Homeland Security
Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation Gao ID: GAO-07-1142T July 31, 2007The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulated major changes to FEMA that were intended to enhance its preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be ready for the 2007 hurricane season. The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.
GAO-07-1142T, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
July 31, 2007:
HOMELAND SECURITY:
Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to
Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations
and Legislation:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1142T, a testimony before the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing
for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions
of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act
stipulated major changes to FEMA that were intended to enhance its
preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters.
As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including
clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing
accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting
against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's
findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address
them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for
continued congressional attention
What GAO Found:
Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what
needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how
well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed
that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities,
development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability
systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and
effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and
responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must
be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood.
Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major
disaster are needed”particularly in the areas of (1) situational
assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3)
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care
and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps
to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and
some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a
catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the
targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system,
are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile
communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be
ready for the 2007 hurricane season.
The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform
and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to
prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic
events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an
organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the
reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving
forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the
post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term,
Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate
oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including
preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an
influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the
use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining
regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the
status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices
regarding oversight assistance.
What GAO Recommends:
This testimony includes no new recommendations, but identifies issues
to which Congress, FEMA, and DHS may wish to give continued attention
so that FEMA may fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina Reform
Act. These issues are based on the findings and recommendations of more
than 30 Katrina-related GAO reports.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T.]
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William Jenkins, Jr. at
(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
GAO-07-1142T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA), an agency within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and its efforts to address the
shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and
enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including
hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season has started and its peak period
will begin in a few weeks.
Almost two years ago, Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster
management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed
weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding, to and
recovering from any catastrophic disaster. The goal of disaster
preparedness and response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and
can be stated as follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set
the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre-and
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS's high-
risk status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS
must overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems
to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud,
and abuse.[Footnote 1] These issues are enormously complex and
challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view
preparedness for and response to major disasters as a national system
with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is because
effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the
coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first
responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well
as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put aside and
cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event. The
experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to
tackle these difficult issues.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership,
response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made
by DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform
Act[Footnote 2] and other recommendations made in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster management
issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are
based on our body of work on disaster and emergency management
including more than 30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
our review of recent emergency management reform legislative changes,
and materials and statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles
and responsibilities; (2) development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue
that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and
responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who has the
authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response
and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was
to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Since the 2006 hurricane season, DHS has designated a FCO for each
region that includes states at risks of hurricanes and a supporting FCO
for each of these states. It has also designated a PFO for each of
three regions--the Gulf Coast, the Northeast Region, and the Mid-
Atlantic Region--plus a separate PFO for the state of Florida and
Texas. However, this year's designations of PFOs, deputy PFOs have
generated some questions in Congress as to the clarity of the lines of
authority between these designated officials and DHS leadership such as
the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of DHS. In a July letter to
the nation's governors, designating PFOs and FCOs, the Secretary of
Homeland Security directed states to contact the head of the Office of
Risk Management and Analysis at the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) with questions related to these designated
officials. The reasons for this were not stated in the letter, and the
Risk Management and Analysis Directorate of the NPPD has no designated
role in the current National Response Plan, which outlines the
principal roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in a major
disaster. In a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security
expressed concern about the role of the NPPD, noting that under the
Post-Katrina Reform Act, the FEMA Administrator is designated to "lead
the Nation's effort to prepare for, protect against, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate against the risks of natural disasters, acts
of terrorism and other man-made disasters including catastrophic
incidents." [Footnote 3]
It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and
responsibilities of FEMA and these designated FCOs and PFOs be clear
and clearly understood by all. There is still some question among state
and local first responders about the need for both positions and how
they will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of
naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity to
meet and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state,
local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster,
possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and
communication in an actual disaster.
Developing the ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
major and catastrophic disasters requires an overall national
preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs
to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities); how it
should be done; and how well it should be done--that is, according to
what standards. The principal national documents designed to address
each of these are, respectively, the National Response Plan (NRP), the
National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National
Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP NIMS and the NPG are undergoing
extensive review and revision by DHS with the input of federal, state,
and local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental
and private sector officials, according to DHS. This effort is intended
to assess the effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these
documents, identify modifications and improvements, and reissue the
documents. The results of the review for the NRP, for example, were
initially scheduled for release in June 2007. However, in April 2007,
DHS officials notified stakeholders that some important issues were
more complex and require national-level policy decisions, and stated
that additional time was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS
noted that the underlying operational principles of the current NRP, as
revised in May 2006, remain intact and still apply. Were the latest
revision of the NRP to be released in the next few weeks, it is
unlikely that any changes from these revisions could be effectively
implemented for the 2007 hurricane season, which is now two months old.
FEMA officials have told us that the final version of the NPG and its
corresponding documents are currently receiving final reviews by the
White House and will be out shortly.
In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation's experience with
hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the
adequacy of the nation's disaster response capabilities in the context
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that
needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and
coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which the
capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and
subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and
local stakeholders. In various meetings with GAO, in congressional
testimonies, and in some documents, FEMA has described a number of
initiatives to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas.
However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to
evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives
appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the
conditions and demand they would face following a major or catastrophic
disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of these
initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster,
such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane.[Footnote 4] The National Guard has
traditionally been an important component of response to major
disasters. States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel
and equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are
frequently deployed to disaster areas, including those outside their
home states. However, the types and quantities of equipment the
National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been
fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that
would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and
integrated their plans[Footnote 5].
With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability,
FEMA has stated it has upgraded its victim recovery systems. For
example, FEMA states that it can register up to 200,000 applicants per
day for individual assistance while including safeguards for preventing
fraudulent and duplicate applications. The inability to reliably and
efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major
problem following Katrina that resulted in hundreds of millions of
dollars in improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its
debris removal and contracting policies and to increase the use of
advanced contracting for goods and services. Again, we have no basis to
determine the effectiveness of these systems as they have yet to be
tested on a large scale basis.
Entering the 2007 hurricane season, FEMA was and is an organization in
transition working to implement the reorganization mandated by the Post-
Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to implement a
comprehensive, risk-based national emergency management system as
required by the act. In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to
the congressional leadership suggesting that one area needing
fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, and
rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that Congress
might consider for oversight are:
* the development and implementation of the National Preparedness
System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist
incidents, and an influenza pandemic;
* the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal
grants in building and sustaining those capabilities;
* regional and multistate planning and preparedness;
* the status and use of preparedness exercises; and:
* DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve
the nation's preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic
disasters.
Background:
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford
Act)[Footnote 6] primarily establishes the programs and processes for
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources,
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC), an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.[Footnote 7] We issued a report this week examining how the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used in disasters and
how its effectiveness could be enhanced.[Footnote 8] As the committee
is aware, a number of specific recommendations have been made to
improve the nation's ability to effectively prepare for and respond to
catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina,[Footnote 9] the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee,[Footnote 10] the White House Homeland Security
Council,[Footnote 11] the DHS Inspector General,[Footnote 12] and DHS
and FEMA[Footnote 13] all identified a variety of failures and some
strengths in the preparations for, response to, and initial recovery
from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these reviews, a report from the
American National Standards Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel
(ANSI-HSSP) contains recommendations aimed at bolstering national
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts in the event of a natural
disaster. A key resource identified in the document is the American
National Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed by the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines a
common set of criteria for preparedness, disaster management, emergency
management, and business continuity programs.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements
of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts,
particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response
capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately
overwhelmed.[Footnote 14] Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly
defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3)
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we recommended that
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
We also recommended that DHS:
1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of
the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified
coordination problems;
2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic
Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational
implementation plans;
3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a
jurisdictional and regional basis;
4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to
meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National
Preparedness Goal; and:
5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest
finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act [Footnote 15] responded to the findings and
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the
act enhanced FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA
is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports
directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within
DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or
significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of
FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent
legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHS's
Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute
establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The
statute also establishes a National Integration Center responsible for
the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-
Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other areas, such as
evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals
with disabilities. In addition, the act includes several provisions to
strengthen the management and capability of FEMA's workforce. For
example, the statute called for a strategic human capital plan to shape
and improve FEMA's workforce, authorized recruitment and retention
bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the
organizational changes became effective as of March 31, 2007. Others,
such as the increase in organizational autonomy for FEMA and
establishment of the National Integration Center, became effective upon
enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4, 2006.
FEMA Is Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements
Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act:
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS
as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act,
whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested
disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS,
the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's internal
structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and
integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities
within FEMA.
The effective implementation of recent recommendations and the Post-
Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes and related roles and
responsibilities should address many of our emergency management
observations and recommendations.[Footnote 16] In addition, we
previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, particularly for
catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and
local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our September
2006:
analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood
leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the
necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse[Footnote 17].
Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from
Catastrophic Disasters:
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and
effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve
leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a
catastrophic disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the
capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall
national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define
what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities),
how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is,
according to what standards. The principal national documents designed
to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG.
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by DHS
with input from state and local government officials, tribal
authorities, non-governmental and private sector officials.[Footnote
18] For example, the review of the NRP is intended to assess the
effectiveness of the NRP, identify modifications and improvements and
reissue the document. This review includes all major components of the
NRP including the base plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes
such as the Catastrophic Incident Annex and its Supplement; the role of
the PFO and FCO, and the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the
current NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational
structure of Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing,
and Human Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this
emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting
agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. According to a
February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place
until the NRP review process is complete and all changes are approved.
The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June
2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that
some important issues were more complex and required national-level
policy decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a
comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational
principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as
revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that
the final version of the National Preparedness Goal and its
corresponding documents like the Target Capabilities List, are
currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are expected
to be out shortly.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. This is an issue that
continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and
responsibilities of the FCO, who has the authority to make mission
assignments to federal agencies for response and recovery under the
Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose role was to provide situational
awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The May 2006 revisions
to the NRP made changes designed to address this issue. However, the
changes may not have fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the
roles of the PFO and the FCO. While the Secretary of Homeland Security
may avoid conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both
positions in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the
Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do
so. Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist
incidents, and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a
rationale for this limitation.
For 2006, FEMA pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf
Coast and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This included
FCOs and PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region,[Footnote 19] Northeast
Region,[Footnote 20] and the Mid-Atlantic Region,[Footnote 21] and
separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas.
However, this year's designations of PFOs, deputy PFOs, and FCOs have
generated some questions in Congress as to the clarity of the lines of
authority between these designated officials and DHS leadership such as
the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of DHS. In a July letter to
the nation's governors, designating PFOs and FCOs, the Secretary of
Homeland Security directed states to contact the head of the Office of
Risk Management and Analysis at the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) with questions related to these designated
officials. The reasons for this were not stated in the letter, and the
Risk Management and Analysis Directorate of the NPPD has no designated
role in the current National Response Plan, which outlines the
principal roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in a major
disaster. In a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security
expressed concern about the role of the NPPD, noting that under the
Post-Katrina Reform Act, the FEMA Administrator is designated to "lead
the Nation's effort to prepare for, protect against, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate against the risks of natural disasters, acts
of terrorism and other man-made disasters including catastrophic
incidents."[Footnote 22]
It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and
responsibilities of FEMA and the designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and
clearly understood by all. There is still some question among state and
local first responders about the need for both positions and how they
will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of
naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity to
meet and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state,
local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster,
possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and
communication in an actual disaster.
Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond
to Major Disasters:
Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White
House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and
capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and
nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number
of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the
ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and
catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort
that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and
where, how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is,
according to what standards. As previously discussed, the principal
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.
Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of
people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed
capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination
in conjunction with training and exercises in which the capabilities
are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently
addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local
stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day
operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its
transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the agency's management
of existing resources compounded these problems.[Footnote 23] FEMA
lacks some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to
changing circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found
that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital
strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated training
effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable
an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills
needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between
current and future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said
they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational
management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18
areas.[Footnote 24]
An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to
identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety
of sources--federal, state, local or tribal governments; military
assets of the National Guard or active military; nongovernmental
entities; and the private sector. One key method of tapping resources
in areas not affected by the disaster is the EMAC. Through EMAC, about
46,000 National Guard and 19,000 civilian responders were deployed to
areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. We issued a
report this week examining how the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be
enhanced.[Footnote 25]
One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard.
States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and
equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are
frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states.
However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of
equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters
have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state
agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not
completed and integrated their plans.[Footnote 26] As a liaison between
the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is
well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces.
However, until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation
are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for
multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and the
National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and
efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the
level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic
emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil
support missions or report this information to Congress. Thus, although
the deployment of National Guard units overseas has decreased the
supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in
the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the
impact on the Guard's ability to perform its domestic missions.
Although DOD has begun to collect data on units' preparedness, these
efforts are not yet fully mature.
The nation's experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces
some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the
context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of
actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies
in each of these areas. Examples include designating national and
regional situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile
satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for
receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and
supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies
on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to
clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human
services. However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too
early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these
initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably
simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a major
or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable
results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or
catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section
below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements
in each of these areas.
Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly
deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called
National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal
presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing
the national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will
support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the
capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers
and support the initial establishment of a unified command.
Emergency Communications. Agencies' communications systems during a
catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient
communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication
requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications
interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire,
emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have
identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to
improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken
action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive,
interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability.
Logistics. FEMA's inability to effectively manage and track requests
for and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came
under harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days,
FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over
much of the logistics mission.[Footnote 27] In the Post-Katrina Reform
Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible
and responsive. FEMA's ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy
and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide
immediate support to a disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods
and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the
private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and
recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we
recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach,
identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system. In
short, FEMA is taking action to transition its logistics program to be
more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other
initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics capabilities,
it will be several years before they are fully implemented and
operational.
Mass Care and Shelter. Our work examining the nation's ability to
evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we showed that FEMA
needs to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the
federal government and outside the federal government. In an April
testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations said that
emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most pressing
priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He
said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support
planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing
methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family
members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities.
In addition, FEMA is in the process of developing an Alternative
Housing Pilot Program (AHPP) designed to evaluate new options for
housing victims in the aftermath of a disaster. We have been asked to
review the process FEMA used to evaluate proposals and award grants
under this program and we expect to release a report at the end of
August of this year.
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources
are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster,
decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited
assistance payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million
to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to
applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended
outcomes.[Footnote 28]
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making
should quickly replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time,
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes
intended.
We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to
provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the
magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster
assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for
response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in
all cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance
procurement practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal
agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal
agencies could then better manage disaster-related procurement and
establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous
planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and the
maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of
emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that
provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its
disaster-related procurements. These practices include developing
knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing
vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable
operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response
with the need.[Footnote 29]
Recent statutory changes have established more controls and
accountability mechanisms. For example, The Secretary of DHS is
required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive use
of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is
also required to promulgate regulations that limit certain
noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances
apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one
percent of funding for agency mission assignments as oversight funds.
The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain internal management
controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and develop and implement
a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds
in response to or recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must
be developed to identify eligible recipients of disaster relief
assistance.
Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional
Attention:
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.[Footnote 30]
He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after
catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the
threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the importance of
ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster
management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and
coordinated can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively
functioning insurance market can substantially reduce the government's
exposure to post-catastrophe payouts.
Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity
for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of
potential catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided
Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act
reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according
to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. The effective
implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes
and related roles and responsibilities--in addition to those changes
already undertaken by DHS--should address many of our emergency
management observations and recommendations.
The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress
could also consider how the federal government can work with other
nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector
organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help
ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively[Footnote
31]. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for,
responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic
disasters, congressional oversight is critical.
Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for
immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and
(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.
DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act:
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and
additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act
of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective
on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a
thorough assessment of FEMA's internal structure to incorporate lessons
learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and
existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the
following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:
* United States Fire Administration,
* Office of Grants and Training,
* Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,
* Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
* Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,
* Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational
elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster
assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition,
FEMA expanded its regional office structure with each region in part by
establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional
Strike Team. FEMA officials have:
noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be no acting
regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by
experienced professionals.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It
also will include the National Integration Center that will maintain
the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities
reflect these documents.
Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions
Should Respond to Many Concerns:
The effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's
organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities--in
addition to those changes already undertaken by DHS--should address
many of our emergency management observations and recommendations.
As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership
roles and responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the
FEMA Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management
adviser to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress
after informing the Secretary of DHS. The incident management
responsibilities and roles of the National Integration Center are now
clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a
clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the federal response to
any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The
law also establishes qualifications that appointees must meet. For
example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated ability in and
knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of
executive leadership and management experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities,
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program
to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and
strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex to be
eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must
be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional
commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development
of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a
memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to
collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities,
including credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In
addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, such as (1)
developing a logistics system providing real-time visibility of items
at each point throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a
prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support
and response teams.
The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster
Capabilities:
More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal "to establish measurable readiness priorities and
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from
them." The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the NPG using 15 emergency
event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related, with the remaining
3 addressing a major hurricane, major earthquake, and an influenza
pandemic. According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the
planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude
of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation
needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying the
capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale emergency
events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first responders
would have to address. Some state and local officials and experts have
questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for
preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and
the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal,
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005.
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for
these capabilities and the NPG in light of the Hurricane Katrina
experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in
the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the NPG, target capabilities and
preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems--should
be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established
seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness,
including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening
capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and
strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those
seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland
security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority
that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two
overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others.
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2)
integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3)
developing and sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key
resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence
fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability, (6)
strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities,
and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan
review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP
applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that
provides background information, strategic objectives and priorities
addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each
proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have.
The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic:
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management;
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the
effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation.
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of
detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers.
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and
response for such a disaster will require particularly close
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector,
individuals within the United States, as well as international
cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late
summer 2007.
Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their
Capabilities Is Limited:
Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on
state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying
risk management principles to guide federal investments,[Footnote 32]
over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal
funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants.
However, little has been reported about how states and localities
finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and
are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define
and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about
emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what
are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given
finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed.
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes.
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people
across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with
their grant application. States were to use this justification to
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding.
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS continued to use the risk and
effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions, although
changes have been made to make the grant allocation process more
transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said that
they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from grant
funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because they do
not yet have the metrics to do so.
Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust:
Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent
neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the abilities of
first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site
of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist
disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a
regional and multi-governmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the NPG is
embracing regional approaches to building, sustaining, and sharing
capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP applications are to
reflect regional coordination and show an investment strategy that
institutionalizes regional security strategy integration. However, it
is not known to what extent regional and multistate planning has
progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning.
Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of
expenditures.[Footnote 33] One of these challenges included a
coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of
expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent
work on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted
areas that needed strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically
improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide decision
makers.[Footnote 34] For example, additional information could have
been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned
goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and
measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet regional risk and
needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation;
resources and investments; and operational commitment.
Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons
Learned:
Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For
first responders, exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of
events for which there is little actual experience--are essential for
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance. We are
initiating work that will further examine the development and
implementation of a national exercise program.
DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational
Decisions:
Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified
that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its
management areas and mission functions[Footnote 35]. While much of its
sensitive work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has
not been receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and
us with access to various documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that
DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However,
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you and subcommittee members may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William O.
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors
to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; and John Vocino,
Analyst-in-Charge.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Related GAO Products:
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007.
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations,
and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO-07-
411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to
Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution
of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO-07-485R.
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has
Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO-07-
356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete
Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO-07-
205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and
Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal
Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance
Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington, D.C.:
February 14, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes
Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T.
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness
of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs. GAO-07-219.
Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February
7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.
GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 Washington, D.C.:
January 26, 2007.
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance
Education's Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and
Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05-
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
[2] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394
(2006).
[3] Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(11), 120 Stat. 1355, 1396 (2006)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(A)).
[4] Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines "catastrophic
incident" as any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made
disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage
or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass
evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or
government functions in an area.
[5] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington,
D.C.: January 26, 2007).
[6] The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.
[7] California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state's
legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired.
[8] GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve Disaster
Response, GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).
[9] House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[10] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington,
D.C.: May 2006).
[11] White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[12] Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[13] Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006).
[14] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[15] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006).
[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to
Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address
Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. (Washington,
D.C.: May 15, 2007).
[17] GAO-06-618
[18] On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding
leadership issues, such as which situations require secretarial
leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident
Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for
declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including
catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to
the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more detail on
implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to Hurricane
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic
Incident Annex, dated August 2006.
[19] Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
[20] Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.
[21] Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia,
District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
[22] Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(11), 120 Stat. 1355, 1396 (2006)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(A)).
[23] GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems
to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
[24] The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4)
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6)
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15)
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget
process, and (18) disaster relief fund.
[25] GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve Disaster
Response, GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).
[26] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
[27] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[28] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is
the Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-
07-418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.
[29] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
[30] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006.
[31] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
[32] GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to
Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
[33] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004);
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04-
904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective
Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National
Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National
Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).
[34] GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region
Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
[35] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-398T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2007); and GAO, Homeland Security: Management and
Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-
07-452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007)
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