Homeland Security
Guidance from Operations Directorate Will Enhance Collaboration among Departmental Operations Centers Gao ID: GAO-07-683T June 20, 2007This testimony summarizes GAO's October 2006 report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) operations centers--centers run by three DHS components and operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities of potential terrorist activities and other crises. Specifically, GAO assessed the extent to which the centers implemented key practices GAO's work has shown will enhance and sustain collaboration. In addition, GAO is aware of Congress's concerns about the performance of certain DHS components with regard to situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina, and the recent efforts made in response to these concerns identified in hurricane after-action studies and reports. Because these efforts to some extent affect DHS's response to the recommendations made in GAO's previous report, this testimony briefly describes some of the steps DHS reported that it has taken to address situational awareness problems Katrina exposed. However, because these actions are relatively new, it is too early to assess how well they are being implemented.
The DHS operations centers GAO studied--the Air and Marine Operations Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security Operations Center, and the National Operations Center--could improve implementation of the key practices GAO identified as having a positive effect on inter-agency collaboration. These key practices include (1) defining common outcomes and joint strategies; (2) assessing each center's needs to leverage resources; (3) defining the roles and responsibilities of the personnel conducting surveillance activities; (4) establishing compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using DHS's primary information sharing network; (5) developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results of joint operations; and (6) reinforcing accountability by recognizing joint efforts and outcomes achieved in annual performance plans and reports. The Operations Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity to more fully implement these key practices by providing guidance to the operations centers. Although GAO recommended that the Directorate provide this guidance, DHS stated that the Directorate does not have control over the component operations centers; therefore, it has not provided guidance to improve collaboration among the centers. According to DHS, it has given priority to fixing issues that affect situational awareness and its ability to respond to national incidents and disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. The actions in response to Katrina include establishing standard roles and procedures for reporting information during a major incident and creating a Web-based tool to provide a common view of critical information during a crisis. While DHS has not fully responded to GAO's recommendation for implementing key collaborative practices, it maintains that the initiatives it has implemented since Katrina will improve collaboration and create an environment to address the recommendations in the future.
GAO-07-683T, Homeland Security: Guidance from Operations Directorate Will Enhance Collaboration among Departmental Operations Centers
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Testimony:
Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 20, 2007:
Homeland Security:
Guidance from Operations Directorate May Enhance Collaboration among
Departmental Operations Centers:
Statement of Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-07-683T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-683T, a testimony before the House Homeland
Security Committee, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and
Oversight
Why GAO Did This Study:
This testimony summarizes GAO‘s October 2006 report on the Department
of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) operations centers”centers run by three
DHS components and operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities of
potential terrorist activities and other crises. Specifically, GAO
assessed the extent to which they implemented key practices GAO‘s work
has shown will enhance and sustain collaboration.
In addition, GAO is aware of Congress‘ concerns about the performance
of components of DHS during Hurricane Katrina, and the recent efforts
made in response to these concerns identified in hurricane after-action
studies and reports. Because these efforts to some extent affect DHS‘s
response to the recommendations made in GAO‘s previous report, this
testimony briefly describes some of the steps DHS reported that it has
taken to address problems Katrina exposed. However, because these
actions are relatively new, it is too early to assess how well they are
being implemented.
To complete this work, GAO spoke to DHS officials and reviewed relevant
documentation.
What GAO Found:
The DHS operations centers GAO studied”the Air and Marine Operations
Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security
Operations Center, and the National Operations Center”could better
implement most of the key practices GAO identified as having a positive
effect on inter-agency collaboration. These key practices include (1)
defining common outcomes and joint strategies; (2) assessing each
center‘s needs to leverage resources; (3) defining the roles and
responsibilities of the personnel conducting surveillance activities;
(4) establishing compatible standards, policies, and procedures for
using DHS‘s primary information sharing network; (5) developing
mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results of joint operations; and (6)
reinforcing accountability by recognizing joint efforts and outcomes
achieved in annual performance plans and reports. The Operations
Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve operational
efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity to more
fully implement these key practices by providing guidance to the
operations centers. Although GAO recommended that the Directorate
provide this guidance, DHS stated that the Directorate does not have
control over the component operations centers; therefore, it has not
provided guidance to improve collaboration among the centers.
According to DHS, it has given priority to fixing issues that affect
its ability to respond to national incidents and disasters, such as
Hurricane Katrina, instead of directing the Operations Directorate to
provide guidance to enhance collaboration at operations centers. The
actions in response to Katrina include establishing standard roles and
procedures for reporting information during a major incident and
creating a Web-based tool to provide a common view of critical
information during a crisis. While DHS has not fully responded to GAO
recommendation for implementing key collaborative practices, it
maintains that the after-action initiatives it has implemented since
Katrina may improve collaboration and create an environment to address
the recommendations in the future.
Figure: Staff Conducting Surveillance Activities at Operations Centers:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: From left to right: TSA and CBP.
[end of figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-683T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202)
512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our work on assessing the relationship among various operations
centers of components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the agency's overall National Operations Center in carrying out the
important mission of maintaining situational awareness and being
prepared to help with incident management.
When DHS was established as an organization, we recognized the
challenges it would face in trying to integrate 22 legacy agencies into
one new corporate entity. Therefore, in January 2003 we placed the
integration and transformation of the department on GAO's high-risk
list--composed of those federal agencies, programs, or activities that
pose the highest risk to the nation--because we recognized the country
could not afford to have DHS fail. The Department's transformation
remained on our high-risk list for 2007 because DHS had still not fully
addressed its integration, management, and programmatic
challenges.[Footnote 1] Placing it on this list obligates us to
continue to monitor how well the integration and transformation is
succeeding.
With similar concerns, as well as concerns with the response to events
that have occurred since, such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita and
continuing terrorist threats, the Congress has been overseeing DHS's
transformation. As part of this oversight, the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs requested that we identify the
DHS operations centers (established to conduct monitoring and
surveillance activities that can help detect, deter and prevent
terrorist acts), to determine if any centers are redundant, and assess
the functions and customers of these centers. Also, as part of this
oversight, the Committee recognized that Hurricane Katrina demonstrated
that the department's main operations center--the Homeland Security
Operations Center--was not ready to effectively coordinate the sharing
of information in a time of crisis and needed repair; therefore, it
made a series of recommendations to address the problems identified and
has been monitoring agency efforts to ensure it makes these
changes.[Footnote 2]
In response to the Senate Committee's request for GAO to review
operations centers, we decided to assess those centers within DHS's
component agencies that, first, conduct operations 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, 365 days a year (24/7/365), and that, second, have a
broader security mission that DHS has determined requires higher levels
of collaboration from many stakeholders, including DHS component
agencies, and other federal, state, and local agencies. These centers
are the Air and Marine Operations Center and the National Targeting
Center, sponsored by U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the
Transportation Security Operations Center sponsored by the
Transportation Security Administration; and the National Operations
Center Interagency Watch, the successor to the Homeland Security
Operations Center, run within the Office of Operations Coordination at
DHS. We assessed the extent to which they implemented key practices
that our work has shown helps to enhance and sustain
collaboration,[Footnote 3] since such collaboration is important to one
of the main functions of each center, namely, sharing information
needed to develop and maintain situational awareness of potential
crises and terrorist activity nationwide. These key collaborative
practices include defining and articulating a common outcome and joint
strategies to guide multi-agency activities such as information
sharing, and assessing staffing needs to leverage the resources other
agencies contribute to the centers. We found that these practices can
help agencies overcome barriers to collaboration, such as
overprotection of jurisdiction and resources, as well as, incompatible
procedures and processes that can result in agencies operating in a
fragmented and uncoordinated way, wasting resources, and limiting
effectiveness.
Based on our work on operations centers, we issued a report in October
2006 with recommendations for the Office of Operations Coordination to
develop and provide guidance to the centers in our study to encourage
that they implement these key collaborative practices as a means to
enhance their ability to meet their missions.[Footnote 4] Today, we
would like to, first, briefly review the collaboration issues and
recommendations we presented in our report, then, give an update of
DHS's efforts to respond to these recommendations.
In addition, we are aware of the Congress' concerns about the
performance of the Homeland Security Operations Center during Hurricane
Katrina, and the recent efforts made in response to these and other
concerns identified in hurricane after-action studies and reports.
Because these efforts to some extent affect DHS's response to our
recommendations, we briefly describe some of the steps DHS recently
reported to us that it has taken to address problems Katrina exposed,
although it is too early to assess these actions to determine how well
they are being implemented since a number of them are relatively new.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which operations centers managed by
different offices and components within DHS had implemented key
practices that our work has shown can enhance collaboration among
federal agencies, during our original work, we reviewed transition,
management integration, and planning and policy documents from the
department. We also reviewed strategic plans, as well as annual
performance reports and planning documents from DHS and its component
agencies. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed the results of studies
undertaken by DHS to assess and improve coordination and collaboration
at the multi-agency centers as well as reports from GAO, the
Congressional Research Service, the DHS Office of Inspector General,
and others that addressed the integration, coordination, and
collaboration of departmentwide program functions. To determine the
extent to which they reflect how DHS has encouraged the use of the key
collaborative practices, we also met with the acting director and other
responsible officials from the Office of Operations Coordination to
discuss its role and responsibilities.
To obtain updated information on DHS's efforts to implement our
recommendations, we visited the National Operations Center, the
National Infrastructure Coordination Center, the National Response
Coordination Center, and Transportation Security Operations Center and
met with center managers. In addition, we spoke to officials at the
National Targeting Center. We also received a series of briefings on
organizational and operational changes implemented since Hurricane
Katrina and reviewed documentation provided to explain these changes.
We relied on these visits and briefings for updated information on
DHS's response to our and post-Katrina after action report
recommendations; we did not verify the accuracy of DHS's officials'
statements or the effectiveness of the implemented actions. We
conducted our original and additional audit work in accordance with
generally accepted government accounting standards between October 2005
through September 2006, and March 2007 through June 2007, respectively.
Summary:
In our October 2006 report, we reported that the centers had the
opportunity to better implement most of the key practices we identified
that enhance collaboration. While we did not identify any major
problems or barriers to executing their missions, enhanced
collaboration could further ensure robust situational awareness and
support to incident response. For example, we found that while DHS had
implemented one key collaborative practice--leveraging its resources--
by having staff from multiple agencies work together at the four
operations centers, it could better implement the following
collaborative practices:
* Defining and articulating a common outcome or joint strategies. This
helps to provide, for example, a compelling rationale for agencies to
collaborate.
* Assessing each center's needs in order to leverage resources,
especially human resources or staffing needs. This helps to ensure
efficiencies and that the functions of a center are not compromised by
the workforce limitations of a single agency.
* Defining roles and responsibilities, especially of the
watchstanders[Footnote 5] in each center, those staff who come from
other agencies and have the important job of conducting surveillance
activities. This helps to ensure that people at the same center in the
same role perform their responsibilities consistently. Because of the
potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive action at 24/7/
365 operations centers, it is important that the roles and
responsibilities of watchstanders are described and understood by both
the watch staff as well as the officials responsible for managing the
operations centers.
* Establishing compatible standards, policies, and procedures, such as
those for DHS's Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)[Footnote
6]--the primary network DHS uses to share incident management and
homeland security information across DHS, and with other federal,
state, and local partners. This would provide a means to operate across
agency boundaries and help ensure effective communications among the
centers.
* Developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results of joint
operations, such as conducting joint exercises and assessing the after-
action reports. This helps management, key decision makers, and both
stakeholders and customers obtain feedback to improve governing policy
and operational effectiveness.
* Reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts by
recognizing joint efforts and outcomes achieved in published strategic
and annual performance plans and reports. Joint accountability and
recognition can provide an incentive to collaborate.
We found that the Operations Directorate (now known as the Office of
Operations Coordination), established in November 2005 to improve
operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an
opportunity to more fully implement these key practices. Therefore, we
recommended that the Secretary of DHS charge the Director of the
Operations Directorate with developing and providing the guidance
necessary to help ensure the four centers take the following six
actions to implement best practices for collaboration and help better
position the centers to achieve their common missions:
* Define common outcomes and joint strategies for achieving their
overall mission;
* Conduct staffing needs assessments to better leverage resources
within centers;
* Clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders so that they
understand each person's expected duties and contributions, especially
during an emergency;
* Apply standards, policies, and procedures to promote the more
extensive use of DHS's information network to improve communications;
* Prepare mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the results of joint and
collaborative efforts to ensure effectiveness; and:
* Address the results achieved by collaborative efforts in strategic
and annual performance plans and reports to increase accountability.
At the time of our report, DHS agreed with these recommendations, but
according to DHS officials, has yet to implement them. In recent
meetings, DHS said that some changes at the National Operations Center
are responsive to several of these recommendations. For example, the
center is taking steps to better define the role of watchstanders, and
DHS has designed a strategy and set of initiatives to improve the
usefulness of the information network. However, according to Operations
Directorate officials, they have not been directed by DHS to issue the
overall guidance we recommended. They also do not plan to issue such
guidance at this time because they stated they do not have any
administrative, budgetary, or operational authority or control over the
other three component centers. While we understand that these centers
have missions unique to their sponsoring agencies and are not subject
to the Operations Directorate, providing these centers guidance that is
not mandatory but strongly endorsed on ways to better collaborate
internally could enhance their effectiveness within their own centers
as well as in providing the national center the information it needs,
especially during a time of crisis.
DHS officials said another reason they had yet to implement our
recommendations is in part because, instead of focusing on these intra-
department collaboration issues, DHS has been giving priority to fixing
critical inter-agency and inter-governmental issues that hindered its
ability to respond to major, national incidents and disasters,
particularly Hurricane Katrina. DHS officials said there were a number
of post-Katrina initiatives underway which could build relationships
among the centers so that they are more disposed to implement the
recommended key collaborative practices in the future. For example, DHS
points to its efforts to:
* Establish standard roles and procedures among all stakeholders, both
within and outside DHS, for reporting information during a major
incident. Now, according to DHS, information must be verified and
clarified at the field and headquarters level before it is placed on
its information network.
* Create the Common Operating Picture (COP)--a real-time, web-based
tool designed to provide a common view of critical information during a
crisis--within DHS's Homeland Security Information Network.
* Create working groups of partners within and outside of DHS to
enhance information flow on planning, training, and incident
management, to resolve interdepartmental conflicts, and to facilitate
decision-making at higher levels.
While it is too early to assess to what extent DHS has successfully
implemented and institutionalized these initiatives since some are only
recently established, they appear to be designed to address several key
recommendations from congressional and administration Post-Katrina
assessments.[Footnote 7] DHS acknowledges it still has a substantial
way to go to fully implement these initiatives and measure their
results, but it has recently tested some of these initiatives during
interagency training exercises and has plans to do more of these tests
in the future. Continuing to focus on efforts to measure how well these
initiatives are working, and, as importantly, to what extent key
stakeholders, such as state and local governments and the private
sector, anticipate that these initiatives will meet their needs is
critical, given that Hurricane Katrina demonstrated these stakeholders
are the first responders and key to effective disaster response and
recovery. Finally, it is clear that Congressional oversight has been
and will continue to be a key driver in accelerating DHS's efforts to
be better prepared to respond to and manage national incidents.
DHS's Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers Have Unique Missions and
Responsibilities, but Also Have Opportunities to Enhance Collaboration:
In our October 2006 report on DHS multi-agency operations centers, we
found that they were not unnecessarily redundant in that they have
distinct missions but also contribute to the larger effort, carried out
by the National Operations Center, to provide national situational
awareness and incident management across DHS. In terms of key
collaborative practices, DHS had implemented one practice--leveraging
its resources--by having staff from multiple agencies work together at
the four operations centers, but could take advantage of other relevant
practices we have found to be important to enhancing and sustaining
collaboration among federal agencies. We also reported that the
establishment of the Operations Directorate provided DHS with an
opportunity to more consistently implement these practices. As of June
2007, DHS had taken some actions but had not yet implemented our
recommendations for several reasons, including the stated concern that
the Operations Directorate does not have authority over component
centers. Nevertheless, we continue to see merit in the wider use of the
key collaborative practices we identified and a role for the
Directorate to encourage their use across centers.
The Centers Do Not Define and Articulate Common Outcomes and Joint
Strategies, a Key Practice Intended to Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration:
At the time of our review, the three DHS components responsible for the
four multi-agency centers had not developed or documented common goals
or joint strategies that incorporated all the agencies within the
centers and that our work has shown could, in turn, enhance
collaboration among these agencies. Officials at the multi-agency
operations centers we visited said they did consider formally
documenting working agreements but concluded it was not essential since
all of the agencies involved were part of DHS. While this may be true,
documenting common outcomes can provide a compelling rationale for
agencies to collaborate and documenting joint strategies ensures
everyone is working in concert towards the end results that
collectively need to be achieved. Our work shows that agencies
strengthen their commitment to collaborate when they articulate
agreements in formal documents such as memorandums of understanding,
interagency guidance, or interagency planning documents.
Last year, officials from the National Operations Center said that the
lack of formal agreements is a reflection of the speed with which the
center was established and the inherent flexibility offered to DHS
agencies in order to get them to staff the operation center positions.
While recognizing the benefits of such flexibility, it is important to
balance the tradeoff of ensuring that all participants understand the
common goals and objectives to be achieved. In addition, within DHS,
external and internal memorandums of agreement and other interagency
joint operating plans are often used to document common organizational
goals and how agencies will work together. For example, the Office of
Investigations at Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and
Border Protection's border patrol have a memorandum of understanding
that governs the interaction between the two components as they carry
out their missions to investigate and reduce vulnerabilities in the
customs and immigration systems and to protect our borders,
respectively, and formalizes roles and responsibilities in order to
enhance information sharing. In addition, the DHS Office of Inspector
General has reported that memorandums of understanding are valuable
tools for establishing protocols for managing a national-level program
between two organizations.[Footnote 8] For these reasons, we
recommended that the Operations Directorate develop and provide
guidance to the three agencies that sponsor the operations centers to
help ensure they define common goals and joint strategies that
incorporate all the agencies working at the centers.
In our recent follow-up to our recommendations, DHS officials said that
they had not issued such guidance, but pointed to several other post-
Katrina actions DHS was taking that it believes are examples of common
strategies and plans that are put into action daily and that enhance
collaboration, and thus, situational awareness. For example, DHS said
it has developed national reporting requirements and a coordinated
national reporting chain for submitting homeland security information
during a crisis, in part in response to Hurricane Katrina lessons
learned. The national reporting requirements and reporting chain is to
define procedures that component centers, among others, are to follow
for inputting and confirming information used during a crisis.
In addition, our past work has demonstrated that agencies should
involve nonfederal partners, key clients, and stakeholders in defining
and articulating outcomes and decision-making. Along those lines, DHS
has created or plans to create several working groups with state,
local, and private sector members to enhance information flow for
incident management, and facilitate decision-making at higher levels.
For example, the Director of the Office of Operations said DHS plans to
establish a Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Advisory
Council to provide a forum for providing feedback on ways to improve
information sharing among communities of interest.
The Centers Are at Varying Stages of Assessing Staffing Needs; Doing So
Could Help to Ensure Centers Have Enough Staff to Leverage Resources to
Increase Efficiency:
The extent to which officials responsible for managing the four multi-
agency operations centers had conducted needs assessments to determine
the staffing requirements of each center as a means to leverage
resources varied at the time of our review. For example, CBP officials
conducted an evaluation in June 2005 that addressed the Air and Marine
Operations Center's capabilities and continuing staffing needs related
to its personnel, but it did not clearly address the need for, or
responsibilities of, U.S. Coast Guard staff assigned to the center.
Transportation Security Operations Center and National Operations
Center officials said they had not documented a needs analysis for
staff from other agencies. They said they viewed cross-agency staffing
as a historical edict based on a general assumption that such expertise
was needed to fulfill the mission of their operations center, and
believed that the supporting agency providing the staff best knew the
staffing requirements to fulfill its role at the centers. Our work has
shown that identifying and leveraging resources, including human
resources, ensures efficiencies and that the functions of a multi-
agency operations center are not compromised by the workforce
limitations of a single agency.
Since our report, DHS said it is updating mission requirements for the
Operations Directorate and will subsequently assess the National
Operations Center's staffing needs, although DHS did not say when that
assessment would be completed. On the other hand, Officials at the
National Targeting Center and the Transportation Security Operations
Center told us they have not assessed cross-component staffing needs
because they considered such assessments to be the responsibility of
the agency providing staff. Nevertheless, we maintain that such
assessments continue to be useful to ensure efficiency and that
operations centers have the correct mix of staff to perform their
missions. Therefore, while we understand that the Operations
Directorate has taken the position it does not have control over the
component center resources, we maintain that providing guidance to
component agencies to assist them in conducting such staffing needs
assessments would allow the component sponsoring the center to leverage
resources more efficiently to meet the operational needs of the center.
Not All Centers Have Established a Definition of Watchstander Roles and
Responsibilities for All Agencies at Each Center; Doing So Would Help
Ensure Staff Understand Each Others' Duties during Emergencies:
Our work has shown that collaborating agencies should work together to
define and agree on who will do what and how they will organize their
joint and individual efforts, and that this facilitates decision-
making. Agencies use handbooks, charters, standard operating
procedures, and other methods to document these agreements. We found,
however, that while three of the four multi-agency operations centers
had developed descriptions for the watchstander position staffed by
their own agency at the time of our review, only one center--the Air
and Marine Operations Center--had developed a position description for
staff assigned to the center from another DHS agency. For example, at
this center, officials require that Coast Guard staff meet a
standardized set of requirements for radar watchstanders. The other
centers relied on the components that provide staff to define their
watchstanders' roles and responsibilities. These centers also said that
because the contributing agencies provide staff who have experience and
know how they are to operate and contribute in the different multi-
agency settings, formally documenting their roles was not necessary.
While we recognize components may be in the best position to define how
their staff should contribute, we maintain that it is important that
each watchstander's position within a center be clearly defined and
communicated so that staff understand not only their individual role,
but each other's responsibilities and span of control, as well as their
expected joint contributions, most critically during major events. In
addition, because of the potentially time-sensitive need for decisive
action at 24/7/365 operations centers, it is important that the roles
and responsibilities of watchstanders are described and understood by
both the staff and the officials responsible for managing the
operations centers to enhance and sustain collaboration. Further, a
definition of the watchstander role and responsibilities is important
for supporting agency officials who must make staffing decisions about
assigning qualified and knowledgeable personnel to the centers.
According to DHS, since our report, it has taken steps to further
define the role and responsibilities of the watchstanders in its
National Operations Center and documented them in its Standard
Operating Procedures, as well as to develop Memoranda of Agreements
with the components that will codify the role of the watchstanders they
provide to the National Operations Center. Such an action, like that of
the Air and Marine Operations Center with regard to Coast Guard
watchstanders, helps ensure that the staff received from partnering
organizations possess the necessary skills to support the operations
center to which they are assigned. Given that DHS has recognized the
importance of this key practice within these two instances, we continue
to maintain it is important for DHS to ensure the other centers
likewise have clearly defined and communicated the roles and
responsibilities of watchstanders.
DHS Has Taken Some Steps to Provide Centers with Standards, Policies,
and Procedures, Especially for Information Sharing, to Operate across
Agency Boundaries, but Challenges Remain:
Since January 2005, we have designated information sharing for homeland
security a high-risk area because the federal government still faces
formidable challenges in analyzing and disseminating key information
among federal and other partners in a timely, accurate, and useful
manner.[Footnote 9] Likewise, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the
inability to share information during a disaster can impair the speed
of response and recovery efforts. One of the primary missions of each
operations center is to share information so as to understand threats,
maintain situational awareness, and manage responses to incidents. One
of the key technical tools DHS has decided to use to provide for this
information-sharing is the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN), and organizations participating in multi-agency operations
centers need to be connected to the network and have the training and
guidance that enables its use, among other things. DHS implemented HSIN
in 2004 and reports that 18,000 individuals across DHS, other federal
agencies, as well as state and local government and private entities
are authorized to use it. However, we, the DHS IG, and the department
itself have identified continuing concerns with this system, which is
used for sharing a variety of information, including law enforcement
and emergency response information used to support situational
awareness and incident response.
In April 2007, we reported[Footnote 10] that DHS did not fully adhere
to collaborative practices or Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
guidance in coordinating its efforts to implement HSIN through state
and local information-sharing initiatives. DHS is statutorily
responsible for coordinating the federal government's networks and
other communications systems, like HSIN, with state and local
governments. OMB guidance requires DHS to foster such coordination and
collaboration as a means to improve government performance, including
enhancing information sharing and avoiding duplication of effort. Key
practices to help implement the guidance include establishing joint
strategies and developing compatible policies and procedures to operate
across agency boundaries. However, DHS did not fully adhere to these
practices or guidance in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key
state and local stakeholders. As a result, the department faces the
risk that, among other things, effective information sharing is not
occurring and that its HSIN system may duplicate state and local
capabilities. The department has efforts planned and underway to
improve coordination and collaboration, but these efforts have just
begun or are being planned with implementation milestones yet to be
established. As a result, we made recommendations to the Secretary of
Homeland Security to ensure that HSIN is effectively coordinated with
state and local government information-sharing initiatives. The
Inspector General's June 2006 report had similar findings that DHS did
not provide adequate guidance, including clear information sharing
processes, training, and reference materials, needed to effectively
implement HSIN[Footnote 11] so that stakeholders were unsure of how to
use the system.
The HSIN program manager pointed to a number of initiatives being
implemented to address these challenges. These actions include the
issuance of a strategic framework and implementation plan, creation of
a Mission Coordinating Committee to define component information
requirements for the network, and, as mentioned previously, the planned
establishment of a HSIN advisory committee comprised of experts, users,
and other stakeholders involved in homeland security operations around
the country. This committee is intended to provide DHS with comments
and feedback on how the HSIN program can better meet user needs,
examine DHS's processes for deploying HSIN to the states, assess state
resources, and determine how HSIN can coordinate with these resources.
Nevertheless, the program manager also identified challenges in getting
components to participate in the process of identifying user needs, and
said that the department still faced challenges in gaining widespread
acceptance and use of this tool. Furthermore, one component that
sponsors a key portion of HSIN, the Preparedness Directorate, is
considering whether to continue to support and maintain portals to
provide connectivity to private sector owners and operators of critical
infrastructure sites, or whether to pursue other alternatives, raising
questions about the overall utility of HSIN. Finally, the DHS Office of
Inspector General plans to conduct an evaluation of the HSIN beginning
later this spring as a follow-up to its 2006 report to determine the
progress the Department has made in fixing the shortcomings
identified.[Footnote 12]
Three of Four Centers Had Not Developed Methods to Monitor and Evaluate
the Results of Joint Efforts:
With the exception of the Air and Marine Operations Center, the multi-
agency centers had not developed methods to monitor and evaluate the
results of joint efforts at the time of our review, a key practice for
ensuring collaboration. For example, the Office of Management and
Budget's assessment of the National Operations Center for 2005
determined that center officials had not established effective annual
or long-term performance goals, a first step in an effective
performance management and measurement process. Nor were performance
measures or other mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate the joint
efforts of multiple DHS agencies at the Transportation Security
Operations Center and the National Targeting Center. Without annual
goals and a means to measure performance, it is difficult for an
organization to determine how well it is functioning and identify how
it could be more effective. Likewise, our work has shown that
developing performance measures and mechanisms can help management, key
decision makers, and both stakeholders and customers obtain feedback to
improve operational effectiveness and policy.
To date, DHS has not provided guidance to the multiagency centers to
help implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the results of
collaborative efforts. However, as we further discuss later in this
statement, the Operations Directorate said the National Operations
Center, and, as relevant, other centers, have participated in, and will
be participating in, exercises to test some of the changes the centers
have implemented. These exercises provide a means to monitor and
evaluate collaboration during real or hypothetical events, and the
after-action reviews or lessons learned reviews conducted such as
Katrina after-action reports and recommendations, as well as its own
exercises and lessons learned, such as the exercises to test and revise
HSIN and COP. The center director also described several new inter-
agency groups designed to improve operations that also offer a means to
monitor and evaluate results as well.
The Centers Are at Various Stages of Using Joint Agency Planning and
Reporting to Reinforce Accountability for Collaborative Efforts:
In our prior work, we determined that neither DHS nor the component
agencies responsible for managing multi-agency operations centers
consistently discussed, or included a description of, the contribution
of the centers' collaborative efforts in the components' strategic or
annual performance plans and reports. Our work has shown that federal
agencies can use these plans and reports as tools to drive
collaboration with other agencies and partners, as well as to establish
complementary, consistent, and reinforcing goals and strategies for
achieving results. Published strategic and annual performance plans and
reports make agencies answerable for collaboration, and help to ensure
that Congress has the information necessary to monitor, oversee, and
effectively make investment decisions.
In terms of using strategic and performance plans to reinforce
collaboration, the most recent DHS strategic plan, issued in 2004,
neither included a discussion of performance goals for, nor addressed
the joint operations of, the multi-agency centers. On the other hand,
the Air and Marine Operations Center's strategic plan for 2005
generally discussed the importance of strengthening collaboration with
other component agencies and included a goal to strengthen component
agency partnerships to maximize homeland security strategies.
In terms of using published reports to increase accountability for
collaboration, CBP's 2005 annual report on the operations of the
National Targeting Center did include a section dedicated to the
contributions of personnel from other DHS components. But, reports from
the other components that manage the centers did not address the roles
and contributions of supporting agencies in accomplishing the centers'
missions. Thus agencies are missing an opportunity to reinforce the
value of partner agency contributions and investments. Likewise,
reports from the DHS agencies that provide staff to these centers also
did not address their participation in their own performance reports.
DHS's Operations Directorate Has Given Priority to Fixing the Problems
that Hurricane Katrina Exposed:
According to DHS officials, the Operations Directorate and the National
Operations Center have been focused on responding to the congressional
and administration reports and corresponding recommendations generated
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. These reports pointed to a
number of failures and problems attributed to the predecessor to the
National Operations Center--the Homeland Security Operations Center--
including unclear roles and responsibilities; problems with the flow of
information in and out of the center, especially to senior leadership;
a lack of planning; problems confirming and validating information, and
clarifying conflicting information; and untimely reporting. The reports
concluded that as a result, senior leaders in the Department and the
Administration were not aware of problems with the levees and flooding
as early as they should have been. To address these problems, the after
action reports made a series of recommendations, including the:
* Creation of a national operations center to provide national
situational awareness, incident management, and a common operating
picture;
* Establishment of a permanent planning element for incident management
and a national planning and execution system; and:
* Creation of a national reporting system as well as national
information requirements and a reporting chain.
In response to these concerns, among others, DHS reported that it made
a series of changes to its operations, organization, and procedures for
sharing information in order to maintain situational awareness and
provide for incident management. The changes included giving priority
to improving coordination with external stakeholders, such as other
federal agencies, state and local entities who are the first responders
and ultimately manage recovery efforts, and its own components and
their respective operations centers. The DHS National Operations Center
staff with whom we spoke maintained that implementing these changes
could in turn create an environment where the components and centers
will be more disposed to implementing the key practices for improving
collaboration that our work has identified.
To address problems with collecting, analyzing, and timely
disseminating of critical information during an incident that Katrina
exposed, the Operations Directorate and the National Operations Center
reported establishing several initiatives within the last year or so.
Among other things, these initiatives included a new notification
system aimed at providing protocols for sharing information on a
graduated scale (from steady state to awareness, concern, and finally
urgency). The Operations Directorate and the National Operations Center
also defined a reporting structure, ranging from more real-time,
unvetted information available from and to a wide range of stakeholders
to reports intended to be more complete, vetted and validated through
designated lead agencies and higher-level summaries geared for more
senior leadership. DHS has initially developed these protocols and
processes for sharing information for hurricane response and recovery
and is expanding them to other scenarios and concerns.
One other major DHS initiative to better share information for
situational awareness and decision support that responds to key post-
Katrina recommendations also depends on HSIN. DHS has created the
Common Operating Picture (COP) within HSIN as a web-based tool designed
to be available to all HSIN users, including key federal, state, and
joint field office homeland security partners, to provide the
information needed to make critical decisions during crises. Initially,
DHS created COP templates to address hurricane disasters in time for
the 2006 hurricane season. The tool includes, among other things,
current summaries of specific situations, the location and operational
status of critical infrastructure, media reports, and streaming video
from the field that provides a real-time picture of developments,
especially at an incident site, to enhance situational awareness. DHS
also has created COP Training Teams that provide training and technical
support to DHS components, and other partners. DHS said training was
provided to 17 states on the Gulf and East coasts in 2006, the most
hurricane-prone areas of the country. However, DHS is still resolving
operational issues with COP. For example, DHS reported in January 2007
that a comprehensive backup capability for the COP was under
development but that the Department was prepared for contingencies
related to power, telecommunications and server outages. DHS also
reported that it continues to develop information requirements for use
in other scenarios, such as pandemics and incidents involving nuclear
devices, among others, as well as to further refine the system.
DHS reports that it also has provided for the creation of several new
working groups and organizational entities within the Operations
Directorate or National Operations Center aimed at improving
capabilities. The new units include:
* Senior Leadership Group. It is comprised of key DHS officials across
the major components and intended to provide a forum for the Secretary
to obtain critical advice from those with the most direct incident
management responsibilities, to communicate decisions, to facilitate
the integration and coordination of intradepartmental operational
missions, activities, and programs at the headquarters level; and to
assist in resolving intradepartmental issues. The group convenes as
necessary, such as during an actual incident or major exercise,
although the Secretary or the Director of Operations Coordination may
convene the group at any time.
* Incident Management Planning Team”consisting of 53 members drawn from
22 DHS components, 25 partner departments or agencies, and the American
Red Cross”that has begun the coordination of existing plans and the use
of resources for domestic disasters. According to DHS officials, the
team is developing plans for the most likely, and then the most
dangerous, of the National Planning Scenarios”the 15 all-hazards
planning scenarios for use in national, federal, state, and local
homeland security preparedness activities that are representative of
the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and the
related impacts that face our nation.
* Disaster Situational Awareness Teams. These teams are to be comprised
of field staff from Immigrations and Customs Enforcement since they can
be more easily deployed and are to be at a site within 24 hours to
provide situational awareness reporting and other assistance.
* Crisis Action Teams. These multi-agency teams, whose membership
overlaps in part with the new planning teams, are to provide
interagency incident management capabilities and to, among other
things, recommend courses of action, help prioritize incidents and
resources, and serve as a central point for information collection,
evaluation, and coordination, especially for complex or multiple
incidents.
Finally, DHS has completed a study of its operational capabilities and
gaps to guide its future mission and initiatives. Called the Operations
Mission Blueprint, DHS operations staff said the results are still
under review; therefore, that they could not provide us with a copy.
Part of this study includes a plan to consolidate DHS operations
centers in headquarters and its components in a facility located at the
St. Elizabeth's West Campus in Washington, D.C.[Footnote 13] The plan
cites a number of organizational benefits to colocating facilities,
including enhancing collaboration by bringing together a large number
of DHS executives and line employees currently dispersed across the
region.
While DHS provided us with background briefings, some supporting
documentation, and some after action reports on the initiatives we have
outlined, we did not evaluate the extent to which they have been
implemented and are effective at addressing the problems Katrina
identified, in part because they are so new and in some cases still
concepts. DHS officials themselves, however, identified some challenges
and next steps in implementation. These include, for example,
continuing to outreach to and better integrate DHS components as well
as other stakeholders in planning and implementation, such as state,
local, and private sector partners.
As to this latter challenge, DHS has tested several of its new
initiatives through daily use, such as COP, as well as interagency
exercises. For example, through an exercise conducted last year, the
National Operations Center identified opportunities to improve
implementation of the Common Operating Picture. DHS recently completed
two other exercises and plans additional exercises this fall and over
the next two years that can also provide helpful performance
information. We agree that the use of exercises, and more importantly
the after-action and lessons learned analyses and recommendations to
fix identified problems, are good methods to help determine how well
initiatives are working, especially when testing under live, real-time
circumstances is not possible.
Complementing this with more systematic performance measures and ways
to obtain feedback from key users and stakeholders on how well the
initiatives meet their needs would also be helpful. For example, the
program manager for the Homeland Security Information Network is
planning to implement operational measures, such as the timeliness of
information reporting and of responding to requests for information, as
well as to obtain stakeholder feedback through its new Advisory Group
when constituted. The deputy director of the Operations Center also
hopes to be able to establish metrics in the future, such as using
similar measures for the COP, and establishing a users group for
feedback. Following through on implementation of these types of
measures and feedback loops is particularly important for state and
local stakeholders, as Katrina demonstrated, since they are the first
responders and key to effective incident response planning and
implementation.
Concluding Observations:
Our prior work demonstrated that the three component multi-agency
operations centers we reviewed each have a critical mission to meet for
their own agencies, as well as a common mission to support the National
Operations Center, the key hub for sharing information on nationwide
situational awareness and for coordinating federal support during major
disasters. Centers rely on staff from multiple agencies to achieve
their missions, so it is important that the centers can collaborate
effectively among the agencies within a center. Our work provides a
blueprint of key practices the centers could use to achieve this
collaboration, and also demonstrates that they have opportunities to
implement these practices more extensively. The payoff can include
assurance that all staff clearly understands roles and
responsibilities, especially during a crisis, and that centers have a
common goal for achieving their joint missions, the right staff from
across agencies to do so, and ways to evaluate results achieved and
implement needed corrective actions. In turn, this can better position
DHS, and the nation, to prevent, mitigate and respond to a critical
event, help the Congress to fulfill its oversight and homeland security
responsibilities, and help the department better integrate into a
cohesive unit. While we understand that the Directorate does not
control component centers and is reluctant to issue guidance to them on
ways to implement these best practices as we recommended, we continue
to think that the Directorate can reinforce these practices through
such guidance and example, not only as it works with external
stakeholders, but also with its internal component centers. We believe
the Directorate could be more proactive to accelerate implementation so
that centers achieve anticipated benefits sooner given current
priorities and available resources.
We also understand that the department set its priorities to first
focus on fixing the problems Katrina exposed, as the Congress and
Administration tasked, and recognize that such oversight has, and will
continue to be, a key driver in effecting change to improve situational
awareness and incident management capabilities at DHS. We also believe
that the initiatives DHS is implementing in response appear to be the
proper steps moving forward, given that they focus on better planning
for disaster response and better information sharing, as well as
include the necessary key players. However, while these initiatives are
aimed at putting the right players, processes, protocols, and practices
in place, both we and the department recognize that implementation is
early, measures of effectiveness must still be put in place, and
challenges must be overcome.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that
you or any members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
For information about this testimony, please contact Eileen Larence,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777, or
larencee@gao.gov. Other individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Christopher Keisling, Nancy Briggs, Katherine Davis
and Tony DeFrank.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2003); High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2007).
[2] Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Report of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, United State
Senate. (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
[3] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2005).
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies, GAO-07-89 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2006).
[5] For the purpose of our report, we used the term "watchstander" to
refer to an individual required to work full-time on a rotating 24-hour
schedule, 7 days per week, to maintain situational awareness, conduct
information assessment and threat monitoring to deter, detect, and
prevent terrorist incidents. A watchstander may also act as a liaison
between his agency and other agency representatives at the center, and
may manage response to critical threats and incidents.
[6] The HSIN is an unclassified, Web-based system that provides a
secure, collaborative environment for real-time information sharing
that includes reporting, graphics, and chat capabilities, as well as a
document library that contains reports from multiple federal, state,
local, and private-sector sources. HSIN supplies suspicious incident
and pre-incident information, mapping and imagery tools, 24x7
situational awareness, and analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and
weapons.
[7] Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. February 2006.
[8] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office
of Inspections and Special Reviews, An Assessment of the Proposal to
Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2005).
[9] GAO. High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2007).
[10] GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to
Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State
and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455 (Washington,
D.C.: April 2007).
[11] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Office of Information Technology, HSIN Could Support Information
Sharing More Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[12] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
Office of Information Technology, Homeland Security Information Network
Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, OIG-06-38, June
2006.
[13] Department of Homeland Security, National Capital Region Housing
Master Plan: Building a Unified Department, Washington D.C., October
2006.
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