Passenger Rail Security
Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts Gao ID: GAO-07-583T March 7, 2007The four rail attacks in Europe and Asia since 2004, including the most recent in India, highlight the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrate the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected recent program updates. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessments for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail, and (2) the actions that federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system.
The DHS Office of Grants and Training (OGT) and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, GAO reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail. GAO found that, until TSA does so, it may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. GAO also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, as of March 2, 2007, TSA has not issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans for passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on risk assessments. Until TSA does so, it lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. OGT has also acted to help improve passenger rail security by, for example, providing funding for security enhancements to rail transit agencies and Amtrak through various grant programs. DHS and DOT have taken steps to better coordinate their respective rail security roles and responsibilities. In particular, DHS and DOT updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security roles and responsibilities for passenger rail.
GAO-07-583T, Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts
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Testimony:
Before Congressional Subcommittees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 7, 2007:
Passenger Rail Security:
Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and
Guide Security Efforts:
Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-583T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-583T, a report to congressional subcommittees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The four rail attacks in Europe and Asia since 2004, including the most
recent in India, highlight the vulnerability of passenger rail and
other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and
demonstrate the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This
testimony is based primarily on GAO‘s September 2005 passenger rail
security report and selected recent program updates. Specifically, it
addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and
developed a strategy based on risk assessments for securing all modes
of transportation, including passenger rail, and (2) the actions that
federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S.
passenger rail system.
What GAO Found:
The DHS Office of Grants and Training (OGT) and TSA have begun to
assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, GAO
reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive
risk assessment of passenger rail. GAO found that, until TSA does so,
it may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets
and help guide security investments. GAO also reported that DHS had
begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the
private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and
comparing risks among and across critical sectors. Since that time, TSA
has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the
passenger rail system. However, as of March 2, 2007, TSA has not issued
the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans
for passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on
risk assessments. Until TSA does so, it lacks a clearly communicated
strategy with goals and objectives for securing the transportation
sector, including passenger rail.
After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail
security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security,
including issuing security directives, testing security technologies,
and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security,
among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders
have questioned the extent to which TSA‘s directives were based on
industry best practices. OGT has also acted to help improve passenger
rail security by, for example, providing funding for security
enhancements to rail transit agencies and Amtrak through various grant
programs. DHS and DOT have taken steps to better coordinate their
respective rail security roles and responsibilities. In particular, DHS
and DOT updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their
respective security roles and responsibilities for passenger rail.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has previously recommended that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) complete risk assessments, develop rail security
standards based on best practices, and consider implementing practices
used by foreign rail operators. DHS, the Department of Transportation
(DOT), and Amtrak generally agreed with these recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-583T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin at (202)
512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov].
[end of section]
Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairwoman, and Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on transit
and rail security to discuss our recent work, primarily related to
passenger rail security. Since its creation following the events of
September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
has focused much of its efforts and resources on meeting legislative
mandates to strengthen commercial aviation security. However, TSA has
recently placed additional focus on securing surface modes of
transportation, particularly in the area of passenger rail. Passenger
rail systems, which include rail transit (commuter, heavy, and light
rail) and intercity passenger rail, are inherently open and difficult
to secure. One of the critical challenges facing federal agencies and
the rail system operators they oversee or support is finding ways to
protect these systems from potential terrorist attacks without
compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel. The four
attacks in Europe and Asia since 2004, including the most recent in
India, highlight the vulnerabilities of passenger rail systems and make
clear that even when security precautions are put in place, these
systems remain vulnerable to attack. Securing rail and surface
transportation systems is a daunting task, requiring that the federal
government develop a clearly communicated strategy, including goals and
objectives, for strengthening the security of these systems. As part of
that strategy, it is also critical to assess the risks facing these
systems so that limited resources and security efforts can be
prioritized to the areas of greatest need. Furthermore, because the
responsibility for securing rail is shared between federal, state, and
local governments and the private sector, it is critical that the
federal government develop partnerships and coordinate its security
efforts with transportation industry stakeholders.
As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders
involved in securing passenger rail can sometimes lead to communication
challenges, duplication of effort, and confusion about roles and
responsibilities. Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
stakeholders with critical roles include TSA, which is responsible for
the security of all modes of transportation. In addition, the DHS
Office of Grants and Training (OGT) provides grant funds to rail
operators and conducts risk assessments for passenger rail agencies.
Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have
responsibilities for passenger rail safety and security. In addition,
public and private passenger rail operators are responsible for
securing their rail systems.
At the federal level, another challenge related to securing passenger
rail systems involves allocating limited resources on the basis of
risk. Within and among all modes of transportation, there is
competition for resources, as federal, state, and local agencies and
transportation operators seek to identify and invest in appropriate
security measures to safeguard these systems while also investing in
other capital and operational improvements. Moreover, given competing
priorities and limited homeland security resources, difficult policy
decisions have to be made by Congress and the executive branch to
prioritize security efforts and direct resources to the areas of
greatest risk within and among transportation modes and across other
nationally critical sectors.
In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best
allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has
recommended, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 provides that a risk management approach be employed to guide
decision-making related to homeland security resources. A risk
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks
through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing and quantifying three key elements of risk--
threat, vulnerability, and criticality or consequence--evaluating
alternative security measures, selecting which measures to undertake,
and implementing and monitoring those measures.
My testimony today focuses on the actions federal agencies have taken
in developing and implementing security strategies and setting security
priorities. In particular, my testimony highlights two key areas: (1)
the extent to which DHS has assessed the risks facing the U.S.
passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk
assessments for securing all modes of transportation, including
passenger rail and (2) the actions that federal agencies have taken to
enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system. My comments
today are primarily based on our September 2005 report addressing the
security of the U.S. passenger rail system.[Footnote 1] This report was
based on work conducted at DHS, DOT, and Amtrak, as well as 32
passenger rail operators in the United States, and 13 passenger rail
operators in seven European and Asian countries.[Footnote 2] In
addition, we recently obtained selected updates from DHS on its efforts
to secure passenger rail systems. We conducted our work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In Summary:
DHS has made progress in assessing the risks facing the U.S. passenger
rail system, but has not issued a plan based on those risk assessments
for securing the entire transportation sector and supporting plans for
each mode of surface transportation, as required by and in accordance
with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The DHS OGT has
developed and conducted risk assessments of passenger rail systems to
identify rail assets that are vulnerable to attack, such as stations
and bridges. TSA has also conducted a threat assessment of mass transit
and passenger rail and has identified critical rail assets. However, we
reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive
risk assessment of the passenger rail system. We concluded that, until
TSA completed this effort, it is limited in its ability to prioritize
passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions
about protecting them. Since that time, TSA reported that it is working
with rail transit agencies to update risk assessments that FTA and FRA
conducted after September 11. TSA expects the 50 largest rail transit
agencies to complete security self -assessments in early 2007.
According to TSA, the agency is using the results of these assessments
to set priorities, and has identified underground and underwater rail
infrastructure and high-density passenger rail stations as assets at
highest risk. In addition, at the time of our report, DHS had begun
developing, but had not yet completed, a framework to help federal
agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for
analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other critical
sectors. As part of that framework, TSA is developing, but has not yet
issued, a Transportation Sector Specific Plan (TSSP) and supporting
plans for rail and other modes of surface transportation, as required
by DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan and a December 2006
executive order. Until TSA issues these plans, it lacks a clearly
communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the
overall transportation sector, including passenger rail.
Before and after September 11, 2001, FTA and FRA undertook a number of
initiatives to enhance passenger rail security, including conducting
security readiness assessments, providing grants for emergency response
drills and training, and implementing security awareness programs for
rail passengers and employees. However, we reported in September 2005
that TSA's coordination efforts with DOT and industry stakeholders
related to passenger rail security could be improved. In March 2004,
after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid, TSA issued
security directives for passenger rail and mass transit. These
directives were intended to establish standard protective measures for
all passenger rail operators, including Amtrak. However, federal and
rail industry stakeholders questioned the extent to which these
directives were based on industry best practices and expressed
confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives.
Since we completed our work, TSA has taken additional actions to
strengthen the security of the passenger rail system. For example, TSA
has tested rail security technologies, developed training tools for
rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 on passenger
and freight rail security, among other efforts. DHS and DOT have also
taken steps to better coordinate on rail security roles and
responsibilities. The memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT
was updated to include specific agreements between TSA and FTA in
September 2005, and between TSA and FRA in September 2006, to delineate
security-related roles and responsibilities.
In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we
recommended, among other things, that TSA establish a plan with
timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk
assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best
practices and can be measured and enforced. These actions should help
ensure that the federal government has the information it needs to
prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk, and evaluate, select,
and implement measures to help the passenger rail operators protect
their systems against terrorism. In addition, we recommended that the
Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail
industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk management context, of
implementing certain security practices used by foreign rail operators.
DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the report's
recommendations. However, as of March 2, 2007, DHS has not provided a
formal response indicating if or how it has implemented these
recommendations.
Background:
Overview of the Passenger Rail System:
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22
states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light
rail).[Footnote 3] Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad
tracks and provide regional service between a central city and adjacent
suburbs. Commuter rail systems are traditionally associated with older
industrial cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago.
Heavy rail systems--subway systems like New York City's transit system
and Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed rail lines
within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of
traffic. Amtrak operates the nation's primary intercity passenger rail
service over a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight railroad
tracks. Amtrak serves more than 500 stations (240 of which are staffed)
in 46 states and the District of Columbia, and it carried more than 25
million passengers during fiscal year 2005.
Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks:
Certain characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems
make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore
difficult to secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open, have
multiple access points, are hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in
some cases, have no barriers so that they can move large numbers of
people quickly. In contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is
housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The
openness of passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable because
operator personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or
leaves the systems. In addition, other characteristics of some
passenger rail systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure,
economic importance, and location (large metropolitan areas or tourist
destinations)--also make them attractive targets for terrorists because
of the potential for mass casualties and economic damage and
disruption. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make passenger
rail systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers of riders
that pass through a subway system--especially during peak hours--may
make the sustained use of some security measures, such as metal
detectors, difficult because they could result in long lines that
disrupt scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points along
extended routes could make the cost of securing each location
prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic impact of security
enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a difficult
challenge.
Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail
Systems:
Securing the nation's passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these
systems. Since the September 11 attacks, the role of federal agencies
in securing the nation's transportation systems, including passenger
rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11, FTA and FRA,
within DOT, were the primary federal entities involved in passenger
rail security matters. In response to the attacks of September 11,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as
ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. Although its
provisions focus primarily on aviation security, the act gives TSA
regulatory authority for security over all transportation modes. With
the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred,
along with over 20 other agencies, to DHS.[Footnote 4] The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security, working jointly with the Secretary of
Transportation, to develop a National Strategy for Transportation
Security and transportation modal security plans.[Footnote 5] TSA
issued the National Strategy for Transportation Security in 2005. In
addition, the DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
required the development of a Transportation Sector Specific Plan
(TSSP). In accordance with the NIPP, a December 2006 executive order
required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a TSSP by
December 31, 2006, and supporting plans for each mode of surface
transportation not later than 90 days after completion of the
TSSP.[Footnote 6] According to the NIPP, sector specific plans should,
among other things, define the goals and objectives to secure the
sector, assess the risks facing the sector, identify the critical
assets and infrastructure and develop programs to protect them, and
develop security partnerships with industry stakeholders within the
sector. As of March 2, 2007, TSA had not yet issued the TSSP or the
supporting plans for each surface transportation mode.
Within DHS, OGT, formerly the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP),
has become the federal source for security funding of passenger rail
systems. [Footnote 7] OGT is the principal component of DHS responsible
for preparing the United States against acts of terrorism and has
primary responsibility within the executive branch for assisting and
supporting DHS, in coordination with other directorates and entities
outside of the department, in conducting risk analysis and risk
management activities of state and local governments. In carrying out
its mission, OGT provides training, funds for the purchase of
equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises,
technical assistance, and other support to assist states, local
jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to acts of terrorism.
While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all
transportation modes, FTA conducts safety and security activities,
including training, research, technical assistance, and demonstration
projects. In addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its
grant-making authority. FRA has regulatory authority for rail safety
over commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail
inspectors that periodically monitor the implementation of safety and
security plans at these systems.[Footnote 8]
Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk
Management Approach:
Risk management is a tool for informing policy makers' decisions about
assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under
conditions of uncertainty. In recent years, the President, through
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), and Congress, through
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, provided
for federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities to apply
risk-based principles to inform their decision making regarding
allocating limited resources and prioritizing security activities. The
9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. government should identify
and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set
risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and
cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and
funding to implement the effort.[Footnote 9] Further, the Secretary of
DHS has made risk-based decision making a cornerstone of departmental
policy. We have previously reported that a risk management approach can
help to prioritize and focus the programs designed to combat terrorism.
Risk management, as applied in the homeland security context, can help
federal decision makers determine where and how to invest limited
resources within and among the various modes of transportation.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed the department's
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to
use risk management principles in coordinating the nation's critical
infrastructure protection efforts.[Footnote 10] This includes
integrating relevant information, analysis, and vulnerability
assessments to identify priorities for protective and support measures
by the department, other federal agencies, state and local government
agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 further define and establish
critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS and those
federal agencies given responsibility for particular industry sectors,
such as transportation. In June 2006, DHS issued the NIPP, which named
TSA as the primary federal agency responsible for coordinating critical
infrastructure protection efforts within the transportation
sector.[Footnote 11] In fulfilling its responsibilities under the NIPP,
TSA must conduct and facilitate risk assessments in order to identify,
prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical transportation
systems infrastructure, as well as develop risk-based priorities for
the transportation sector.
To provide guidance to agency decision makers, we have created a risk
management framework, which is intended to be a starting point for
applying risk-based principles. Our risk management framework entails a
continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions,
including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk,
evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and
implementing and monitoring those initiatives. DHS's NIPP describes a
risk management process that closely mirrors our risk management
framework.
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first
step in applying risk management principles and helps to ensure that
management decisions are focused on achieving a purpose. These
decisions should take place in the context of an agency's strategic
plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear and concise.
These goals and objectives should identify resource issues and external
factors to achieving the goals. Further, the goals and objectives of an
agency should link to a department's overall strategic plan. The
ability to achieve strategic goals depends, in part, on how well an
agency manages risk. The agency's strategic plan should address risk-
related issues that are central to the agency's overall mission.
Risk assessment, an important element of a risk-based approach, helps
decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate
the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or
quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event
occurring and the severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk
assessment in a homeland security application often involves assessing
three key elements--threat, vulnerability, and criticality or
consequence. A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential
threats on the basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and
past activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that
may be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address
those weaknesses. A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and
prioritizes assets and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as
their importance to public safety and the economy, as a basis for
identifying which structures or processes are relatively more important
to protect from attack. Information from these three assessments
contributes to an overall risk assessment that characterizes risks on a
scale such as high, medium, or low and provides input for evaluating
alternatives and management prioritization of security initiatives. The
risk assessment element in the overall risk management cycle may be the
largest change from standard management steps and can be important to
informing the remaining steps of the cycle.
DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Has
Not Issued a Strategy for Securing the Transportation Sector:
DHS has made progress in assessing the risks facing the U.S. passenger
rail system, but has not issued a plan based on those risk assessments
for securing the entire transportation sector and supporting plans for
each mode of transportation, including passenger rail. The DHS OGT
developed and implemented a risk assessment tool to help passenger rail
operators better respond to terrorist attacks and prioritize security
measures. Passenger rail operators must have completed a risk
assessment to be eligible for financial assistance through the fiscal
year 2007 OGT Transit Security Grant Program, which includes funding
for passenger rail. To receive grant funding, rail operators are also
required to have a security and emergency preparedness plan that
identifies how the operator intends to respond to security gaps
identified by risk assessments. As of February 2007, OGT had completed
or planned to conduct risk assessments of most passenger rail
operators. According to rail operators, OGT's risk assessment process
enabled them to prioritize investments on the basis of risk and allowed
them to target and allocate resources towards security measures that
will have the greatest impact on reducing risk across their rail
systems.
Further, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a
comprehensive risk assessment of the entire passenger rail system. TSA
had begun to assess risks to the passenger rail system, including
completing an overall threat assessment for both mass transit and
passenger and freight rail modes. TSA also conducted criticality
assessments of nearly 700 passenger rail stations and had begun
conducting assessments for other passenger rail assets such as bridges
and tunnels. TSA reported that it planned to rely on asset criticality
rankings to prioritize which assets it would focus on in conducting
vulnerability assessments to determine which passenger rail assets are
vulnerable to attack. For assets that are deemed to be less critical,
TSA has developed a software tool that it has made available to
passenger rail and other transportation operators for them to use on a
voluntary basis to assess the vulnerability of their assets. We
reported that, until all three assessments of passenger rail systems--
threat, criticality, and vulnerability--have been completed, and until
TSA determined how to use the results of these assessments to analyze
and characterize the level of risk (high, medium, or low), it will be
difficult to prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment
decisions about protecting them.
More recently, in January 2007, TSA reported taking additional actions
to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. For example,
TSA reported that its surface transportation security inspectors are
working with rail transit agencies to update risk assessments that FTA
and FRA conducted after September 11, and is also conducting additional
security assessments of rail transit agencies. TSA also expected that
the 50 largest rail transit agencies would complete security self
assessments in early 2007. According to TSA, the agency is using the
results of these assessments to set priorities and identify baseline
security standards for the passenger rail industry. For example, in
January 2007 the agency reported that it has identified underground and
underwater rail infrastructure and high-density passenger rail stations
as the critical assets most at risk. According to TSA, the agency
prioritized a list of the underwater rail tunnels deemed to be at
highest risk, and plans to conduct assessments of high-risk rail
tunnels.
We also reported in September 2005 that DHS was developing, but had not
yet completed, a framework intended to help TSA, OGT, and other federal
agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. This framework is
intended to help the private sector and state and local governments
develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and vulnerability
across infrastructure types and across entire economic sectors, develop
consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. The framework is
also intended to enable a federal-level assessment of risk in general,
and comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource allocation and
response planning. DHS reported that this framework will provide
overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies on how various risk
assessment methodologies may be used to analyze, normalize, and
prioritize risk within and among sectors. We plan to assess DHS's and
DOT's progress in enhancing their risk assessment efforts during our
follow-on review of passenger rail security.
Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and other
transportation modes and conducting risk assessments to determine the
areas of greatest need are key steps required in developing a strategy
for securing the overall transportation sector and each mode of
transportation individually. However, TSA has not issued the required
TSSP and supporting plans for securing each mode of transportation.
According to TSA, the TSSP and supporting modal plans are in draft, but
must be reviewed by DHS and the White House Homeland Security Council
before they can be finalized. Until TSA issues the TSSP and modal
plans, the agency lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and
objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including
passenger rail.
Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security:
In addition to ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security
conducted by FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA
issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March
2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal
and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which
these directives were based on industry best practices and expressed
confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives.
Since we completed our work on passenger rail security, TSA has
reported taking additional actions to strengthen the security of the
passenger rail system. For example, TSA tested rail security
technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a
proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail
security, among other efforts. OGT has also acted to help improve
passenger rail security by, for example, providing funding for security
enhancements to rail transit agencies and Amtrak through various grant
programs. DHS and DOT have taken steps to better coordinate their rail
security roles and responsibilities. In particular, the memorandum of
understanding between DHS and DOT was updated to include specific
agreements between TSA and FTA in September 2005 and between TSA and
FRA in September 2006 to delineate security-related roles and
responsibilities, among other things, for passenger rail and mass
transit.
DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security:
Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, FTA and FRA, within DOT,
were primarily responsible for the security of passenger rail systems.
These agencies undertook a number of initiatives to enhance the
security of passenger rail systems after the September 11 attacks that
are still in place today. Specifically, FTA launched a transit security
initiative in 2002 that included security readiness assessments,
technical assistance, grants for emergency response drills, and
training. FTA also instituted the Transit Watch campaign in 2003--a
nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to encourage
the participation of transit passengers and employees in maintaining a
safe transit environment. The program provides information and
instructions to transit passengers and employees so that they know what
to do and whom to contact in the event of an emergency in a transit
setting. FTA plans to continue this initiative, in partnership with TSA
and OGT, and offer additional security awareness materials that address
unattended bags and emergency evacuation procedures for transit
agencies. In addition, in November 2003, FTA issued its Top 20 Security
Program Action Items for Transit Agencies, which recommended measures
for passenger rail operators to include in their security programs to
improve both security and emergency preparedness. FTA has also used
research and development funds to develop guidance for security design
strategies to reduce the vulnerability of transit systems to acts of
terrorism. Further, in November 2004, FTA provided rail operators with
security considerations for transportation infrastructure. This
guidance provides recommendations intended to help operators deter and
minimize attacks against their facilities, riders, and employees by
incorporating security features into the design of rail infrastructure.
FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail
security since September 11, 2001. For example, it has assisted
commuter railroads in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak's
security plans, and helped fund FTA security readiness assessments for
commuter railroads. In the wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings in
March 2004, nearly 200 FRA inspectors, in cooperation with TSA,
conducted inspections of each of 18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to
determine what additional security measures had been put into place to
prevent a similar occurrence in the United States. FRA also conducted
research and development projects related to passenger rail security.
These projects included rail infrastructure security and trespasser
monitoring systems and passenger screening and manifest projects,
including explosives detection. Although FTA and FRA now play a
supporting role in transportation security matters since the creation
of TSA, they remain important partners in the federal government's
efforts to strengthen rail security, given their role in funding and
regulating the safety of passenger rail systems. Moreover, as TSA moves
ahead with its passenger rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA are
continuing their passenger rail security efforts.
TSA Issued Rail Security Directives, but Faces Challenges Related to
Compliance and Enforcement:
In May 2004, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail
industry to establish standard security measures for all passenger rail
operators, including Amtrak.[Footnote 12] However, as we previously
reported, it was unclear how TSA developed the requirements in the
directives, how TSA planned to monitor and ensure compliance, how rail
operators were to implement the measures, and which entities were
responsible for the directives' implementation. According to TSA, the
directives were based upon FTA and American Public Transportation
Association best practices for rail security. Specifically, TSA stated
that it consulted a list of the top 20 actions FTA identified that rail
operators can take to strengthen security. While some of the
directives' requirements correlate to information contained in the FTA
guidance, the source for many of the requirements is unclear. Amtrak
and FRA officials also raised concerns about some of the directives.
For example, FRA officials stated that current FRA safety regulations
requiring engineer compartment doors be kept unlocked to facilitate
emergency escapes[Footnote 13] conflict with the TSA security directive
requirement that doors equipped with locking mechanisms be kept locked.
Other passenger rail operators we spoke with during our review stated
that TSA did not adequately consult with the rail industry before
developing and issuing these directives. In January 2007, TSA stated
that it recognizes the need to closely partner with the passenger rail
industry to develop security standards and directives.
As we reported in September 2005, rail operators are required to allow
TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations, or tests based on
execution of the directives at any time or location. However, we
reported that some passenger rail operators have expressed confusion
and concern about the role of TSA's inspectors and the potential that
TSA inspections could be duplicative of other federal and state rail
inspections, such as FRA inspections. Since we issued our report, TSA
officials reported that the agency has hired 100 surface transportation
inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and
enforce compliance with TSA's rail security directives. According to
TSA, since the initial deployment of surface inspectors, these
inspectors have developed relationships with security officials in
passenger rail and transit systems, coordinated access to operations
centers, participated in emergency exercises, and provided assistance
in enhancing security. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to
enforce compliance with rail security requirements, including those in
the December 2006 proposed rule on rail security, during our follow-on
review of passenger rail security.
TSA Has Reported Taking Additional Actions to Strengthen Passenger Rail
Security:
In January 2007, TSA identified additional actions they had taken to
strengthen passenger rail security. We have not verified or evaluated
these actions. These actions include:
National explosive canine detection teams: Since late 2005, TSA
reported that it has trained and deployed 53 canine teams to 13 mass
transit systems to help detect explosives in the passenger rail system
and serve as a deterrent to potential terrorists.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams: This program is
intended to provide law enforcement, canines, and inspection teams to
mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter and detect potential
terrorist actions. Since the program's inception in December 2005, TSA
reported conducting more than 25 exercises at mass transit and
passenger rail systems throughout the nation.
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security Information Sharing Network:
According to TSA, the agency initiated this program in August 2005 to
develop information sharing and dissemination processes regarding
passenger rail and mass transit security across the federal government,
state and local governments, and rail operators.
National Transit Resource Center: TSA officials stated that they are
working with FTA and DHS OGT to develop this center, which will provide
transit agencies nationwide with pertinent information related to
transit security, including recent suspicious activities, promising
security practices, new security technologies, and other information.
National Security Awareness Training Program for Railroad Employees:
TSA officials stated that the agency has contracted to develop and
distribute computer-based training for passenger rail, rail transit,
and freight rail employees. The training will include information on
identifying security threats, observing and reporting suspicious
activities and objects, mitigating security incidents, and other
related information. According to TSA, the training will be distributed
to all passenger and freight rail systems.
Transit Terrorist Tool and Tactics: This training course is funded
through the Transit Security Grant Program and teaches transit
employees how to prevent and respond to a chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or explosive attack. According to TSA, this
course was offered for the first time during the fall of 2006.
National Tunnel Security Initiative: This DHS and DOT initiative aims
to identify and assess risks to underwater tunnels, prioritize security
funding to the most critical areas, and develop technologies to better
secure underwater tunnels. According to TSA, this initiative has
identified 29 critical underwater rail transit tunnels.
DHS and TSA have also sought to enhance passenger rail security by
conducting research on technologies related to screening passengers and
checked baggage in the passenger rail environment. For example, TSA
conducted a Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot, a $1.5 million effort to
test the feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to
screen passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels
for explosives. According to TSA, the agency completed this pilot in
July 2004. TSA officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses,
the screening technologies and processes tested would be very difficult
to implement on heavily used passenger rail systems because these
systems carry high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of
entry. However, TSA officials added that the screening processes used
in the pilot may be useful on certain long-distance intercity train
routes, which make fewer stops. Further, TSA officials stated that
screening could be used either randomly or for all passengers during
certain high-risk events or in areas where a particular terrorist
threat is known to exist. For example, screening technology similar to
that used in the pilot was used by TSA to screen certain passengers and
belongings in Boston and New York rail stations during the 2004
Democratic and Republican national conventions. According to TSA, the
agency is also researching and developing other passenger rail security
technologies, including closed circuit television systems that can
detect suspicious behavior, mobile passenger screening checkpoints to
be used at rail stations, bomb resistant trash cans, and explosive
detection equipment for use in the rail environment. Finally, TSA
recently reported that the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate
conducted a rail security pilot, which tested the effectiveness of
explosive detection technologies in partnership with the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey.
In December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rule on passenger and freight
rail security requirements. TSA's proposed rule would require that
passenger and freight rail operators, certain facilities that ship or
receive hazardous materials by rail, and rail transit systems take the
following actions:
* Designate a rail security coordinator to be available to TSA on a 24-
hour, 7-day-a-week basis to serve as the primary contact for the
receipt of intelligence and other security related information.
* Immediately report incidents, potential threats, and security
concerns to TSA.
* Allow TSA and DHS officials to enter and conduct inspections, test,
and perform other duties within their rail systems.
* Provide TSA, upon request, with the location and shipping information
of rail cars that contain a specific category and quantity of hazardous
materials within 1 hour of receiving the request from TSA.
* Provide for a secure chain of custody and control of rail cars
containing a specified quantity and type of hazardous material.
The period for public comment on the proposed rule was scheduled to
close in February 2007. TSA plans to review these comments and issue a
final rule in the future.
OGT Has Used Various Grant Programs to Fund Passenger Rail Security
Since 2003:
OGT has used various programs to fund passenger rail security since
2003. Through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program,
OGT has provided grants to urban areas to help enhance their overall
security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to, and recover
from acts of terrorism. In 2003 and 2004, $65 million and $50 million,
respectively, were provided to rail transit agencies through the UASI
program. In addition, the DHS Appropriations Act 2005 appropriated $150
million for rail transit, intercity passenger rail, freight rail, and
transit security grants.[Footnote 14] OGT used this funding to build on
the work under way through the UASI program and create and administer
new programs focused specifically on transportation security, including
the Transit Security Grant Program and the Intercity Passenger Rail
Security Grant Program. These programs provided financial assistance to
address security preparedness and enhancements for passenger rail and
transit systems. During fiscal year 2006, OGT provided $110 million to
passenger rail transit agencies through the Transit Security Grant
Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through the Intercity Passenger
Rail Security Grant Program. During fiscal year 2007, OGT plans to
distribute $156 million for rail and bus security grants and $8 million
to Amtrak.
In January 2007, OGT reported that the Intercity Passenger Rail
Security Program had been incorporated into the Transit Security Grant
Program. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request includes $175
million for the Transit Security Grant Program. According to budget
documents, grants will be awarded to rail transit agencies and Amtrak
for preparedness activities related to terrorism and other incidents on
the basis of risk and effectiveness.[Footnote 15]
Although OGT has distributed hundreds of millions of dollars in grants
to improve passenger rail security, issues have surfaced about the
grant process.
* Changes to grant requirements: As DHS works to refine its risk
assessment methodologies, develop better means of assessing proposed
investments using grant funds, and align grant guidance with the
implementation of broader emergency preparedness goals, such as
implementation of the National Preparedness Goal, it has annually made
changes to the guidance for the various grants it administers. These
changes include changes in the eligibility for grants. As a result of
these annual changes, awardees and potential grant recipients must
annually review and understand new information on the requirements for
grant applications including justification of their proposed use of
grant funds.
* Allowable uses of grants: Funds awarded through the Transit Security
Grant Program can be used to supplement funds received from other grant
programs. However, allowable uses are not clearly defined. For example,
Transit Security Grant Program funds can be used to create canine teams
but cannot be used to maintain these teams--that is, the grant funds
cannot be used for food, medical care, and other such maintenance costs
for the dogs on the team. Whether other grant funds could be used for
such maintenance costs would be governed by the terms of those grants.
Grant recipients have expressed a need for clear guidance on the
allowable use of grants and how they can combine funds from more than
one grant to fund and implement specific projects.
DHS and DOT Have Worked to Improve Coordination on Passenger Rail
Security:
With multiple DHS and DOT stakeholders involved in securing the U.S.
passenger rail system and inherent relationships between security and
safety, the need to improve coordination between the two agencies has
been a consistent theme in our prior work in this area. In response to
a previous recommendation we made,[Footnote 16] DHS and DOT signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 2004 to develop
procedures by which the two departments could improve their cooperation
and coordination for promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement
of people and goods throughout the transportation system. The MOU
defines broad areas of responsibility for each department. For example,
it states that DHS, in consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders,
will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure. The MOU acknowledges that DHS has primary
responsibility for transportation security, with DOT playing a
supporting role by providing technical assistance and helping DHS
implement security policies.
The MOU between DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for
cooperation that is to be supplemented by additional signed agreements,
or annexes, between the departments. These annexes are to delineate the
specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and
commitments for mass transit, rail, research and development, and other
matters.[Footnote 17] TSA signed annexes to the MOU with FRA in
September 2006 and FTA in September 2005. These annexes describe each
agency's roles and responsibilities for passenger rail security. These
annexes also describe how TSA and these DOT agencies will coordinate
security-related efforts, avoid duplication of efforts, and improve
coordination and communication with industry stakeholders. For example,
the annex signed by FTA includes a provision that FTA, TSA, and OGT
will communicate with each other about funding for transportation
security projects in order to present a coordinated position on
transportation security funding and to avoid duplicative funding
requests. Table 1 describes some areas of responsibility outlined in
the annexes where DHS and DOT agencies play different but coordinated
roles.
Table 1: Examples of Responsibilities Divided between DHS and DOT as
Outlined in MOU Annexes:
Area of responsibility: Rail inspections;
DHS (TSA) role: TSA inspectors are to take the lead in conducting
security inspections, referring significant safety problems they
observe to FRA;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: FRA inspectors are to take the lead in
conducting safety inspections, referring significant security problems
they observe to TSA; FRA inspectors are to support TSA inspectors if
needed.
Area of responsibility: Use of personnel;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS may request in writing the use of FRA personnel and
other assets, as warranted; TSA officials can be detailed to FTA, as
appropriate;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: FRA is to respond as soon as practicable to DHS
requests for use of FRA resources; FTA officials can be detailed to
TSA, as appropriate.
Area of responsibility: Assessments and resulting measures;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS is the lead agency responsible for assessing risk
to passenger rail systems; DHS is to share risk assessment results with
FTA to ensure FTA's training and technical assistance programs conform
to DHS policy; TSA is to consult with FRA in the development of
security procedures that impact rail facilities or operations and
ensure they do not conflict with safety requirements;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: FTA may review security-related issues on FTA-
funded transit projects and is to invite DHS to participate; FTA is to
share the results of the limited number of vulnerability assessments it
conducts with DHS; FRA is to provide TSA with data from security
inspections and other reviews.
Area of responsibility: Threat information;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS is to communicate relevant intelligence
information, including threats and warnings, and changes to the
national threat condition to DOT and rail industry stakeholders in a
timely manner;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: DOT is to communicate relevant intelligence
information, including threats and warnings, to DHS.
Area of responsibility: Protective measures;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS is to consult with DOT before disseminating
security requirements;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: DOT is to consult with DHS before disseminating
safety requirements, including safety measures with security
implications.
Area of responsibility: Public awareness;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS is to support FTA's security awareness program,
Transit Watch, with available funds;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: FTA is to implement and support Transit Watch
and coordinate this program with DHS's Citizen Corps, a public
participation program.
Area of responsibility: Emergency drills;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS is to develop guidance on the use of its Transit
Security Grant Program to fund emergency response drills for transit
agencies;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: FTA is to work with DHS in developing the
guidance for the Transit Security Grant Program.
Area of responsibility: Emergency responders forums;
DHS (TSA) role: DHS, subject to funding availability, is to work with
FTA to jointly hold emergency responder forums, a program known as
Connecting Communities;
DOT (FRA and FTA) role: FTA, which initiated Connecting Communities, is
to work with DHS to jointly hold forums and coordinate with DHS's
Citizen Corps program.
Source: GAO analysis of the MOU and related annexes.
[End of table]
DHS and DOT officials have stated that the MOU and its related annexes
have improved how the two departments' agencies work together,
providing for close cooperation and increased efficiency and thereby
benefiting the passenger rail industry and the public. For example, FTA
officials said that using the MOU annex as a blueprint, they
established an Executive Steering Committee with TSA and OGT to oversee
eight project management teams implementing the tasks outlined in the
MOU annex. The teams' efforts address issues such as risk assessment
and technical assistance, annual planning and grant guidance, and
standards and research, among other areas.
Although the execution of the MOU and related annexes is an important
step forward, additional efforts to maintain and improve coordination
will be required as both departments move forward with existing and new
initiatives. For example, as we reported in July 2006, after TSA hired
100 surface transportation inspectors, officials from state-designated
agencies that oversee rail transit safety and security under FTA's
State Safety Oversight program told us that they did not have a clear
picture of who was responsible for overseeing transit security
issues.[Footnote 18] Some of these officials expressed concern that
TSA's rail inspectors would be duplicating their role in overseeing
transit security. Similarly, officials from rail transit agencies said
they were unsure of lines of responsibility for transit security
oversight and said they were confused about what standards they would
be required to meet. For example, while state oversight agencies are
free to create their own standards, TSA issued rail security directives
in May 2004 and has authority to undertake regulatory actions that
impose requirements upon transit agencies. To reduce confusion among
transit and oversight agencies, we recommended last year that TSA 1)
coordinate with FTA to clearly articulate to state oversight agencies
and transit agencies the roles and responsibilities TSA develops for
its rail inspectors, and 2) work with state oversight agencies to
coordinate their security audits whenever possible and include FTA in
this communication to help ensure effective coordination with these
agencies. FTA and TSA officials stated that they are working to
determine how to implement the recommendations.
Conclusions:
In conclusion, the rail attacks in Europe and Asia highlight the
inherent vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface
transportation systems to terrorist attack. Moreover, securing rail and
other surface transportation systems is a daunting task, requiring the
federal government to develop clear strategies that are based on an
assessment of the risks to the security of the systems, including goals
and objectives, for strengthening the security of these systems. Since
our September 2005 report, DHS components have taken steps to assess
the risks to the passenger rail system, such as working with rail
operators to update prior risk assessments and facilitating rail
operator security self assessments. According to TSA, the agency plans
to use these assessment results to set priorities for securing rail
assets deemed most at risk, such as underground and underwater rail
infrastructure and high density passenger rail stations. A
comprehensive assessment of the risks facing the transportation sector
and each mode, including passenger rail, will be a key component of the
TSSP and supporting plans for each mode of transportation. Until TSA
issues these plans, however, the agency lacks a clearly communicated
strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall
transportation sector and each mode of transportation, including
passenger rail. As TSA moves forward to issue the TSSP and supporting
plans for each mode of transportation, it will be important that the
agency articulate its strategy for securing rail and other modes to
those government agencies and industry stakeholders that share the
responsibility for securing these systems.
With the execution of the MOU and related annexes, DHS and DOT have
taken important steps forward in improving coordination among the
federal entities involved in passenger rail security matters. The
execution of the MOUs and related annexes is not a panacea, however.
Effective and continued coordination between the two departments and
periodic reassessment of roles and responsibilities will be important
as both move forward in implementing existing programs and new security
initiatives. We will continue to assess DHS and DOT's efforts to secure
the U.S. passenger rail system during follow-on work to be initiated
later this year.
Mr. Chairman and Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would
be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the
Subcommittees may have at this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Norman J.
Rabkin at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Cathleen Berrick, Nikki Clowers, Chris Currie, John
Hansen, JayEtta Hecker, Andrew Huddleston, Kirk Kiester, and Ray
Sendejas.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2005).
[2] We have been requested to conduct a follow-on review of passenger
rail security and to review the security of other surface modes of
transportation--including freight rail, commercial vehicles, and
highway infrastructure. We expect to have all this work underway this
year.
[3] The American Public Transportation Association compiled these
fiscal year 2003 ridership data from FTA's National Transit Database.
These are the most current data available. Rail transit systems in the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics.
[4] See Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (2002).
[5] Pub. L. No. 108-458, §4001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3710-12 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 114(t), 44904(c)-(d))).
[6] On December 5, 2006, the President issued Executive Order 13416,
which requires among other things, that DHS develop a comprehensive
transportation systems sector specific plan, as defined in the NIPP,
not later than December 31, 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 71,033 (Dec. 7,
2006).
[7] OGT originated within the Department of Justice's Office of Justice
Programs in 1998 as the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP).
Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ODP was transferred to
DHS in March 2003. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403(5), 116 Stat. at 2178
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of
Homeland Security consolidated ODP with the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination to form the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). SLGCP was created to
provide a "one-stop shop" for the numerous federal preparedness
initiatives applicable to state and local governments. In 2005, SLGCP
was incorporated under the Preparedness Directorate as OGT. Pursuant to
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2007, OGT is to
be transferred, along with certain other components of the Preparedness
Directorate, into the Federal Emergency Management Agency effective
March 31, 2007. Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(13), 120 Stat. 1355, 1400
(2006).
[8] FRA administers and enforces federal laws and regulations that are
designed to promote safety on railroads, such as track maintenance,
inspection standards, equipment standards, and operating practices. FRA
exercises jurisdiction over all areas of railroad safety pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 20103.
[9] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The
9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission created in
late 2002, to prepare a complete account of the circumstances
surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including
preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The
Commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to
guard against future attacks.
[10] In 2006, DHS reorganized its Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection division. The functions of the Directorate of
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection were moved to the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis and Office of Infrastructure
Protection.
[11] HSPD-7 directed DOT and DHS to collaborate on all matters relating
to transportation security and transportation infrastructure
protection. In 2003, DHS designated TSA as the lead agency for
addressing HSPD-7 as it relates to securing the nation's transportation
sector.
[12] TSA issues security related regulations and directives pursuant to
its 49 U.S.C. § 114(l) rulemaking authority.
[13] See 49 C.F.R. § 238.235.
[14] Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1309 (2004). The fiscal year
2006 DHS appropriations act also appropriated $150 million and the
fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act appropriated $175 million for
the same purpose. Pub. L. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064, 2076 (2005); Pub.
L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1369 (2006).
[15] The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users provided that DOT and DHS shall jointly issue
final regulations to establish the characteristics of and requirements
for public transportation security grants, including funding
priorities, eligible activities, methods for awarding grants, and
limitations on administrative expenses. See Pub. L. No. 109-59, §
3028(c), 119 Stat. 1144, 1624-25 (2005). According to language
contained in the draft proposed rule, the rule will provide for
interagency coordination between DHS and FTA with regard to the transit
security grant program.
[16] GAO, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help
Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003).
[17] We did not examine the appropriateness or assess the efficiency of
the how DHS and DOT have divided and assigned security-related roles in
the MOU or annexes.
[18] GAO, Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance
FTA's State Safety Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.:
July 26, 2006).
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