Homeland Security
Preparing for and Responding to Disasters Gao ID: GAO-07-395T March 9, 2007The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 stipulates major changes to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the agency's preparedness for and response to catastrophic disasters. For example, the act establishes a new mission for and new leadership positions within FEMA. As GAO has reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective response while also protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to overcome these challenges This testimony summarizes earlier GAO work on: (1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the Post-Katrina Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for continued Congressional attention.
GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic disasters--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act will address many of these issues, and FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas. But their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested. As a result of its body of work, GAO's recommendations included that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed operational implementation plans support the National Response Plan (NRP); (3) provide guidance and direction for all planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in making its investment decisions. We also recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take action to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
GAO-07-395T, Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Friday, March 9, 2007:
Homeland Security:
Preparing for and Responding to Disasters:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-395T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-395T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 stipulates
major changes to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the agency‘s
preparedness for and response to catastrophic disasters. For example,
the act establishes a new mission for and new leadership positions
within FEMA
As GAO has reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems
to provide effective response while also protecting against waste,
fraud, and abuse. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has
taken steps to overcome these challenges
This testimony summarizes earlier
GAO work on: (1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability
controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the Post-Katrina
Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for continued
Congressional attention.
What GAO Found:
GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to
more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and
recovery efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in
leadership roles and responsibilities, development of necessary
disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need
for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and
abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal
authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all
government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated,
and well understood. Improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic
disasters”particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and
awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search
and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering.
Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act
will address many of these issues, and FEMA has initiated reviews and
some actions in each of these areas. But their operational impact in a
major disaster has not yet been tested.
As a result of its body of work, GAO‘s recommendations included that
DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent
clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority
for all levels of leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed
operational implementation plans support the National Response Plan
(NRP); (3) provide guidance and direction for all planning, training,
and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness,
response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and
regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies‘ efforts
to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim
National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in
making its investment decisions. We also recommended that Congress give
federal agencies explicit authority to take action to prepare for all
types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested
that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a
strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover,
and rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider
several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1)
evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness
System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing
state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance
those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and
preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and
(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
What GAO Recommends:
This testimony contains no new recommendations but does identify issues
that Congress and DHS may wish to give continued attention to so that
FEMA may more effectively fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina
Reform Act.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr.
at (202) 512-8757 or jenkinsWO@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on disaster
preparation and response. The goal of disaster preparedness and
response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as
follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set
the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre-and
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
GAO has identified disaster preparedness and response as a major
challenge for the 21st century. In 2005, GAO issued a special report
examining the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook, the
nation's ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American
society, and the future role of the federal government. Among the
issues discussed was homeland security.[Footnote 1] In our report we
identified the following illustrative challenges and questions for
examining emergency preparedness and response:
* What is an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level
of risk? The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an
unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable
level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments,
particularly federal funding. What criteria should be used to target
federal and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize
results and mitigate risk within available resource levels?
* What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in
identifying risks--from nature or man--in individual states and
localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and
capacities that first responders need?
* Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector
protection of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and what
changes might be necessary?
* What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results
management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and who
is accountable for the many components of homeland security when many
partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How can these
actors be held accountable and by whom? What costs should be borne by
federal, state, and local governments or the private sector in
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters large and
small--whether the acts of nature or the deliberate or accidental acts
of man?
* To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and
foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency planning
and response?
These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of
government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to
major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and
capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response
to major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of
multiple actors from multiple first responder disciplines,
jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental
entities. Parochialism must be put aside and cooperation must prevail
before and after an emergency event. The experience of Hurricane
Katrina illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult
issues.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006[Footnote 2]
(Post-Katrina Reform Act) requires major changes designed to increase
the effectiveness of preparedness and response. The act has established
new leadership positions and position requirements within the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), establishes new missions for FEMA,
requires the transfer of preparedness functions to it, and requires the
FEMA Administrator to undertake a broad range of activities before and
after disasters occur. However, as the Comptroller General testified
last month on DHS's high-risk status and specifically disaster
preparedness and response, DHS must overcome continued challenges,
including those related to clearly defining leadership roles and
responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities,
and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services
while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings regarding
leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2)
discusses the organizational changes provided for the in the Post-
Katrina Reform Act; and (3) highlights several disaster management
issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are
based on our Hurricane Katrina work on disaster and emergency
management and our review of recent emergency management reform
legislative changes. We conducted our audit work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains a
selected list of GAO reports related to my statement.
Summary:
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of
an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and
define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how
well it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The
principal national documents designed to address each of these are,
respectively, the National Response Plan, the National Incident
Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we reported that DHS needs to
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts more
effectively.[Footnote 3] FEMA officials have acknowledged that FEMA was
unprepared for a disaster of Katrina's geographic scope and
destruction, including an unprecedented number of displaced households.
Our analysis showed improvements were needed in leadership roles and
responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities,
and accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast
and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and
abuse. Legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of
authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and
effective decision making. We found improved capabilities for
catastrophic disasters were needed --particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3)
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care
and sheltering. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms
help to ensure that resources are used appropriately. FEMA has
initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their
operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested.
In line with a similar recommendation following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended
that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions
to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is
warning. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and
exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and
lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes
needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the
NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be
supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans;
(3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a
jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring
federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities
under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a
risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite
resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. The
Post-Katrina Reform Act requires major changes within DHS, and at FEMA
particularly, designed to increase the effectiveness of preparedness
and response. Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's
organizational changes, related roles and responsibilities and
capabilities should address many of our emergency management
observations and recommendations.
In his November 2006 letter to Congress on oversight issues, the
Comptroller General suggested that one area for fundamental reform and
oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare
for, respond to, recover from, and rebuild after catastrophic events.
Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate
oversight. These include (1) evaluating development and implementation
of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an
influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the
use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining
regional and multistate planning and preparation; (4) determining the
status of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices
regarding oversight assistance.
Background:
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford
Act)[Footnote 4] primarily establishes the programs and processes for
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources,
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes
all 50 states and the District of Columbia. We have ongoing work
examining how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used
in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to
report within a few months.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 5] required the newly
established DHS to develop a comprehensive National Incident Management
System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for
incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the
cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles and
responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and various
first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency event. It
also prescribes interoperable communications systems and preparedness
before an incident happens, including planning, training, and
exercises. The act required DHS to consolidate existing federal
government emergency response plans into a single, integrated and
coordinated national response plan. DHS issued the National Response
Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan
establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the management of
domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary. The NRP,
operating within the framework of NIMS, provides the structure and
mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for
domestic incident management. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic
Incident Annex, which describes an accelerated, proactive national
response to catastrophic incidents.
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of
an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and
define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how
well it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The
principal national documents designed to address each of these are,
respectively, the National Response Plan, the National Incident
Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. The interim
National Preparedness Goal, required by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8, is particularly important for determining what
capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic disaster. All
states and urban areas are to align existing preparedness strategies
within the National Preparedness Goal's eight national
priorities.[Footnote 6] The December 2005 draft National Preparedness
Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first responders
should possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from a
wide range of incidents and the most critical tasks associated with
these capabilities. An inability to effectively perform these critical
tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental affect on effective
protection, prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. A final
National Preparedness Goal is expected to be released soon.
As the subcommittee is aware, beginning in February 2006, reports by
the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,[Footnote 7] the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,[Footnote 8] the White
House Homeland Security Council,[Footnote 9] the DHS Inspector
General,[Footnote 10] and DHS and FEMA[Footnote 11] all identified a
variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for,
response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Collectively,
these reports, along with GAO's various reports and testimonies,
offered a number of specific recommendations for improving the nation's
ability to effectively prepare for and respond to catastrophic
disasters. Table 1 contains the resulting reports and a brief
description of their findings.
Table 1: Findings in Reports by Congress and the Administration:
Title and author: DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina
in Louisiana (February 13, 2006); Source: FEMA;
Major findings: Found improvements needed in areas of communications
and interoperability; FEMA staffing, unified command, logistics and
staging, and operating procedures. Recommendations for FEMA included:
work to strengthen emergency management capability at state and local
levels; review emergency management architecture for response and
recovery operations; train, equip, and staff response teams; improve
the financial management of disasters; improve leadership and
management; establish command authority in the Joint Field Office
(JFO); and continue catastrophic planning with federal, state, and
local governments.
Title and author: A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 15, 2006); Source: House of
Representatives; House Select Bipartisan Committee;
Major findings: Identified 14 major findings including the following:
critical elements of the NRP were executed late, ineffectively, or not
at all; there was massive communications damage; command and control
was impaired at all levels, delaying relief; and the military played an
invaluable role but coordination was lacking, among others. No
recommendations provided.
Title and author: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (February 23, 2006); Source: White House Homeland Security
Council;
Major findings: Identified 17 critical challenges including national
preparedness, integrated use of military capabilities, communications,
logistics and evacuation, search and rescue, public safety and
security, public health and medical support, human services, mass care
and housing, public communications, critical infrastructure and impact
assessment, environmental hazards and debris removal, foreign
assistance, non-governmental aid, training, exercises, and lessons
learned, professional development and education, citizen and community
preparedness. Identified 125 recommendations for DHS, Department of
Defense, and other federal departments and agencies, including 44 that
were to be implemented by June 1, 2006.
Title and author: A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina (March 31, 2006); Source:
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General;
Major findings: Found FEMA adapted to new response plans with
difficulty; FEMA provided record levels of support but needs to improve
delivery structure; and FEMA needs to improve readiness. Identified 38
recommendations.
Title and author: Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared: Report
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (May
2006); Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs;
Major findings: Found differing roles at different levels of government
affected the response; long-term and short-term warnings went unheeded;
preparation proved insufficient; response at all levels of government
was unacceptable; long-term factors contributed to poor response; and
waste, fraud, and abuses were identified. Report identified seven
foundational recommendations based on identified systematic weaknesses
and challenges.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch and congressional reports.
[End of table]
Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will
Improve Emergency Management:
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS
as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act,
whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested
disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Based on work done
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that
DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness,
response, and recovery efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters
in which the response capabilities of state and local governments are
almost immediately overwhelmed.[Footnote 12] Our analysis showed the
need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and
responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from
Catastrophic Disasters:
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and
effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve
leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a
catastrophic disaster. For example, there were problems with roles and
responsibilities under the NRP and ambiguities about both what
constituted an incident of national significance to trigger the NRP and
what constituted a catastrophic incident to trigger the proactive
response of the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex. On May 25, 2006, DHS
released changes to the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as which
situations require secretarial leadership; the process for declaring
incidents of national significance; and the scope of the NRP and its
Catastrophic Incident Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports directly to the President,
is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of national
significance, including catastrophic ones. At the time of Katrina, the
supplement to the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more
detail on implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic
Incident Annex, dated August 2006.
The White House Homeland Security Council report included 44
recommendations that were intended for quick implementation, of which
18 were focused on improving and clarifying the legal authorities,
roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority. DHS has provided
limited information on the status of its implementation of the White
House recommendations, although it has reported actions taken on some
issues raised in the White House Homeland Security Council report and
in other reports. For example, DHS has pre-designated Principal Federal
Officials and Federal Coordinating Officers for regions and states at
risk of hurricanes and described their respective roles in coordinating
disaster response--which was a source of some confusion in the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina. However, the changes may not have fully
resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of the principal
federal officer and federal coordinating officer. While the Secretary
of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by appointing a single
individual to serve in both positions in nonterrorist incidents,
confusion may persist if the Secretary of Homeland Security does not
exercise this discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion does
not exist for terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP does not
specifically provide a rationale for this limitation.
Congress also raised concerns in 2006 that FEMA's performance problems
during the response to Hurricane Katrina may have stemmed from its
organizational placement and its budgetary relationship within DHS. In
May 2006, we noted that organizational changes alone, while potentially
important, were not likely to adequately address the underlying
systemic conditions that resulted in FEMA's performance
problems.[Footnote 13] We noted that a number of factors other than
organizational placement may be more important to FEMA's success in
responding to and recovering from future disasters, including
catastrophic ones. Conditions underlying FEMA's performance during
Hurricane Katrina involved the experience and training of DHS or FEMA
leadership; the clarity of FEMA's mission and related responsibilities
and authorities to achieve mission performance expectations; the
adequacy of it human, financial, and technological resources; and the
effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships. The
Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions that address each of these
issues.
Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery Are
Needed:
Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial
resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal
governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet
the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage
and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be
part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to
integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be
done, and how well it should be done--that is, according to what
standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of
these are, respectively, the National Response Plan, the National
Incident Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. The
nation's experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of
the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering.
Capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people,
skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are
available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction
with training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically
tested and problems identified and subsequently addressed in
partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. In
recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day operations, we found that
although shifting resources caused by its transition to DHS created
challenges for FEMA, the agency's management of existing resources
compounded these problems.[Footnote 14] FEMA lacks some of the basic
management tools that help an agency respond to changing circumstances.
Most notably, FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human
capital strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated
training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they
enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical
skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps
between current and future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have
said they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational
management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18
areas, whose final reports and recommendations are due later this
spring.[Footnote 15]
In identifying available capabilities, FEMA needs to identify and
assess the capabilities that exist across the federal government and
outside the federal government. For example, in a recent report on
housing assistance, we found that the National Response Plan's annex
covering temporary shelter and housing (Emergency Support Function--6)
clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two primary
responsible agencies--FEMA and the Red Cross.[Footnote 16] However, the
responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of
Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans
Affairs--did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities.
Further, these support agencies had not, at the time of our work,
developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific
authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. We
recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that
fully reflect each respective support agency's capabilities for
providing temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact
sheets, and develop operational plans that provide details on how their
respective agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities.
The Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans
Administration, and Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations.
The Red Cross did not comment on our report or recommendations. As part
of a housing task force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of
incorporating housing assistance offered by private sector
organizations.
Further, recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the
responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially
for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state
and local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate
transportation-disadvantaged populations (ie. planning, training, and
conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to
address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006 DHS reported
that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the
urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating
these populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include
collaboration with social service and transportation providers and
transportation planning organizations--some of which are Department of
Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders--to determine
transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of
drivers and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation
assistance to state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance
have hindered many of these governments' ability to sufficiently
prepare for evacuations. This includes the lack of any specific
requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of
transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in the
usefulness of DHS's guidance. We recommended that DHS should clarify
federal agencies' roles and responsibilities for providing evacuation
assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed. DHS should
require state and local evacuation preparedness for transportation-
disadvantaged populations and improve information to assist these
governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to share
information to assist in evacuation preparedness for these populations.
DOT and DHS agreed to consider our recommendations, and DHS stated it
has partly implemented some of them.
Finally, the use of a risk management methodology--integrating
systematic concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision
making and implementation--should be central to assessing the risk for
catastrophic disasters, guiding the development of national
capabilities and the expertise that can be used to respond effectively
to catastrophic disasters. As I stated in my testimony to this
subcommittee on applying risk management principles to guide federal
investments, risk management should be viewed strategically, that is,
with a view that goes beyond assessing what the risks are, to the
integration of risk into annual budget and program review
cycles.[Footnote 17]
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources
are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster,
decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited
assistance payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million
to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to
applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended
outcomes.
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making
should quickly replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time,
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes
intended. The federal government also will be a major partner in the
longer-term recovery and rebuilding of communities along the Gulf
Coast. Among the areas requiring federal attention are (1) assessing
the environmental hazards created by the storms; (2) rebuilding and
strengthening the levees; (3) providing assistance to school districts
that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee children; and (4) building
the capacity to address demand in multiple victims assistance programs
such as financial assistance or loans for repair and replacement of
housing and the rebuilding of businesses.
GAO Recommendations Stress Changes in Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability:
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended
that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions
to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is
warning. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and
exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and
lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes
needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the
NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be
supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans;
(3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a
jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring
federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities
under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a
risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite
resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
As I mentioned earlier, DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released
the final Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex--both designed
to further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships
among federal, state and local governments and responders. However,
these revisions have not been tested in a major disaster. FEMA and DHS
have also announced a number of actions intended to improve readiness
and response based on our work and the work of congressional committees
and the Administration. DHS is also currently reorganizing FEMA as
required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act. However, there is little
information available on the extent to which these changes are
operational and they also have not yet been tested in a major disaster.
Originally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following
Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of
needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or
ensure that there were provisions in contracts for response and
recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We
recommended that DHS create accountability systems that effectively
balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We also recommended that DHS provide
guidance on advance procurement practices (precontracting) and
procedures for those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities
under the NRP. These federal agencies could then better manage disaster-
related procurement and establish an assessment process to monitor
agencies' continuous planning efforts for their disaster- related
procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities. For example, we
identified a number of emergency response practices in the public and
private sectors that provide insight into how the federal government
can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These practices
include developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and
establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and
establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity
to match the response with the need.[Footnote 18]
Post-Katrina Reform Act Changes:
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina. Most of the Act's provisions become
effective as of March 31, 2007, while others became effective upon the
Act's enactment on October 4, 2006. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the
act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. Under
the act, for example, FEMA's mission is to reduce the loss of life and
property and protect the nation from all hazards, including natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. To
accomplish this mission, FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness,
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA
Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a
distinct entity within DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer
substantially or significantly reduce the authorities,
responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform
them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA will absorb the
functions of DHS's Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The
statute establishes 10 regional offices with specified
responsibilities. The statute also establishes a National Integration
Center responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the
NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina Reform Act also includes provisions for
other areas, such as evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the
needs of individuals with disabilities, In addition, the act includes
several provisions to strengthen the management and capability of
FEMA's workforce. For example, the statute calls for a strategic human
capital plan to shape and improve FEMA's workforce, authorizes
recruitment and retention bonuses, and establishes a Surge Capacity
Force. Most of the organizational changes become effective as of March
31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in organizational autonomy for
FEMA and establishment of the National Integration Center, became
effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4,
2006.
DHS Reports Planned Changes Consistent with the Legislation:
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and
additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act
of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, will become effective on
March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough
assessment of FEMA's internal structure to incorporate lessons learned
from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing
assets and responsibilities within FEMA. The department's core
structural conclusions are described in the letter.
DHS will transfer the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:
* United States Fire Administration,
* Office of Grants and Training,
* Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,
* Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
* Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,
* Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials say that they will carefully manage all financial,
organizational, and personnel actions necessary to transfer these
organizations by March 31, 2007. They also said they will establish
several other organizational elements, such as a logistics management
division, a disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations
division. In addition, FEMA will expand its regional office structure
with each region in part by establishing a Regional Advisory Council
and at least one Regional Strike Team. With the recent appointment of
the director for region III, FEMA officials noted that for the first
time in recent memory there will be no acting regional directors and
all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by experienced
professionals, according to FEMA officials.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It
also will include DHS's exercise coordination and evaluation program,
emergency management training, and hazard mitigation associated with
the chemical stockpile and radiological emergency preparedness
programs.
Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions
Should Respond to Many Concerns:
Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's
organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities, in
addition to those changes already undertaken by DHS, should address
many of our emergency management observations and recommendations. As
noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and
responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA
Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser
to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of
DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing
the Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and
roles of the National Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary
of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a clear chain of command
to lead and coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster,
act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The law also establishes
qualifications that appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA
Administrator must have a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of
emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of executive
leadership and management experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities,
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program
to test and evaluate the National Preparedness Goal, NIMS, NRP, and
other related plans and strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in
order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state
annexes must be developed in consultation with local officials,
including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to
foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA
must enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal
entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment
capabilities, including credentialing of personnel and typing of
resources, must be developed. In addition, FEMA must implement several
other capabilities, such as (1) developing a logistics system providing
real-time visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics
system, (2) establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3)
establishing emergency support and response teams.
FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems:
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's performance in the logistics
area came under harsh criticism; within days, FEMA became overwhelmed
and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics
mission.[Footnote 19] In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required
FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. Since
the legislation, FEMA has been working to address its provisions, but
it is too early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA
logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas
necessary for an effective logistics system. Below, we describe these
five areas along with FEMA's ongoing actions to address each.
* Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place to
address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information on
states' capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not have
information from these sources to define what and how much it needs to
stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of operations to underpin
its logistics program and told us that it is working to develop
detailed plans and the associated stockage requirements. However, until
FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency will be
unable to assess its true preparedness.
* Inventory management: FEMA's system accounts for the location,
quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in-
transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve
transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as
expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test
regions to all FEMA regions.
* Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of
smaller storage facilities across the country. However, it has little
assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in the
right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of
determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where they
should be located.
* Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA's distribution system,
including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and
lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives under
way that should mitigate some of the problems with contractors, and has
been working with Department of Defense and Department of
Transportation to improve the access to transportation when needed.
* People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the
logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff,
supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff.
However, FEMA's recent retirements and losses of staff, and its
difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created
staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a January
2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls in
staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the
planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills
needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently
hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire
qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics
program to be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and
other initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics
capabilities, it will be years before they are fully implemented and
operational.
Post-Katrina Reform Act Provisions Also Respond to Accountability
Issues:
Statutory changes establish more controls and accountability
mechanisms. For example, the Post-Katrina Reform Act requires FEMA to
develop and implement a contracting system that maximizes the use of
advance contracting to the extent practical and cost-effective. The
Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to
limit the excessive use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The
Secretary of DHS is also required to promulgate regulations that limit
certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional
circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate
up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as
oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain
internal management controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and
develop and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and
abuse of federal funds in response to or recovery from a disaster.
Verification measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients
of disaster relief assistance.
Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional
Attention:
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.[Footnote 20]
He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after
catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the
threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the importance of
ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster
management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and
coordinated can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively
functioning insurance market can substantially reduce the government's
exposure to post-catastrophe payouts. Lessons learned from past
national emergencies provide an opportunity for Congress to look at
actions that could mitigate the effects of potential catastrophic
events. Similarly, the Comptroller General suggested that Congress
could also consider how the federal government can work with other
nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector
organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help
ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the
billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to,
recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters,
congressional oversight is critical.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term
efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas
for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and
(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster
Capabilities:
More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal "to establish measurable readiness priorities and
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from
them." The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness
Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist
related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major
earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS's National
Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to
illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic
emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form
the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide
range of large scale emergency events. The scenarios focused on the
consequences that first responders would have to address. Some state
and local officials and experts have questioned whether the scenarios
were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in
terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal,
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005.
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for
these capabilities and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the
Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in
the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the National Preparedness Goal, target
capabilities and preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment
systems--should be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS
had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder
preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS;
strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration;
and strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis.
Those seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006
homeland security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth
priority that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic
planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two
overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others.
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the National
Preparedness Goal, (2) integrating and synchronizing preparedness
programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a statewide
critical infrastructure/key resource protection program, (4) enabling
information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications
interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear
detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to
address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal
year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an investment
justification that provides background information, strategic
objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan,
and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated
to have.
The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic:
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management;
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the
effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation.
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of
detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers.
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and
response for such a disaster will require particularly close
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector,
individuals within the United States, as well as international
cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late
summer 2007.
Our Knowledge of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities
Is Limited:
Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on
state and local capabilities. As I testified before this subcommittee
last month on applying risk management principles to guide federal
investments, over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion
in federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its
HSGP grants. Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and
localities finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal
funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those
funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define
and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about
emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what
are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given
finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed.
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes.
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people
across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with
their grant application. States were to use this justification to
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding.
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk
and effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions,
although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process
more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said
that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from
grant funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because
they do not yet have the metrics to do so.
Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust:
Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent
neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the abilities of
first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site
of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist
disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a
regional and multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the
National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to
building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of
government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination
and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional
security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent
regional and multi-state planning has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning.
Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of
expenditures.[Footnote 21] One of these challenges included a
coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of
expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent
work on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted
areas that needed strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically
improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide decision
makers.[Footnote 22] For example, additional information could have
been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned
goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and
measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet regional risk and
needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation;
resources and investments; and operational commitment.
Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons
Learned:
Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For
first responders, exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of
events for which there is little actual experience--are essential for
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective
response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance.
DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational
Decisions:
Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified
that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its
management areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive
work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been
receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with
access to various documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that
DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives.
Concluding Observations:
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions
of dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to
assist in strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has
developed several key policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and
the National Preparedness Goal to guide federal, state, and local
efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a
reassessment of the federal role in preparing for and responding to
catastrophic events. The studies and reports of the past year--by
Congress, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS
and FEMA, GAO, and others--have provided a number of insights into the
strengths and limitations of the nation's capacity to respond to
catastrophic disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for
strengthening that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports
paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that the nation--federal,
state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the
private sector; and individual citizens--faces in preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post-
Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy
changes to respond to these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task
that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver
bullet," no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but
requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because
circumstances change and we will never have the funds to do everything
we might like to do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you and subcommittee members may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William O.
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors
to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino,
Analyst-in-Charge; and Richard Ascarate, Communications Analyst. The
following individuals from GAO's Defense Capabilities and Management
Team also made major contributors to this testimony: John Pendelton,
Director; Ann Borseth, Assistant Director.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Related GAO Products:
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007:
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05-
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[2] Pub. L. 109-295.
[3] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[4] Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §5121 et seq.)
[5] Pub. L. No. 107-296, §502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2212 (2002) (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. §314.
[6] Those priorities are (1) implement the National Incident Management
System and National Response Plan; (2) expand regional collaboration;
(3) implement the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (4)
strengthen information-sharing and collaboration capabilities; (5)
strengthen interoperable communications capabilities; (6) strengthen
chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive detection,
response, and decontamination capabilities; (7) strengthen medical
surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities; and (8) review emergency
operations plans and the status of catastrophic planning.
[7] House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[8] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington,
D.C.: May 2006).
[9] White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[10] Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[11] Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006).
[12] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[13] GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future
Success and Issue to Consider for Organizational Placement, GAO-06-746T
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006)
[14] GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems
to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
[15] The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4)
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6)
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15)
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget
process, and (18) disaster relief fund.
[16] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2007).
[17] GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to
Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7,
2007).
[18] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
[19] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[20] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006.
[21] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004);
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04-
904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective
Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National
Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National
Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).
[22] GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region
Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
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