Aviation Security
Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened Gao ID: GAO-07-891R July 31, 2007Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns continue to be raised about the nation's system for protecting commercial aviation. Past disclosures of terrorists' plans for smuggling liquids onboard aircraft to construct a bomb in flight highlighted the continued need to examine this key aspect of homeland security. One layer of the aviation security system involves the ability of the federal government to respond to actual or potential security threats while a commercial aircraft is in flight. These security threats can include the following: (1) Passengers considered to be security risks to aviation are found to be onboard flights bound for or leaving the United States. (2) Situations develop while the aircraft is in flight--for example, a passenger becomes disruptive or acts suspiciously, a bomb threat is received, or an unidentified package is found onboard the aircraft. (3) A commercial aircraft transmits a signal designed to alert authorities that a hijacking is in process. Procedures for addressing these in-flight security threats involve a wide range of federal agencies and entities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for taking much of the lead in responding to these incidents, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established to ensure the security of all modes of transportation--including aviation. Responding to an in-flight threat, however, involves many agencies beyond DHS and TSA. Depending on the nature of the threat, managing and responding to in-flight threats can involve extensive coordination among more than 15 federal agencies and agency components, each with its own set of responsibilities that may influence the threat response. For example, another DHS component, Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC), is responsible for comparing names and other identifying information of passengers onboard commercial aircraft flying to or from the United States with terrorist watch lists of persons considered to be potential security risks. If a passenger is determined to match an identity listed on a terrorist watch list, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a Department of Justice (DOJ) agency, is often involved in conducting a risk assessment of the threat posed by that passenger while the flight is en route. Further, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) becomes involved with in-flight threats as it monitors aircraft traffic entering into and operating within U.S. airspace to ensure safe operations, while the Department of Defense's (DOD) North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--a bi-national command established by agreement between the governments of the United States and Canada--becomes involved with the situation as it ensures the air sovereignty and air defense of U.S. airspace. Since these security incidents involve aircraft that are already in flight, timely and effective coordination among these agencies and components is paramount. Congress asked that we examine in-flight security threats and current federal efforts to respond collaboratively to them. In response, on February 28, 2007, we issued a classified report addressing the following questions: (1) What were the number and types of in-flight security incidents that occurred onboard commercial aircraft during 2005 that were reported to TSA, and to what extent did these threats result in aircraft being diverted? (2) What is the process that federal agencies follow to identify, assess, and respond to in-flight security threats? (3) To what extent did interagency coordination problems occur during 2005, if at all, and what steps did the involved agencies take to address any identified problems?
Aviation security consists of multiple layers. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, created TSA as the agency responsible for securing all modes of transportation, including aviation.4 Since then, TSA has worked with other stakeholders to develop a layered approach to ensure the security of commercial aviation, involving multiple diverse and coordinated measures. These measures include enhancing passenger and checked baggage screening, offering security training for flight and cabin crews to handle potential threats onboard aircraft, expanding the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) to place more federal air marshals on domestic and international commercial flights, and training pilots on commercial passenger and cargo aircraft on how to use lethal force against an intruder on the flight deck through the Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) Program. Many agencies are involved in resolving in-flight security threats. this effort requires a significant degree of interagency collaboration and coordination because it involves many different aspects of homeland security, aviation operations, and law enforcement--everything from examining thousands of passenger lists for inbound and outbound international flights to ensure that suspected terrorists are not boarding aircraft, to diverting flights to alternative airports--and, if needed, mobilizing military fighter jets to intercept threatening aircraft. Four main departments are involved in this interagency effort: Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation, and Defense. Additionally, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a component of the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence, may also be involved. Agencies use interagency communication tools to coordinate during in-flight security threats. Relatively few in-flight incidents were reported during 2005, with a small percentage resulting in aircraft diversions. Process for resolving in-flight security threats requires extensive agency coordination and typically involves four main stages. The four process stages are (1) identifying the threat and notifying affected agencies; (2) sharing pertinent information and collaboratively assessing the severity of the threat; (3) deciding on and carrying out the appropriate in-flight response, such as initiating a diversion; and (4) if necessary, completing the law enforcement response when the flight has landed. Agencies experienced relatively few coordination problems in resolving in-flight security threats and took steps to address them, but opportunities exist to further strengthen coordination.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-891R, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened
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July 31, 2007:
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Republican Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: House of
Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thomas E. Petri:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-
flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened:
Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns
continue to be raised about the nation's system for protecting
commercial aviation. Past disclosures of terrorists' plans for
smuggling liquids onboard aircraft to construct a bomb in flight
highlighted the continued need to examine this key aspect of homeland
security. One layer of the aviation security system involves the
ability of the federal government to respond to actual or potential
security threats while a commercial aircraft is in flight. These
security threats can include the following:
* Passengers considered to be security risks to aviation are found to
be onboard flights bound for or leaving the United States.
* Situations develop while the aircraft is in flight--for example, a
passenger becomes disruptive or acts suspiciously, a bomb threat is
received, or an unidentified package is found onboard the aircraft.
* A commercial aircraft transmits a signal designed to alert
authorities that a hijacking is in process.[Footnote 1]
Procedures for addressing these in-flight security threats involve a
wide range of federal agencies and entities. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is responsible for taking much of the lead in responding
to these incidents, and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) was established to ensure the security of all modes of
transportation--including aviation.[Footnote 2] Responding to an in-
flight threat, however, involves many agencies beyond DHS and TSA.
Depending on the nature of the threat, managing and responding to in-
flight threats can involve extensive coordination among more than 15
federal agencies and agency components, each with its own set of
responsibilities that may influence the threat response. For example,
another DHS component, Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) National
Targeting Center (NTC), is responsible for comparing names and other
identifying information of passengers onboard commercial aircraft
flying to or from the United States with terrorist watch lists of
persons considered to be potential security risks. If a passenger is
determined to match an identity listed on a terrorist watch list, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a Department of Justice (DOJ)
agency, is often involved in conducting a risk assessment of the threat
posed by that passenger while the flight is en route. Further, the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) becomes involved with in-flight threats as it monitors aircraft
traffic entering into and operating within U.S. airspace to ensure safe
operations, while the Department of Defense's (DOD) North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--a bi-national command established by
agreement between the governments of the United States and Canada--
becomes involved with the situation as it ensures the air sovereignty
and air defense of U.S. airspace. Since these security incidents
involve aircraft that are already in flight, timely and effective
coordination among these agencies and components is paramount.
You asked that we examine in-flight security threats and current
federal efforts to respond collaboratively to them. In response, on
February 28, 2007, we issued a classified report addressing the
following questions: (1) What were the number and types of in-flight
security incidents that occurred onboard commercial aircraft during
2005 that were reported to TSA, and to what extent did these threats
result in aircraft being diverted? (2) What is the process that federal
agencies follow to identify, assess, and respond to in-flight security
threats? (3) To what extent did interagency coordination problems occur
during 2005, if at all, and what steps did the involved agencies take
to address any identified problems?
As our February 2007 report contained information that was deemed to be
either classified, sensitive security information, or law enforcement
sensitive, this version of the report is intended to generally
summarize our overall findings and recommendations while omitting
sensitive information about the in-flight security threat resolution
process, including specific agency roles and responsibilities and
coordination challenges that have occurred and steps agencies have
taken to address them. Our classified February 2007 report also
summarized the events associated with security-related aircraft
diversions that occurred in 2005, but those summaries included
classified or sensitive information and therefore could not be included
in this report. As our intent in preparing this report is to convey, in
a publicly available format, the non-classified, non-sensitive results
of the classified February 2007 report, we did not attempt to update
the information here to reflect changes that may have occurred since
the publication of the February 2007 report.
Although the information provided in this report is much more limited
in scope, the overall methodology used for our initial report is
relevant to this version of the report as well because the information
contained here was derived from the initial classified report. To
address the objectives of our initial report, we analyzed security
incident reports from TSA dated January 1, 2005, through December 31,
2005. Because TSA is the primary agency responsible for aviation
security and maintains records of aviation security incidents, the TSA
incident reports were our primary source of security threat
information. These TSA incident reports contain descriptions of in-
flight threat incidents that were reported to TSA and include
information on the threat type and whether or not the aircraft was
diverted. To understand the in-flight security threat resolution
process, the extent to which interagency coordination problems
occurred, and the steps agencies have taken to strengthen interagency
coordination, we met with representatives from key offices within DHS,
DOT, DOD, and DOJ who have responsibility for in-flight security threat
resolution.[Footnote 3] We also analyzed documentation--including
agency aviation security incident reports--from these agencies to
supplement information obtained from TSA security incident reports. In
addition, we met with representatives of two domestic and five foreign
air carriers--including some air carriers that have been involved in
aircraft diversions--to discuss air carrier and government
responsibilities pertaining to in-flight security threats. We also
interviewed officials from three domestic and two international air
carrier associations that represent the interests of air carriers and
travelers to obtain their views on air carrier and government
responsibilities pertaining to in-flight security threats. We conducted
our work from April 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results:
Aviation Security Consists of Multiple Layers:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,
created TSA as the agency responsible for securing all modes of
transportation, including aviation.[Footnote 4] Since then, TSA has
worked with other stakeholders to develop a layered approach to ensure
the security of commercial aviation, involving multiple diverse and
coordinated measures. These measures include enhancing passenger and
checked baggage screening, offering security training for flight and
cabin crews to handle potential threats onboard aircraft, expanding the
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) to place more federal air marshals
on domestic and international commercial flights, and training pilots
on commercial passenger and cargo aircraft on how to use lethal force
against an intruder on the flight deck through the Federal Flight Deck
Officers (FFDO) Program.[Footnote 5]
Many Agencies Are Involved in Resolving In-flight Security Threats:
Consistent with its role as the lead federal agency responsible for
aviation security, TSA established the Transportation Security
Operations Center (TSOC), TSA's operational center for managing all
types of transportation security incidents. To assist TSOC in
performing its duties, in November 2004, TSA issued a security
directive requiring all commercial air carriers flying to, from, or
within the United States to report all in-flight security threats to
TSOC so it can coordinate the federal response.[Footnote 6] The
security directive contains the criteria for which types of threats air
carriers should report to TSOC, but according to TSA officials, the
guidelines were purposefully left vague because TSA preferred that air
carriers report too many incidents rather than too few. For example,
the security directive states that air carriers should report all
incidents and suspicious activity that could affect the security of
U.S. civil aviation. Prior to the issuance of this security directive,
air carriers were not required to report potential in-flight security
threats to TSA. As a result, TSA and other federal agencies did not
always have the information they needed to appropriately respond to
security incidents.
Although TSA was created and vested with authority to secure the
nation's aviation system, this effort requires a significant degree of
interagency collaboration and coordination because it involves many
different aspects of homeland security, aviation operations, and law
enforcement--everything from examining thousands of passenger lists for
inbound and outbound international flights to ensure that suspected
terrorists are not boarding aircraft, to diverting flights to
alternative airports--and, if needed, mobilizing military fighter jets
to intercept threatening aircraft. Four main departments are involved
in this interagency effort: Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation,
and Defense. Additionally, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
a component of the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
may also be involved. The nature and extent of each agency's
involvement depends on the type and nature of the threat. The specific
roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in the resolution of
in-flight security threats is considered law enforcement sensitive and
thus could not be included in this report.
Agencies Use Interagency Communication Tools to Coordinate during In-
flight Security Threats:
One communications tool that agencies use to gather and disseminate
information for all types of in-flight security threats is the Domestic
Events Network, an around-the-clock unclassified teleconference with
controlled access administered by FAA and monitored by approximately 60
users from a variety of federal agencies as well as state and local
entities.[Footnote 7] This network was originally established as a
conference call on the morning of September 11, 2001, to coordinate the
federal response to the hijacked aircraft and has remained in existence
since then as an open telecommunication line that serves as a basis for
interagency communication. Any Domestic Events Network user can
broadcast information, allowing other agencies on the network to
communicate and monitor a situation in real time. Another important
interagency communications tool is the Defense Red Switch Network,
which is a secure, classified network administered by DOD. However,
some officials involved in the interagency resolution of in-flight
security threats may not have the appropriate clearances to participate
in the Defense Red Switch Network discussions. As a result, decisions
reached via discussions over the Defense Red Switch Network are
typically broadcast over the unclassified Domestic Events Network so
officials without access to the classified network can stay informed.
Relatively Few In-flight Incidents Were Reported during 2005, with a
Small Percentage Resulting in Aircraft Diversions:
Federal agencies and air carriers reported relatively few in-flight
security threat incidents to TSA during calendar year 2005 as compared
with the number of flights that occurred.[Footnote 8] In-flight
security threats include a wide range of incidents, but all are
considered to threaten the security and safety of an aircraft and occur
between the times the aircraft departs and lands. Approximately two-
thirds of these reported incidents involved disruptive passengers such
as passengers who were intoxicated, unruly, or trying to smoke in a
lavatory. The remaining one-third of reported incidents included, for
example, situations in which passengers that the U.S. government had
previously identified as representing a security risk were identified
onboard international flights traveling to or from the United
States,[Footnote 9] suspicious passenger behavior, or an aircraft
accidentally transmitting a signal that a hijack was in process. In
calendar year 2005, a relatively small percentage of all reported in-
flight security threats were deemed serious enough to initiate the
diversion of the aircraft from its original destination.[Footnote 10]
Process for Resolving In-flight Security Threats Requires Extensive
Agency Coordination and Typically Involves Four Main Stages:
The process that federal agencies follow to identify, assess, and
respond to in-flight security threats generally involves multiple
federal agencies and other entities (such as air carriers), each having
specific roles and responsibilities that vary according to the facts
and circumstances of the threat. TSA is responsible for coordinating
the overall interagency process for resolving in-flight security
threats but does not control the actions of other agencies; rather,
each agency has its own mission, responsibilities, and procedures. For
example, NORAD uses its own procedures for deciding how to respond to
an in-flight security threat (such as launching military jets to
intercept a flight). The coordination process that agencies use to
resolve reported threats has never been systematically or
comprehensively documented. Using interviews and agency documents, we
developed a four-stage framework for describing the typical interagency
process for resolving in-flight security threats. The four process
stages are (1) identifying the threat and notifying affected agencies;
(2) sharing pertinent information and collaboratively assessing the
severity of the threat; (3) deciding on and carrying out the
appropriate in-flight response, such as initiating a diversion; and (4)
if necessary, completing the law enforcement response when the flight
has landed.
Federal agencies have options for responding to an in-flight security
threat incident such as (1) ordering the aircraft to divert by either
denying it access to U.S. airspace or requiring it to land at a U.S.
airport that is different from its intended destination,[Footnote 11]
and (2) launching military fighter jets to monitor or intercept the
aircraft. In general, TSA is the federal agency responsible for
deciding if an aircraft should be diverted because of an in-flight
security threat, and FAA is responsible for managing the operational
aspects of the diversion.[Footnote 12] The specific process agencies
typically follow to make these determinations is considered sensitive
security information and therefore could not be included in this
report, but in general, TSA, the pilot in command,[Footnote 13] or FAA
may initiate a diversion if it is considered the most appropriate
response to the security threat, based on the unique facts and
circumstances of each incident and the judgment of the individuals
involved.
Agencies Experienced Relatively Few Coordination Problems in Resolving
In-flight Security Threats and Took Steps to Address Them, but
Opportunities Exist to Further Strengthen Coordination:
Agencies have taken steps to enhance the interagency coordination
process for resolving in-flight security threats. Although we
identified a few coordination problems during 2005, none resulted in
serious consequences such as a hijacking. Problems included
misunderstandings of other agencies' roles and responsibilities and
untimely information sharing--due in part to a lack of clear policies
and procedures. Agencies took some steps to address identified problems
and proactively worked to strengthen coordination. Nevertheless, we
identified three concerns with the current process for resolving in-
flight security threats:
* Agencies lack a comprehensive document describing each agency's roles
and responsibilities for responding to in-flight security threats and
the information to be shared among agencies. Without such a document,
interagency communication and information sharing can be hindered,
potentially leading to confusion and a slower response. Since the
response to in-flight security threats is inherently an interagency
effort, having established policies and procedures to guide this
information exchange and resulting actions is important. Agency
officials involved in the resolution of in-flight threats generally
agreed that a concept of operations plan or similar document would help
strengthen the interagency threat resolution process.
* Procedures guiding the interagency coordination process are not
uniformly established or shared. Some agencies lack established
procedures, and some do not routinely share them, even though agencies
agreed this could improve interagency coordination. In previous work,
we found that a lack of clearly established policies and procedures for
sharing information among agencies can hinder interagency coordination
efforts.[Footnote 14] Two key federal entities involved in the
interagency resolution of in-flight security threats--FAA and TSOC,
TSA's operational center for managing all types of transportation
security incidents--have not finalized internal standard operating
procedures outlining roles, responsibilities, and interactions with
partner agencies. Agency officials from FAA and TSOC stated that their
procedures would be finalized, but did not specify a date for when this
would occur. In addition, agencies have also not routinely shared their
procedures with other agencies that they regularly coordinate with to
resolve in-flight threats, even though doing so could improve
interagency coordination. For example, as of October 2006, FAA had not
received standard operating procedures or other detailed procedural
documentation from NORAD or TSOC. According to agency officials,
sharing these procedures could help ensure that each agency establishes
compatible policies and procedures to enhance the safety of in-flight
security threat resolution and strengthen overall interagency
coordination.
* Some agencies have not documented and applied lessons learned from
interagency exercises. FAA and TSA conduct interagency exercises to
enhance coordination for responding to in-flight threat scenarios, but
no mechanism exists for documenting the exercise results. As a result,
officials did not systematically document or distribute the results of
the exercises or identify any follow-up action items. TSA officials
stated that they believed it was clear during the exercises who was
responsible for follow-up activities, if any were needed. However, by
not systematically producing after-action reports, agencies are
unlikely to realize all of the benefits that participating in
interagency exercises can provide. We have found that after-action
reports provide accountability and wider dissemination of information
because they identify problems or issues and can be used to track the
progress of corrective action.[Footnote 15]
Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive Action:
As the post-September 11 interagency threat resolution process matures,
it is important for agencies to develop mechanisms and procedures that
enable effective and efficient coordination. Such steps are necessary,
for example, to ensure that even when key individuals are absent,
others will know how to respond. To strengthen the interagency
coordination process for resolving in-flight security threats, we
recommended in our February 2007 report that the Secretaries of
Homeland Security, Transportation, and Defense, and the Attorney
General, take the following two actions:
* develop a concept of operations plan or similar interagency document
that outlines the general interagency coordination strategy and clearly
delineates lines of communication among all agencies and entities
involved in resolving in-flight security threats and:
* ensure that each agency involved in the resolution of in-flight
security threats has documented internal standard operating procedures
that clearly identify agency procedures for resolving in-flight
security incidents, and establish mechanisms for sharing these standard
operating procedures with other agencies as appropriate.
We also recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
Transportation direct the Administrators of TSA and FAA, respectively,
to enhance the effectiveness of interagency exercises involving in-
flight security threats by fully documenting and disseminating the
results to all participants and ensuring that any follow-up action
items are addressed as appropriate.
DHS and DOD agreed with the recommendations.[Footnote 16] DOT and DOJ
did not comment on them.
We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security; the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation; the Secretary of the Department of Defense; the
Attorney General; and interested congressional committees. We will also
make this report available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3404 or
berrickc@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this report were Dawn Hoff,
Assistant Director; Lisa Canini; Rudy Chatlos; Adam Hoffman; David
Hooper; James Madar; Denise McCabe; Leslie Sarapu; Kathryn Smith; and
Stan Stenersen.
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
FOOTNOTES
[1] Aircraft that violate restricted airspace may also pose a security
threat. We previously reported on the interagency operations to manage
aircraft incursions into restricted airspace. For more information, see
GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of
Restricted Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed, GAO-05-
928T (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).
[2] TSA was originally created as an agency within the Department of
Transportation (DOT). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, signed into law on November 25, 2002,
transferred TSA from DOT to DHS.
[3] Specifically, within DHS we met with representatives and analyzed
documents from TSA, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, the
Office of Intelligence, and the Transportation Security Operations
Center; Customs and Border Protections' National Targeting Center; and
the Homeland Security Operations Center. Within DOT, we met with
representatives and analyzed documents from FAA and the National
Capital Region Coordination Center. Within DOJ, we met with
representatives and analyzed documents from FBI, including the
Terrorist Screening Operations Unit and the Terrorist Screening Center.
Within DOD, we met with representatives and analyzed documents from
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. We also met with representatives from
the National Counterterrorism Center.
[4] Pub. L. No. 107-71 (2001).
[5] Administered by TSA, the FFDO Program deputizes volunteer pilots of
commercial passenger aircraft as armed federal law enforcement officers
for the purpose of defending the flight deck, "against acts of criminal
violence or air piracy." Since the program was officially established
on February 25, 2003, TSA has deputized thousands of eligible flight
crew members as FFDOs.
[6] Security Directive 1522-04-15, "Incidents and Suspicious Activity
Reporting," became effective on December 8, 2004, and applies to all
air carriers that are required to adopt and carry out a security
program regulated under CFR Part 1544, and that operate flights to,
from, or within the United States. A security directive is used by an
agency to notify aircraft and airport operators or field staff of a
specific security concern where additional security measures are
necessary to respond to a threat assessment or a specific threat
against the United States. The security directive will require the
entity that receives it to carry out certain measures. If these certain
measures cannot be carried out, the entity that receives the security
directive must have alternative measures approved.
[7] Events broadcast over the Domestic Events Network may include
incidents that occur in an airport terminal as well as situations that
arise onboard an aircraft.
[8] The specific number of in-flight security threats is considered law
enforcement sensitive and therefore could not be included in this
report.
[9] The specific number of passengers previously identified as
representing a security risk, as well as the process that is used to
identify these passengers, is considered law enforcement sensitive and
therefore could not be included in this report.
[10] The specific number of aircraft diversions that occurred in 2005
and a detailed discussion of each diversion are considered law
enforcement sensitive and therefore could not be included in this
report. For purposes of this review, the phrase "initiate a diversion"
refers to the security decision that an aircraft should be diverted
because of an in-flight security threat. We are not referring to the
operational implementation of the diversion, such as directing the
aircraft to a specific location.
[11] For purposes of this report, we are defining an aircraft diversion
as the redirecting of a commercial aircraft to a location other than
its intended destination because of an in-flight security threat
involving that specific aircraft. We are not including flight
cancellations, aircraft that are required to change their flight path
but land at their intended destination, or ground-based security
incidents, such as airport closure, that result in an aircraft being
redirected to an alternative airport.
[12] Once diversion is initiated, FAA and its air traffic controllers
are responsible for any operational aspect of the diversion within U.S.
airspace. For example, FAA is responsible for providing information and
assistance to both TSA and the pilot to ensure that an aircraft is
diverted safely.
[13] The pilot in command is the pilot responsible for the operation
and safety of an aircraft during flight.
[14] See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[15] With regard to monitoring and evaluation efforts, we reported in
January 2005 that the U.S. Coast Guard units we studied we limited in
their ability to benefit from port security exercises because after-
action reports did not accurately capture all exercise results and
lessons learned. GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons
Learned From Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2006).
[16] Agency comments on the recommendations are considered sensitive
security information and therefore could not be included in this report.
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To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
