listing of GAO reports related to the
transformation, management, and program challenges discussed in this
statement are contained in Appendix 1.
Summary:
We first designated DHS's implementation and transformation as high
risk in 2003 because 22 disparate agencies had to transform into one
department. Many of these individual agencies were facing their own
management and mission challenges. But most importantly, the failure to
effectively address DHS's management challenges and program risks could
have serious consequences for our homeland security as well as our
economy. We kept the DHS implementation and transformation on the high-
risk list in 2005 because serious transformation challenges continued
to hinder DHS's success. Since then, our and the DHS Inspector
General's (IG) reports have documented DHS's progress and remaining
challenges in transforming into an effective, integrated organization.
For example, in the management area, DHS has developed a strategic
plan, is working to integrate some management functions, and has
continued to form necessary partnerships to achieve mission success.
Despite these efforts, however, the DHS implementation and
transformation continues to remain on the 2007 high-risk list because
numerous management challenges remain. For example,
* Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management
integration on a function by function basis, DHS lacks a comprehensive
management integration strategy with overall goals, timelines, and a
team dedicated to support its integration efforts.
* The DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government Performance
and Results Act required elements and takes into account its non-
homeland security missions, such as responding to natural disasters.
However, DHS and its components must also improve planning by linking
resource needs to its goals and promoting greater stakeholder
involvement to ensure resource investments target the highest
priorities.
* Several DHS programs have not developed outcome-based measures to
assess performance.
* While the Secretary of DHS has expressed a commitment to risk
management, DHS has not performed comprehensive risk assessments in
transportation, trade, critical infrastructure, or the immigration and
customs systems to guide resource allocation decisions.
* Since its creation, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified or
"clean" audit opinion on its financial statements. The auditors
continue to report 10 material internal control weaknesses and that
DHS's financial systems do not substantially comply with federal
requirements. These weaknesses highlight the concern that DHS, the
second-largest government agency, may not be able to account for all of
its funding and resources or have reliable financial information for
management and budget purposes.
* DHS has not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for
information management to, among other things, guide technology
investments, and despite some progress, DHS's human capital--the
centerpiece of its transformation efforts--and acquisition systems will
require continued attention to help prevent waste and to ensure that
DHS can allocate its resources efficiently and effectively.
DHS has taken some actions to strengthen program activities in areas
such as cargo, transportation, and border security; Coast Guard
acquisition management; disaster preparedness conducting advance
contracting for goods and services; and immigration services. However,
DHS continues to face programmatic and partnering challenges. To help
ensure its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued
challenges related to:
* strengthening cargo and passenger screening, visitor tracking,
efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens, and outdated Coast
Guard asset capabilities;
* balancing its homeland security and other missions, such as disaster
preparedness; and:
* clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing
accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting
against waste, fraud, and abuse at the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA).
To be removed from GAO's high-risk list,[Footnote 1] agencies must do
three things. First, they have to produce a corrective action plan that
defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective
solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing
corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include
performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor
progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us with a draft
corrective action plan that did not contain key elements we have
identified as necessary for an effective corrective action plan,
including specific actions to address identified objectives. Second,
agencies must demonstrate significant progress in addressing the
problems identified in their corrective action plan. To date, DHS has
not been transparent in its efforts in strengthening its management
areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to
be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive towards
oversight and its delays in providing Congress and us with access to
various documents and officials have impeded our work. Finally,
agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a commitment
to achieve any remaining key objectives and sustain various
improvements in their performance over the long term. Although DHS
leaders have expressed their intent to integrate legacy agencies into
the new department, they have not dedicated the resources needed to
oversee this effort and have not been responsive to many directions
from Congress and recommendations from study groups and accountability
organizations like the IGs and GAO.
Background:
In an effort to strengthen homeland security following the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued
the National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed
legislation creating DHS in November 2002.[Footnote 2] The strategy set
forth the overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and assist in the
recovery from attacks that may occur.
DHS, which began operations in March 2003, represented a fusion of 22
federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many
homeland security activities under a single department. Although the
National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that many other
federal departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) are involved in
homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in implementing
the strategy. The strategy identified 6 mission areas and 43
initiatives. DHS was designated as the lead federal agency for 37 of
the 43 initiatives, and has activities under way in 40 of the 43
initiatives.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, represented a
historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal
government to fundamentally transform how the nation thinks of homeland
security, including how it protects itself from terrorism. Also
significant was the fact that many of the 22 departments brought
together under DHS were not focused on homeland security missions prior
to September 11, 2001. Rarely in the country's past had such a large
and complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed
with such a singular and urgent purpose. The creation of DHS
represented a unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of
agencies with multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and
effective cabinet department whose goals are to, among other things,
protect U.S. borders and infrastructure, improve intelligence and
information sharing, and prevent and respond to potential terrorist
attacks. Together with this unique opportunity, however, came a
significant risk to the nation that could occur if the department's
implementation and transformation efforts were not successful.
Mission areas designated as high risk have national significance, while
other areas designated as high risk represent management functions that
are important for agency performance and accountability. The identified
areas can have a qualitative risk that may be detrimental to public
health or safety, national security, and economic growth, or a fiscal
risk due to the size of the program in question. Examples of high-risk
areas include federal governmentwide problems, like human capital
management; large programs, like Social Security, Medicaid, and
Medicare; and more narrow issues, such as contracting at a specific
agency. The DHS transformation is unique in that it involves
reorganization, management, and program challenges simultaneously.
DHS's Transformation:
We first designated DHS's transformation as high risk in January 2003
based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in
implementing an effective transformation process, developing
partnerships, and building needed management capacity because it had to
effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees
into one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and
management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy
agencies. For example, many of the major components that were merged
into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs
Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard,
brought with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human
capital, information technology, and financial management. Finally,
DHS's national security mission was of such importance that the failure
to effectively address its management challenges and program risks
could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our
citizens' health and safety, and our economy.
Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the
creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large
organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations
than DHS, can take 5 to 7 years to achieve.[Footnote 3] On the basis of
the need for more progress in its transformation efforts, DHS's
implementation and transformation stayed on our high-risk update for
2005. Further, in November of 2006, we provided the congressional
leadership a listing of government programs, functions, and activities
that warrant further congressional oversight.[Footnote 4] Among the
issues included were DHS integration and transformation efforts.
DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges:
Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and
complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key
management functions across the department, and partnering with
stakeholders across the public and private sectors. DHS has made some
progress in each of these areas, but much additional work is required
to help ensure sustainable success. Apart from these integration
efforts, however, a successful transformation will also require DHS to
follow through on its initial actions of building capacity to improve
the management of its financial and information technology systems, as
well as its human capital and acquisition efforts.
DHS Transformation and Integration:
Thorough planning is important for DHS to successfully transform and
integrate the management functions of 22 disparate agencies into a
common framework that supports the organization as a whole. Our past
work has identified progress DHS has made in its planning
efforts.[Footnote 5] For example, the DHS strategic plan addresses five
of six Government Performance and Results Act required elements and
takes into account its non-homeland security missions, such as
responding to natural disasters. Furthermore, several DHS components
have developed their own strategic plans or strategic plans for
missions within their areas of responsibility. For example, U.S.
Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE) has produced an interim
strategic plan that identifies its goals and objectives, and the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a border patrol strategy
and an anti terrorism trade strategic plan. However, deficiencies in
DHS's planning efforts remain. A DHS-wide transformation strategy
should include a strategic plan that identifies specific budgetary,
human capital, and other resources needed to achieve stated goals. The
strategy should also involve key stakeholders to help ensure that
resource investments target the highest priorities. DHS's existing
strategic plan lacks these linkages, and DHS has not effectively
involved stakeholders in the development of the plan. DHS has also not
completed other important planning-related activities. For example,
some of DHS's components have not developed adequate outcome-based
performance measures or comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and
independently evaluate the effectiveness of their plans and
performance.
Integrating core management functions like financial, information
technology, human capital, and procurement is also important if DHS is
to transform itself into a cohesive, high-performing organization.
However, DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with
overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its
management integration efforts. In 2005, we recommended that DHS
establish implementation goals and a timeline for its management
integration efforts as part of a comprehensive integration strategy, a
key practice to help ensure success for a merger or transformation.
Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management
integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a
plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur
across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur,
how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage
them. In addition, although DHS had established a Business
Transformation Office that reported to the Under Secretary for
Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies among the
individual functional management integration efforts, that office was
not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and
integration itself. In addition to the Business Transformation Office,
we have suggested that Congress should continue to monitor whether it
needs to provide additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under
Secretary for Management or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief
Management Officer position which could help elevate, integrate, and
institutionalize DHS's management initiatives.
Finally, DHS cannot successfully achieve its homeland security mission
without working with other entities that share responsibility for
securing the homeland. Partnering for progress with other governmental
agencies and private sector entities is central to achieving its
missions. Since 2005, DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships
and has undertaken a number of coordination efforts with private sector
entities. These include, for example, partnering with (1) airlines to
improve aviation passenger and cargo screening, (2) the maritime
shipping industry to facilitate containerized cargo inspection, (3)
financial institutions to follow the money trail in immigration and
customs investigations, and (4) the chemical industry to enhance
critical infrastructure protection at such facilities.[Footnote 6] In
addition, FEMA has worked with other federal, state, and local entities
to improve planning for disaster response and recovery. However,
partnering challenges continue as DHS seeks to form more effective
partnerships to leverage resources and more effectively carry out its
homeland security responsibilities. For example, because DHS has only
limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it must
continue to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is
assessing vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also,
while TSA has taken steps to collaborate with federal and private
sector stakeholders in the implementation of its Secure Flight program,
these stakeholders stated that TSA has not provided them with the
information they would need to support TSA's efforts as they move
forward with the program.
Financial Management and Internal Controls:
DHS has made limited improvements in addressing financial management
and internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant
challenges in these areas. For example, since its creation, DHS has
been unable to obtain an unqualified or "clean" audit opinion on its
financial statements. The independent auditor's report cited 10
material weaknesses--i.e., significant deficiencies in DHS's internal
controls--showing no decrease from fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses
included financial management oversight, financial reporting, financial
systems security, and budgetary accounting. Furthermore, the report
found two other reportable conditions and instances of non- compliance
with eight laws and regulations, including the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act of 1982, the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996, and the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002.[Footnote 7] While there continue to be material
weaknesses in its financial management systems, DHS has made some
progress in this area. For example, the independent auditor's fiscal
year 2006 report noted that DHS had made improvements at the component
level to improve financial reporting during fiscal year 2006, although
many challenges were remaining. Also, DHS and its components have
reported developing corrective action plans to address the specific
material internal control weaknesses identified.
In addition to the independent audits, we have done work to assess
DHS's financial management and internal controls. For example, in 2004,
we reviewed DHS's progress in addressing financial management
weaknesses and integrating its financial systems.[Footnote 8]
Specifically, we identified weaknesses in the financial management
systems DHS inherited from the 22 component agencies, assessed DHS
progress in addressing these weaknesses, identified plans DHS had to
integrate its financial management systems, and reviewed whether the
planned systems DHS was developing would meet the requirements of
relevant financial management improvement legislation. On the basis of
our work, we recommended that DHS (1) give sustained attention to
addressing previously reported material weaknesses, reportable
conditions, and observations and recommendations; (2) complete
development of corrective action plans for all material weaknesses,
reportable conditions, and observations and recommendations; (3) ensure
that internal control weaknesses are addressed at the component level
if they were combined or reclassified at the departmentwide level; and
(4) maintain a tracking system of all auditor-identified and management-
identified control weaknesses. These recommendations are still relevant
today.
Information Technology:
A departmentwide information technology (IT) governance framework--
including controls (disciplines) aimed at effectively managing IT-
related people, processes, and tools--is vital to DHS's transformation
efforts. These controls and disciplines include:
* having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint,
as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT
investments;
* defining and following a corporate process for informed decision
making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options;
* applying system and software development and acquisition discipline
and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and
maintaining systems;
* establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect
its information and systems;
* having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and
abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and:
* centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout
the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer.[Footnote
9]
In early 2006, we testified on DHS's progress regarding its IT
management controls. At the time, we reported that DHS had made efforts
during the previous 3 to 4 years, to establish and implement IT
management controls and disciplines, but progress in these key areas
had been uneven, and more remained to be accomplished. Specifically,
DHS had made improvements in its enterprise architecture by
establishing departmentwide technology standards. It had also developed
and initiated the implementation of a plan to introduce a shared
services orientation to the architecture, particularly for information
services, such as data centers and e-mail. In addition, to strengthen
IT investment management, DHS established an acquisition project
performance reporting system, aligned its investment management cycle
and associated milestones with the department's annual budget
preparation process, and linked investment management systems to
standardize and make consistent the financial data used to make
investment decisions. Further, to develop more effective information
security management, DHS completed a comprehensive inventory of its
major information systems and implemented a departmentwide tool that
incorporates the guidance required to adequately complete security
certification and accreditation for all systems. We have ongoing work
that will update the status of DHS's IT management controls.
Despite these efforts, DHS must do more before each of these management
controls and capabilities is fully mature and institutionalized. For
example, our reviews of key nonfinancial systems shows that DHS has not
consistently employed reliable cost-estimating practices, effective
requirements development and test management, meaningful performance
measurement, strategic workforce management, and proactive risk
management, among other recognized program management best practices.
In addition, DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive information
security program; and goals related to consolidating networks and e-
mail systems, for example, remain to be fully accomplished. More work
also remains in deploying and operating IT systems and infrastructure
in support of DHS's core mission operations. For example, although a
system to identify and screen visitors entering the country has been
deployed and is operating, a related exit capability largely is not. In
addition, the Automated Commercial Environment program has not yet
demonstrated that it can accurately measure progress against its
commitments because the data it uses are not consistently
reliable.[Footnote 10] DHS must also ensure that the Chief Information
Officer is sufficiently empowered to extend management discipline and
implement common IT solutions across the department. Until DHS fully
establishes and consistently implements the full range of IT management
disciplines embodied in its framework and related federal guidance and
best practices, it will be challenged in its ability to effectively
manage and deliver programs.
Human Capital Systems:
DHS has made some progress in transforming its human capital systems,
but more work remains.[Footnote 11] Some of the most pressing human
capital challenges at DHS include (1) successfully completing its
ongoing transformation, (2) forging a unified results-oriented culture
across the department (line of sight), (3) linking daily operations to
strategic outcomes, (4) rewarding individuals based on individual,
team, unit, and organizational results, (5) obtaining, developing,
providing incentives to, and retaining needed talent, and (6) most
importantly, leadership both at the top, to include a chief operating
officer (COO) or chief management officer (CMO). A strategic workforce
plan is integral to defining the level of staffing, identifying the
critical skills needed to mission achievement, and eliminating gaps to
prepare the agency for future needs. In 2005, we reported that DHS had
initiated strategic human capital planning efforts and published
proposed regulations for a modern human capital management
system.[Footnote 12] We also reported that DHS's leadership was
committed to the human capital system design process and had formed
teams to implement the resulting regulations. Since our report, DHS has
finalized its human capital regulations, and although certain labor
management provisions are the subject of litigation, it is vital that
DHS implement its human capital system effectively because strategic
human capital management is the centerpiece of any transformation
effort.[Footnote 13] Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some
actions to integrate the legacy agency workforces that make up its
components. For example, it standardized pay grades for criminal
investigators at ICE and developed promotion criteria for investigators
and CBP officers that equally recognize the value of the experience
brought to ICE and CBP by employees of each legacy agency. DHS also
made progress in establishing human capital capabilities for the US-
VISIT program, which should help ensure that it has sufficient staff
with the necessary skills and abilities to implement the program
effectively. CBP also developed training plans that link its officer
training to CBP strategic goals.
Despite these efforts, however, DHS must still (1) create a clearer
crosswalk between departmental training goals and objectives and DHS's
broader organizational and human capital goals, (2) develop appropriate
training performance measures and targets for goals and strategies
identified in its departmentwide strategic training plan, and (3)
address our earlier recommendations that its new human capital system
be linked to its strategic plan. We have also made recommendations to
specific program offices and organizational entities to help ensure
that human capital resources are provided to improve the effectiveness
of management capabilities, and that human capital plans are developed
that clearly describe how these components will recruit, train, and
retain staff to meet their growing demands as they expand and implement
new program elements. We are completing an updated review of DHS's
human capital efforts and plan to report on our results soon. This
report will discuss information on selected human capital issues at
DHS: attrition rates at DHS; senior-level vacancies at DHS; DHS's use
of human capital flexibilities, the Intergovernmental Personnel Act,
and personal services contracts; and DHS's compliance with the
Vacancies Reform Act.
Acquisition Management:
DHS continues to face challenges in creating an effective, integrated
acquisition organization. Since its inception in March 2003, DHS has
made progress in implementing a strategic sourcing program to increase
the effectiveness of its buying power and in creating a small business
program. These programs have promoted an environment in which there is
a collaborative effort toward the common goal of an efficient, unified
organization. Strategic sourcing allows DHS components to formulate
purchasing strategies to leverage buying power and increase savings for
a variety of products like office supplies, boats, energy, and weapons,
while its small business program works to ensure small businesses can
compete effectively for the agency's contract dollars. However, DHS's
progress toward creating a unified acquisition organization has been
hampered by policy decisions. In March 2005, we reported that an
October 2004 management directive, Acquisition Line of Business
Integration and Management, while emphasizing the need for a unified,
integrated acquisition organization, relies on a system of dual
accountability between the chief procurement officer and the heads of
the departments to make this happen.[Footnote 14] This situation has
created ambiguity about who is accountable for acquisition decisions.
We also found that the various acquisition organizations within DHS are
still operating in a disparate manner, with oversight of acquisition
activities left primarily up to each individual component.
Specifically, we reported that (1) there were components exempted from
the unified acquisition organization, (2) the chief procurement officer
had insufficient staff for departmentwide oversight, and (3) staffing
shortages led the office of procurement operations to rely extensively
on outside agencies for contracting support.[Footnote 15] In March
2005, we recommended that, among other things, the Secretary of
Homeland Security provide the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
with sufficient resources and enforcement authority to enable effective
departmentwide oversight of acquisition policies and procedures, and to
revise the October 2004 management directive to eliminate reference to
the Coast Guard and Secret Service as being exempt from complying with
the directive. Unless DHS addresses these challenges, it is at risk of
continuing to exist as a fragmented acquisition organization. Because
some of DHS's components have major, complex acquisition programs--for
example, the Coast Guard's Deepwater program (designed to replace or
upgrade its cutters and aircraft) and CBP's Secure Border Initiative--
DHS needs to improve the oversight of contractors and should adhere to
a rigorous management review process.
Programmatic Challenges Facing DHS:
DHS continues to face challenges, many of which were inherited from its
component legacy agencies, in carrying out its programmatic activities.
These challenges include enhancing transportation security,
strengthening the management of U.S. Coast Guard acquisitions and
meeting the Coast Guard's new homeland security missions, improving the
regulation of commercial trade while ensuring protection against the
entry of illegal goods and dangerous visitors at U.S. borders and ports
of entry, and improving enforcement of immigration laws, including
worksite immigration laws, and the provision of immigration services.
DHS must also effectively coordinate the mitigation and response to all
hazards, including natural disaster planning, response, and recovery.
DHS has taken actions to address these challenges, for example, by
strengthening passenger and baggage screening, increasing the oversight
of Coast Guard acquisitions, more thoroughly screening visitors and
cargo, dedicating more resources to immigration enforcement, becoming
more efficient in the delivery of immigration services, and conducting
better planning for disaster preparation. However, challenges remain in
each of these major mission areas.
Transportation Security:
Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in
effectively executing transportation security efforts. We have
recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) more
fully integrate a risk management approach--including assessments of
threat, vulnerability, and criticality--in prioritizing security
efforts within and across all transportation modes; strengthen
stakeholder coordination; and implement needed technological upgrades
to secure commercial airports.[Footnote 16] DHS has made progress in
all of these areas, particularly in aviation, but must expand its
security focus more towards surface modes of transportation and
continue to seek best practices and coordinated security efforts with
the international community. DHS and TSA have taken numerous actions to
strengthen commercial aviation security, including strengthening
passenger and baggage screening, improving aspects of air cargo
security, and strengthening the security of international flights and
passengers bound for the United States.[Footnote 17] For example, TSA
increased efforts to measure the effectiveness of airport screening
systems through covert testing and other means and has worked to
enhance passenger and baggage screener training. TSA also improved its
processes for identifying and responding to threats onboard commercial
aircraft and has modified airport screening procedures based on risk.
Despite this progress, however, TSA continues to face challenges in
implementing a program to match domestic airline passenger information
against terrorist watch lists, fielding needed technologies to screen
airline passengers for explosives, and strengthening aspects of
passenger rail security.[Footnote 18] In addition, TSA has not
developed a strategy, as required, for securing the various modes of
transportation. As a result, rail and other surface transportation
stakeholders are unclear regarding what TSA's role will ultimately be
in establishing and enforcing security requirements within their
transportation modes. We have recommended that TSA more fully integrate
risk-based decision making within aviation and across all
transportation modes, strengthen passenger prescreening, and enhance
rail security efforts. We have also recommended that TSA work to
develop sustained and effective partnerships with other government
agencies, the private sector, and international partners to coordinate
security efforts and seek potential best practices, among other
efforts.
Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions:
The Coast Guard needs to improve the management of its acquisitions and
continue to enhance its security mission while meeting other mission
responsibilities. We recommended that the Coast Guard improve its
management of the Deepwater program by strengthening key management and
oversight activities, implementing procedures to better ensure
contractor accountability, and controlling future costs by promoting
competition.[Footnote 19] In April 2006, we reported the Coast Guard
had made some progress in addressing these recommendations. For
example, the Coast Guard has addressed our recommendation to ensure
better contractor accountability by providing for better input from
U.S. Coast Guard performance monitors.[Footnote 20] However, even with
these improvements, some Deepwater assets have recently experienced
major setbacks due to design concerns in two classes of replacement
cutters. Further, other Coast Guard acquisition programs--such as the
Rescue 21 emergency distress and communications system--have
experienced major cost increases, schedule delays, and performance
shortfalls.
The Coast Guard has made progress in balancing its homeland security
and traditional missions. The Coast Guard is unlike many other DHS
components because it has substantial missions not related to homeland
security. These missions include maritime navigation, icebreaking,
protecting the marine environment, marine safety, and search and rescue
for mariners in distress. Furthermore, unpredictable natural disasters,
such as Hurricane Katrina, can place intense demands on all Coast Guard
resources. The Coast Guard must continue executing these traditional
missions and balance those responsibilities with its homeland security
obligations, which have increased significantly since September 11.
Border Security and the Regulation of Trade:
DHS has made some progress but still faces an array of challenges in
securing the border while improving the regulation of commercial
trade.[Footnote 21] Since 2005, DHS agencies have made some progress in
implementing our recommendations to refine the screening of foreign
visitors to the United States, target potentially dangerous cargo, and
provide the personnel necessary to effectively fulfill border security
and trade agency missions. As of January 2006, DHS had a pre-entry
screening capability in place in overseas visa issuance offices, and an
entry identification capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154
land ports of entry. Furthermore, the Secretary of Homeland Security
has made risk management at ports and all critical infrastructure
facilities a key priority for DHS. In addition, DHS developed
performance goals and measures for its trade processing system and
implemented a testing and certification process for its officers to
provide better assurance of effective cargo examination targeting
practices. However, efforts to assess and mitigate risks of DHS's and
the Department of State's implementation of the Visa Waiver Program
remain incomplete, increasing the risk that the program could be
exploited by someone who intends harm to the United States. Further,
many of DHS's border-related performance goals and measures are not
fully defined or adequately aligned with one another, and some
performance targets are not realistic. For example, CBP has not yet put
key controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that its
screening system is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers
with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass
destruction, nor has it found a way to incorporate inspection results
back into the targeting system. Other trade and visitor screening
systems have weaknesses that must be overcome to better ensure border
and trade security. For example, deficiencies in the identification of
counterfeit documentation at land border crossings into the United
States create vulnerabilities that terrorists or others involved in
criminal activity could exploit. We also reported that DHS's Container
Security Initiative to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at
foreign ports before they leave for the United States has not achieved
key goals because of staffing imbalances, the lack of minimum technical
requirements for inspection equipment used at foreign ports, and
insufficient performance measures to assess the effectiveness of
targeting and inspection activities.
Enforcement of Immigration Laws:
DHS has taken some actions to improve enforcement of immigration laws,
including worksite immigration laws, but the number of resources
devoted to enforcing immigration laws is limited given that there are
an estimated 12 million illegal aliens residing in the United States.
DHS has strengthened some aspects of immigration enforcement, including
allocating more investigative work years to immigration functions than
the Immigration and Naturalization Service did prior to the creation of
DHS. Nevertheless, effective enforcement will require more attention to
efficient resource use and updating outmoded management
systems.[Footnote 22] In April 2006, ICE announced an interior
enforcement strategy to bring criminal charges against employers who
knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also reported increases in
the number of criminal arrests and indictments for these violations
since fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE has plans to shift
responsibility for identifying incarcerated criminal aliens eligible
for removal from the United States from the Office of Investigations to
its Office of Detention and Removal, freeing those investigative
resources for other immigration and customs investigations. ICE has
also begun to introduce principles of risk management into the
allocation of its investigative resources. However, enforcement of
immigration enforcement laws needs to be strengthened and significant
management challenges remain. DHS's ability to locate and remove
millions of aliens who entered the country illegally or overstayed the
terms of their visas is questionable, and implementing an effective
worksite enforcement program remains an elusive goal. ICE's Office of
Investigations has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the
customs and immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for
exploitation by criminals and terrorists. This office also lacks
outcome-based performance goals that relate to its objective of
preventing the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and
immigration systems, and it does not have sufficient systems in place
to help ensure systematic monitoring and communication of
vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations. Moreover, the
current employment verification process used to identify workers
ineligible for employment in the United States has not fundamentally
changed since its establishment in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses have
undermined its effectiveness. We have recommended that DHS take actions
to help address these weaknesses and to strengthen the current process
by issuing final regulations on changes to the employment verification
process which will reduce the number of documents suitable for proving
eligibility to work in the United States. Some other countries require
foreign workers to present work authorization documents at the time of
hire and require employers to review these documents and report
workers' information to government agencies for collecting taxes and
social insurance contributions, and conducting worksite enforcement
actions.
Provision of Immigration Services:
Although DHS has made progress in reducing its backlog of immigration
benefit applications, improvements are still needed in the provision of
immigration services, particularly by strengthening internal controls
to prevent fraud and inaccuracy.[Footnote 23] Since 2005, DHS has
enhanced the efficiency of certain immigration services. For example,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimated that it had
reduced its backlog of immigration benefits applications from a peak of
3.8 million cases to 1.2 million cases from January 2004 to June 2005.
USCIS has also established a focal point for immigration fraud,
outlined a fraud control strategy that relies on the use of automation
to detect fraud, and is performing fraud assessments to identify the
extent and nature of fraud for certain benefits. However, DHS still
faces significant challenges in its ability to effectively provide
immigration services while at the same time protecting the immigration
system from fraud and mismanagement. USCIS may have adjudicated tens of
thousands of naturalization applications without alien files, and
adjudicators were not required to record whether the alien file was
available when they adjudicated the application. Without these files,
DHS may not be able to take enforcement action against an applicant and
could also approve an application for an ineligible applicant. In
addition, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of our internal
control standards or fraud control best practices identified by leading
audit organizations. Such best practices would include (1) a
comprehensive risk management approach, (2) mechanisms for ongoing
monitoring during the course of normal activities, (3) clear
communication agencywide regarding how to balance production-related
goals with fraud-prevention activities, and (4) performance goals for
fraud prevention.
Disaster Preparedness and Response:
We have reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.[Footnote 24] Since FEMA
became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities have been
dispersed and its role has continued to evolve. Hurricane Katrina
severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local
levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Our
analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood
leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the
necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. In September 2006, we
recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to
take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when
there is warning. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously re-test,
train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership,
implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems;
(2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and its
supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and
detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and
direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and
exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness,
response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and
regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts
to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim
National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in
deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific
capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released its Supplement to the
Catastrophic Incident Annex--both designed to further clarify federal
roles and responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and
local governments and responders. However, these revisions have not
been tested. DHS has also announced a number of actions intended to
improve readiness and response based on our work and the work of
congressional committees and the Administration. For example, DHS is
currently reorganizing FEMA as required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS
appropriations act.[Footnote 25] DHS has also announced a number of
other actions to improve readiness and response. However, there is
little information available on the extent to which these changes are
operational. Finally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly
following Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the
magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster
assistance, or ensure that there were provisions in contracts for
response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in
all cases. We recommended that DHS create accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We also recommended that DHS
provide guidance on advance procurement practices (pre-contracting) and
procedures for those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities
under the NRP so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related
procurement, and establish an assessment process to monitor agencies'
continuous planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement
needs and the maintenance of capabilities.[Footnote 26] For example, we
identified a number of emergency response practices in the public and
private sectors that provide insight into how the federal government
can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These include both
developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices and
establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and
establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity
to match the response with the need.
Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS's Transformation and Integration
Efforts:
To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a
corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified
problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and
provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near
term. Such a plan should include performance measures, metrics and
milestones to measure their progress. Agencies should also demonstrate
significant progress in addressing the problems identified in their
corrective action plan. This should include a program to monitor and
independently validate progress. Finally, agencies, in particular top
leadership, must demonstrate a commitment to sustain initial
improvements. This would include a strong commitment to address the
risk(s) that put the program or function on the high-risk list and
provide for the allocation of sufficient people and resources
(capacity) to resolve the risk(s) and ensure that improvements are
sustainable over the long term.
In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us a draft corrective action plan
for addressing its transformation challenges. This plan addressed major
management areas we had previously identified as key to DHS's
transformation--management integration through the DHS management
directorate and financial, information, acquisition, and human capital
management. The plan identified an overall goal to develop and
implement key department wide processes and systems to support DHS's
transformation into a department capable of planning, operating, and
managing as one effective department.
In the short term, the plan sought to produce significant improvements
over the next 7 years that further DHS's ability to operate as one
department. Although the plan listed accomplishments and general goals
for the management functions, it did not contain (1) objectives linked
to those goals that are clear, concise, and measurable; (2) specific
actions to implement those objectives; (3) information linking
sufficient people and resources to implement the plan; or (4) an
evaluation program to monitor and independently validate progress
toward meeting the goals and measuring the effectiveness of the plan.
In addition to developing an effective corrective action plan, agencies
must show that significant progress has taken place in improving
performance in the areas identified in its corrective action plan.
While our work has noted progress at DHS, for us to remove the DHS
implementation and transformation and from our high-risk list, we need
to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has
implemented many of our past recommendations, or has taken other
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives. Our work
for Congress assessing DHS's operations has been significantly hampered
by long delays in granting us access to program documents and
officials, or by questioning our access to information needed to
conduct our reviews. We are troubled by the impact that DHS's processes
and internal reviews have had on our ability to assess departmental
programs and operations. Given the problems we have experienced in
obtaining access to DHS information, it will be difficult for us to
sustain the level of oversight that Congress has directed and that is
needed to effectively oversee the department, including the level of
oversight needed to assess DHS's progress in addressing the existing
transformation, integration, and programmatic challenges identified in
this statement.
Finally, to be removed from our high-risk list, any progress that
occurs must be sustainable over the long term. DHS's leaders need to
make and demonstrate a commitment to implementing a transformed
organization. The Secretary has stated such a commitment, most
prominently as part of his "second stage review" in the summer of 2005,
and more recently in remarks made at George Washington University's
Homeland Security Policy Institute. However, appropriate follow-up is
required to assure that transformation plans are effectively
implemented and sustained, to include the allocation of adequate
resources to support transformation efforts. In this regard, we were
pleased when DHS established a Business Transformation Office, but we
believe that the office's effectiveness was limited because the
department did not give it the authority and responsibility needed to
be successful. We understand that this office has recently been
eliminated. Further, department leaders can show their commitment to
transforming DHS by acting on recommendations made by the Congress,
study groups, and accountability organizations such as its Office of
the IG and GAO. Although we have also seen some progress in this area,
it is not enough for us to conclude that DHS is committed to and
capable of quickly incorporating corrective actions into its
operations. Therefore, until DHS produces an acceptable corrective
action plan, demonstrates progress reforming its key management
functions, and dedicates the resources necessary to sustain this
progress, it will likely remain on our high-risk list.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this completes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or
other members of the committee may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin,
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-
8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov. Other individuals making key contributions to
this testimony include Cathleen Berrick, Paul Jones, Christopher
Conrad, Anthony DeFrank, Nancy Briggs, and Aaron Stern.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Related GAO Products:
Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security:
Implementation and Transformation:
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2007.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities,
but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-899T. Washington, D.C.: June
21, 2006.
Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring the
Effectiveness of Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612.
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management
Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. GAO-06-206.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2005.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities. GAO-05-
434. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security
Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning Process
Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. GAO-05-300. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach
Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139. Washington, D.C.:
March 16, 2005.
Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal
Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices. GAO-
05-49. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2004.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned
for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO-
03-293SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO/OGC-00-12. Washington, D.C.: August 2000.
Financial Management and Internal Controls:
Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to Incorporate
Best Practices in Modernization Efforts. GAO-06-553T. Washington, D.C.:
March 29, 2006.
Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces Significant
Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-774. Washington, D.C.: July 19,
2004.
Information Technology:
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management
Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. May 31, 2006.
Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread
Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure
Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006.
Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on
Department's Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T.
Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.
Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on Immigration
and Customs Enforcement's Infrastructure Modernization Program. GAO- 05-
805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005.
Information Technology: Federal Agencies Face Challenges in
Implementing Initiatives to Improve Public Health Infrastructure. GAO-
05-308. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment
Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements Continues.
GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Human Capital Systems:
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. Washington,
D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but
Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T. Washington,
D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training
Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2005.
Acquisition Management:
Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition
Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.
Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create an
Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, D.C.: March
29, 2005.
Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of
Special DHS Acquisition Authority. GAO-05-136. Washington, D.C.:
December 15, 2004.
Transportation Security:
Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive
Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened. GAO-06-
795. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: Jul.
28, 2006.
Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State
Safety Oversight Program. GAO-06-821. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006.
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T.
Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.
Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April
4, 2006.
Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2006.
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: November
28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-
781. Washington, D.C.: September 6. 2005.
Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should
Be Strengthened. GAO-05-930. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2005.
Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted
Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T.
Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Coast Guard Acquisitions and Non-Homeland Security Missions:
United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and
Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition. GAO-06-623. Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2006.
Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted. GAO-06-
546. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny
with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GA0-05-404. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2005.
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380.
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
Border Security and the Regulation of Trade:
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.
Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2006.
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management
Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border
Surveillance Technology Program. GAO-06-295. Washington, D.C.: February
22, 2006.
Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border
Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296. Washington, D.C.:
February 14, 2006.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859.
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and
Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department
of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. Washington,
D.C.: July 29, 2005.
Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest
Differences in Sector Performance. GAO-05-435. Washington, D.C.: July
22, 2005.
Enforcement of Immigration Laws:
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and
Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-06-895T. Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2006.
Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in
the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. Washington,
D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and
Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.
Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.
Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's
Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington,
D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and
Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. Washington, D.C.: August 31,
2005.
Provision of Immigration Services:
Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien
Files Are Located when Needed. GAO-07-85. Washington, D.C.: October 27,
2006.
Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy
Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud. GAO-06-259.
Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006.
Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and
Ensure Quality of Adjudications. GAO-06-20. Washington, D.C.: November
21, 2005.
Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call
Centers. GAO-05-526. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Disaster Preparedness and Response:
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for
Health Facilities Should be Addressed. GAO-06-826. Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June16, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05-
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High
Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2000).
[2] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
[3] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons
Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
[4] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
[5] GAO, Results Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning
Process Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005); Homeland Security: Better Management
Practices Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate Investigative
Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006); Border
Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in
Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22, 2005).
[6] GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May
Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 9, 2006); Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation
and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T (Washington,
D.C.: May 17, 2005); Homeland Security: Better Management Practices
Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-
462T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006); and Homeland Security: DHS Is
Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is
Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006).
[7] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General.
Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2006 Financial Statements. OIG-
07-10. (Washington, D.C.: November 2006).
[8] GAO, Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces
Significant Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774 (Washington,
D.C.: July 19, 2004).
[9] GAO, Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain
on Department's Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).
[10] GAO, Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on
Automated Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing
Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580 May 31, 2006.
[11] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of
Training Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005); Information on Immigration
Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the Department of Homeland
Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border
Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006); Homeland
Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but
Management Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006); and Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to
Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854
(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).
[12] GAO, Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland
Security Management Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20,
2005).
[13] The Homeland Security Act gave DHS authorization to design a human
capital management system to meet its unique missions. In January 2005,
DHS announced its final human capital management system regulations.
Although DHS intended to implement a new personnel system in 2005,
court decisions have resulted in further delays. According to DHS OIG,
these delays will impact the cost of implementation, the current
development and implementation contract, and the ability to properly
manage the workforce. Department of Homeland Security, Office of
Inspector General. Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of
Homeland Security, OIG-06-14 (Washington, D.C.: December 2005).
[14] GAO, Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to
Create an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 29, 2005).
[15] GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective
Acquisition Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July. 27,
2006).
[16] GAO, Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security
Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls
Needed, GAO-05-781 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005); Aviation
Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo
Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005; Rail Transit:
Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety
Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006); and
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July
28, 2006).
[17] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening
Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul.
28, 2006); Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,
2005); and Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and
Checked Baggage, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 4, 2006).
[18] GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).
[19] GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).
[20] GAO, Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and
Program Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted,
GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006).
[21] GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006); Border Security: Key
Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance
Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2006);
Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated
Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management
Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006);
and Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key
Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).
[22] GAO, Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory
Promotions in the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R
(Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006); Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses
Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-
895T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006); and Homeland Security: Better
Management Practices Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Allocate
Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006).
[23] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help
Ensure Alien Files Are Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 27, 2006); Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a
Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit
Fraud, GAO-06-259 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2006); and Immigration
Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of
Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2005).
[24] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[25] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 303 (2006).
[26] See GAO-06-618.
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