Border Security
Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations Gao ID: GAO-07-884T September 27, 2007The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico.
On the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.
GAO-07-884T, Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, September 27, 2007:
Border Security:
Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border
Locations:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensic Audits and
Special Investigations:
John W. Cooney, Assistant Director Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations:
The testimony was revised on October 2, 2007, to include a link to
digital video simulating the transport of radioactive material and
other contraband across northern and southern U.S. borders at
unmanned or unmonitored locations. A link has been added in the
Northern Border Location One section on page 4.
GAO-07-884T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-884T, a testimony before the Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border
vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security
risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other
contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and
southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and
unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In
unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial
drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In
unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and
must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its
obligation to protect the border.
Today‘s testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a
limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned,
unmonitored, or both”four at the U.S.–Canada border and three at the
U.S.–Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.–Canada
border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to
simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other
contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from
attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point
in Mexico.
What GAO Found:
On the U.S.–Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border
that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations,
the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross
without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating
the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband
into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern
border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through
the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol
agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern
border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had
posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight.
On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement
and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned
aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were
adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be
monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which
contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although
CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to
the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental,
and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement”for example,
environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.
Table: Summary of Selected GAO Border Security Activities:
Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; Investigator
activity: An investigator simulated the cross-border movement of
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
Canada; Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* Suspicious activity was reported to the U.S. Border Patrol, but
responding agents were unable to locate GAO investigators and their
simulated contraband.
Security vulnerability: Ports of entry with posted hours; Investigator
activity: investigators attempted to trigger a law enforcement response
by taking photographs of a port of entry that had closed for the night;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* A gate was placed across the road, but investigators observed it
would be possible to drive around the gate;
* U.S. Border Patrol responded 20 minutes after investigators were
caught on camera at the port of entry;
* Responding U.S. Border Patrol agent did not attempt to verify
identity of investigators or search their vehicle.
Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
Investigator activity: Investigators approached the U.S.–Mexico border;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* Investigators observed evidence of frequent border crossings into the
United States at this location.
Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
Investigator activity: Investigator stepped over a 4-foot-high border
fence, entered Mexico, and returned again to the United States; Law
enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* No observed law enforcement presence despite proximity to border.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-884T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-
9505 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential
security vulnerabilities on northern and southern U.S. borders. The
United States shares over 5,000 miles of border with Canada to the
north, and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south. Individuals
attempting to legally enter the United States by land present
themselves to a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at one of
the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. Any other method of
land entry is illegal.[Footnote 1] Because CBP checks the
identification of entrants into the United States and searches vehicles
for contraband at ports of entry, individuals entering the United
States illegally may attempt to avoid screening procedures by crossing
the border in areas between ports of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol,
which is part of CBP, is responsible for patrolling and monitoring
these areas to stop cross-border violators. However, given limited
resources and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is
limited in its ability to monitor the border either through use of
technology or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with the
perceived threat, there is a sharp contrast between how CBP distributes
human resources on the northern border as opposed to the southern
border. According to CBP, as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol
agents on the northern border and 11,986 agents on the southern border.
Given the potential security vulnerabilities on our borders, you
expressed concern that cross-border violators may attempt to enter the
United States, possibly bringing with them radioactive materials or
other contraband, such as explosives, drugs, counterfeit money, and
bogus credit cards. We were therefore asked to perform a limited
security assessment to identify vulnerable border areas where CBP does
not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there is no
apparent monitoring equipment in place. You also requested that, where
possible, our investigators attempt to simulate the cross-border
movement of radioactive materials or other contraband to demonstrate
the existence of serious security vulnerabilities. To perform this
work, our investigators visited seven border areas that were unmanned,
unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the
U.S.-Mexico border. We identified these areas by reviewing information
that is publicly available and by reviewing our previous work on border
security.[Footnote 2] These areas were located in four states on the
northern border and two states on the southern border. We did not
attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities.
Investigators used a global positioning system (GPS) in some cases and
geographic landmarks in others to determine the location of the border.
In three out of four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators
crossed into the United States from Canada carrying a duffel bag to
simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other
contraband. Safety considerations prevented our investigators from
attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point
in Mexico.
We conducted our investigation from October 2006 through June 2007 in
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Summary of Investigation:
In four states along the U.S.-Canada border we found state roads that
were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In
three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed
investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-
border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the
United States from Canada. In one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area
on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to our
activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding
U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate our investigators and
their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, our
investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime
hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that
surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive
measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United
States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around.
In contrast to the northern border locations we visited, on a state
road near the southern border, investigators observed a large law
enforcement and Army National Guard presence, including unmanned aerial
vehicles. However, our limited security assessment identified potential
security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the
U.S.-Mexico border; we did not observe monitoring or a law enforcement
presence during the time our investigators visited these areas. The
Department of the Interior (Interior) provided us with a memorandum of
understanding between itself; the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), of which CBP is a component; and the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) documenting the agreed approach to protecting federal lands
along U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for
protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal,
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for
enforcement.
Northern Border:
According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator
can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of
the crossing, are critical factors in determining whether an area of
the border is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border
that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate
the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband
from Canada into the United States. We also located several ports of
entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were
unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment
was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to
stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a
barrier across the road that could be driven around. CBP provided us
with records that confirmed our observations, indicating that on one
occasion a cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to
illegally enter the United States. The violator was later caught by
state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol.
State Roads Close to the Northern Border:
We found state roads close to the U.S.-Canada border in several states.
Many of the roads we found appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored,
allowing us to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive
materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States.
Northern Border Location One:
On October 31, 2006, our investigators positioned themselves on
opposite sides of the U.S.-Canada border in an unmanned location. Our
investigators selected this location because roads on either side of
the border would allow them to quickly and easily exchange simulated
contraband. After receiving a signal via cell phone, the investigator
in Canada left his vehicle and walked approximately 25 feet to the
border carrying a red duffel bag. While investigators on the U.S. side
took photographs and made a digital video recording,[Footnote 3] the
individual with the duffel bag proceeded the remaining 50 feet,
transferred the duffel bag to the investigators on the U.S. side, and
returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada to the United States in
Northern Border Location One:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity.
[End of figure]
The set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which
time the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian
and U.S. sides of the border.
According to CBP records of this incident, an alert citizen notified
the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious activities of our
investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently attempted to search
for a vehicle matching the description of the rental vehicle our
investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol was not able to
locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even though they had
parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the port of entry.
Northern Border Location Two:
Investigators identified over a half dozen locations in this area where
state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border. Although investigators
took pictures of the border area, they did not attempt to cross the
border because of private property concerns. There was no visible U.S.
Border Patrol response to our activities and no visible electronic
monitoring equipment. CBP told us that the activities of our
investigators would not be grounds for a formal investigation. Still,
according to CBP records, criminals are aware of vulnerabilities in
this area and have taken advantage of the access provided by roads
close to the border. For example, appendix I details an incident on
January 25, 2007, in which an alert citizen notified CBP about
suspicious activities on the citizen's property, leading to the arrest
of several cross-border violators.
Northern Border Location Three:
On November 15, 2006, our investigators visited an area in this state
where state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border. One of our
investigators simulated the cross-border movement of radioactive
materials or other contraband by crossing the border north into Canada
and then returning to the United States (see fig. 2). There did not
appear to be any monitoring or intrusion alarm system in place at this
location, and there was no U.S. Border Patrol response to our border
crossing.
Figure 2: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States
in Northern Border Location Three:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity.
[End of figure]
Northern Border Location Four:
On December 5, 2006, our investigators traveled along a road parallel
to the U.S.-Canada border. This road is so close to the border that
jumping over a ditch on the southern side of the road allows an
individual to stand in the United States. While driving the length of
this road on the Canadian side, our investigators noticed cameras
placed at strategic locations on the U.S. side of the border. They also
observed U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked at different locations
along the border. At a location that appeared to be unmanned and
unmonitored, one investigator left the vehicle carrying a red duffel
bag. He crossed the ditch and walked into the United States for several
hundred feet before returning to the vehicle. Our investigators stayed
in this location for about 15 minutes, but there was no observed
response from law enforcement. At two other locations, investigators
crossed into the United States to find out whether their presence would
be detected. In all cases, there was no observed response from law
enforcement.
Ports of Entry with Posted Hours on the Northern Border:
We identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in a
state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of entry
are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that it
relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to
interdict illegal border crossing activity. On November 14, 2006, at
about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S. side of one
port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators observed
that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only visible
preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the United
States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around.
Investigators stayed at the port of entry for approximately 12 minutes
to see whether the U.S. Border Patrol would respond. During this time,
the investigators walked around the port of entry area and took
photographs. When the U.S. Border Patrol did not arrive at the port of
entry, our investigators returned south, only to have a U.S. Border
Patrol agent pull them over 3 miles south of the port of entry. When
questioned by the U.S. Border Patrol agent, our investigators indicated
that they were federal investigators testing security procedures at the
U.S. border. The agent did not ask for identification from our
investigators and glanced only briefly at the badge and commission book
the driver offered for inspection. In addition, he did not attempt to
search the vehicle, ask what agency our investigators worked for, or
record their names. According to DHS, the agent acted in a manner
consistent with operational protocol because he was satisfied with the
credentials presented to him and did not have probable cause to search
the vehicle.
CBP provided us with records concerning this incident. According to the
records, the agent was dispatched because of the suspicious activities
of our investigators in front of the port of entry camera. The records
indicated that after this incident, CBP staff researched the incident
fully to determine whether our investigators posed a threat. By
performing an Internet search on the name of the investigator who
rented the vehicle, CBP linked the investigators to GAO. CBP also
provided us with records that confirmed our observations about the
barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one occasion a cross-
border violator drove around this type of barrier to illegally enter
the United States. The violator was later caught by state law
enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol.
Southern Border:
Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the
same assessment work on the U.S.-Mexico border as performed on the
northern border. In contrast to our observations on the northern
border, our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army
National Guard presence near a state road on the southern border,
including unmanned aerial vehicles. However, our limited security
assessment also identified potential security vulnerabilities on
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement
presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. Although
CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting these areas, officials
told us that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations
limit options for enforcement.
State Road Close to the Southern Border:
On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a main U.S. route
about a quarter mile from a U.S.-Mexico port of entry. Traveling on a
dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators used a GPS
system to get as close to the border as possible. Our investigators
passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National Guard units. In
addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial vehicles and a
helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point where the dirt
road ran closest to the U.S.-Mexico border, our investigators spotted
additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in a covered position.
About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, our investigators
pulled off the road. One investigator exited the vehicle and proceeded
on foot through several gulches and gullies toward the Mexican border.
His intent was to find out whether he would be questioned by law
enforcement agents about his activities. He returned to the vehicle
after 15 minutes, at which time our investigators returned to the main
road. Our investigators did not observe any public traffic on this road
for the 1 hour that they were in the area, but none of the law
enforcement units attempted to stop our investigators and find out what
they were doing. According to CBP, because our investigators did not
approach from the direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation
for law enforcement units to question these activities. (See fig. 3.)
Figure 3: Route of GAO Investigators at U.S.-Mexico Border Location:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Federal Lands Adjacent to the Southern Border:
Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on
federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the
time our investigators visited the sites. Investigators learned that a
memorandum of understanding exists between DHS (of which CBP is a
component), Interior, and USDA regarding the protection of federal
lands adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible
for protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal,
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for
enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal
sovereignty rights.
Southern Border Location One:
On January 9, 2007, our investigators entered federally managed land
adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. The investigators had identified a
road running parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators
were informed by an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S.
government was building a fence, the road was closed to the public.
However, our investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was
not physically closed. While driving west along this road, our
investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law
enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the
movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of
the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at
one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion
alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico,
and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the
location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law
enforcement response to their activities.
Southern Border Location Two:
On January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on federally managed
lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. In this area, the Rio Grande
River forms the southern border between the United States and Mexico.
After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks of the Rio Grande,
our investigators observed, in two locations, evidence that frequent
border crossings took place. In one location, the investigators
observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the Mexican side of the
river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S. side of the Rio
Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side. Access to the
boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn footpaths and
vehicle tracks (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: GAO Investigator at a U.S.-Mexico Border Location:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
An individual who worked in this area told our investigators that at
several times during the year, the water is so low that the river can
easily be crossed on foot. Our investigators were in this area for 1
hour and 30 minutes and observed no surveillance equipment, intrusion
alarm systems, or law enforcement presence. Our investigators were not
challenged regarding their activities. According to CBP officials, in
some locations on federally managed lands, social and cultural issues
lead the U.S. Border Patrol to defer to local police in providing
protection. This sensitivity to social and cultural issues appears to
be confirmed by the provisions of the memorandum of understanding
between DHS, Interior, and USDA.
Corrective Action Briefing:
On February 23, 2007, we met with CBP officials to discuss the results
of our investigation. CBP officials clarified their approach to law
enforcement in unmanned and unmonitored areas at the northern and
southern U.S. borders, including an explanation of jurisdictional
issues on federally managed lands. CBP indicated that resource
restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from investigating all
instances of suspicious activity. They added that the northern border
presents more of a challenge than the southern border and that many
antiquated ports of entry exist.
Conclusions:
Our visits to the northern border show that CBP faces significant
challenges in effectively monitoring the border and preventing
undetected entry into the United States. Our work shows that a
determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring
radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United
States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the locations we
investigated. CBP records indicate that it does successfully stop many
individuals from crossing the border illegally, but our own
observations and experiences (along with CBP's acknowledgment of
existing challenges) lead us to conclude that more human capital and
technological capabilities are needed to effectively protect the
northern border. Our observations on the southern border showed a
significant disparity between the large law enforcement presence on
state lands in one state and what seemed to be a lack of law
enforcement presence on federally managed lands.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement.
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this
time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contacts points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this testimony.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Case Studies of Successful Customs and Border Protection
Responses to Suspicious Activities on Northern and Southern U.S.
Borders:
This appendix details four cases where Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) apprehended individuals who were engaged in suspicious activities
on the northern and southern borders. According to CBP, U.S. Border
Patrol agents followed proper protocols in responding to these
incidents. We are summarizing these case studies--which CBP provided to
us--to further illustrate challenges the U.S. Border Patrol faces.
Northern Border Incident One:
At about 3:20 a.m. on June 24, 2006, electronic surveillance equipment
observed a vehicle arrive at the port of entry gate from the direction
of Canada. The suspect got out of the vehicle and, after inspecting the
area around the gate, returned to the vehicle and drove around the gate
into the United States. U.S. Border Patrol agents were notified, along
with state law enforcement. The state officer identified and stopped
the vehicle while the U.S. Border Patrol agents were en route. U.S.
Border Patrol agents arrived and arrested the suspect. The suspect was
identified as a citizen of Albania and admitted to driving around the
port of entry gate. The suspect had applied for asylum in the United
States and been denied in 2001, at which point he had moved to Canada.
Attempts to return the suspect to Canada failed, as he had no legal
status in Canada. Suspect was held in jail pending removal proceedings.
Northern Border Incident Two:
At about 6:00 p.m. on January 25, 2007, the U.S. Border Patrol was
notified of suspicious activity on the U.S.-Canada border. U.S.
residents on the border had observed a vehicle dropping off several
individuals near their home. A U.S. Border Patrol agent proceeded to
the area where residents had observed the suspicious activity. Once
there, the agent followed footprints in the snow and discovered two
suspects hiding among a stand of pine trees. The suspects were
Columbian nationals, one male and one female. They indicated that a man
was going to pick them up on the Canadian side of the border, and that
a friend had driven them to the agreed-upon location on the U.S. side.
Cell phone numbers retrieved from the suspect's phone linked him to
phone numbers belonging to a known alien smuggler in the area. The
suspects said they intended to seek political asylum in Canada. They
were sent to a detention facility after their arrest.
Northern Border Incident Three:
On February 10, 2007, at about 2:00 a.m., U.S. Border Patrol
surveillance equipment detected six suspects entering the United States
from Canada. The suspects were walking south along railroad tracks.
After a short foot chase, U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended all six
suspects--two individuals who were believed to be smugglers and a
family of four. All the suspects were citizens of South Korea.
According to interviews with the suspects, after the family arrived in
Canada they were approached by an individual who said he could take
them to the United States. He brought the family to a desolate area and
introduced them to a male and a female, who they were to follow across
the border. The individual then instructed the family to leave their
luggage in the car and said that he would pick all six of them up in
the United States. The wife and two children in the family were
released for humanitarian reasons after apprehension, and the male was
placed in detention.
Southern Border Incident One:
On May 3, 2007, at about 1:20 a.m., an alert citizen reported a
possible illegal alien near the U.S.-Mexico border. The responding U.S.
Border Patrol agent located the individual, who claimed to be a citizen
of Uruguay. He said that he had used a variety of transportation means,
including airplanes and buses, to travel from Uruguay to a Mexican city
just south of the U.S. border. The individual claimed to have crossed
the border by foot along with four other individuals. He then walked
for 4 days through the desert. When he became dehydrated, he sought
help at a nearby U.S. town. As a result, he was spotted by the alert
citizen who notified the U.S. Border Patrol. The individual was
scheduled to be removed from the country but requested a hearing before
an immigration judge.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] 19 U.S.C. §§ 1433, 1459; 8 C.F.R. §235.1.
[2] See GAO, Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their
Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands, GAO-04-590 (Washington,
D.C.: June 16, 2004).
[3] This testimony was revised on October 2, 2007, to include a link to
digital video simulating the transport of radioactive material and
other contraband across northern and southern U.S. borders at
unmanned or unmonitored locations. View the video at:
[hyperlink, http://wwww.gao.gov/media/video/gao-07-884t/].
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