Emergency Management Assistance Compact
Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response Gao ID: GAO-07-854 June 29, 2007The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a collaborative arrangement among member states that provides a legal framework for requesting resources. Working alongside federal players, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Guard Bureau, EMAC members deployed an unprecedented level of assistance in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although EMAC played a critical role in our nation's response to these hurricanes, the magnitude of these events revealed limitations. GAO was asked to (1) examine how the use of EMAC has changed since its inception; (2) assess how well existing policies, procedures, and practices facilitate collaboration; and (3) evaluate the adequacy of the EMAC network's administrative capacity to achieve its mission. GAO examined documents and interviewed officials from 45 federal, state, and local agencies and offices.
Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides. EMAC's membership has increased from a handful of states in 1995 to 52 states and territories today, and EMAC members have used the compact to obtain support for several types of disasters including hurricanes, floods, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The volume and variety of resources states have requested under EMAC have also grown significantly. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, New York requested 26 support staff under EMAC to assist in emergency management operations; whereas, in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, approximately 66,000 personnel--about 46,500 National Guard and 19,500 civilian responders-- were deployed under EMAC from a wide variety of specialties, most of whom went to areas directly impacted by the storms. EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices, enables its members to overcome differences to achieve a common mission--streamlining and expediting the delivery of resources among members during disasters. While these policies, procedures, and practices have worked well for smaller-scale deployments, they have not kept pace with the changing use of EMAC, sometimes resulting in confusion and deployment delays. The EMAC network has taken steps to address several of these challenges, but additional improvements can be made in a number of areas including clarifying roles and responsibilities of EMAC members and improving existing systems that track resources deployed under EMAC. In addition, a lack of sufficiently detailed federal standards and policies has led to some reimbursement delays and additional administrative burdens. While the EMAC network has developed a basic administrative capacity, opportunities exist for it to further build on and sustain these efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from experiences and developing a 5-year strategic plan. However, the EMAC network can enhance its administrative capacity by improving how it plans, measures, and reports on its performance. FEMA provided $2 million to help build this capacity in 2003, but the agreement has recently expired. FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a new 3-year cooperative agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the EMAC network's ability to support its collaborative efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-854, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response
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Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2007:
Emergency Management Assistance Compact:
Enhancing EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should
Improve National Disaster Response:
EMAC's National Disaster Response:
GAO-07-854:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-854, a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a collaborative
arrangement among member states that provides a legal framework for
requesting resources. Working alongside federal players, including the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Guard
Bureau, EMAC members deployed an unprecedented level of assistance in
response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although EMAC played a
critical role in our nation‘s response to these hurricanes, the
magnitude of these events revealed limitations.
GAO was asked to (1) examine how the use of EMAC has changed since its
inception; (2) assess how well existing policies, procedures, and
practices facilitate collaboration; and (3) evaluate the adequacy of
the EMAC network‘s administrative capacity to achieve its mission. GAO
examined documents and interviewed officials from 45 federal, state,
and local agencies and offices.
GAO makes recommendations to the Secretaries of DHS and DOD to further
enhance the administrative capacity required to support the EMAC
network and to develop guidance and to formalize certain procedures to
alleviate burdens experienced by EMAC members during catastrophic
disasters. DHS concurred with all of our recommendations. DOD did not
concur with one recommendation.
What GAO Found:
Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly
in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides. EMAC‘s
membership has increased from a handful of states in 1995 to 52 states
and territories today, and EMAC members have used the compact to obtain
support for several types of disasters including hurricanes, floods,
and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The volume and variety of
resources states have requested under EMAC have also grown
significantly. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, New York requested 26 support staff under EMAC to assist in
emergency management operations; whereas, in response to the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, approximately 66,000 personnel”about 46,500 National
Guard and 19,500 civilian responders”were deployed under EMAC from a
wide variety of specialties, most of whom went to areas directly
impacted by the storms.
EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices,
enables its members to overcome differences to achieve a common
mission”streamlining and expediting the delivery of resources among
members during disasters. While these policies, procedures, and
practices have worked well for smaller-scale deployments, they have not
kept pace with the changing use of EMAC, sometimes resulting in
confusion and deployment delays. The EMAC network has taken steps to
address several of these challenges, but additional improvements can be
made in a number of areas including clarifying roles and
responsibilities of EMAC members and improving existing systems that
track resources deployed under EMAC. In addition, a lack of
sufficiently detailed federal standards and policies has led to some
reimbursement delays and additional administrative burdens.
While the EMAC network has developed a basic administrative capacity,
opportunities exist for it to further build on and sustain these
efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good management
practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from experiences
and developing a 5-year strategic plan. However, the EMAC network can
enhance its administrative capacity by improving how it plans,
measures, and reports on its performance. FEMA provided $2 million to
help build this capacity in 2003, but the agreement has recently
expired. FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a
new 3-year cooperative agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the
EMAC network‘s ability to support its collaborative efforts.
(See PDF for image)
Source: FEMA.
[End of figure]
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-854].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Stanley Czerwinski at
(202) 512-6806 or Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief;
Background;
EMAC's Membership and Usage Have Grown Over Time to Include Different
Types of Disasters and Responders;
EMAC Provides for Successful Collaboration, but Opportunities Exist for
Improvement;
EMAC Network Has Developed a Basic Administrative Capacity, but
Opportunities Exist to Further Support Its Mission;
Conclusions;
Recommendations for Executive Action;
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation;
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology;
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense;
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments;
Figures:
Figure 1: The EMAC Process;
Figure 2: Growth in EMAC Membership from 1995 through 2007;
Figure 3: Number of Civilian and National Guard Personnel Deployed
through EMAC in Response to Selected Disasters;
Figure 4: Types of Civilian Personnel Deployed through EMAC in Response
to Selected Disasters;
Figure 5: Percentage of Out-of-State Personnel Deployed on September
10, 2005, in Response to Hurricane Katrina;
Figure 6: EMAC Members' Ability to Deploy Private Sector and Volunteer
Assets through EMAC;
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
NEMA: National Emergency Management Association:
NGB: National Guard Bureau:
NRP: National Response Plan:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 29, 2007:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provide powerful examples of how
catastrophic events can overwhelm the capacity of individual states,
requiring them to rely on outside sources for assistance. Over the past
12 years, states affected by disasters such as hurricanes Katrina and
Rita have increasingly relied on the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) as a means to access resources from other states,
including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first
responders. For example, approximately 66,000 personnel from 48 states,
2 territories, and the District of Columbia deployed to the Gulf states
in 2005 to assist in response and recovery efforts--by far the largest
example of state mutual assistance to date. While this assistance was
state to state, these resources played a critical role in the nation's
overall disaster response efforts and cost the federal government
hundreds of millions of dollars.
EMAC establishes a structure for member states to request and deploy
assistance, reimburse states that provide assistance, and confer
liability and workers' compensation protections.[Footnote 1] As your
committee and others have reported, EMAC enabled an unprecedented level
of assistance in 2005 to be deployed to impacted areas in a timely and
effective manner.[Footnote 2] However, the magnitude of catastrophic
events such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita strained the EMAC process
and revealed limitations in the system to support operations.
Responding to disasters involves many actors and the inclusion of every
level of government, as well as the network of EMAC member states (EMAC
network). As a result, effective collaboration between these members,
as well as between the EMAC network and federal agencies such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Guard
Bureau (NGB), is essential for states to identify, request, deploy, and
reimburse resources under EMAC.
You asked us to determine (1) the extent to which EMAC membership and
usage have changed since its inception in 1995; (2) the degree to which
existing policies, procedures, and practices facilitate collaboration
among EMAC's members and between the EMAC network and certain federal
agencies; and (3) the extent to which the EMAC network has the
administrative capacity--the ability to provide adequate human capital,
financial, information technology, and other resources to support
operations--to build and sustain the collaborative effort to achieve
its mission.
To determine how EMAC membership and usage have changed, we reviewed
and analyzed membership data and available data detailing previous
activations of the EMAC process, including the volume and type of
resources deployed for each activation. To assess the reliability of
the data, we reviewed additional documents and conducted additional
interviews with local, state, and federal emergency management
officials for selected events captured by the database. In cases where
the data were inaccurate, we supplemented them with data from more
reliable sources. In addition, we selected past disasters for further
analysis based on the type, scale, and timing of the disasters. We
interviewed past and present leaders of the EMAC network and state
officials who requested assistance in previous disasters under EMAC. We
also reviewed relevant guidance, protocols, and law.
To determine the degree to which existing policies, procedures, and
practices facilitated collaboration, we analyzed civilian and military
guidance and laws that specified how the various players were to
coordinate, and we compared them to actual coordination during the
disasters. We also interviewed government officials at the state,
local, and federal levels. Our interviews included officials from 29
states, civilian and National Guard responders, and EMAC leadership. In
addition, we interviewed officials from localities including Hancock
and Harrison counties, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Louisiana. To
assess collaboration between levels of government, we interviewed
officials from FEMA, NGB, and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, along with the state and local officials previously
mentioned. In assessing the nature and extent of collaboration among
EMAC members and between the EMAC network and key federal players, we
applied criteria we previously developed regarding successful
collaborative practices.[Footnote 3]
To determine the extent to which the EMAC network has the
administrative capacity to build and sustain the collaborative effort,
we interviewed EMAC leadership and officials from EMAC member states
and analyzed EMAC strategic planning documents and state, federal, and
EMAC after-action reports. For more information on our scope and
methodology, see appendix I. We conducted our work from June 2006
through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly
in membership as well as volume and type of resources it provides--
responding to a myriad of disasters, including hurricanes, floods,
wildfires, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.[Footnote 4]
During this time, EMAC membership has grown from 4 states to its
current membership of 49 states, 2 territories, and the District of
Columbia. The resources deployed through the EMAC network have also
greatly increased in number and diversity. Prior to 2004, states used
EMAC primarily to request emergency management personnel to support
their emergency management operations centers. For example, in 2001,
New York requested 26 emergency management personnel in response to the
September 11 terrorist attacks. In 2004, the way states used EMAC to
augment in-state assistance changed significantly. In response to the
2004 Florida hurricanes, approximately 2,500 National Guard and
civilian personnel deployed to state operations centers as well as to
impacted areas.[Footnote 5] In response to the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes, the personnel deployed through EMAC increased to
approximately 66,000 persons--about 46,500 National Guard and 19,500
state and local civilian responders--from a wide variety of
specialties, most of whom were deployed to areas directly impacted by
the storms.[Footnote 6] In addition, resources deployed under EMAC in
2005 represented a substantial portion of overall out-of- state
assistance. For example, on September 10, 2005, such deployments
constituted more than half of all out-of-state personnel.
EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices,
facilitates successful collaboration among its members. The compact
provides a framework for members to overcome differences in
organizational cultures and established ways of doing business in order
to achieve a common mission--streamlining and expediting the delivery
of resources among members during disasters. Building on this
framework, the EMAC network also delineates member roles and
responsibilities for states requesting assistance in several areas,
such as receiving and integrating emergency management personnel into
their state emergency operations centers. In addition, to facilitate
collaboration among members in times of a disaster, the EMAC network
has established standards and systems regarding how members seek and
provide assistance through EMAC. Finally, some members have developed
practices that may provide models or insights to other members to
enhance their ability to leverage resources under EMAC--providing
additional benefits that would not otherwise be available. For example,
through advanced planning and coordination with other states, Florida
has been able to reduce the amount of time it takes to secure medical
transportation for patients in the Florida Keys should such services be
required following a disaster. Conversely, states have identified other
scenarios where they will not likely be able to turn to the EMAC
network for assistance, such as an influenza pandemic.
Although the EMAC framework and accompanying policies, procedures, and
practices provide for collaboration, they have not kept pace with the
growing use of EMAC. While delineated roles and responsibilities have
worked well for smaller-scale deployments through EMAC, large-scale
deployments, such as those in response to the 2004 Florida hurricanes
and 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, revealed some shortcomings. For
example, although the EMAC network delineates roles and
responsibilities with regard to receiving and integrating emergency
management personnel into state emergency operations centers, similar
guidelines do not exist for the receipt and integration of first
responders into impacted areas, sometimes resulting in confusion and
deployment delays. Limitations in EMAC standards and policies presented
challenges with regard to efficient communication of resources and
comprehensive resource tracking. As a result, emergency resources were
delayed up to several days as mission specifications were clarified,
and limitations in tracking resource requests yielded confusion as to
the status of some missions. Limitations in EMAC standards and
policies, coupled with a lack of understanding of these standards and
policies, led to reimbursement delays. In addition, a lack of
sufficiently detailed federal standards and policies resulted in
reimbursement delays and additional administrative burdens.
The EMAC network has begun to develop the basic administrative capacity
necessary to facilitate efficient and effective sharing of resources
between members in a disaster, but opportunities exist to further build
and sustain these efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good
management practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from
past disasters and developing a 5-year strategic plan. Building on its
progress, there are additional opportunities to improve the way the
network plans, tracks, and reports on its performance. In 2003, FEMA
provided $2 million to help build the EMAC network's administrative
capacity, but this agreement has recently expired. FEMA and EMAC
leadership are in the process of finalizing a new 3-year cooperative
agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the EMAC network's ability
to provide adequate human capital and information technology to support
its collaborative efforts.
We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of Homeland Security
and Defense to enhance the administrative capacity required to support
the EMAC network and to develop guidance and to formalize procedures to
alleviate financial and administrative burdens EMAC members have
experienced in response to catastrophic disasters. We provided a draft
of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary
of Defense for comment. The Director of FEMA's Office of Policy and
Program Analysis provided oral comments, concurring with all of our
recommendations. FEMA also provided technical comments that were
incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Defense (DOD) did not
concur with one recommendation and its response is reprinted in
appendix II. In his written comments on a draft of this report, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs did not agree with
our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense work with the
Secretary of Homeland Security to amend the National Response Plan's
Catastrophic Incident Supplement Execution Schedule to include early
consideration of the use of Title 32 in situations where the Secretary
of Defense deems it appropriate. The Assistant Secretary stated that
use of National Guard forces in Title 32 status is an inherent DOD
function outside the purview of the Secretary of Homeland Security. We
agree that the use of National Guard forces in Title 32 status is an
inherent DOD function, and our recommendation is consistent with this
statement. However, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense,
per Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, shall establish
appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and
coordination in response to catastrophic disasters. Our reference to
the Secretary of Homeland Security was simply to acknowledge DHS's
coordinator role for the National Response Plan. DOD also stated that
amending the National Response Plan as we suggested could be
interpreted to imply that it is DOD policy to place National Guard
forces into Title 32 status. However, our recommendation does not state
that DOD should place National Guard forces into any particular status.
Instead, we call for a mechanism to trigger DOD's consideration of
whether authorization of Title 32 status is appropriate in the earlier
stages of a catastrophic event. We also provided the draft report to
the Chair of the EMAC Executive Task Force and the Executive Director
of the National Emergency Management Association. Relevant sections of
the draft report were provided to state and local emergency offices
whose experiences we reference. Technical suggestions from these groups
have been incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that allow them
to act collectively to address issues that transcend state
borders.[Footnote 7] Interstate compacts that may affect the balance of
power between states and encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the
United States must have congressional consent.[Footnote 8] Since the
late 1940s, states have entered into interstate compacts to facilitate
the sharing of resources across state lines in response to disasters.
In passing the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950,[Footnote 9] Congress
encouraged states to enter into interstate agreements that provided a
legal framework for mutual defense aid and disaster assistance. By the
early 1950s, virtually all states and other jurisdictions entered into
defense aid and disaster compacts. However, after years of minimal
financing and public support, the Federal Civil Defense Act did not
play a significant role in facilitating disaster response.
After Hurricane Andrew devastated southern Florida in 1992, Congress
enacted many of the repealed provisions of the Federal Civil Defense
Act into the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act in 1994.[Footnote 10] Responding to similar concerns
raised following Hurricane Andrew, the Southern Governors' Association
created the Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact
to enable member states to provide mutual aid in managing any emergency
or disaster that had been designated as such by the governor of the
impacted state. It also provided for mutual emergency-related
activities, testing, and training. In 1995, the Southern Governors'
Association opened membership to all U.S. states and territories,
revising the terms of the agreement and adopting the new name, the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Congress consented to
the compact in 1996.[Footnote 11]
Member States Provide Governance for EMAC Network While NEMA Provides
Administrative Support:
EMAC is a mutual aid agreement among member states and is not a
government agency.[Footnote 12] Overall governance is provided by the
EMAC Committee, whose chair is selected annually by the President of
the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA).[Footnote 13] Day-
to-day work of the EMAC Committee is carried out by an EMAC Executive
Task Force whose members are elected by the EMAC membership. The Chair
of the EMAC Committee works with the Executive Task Force to develop
policies and issue guidance. NEMA provides administrative oversight for
the EMAC network. Since 2003, NEMA has assigned one person to serve as
the EMAC Coordinator--the only paid employee dedicated full time to
EMAC--as well as a part-time consultant who serves in the position of
EMAC Senior Adviser.[Footnote 14] Both of these positions have been
funded through a cooperative agreement between FEMA and NEMA to provide
administrative and management support for EMAC.
Process for Requesting and Providing Assistance under EMAC:
EMAC operating protocols outline one process for member states to
request and provide assistance, whether these resources are civilian or
National Guard. The process describes how to request, provide, receive,
and reimburse assistance from other member states in response to a
disaster. Before resources can be deployed under EMAC, the governor of
an impacted state must first declare an emergency. Representatives from
the impacted state then contact EMAC leadership to inform them that
interstate assistance may be needed. If desired, the impacted--or
requesting--state can ask the EMAC leadership to send a team of
emergency management personnel to the state's emergency operations
center to assist with subsequent resource requests under EMAC. The
requesting state can then request additional resources through the EMAC
network from other member states. These states--often referred to as
assisting states--work with the requesting state to identify resources
required and other details. Once both the requesting and assisting
states approve the final details, resources are deployed to the area of
need. Once the missions have been completed and resources have returned
home, the assisting states prepare formal requests for reimbursement,
which are then sent to, and processed by, the requesting state. Figure
1 provides a summary of this process.
Figure 1: The EMAC Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EMAC operating procedures.
[End of figure]
In cases when a disaster strikes multiple states, FEMA has a standing
agreement with NEMA to request a team of emergency managers to deploy
to its national or regional coordination centers to help coordinate
EMAC network and federal activities, as appropriate.
Impacted States Can Request Assistance From FEMA to Help Cover Eligible
Costs for Missions Under EMAC:
Although EMAC is an agreement between states, catastrophic disasters
can overwhelm the resources of an impacted state, requiring it to seek
assistance from the federal government. In the case of a presidentially
declared disaster, impacted states can work with FEMA to seek federal
financial assistance to cover costs associated with emergency response
efforts that may include eligible missions conducted under EMAC. In
such cases, the impacted state prepares project worksheets--a form used
to collect and document information on the scope and estimated cost for
public assistance projects--and submits them to FEMA for review. Once
approved, FEMA will obligate funds for the project to the impacted
state, which in turn reimburses the assisting state directly. As of
June 2007, Mississippi and Louisiana are in the process of seeking
financial assistance from FEMA to cover approximately $200 million for
missions conducted under EMAC.
NGB Is the Coordinator of National Guard Assets:
The National Guard Bureau's (NGB) mission is to participate with the
Army and Air Force staffs in the formulation, development, and
coordination of all programs, policies, concepts, and plans for the
National Guard. NGB has visibility of all National Guard assets and
advises the states on force availability to support all requirements.
NGB serves as a coordinator between the Secretaries of the Army and Air
Force and state National Guard assets. This is achieved through
coordinating with state governors and adjutant generals. NGB also
monitors and assists the states in the organization, maintenance, and
operation of their National Guard units.
Another aspect of NGB's coordination is working with other DOD agencies
as it carries out responsibilities to address domestic emergencies
assigned in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP). The
purpose of the NRP is to establish a comprehensive, national, all-
hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of
activities, including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
In addition, it contains a catastrophic incident annex that establishes
the strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated proactive
national response to a catastrophic incident, including strategies to
rapidly provide key resources to augment state, local, and tribal
response efforts during a catastrophic event. The NRP also contains a
catastrophic incident supplement with a detailed execution schedule
that lists steps that agencies should take at specific times ranging
from within 10 minutes of the start of an incident time to within 96
hours after the incident occurs. The purpose of this supplement is to
accelerate the delivery of federal and federally accessible resources
and capabilities in support of a response to a no-notice or short-
notice catastrophic incident. These are incidents in which the response
capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction (including mutual
aid from surrounding jurisdictions) will be profoundly insufficient and
quickly overwhelmed.
EMAC's Membership and Usage Have Grown Over Time to Include Different
Types of Disasters and Responders:
Since the inception of the EMAC in 1995, both the number of members and
the volume and types of resources requested have grown considerably.
States activated EMAC in response to a variety of emergencies,
including hurricanes; floods; wildfires; and the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. In recent years, the volume and types of resources
deployed under EMAC have also increased. Resources deployed under EMAC
represented a substantial portion of overall out-of-state assistance
deployed in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
EMAC Membership Has Increased to 52:
EMAC membership has grown from a handful of members in 1995 to 52
today. EMAC grew out of the Southern Regional Emergency Management
Assistance Compact, which was created in August 1993 by the Southern
Governors' Association and the Virginia Department of Emergency
Services following Hurricane Andrew. When EMAC was formed in 1995,
membership consisted of 4 states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee,
and Virginia. Since that time, as figure 2 shows, EMAC membership has
grown to 49 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia.[Footnote 15]
Figure 2: Growth in EMAC Membership from 1995 through 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of state laws.
[A] California's membership expired in March 2007.
[End of figure]
During this period, states have used EMAC in response to a variety of
emergency events, including natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and
other disasters and emergencies. For example, the states activated the
EMAC process in response to disasters such as the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes; tornadoes in Kansas and Kentucky; floods in West Virginia
and New Hampshire; wildfires in Texas and Nebraska; the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks; and a variety of other disasters and
emergencies, such as the 2003 Rhode Island Nightclub Fire and the Space
Shuttle Columbia Disaster.
2004 and 2005 Deployments Exceeded Prior Years:
In 2004 and 2005, the number and types of deployments under EMAC
exceeded previous years' deployments. Although deployment data for 1995
through 2004 are incomplete, EMAC leadership reported that deployments
were higher in 2004 than in previous years. Data compiled by the EMAC
network demonstrate that the total civilian and National Guard
deployments in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes were more
than 25 times the number of the deployments for the 2004 Florida
hurricanes. Figure 3 shows EMAC deployment data for some significant
disasters.
Figure 3: Number of Civilian and National Guard Personnel Deployed
through EMAC in Response to Selected Disasters:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EMAC, New York, and Florida state data.
Note: Given the limited reliability of the aggregate data maintained by
the EMAC network, we have supplemented the data where appropriate. See
app. I for more details.
[End of figure]
States have made larger requests for assistance under EMAC, and they
have requested a wider range of resources. According to EMAC
leadership, prior to 2004, states primarily requested emergency
management personnel to support their state emergency operations
centers. For example, of the estimated 40,000 people who responded to
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York, New York officials
requested only 26 emergency management personnel under EMAC to
supplement state emergency management efforts. In 2004, Florida
requested a wider variety of resources from other states under EMAC
than had been requested in previous disasters. It requested first
response personnel, health professionals, logistics support, and
emergency management support for county emergency operations centers.
In 2005, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and Florida requested
an even greater variety of resources under EMAC, including 46,503
National Guard personnel, 6,882 law enforcement responders, 2,825 fire
and hazardous materials responders, and 9,719 other responders, many of
whom were local government assets deployed directly to the impacted
areas.[Footnote 16] Figure 4 shows the variety of civilian personnel
deployed under EMAC for selected significant disasters.
Figure 4: Types of Civilian Personnel Deployed through EMAC in Response
to Selected Disasters:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EMAC and New York state data.
[End of figure]
During the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, Resources Deployed under EMAC
Represented a Substantial Percentage of Overall Out-of-State Response:
Resources deployed under EMAC in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes constituted a substantial portion of overall out-of-state
response efforts. Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Louisiana and
Mississippi both relied heavily on support from other states to
supplement their own emergency response efforts. Although the exact
number of personnel deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi in response
to Hurricane Katrina is not known, data available on the response
during the first 2 weeks clearly indicate that the share of personnel
deployed under EMAC represented a significantly larger share of
personnel deployed from out of state than from any other contributor,
including states that are not members of EMAC; the active component,
military; FEMA; the U.S. Coast Guard; and federal law enforcement.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of out-of-state personnel deployed to
impacted states following Hurricane Katrina.
Figure 5: Percentage of Out-of-State Personnel Deployed on September
10, 2005, in Response to Hurricane Katrina:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DHS, and EMAC data.
[A] California did not join EMAC until September 14, 2005.
[End of figure]
EMAC Provides for Successful Collaboration, but Opportunities Exist for
Improvement:
EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices,
provides for successful collaboration that enables its members to
request resources and provides timely assistance to states in need.
However, opportunities exist to enhance and sustain collaborative
efforts within the EMAC network and between the network and federal
agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Our previous work
identified a number of steps that can improve collaboration, including
(1) clearly articulating roles and responsibilities; (2) establishing
clear, consistent, and compatible standards; and (3) identifying
opportunities to leverage and share resources.[Footnote 17] While the
compact itself and the policies and procedures adopted by the EMAC
network have clarified roles and responsibilities for some key
operations, coordination can be improved among EMAC members to reduce
confusion and delays when deploying resources. EMAC members have also
adopted protocols, standards, and systems that work well for smaller-
scale deployments, though gaps still exist with regard to requesting
resource needs, tracking resource requests, and facilitating
reimbursement following catastrophic disasters. Finally, some members
have developed practices that may provide models or insights to other
members to enhance their ability to leverage resources under EMAC.
EMAC Provides a Framework to Achieve a Common Mission:
As we have previously found, to overcome differences in organizational
cultures and established ways of doing business, collaborating
organizations must have a clear and compelling rationale to work
together.[Footnote 18] This compelling rationale can be imposed through
legislation or other directives or can come from the organizations' own
perceptions of the benefits they can obtain from working together.
Collaborating organizations must also work across organizational lines
to define and articulate a common outcome consistent with their
respective goals.
EMAC provides a framework that helps its members to overcome
differences in missions, organizational cultures, and established ways
of doing business in order to achieve a common outcome--streamlining
and expediting the delivery of resources among members during
emergencies. Each member must enact identical legislation to that of
the EMAC legislation passed by Congress in 1996, ensuring that member
states' goals are aligned with the goals outlined in the compact. The
EMAC language sets the foundation for members to provide mutual
assistance in a disaster or emergency, regardless whether it is a
natural disaster or a man-made disaster, such as technological hazard,
civil emergency, community disorder, or enemy attack. In addition, the
compact language:
* outlines responsibilities for the members to formulate procedural
plans and programs for interstate cooperation through EMAC;
* affords personnel from assisting states the same duties, rights, and
privileges afforded to similar personnel within the requesting state
(except for the power of arrest);
* accepts licenses, certificates, or other permits for skills requested;
* provides liability protection to responders from assisting states as
agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes;
* requires that assisting states provide workers' compensation for
resources deployed from their states; and:
* calls for the reimbursement of services rendered through EMAC.
By streamlining legal and other administrative requirements associated
with sharing resources across state lines, EMAC enables states to more
quickly provide emergency assistance in times of disaster than if these
states worked outside of EMAC to seek and provide assistance. For
example, although New York was not a member of EMAC prior to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it joined shortly thereafter. New
York officials stated that they expedited the arrival of the
supplemental assistance by requesting assistance from EMAC members.
The Lack of Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities in Some Areas
Limits EMAC's Effectiveness:
While the compact and its accompanying protocols establish roles and
responsibilities that have worked well for smaller-scale deployments,
they have not kept pace with the growing use of EMAC, sometimes
resulting in delays and limiting EMAC's overall effectiveness. Our
previous work has shown that defining roles and responsibilities among
collaborating organizations both enhances and sustains
collaboration.[Footnote 19] In doing so, organizations clarify who will
do what, thereby better organizing both joint and individual efforts
and facilitating decision making. In 2004 and 2005, the lack of clearly
defined roles and responsibilities with regard to receiving and
integrating resources deployed under EMAC resulted in delays and
confusion. During this same period, the EMAC network and NGB
experienced challenges in effectively coordinating, though they have
since made improvements.
A Lack of Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities in Some Areas Led
to Delays and Confusion:
The EMAC network delineates roles and responsibilities for requesting
states to receive and integrate emergency management personnel deployed
under EMAC through its protocols into states' emergency operations
centers. For example, the EMAC Operations Manual recommends that
requesting states provide workstations, equipment, and technology for
emergency managers deployed to their states' emergency operations
centers and that these resources be integrated into their states'
emergency operations centers' organizational charts.
However, the roles and responsibilities of member states have not kept
pace with the changing use of EMAC. While roles and responsibilities do
exist for member states to receive and integrate emergency management
personnel into state emergency operations centers, similar guidelines
do not exist to define the roles and responsibilities of requesting
states regarding how to receive and integrate first responders deployed
under EMAC into impacted areas, leading to confusion and delays--this
is especially important since most of the resources deployed under EMAC
in 2004 and 2005 were deployed to areas outside state emergency
operations centers. This, in turn, affected the overall ability of
resources deployed under EMAC to provide the necessary assistance in
response to the 2004 Florida hurricanes and the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes.
During the response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, state officials
managing response efforts on the ground were sometimes unaware of
general EMAC policies and unprepared to receive or integrate resources
deployed under EMAC into impacted areas. For example, although
resources deployed under EMAC do not require additional certification
to practice their respective professions in the impacted state,
confusion arose when an emergency medical response team deployed,
because Mississippi state health officials required the medical team to
complete supplemental medical licensure applications. In addition,
Florida health officials told us that they were initially not prepared
to receive or integrate resources deployed under EMAC in response to
the 2004 Florida hurricanes, causing some confusion and delaying
deployments. Learning from their experiences in 2004, Florida officials
stated that they resolved these shortcomings and had policies and
procedures in place to receive and integrate out-of-state resources
when Hurricane Katrina was approaching Florida in 2005.
Local officials we spoke with responsible for receiving and integrating
resources deployed under EMAC--and many state and local responders who
interacted with local officials responsible for receiving and
integrating resources deployed under EMAC--stated that they had limited
or no knowledge of what EMAC was or how it functioned, were not aware
that resources had been requested or deployed to assist them, and did
not have plans for how to employ these resources once they arrived. For
example, local officials from counties in southern Mississippi told us
they were unaware that emergency response teams from Florida or New
York were deployed and were not sure how to employ their assistance. As
a result, rather than providing immediate assistance at full capacity,
the emergency response teams spent critical time briefing local
officials on basic EMAC processes and emergency procedures. In other
circumstances, resources that were deployed to impacted areas
experienced challenges in locating points of contact and integrating
into local command structures. For example, a South Carolina National
Guard Unit deployed under EMAC told us that it "wasted valuable time"
waiting for mission assignments from local authorities following
Hurricane Katrina.
EMAC leadership has taken steps in the past year to address the lack of
clarity regarding roles and responsibilities of states receiving and
integrating assistance. These include updating the EMAC Operations
Manual to include specific language suggesting the need for members to
establish procedures for requesting and receiving assistance. EMAC
leadership has also taken steps to address EMAC knowledge gaps among
state and local officials by creating an ad hoc task force to evaluate
and improve training materials available to member states, such as a
brochure to help personnel deployed under EMAC understand basic EMAC
protocols. However, the EMAC network has not developed as clear
guidance for receiving and integrating resources into impacted areas as
it has for receiving and integrating emergency managers into state
emergency operations centers.
The EMAC Network and NGB Have Improved Coordination in Response to
Challenges Raised in 2005:
In 2005, the EMAC network and NGB experienced coordination challenges.
Although both the EMAC network and NGB facilitate the sharing of
resources across state lines, they had limited visibility into each
others' systems for initiating and fulfilling requests. For example,
emergency management officials responsible for coordinating requests
for assistance under EMAC in the first 3 weeks after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall stated that they were frequently unaware of National
Guard deployments under EMAC until after the resources had already
returned to their home states. In addition, NGB officials responsible
for coordinating deployments of National Guard resources stated that
they were unaware of requests for assistance made through EMAC.
Learning from these challenges, the EMAC network and NGB have begun to
work together to develop a better understanding of their mutual roles
and responsibilities, as well as how they can collaborate to achieve an
outcome that benefits their respective missions. For example, to
improve coordination between the EMAC network and key partners such as
NGB, EMAC leadership created the EMAC Advisory Group in 2006.[Footnote
20] NGB, along with other advisory group members, has recently been
granted access to view reports on requests and deployments under EMAC
during a disaster.
Gaps in EMAC and Federal Policies, Standards, and Systems Have
Contributed to Delays and Confusion:
We previously reported that collaborating organizations need to address
the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data systems
in their efforts to facilitate working across boundaries and prevent
misunderstanding.[Footnote 21] While the EMAC network has developed
protocols, standards, and systems that have generally worked well for
smaller-scale deployments, gaps emerged with the rapid growth in the
number and types of resources deployed under EMAC. In addition, gaps in
federal guidance and protocols resulted in administrative burdens and
reimbursement delays. We identified challenges in five areas: (1) gaps
in EMAC protocols with regard to communicating resource needs sometimes
yielded deployment delays and confusion among requesting state
officials and resource providers; (2) the lack of a comprehensive
system to support the tracking of resource requests from initial offers
of assistance through mission completion in 2005 caused delays,
duplications of effort, and frustration; (3) existing reimbursement
standards are not designed to facilitate timely reimbursement following
catastrophic disasters; (4) the lack of federal guidance to obtain
advance funding resulted in delaying some state-to-state reimbursements
under EMAC; and (5) deployment of National Guard troops under two
different authorities resulted in delays in reimbursement and
additional administrative burdens.
EMAC Network Has Developed Standards for Communicating Mission
Requirements, but Gaps Remain:
To facilitate collaboration in times of a disaster, the EMAC network
has established standard processes and systems regarding how its
members request resources through EMAC. EMAC processes enable members
to solicit assistance through the use of standardized e-mail requests
which are broadcast to everyone in the network, or directly from a
specific member either in writing or verbally. When an assisting state
responds to a request for assistance, the requesting and assisting
states communicate back and forth to negotiate mission details: (1)
officials from the requesting state approve, sign, and fax the request
to an assisting state; (2) officials from the assisting state provide
details on the assistance they intend to provide, sign the request, and
fax it back to the requesting state; and (3) once the agreement is
finalized, requesting state officials approve, sign, and fax the
finalized request for assistance back to the assisting state.
Although the EMAC network has developed these basic processes, gaps in
some areas have led to confusion and delays among member states
regarding the effective communication of resource needs when responding
to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. For example, emergency managers
deployed under EMAC to Louisiana told us that they received repeated
requests simply for "search and rescue" teams and that these initial
requests did not initially contain sufficient detail regarding the type
of skills and equipment needed to carry out the particular operation
that was needed. Search and rescue missions can vary significantly--one
type of mission might require an aerial search and rescue team, while
another might require a canine search and rescue team. Therefore,
identifying and then clearly communicating the specific skills and
equipment required is critical. According to these officials, requests
that initially omitted critical mission details had to be clarified,
causing delays in resource deployments of up to 3 or more days as
requesting and assisting state officials went back and forth to clarify
these details.
A second shortcoming in how requests were communicated during the 2005
Gulf Coast hurricanes was that requesting states did not provide
sufficient details regarding conditions at the locations to which
resources were deployed. This led to teams arriving in the area of
operations without necessary support for responders. For example, the
first firefighters deployed to New Orleans under EMAC were given
incorrect information regarding the availability of food supplies and
housing. Accordingly, these firefighters were told they would receive
transportation, food, and lodging when they arrived. However, once they
arrived at the initial staging area, they quickly realized that they
were not going to receive any of these resources. As a result, they
were delayed at the initial staging area until they located necessary
supplies on their own.
Responding to concerns raised regarding the clarity of resource
requests, the EMAC network has taken several steps to improve its
processes and systems. For example, the EMAC network has adopted
changes to the EMAC Operations Manual that require requesting states to
include additional details such as the type of resources requested,
specifying the particular skills, abilities, or equipment needed. EMAC
leadership updated the basic form used to request assistance so that it
now includes additional mission details, such as the severity of
conditions within the area of operations. EMAC leadership is currently
transitioning part of the process to an online format with templates,
pull-down menus, and other tools to help further specify mission
details and improve the consistency of language used in the request
process. The new version of the form to request assistance more
effectively captures personnel deployment considerations (e.g.,
recommended immunizations), but it does not capture equipment
considerations (e.g., fuel supplies, maintenance provisions, and
ownership of equipment purchased for the activation).
Lack of Comprehensive System to Track Resource Requests through Mission
Completion:
The EMAC network does not have a comprehensive system in place to
support the tracking of resources from initial offers of assistance
through mission completion. Data systems in place to track resource
requests and deployments when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005
did not provide efficient tracking of resources deployed under EMAC. In
addition, requesting states maintained duplicate and ad hoc systems for
tracking resource requests and deployments. For example, when
responding to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes emergency management
support personnel responsible for facilitating requests for assistance
recorded the same mission-related information in two separate systems:
an EMAC system that cataloged all resource requests and a state-
specific spreadsheet to track resource requests solely for that
individual state. In 2005, the EMAC network itself found that these
separate systems were often not aligned with each other and required
emergency managers to manually reenter data into the EMAC system.
Immediate access to these data systems was not given to personnel
deployed to state operations centers to facilitate requests under EMAC,
causing some to create ad hoc systems for tracking requests. In
addition, emergency managers deployed to state emergency operations
centers to facilitate requests under EMAC in the first weeks of the
Hurricane Katrina response efforts told us that they maintained
duplicative systems to track these requests, including using Post-ItsTM
and notepads. Emergency management officials responsible for
coordinating assistance provided under EMAC with other efforts at the
federal level did not have accurate information. In addition, there are
no mechanisms in place to ensure that data electronically cataloged by
the EMAC network are complete or accurate; of the 57 events for which
the EMAC process was activated since 1995, the EMAC network has
incomplete information for 72 percent of these events. As a result,
aggregate data used to report on activities conducted by the EMAC
network may not accurately reflect the number of deployments, personnel
deployed, or estimated costs of resources deployed under EMAC.
Officials from assisting states also expressed frustration at not
knowing whether their offers for assistance had been accepted or
rejected. For example, after responding to a broadcast message to EMAC
members for assistance in responding to Hurricane Katrina, emergency
management officials from two states said that they sometimes had to
wait several days before finding out whether their offers to assist
were ultimately accepted. During this period, both states continued to
ready their resources for deployment although it had turned out that
their offers to assist were not selected by the requesting state.
Because these officials were not informed in a timely manner that they
were not selected to provide assistance on these missions, they
incurred additional, nonreimbursable costs. As a result, these
officials stated that they were less likely to mobilize resources in
advance of a finalized agreement--resulting in additional time to
deploy once an agreement was reached. In addition, some state officials
stated they were less likely to deploy resources under EMAC in the
future as a result of this lack of communication.
Recognizing the need for a more coordinated data system, EMAC
leadership has taken steps to link requests for assistance with its
existing resource tracking system. EMAC leadership stated that by
migrating part of the request process online, they hope to reduce steps
and simplify the EMAC network's abilities to capture initial requests
electronically. However, progress remains to be made in developing an
integrated system that incorporates EMAC mission details into the
existing resource tracking system.
Reimbursement Processes Are Not Designed for Large-Scale Deployments:
The EMAC network developed a process for establishing basic standards
and procedures for how states request and make reimbursements. While
these standards and procedures worked sufficiently for smaller-scale
deployments, shortcomings emerged when they were applied to larger-
scale deployments in response to catastrophic disasters. These
reimbursement delays caused some assisting states and localities to
forgo or delay expenditures for equipment and other critical purchases.
In some cases, these delays have caused states and localities to
reconsider whether they would provide assistance through EMAC in the
future. Following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the EMAC network has
taken steps to address some of the concerns associated with the
reimbursement process and standards.
To facilitate reimbursement between states following a disaster, the
EMAC network developed a process for establishing basic standards and
procedures for how states request and award reimbursements. While EMAC
leadership and state emergency managers stated that this process has
worked reasonably well for smaller-scale deployments, EMAC members
encountered significant challenges with it during the large-scale
deployments in response to the Florida hurricanes of 2004 and the Gulf
Coast hurricanes of 2005. For example, although EMAC standards in
effect during these events required that disbursement of funds be made
within 30 days after a mission ended, it took considerably longer to
actually do so. Specifically, assisting states were not completely
reimbursed until 10 months after the conclusion of their missions
following the 2004 hurricanes, and according to the latest data from
provided to us by Louisiana and Mississippi, 57 percent, or about $119
million, remains outstanding for missions completed in Mississippi and
Louisiana following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
One of the causes of these delays is the lack of awareness among EMAC
members regarding recordkeeping requirements and how to process
reimbursement packages. For example, while EMAC protocols state that
the requesting state is obligated to reimburse assisting states for
approved missions deployed under EMAC, assisting states must first file
reimbursement packages with the requesting state documenting their
expenses and providing supporting documentation. After the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, the lack of awareness of this requirement on the part
of several assisting states resulted in additional burdens for
requesting states. In July 2006, Louisiana officials sent letters to 37
assisting states that had not yet submitted reimbursement packages with
the state--11 months after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, assisting
states were not always fully aware of the documentation required to
support deployment activities. For example, officials from one state
told us that they were not aware that under EMAC protocols they were
expected to complete a predeployment inventory of all equipment and
personnel taken into the impacted area. As a result, these officials
encountered reimbursement challenges because the state could not
document equipment lost during its response to the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes.
Reimbursement was further complicated by the lack of consistent
understanding as to what is considered reasonably reimbursable
according to criteria outlined in the EMAC Operations Manual. While
EMAC protocols detailing reimbursement guidelines did identify a number
of broad eligible costs--personnel costs, travel costs, equipment
costs, contractual costs, commodities, and other expenses--they did not
provide any standards for how states were to determine what types of
costs under these broad categories were considered reasonable.
The delays in reimbursing assisting state and local agencies in turn
delayed or eliminated planned expenditures to cover budgetary
shortfalls. For example, officials with the Virginia State Police told
us that delays in receiving reimbursement for $1.8 million in
assistance they provided in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes
forced them to delay or cancel the maintenance and purchase of critical
equipment and supplies, such as ammunition, uniforms, and office
supplies. Additionally, state and local officials told us that these
reimbursement delays have caused them to reconsider the level of
assistance they would be willing to provide through EMAC in the future.
Following the 2005 hurricane season, the EMAC network has taken steps
to address some of these reimbursement concerns. For example, the EMAC
network recently updated the EMAC Operations Manual to incorporate
additional specificity on the types of costs eligible and not eligible
for reimbursement. The manual also contains new flexibilities,
including the elimination of the 30-day reimbursement requirement and
the option for an assisting state to delay paying actual service
providers, such as state agencies and local governments, until it first
receives funds to cover these expenses from the requesting state.
Lack of Federal Guidance Delayed Some State-to-State Reimbursements
under EMAC:
Although EMAC is an agreement between states, the involvement of the
federal government following presidentially declared disasters can
affect state-to-state reimbursements. Under EMAC, requesting states are
obligated to reimburse assisting states for missions performed under
the compact. However, catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the
resources of an impacted state, requiring it to seek financial
assistance. While the EMAC reimbursement process is intended to be
independent of any efforts by a requesting state to seek federal
assistance, the federal government, through FEMA, can offer funding for
eligible response efforts following a presidentially declared disaster.
In such circumstances, a requesting state works with FEMA to obtain
financial assistance for eligible missions. Once it receives this
assistance, a requesting state can then reimburse assisting states for
missions performed under EMAC.
Shortly after a presidentially declared disaster occurs, impacted
states can work with FEMA to seek financial assistance while response
and recovery efforts are under way to help cover anticipated costs. In
2004, in an effort to expedite the reimbursement of localities that
responded to the 2004 Florida hurricanes, FEMA developed a process for
impacted states to request and receive advance funding based on
disaster estimates included in an expedited project worksheet. Unlike
standard project worksheets, expedited project worksheets require less
specificity as to how funding should be spent, so long as the expedited
project worksheets are reconciled against actual, authorized spending
at a later point. These funds could be used to reimburse assisting
states for responses provided under EMAC or cover other anticipated
costs. According to a senior FEMA official for the Public Assistance
Program, guidance on how to seek expedited project worksheets does not
exist. In 2005, neither Louisiana officials nor Mississippi officials
were aware that such payments existed. According to Louisiana
officials, FEMA officials suggested that they obtain advance funding of
$70 million to alleviate response and recovery costs--including
assistance provided under EMAC. These officials added that this
advanced funding enabled them to reimburse assisting states in the
amount of almost $25 million, or slightly more than half of all
reimbursements Louisiana provided to assisting states for missions
conducted under EMAC in response to Hurricane Katrina. In contrast,
Mississippi officials stated that they were not aware that expedited
project worksheets could be used to cover eligible EMAC-related costs.
Accordingly, they did not pursue the same opportunity, and as a result,
Mississippi has only been able to pay 38 percent of the $113 million
for missions provided under EMAC.
Deployment of National Guard Troops under Two Different Authorities
Resulted in Delays in Reimbursement and Additional Administrative
Burdens:
During Hurricane Katrina, National Guard troops provided assistance in
their State Active Duty status as well as in Title 32 status, and the
EMAC process was used for the deployment of National Guard resources.
When units operate in State Active Duty status, they are under the
command and control of the assisting state's governor and missions are
funded by the state. When units are in Title 32 status, units remain
under the command and control of the governor and continue to deploy
under EMAC, but their missions are federally funded. Under EMAC, the
governor of the assisting state delegates operational control to the
emergency services authorities of the state receiving assistance. If
deemed appropriate, the Secretary of Defense can approve federal
funding of National Guard troops under Title 32.
The first National Guard units that responded after Hurricane Katrina
deployed under State Active Duty status. Then, on September 7, 2005--9
days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana--the Deputy
Secretary of Defense authorized the use of DOD funding for National
Guard troops through Title 32, retroactive to August 29, 2005; all but
two states elected to do so.[Footnote 22]
While both requesting and assisting states were faced with
administrative burdens and costs as they transitioned from State Active
Duty status to Title 32 status, National Guard units deployed in State
Active Duty status had more administrative requirements than those
deployed in Title 32 status. Units that remained in State Active Duty
status were required by EMAC procedures and their state emergency
operations plans or other guidance to maintain cost-supporting
documentation throughout their deployment, which was later used for
reimbursement purposes. Following the disaster, states that deployed
National Guard units in State Active Duty status submitted this
documentation to the requesting state to obtain reimbursement,
negotiating the final amount of the reimbursement with the requesting
state. The requesting state, in turn, sought federal reimbursement
through the Public Assistance Program at FEMA.
In contrast, states that deployed their units under EMAC in Title 32
status were not required to seek reimbursement from the requesting
state directly, but were reimbursed by DOD. In Title 32 status,
expenses are directly tracked against a funding-site code assigned by
DOD, which enables direct payroll payment. Also, a record of equipment
and maintenance costs is kept for reimbursement through charges against
the funding-site code.
Use of Title 32 status in response to Hurricane Katrina reduced the
administrative burdens on both the requesting and the assisting states,
eliminated the need for requesting states to fund National Guard
assistance from outside their states, and reduced the time assisting
states had to wait to be reimbursed. Iowa's and South Carolina's
experience during the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes illustrates the
difference between keeping a responding state's National Guard units in
State Active Duty status and switching to Title 32 status. For those
units deployed in State Active Duty status, Iowa was required to follow
standard EMAC processes for seeking reimbursement as opposed to being
directly reimbursed for missions performed in Title 32 status. It took
until October 2006 for Iowa to be reimbursed for a water purification
unit that Iowa's National Guard sent to Mississippi while in State
Active Duty status in September 2005--9 months from the time the
mission was completed. South Carolina National Guard troops performed a
similar mission in Title 32 status, and the state was reimbursed within
a month.
In addition, switching from State Active Duty status to Title 32 status
has associated administrative costs. For example, one state recorded an
estimated $87,000 in administrative costs for National Guard personnel
and material expenses for making such a switch. Some of these costs
were derived from rescinding State Active Duty orders; backing out of
state payroll systems; performing audits to ensure that all data were
adjusted appropriately; correcting faults discovered; compiling,
reviewing, and transmitting troop personnel information for state
processing; publishing Title 32 status orders; and estimating payroll
expenses and equipment use costs.
Following Hurricane Katrina, many reviews of lessons learned focused on
the failure of the federal government to implement the Catastrophic
Incident Annex and Supplement of the NRP, which could have rapidly
provided critical resources to assist and augment state and local
response efforts. However, even if the Catastrophic Incident Supplement
had been implemented, the decision to authorize the use of Title 32
might not have come any sooner, because the supplement's execution
schedule does not specify a time at which DOD should consider whether
it is appropriate to authorize the use of Title 32 funding for National
Guard response efforts during an incident.[Footnote 23]
States Can Enhance Their Ability to Identify and Request Assistance
under EMAC:
Some states have developed practices that may provide models or
insights to other members to enhance their ability to leverage
resources under EMAC--including legislation and planning efforts--
providing additional benefits that would not be otherwise available. We
have previously reported that organizations that effectively
collaborate look for opportunities to address resource needs by
leveraging each others' resources, obtaining benefits that would not be
available if they were working separately.[Footnote 24] To this end,
states have found ways to leverage resources, including: (1)
substantially broadening the resource pool from which they can draw
through intrastate mutual aid and other similar agreements and (2)
proactively considering how resources deployed under EMAC might be able
to fill in-state resource gaps. At the same time, states have
identified other scenarios where they will not likely be able to turn
to the EMAC network for assistance, such as an influenza pandemic.
The Use of Intrastate Mutual Aid and Similar Agreements Can Broaden the
Available Resources Deployed under EMAC:
In addition to seeking and providing state-level resources deployed
under EMAC, such as the National Guard, states are able to supplement
these state-level resources with local and county resources through
intrastate mutual aid and similar agreements. Intrastate mutual aid
agreements create a system for mutual aid between participating state
counties, parishes, or other political subdivisions in the prevention
of, response to, and recovery from any disaster that results in a
formal state of emergency. Firefighting, police, and medical personnel
and equipment are examples of emergency response assets that can be
leveraged within a state using such agreements. Through intrastate
mutual aid, the types and volume of resources available under EMAC are
substantially greater than those resources available solely at the
state level. For example, in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
Illinois, New York, and Texas were able to deploy 1,663 local fire and
hazardous materials response personnel and supporting equipment to
Louisiana under EMAC--something that would likely not have been
possible without these types of mutual aid.
Thirty-eight states have intrastate mutual or similar agreements in
place that enable states to leverage local resources under EMAC.
However, only 16 EMAC members have instituted intrastate mutual aid
agreements that can also leverage private sector resources and 22 can
deploy volunteer resources. For example, Indiana's intrastate mutual
aid agreement includes a provision to call on state and private sector
health professionals throughout the state. When this provision is
applied, as in response to Hurricane Katrina deployment to Mississippi,
through the Indiana Governor's Executive Order, the private sector
personnel become temporary employees of the state's Department of
Homeland Security. In this status, they are eligible to be deployed as
a state asset under EMAC with all rights and licensing recognition
afforded permanent state employees under that compact. Figure 6 shows
which states are able to deploy private sector resources, volunteer
resources, or both.
Figure 6: EMAC Members' Ability to Deploy Private Sector and Volunteer
Assets through EMAC:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: National Emergency Management Association data and Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Some States Engage in Advanced Planning on How EMAC Can Fill Resource
Gaps:
Some states have begun to plan for how interstate resources deployed
under EMAC can supplement in-state resources, thereby improving their
ability to respond to a disaster more quickly and effectively. For
example, the Florida National Guard has a standing Memorandum of
Understanding with North Carolina for the use of C-130 aircraft for
medical evacuation of patients from the Florida Keys if required during
a disaster. By having this agreement in place, Florida is able to
bypass the need to solicit assistance across the EMAC network and
reduce the time it would otherwise take to negotiate mission details.
Other states have also developed prescripted EMAC missions to fill in-
state resource gaps. Louisiana, learning from its experiences during
the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, has been working with neighboring
states to identify resources that can fill gaps identified through in-
state planning efforts. For example, according to Louisiana National
Guard officials, they have developed agreements to request security
personnel from Arkansas and commodity distribution support from
Oklahoma. These agreements include such details as: (1) mission
description, (2) number of personnel required, (3) approximate length
of deployment, (4) arrival location, (5) support/equipment
requirements, (6) self-sustaining period (7) lodging arrangements, and
(8) on-site point of contact information.
In addition, as states are more likely to turn to EMAC to fill in-state
resource gaps caused by competing deployments related to national
missions, such as missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, NGB is beginning to
encourage the prescripting of National Guard assets for emergency
response missions across several states. For example, officials from
the Florida and South Carolina National Guards told us that deployments
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
Operation Jump Start have reduced their availability of in-state
emergency assets required for responding to disasters.[Footnote 25]
These officials, citing similar and pending deployments that may
diminish their emergency response capacity, stated that they expect an
increased reliance on interstate assistance provided under EMAC as a
result of such deployments.
While some states have identified situations where they will use EMAC
to supplement in-state resources, others have identified scenarios
where they were unlikely to do so. For example, EMAC leadership and
emergency managers from several states we spoke with cited three
reasons why they believe EMAC would not work well for an influenza
pandemic. First, the officials stated that they would be reluctant to
send personnel into a contaminated area. Second, the officials
expressed their concern that resources would not be available should
the pandemic spread to their respective states. Third, since EMAC
member states are not required to provide assistance under EMAC and
states cannot compel emergency response personnel to participate in any
disaster response, these officials believe that emergency personnel
would be reluctant to volunteer to respond to a pandemic event in
another state.
EMAC Network Has Developed a Basic Administrative Capacity, but
Opportunities Exist to Further Support Its Mission:
The EMAC network has begun to develop a basic administrative capacity
to support its operations; however, improvements in how it plans,
tracks, and reports on its performance, along with a consistent source
of funding, would help the network achieve its mission. Although the
EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as
using a structured approach to learn from past deployments and
developing a 5-year strategic plan, opportunities exist to further
enhance these efforts by considering the experience of leading
organizations in results-oriented performance measurement. In addition,
the EMAC network and FEMA entered into a cooperative agreement that
provided some federal funding to help build the EMAC network's
administrative capacity, but this agreement has recently expired. The
EMAC network's ability to provide the adequate human capital,
information technology, and other infrastructure required to support
the collaborative efforts is likely to be affected by this loss of
funds.
EMAC Network Has Recently Begun to Develop a Basic Administrative
Capacity to Support the Collaborative Effort:
The EMAC network has recently taken steps to develop a basic
administrative capacity to support the sharing of resources between
member states. Prior to 2003, the EMAC network's administrative
capacity--that is, its ability to provide adequate human capital,
financial resources, and information technology to support its
operations--was very limited and was confined to situations when the
EMAC process was activated in response to a disaster. Under such
conditions, emergency managers from states whose members were serving
in EMAC senior leadership posts would temporarily take on the
responsibility of facilitating requests for assistance between member
states, processing paperwork, and answering questions. There was no
dedicated administrative support available to support routine
activities, such as training, or to maintain regular coordination
between the EMAC network and key federal players.
In 2003, the EMAC network, working through NEMA, entered into a
cooperative agreement with FEMA that enabled it to hire a full-time
staff member to serve as EMAC Coordinator. Among other things, this
individual was tasked with supporting the development of training for
responders deploying under EMAC and creating an information technology
system that would capture mission-level information for each disaster
for which EMAC was activated. In addition, these funds were used to
support other capacity-building activities, including the holding of
after-action reviews to capture lessons learned as well as the
development of the EMAC network's first strategic plan and operations
manual.
EMAC Has Some Planning Mechanisms in Place but Would Benefit from More
Specific Objectives and Appropriate Performance Measures:
Over the last several years, EMAC leadership has taken steps to adopt a
more systematic and rigorous approach to learning from its past
experiences and planning for the future. These include using after-
action reports following major events to identify ways in which the
operation of the network might be improved and developing a strategic
plan to help ensure that the activities and limited resources of the
EMAC network are contributing to achieve its mission. We have
previously reported that a structured, deliberate approach toward
planning that includes long-term goals clearly linked to specific
objectives and appropriate performance measures can provide a useful
tool in helping organizations achieve their missions.[Footnote 26]
In 2004 and 2005, the EMAC network conducted the first two of what it
expects to be a series of after-action reviews to analyze its
performance and identify areas where it performed well and issues
needing improvement. As part of this process, the EMAC network
contracted with an outside firm to conduct focus groups of operations
and management personnel who either facilitated requests for assistance
on behalf of EMAC member states or first responders who responded to
requests for assistance. Federal officials from FEMA and NGB also
participated in these sessions. In addition, the outside firm analyzed
data from EMAC databases that cataloged requests for assistance and
validated its research with EMAC leadership. Information from these
reports was widely disseminated among EMAC members and also provided
the foundation for several objectives and tasks contained in the EMAC
Strategic Plan.
In 2005, EMAC developed its first 5-year strategic plan to more clearly
identify goals and objectives that would assist it in achieving its
mission of "facilitating the efficient and effective sharing of
resources between member states during times of disaster or emergency."
The plan, which was updated in 2006, identifies four broad goals: (1)
provide leadership on mutual aid issues, (2) sustain and enhance mutual
aid capabilities, (3) promote mutual aid and strengthen relationships,
and (4) align EMAC capabilities with nationwide preparedness and
response priorities. Under each of these goals is a series of
supporting objectives and still more specific tasks.
This plan represents a significant and positive first step; however,
there are several areas where future efforts could be improved,
particularly in the way the plan measures and reports on performance.
We have previously reported on several key characteristics of effective
plans, including performance measures.[Footnote 27] Performance plans
that include precise and measurable objectives for resolving mission-
critical management problems are important to ensuring that
organizations have the capacity to achieve results-oriented
programmatic goals. Appropriate performance measures, along with
accompanying targets, are important tools to enable internal and
external stakeholders to effectively track the progress the
organization is making toward achieving its goals and objectives. To
this end, organizations may use a variety of performance measures--
output, efficiency, customer service, quality, and outcome--each of
which focuses on a different aspect of performance.
The EMAC leadership stated that they have informal mechanisms that
assess targets for achieving objectives, such as regular status
meetings. However, they do not have a formal implementation or action
plan that operationalizes the goals and objectives outlined in the
strategic plan. In the absence of such a plan, EMAC's current strategic
plan contains no quantifiable measures or targets for its many goals
and objectives. For example, EMAC's strategic plan calls for the
development of a comprehensive training program, listing seven key
tasks including evaluating training needs and developing training
modules. However, the plan does not provide milestones for these
activities or any performance measures for assessing whether these
activities are in fact having their intended impact.
The lack of clear and formal performance measures is compounded by the
regular rotation of senior leadership within the EMAC network. As we
have previously reported, sustained focus and direction from top
management is a key component of effective management.[Footnote 28]
Management control requires that organizations consider the effect upon
their operations if key leadership is expected to leave and then
establish criteria for a retention or mitigation strategy. Each year,
the Chair of the Executive Task Force, responsible for the day-to-day
management of EMAC, changes. EMAC has reduced some of the challenges
that may be associated with such regular transitions by requiring that
each new chair of the Executive Task Force first serve in an
observational role for 1 year before becoming the chair and then serve
as a mentor to the incoming chair following a 1-year term. However,
because the leadership changes annually and there are no formal
performance measures to determine whether goals and objectives are
being achieved, it may be difficult to clearly assess whether the EMAC
network is operating effectively and efficiently. To alleviate
potential challenges that may arise by the annual rotation of its
leadership, the EMAC network has recently begun transitioning more
management responsibilities to NEMA.
A Lack of Funding May Affect the EMAC Network's Ability to Build and
Sustain the Collaborative Effort:
Since its inception, the EMAC network has received disparate funding to
sustain its administrative capacity. From 2000 through 2002, the EMAC
network received minimal financial support from its members through
voluntary annual contributions of approximately $1,000 per member. In
2003, FEMA and the EMAC network entered into a 3-year, $2 million
cooperative agreement to fund EMAC operations through May 31,
2007.[Footnote 29] This cooperative agreement enabled the EMAC network
to develop an electronic system to collect, manage, and analyze the
EMAC process; coordinate with FEMA on efforts to develop standard
resource deployment packages; improve EMAC training initiatives; and
hire one staff member to coordinate EMAC network operations.
In October 2006, Congress for the first time specifically authorized
FEMA to obligate up to $4 million in grants in fiscal year 2008 to
support EMAC operations and coordination activities.[Footnote 30] In
May 2007, Congress appropriated $2.5 million to FEMA for interstate
mutual aid agreements,[Footnote 31] and according to FEMA officials,
FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a 3-year
cooperative agreement to improve the use and awareness of resource
typing among its members, and develop training programs to improve
awareness of EMAC at the federal, state, and local levels. Present and
past EMAC leadership stated that if the EMAC network does not receive
additional funding to support operations, efforts to build and sustain
the administrative capacity will have to be scaled back. Specifically,
they stated that the EMAC network will lose day-to-day administrative
support, there will be no resources to maintain the electronic systems
that facilitate requests under EMAC or the EMAC Web site, training
initiatives organized and led by EMAC leadership will be suspended, and
coordination between the EMAC network and key federal players will be
curtailed.
Conclusions:
EMAC's success relies on effective collaboration among its members. The
compact provides a broad and flexible framework that enables its
members to overcome differences in missions, organizational cultures,
and established ways of doing business in order to achieve a common
mission. The EMAC network has built upon this framework, establishing
roles and responsibilities and developing standards and systems in some
key areas. At the same time, we found that opportunities exist for the
EMAC network--as well as individual members--to make improvements in
several areas, such as (1) developing member roles and responsibilities
regarding how first responders are received and integrated into
impacted areas; (2) continuing to develop electronic systems that
enable the EMAC network to track resources, from request through
mission completion; (3) continuing to improve understanding of
reimbursement guidelines and standards among member states, especially
following large-scale deployments; (4) promoting good practices across
the EMAC network that improve members' abilities to leverage resources;
and (5) enhancing the EMAC network's strategic and management planning
efforts by considering more robust performance measures.
In addition to helping states assist one another, EMAC has shown that
it plays a critical role in our nation's disaster response. However,
there will be times when the EMAC network will be strained, and our
nation's next large-scale disaster will likely produce similar
challenges to those encountered following the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes. With this in mind, opportunities exist at the federal level
to help alleviate these challenges. One way to improve the nation's
overall capacity to respond to disasters is to build the EMAC network's
administrative capacity through mechanisms such as cooperative
agreements, grants, or training initiatives. In doing so, planning and
coordination within the EMAC network can be enhanced--key elements
required for developing the capacities needed to respond to disasters.
Valuable opportunities also exist to reflect on lessons learned to
alleviate financial and administrative burdens placed on both the
assisting and requesting states in response to catastrophes.
Opportunities exist to reduce confusion among states with regard to
seeking and obtaining advance funding through expedited project
worksheets to facilitate timely reimbursements under EMAC.
Additionally, early consideration of whether it would be appropriate to
authorize the use of Title 32 status for National Guard units
responding to catastrophic incidents could decrease the administrative
and financial burdens states endure when switching between State Active
Duty status and Title 32 status.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making the following three recommendations:
To further enhance the administrative capacity required to support the
EMAC network, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Administrator of FEMA to look for ways to build the
administrative capacity required to support the EMAC network, such as
cooperative agreements, grants, and training initiatives.
In situations involving catastrophic disasters that require significant
assistance from several states and in turn increase the financial and
administrative burdens on EMAC members:
* We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop guidance
for impacted states to efficiently seek and obtain advance funding
through expedited project worksheets to facilitate more expedited
reimbursement for those states providing assistance through EMAC to
impacted areas.
* We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security
work together to amend the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Supplement
Execution Schedule to include early consideration of the use of Title
32 in situations where the Secretary of Defense deems it appropriate.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of Defense for comment. The Director of
FEMA's Office of Policy and Program Analysis provided oral comments,
concurring with all of our recommendations. FEMA also provided
technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. The
Department of Defense did not concur with the recommendation that calls
for an expedited consideration of whether to offer Title 32 following
catastrophic disasters requiring significant assistance from several
states. DOD's response is reprinted in appendix II.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Reserve Affairs did not concur with our recommendation
that the Secretary of Defense work with the Secretary of Homeland
Security to amend the National Response Plan's Catastrophic Incident
Supplement Execution Schedule to include early consideration of the use
of Title 32 in situations where the Secretary of Defense deems it
appropriate. The Department stated that use of National Guard forces in
Title 32 status is an inherent DOD function and, in accordance with
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, outside the purview of the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
We agree that the use of National Guard forces in Title 32 status is an
inherent DOD function, and our recommendation recognizes the authority
of the Secretary of Defense to determine when use of that authority is
appropriate. While making clear that the directive in no way impairs or
affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over DOD, Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-5 also states that the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish
appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and
coordination between their two departments. The Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security has responsibility for the National
Response Plan, which already assigns responsibilities to DOD, as a
cooperating agency, and changes to the plan must be coordinated through
his department. Our reference to the Secretary of Homeland Security was
simply to acknowledge DHS's coordinating role.
DOD also stated that amending the Catastrophic Incident Supplement
Execution Schedule of the National Response Plan as we suggested "could
be interpreted to imply that it is DOD policy to place National Guard
forces into Title 32 status when in fact, the response to the event
only requires National Guard in State Active Duty status." Our
recommendation does not state that DOD should place National Guard
forces into any particular status. The intent behind our recommendation
is to create a mechanism that would trigger DOD's consideration of
whether authorization of Title 32 status is appropriate in the earlier
stages of an event, when the event has been designated as
"catastrophic" under the National Response Plan. In our view, a
decision point for consideration of Title 32 status does not imply that
the decision should be made in favor of or in opposition to authorizing
Title 32. The Secretary of Defense may decide that it would not be
appropriate to offer Title 32 status, and even if the Secretary did
decide to offer Title 32, states would still be free to deploy their
forces under State Active Duty status if they preferred. In addition,
the Department of Defense would not be precluded from considering the
issue again at a later time. However, a quicker decision from DOD
concerning the appropriateness of Title 32 would, in circumstances
where the authorization of Title 32 was deemed to be appropriate, allow
states to deploy their National Guard forces under a single status
rather than switching statuses in the midst of a catastrophe. This
could enhance state responses because, as our report highlights, states
face additional administrative burdens when they switch their National
Guard forces from State Active Duty status to Title 32 status.
We also provided a draft of this report to the Chair of the EMAC
Executive Task Force and to the Executive Director of NEMA. Relevant
sections of the draft report were provided to state and local emergency
offices whose experiences we reference. Technical suggestions from
these groups have been incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this
report to interested congressional committees as well as the
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, members of the EMAC
Executive Task Force, the Executive Director of the National Emergency
Management Association, and state and local officials contacted for
this report. We will also make this report available to others who are
interested and make copies available to others who request them. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Stanley J. Czerwinski at (202) 512-6806 or czerwinskis@gao.gov
or: Sharon L. Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Stanley J. Czerwinski:
Director:
Strategic Issues:
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director:
Defense Capabilities Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology;
To determine the extent to which the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact's (EMAC) membership and its use have grown since its inception
in 1995, we reviewed a number of disaster responses for which the EMAC
process was activated based on the type, scale, and time frame of the
event from information provided by EMAC officials. We also interviewed
emergency management officials and analyzed sources that provided
additional details for events for which the EMAC process was activated,
including after-action reports. Our work was constrained by data
limitations, since EMAC leadership maintained data only sporadically
prior to 2005, and data capturing deployments under EMAC for disasters
since 2005 were incomplete or inconsistent. To assess the reliability
of the deployment data, we reviewed additional documents and conducted
additional interviews with local, state, and federal emergency
management officials for selected events captured by the database. In
cases where the data were inaccurate, we supplemented them with data
from more reliable sources. For example, in determining the number of
civilian and military personnel deployed through EMAC for the September
11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York and the 2004 Florida hurricanes,
we obtained additional data from New York and Florida officials. In
addition, in determining the number of out-of-state personnel deployed
on September 10, 2005, in response to Hurricane Katrina, we worked with
the Department of Defense (DOD) to obtain more accurate data regarding
National Guard and active component, military deployment figures. We
also attended conferences that addressed interstate compacts and EMAC,
and we conducted literature and legal reviews of mutual assistance
compact structures and governance.
To determine the degree to which existing policies, procedures, and
practices facilitate successful collaboration among EMAC members and
between the EMAC network and federal agencies, we interviewed various
local, state, and federal emergency management officials and analyzed
the procedures and practices they used during their response. We
focused on the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes emergency response since it
presented the largest use of the EMAC process to date, with
approximately 66,000 civilian and National Guard responders deployed
across several disciplines. In addition, we also selected a cross
section of disasters for further analysis based on the type, scale, and
timing of the disaster. To gain firsthand knowledge of EMAC procedures,
we held a combination of in person and telephone interviews with some
of the actual civilian and National Guard emergency responders to the
2004 Florida hurricanes and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. In
addition, we applied criteria for practices GAO previously developed to
assess collaboration among EMAC members and between the EMAC network
and key federal officials. [Footnote 32] We used the first six of these
eight practices for this report:
* defining and articulating a common outcome;
* establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;
* identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
* agreeing on roles and responsibilities;
* establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to
operate across agency boundaries;
* developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results;
* reinforcing agency accountability for collaboration efforts through
agency plans and reports; and:
* reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through performance management systems;
We did not use the last two practices because they were beyond the
scope of this review, and the sixth practice is discussed in our
assessment of the EMAC network's administrative capacity. We then
selected examples that illustrated and supported the need for
improvement in specific areas where the key practices could be used. We
also spoke with individuals who were responsible for various roles
during these disasters such as resource identification and requests,
coordination, and reimbursement. These discussions were held with
officials from the following offices and commands;
Local Officials:
* Arlington County Office of Emergency Management, Arlington, Virginia;
* Hancock County Emergency Management Agency, Louis, Mississippi;
* Harrison County Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency,
Gulfport, Mississippi;
* Henrico County Manager, Richmond, Virginia;
* Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Charles County, Maryland;
* Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Kent County, Maryland;
* New Orleans Fire Department, New Orleans, Louisiana;
* New York City Fire Department, Brooklyn, New York;
State Officials:
* California Department of Emergency Management, Sacramento, California;
* California Highway Patrol, Sacramento, California;
* California Incident Management Team, Sacramento, California;
* Colorado Department of Local Affairs - Division of Emergency
Management, Denver, Colorado;
* Council of State Governments, Midwestern Region, Lombard, Illinois;
* Delaware National Guard, Wilmington, Delaware;
* Florida Department of Community Affairs/Division of Emergency
Management, Tallahassee, Florida;
* Florida National Guard, St. Augustine, Florida;
* Georgia Homeland Security - Emergency Management Agency, Atlanta,
Georgia;
* Indiana State Department of Health, Indianapolis, Indiana;
* Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Johnston,
Iowa;
* Iowa National Guard, Johnston, Iowa;
* Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
* Louisiana National Guard, Pineville, Louisiana;
* Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Pearl, Mississippi:
* Mississippi National Guard, Jackson, Mississippi;
* Montana Department of Emergency Affairs/Disaster and Emergency
Services Division, Helena, Montana;
* National Emergency Management Association, Lexington, Kentucky;
* New Mexico Department of Public Safety/New Mexico State Police, Santa
Fe, New Mexico;
* New York State Emergency Management Office, Albany, New York;
* North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety,
Raleigh, North Carolina;
* North Carolina Regional Coordinating Team, Raleigh, North Carolina;
* North Dakota Department of Emergency Services-Homeland Security
Division, Bismarck, North Dakota;
* Oregon National Guard, Salem, Oregon;
* South Carolina National Guard, Columbia, South Carolina;
* South Carolina Department of Emergency Management, West Columbia,
South Carolina;
* Texas Governor's Division of Emergency Management, Austin, Texas;
* Virginia Division of Emergency Management, Richmond, Virginia:
* Washington D.C. Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
Federal Officials:
* Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia;
* Department of Defense - Office of General Counsel, Arlington,
Virginia;
* Department of Defense - Inspector General, Arlington, Virginia;
* Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.;
* Federal Emergency Management Agency - Public Assistance, Washington,
D.C.;
* National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia;
* National Guard Crisis Action Team (Army), Falls Church, Virginia;
* National Guard Crisis Action Team (Air Force), Camp Springs, Maryland;
Furthermore, we reviewed the EMAC process through which state and local
assets are requested and activated. In addition, we looked at how the
deployment status of National Guard support affected the timeliness of
reimbursement.
To determine the extent to which the EMAC network has the
administrative capacity to build and sustain the collaborative effort
to achieve its mission, we interviewed a select number of former and
current EMAC leaders as well as emergency management officials from
EMAC member states. We also reviewed and analyzed the EMAC strategic
planning documents and selected after-action reports. We performed
similar reviews of state and federal after-action reports for 2004
through 2006. These discussions and reviews helped us gain an
understanding of EMAC organizational structure and developmental and
funding plans.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through June 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
We provided drafts of relevant sections of this report to state and
local emergency management officials whose experiences we reference and
we incorporated their technical corrections as appropriate. In
addition, we requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD and
DHS, as well as the Chair the EMAC Executive Task Force and the
Executive Director of NEMA. Comments from DOD are reprinted in appendix
II. Their comments are addressed in the Agency Comments section of this
report. The Department of Homeland Security provided oral comments,
concurring with all of our recommendations.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense;
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
1500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-1500:
Reserve Affairs:
June 22, 2007:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Ms. Pickup:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO draft report, GAO-07-
854, "Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National
Disaster Response,dated June 1, 2007 (GAO Code 450479).
The Department nonconcurs with the recommendation contained in this
report. Our detailed comments are enclosed.
My point of contact is COL Eric Lindner at 703-693-4204.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
T.F. Hall
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated June 1, 2007
GAO CODE 450479/GAO-07-854
"Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National
Disaster Response"
Department Of Defense
Comments To The Recommendation;
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security work together to amend the National Response Plan's
(NIP) Catastrophic;
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments;
GAO Contacts:
Stanley J. Czerwinski, (202) 512-6806 or czerwinskis@gao.gov:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, Peter Del Toro, Assistant
Director; Michael J. Ferren, Assistant Director; Andrew C. Edelson;
Gwyneth M. Blevins; James A. Driggins; K. Nicole Haeberle; K. Nicole
Harms; Molly E. McNamara; Justin L Monroe; Sheila D. Rajabiun; and
Nathaniel J. Taylor made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Catastrophic Disaster: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[2] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington,
D.C.: May 2006), and White House Homeland Security Council, The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
23, 2006).
[3] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[4] For the purposes of this report, "disaster" refers to both natural
or nonnatural disasters or emergencies.
[5] For the purposes of this report, "2004 Florida hurricanes" refers
to hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne as well as tropical
storm Bonnie.
[6] For the purposes of this report, "2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes"
refers to hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
[7] GAO, Interstate Compacts: An Overview of the Structure and
Governance of Environment and Natural Resource Compacts, GAO-07-519
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 2007).
[8] Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517--18 (1893).
[9] The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, June 12, 1951. ch. 1228, 64
Stat. 1245.
[10] Pub. L. No. 103-337, Div. C, § 3401, 108 Stat. 2663 (Jan. 25,
1994).
[11] Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (Oct. 19, 1996).
[12] For the purposes of this report, "states" includes the 50 states,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and U.S.
territorial possessions.
[13] NEMA is a nonprofit, nonpartisan association of emergency
management and homeland security professionals with a mission to
provide national leadership and expertise in comprehensive emergency
management; serve as a vital emergency management information and
assistance resource; and advance continuous improvement in emergency
management through strategic partnerships, innovative programs, and
collaborative policy positions. NEMA has tax-exempt status under §
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
[14] For the purposes of this report, "EMAC" refers to the compact
itself and "EMAC leadership" refers to the state representatives who
have been selected by EMAC members to oversee day-to-day operations
relating to EMAC as well as the Chair of the EMAC Committee, EMAC
Coordinator, EMAC Senior Advisor, and NEMA Legal Committee Chair who
provide administrative and other assistance to the EMAC network.
[15] Although California became a member of EMAC on September 14, 2005,
its membership expired on March 1, 2007. As of the date of this report,
the California State Legislature is considering legislation, AB 1564,
that will renew California's membership in EMAC.
[16] Other responders include professionals in engineering, animal
resources, public works, transportation and highways, emergency
management, agriculture and forestry, and search and rescue.
[17] GAO-06-15.
[18] GAO-06-15.
[19] GAO-06-15.
[20] The EMAC Advisory Group is intended to serve as a conduit between
the EMAC network and the constituencies represented by the advisory
group members, identify and share best practices, provide guidance for
the strategic direction of the EMAC network, and provide a connection
between other mechanisms that provide aid.
[21] GAO-06-15.
[22] The two states that elected to continue to deploy in State Active
Duty status after Title 32 status was made available were Delaware and
Iowa.
[23] As we have previously reported, the Catastrophic Incident
Supplement lists very few specific tasks that DOD should perform during
a catastrophe. For more information, see GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better
Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to
Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2006).
[24] GAO-06-15.
[25] Operation Enduring Freedom includes ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and in certain other countries; Operation Iraqi Freedom
includes ongoing operations in Iraq; Operation Jump Start includes
ongoing operations on the southern border of the United States.
[26] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June,
1996).
[27] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
[28] GAO, Managing for Results: Next Steps to Improve the Federal
Government's Management and Performance, GAO-02-439T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 15, 2002).
[29] The agreement was expected to expire on January 31, 2006, but FEMA
extended the cooperative agreement to May 31, 2007.
[30] Pub L. No. 109-295, title VI, §661, 120 Stat. 1335, 1432-33 (Oct.
4, 2006).
[31] Pub L. No. 110-28, title III, ch.5, 121 Stat. 112, 142 (May 25,
2007).
[32] GAO-06-15.
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