Homeland Security
Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation Gao ID: GAO-07-835T May 15, 2007As a new hurricane season approaches, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulates major changes to FEMA intended to enhance its preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be ready for the coming hurricane season. The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
GAO-07-835T, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, May 15, 2007:
Homeland Security:
Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to
Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations
and Legislation:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-835T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-835T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
As a new hurricane season approaches, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces
the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and
implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulates
major changes to FEMA intended to enhance its preparedness for and
response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA
and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining
leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster
response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to
provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and
abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges
and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several
disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
What GAO Found:
Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what
needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how
well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed
that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities,
development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability
systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and
effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and
responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must
be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood.
Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major
disaster are needed”particularly in the areas of (1) situational
assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3)
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care
and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps
to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and
some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a
catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the
targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system,
are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile
communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be
ready for the coming hurricane season.
The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform
and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to
prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic
events. FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in
transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization
required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on
initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina
reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may
wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These
include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the
National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural
disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2)
assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to
enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state
planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of
preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding
oversight assistance.
What GAO Recommends:
This testimony includes no new recommendations, but identifies issues
to which Congress, FEMA, and DHS may wish to give continued attention
so that FEMA may fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina Reform
Act. These issues are based on the findings and recommendations of more
than 30 Katrina-related GAO reports.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-835T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William Jenkins, Jr. at
(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to address the
shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and
enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including
hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins in just a few weeks.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements
of preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to
state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set
the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre-and
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS's high-
risk status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS
must overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems
to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud,
and abuse.[Footnote 1] These issues are enormously complex and
challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view
preparedness for and response to major disasters as a national system
with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is because
effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the
coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first
responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well
as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put aside and
cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event. The
experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to
tackle these difficult issues.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership,
response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made
by DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform
Act[Footnote 2] and other recommendations made in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster management
issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are
based on our body of work on disaster and emergency management
including more than 30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
our review of recent emergency management reform legislative changes,
and materials and statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles
and responsibilities; (2) development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue
that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and
responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who has the
authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response
and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was
to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
DHS has designated a FCO for each region that includes states at risks
of hurricanes and a supporting FCO for each of these states. It has
also designated a PFO for each of three regions--the Gulf Coast, the
Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic Region--plus a separate PFO for
the state of Florida and Texas. It is critically important that the
authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these designated FCOs and
PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all. There is still some
question among state and local first responders about the need for both
positions and how they will work together in disaster response. One
potential benefit of naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they
have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations, roles and
responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials
before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved
coordination and communication in an actual disaster.
As we have previously reported, developing the ability to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters requires
an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate
and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and
responsibilities); how it should be done; and how well it should be
done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the
National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP, NIMS and the
NPG are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, state, and
local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental and
private sector officials. This effort is intended to assess the
effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these documents, identify
modifications and improvements, and reissue the documents. The results
of the review for the NRP, for example, was initially scheduled for
release in June 2007. However, in April 2007 DHS officials notified
stakeholders that some important issues were more complex and require
national-level policy decisions, and stated that additional time than
was expected was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted
that the underlying operational principles of the NRP remain intact and
that the current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA
officials have told us that the final version of the NPG and its
corresponding documents are currently receiving final reviews by the
White House and will be due out shortly. We are concerned, however,
that if the revisions are not completed prior to the beginning of the
2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the changes resulting from
these revisions could be effectively implemented for the 2007 hurricane
season.
In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation's experience with
hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the
adequacy of the nation's disaster response capabilities in the context
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that
needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and
coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which the
capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and
subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and
local stakeholders. In various meetings with GAO, in congressional
testimonies, and in some documents FEMA has described a number of
initiatives to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas
and progress is being made on these multiyear efforts. However, a
number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate
their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to
have been tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions
and demand they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster.
Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of these
initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster,
such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane.[Footnote 3] Additional information
on FEMA's efforts can be found in Appendix I.
The National Guard has traditionally been an important component of
response to major disasters. States and governors rely on their
National Guard personnel and equipment for disaster response, and
National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas,
including those outside their home states. However, as we reported in
January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National Guard
needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully
identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would
have roles in responding to such events have not completed and
integrated their plans.
With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability,
FEMA has stated it can register up to 200,000 applicants per day for
individual assistance while including safeguards for preventing
fraudulent and duplicate applications. The inability to reliably and
efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major
problem following Katrina that resulted in millions of dollars in
improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its debris
removal and contracting policies and to increase the use of advanced
contracting for goods and services. Again, we have no basis to
determine the effectiveness of these systems as they have yet to be
tested on a large scale basis.
As FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season, it is an organization in
transition that is working to implement the reorganization mandated by
the Post-Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to
implement a comprehensive, risk-based national emergency management
system as required by the act. In November 2006, the Comptroller
General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting that one area
needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding
to, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that
Congress might consider for oversight are:
* the development and implementation of the National Preparedness
System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist
incidents, and an influenza pandemic;
* the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal
grants in building and sustaining those capabilities;
* regional and multistate planning and preparedness;
* the status and use of preparedness exercises; and:
* DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve
the nation's preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic
disasters.
Background:
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford
Act)[Footnote 4] primarily establishes the programs and processes for
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources,
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.[Footnote 5] We have ongoing work examining how the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact has been used in disasters and how its
effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report by this summer.
As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations have
been made to improve the nation's ability to effectively prepare for
and respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina,[Footnote 6] the Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee,[Footnote 7] the White House
Homeland Security Council,[Footnote 8] the DHS Inspector
General,[Footnote 9] and DHS and FEMA[Footnote 10] all identified a
variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for,
response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. In addition
to these reviews, a report from the American National Standards
Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel (ANSI-HSSP) contains
recommendations aimed at bolstering national preparedness, response,
and recovery efforts in the event of a natural disaster. A key resource
identified in the document is the American National Standard for
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/
NFPA 1600), which was developed by the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA). The standard defines a common set of criteria for
preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and business
continuity programs.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements
of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts,
particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response
capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately
overwhelmed.[Footnote 11] Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly
defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3)
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we recommended that
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
We also recommended that DHS:
1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of
the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified
coordination problems;
2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic
Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational
implementation plans;
3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a
jurisdictional and regional basis;
4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to
meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National
Preparedness Goal; and:
5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest
finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the
act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA
is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports
directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within
DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or
significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of
FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent
legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHS's
Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute
establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The
statute also establishes a National Integration Center responsible for
the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-
Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other areas, such as
evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals
with disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to
strengthen the management and capability of FEMA's workforce. For
example, the statute called for a strategic human capital plan to shape
and improve FEMA's workforce, authorized recruitment and retention
bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the
organizational changes became effective as of March 31, 2007. Others,
such as the increase in organizational autonomy for FEMA and
establishment of the National Integration Center, became effective upon
enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4, 2006.
FEMA Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements
Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act:
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS
as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act,
whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested
disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS,
the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's internal
structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and
integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities
within FEMA.
As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of
recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational
changes and related roles and responsibilities should address many of
our emergency management observations and recommendations. In addition,
we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, particularly for
catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and
local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our analysis
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from
Catastrophic Disasters:
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and
effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve
leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a
catastrophic disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the
capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall
national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define
what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities),
how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is,
according to what standards. The principal national documents designed
to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG.
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by
federal, state, and local government officials, tribal authorities, non-
governmental and private sector officials.[Footnote 12] For example,
the review of the NRP is intended to assess the effectiveness of the
NRP, identify modifications and improvements and reissue the document.
This review includes all major components of the NRP including the base
plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the
Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the
PFO, FCO, and the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the current
NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of
Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, and Human
Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this emergency support
function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the
responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. According to a February 2007
letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP
review process is complete and all changes are approved.
The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June
2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that
some important issues were more complex and require national-level
policy decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a
comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational
principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as
revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that
the final version of the National Preparedness Goal and its
corresponding documents like the Target Capabilities List, are
currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are expected
to be out shortly.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be
a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the FCO,
who has the authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies
for response and recovery under the Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose
role was to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. The May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to
address this issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may
not have fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of
the PFO and the FCO. While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid
conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both positions
in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary of
Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so.
Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents,
and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a rationale for this
limitation.
FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf Coast
and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes FCOs
and PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region,[Footnote 13] Northeast
Region,[Footnote 14] and the Mid-Atlantic Region,[Footnote 15] and
separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas. It is
critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities
of these pre-designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood
by all. There is still some question among state and local first
responders about the need for both positions and how they will work
together in disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs
and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss
expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, local, and
nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, possibly setting
the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual
disaster.
Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond
to Major Disasters:
Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White
House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and
capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and
nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number
of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the
ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and
catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort
that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and
where, how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is,
according to what standards. As previously discussed, the principal
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.
Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of
people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed
capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination
in conjunction with training and exercises in which the capabilities
are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently
addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local
stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day
operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its
transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the agency's management
of existing resources compounded these problems.[Footnote 16] FEMA
lacks some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to
changing circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found
that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital
strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated training
effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable
an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills
needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between
current and future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said
they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational
management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18
areas, whose final reports and recommendations are due later this
spring.[Footnote 17]
An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to
identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety
of sources--federal, state, local or tribal governments; military
assets of the National Guard or active military; nongovernmental
entities; and the private sector. One key method of tapping resources
in areas not affected by the disaster is the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC). Through EMAC about 46,000 National Guard and
19,000 civilian responders were deployed to areas directly affected by
the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. We have ongoing work examining how EMAC
has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced
and expect to report by this summer.
One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard.
States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and
equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are
frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states.
However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of
equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters
have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state
agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not
completed and integrated their plans.[Footnote 18] As a liaison between
the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is
well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces.
However, until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation
are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for
multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and the
National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and
efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the
level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic
emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil
support missions or report this information to Congress. Thus, although
the deployment of National Guard units overseas has decreased the
supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in
the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the
impact on the Guard's ability to perform its domestic missions.
Although DOD has begun to collect data on units' preparedness, these
efforts are not yet fully mature.
The nation's experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces
some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the
context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of
actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies
in each of these areas. Examples include designating national and
regional situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile
satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for
receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and
supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies
on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to
clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human
services. However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too
early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these
initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably
simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a major
or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable
results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or
catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section
below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements
in each of these areas. Additional details can be found in appendix I.
Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly
deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called
National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal
presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing
the national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will
support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the
capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers
and support the initial establishment of a unified command.
Emergency Communications. Agencies' communications systems during a
catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient
communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication
requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications
interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire,
emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have
identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to
improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken
action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive,
interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which
we discuss further in appendix I.
Logistics. FEMA's inability to effectively manage and track requests
for and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came
under harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days,
FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over
much of the logistics mission.[Footnote 19] In the Post-Katrina Reform
Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible
and responsive. FEMA's ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy
and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide
immediate support to a disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods
and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the
private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and
recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we
recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach,
identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system,
which are discussed in appendix I. In short, FEMA is taking action to
transition its logistics program to be more proactive, flexible, and
responsive. While these and other initiatives hold promise for
improving FEMA's logistics capabilities, it will be several years
before they are fully implemented and operational.
Mass Care and Shelter. In GAO's work examining the nation's ability to
evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA
needs to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the
federal government and outside the federal government. In an April
testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations said that
emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most pressing
priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He
said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support
planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing
methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family
members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities.
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources
are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster,
decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited
assistance payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million
to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to
applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended
outcomes.[Footnote 20]
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making
should quickly replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time,
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes
intended.
We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to
provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the
magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster
assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for
response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in
all cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance
procurement practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal
agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal
agencies could then better manage disaster-related procurement and
establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous
planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and the
maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of
emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that
provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its
disaster-related procurements. These practices include developing
knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing
vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable
operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response
with the need.[Footnote 21]
In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes have
established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For example,
The Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to
limit the excessive use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The
Secretary of DHS is also required to promulgate regulations that limit
certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional
circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate
up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as
oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain
internal management controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and
develop and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and
abuse of federal funds in response to or recovery from a disaster.
Verification measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients
of disaster relief assistance.
Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional
Attention:
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.[Footnote 22]
He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after
catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the
threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the importance of
ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster
management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and
coordinated can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively
functioning insurance market can substantially reduce the government's
exposure to post-catastrophe payouts.
Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity
for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of
potential catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided
Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act
reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according
to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated in our
March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina
Reform Act's organizational changes and related roles and
responsibilities--in addition to those changes already undertaken by
DHS--should address many of our emergency management observations and
recommendations.
The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress
could also consider how the federal government can work with other
nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector
organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help
ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the
billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to,
recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters,
congressional oversight is critical.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term
efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas
for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and
(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.
DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act:
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and
additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act
of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective
on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a
thorough assessment of FEMA's internal structure to incorporate lessons
learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and
existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the
following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:
* United States Fire Administration,
* Office of Grants and Training,
* Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,
* Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
* Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,
* Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational
elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster
assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition,
FEMA expanded its regional office structure with each region in part by
establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional
Strike Team. With the recent appointment of the director for region
III, FEMA officials noted that for the first time in recent memory
there will be no acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional
offices will be headed by experienced professionals.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It
also will include the National Integration Center that will maintain
the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities
reflect these documents.
Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions
Should Respond to Many Concerns:
As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the effective
implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes
and related roles and responsibilities--in addition to those changes
already undertaken by DHS--should address many of our emergency
management observations and recommendations.
As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership
roles and responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the
FEMA Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management
adviser to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress
after informing the Secretary of DHS. The incident management
responsibilities and roles of the National Integration Center are now
clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a
clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the federal response to
any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The
law also establishes qualifications that appointees must meet. For
example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated ability in and
knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of
executive leadership and management experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities,
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program
to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and
strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in
order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state
annexes must be developed in consultation with local officials,
including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to
foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA
must enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal
entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment
capabilities, including credentialing of personnel and typing of
resources. In addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities,
such as (1) developing a logistics system providing real-time
visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics system, (2)
establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing
emergency support and response teams.
The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster
Capabilities:
More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal "to establish measurable readiness priorities and
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from
them." The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness
Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist
related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major
earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS's National
Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to
illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic
emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form
the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide
range of large scale emergency events. The scenarios focused on the
consequences that first responders would have to address. Some state
and local officials and experts have questioned whether the scenarios
were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in
terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal,
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005.
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for
these capabilities and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the
Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in
the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the NPG, target capabilities and
preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems--should
be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established
seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness,
including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening
capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and
strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those
seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland
security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority
that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two
overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others.
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2)
integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3)
developing and sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key
resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence
fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability, (6)
strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities,
and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan
review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP
applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that
provides background information, strategic objectives and priorities
addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each
proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have.
The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic:
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management;
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the
effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation.
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of
detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers.
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and
response for such a disaster will require particularly close
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector,
individuals within the United States, as well as international
cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late
summer 2007.
Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their
Capabilities Is Limited:
Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on
state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying
risk management principles to guide federal investments, over the past
4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to
states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants.
Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and localities
finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and
are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define
and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about
emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what
are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given
finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed.
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes.
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people
across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with
their grant application. States were to use this justification to
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding.
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk
and effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions,
although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process
more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said
that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from
grant funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because
they do not yet have the metrics to do so.
Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust:
Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent
neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the abilities of
first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site
of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist
disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a
regional and multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the
National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to
building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of
government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination
and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional
security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent
regional and multistate planning has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning.
Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of
expenditures.[Footnote 23] One of these challenges included a
coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of
expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent
work on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted
areas that needed strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically
improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide decision
makers.[Footnote 24] For example, additional information could have
been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned
goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and
measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet regional risk and
needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation;
resources and investments; and operational commitment.
Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons
Learned:
Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For
first responders, exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of
events for which there is little actual experience--are essential for
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective
response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance.
DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational
Decisions:
Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified
that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its
management areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive
work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been
receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with
access to various documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that
DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives.
Concluding Observations:
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions
of dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to
assist in strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has
developed several key national policy documents, including the NRP,
NIMS, and the NPG to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The
aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of
the federal role in preparing for and responding to catastrophic
events. The studies and reports of the past year--by Congress, the
White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO,
and others--have provided a number of insights into the strengths and
limitations of the nation's capacity to respond to catastrophic
disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for strengthening
that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports paint a complex
mosaic of the challenges that the nation--federal, state, local, and
tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the private sector; and
individual citizens--faces in preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post-Katrina Reform Act
directs many organizational, mission, and policy changes to respond to
these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task
that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver
bullet," no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but
requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because
circumstances change and we will never have the funds to do everything
we might like to do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you and subcommittee members may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William O.
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors
to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino,
Analyst-in-Charge; Flavio Martinez, Analyst; and Amy Bernstein,
Communications Analyst.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and
Recovery:
Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial
resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal
governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet
the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage
and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be
part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to
integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well
it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The principal
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG. The nation's experience with Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the
adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster--
particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness,
(2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue,
(5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering.
FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each of
these areas. Examples include designating national and regional
situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite
communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving
and tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies;
acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route
to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify
roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services.
This appendix provides additional details of FEMA's actions in each of
these areas.
FEMA Taking Steps to Improve Situational Assessment Capabilities:
One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is
their situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a
concept for rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams,
at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a
forward federal presence to facilitate managing the national response
for catastrophic incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three
national-level teams and ten regional-level teams, one in each of the
ten FEMA regions. These teams will support efforts to meet the emergent
needs during disasters such as the capability to provide initial
situational awareness for decision-makers and support the initial
establishment of a unified command. According to FEMA's plans, these
teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure that the multi-
disciplinary requirements of emergency management are met. The teams
are envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective federal
presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the state, to
coordinate federal activities, and to be self sufficient for a minimum
of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially scarce local
resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with
permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a
collateral duty basis. Team composition will include representatives
from other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners.
When not deployed, the teams will team-train with federal partners and
provide a training capability to elevate state and local emergency
management capabilities. The teams will also engage in consistent and
coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with state,
local, tribal, and other stakeholders.
According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed and
decisions on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not
yet been finalized. The new teams are envisioned to eventually subsume
the existing FIRST (Federal Incident Response Teams) and ERTs (FEMA's
Emergency Response Teams), and their mission and capabilities will
incorporate similar concepts involving leadership, emergency management
doctrine, and operational competence in communications. FEMA plans to
implement one National Incident Management Team and one Regional
Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007.
Some Progress Has Been Made on Interoperable Communications:
As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical
capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies'
communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be
operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and
emergency communication requirements. Once operable, they then should
have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies
(e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service
agencies (e.g., public works, transportation, and hospitals) can
communicate within and across agencies and jurisdictions in real time
as needed.
DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities they
have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally.
DHS's Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was
established to strengthen and integrate interoperability and
compatibility efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and federal
emergency preparedness and response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which is
transitioning to the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)--in
response to the Post-Katrina Reform Act--is developing tools,
templates, and guidance documents, including field tested statewide
planning methodologies, online collaboration tools, coordinated grant
guidance, communications requirements, and a comprehensive online
library of lessons learned and best practices to improve
interoperability and compatibility across the nation. DHS officials
cited the development of the following examples in their efforts to
improve interoperable communications:
* Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational and functional
requirements for emergency response communications.
* Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help emergency
response agencies map interoperable communications system requirements
and identify system gaps.
* Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance Assessment
Program. This project is in conjunction with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to support the efforts of the emergency
response community and industry;
* Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Methodology to
offer states a tangible approach as they initiate statewide
interoperability planning efforts. SAFECOM also collaborated in DHS
grant guidance to help states develop statewide interoperability plans
by the end of 2007.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to design,
staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable,
and highly reliable emergency communications capability using the
latest commercial off-the-shelf voice, video, and data technology.
FEMA's Response Division is the designated lead for tactical
communications, along with situational awareness information technology
enablers that are provided by FEMA's Chief Information Officer. Mobile
Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments provide robust,
deployable, command, control, and incident communications capabilities
to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic Incidents of National
Significance. The MERS mission supports Emergency Support Function
partners at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The
plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and leverage commercial
technology to provide real-time connectivity between communications
platforms in a manner consistent with emergency communication
deployment doctrine being developed by DHS and FEMA. According to FEMA
officials, emergency managers at the federal, state, and local levels
of government will benefit from an integrated interoperable emergency
communications architecture that includes the Department of Defense,
United States Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau.
Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been
awarded to states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to
make improvements on a variety of interoperability projects.[Footnote
25] However this work noted that the SAFECOM program has made limited
progress in improving communications interoperability at all levels of
government. For example, the program has not addressed interoperability
with federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable
communications required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.[Footnote 26] The SAFECOM program has focused on
helping states and localities improve interoperable communications by
developing tools and guidance for their use. However, based on our
review of four states and selected localities, SAFECOM's progress in
achieving its goals of helping these states and localities improve
interoperable communications has been limited. Officials from the
states and localities we reviewed often found that the tools and
planning assistance provided by the program were not helpful, or they
were unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The program's
limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program management
practices, including the lack of a plan for improving interoperability
across all levels of government and inadequate performance measures
that would provide feedback to better attune tools and assistance with
public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key management
practices, its progress is likely to remain limited.
Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25
standards--a suite of national standards that are intended to enable
interoperability among the communications products of different
vendors. For example, although one of the eight major subsets of
standards was defined in the project's first 4 years (from 1989 to
1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed
that could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25
system. The private-sector coordinating body responsible for Project 25
has defined specifications for three additional subsets of standards.
However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to
incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and no
compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors' products are
interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and
local agencies to use grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios,
which are substantially more expensive than non-Project 25 radios. As a
result, states and local agencies have purchased fewer, more expensive
radios, which still may not be interoperable and thus may provide them
with minimal additional benefits. Thus, until DHS takes a more
strategic approach here, progress by states and localities in improving
interoperability is likely to be impeded.
FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems:
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's performance in the logistics
area came under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed
and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics
mission.[Footnote 27] In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required
FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. FEMA's
improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to
initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site
mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish
sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are
needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA
officials.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning
capabilities that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to
support a variety of communications requirements--satellite, land
mobile radio, computer and telephone systems--with the ability to
operate from one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the
response area of operations. FEMA has also developed a Pre-Positioned
Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving
and life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies as close to a
potential disaster site as possible, in order to substantially reduce
the initial response time to incidents.[Footnote 28] Further, FEMA is
developing a Pre-positioned Equipment Program (PEP) that also consists
of standardized containers of equipment to provide state and local
governments responding to a range of major disasters such equipment as
personal protective supplies, decontamination, detection, technical
search and rescue, law enforcement, medical, interoperable
communications and other emergency response equipment. According to
FEMA officials, currently FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP
locations, as mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, and FEMA is
currently conducting an analysis to determine where the additional PEP
sites should be located. FEMA has also stated that it has enhanced its
relationships with the public sector with its disaster logistics
partners and has worked to utilize the public sector's expertise
through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency, the
Department of Transportation and Marine Corps Systems Command.
According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating an
effective logistics system is based upon FEMA's ability to work
collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and
private partners. FEMA's logistics efforts have identified private
sector expertise to improve and develop software systems to increase
logistics program efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the
Logistics Information Management System (LIMS) is FEMA's formal
accountability database system for all property managed within FEMA
nation-wide or at disaster field locations. At the same time, FEMA is
also developing a multi-phased Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program
with the assistance of the private sector to leverage the collective
resources of the private and public sector to improve emergency
response logistics in the areas of transportation, warehousing, and
distribution. The current phase of the program, which is operational at
two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth, Texas),
encompasses two software management packages designed to provide FEMA
the ability to inventory disaster response commodities upon arrival at
a warehouse, place the commodities in storage, and track the
commodities while stored in the warehouse. FEMA plans to expand the
capabilities of this first phase of the system to all FEMA Regions
during 2007. This will provide FEMA with sufficient logistics
management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase two can be
implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently conducting market
research to solicit input from the private sector and other sources to
facilitate final design of the program's second phase. According to
FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase are
scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and fully-operational in June
2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more
comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and
incorporate FEMA's financial resource tracking requirements. It will
also be able to support other federal departments and agencies, non-
government organizations, and state, local and tribal organizations
under the guidelines of the NRP.
While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities, it
is too early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA
logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas
necessary for an effective logistics system. Below, we describe these
five areas along with FEMA's ongoing actions to address each.
Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place to
address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information on
states' capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not have
information from these sources to define what and how much it needs to
stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of operations to underpin
its logistics program and told us that it is working to develop
detailed plans and the associated stockage requirements. However, until
FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency will be
unable to assess its true preparedness.
Inventory management: FEMA's system accounts for the location,
quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in-
transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve
transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as
expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test
regions to all FEMA regions.
Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of smaller
storage facilities across the country. However, it has little assurance
that these are the right number of facilities located in the right
places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of determining
the number of storage facilities it needs and where they should be
located.
Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA's distribution system,
including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and
lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives under
way that should mitigate some of the problems with contractors, and has
been working with Department of Defense and Department of
Transportation to improve the access to transportation when needed.
People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the
logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff,
supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff.
However, FEMA's recent retirements and losses of staff, and its
difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created
staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a January
2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls in
staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the
planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills
needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently
hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire
qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics
program to be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and
other initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics
capabilities, it will be years before they are fully implemented and
operational.
Revisions Made to Evacuation Planning, Mass Care, Housing and Human
Services:
In an April 2007 testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations
said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most
pressing priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic
disaster. He said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee
support planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are
developing methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing
family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based
data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities.
Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify
the responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations,
especially for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found
that state and local governments are generally not well prepared to
evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations (i.e. planning,
training, and conducting exercises), but some states and localities
have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, in June
2006, DHS reported that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12
percent of the urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately
addressed evacuating these populations. Steps being taken by some such
governments include collaboration with social service and
transportation providers and transportation planning organizations--
some of which are Department of Transportation (DOT) grantees and
stakeholders--to determine transportation needs and develop agreements
for emergency use of drivers and vehicles. The federal government
provides evacuation assistance to state and local governments, but gaps
in this assistance have hindered many of these governments' ability to
sufficiently prepare for evacuations. This includes the lack of any
specific requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the
evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps
in the usefulness of DHS's guidance. We recommended that DHS should
clarify federal agencies' roles and responsibilities for providing
evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed.
DHS should require state and local evacuation preparedness for
transportation-disadvantaged populations and improve information to
assist these governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to
share information to assist in evacuation preparedness for these
populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our recommendations, and
DHS stated it has partly implemented some of them.
In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee, FEMA's Deputy Administrator stated that
FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuation support planning to
help State and local government plan and prepare for hosting large
displaced populations. The project is to include the development of an
evacuee registration and tracking capability and implementation plans
for federal evacuation support to states.
Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA has
revised the organizational structure of ESF-6, Mass Care, Housing, and
Human Services, and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible for
this emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a
supporting agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. FEMA
continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red
Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities for mass care.
The MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December
2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other
support agencies to revise ESF-6 standard operating procedures.
According to a February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will
not take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes
are approved. According to FEMA's Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the
Red Cross have developed the first phase of a web-based data system to
support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification
activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide
shelter service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive
understanding of the shelter populations and available shelter
capacity.
Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to
identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal
government and outside the federal government, including temporary
housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the
National Response Plan's annex covering temporary shelter and housing
in ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two
primary responsible agencies--FEMA and the Red Cross.[Footnote 29]
However, the responsibilities described for the support agencies--the
Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), and Veterans Affairs--did not, and still do not, fully reflect
their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not, at the
time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and
responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency-
specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. Our
February 2007 report recommended that the support agencies propose
revisions to the NRP that fully reflect each respective support
agency's capabilities for providing temporary housing under ESF-6,
develop the needed fact sheets, and develop operational plans that
provide details on how their respective agencies will meet their
temporary housing responsibilities. The Departments of Defense, HUD,
Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, and Agriculture, concurred
with our recommendations. The Red Cross did not comment on our report
or recommendations. As part of a housing task force, FEMA is currently
exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by private
sector organizations. FEMA says it has also developed a housing portal
to consolidate available rental resources for evacuees from Federal
agencies, private organizations, and individuals.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Related GAO Products:
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007:
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations,
and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO-07-
411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007:
Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to
Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution
of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO-07-485R.
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has
Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO-07-
356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete
Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO-07-
205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and
Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007:
Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal
Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance
Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington, D.C.:
February 14, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes
Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T.
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness
of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs. GAO-07-219.
Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February
7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007:
GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 Washington, D.C.:
January 26, 2007:
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance
Education's Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and
Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05-
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
[2] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394
(2006).
[3] Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines "catastrophic
incident'' as any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made
disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage
or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass
evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or
government functions in an area.
[4] The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.
[5] California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state's
legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired.
[6] House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[7] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington,
D.C.: May 2006).
[8] White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[9] Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[10] Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006).
[11] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[12] On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding
leadership issues, such as which situations require secretarial
leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident
Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for
declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including
catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to
the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more detail on
implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to Hurricane
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic
Incident Annex, dated August 2006.
[13] Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
[14] Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.
[15] Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia,
District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
[16] GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems
to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
[17] The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4)
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6)
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15)
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget
process, and (18) disaster relief fund.
[18] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
[19] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[20] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is
the Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-
07-418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.
[21] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
[22] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006.
[23] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004);
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04-
904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective
Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National
Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National
Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).
[24] GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region
Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
[25] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability. GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007).
[26] See 6 U.S.C. § 194(a).
[27] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[28] States participating in the PPDS program sign a Memorandum of
Agreement with FEMA for the use of the containers.
[29] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2007).
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