Aviation Security
TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive
Gao ID: GAO-07-623R April 25, 2007
The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple commercial aircraft bound for the United States from the United Kingdom has highlighted both the continued importance of securing the civil aviation system and the potential that improvised explosive devices (IED) may be smuggled onboard passenger aircraft. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primary responsibility for ensuring the security of civil aviation, which includes the safety of passengers and flight crew. One measure TSA uses to protect the aviation system is prohibiting individuals from carrying items that it determines to be a threat to the aircraft and its passengers into an airport sterile area or onboard an aircraft either in their carry-on bag or on their person. To implement this measure, TSA maintains a prohibited items list that informs both the Transportation Security Officers (TSO) who conduct passenger screening and the traveling public of items that will not be allowed into an airport sterile area or onboard an aircraft. In December 2005, TSA revised its prohibited items list to allow passengers to carry: (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4 inches or less in length as measured from the fulcrum; and (2) tools--such as pliers, screwdrivers, and wrenches--7 inches or less in length (excluding crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws). TSA considers any incident that threatens the security or safety of an aircraft or its passengers and flight crew to be a security incident. These could include a range of activities onboard an aircraft such as disruptive passenger behavior, violence against a passenger or crew member, hijacking attempts, or the use of an improvised explosive device. By examining the security impacts of the change to the prohibited items list, this report considers the impacts that could result from a passenger attempting to use scissors or tools to hijack an aircraft or to commit other forms of violence onboard a flight. Such actions fall within TSA's statutory responsibility to ensure the safety and security of passengers and crew aboard aircraft. In accordance with Conference Report 109-699, which accompanied the fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations act, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What was TSA's basis for removing certain scissors and tools from the prohibited items list and what are stakeholder views on the change? (2) What have been the impacts, if any, of the removal of certain scissors and tools from the prohibited items list on the security of aircraft passengers and flight crew and on the effectiveness of checkpoint screening operations?
TSA's stated purpose in removing certain scissors and tools from the prohibited items list was to shift TSO focus from items considered by TSA to pose a low threat (including certain scissors and tools) to items considered to pose a high threat, such as explosives. The change also was intended to better allocate TSA resources to implement other security measures that target explosives--a change supported by the majority of aviation industry stakeholders that we interviewed. TSA's decision to remove these items from the prohibited items list was based on the professional judgment of TSA officials that these items do not pose a significant threat to the security of the cockpit or to passengers and flight crew as well as internal studies that sought to examine, among other things, risks to flight security and considerations of customer concerns and screening efficiencies. Based on our review of TSA security incident reports from the time period following the prohibited items list change (December 2005 through February 2007), there have been no reported security incidents onboard an aircraft involving the use of small scissors or tools. However, the impact of the prohibited items list change on security is uncertain because the absence of an event occurring involving the use of these items does not preclude the possibility that future occurrences could happen. In addition, with respect to the effectiveness of the change on checkpoint screening operations, it is not possible to determine this because the available data are inconclusive. As we reported in March 2007, TSA conducted informal studies 30, 60, and 90 days following the change and concluded that TSO time was freed up to focus on high-threat items, but our analysis of TSA data does not support this conclusion. TSA agrees that the agency could have conducted a more methodologically sound evaluation of the impact of the prohibited items list change, but continues to believe that the change nevertheless significantly contributed to the agency's efforts to free up TSO resources to focus on detecting high-threat items, such as explosives. It also is not clear whether the change had any impact on TSOs' ability to detect explosives--a key goal of the change. One way TSA measures the effectiveness of the passenger screening system in detecting threat items, such as explosives, is the results of threat image projection testing. However, TSA does not claim nor do the data definitively support that TSA's change to the prohibited items list had any impact on threat image projection results because TSA implemented other changes to checkpoint screening operations at or around the same time as the prohibited items list change. With regard to TSA's efforts to increase training for identifying explosives as part of its overall effort to become a more risk-based organization, TSA data between October 2004 and January 2007 show an increase in the average number of hours spent in training per TSO, but this trend began before the change to the prohibited items list and there are other factors that may have contributed to this increase.
GAO-07-623R, Aviation Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive
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Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of
the Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive' which was released
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April 25, 2007:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton:
United States Senate:
Subject: Aviation Security: TSA's Change to Its Prohibited Items List
Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of
the Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive:
The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives
onboard multiple commercial aircraft bound for the United States from
the United Kingdom has highlighted both the continued importance of
securing the civil aviation system and the potential that improvised
explosive devices (IED) may be smuggled onboard passenger aircraft. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primary responsibility
for ensuring the security of civil aviation, which includes the safety
of passengers and flight crew.[Footnote 1]
One measure TSA uses to protect the aviation system is prohibiting
individuals from carrying items that it determines to be a threat to
the aircraft and its passengers into an airport sterile area or onboard
an aircraft either in their carry-on bag or on their person.[Footnote
2] To implement this measure, TSA maintains a prohibited items list
that informs both the Transportation Security Officers (TSO) who
conduct passenger screening and the traveling public of items that will
not be allowed into an airport sterile area or onboard an aircraft. In
December 2005, TSA revised its prohibited items list to allow
passengers to carry: (1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4
inches or less in length as measured from the fulcrum; and (2) tools--
such as pliers, screwdrivers, and wrenches--7 inches or less in length
(excluding crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws).[Footnote 3]
TSA considers any incident that threatens the security or safety of an
aircraft or its passengers and flight crew to be a security incident.
These could include a range of activities onboard an aircraft such as
disruptive passenger behavior, violence against a passenger or crew
member, hijacking attempts, or the use of an improvised explosive
device. By examining the security impacts of the change to the
prohibited items list, this report considers the impacts that could
result from a passenger attempting to use scissors or tools to hijack
an aircraft or to commit other forms of violence onboard a flight. Such
actions fall within TSA's statutory responsibility to ensure the safety
and security of passengers and crew aboard aircraft. In accordance with
Conference Report 109-699, which accompanied the fiscal year 2007
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations act,[Footnote 4]
this report addresses the following questions: (1) What was TSA's basis
for removing certain scissors and tools from the prohibited items list
and what are stakeholder views on the change? (2) What have been the
impacts, if any, of the removal of certain scissors and tools from the
prohibited items list on the security of aircraft passengers and flight
crew and on the effectiveness of checkpoint screening operations?
To address these objectives, we analyzed TSA documentation and data,
including TSA security incident reports, TSA written analyses related
to the prohibited items list change, results of Threat Image Projection
(TIP) testing,[Footnote 5] and data on training hours completed by
TSOs. Although the TIP data we received had limitations, we believe
that they are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report and
that the data on training hours are sufficiently reliable as well. We
also met with two Federal Security Directors (FSD) to obtain their
views on the impact of the prohibited items list change on checkpoint
screening operations.[Footnote 6] However, information obtained from
our interviews with these FSDs cannot be generalized because we did not
use random selection or representative sampling when determining which
FSDs should be interviewed. In addition, we met with officials at the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Federal Air Marshals
Service (FAMS)--a component of TSA--to obtain their views regarding the
prohibited items list change. We also met with TSA officials to obtain
information on their rationale behind the change. We spoke with 13
stakeholders within the aviation industry, including representatives of
4 domestic aviation associations, the largest association representing
airline pilots in the United States, the largest association
representing flight attendants in the United States, an association
representing federal air marshals and other federal law enforcement
officers, an international aviation association, and 5 aviation
security experts. We also met with a major aircraft manufacturer to
determine whether there are any major safety concerns related to the
change to the prohibited items list. Finally, we incorporated aspects
of a recently issued GAO report on passenger checkpoint screening
procedures, which included a review of the factors TSA considered in
modifying the prohibited items list and TSA's analysis supporting the
December 2005 prohibited items list change.[Footnote 7] We conducted
our work from November 2006 through March 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. More details about
the scope and methodology of our work are presented in enclosure I.
Results in Brief:
TSA's stated purpose in removing certain scissors and tools from the
prohibited items list was to shift TSO focus from items considered by
TSA to pose a low threat (including certain scissors and tools) to
items considered to pose a high threat, such as explosives. The change
also was intended to better allocate TSA resources to implement other
security measures that target explosives--a change supported by the
majority of aviation industry stakeholders that we interviewed. TSA's
decision to remove these items from the prohibited items list was based
on the professional judgment of TSA officials that these items do not
pose a significant threat to the security of the cockpit or to
passengers and flight crew as well as internal studies that sought to
examine, among other things, risks to flight security and
considerations of customer concerns and screening efficiencies. As part
of these internal studies, TSA collected data on the number and types
of prohibited items surrendered at checkpoints and the time it takes
for TSOs to conduct carry-on bag searches. In March 2007, we reported
that TSA did not analyze these data to determine the extent to which
TSO resources would actually be freed up to implement other security
measures, nor did TSA analyze other relevant factors such as the amount
of time taken to search for small scissors and tools and the number of
TSOs conducting these searches. We recommended that TSA develop sound
evaluation methods, when possible, that can help TSA determine whether
proposed procedures would achieve their intended purpose.[Footnote 8]
TSA concurred with the recommendation and stated that it plans to make
better use of generally accepted research design principles and
techniques when operationally testing proposed changes to screening
procedures. Based on our analysis of TSA data for the third and fourth
quarters of fiscal year 2005 (a 6-month period), we determined that
TSOs spent, on average, less than 1 percent of their time--about 1
minute per day over the 6-month period--searching for the approximately
1.8 million sharp objects, other than knives and box cutters, that were
found at passenger screening checkpoints between April 2005 and
September 2005. Therefore, it may not have been accurate for TSA to
assume that no longer requiring TSOs to search for small scissors and
tools would significantly contribute to TSA's efforts to free up TSO
resources that could be used to implement other security measures. TSA
acknowledged that its data collection and analysis effort may not have
been methodologically rigorous but stated that it did serve to provide
insights regarding the type and quantity of items collected at the
passenger checkpoint. TSA officials also stated that even if TSO
resources were not freed up as intended, they continue to view their
decision to allow small scissors and tools onboard aircraft as sound,
particularly because their review of threat information determined that
small scissors and tools do not pose a significant threat to aviation
security. Additionally, 9 of the 13 aviation industry stakeholders whom
we interviewed supported the removal of small scissors and tools from
the prohibited items list because they believe small scissors and tools
do not pose a risk to the security of the aircraft and stated that the
change will increase TSA's focus on IEDs; the remainder disagreed,
citing potential increased security risks. TSA officials acknowledged
that small scissors and tools, as well as other items permitted onboard
commercial aircraft, may potentially be used as weapons against
passengers and flight crew, but stated that these items cannot be used
to hijack an aircraft given the other layers of security in place, such
as hardened cockpit doors that prevent unauthorized access to the
flight deck.
Based on our review of TSA security incident reports from the time
period following the prohibited items list change (December 2005
through February 2007), there have been no reported security incidents
onboard an aircraft involving the use of small scissors or tools.
However, the impact of the prohibited items list change on security is
uncertain because the absence of an event occurring involving the use
of these items does not preclude the possibility that future
occurrences could happen. In addition, with respect to the
effectiveness of the change on checkpoint screening operations, it is
not possible to determine this because the available data are
inconclusive. As we reported in March 2007, TSA conducted informal
studies 30, 60, and 90 days following the change and concluded that TSO
time was freed up to focus on high-threat items, but our analysis of
TSA data does not support this conclusion.[Footnote 9] TSA agrees that
the agency could have conducted a more methodologically sound
evaluation of the impact of the prohibited items list change, but
continues to believe that the change nevertheless significantly
contributed to the agency's efforts to free up TSO resources to focus
on detecting high-threat items, such as explosives. It also is not
clear whether the change had any impact on TSOs' ability to detect
explosives--a key goal of the change. One way TSA measures the
effectiveness of the passenger screening system in detecting threat
items, such as explosives, is the results of threat image projection
testing.[Footnote 10] However, TSA does not claim nor do the data
definitively support that TSA's change to the prohibited items list had
any impact on threat image projection results because TSA implemented
other changes to checkpoint screening operations at or around the same
time as the prohibited items list change. With regard to TSA's efforts
to increase training for identifying explosives as part of its overall
effort to become a more risk-based organization, TSA data between
October 2004 and January 2007 show an increase in the average number of
hours spent in training per TSO, but this trend began before the change
to the prohibited items list and there are other factors that may have
contributed to this increase.
Background:
In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, TSA prohibits
weapons, explosives or incendiaries, and other items that TSA believes
pose a significant threat to civil aviation security onboard commercial
aircraft.[Footnote 11] TSA has divided these prohibited types of items
into seven categories. Individuals are prohibited from carrying these
items into an airport sterile area or onboard an aircraft either in
their carry-on bag or on their person. Table 1 provides a description
of the items included in the seven categories.
Table 1: Categories and Descriptions of Prohibited Items.
Category of prohibited item: Guns and firearms;
Description of items included in the category: BB guns; compressed air
guns; firearms; flare pistols; gun lighters; parts of guns and
firearms; pellet guns; realistic replicas of firearms; spear guns;
starter pistols; stun guns/cattle prods/ shocking devices.
Category of prohibited item: Sharp objects;
Description of items included in the category: Axes and hatchets; bows
and arrows; ice axes/ice picks; knives of any length, except rounded-
blade butter and plastic cutlery; meat cleavers; razor-type blades,
such as box cutters, utility knives, and razor blades not in a
cartridge, but excluding safety razors; sabers; scissors, metal with
pointed tips and a blade length greater than 4 inches as measured from
the fulcrum; swords; throwing stars (martial arts).
Category of prohibited item: Club-like items;
Description of items included in the category: Baseball bats; billy
clubs; blackjacks; brass knuckles; cricket bats; golf clubs; hockey
sticks; lacrosse sticks; martial arts weapons, including nunchucks, and
kubatons; night sticks; pool cues; ski poles.
Category of prohibited item: All explosives;
Description of items included in the category: Ammunition; blasting
caps; dynamite; fireworks; flares in any form; gunpowder; hand
grenades; plastic explosives; realistic replicas of explosives.
Category of prohibited item: Incendiaries;
Description of items included in the category: Aerosol, any, except for
personal care or toiletries in limited quantities; fuels, including
cooking fuels and any flammable liquid fuel; gasoline; gas torches,
including microtorches and torch lighters; lighter fluid; strike-
anywhere matches; turpentine and paint thinner; realistic replicas of
incendiaries; all lighters.
Category of prohibited item: Disabling chemicals and other dangerous
items;
Description of items included in the category: Chlorine for pools and
spas; compressed gas cylinders (including fire extinguishers); liquid
bleach; mace; pepper spray; spillable batteries, except those in
wheelchairs; spray paint; tear gas.
Category of prohibited item: Tools;
Description of items included in the category: Crowbars; drills and
drill bits, including cordless portable power drills; hammers; saws and
saw blades, including cordless portable power saws; other tools greater
than 7 inches in length, including pliers, screwdrivers, and wrenches.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other items included
on TSA's prohibited items list onboard an aircraft or into a sterile
area.[Footnote 12] Passenger screening personnel--TSOs--must inspect
individuals for prohibited items at designated screening
locations.[Footnote 13] As shown in figure 1, the passenger screening
functions are:
* X-ray screening of property,
* walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,
* hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals,
* physical search of property and trace detection for explosives, and:
* behavioral observation.
Figure 1: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Functions:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO and Nova Department Corporation.
Notes: Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing
swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine
to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then
chemically analyzes the swab to identify any traces of explosive
materials.
Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO) are available to respond to unresolved
alarms at the checkpoint that involve possible explosive devices. The
BAO may contact appropriate law enforcement or bomb squad officials if
review indicates possible or imminent danger, in which case the BAO
ensures that the security checkpoint is cleared. The BAO approves
reopening of security lane(s) if no threat is posed.
[A] BDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in
individuals approaching the checkpoint. Should the BDO observe such
behavior, he or she may refer the individual for individual screening
or to a law enforcement officer. As of April 2007, BDOs are not present
at all airport checkpoints.
[B] The hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified
or randomly selected for additional screening because he or she met
certain criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal detector.
[C] Manual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the
passenger is identified or randomly selected for additional screening
or if the screener identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray.
[End of figure]
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their
carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector.
Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm
the walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees--
that is, passengers selected by the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS[Footnote 14]) or other TSA-approved
processes to receive additional screening--are screened by hand-wand or
pat-down and have their carry-on items screened for explosives traces
or physically searched.
In addition to passenger checkpoint screening, other layers of aviation
security recognized by TSA include, among other things:
* Hardened cockpit doors to prevent unauthorized access or forced entry
to the flight deck.
* Deployment of federal air marshals on certain flights to provide
physical security should an incident occur.
* Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) Program to train pilots on
commercial passenger and cargo aircraft on how to use lethal force
against an intruder on the flight deck.[Footnote 15]
* Security training for flight and cabin crews to handle potential
threats onboard aircraft. Flight and cabin crews are expected to defend
the flight deck in accordance with a TSA and FAA-developed guidance
manual known as the Common Strategy.[Footnote 16]
In addition, TSA considers the vigilance of able-bodied passengers to
be an important layer of aviation security. Able-bodied passengers are
those passengers who may engage in self-defense actions should an
incident occur onboard commercial aircraft.
TSA Changed the Prohibited Items List to Shift TSO Resources to Higher-
Threat Priorities and Most Aviation Industry Stakeholders Interviewed
Supported TSA's Change:
TSA Conducted Various Studies to Determine Whether Changing the
Prohibited Items List Would Free Up TSO Resources, but Some Efforts
Lacked Methodological Rigor:
As we reported in March 2007,[Footnote 17] TSA changed the prohibited
items list in an effort to shift TSO resources to focus on higher
threats, such as explosives, and based on its determination that small
scissors and tools do not pose a risk to aviation security.[Footnote
18] TSA's decision was informed by the conclusions reached by an
Explosives Detection Improvement Task Force established in October 2005
by the TSA Assistant Secretary to respond to the threat of IEDs being
carried through the checkpoint. The goal of the task force was to apply
a risk-based approach to screening passengers and their baggage in
order to enhance TSA's ability to detect IEDs. As part of its analysis,
the task force considered a number of factors including threat
information, TSO effectiveness, and overall screening performance.
According to TSA officials, the task force also considered the results
of a Prohibited Items Working Group that was established in February
2005 by the then-TSA Assistant Secretary to develop recommendations for
modifying the prohibited items list to better reflect the current
aviation security environment.
The Prohibited Items Working Group assessed each item on the prohibited
items list using four criteria: (1) risks to flight security (i.e., can
the item be used to take down an aircraft in flight); (2) legal
restrictions (i.e., hazardous and other materials that are prohibited
from the aircraft or from the flight cabin); (3) public concern and
screener effectiveness (i.e., would permitting the item onboard an
aircraft cause significant passenger and flight crew concern regarding
their safety); and (4) international standards (i.e., international
protocols recommend that the item be prohibited from the aircraft or
the flight cabin). At the conclusion of its analysis, the working group
recommended that scissors with pointed tips less than 6 centimeters
(2.36 inches) and tools less than 7 inches be removed from the
prohibited items list because these items were not considered to
represent a risk to the aircraft or cockpit security. Although the
working group based its size restriction for scissors on the size
parameters recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO)--which is to provide for the safe, orderly, and efficient
development of international civil aviation--the working group deviated
from ICAO's recommendation to prohibit all pointed/edged
scissors.[Footnote 19] A TSA representative from the working group
stated that this change was recommended because the working group
concluded that pointed/edged scissors could not be used to gain access
to the cockpit to take down an aircraft in flight. In addition, the
working group stated that concentrating on such items diminished TSA's
efforts to focus on identifying objects that pose the greatest threat
to aviation security, such as IEDs.
Subsequent to the analysis of the working group, TSA's Explosives
Detection Improvement Task Force collected information from several
sources to test its assumption that a disproportionate amount of TSO
resources was being spent searching for small scissors and tools.
First, TSA reviewed data maintained in TSA's Performance Management
Information System,[Footnote 20] which showed that during the third and
fourth quarters of fiscal year 2005 (a 6-month period), TSOs collected
a total of about 1.8 million sharp objects other than knives or box
cutters and about 468,000 tools. The sharp objects constituted 19
percent of all prohibited items surrendered at the checkpoint during
this period and tools constituted 5 percent of the items. Second, based
on information provided by FSDs, TSOs, and other screening experts, TSA
determined that scissors constituted a large majority of the total
number of sharp objects found at passenger screening checkpoints. TSA
also concluded that small screwdrivers, wrenches, and pliers make up a
large majority of the tools found at checkpoints. Third, TSA
headquarters officials searched through surrendered items bins at four
airports and found that most of the scissors had blades less than 4
inches in length and a very large percentage of the tools that were
surrendered were 7 inches or smaller.
Based on these collective efforts, TSA's Explosive Detection
Improvement Task Force concluded that a significant number of items
found at the checkpoint were low-threat, easily identified items, such
as small scissors and tools, and that a disproportionate amount of time
was spent searching for these items--time that could have been spent
searching for high-threat items, such as explosives. The task force
also concluded that because TSOs can generally identify scissors and
tools on X-ray images easily, if small scissors and tools were no
longer on the prohibited items list, TSOs could avoid conducting time-
consuming physical bag searches to locate and remove these items. TSA
ultimately concurred with the recommendations provided by the Explosive
Detection Improvement Task Force and decided to remove scissors less
than 4 inches and certain tools less than 7 inches from the prohibited
items list.
Although TSA's rationale for its December 2005 change to the prohibited
items list was to reduce focus on low-threat items in order to free up
TSO time, attention, and resources to implement screening practices
that better focus on high-threat items--such as Screening Passengers by
Observation Technique (SPOT) and Unpredictable Screening Process
(USP)[Footnote 21]--we reported in March 2007 that TSA had not
conducted the necessary analysis of the data collected to determine the
extent to which the removal of small scissors and tools from the
prohibited items list could free up TSO resources. Specifically, we
found that TSA had not analyzed the data on sharp objects surrendered
at the checkpoint along with other relevant factors, such as the amount
of time taken to search for scissors and the number of TSOs at the
checkpoint conducting these searches. Based on our analysis of TSA's
data for the third and fourth quarters of fiscal year 2005 (a 6-month
period), where we considered these other relevant factors, we
determined that TSOs spent, on average, less than 1 percent of their
time--about 1 minute per day over the 6-month period--searching for the
approximately 1.8 million sharp objects, other than knives and box
cutters, that were found at passenger screening checkpoints between
April 2005 and September 2005. If the average amount of time TSOs spent
searching for sharp objects per day over a 6-month period was less than
1 minute per TSO, and sharp objects constituted just 19 percent of all
prohibited items surrendered at checkpoints over this period, then it
may not be accurate to assume that no longer requiring TSOs to search
for small scissors and tools would significantly contribute to TSA's
efforts to free up TSO resources that could be used to implement other
security measures. TSA stated that the decision to remove small
scissors and small tools from the prohibited items list was not only
based on an analysis of data but was also firmly rooted in its
assessment of risk, professional judgment, and experience. According to
TSA, this included interviews with FSDs who unanimously indicated the
change would free up TSO resources, as well as examinations of the
prohibited items surrendered at several airports and a study to
determine the amount of time taken to conduct bag searches.
TSA acknowledged that this particular data collection and analysis
effort may not have been methodologically rigorous, but stated that it
did serve to provide insights regarding the type and quantity of items
collected at the passenger checkpoint and the analysis effort generally
supported the decision. Additionally, the TSA Assistant Secretary
stated that even if TSA determined that the proposed prohibited items
list modification would not free up existing TSO resources to conduct
explosives detection procedures, he would have implemented the change
anyway considering that such items no longer posed a significant
security risk given the multiple layers of aviation security.
In our March 2007 report, we recommended that TSA develop sound
evaluation methods, when possible, that can help TSA determine whether
proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their
intended purpose, such as enhancing TSA's ability to detect prohibited
items and freeing up existing TSO resources that could be used to
implement proposed procedures.[Footnote 22] TSA concurred with the
recommendation and stated that it plans to make better use of generally
accepted research design principles and techniques when operationally
testing proposed changes to screening procedures. For example, TSA
agreed to consider using random selection, representative sampling, and
control groups in order to isolate the impact of proposed changes to
screening procedures from the impact of other variables.
Most Aviation Industry Stakeholders We Contacted Supported TSA's
Changes to the Prohibited Items List:
The majority (9 of 13) of the aviation industry stakeholders that we
interviewed supported the removal of small scissors and tools from the
prohibited items list. In general, these stakeholders said that they
believe that the layers of aviation security reduce a passenger's
ability to access the cockpit with low-threat items, and further noted
that passengers may carry other items onboard an aircraft (such as
glass bottles, pens, and sharpened credit cards) that may also be used
as weapons. Stakeholders also stated that TSOs will be able to better
focus on detecting IEDs if low-threat items such as small scissors and
tools are removed from the prohibited items list. However, 4 out of 13
aviation industry stakeholders that we interviewed were opposed to the
prohibited items list change, stating that permitting scissors
increases the risk of violence against passengers and flight crew
onboard an aircraft. Some of these stakeholders also stated that
scissors also increase the risk that hijackings could be successfully
implemented because scissors have bladed edges and pointed tips and
therefore can be used as knives, and because terrorists can train with
scissors to perfect their use as weapons. These stakeholders further
stated that unlike other items that can be improvised to create a
cutting surface (such as broken glass bottles), terrorists would not
need to alter scissors onboard aircraft to use them as weapons. This
could also allow a passenger to use the cutting edge and/or the
sharpened tip of a scissor as a weapon without alerting other
passengers or flight crew, as compared with the attention that could be
drawn to a passenger that breaks a glass bottle.
TSA acknowledges that scissors and tools may be used as weapons against
passengers and flight crew. However, TSA stated that other items that
are permitted onboard commercial aircraft, such as pens and glass
bottles, may also be used as weapons against passengers and flight
crew. TSA also maintained that its focus is on detecting explosives or
items that can be used to breach the cockpit and potentially hijack the
aircraft, which TSA and the majority of the aviation industry
stakeholders that we spoke with view as a significant threat to
aviation. TSA maintained that small scissors and tools cannot be used
to hijack an aircraft, particularly given the other layers of security.
Although stakeholders who both supported and disagreed with TSA's
change stated that the layers of security implemented since September
11, 2001--particularly the hardened cockpit door--have decreased the
likelihood of a successful hijacking, stakeholders generally stated
that the risk of a hijacking is highest when the cockpit door is
opened. In an attempt to mitigate this potential vulnerability, and in
accordance with the air carrier's responsibility to ensure that no
passenger can access the flight deck when the cockpit door needs to be
opened during flight, air carriers will typically place a beverage cart
between passengers and the cockpit with a flight attendant standing
behind the cart. The beverage cart and the flight attendant serve as a
"secondary barrier" between passengers and the cockpit door. However,
two aviation stakeholders--a former law enforcement officer who
provides self-defense training and a representative from the
association of flight attendants--stated that this secondary barrier
can be circumvented by a determined terrorist using a scissor to attack
the flight attendant who is manning the beverage cart, which could
allow the terrorist to negotiate around the beverage cart and then
access the open cockpit door. A senior TSA official stated that flight
crew protocols are sufficient to ensure passengers cannot breach the
cockpit and that mechanisms are in place to ensure that cockpit doors
are opened for brief periods of time.
No Security Incidents against Passengers or Crew Using Scissors or
Tools Have Been Reported to TSA Since the Change to the Prohibited
Items List, but the Impact of the Change on Screening Operations Is
Inconclusive:
No Onboard Incidents Involving Small Scissors or Tools Reported to TSA
Since Prohibited Items List Change and FAA Does Not Believe These Items
Pose a Risk to the Integrity of an Aircraft:
Based on our review of TSA security incident reports from the time
period following the prohibited items list change (December 2005
through February 2007), there have been no reported security incidents
onboard an aircraft involving the use of small scissors or
tools.[Footnote 23] However, TSA and aviation security stakeholders we
spoke with acknowledged that the absence of an onboard incident
involving scissors or tools as weapons does not preclude the
possibility of such an incident in the future. In addition, based on
aircraft vulnerability and system safety and security analyses
performed to date by government and industry, neither FAA nor a major
aircraft manufacturer we interviewed perceive any meaningful increase
in risk to the integrity of an aircraft associated with TSA's decision
to permit small scissors and tools onboard aircraft.[Footnote 24] FAA
officials also stated that aircraft are designed so that there are many
layers of protection to prevent damage to the integrity of an aircraft
from within (e.g., hardened cockpit doors and separate and redundant
wiring for critical systems with few internal access points). The
aircraft manufacturer stated that while it is possible that terrorists
or others intending to do harm to the aviation system could use these
items in ways not currently foreseeable, given current risk mitigation
activities, the ability to inflict major damage to an aircraft with
them is extremely remote.
Impact of Prohibited Items List Change on Checkpoint Screening
Operations Is Inconclusive:
TSA conducted informal studies 30, 60, and 90 days after the prohibited
items list changes went into effect to determine whether the change had
resulted in reductions in the percentage of carry-on bags that were
searched and overall screening time. However, in a prior report, we
identified limitations in TSA's methodology for conducting these
studies and concluded that it may not be accurate to assume that the
prohibited items list change freed up resources.[Footnote 25] TSA
agrees that the agency could have conducted a more methodologically
sound evaluation of the impact of the prohibited items list change, but
TSA continues to believe that the change did significantly contribute
to the agency's efforts to free up TSO resources to focus on detection
of high-threat items, such as explosives. TSA officials stated that
that they have not conducted or planned any additional studies on the
prohibited items list change to determine the impact of the change on
the effectiveness of screening operations. Officials continue to view
the change as sound based on their professional judgment and assessment
of risk, and state that the change allowed the agency to shift focus
from low risks to areas such as increased focus on explosive devices
and increased training.
In February 2007, a TSA official stated that some FSDs interviewed
several TSOs after the prohibited items list change went into effect,
and these TSOs reported that the change did save screening time.
However, TSA could not identify how many TSOs were interviewed, at
which airports the TSOs were located, and how the TSOs were selected
for the interview; nor did TSA document the results of these
interviews. As TSA did not use random selection or representative
sampling when determining which TSOs should be interviewed, the
interview results cannot be generalized.
Most of the FSDs we interviewed in August 2006 as part of our passenger
screening procedures review stated that the prohibited items list
change, in addition to another change, did not collectively free up TSO
resources to perform screening activities focused on threats considered
to pose a high risk, such as explosives.[Footnote 26] Specifically, 13
of 19 FSDs we interviewed at airports that tested USP and SPOT said
that TSO resources were not freed up as a result of the prohibited
items list change and another change made by TSA during this time
frame.[Footnote 27] In addition, 9 of the 19 FSDs said that in order to
operationally test the procedures, TSOs had to work overtime, switch
from other functions (such as checked baggage screening), or a
screening lane had to be closed. Moreover, 13 of the 19 FSDs stated
that TSOs did not experience more time to conduct explosives
training.[Footnote 28]
In addition to the lack of clarity about the impact of changes to the
prohibited items list on TSO's available time, it also is not clear
whether the change had any impact on TSOs' ability to detect IEDs--a
key goal of the change. The results of threat image projection (TIP)
testing are one way that TSA measures the effectiveness of the
passenger screening system in detection of threat items, such as
explosives. The results of TSA TIP testing are considered sensitive
security information and thus could not be included in this report.
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether TSA's change to the prohibited
items list had any impact on TSOs' ability to identify IEDs during TIP
testing because multiple factors could have accounted for the changes
in TIP scores over time. For example, TSA implemented other changes to
checkpoint screening operations at or around the same time as the
prohibited items list change. These changes include both new and
revised procedures, such as: revising the USP to include selected
screening process elements like explosive trace detection of footwear
and accessible property; screening 100 percent of passengers' footwear;
banning liquids and gels; revising bulk-item pat downs to include the
waistline down to the ankles; targeting threat area searches within
baggage; revising the CAPPS rules; and implementing the new SPOT
procedure. In fact, FSDs we interviewed at two category X
airports[Footnote 29] in February 2007 as well as other TSA officials
stated that at this time it is not possible to isolate the effect of
the prohibited items list change from these additional changes in order
to determine its impact on checkpoint screening operations and whether
the prohibited items list change freed up TSO resources.[Footnote 30]
With regard to TSA's efforts to increase training for identifying IEDs
as part of its overall effort to become a more risk-based organization,
TSA data between October 2004 and January 2007 show an increase in the
average number of hours spent in training per TSO, but this trend began
before the change to the prohibited items list and there are other
factors that may have contributed to this increase. Our analysis of
these data show an increase of an average of 1.68 hours per TSO in
monthly IED training over the 29-month period, from an average of 0.42
hours per TSO in October 2004 to an average of 2.10 hours per TSO in
February 2007. According to TSA's TSO training officials, there are two
primary explanations for the increase: (1) in October 2005 TSA provided
a 4-hour IED training course to 18,000 TSOs over a 3-week period, and,
according to TSA, about 98 percent of the 48,236 TSOs on board had
received classroom, checkpoint, or computer-based improvised explosive
device recognition training as of February 6, 2007; and (2) in May 2006
TSA instituted a new monthly requirement of 4 hours of IED training per
TSO. Thus, although a goal of the prohibited items list change was to
increase TSO training hours for detecting IEDs, TSA program officials
acknowledge, and we agree, that it is not clear whether the change to
the prohibited items list had any impact on time spent in training.
Concluding Observations:
TSA is faced with the challenge of addressing numerous threats to
commercial aviation security, as demonstrated by the alleged August
2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple
commercial aircraft bound for the United States from the United
Kingdom. TSA's December 2005 change to the prohibited items list is one
of several efforts TSA has made to focus its resources on addressing
the threat posed by explosives, which TSA considers to be the most
significant threat to commercial aviation security. While TSA's
consideration of threat information, the professional judgment of TSA
personnel, data analysis, and international standards all constitute
reasonable inputs to making informed decisions on how to best
anticipate and address threats given its available resources, the
impact of the prohibited items list change on security and screening
effectiveness is inconclusive. Nevertheless, we are encouraged that TSA
recognized the limitations in its analysis of data used to help inform
the prohibited items list change and plans to improve the
methodological rigor for evaluating proposed changes to passenger
screening procedures in the future, as we recommended in our March 2007
report. This effort will be particularly important as additional
changes to passenger screening procedures--including future revisions
to the prohibited items list--are considered and implemented.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of the report to DHS for its review and comment.
TSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security; the Assistant Secretary, TSA; and interested
congressional committees as appropriate. We will also make this report
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in enclosure II.
Signed by:
Robert Goldenkoff:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Enclosures:
Enclosure I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe TSA's basis for removing certain scissors and tools from
the prohibited items list and stakeholder views on the change, we
obtained and analyzed TSA documentation of the proposed prohibited
items list change considered by TSA's Explosives Detection Improvement
Task Force, which was the deliberating body for proposed TSA procedural
changes that were considered between October 2005 and December 2005. We
also obtained and analyzed a draft TSA Prohibited Items Working Group
analysis, as well as TSA public statements and testimonies regarding
the rationale for the prohibited items change. We also met with TSA
officials to obtain information on their rationale behind the change.
In addition, we met with officials at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS)--a
component of TSA--to obtain their views regarding the prohibited items
list change. We spoke with organizations within the aviation community
including four domestic aviation associations, one international
aviation association, a major aircraft manufacturer, the largest
association representing airline pilots in the United States, the
largest association representing flight attendants in the United
States, and an association representing federal air marshals and other
federal law enforcement officers.[Footnote 31] In addition, we met with
five aviation security experts to obtain their views on TSA's change to
the prohibited items list.[Footnote 32] We selected these experts based
on their depth of experience in the field of aviation, employment
history, and their recognition in the aviation security community. We
also met with a major aircraft manufacturer to determine whether there
are any major safety concerns related to the change to the prohibited
items list. Finally, we incorporated aspects from our recently issued
report on passenger checkpoint screening procedures,[Footnote 33] which
included a review of the factors TSA considered in modifying the
prohibited items list and TSA's analysis supporting the December 2005
prohibited items list change.
To determine the impacts, if any, that the removal of certain scissors
and tools from the prohibited items list had on security and on the
effectiveness of screening operations, we obtained and reviewed TSA
documentation and data including the results of threat image projection
(TIP) testing and data on training hours completed by Transportation
Security Officers (TSO). We sent written questions about data quality
control and reporting procedures to TSA officials responsible for
collecting and analyzing these data, and received responses to these
questions. The TIP data TSA provided contained limitations. First, the
data contained only monthly averages for tests in which improvised
explosive devices (IED) images had been successfully identified by
TSOs, according to individual airports in each airport category; we did
not receive the raw numbers of image presentations from which the
percentages were derived. Therefore, to compute an average percentage
of successful TIP tests across all airports, we computed an average of
averages. Computing an average in this manner can provide a result that
is slightly different than if raw data had been used. For example, we
could not adjust our computations to account for differing numbers of
image presentations or the rate of image presentations by airport.
Second, there were missing values, or no test results, for some
airports in certain months. Despite these limitations, we believe the
TIP data were sufficiently reliable to provide an indication of TSOs'
abilities to identify IED images. In addition, we interviewed Federal
Security Directors (FSD) from Boston Logan Airport and Washington
Dulles International Airport to obtain anecdotal information about
their views on the impact of the prohibited items list change on
checkpoint screening operations. However, the perspectives of these two
FSDs cannot be considered to be representative of the views of FSDs
nationwide or generalized because we did not use random selection or
representative sampling when determining which FSDs should be
interviewed.
To determine whether the change to the list of prohibited items had any
impact on TSO time spent in training, we also analyzed training data
provided by TSA on the average number of hours spent in training per
TSO for the period from October 2004 through February 2007. TSA uses a
dynamic system to capture training data called the Online Learning
Center, and TSA offers several reasons for the dynamic nature of this
system. First, TSA employees and contractors are continuously allowed
to update training history hours. As a result, data on training hours
and attendance extracted from the database at two different points in
time may vary as employees and contractors update their training
history. Second, there can be a delay in updating training data due to
manual entry of student results. TSA policy is that final reports are
generated on the 10TH of each month in order to permit time to collect
and consolidate airport data for manual data entry. The training hour
data were sufficiently reliable for our purpose in showing a general
increase in IED training over time. Our results are based on the data
TSA provided to us on March 21, 2007.
To determine if any security incidents onboard an aircraft involving
the use of small scissors or tools were reported to TSA, we reviewed
and analyzed TSA security incident reports from the time period
following the prohibited items list change (December 22, 2005--the
effective date of the prohibited items list change--through February
28, 2007). Because TSA is the agency with primary responsibility for
aviation security and maintains records of aviation security incidents,
TSA security incident reports were our primary source of information
for identifying incidents involving small scissors or tools. We
followed a two-step process to identify incidents appropriate to our
review. During the first step, one analyst reviewed all incidents in
each daily TSA security incident report to identify any incidents that
he or she discerned involved small scissors or tools based on key words
or phrases in the incident title or description. A log was created for
each incident report reviewed. In the second step, a random sample of
10 percent of the incident reports was selected, and these reports and
their accompanying logs were reviewed by a second analyst to verify the
accuracy of the first analyst's judgments. We limited the scope of our
TSA security incident report review to incidents that occurred on
commercial passenger aircraft in-flight. We defined "in-flight" as the
time between aircraft take-off and landing. Although it is possible
that there were some incidents involving small scissors or tools that
occurred during the time period of our review that were not reported to
TSA, and thus not recorded in the incident reports, we found the
incident reports sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted our work from November 2006 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Robert Goldenkoff (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report were Maria Strudwick, Assistant
Director; David Alexander; Christopher Backley; Amy Bernstein; Tony
Cheesebrough; Adam Hoffman; Stanley Kostyla; Tom Lombardi; and Brian
Sklar.
(440557):
FOOTNOTES
[1] See 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(d), 44903(b).
[2] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are
provided access to boarding aircraft.
[3] 70 Fed. Reg. 72,930 (Dec. 8, 2005).
[4] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 139 (2006) (accompanying H.R.
5441, enacted into law as the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 121 Stat 1355 (2006)).
[5] The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs'
detection capabilities by projecting threat images, including guns,
knives, and explosives, onto carry-on bags as they are screened during
actual operations. TSOs are responsible for identifying the threat
image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP
identifies to the TSO whether the threat is real and then records the
TSO's performance in a database that could be analyzed for performance
trends.
[6] FSDs are the ranking authorities responsible for leading and
coordinating security activities at U.S. commercial airports at which
TSA provides for or oversees the provision of screening activities.
[7] GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns
Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation
and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-57SU
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2007). The information in this report is
considered sensitive security information in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
part 1520 and is not available to the public. A public version of this
report (GAO-07-634) is expected to be issued in May 2007.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] The results of TSA TIP testing are considered sensitive security
information and thus could not be included in this report.
[11] See 49 U.S.C. § 44902; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.111, 1544.201(d).
[12] Access to sterile areas is controlled by TSOs (or by nonfederal
screeners at airports participating in the Screener Partnership
Program) at checkpoints where they conduct physical screening of
individuals and their carry-on baggage for weapons, explosives, and
other prohibited items.
[13] TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in
accordance with passenger screening standard operating procedures. If
an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must
not be allowed into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft.
[14] CAPPS is a computer-assisted system that, based on information
obtained from airline reservation systems, identifies passengers that
may pose a high risk to aviation security. These high-risk passengers,
along with other individuals selected for secondary screening, and
their carry-on baggage are subject to additional and more thorough
screening.
[15] Administered by TSA, the FFDO Program deputizes volunteer pilots
of commercial passenger aircraft as armed federal law enforcement
officers for the purpose of defending the flight deck "against acts of
criminal violence or air piracy." Since the program was officially
established on February 25, 2003, TSA has deputized thousands of
eligible flight crew members as FFDOs.
[16] The Common Strategy is a detailed guidance manual developed by TSA
and FAA for pilots and other crewmembers to identify their
responsibilities and the appropriate responses during in-flight
security threats. In January 2005, TSA and FAA issued a revised version
of the Common Strategy. The previous version, referred to as Common
Strategy #1, was the strategy in effect on September 11, 2001. Common
Strategy #1 was developed jointly by industry, FAA, and FBI, and
presumed a hijacker whose motive might be ransom, escape from the law,
political asylum, or publicity. According to the Common Strategy, the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that Common
Strategy #1 was not effective in dealing with a new breed of hijacker
whose motives are terrorism, mass murder, and suicide.
[17] GAO-07-57SU.
[18] The change to the prohibited items list was one of several other
changes to TSA procedures intended to focus more TSA resources on
higher threats, such as explosives. The Explosive Detection Improvement
Task Force recommended seven proposed procedures that were ultimately
implemented by TSA. These procedures were considered by senior TSA
officials as especially important for enhancing the detection of
explosives and for deterring terrorists from attempting to carry out an
attack. According to TSA, some of the proposed procedures, such as the
prohibited items list change, could also free up TSOs so that they
could spend more time on procedures for detecting explosives and less
time on procedures associated with low security risks, such as
identifying small scissors in carry-on bags. The seven proposed
procedures tested by the task force reflect both new procedures and
modifications to existing procedures. The procedures are discussed in
detail in GAO-07-57SU.
[19] Nations that are members to ICAO agree to cooperate with other
member states to meet standardized international aviation security
measures. ICAO recommends that pointed/edged scissors of any size
should be prohibited from the flight cabin, while rounded or blunt
scissors less than 6 cm should be permitted in the flight cabin. The
TSA Prohibited Items Working Group utilized the ICAO size parameters,
but applied the parameters to both rounded/blunt scissors as well as
pointed/edged scissors, thus deviating from the ICAO recommendation to
ban all pointed/edged scissors.
[20] TSA's Performance Management Information System is designed to
collect, analyze, and report passenger and baggage screening
performance data, such as wait times at selected airports, workload
data, and the performance and utilization of passenger and baggage
screening equipment. TSA headquarters uses the Performance Management
Information System data to support external reporting on performance
and internal decision-making processes.
[21] Screening Passengers by Observation Technique involves specially
trained TSOs observing the behavior of passengers and resolving any
suspicious behavior through casual conversation with passengers and
referring suspicious passengers to selectee screening. Unpredictable
Screening Process entails random selection of passengers across two
screening lanes to be subjected to a predetermined element of the
selectee screening process.
[22] GAO-07-57SU.
[23] Because TSA is the primary agency responsible for aviation
security and maintains records of aviation security incidents, TSA
security incident reports were our primary source of information for
identifying incidents involving small scissors or tools. These security
incident reports summarize transportation security incidents--
including aviation--that are reported to TSA and include descriptions
of the incident. We used the December 2005-February 2007 time period
because it was after the effective date of the prohibited items list
change. Pursuant to TSA-issued Security Directive 1544-04-15, all
aircraft operators are required to immediately report all threats that
could affect the security of commercial aircraft to TSA.
[24] The Federal Aviation Administration has primary responsibility for
ensuring the safety of civil aviation operations, including the
operation of air traffic control and regulating the manufacture,
operation, and maintenance of aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. § 44701.
[25] The results of the informal follow-on studies, which were
conducted at 6 to 9 airports, show that the percentage of carry-on bags
searched increased by about 0.1 percentage point at the time of the 30-
day study, then decreased by 2.3 and 0.7 percentage points at the time
of the 60-day and 90-day studies, respectively. However, the results of
these informal studies may not be reliable due to the limitations in
the methodology TSA used to conduct the studies. Specifically, TSA did
not use a methodology that would control for factors other than the
prohibited items list change that may influence the percentage of carry-
on bags searched by TSOs. To do this, TSA would have had to develop a
formal, systematic methodology for randomly selecting various times of
day, location of checkpoints, number of checkpoints, and so on for data
collection. By not controlling for such factors, TSA may not know the
extent to which a reduction in the percentage of carry-on bags searched
is due to the prohibited items list changes. See GAO-07-57SU.
[26] See GAO-07-57SU. An additional measure intended to free up TSO
resources involved changes to CAPPS rules to reduce the number of
passengers selected for secondary screening. TSA's assumption is that
these changes could allow TSOs who were normally assigned to selectee
screening duties to be reassigned to new procedures, which may require
new screening positions.
[27] Since we did not use random selection or representative sampling
when determining which FSDs should be interviewed, the interview
results cannot be generalized.
[28] Of the remaining 6 FSDs, 5 said that TSO resources were freed up
as a result of the prohibited items list and CAPPS rules changes, and 1
was uncertain whether TSO resources were actually freed up.
[29] TSA classifies the over 400 commercial airports in the United
States into one of five categories--X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally,
category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings and
category IV airports have the smallest number.
[30] The views of the two FSDs we interviewed may not be representative
of the views of the population of FSDs.
[31] Specifically, we met with the Air Transport Association (ATA), the
National Air Carrier Association (NACA), the Regional Airline
Association (RAA), the Air Carrier Association of America (ACAA), the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), and the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA).
[32] The views of these five experts may not necessarily represent the
general view of other experts in the field of aviation security.
[33] GAO-07-57SU.
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