Homeland Security
Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers Gao ID: GAO-07-1241T September 27, 2007In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government--including the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), who has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ)--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony is based on GAO's draft report on state and local fusion centers. It addresses (1) the status and characteristics of the centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges fusion centers identified. In conducting this work GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers.
Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted. However, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. At least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted reported that they had federal personnel assigned to their centers. Products disseminated and services provided vary. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address some of the challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. They said that these issues made it difficult to plan for the future, and created concerns about the fusion centers' ability to sustain their capability for the long term. To support fusion centers, both DHS and FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grant funds. These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through an information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards for fusion center analyst training to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document is in draft as of September.
GAO-07-1241T, Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, September 27, 2007:
Homeland Security:
Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced
by State and Local Information Fusion Centers:
Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues:
GAO-07-1241T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1241T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect,
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.
Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information
sharing, the federal government”including the Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), who has primary
responsibility for governmentwide information sharing, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ)”is
taking steps to partner with fusion centers.
This testimony is based on GAO‘s draft report on state and local fusion
centers. It addresses (1) the status and characteristics of the centers
and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges fusion
centers identified. In conducting this work GAO reviewed center-related
documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and
the PM-ISE, and semistructured interviews with 58 state and local
fusion centers.
What GAO Found:
Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers
to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the
country vary in their stages of development”from operational to early
in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted
described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had
opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state
police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing
agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted.
However, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with
other agencies. At least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we
contacted reported that they had federal personnel assigned to their
centers. Products disseminated and services provided vary.
DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address some
of the challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have
provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but
fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing
multiple information systems. Both DHS and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) have provided security clearances for state and
local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited
challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of
the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to
obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported
challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers‘
sustainability. They said that these issues made it difficult to plan
for the future, and created concerns about the fusion centers‘ ability
to sustain their capability for the long term. To support fusion
centers, both DHS and FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To
help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address
restrictions on the use of federal grant funds. These individual agency
efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding.
However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-
term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is
critical for center management to know whether to expect continued
federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the
federal government, through an information sharing environment, expects
to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information
sharing with state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-
ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical
assistance to fusion centers, for instance by issuing guidelines for
establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58
centers said they had challenges training their personnel, and
officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government to
establish standards for fusion center analyst training to help ensure
that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a
technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also
developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document is in draft
as of September.
What GAO Recommends:
In its draft report, GAO is recommending that the federal government
determine and articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether
it expects to provide resources to centers to help ensure their
sustainability. GAO‘s draft report is currently at DHS, DOJ, and the PM-
ISE for review and comment.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-07-1241T.
For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or
larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chair, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our ongoing work on state and local fusion centers. Since the
events of September 11, 2001, most states and some local governments
have, largely on their own initiative, established fusion centers to
address gaps in homeland security and law enforcement information
sharing by the federal government and to provide a conduit of this
information within the state. Although fusion centers vary because they
were primarily established to meet state and local needs, a fusion
center is generally "a collaborative effort of two or more agencies
that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with
the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate,
and respond to criminal and terrorist activity."[Footnote 1] Fusion
centers may include a range of federal, state, and local entities and
collect and analyze information related to homeland security,
terrorism, and law enforcement.
With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing
factor in the nation's lack of preparedness for the September 11
attacks, a number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). The
Homeland Security Act requires that the President, among other things,
prescribe and implement procedures under which federal agencies can
share relevant and appropriate homeland security information with other
federal agencies and with appropriate state and local personnel, such
as law enforcement agencies and first responders.[Footnote 2] The
Intelligence Reform Act, as amended in August 2007 by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission
Act), mandates a more extensive information-sharing regime.[Footnote 3]
It requires the President to take action to facilitate the sharing of
terrorism and homeland security information by establishing an
Information Sharing Environment (ISE). This environment is to combine
policies, procedures, and technologies that link people, systems, and
information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal
entities and the private sector. This act also requires, among other
things, that the President appoint a program manager to oversee
development and implementation of the ISE, which the President did in
April 2005.
Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical
source of local information about potential threats and a mechanism for
providing terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal
sources, the Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE),[Footnote 4] the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) are taking steps to partner with and leverage fusion centers as
part of the overall information sharing environment. The PM-ISE issued
a plan for implementing the ISE in November 2006 that incorporated
presidentially approved recommendations for federal, state, local, and
private sector information sharing. Recognizing that the collaboration
between fusion centers and with the federal government marks a
tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity that can
be used to combat terrorism, the plan envisions that the federal
government, through the ISE, will rely on a nationwide network of
fusion centers as the cornerstone of information sharing with state and
local governments. Under the plan, DHS and DOJ are to work with states
to designate a primary fusion center to serve as the statewide or
regional hub to interface with the federal government and through which
to coordinate the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of
terrorism-related information.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions
related to fusion centers.[Footnote 5] For example, the act requires
the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, the PM-
ISE, and others, to establish a state, local, and regional fusion
center initiative within DHS to establish partnerships with fusion
centers that will, among other things, provide operational and
intelligence advice and assistance, as well as management assistance,
and facilitate close communication and coordination between fusion
centers and DHS. In addition, the initiative is to provide training to
fusion centers and encourage the centers to participate in terrorism
threat-related exercises conducted by DHS.
My testimony today discusses our draft report on state and local fusion
centers. The report is currently at DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE for review
and comment and we expect to issue it next month. Specifically, I will
discuss (1) the stages of development and characteristics of state and
local fusion centers and (2) the extent to which efforts under way by
the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ help to address some of the challenges
identified by fusion centers.
In conducting this work, we reviewed relevant directives, plans, and
documents and interviewed officials--including many of those from the
PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ--who are involved with those entities' efforts to
support fusion centers. In addition, we spoke with officials from
organizations conducting research on state and local information
sharing, including officials at the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) who released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers.[Footnote 6]
We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with officials
from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local
jurisdictions. Specifically, from February through May 2007, we spoke
with the director (or his or her designee) of every state fusion
center, the District of Columbia center, and 8 local centers to obtain
information about the centers' characteristics, challenges encountered,
and support received from DHS and DOJ. [Footnote 7] Our selection
criteria for local fusion centers included their relationship with the
state fusion center, their stage of development, and geographic
diversity. While we did contact officials in all state fusion centers,
we did not contact officials in all local fusion centers; therefore our
results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion
centers.[Footnote 8] Finally, to obtain detailed information about
centers' operations and challenges encountered, we conducted site
visits to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona;
Richmond, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and
New York City, New York. We performed our work from August 2006 through
September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Summary:
Established by state and local governments generally to improve
information sharing and to prevent terrorism or other threats, fusion
centers across the country are in varying stages of development--from
operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as
of September 2007.[Footnote 9] Thirty-four of the operational centers
are relatively new, having been opened since January 2004, while 9
centers opened within the couple of years after the attacks of
September 11. The majority had missions and scopes of operations that
included more than just counterterrorism-related activities, such as a
focus on all crimes. Adopting a broader focus helped provide
information about all threats and increased the center's
sustainability, for instance, by including additional stakeholders who
could provide staff and support. Law enforcement entities, such as
state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or
managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers we
contacted. However, the centers varied in their staff sizes and
partnerships with other agencies. At least 34 of the 43 operational
fusion centers we contacted reported that they had federal personnel
assigned to their centers. Thus far, products disseminated and services
provided vary from bulletins to in-depth reports.
In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating
information sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have
several efforts under way that begin to address challenges that fusion
center officials identified in establishing and operating their
centers.[Footnote 10] DHS and DOJ have made efforts to provide fusion
centers access to federal information systems, but some fusion center
officials cited challenges accessing relevant, actionable information
and managing multiple information systems. As a result, these center
officials said that their ability to receive and share information with
those who need it may be limited. Additionally, both DHS and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have provided clearances to state
and local officials and have set timeliness goals for the issuance of
new clearances, but some fusion center officials told us they had
encountered challenges obtaining and using security clearances.
Further, while law and executive order provide that a security
clearance granted by one federal agency should generally be accepted by
other agencies, officials also encountered difficulties with federal
agencies, particularly DHS and FBI, accepting each others' clearances.
Notwithstanding DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion
centers and DHS's grant funding to support their establishment and
enhancement, fusion center officials noted challenges obtaining
personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to sustain the centers. To
help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address
restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. Finally, officials at
31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their personnel,
and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government
to establish standards for fusion center analyst training to help
ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a
technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also
developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document is in draft
as of September 2007.
Because of officials' concerns about sustaining their centers and
recognizing that doing so is critical if the federal government's
nationwide network of fusion centers is to succeed, in our draft
report, we are recommending that the federal government determine and
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to
provide resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability.
State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and
Characteristics:
Since September 2001, almost all states and several local governments
have established or are in the process of establishing fusion centers.
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their
centers as operational as of September 2007, ranging from having
limited operations and functionality to being fully operational and
functional. Specifically, officials in 35 states, the District of
Columbia, and 7 local jurisdictions we contacted described their fusion
centers as operational. Officials in 14 states and 1 local jurisdiction
considered their centers to be in the planning or early stages of
development, and 1 state did not plan to have a fusion center, as shown
in figure 1.
Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by fusion center
officials; Map, Map Resources.
[End of figure]
Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local area
established a fusion center. To improve information sharing--related to
homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement--among federal,
state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the
attacks of September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons. Thirty-
four of the operational centers are relatively new, having been opened
since January 2004, while 9 centers opened in the couple of years after
the attacks of September 11. The majority had missions and scopes of
operations that included more than just counterterrorism-related
activities. For example, 23 of the 36 operational fusion centers that
provided us mission statements had missions that involved collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-related
information. Further, 11 fusion centers had missions that involved
enhancing, supporting, or coordinating information and intelligence
dissemination to both law enforcement and homeland security agencies.
Adopting a broader focus helped provide information about all threats,
because of the link of many crimes to terrorist activity, and increased
the centers' sustainability, for instance, by including additional
stakeholders.
Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of
investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the
operational centers we contacted. However, the centers varied in their
staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. A few centers we
contacted had fewer than 5 employees, while others had over 80. At
least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted reported
that they had federal personnel assigned to their centers. For example,
DHS has assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational centers
included in our review. About three quarters of the operational centers
we contacted also reported that the FBI has assigned personnel,
including intelligence analysts and special agents, to their centers.
Additionally, 12 of the operational centers we contacted were colocated
in an FBI field office or with an FBI task force. Finally, 19 of the 43
operational centers reported that they had other DHS and DOJ components
represented in their centers, including personnel from Customs and
Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; United States
Secret Service; United States Coast Guard; Transportation Security
Administration; United States Attorneys Office; Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms; Drug Enforcement Administration; or the United
States Marshals Service.
Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's
unclassified networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO),
containing, among other things, terrorism and related
information.[Footnote 11] For example 40 of the 43 operational centers
reported they had access to HSIN, while 39 reported having access to
LEO. In addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the
process of obtaining access to DHS's classified network of secret-level
homeland security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process
of obtaining access to FBI's classified systems containing, among other
things, secret-level investigative case files. Products disseminated
and services provided also vary. Fusion centers reported issuing a
variety of products, such as daily and weekly bulletins on general
criminal or intelligence information and intelligence assessments that,
in general, provide in-depth reporting on an emerging threat, group, or
crime. In addition some centers provide investigative support for law
enforcement officers.
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address
Some Reported Challenges:
DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in
information sharing, have undertaken efforts that begin to address
challenges fusion center officials identified in establishing and
operating their centers, such as accessing information, obtaining
security clearances, obtaining and retaining personnel, obtaining
funding, and finding sufficient guidance and training.
Fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing
multiple information systems. DHS and FBI have provided information
system access, such as to HSIN and LEO, to a number of state and local
fusion centers and have outlined plans to provide greater access to
their classified networks. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers
we contacted still reported challenges obtaining access to federal
information systems or networks. For example, officials in some centers
cited challenges with DHS and FBI not providing fusion center personnel
with direct access to their classified systems. In these centers,
fusion center personnel must rely on federal personnel who are assigned
to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to
access these systems, obtain the relevant information, and share it
with them. Further, officials in 12 of 58 fusion centers reported
challenges meeting system security requirements or establishing the
technical capabilities necessary to access information systems, and DHS
and FBI have taken some steps to address these challenges.
In addition, officials at 30 of the fusion centers found the multiple
systems or heavy volume of often redundant information a challenge to
manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers said that they had difficulty
with what they perceived to be the high volume of information their
center receives, variously describing the flow of information as
"overwhelming," "information overload," and "excessive." For example,
officials said that center personnel must sort through the large amount
of information, much of which is not relevant to the center, to find
information that is useful or important to them. Additionally,
officials in 18 fusion centers find the lack of integration among these
multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems challenging, or
said they wanted a single mechanism or system through which to receive
or send information. Officials from the PM-ISE's office said they are
collaborating with other agencies, including DHS and DOJ, on an effort
to review existing federal information systems and users' needs to
determine opportunities to streamline system access. This review is in
accordance with recommendations that fusion centers made during the
National Fusion Center Conference in March 2007. Specifically, fusion
centers recommended the federal government explore using a single sign-
on or search capability, which would facilitate accessing multiple
systems. However, it is too early to tell whether the efforts by the PM-
ISE's office will address the challenges reported by fusion centers.
Both DHS and FBI have provided security clearances for state and local
personnel in order to access classified information and have set goals
to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a security clearance.
For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret clearance,
and FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret clearance and
6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret clearance. DHS and FBI have also
provided centers with information about the security clearance process
and time frames, stating that processing time for individual security
clearances can vary, depending on complexity. However, obtaining and
using security clearances represented a challenge for 44 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted. Further, while law and executive order
provide that a security clearance granted by one government agency
should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of the
centers encountered difficulties with federal agencies, particularly
DHS and FBI, accepting each others' clearances. DHS and DOJ officials
said that they were not aware of fusion centers encountering recent
challenges with reciprocity of security clearances. However, they said
that there were complications in the clearance process because, for
example, multiple federal agencies carry out their own processes
without central coordination.
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing
challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion
centers reported challenges with obtaining and maintaining funding when
establishing and operating their centers, challenges that some of these
officials also said affected their centers' sustainability. For
example, officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with
federal, state, and local agencies not being able to detail personnel
to their fusion center, particularly in the face of resource
constraints. Fusion centers rely on such details as a means of staffing
the centers and enhancing information sharing with other state and
local agencies. Furthermore, officials in 20 of the centers we
contacted said that they faced challenges finding, attracting, and
retaining qualified personnel. For instance, an official from one
fusion center said that finding personnel with the expertise to
understand the concept behind the development of the center and to use
the tools to build the center was challenging, while an official at
another fusion center acknowledged that there was a very limited number
of qualified candidates in the state from which to hire personnel. To
support fusion centers, DHS and FBI have assigned personnel to centers.
As of September 2007, DHS has assigned intelligence officers to 17 of
the operational fusion centers we contacted. In addition, DHS was in
the process of staffing 8 additional centers and has plans to place
officers in a total of 35 fusion centers by the end of fiscal year
2008. The FBI has also assigned personnel to about three quarters of
the fusion centers we contacted and continues to do so.
In terms of funding, officials in 35 of the 58 centers encountered
challenges with the complexity of the federal grant process,
uncertainty as to whether they would receive federal funds, or
declining federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers
reported having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said
that these issues created confusion for their centers over the steps
needed to secure federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the
future, and created concerns about the fusion centers' abilities to
sustain their capabilities for the long term. Fusion center officials
identified challenges with restrictions on the use of federal grant
funds, unclear and changing grant guidance, and a lack of understanding
of how federal funding decisions are made.[Footnote 12] DHS has made
several changes to help address these challenges by taking steps to
ease the grant process and by adjusting some of the restrictions on the
timing and use of grant funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding
in fiscal year 2006 in the area of allowable costs for information
sharing and collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by states to
develop and enhance their fusion centers, particularly by hiring
contract or government employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing
information technology hardware, software, and communication equipment;
hiring consultants to make recommendations on fusion center
development; or leasing office space for use by a fusion center.
While these funds are helpful, fusion center officials were concerned
about the extent of federal support they could expect over the long
term. The federal government, through the ISE, has stated that it
expects to rely on a nationwide network of fusion centers as the
cornerstone of information sharing with state and local governments,
but ISE plans or guidance to date do not articulate the long-term role
the federal government expects to play in sustaining these centers,
especially in relation to the role of their state or local
jurisdictions. It is critical for center management to know whether to
expect continued federal resources, such as grant funds, facility
support, personnel, and information systems over the long term. While
the federal government generally cannot commit future resources,
articulating the extent to which it plans to help support these centers
in the long term is important for fusion center management in their
planning efforts and sustaining the network.
DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken some steps to develop guidance and
provide technical assistance to fusion centers to help address their
challenges in the areas of guidance and training. For instance, in
August 2006, DHS and DOJ issued jointly developed Fusion Center
Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and
operating fusion centers--for example, ensuring appropriate security
measures are in place for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in
48 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that they found the
guidelines generally good or useful, although others said they were not
specific enough to address their challenges. Officials at 19 fusion
centers said they lacked guidance on specific policies and procedures
on information sharing or lacked national standards and guidelines on
training or qualifications for analysts. Furthermore, officials at 31
of the fusion centers we contacted said they had challenges training
their personnel, and officials at 11 centers we contacted, most of whom
were operational centers that had been in existence for more than 2
years, expressed a need for the federal government to establish
standards for training fusion center analysts. DHS and DOJ have
initiated a technical assistance service program for fusion centers
and, along with the PM-ISE, sponsored regional and national conferences
and are developing a baseline capabilities document to provide more
specific guidelines for fusion centers. However, as of September 2007
the baseline capabilities document is in draft.
In closing, Madam Chair, state and local governments created fusion
centers to fill their information needs, and the centers have attracted
the attention of the federal government as it works to improve
information sharing with state, local, and tribal entities in
accordance with the Homeland Security and Intelligence Reform Acts.
Indeed, the PM-ISE's implementation plan envisions that the federal
government will work to promote fusion center initiatives to facilitate
effective terrorism information sharing nationwide and designates
fusion centers as the focus of sharing with state, local, and tribal
governments. To date, DHS's and DOJ's efforts to assist fusion centers,
such as providing access to information systems, security clearances,
personnel, funding, and guidance, have begun to address a number of the
challenges fusion center directors identified to us. However, it is
also important for fusion center management to understand the federal
government's role with respect to these centers since this affects
state and local governments' support to centers. However, many fusion
center officials were uncertain about the level of future resources and
the sustainability of federal support. Although the federal government
cannot make promises regarding future resources, articulating whether
the federal government views its role in providing resources, such as
grant funding, facilities, personnel, and information-sharing systems,
to fusion centers as a short-term start-up effort or for the long-term
sustainability of operations is important for fusion center management
in their planning efforts and sustaining the network.
In our draft report, which is now at the agencies for review and
comment, we are recommending that the federal government determine and
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to
provide resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability.
Particular emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those
fusion center functions that support a national information-sharing
capability as critical nodes of the ISE. We provided the agencies a
statement of facts for our draft report and discussed the
recommendation with them to obtain their comments. The Deputy PM-ISE
generally agreed with the recommendation, and the agencies provided us
technical details, which we incorporated. All agencies will be sending
official comments on the draft report later.
Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen
Larence at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at larencee@gao.gov. Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony include Susan Quinlan,
Assistant Director; Michael Blinde; Jill Evancho; and Mary Catherine
Hult.
Footnotes:
[1] See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a
New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at
the Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence,
Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006).
[2] See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 892, 116 Stat. 2135, 2253-55 (2002).
[3] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004),
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 504, 121 Stat. 266, 313-17 (2007).
[4] On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM-
ISE and its staff within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
[5] See Pub. L. No. 110-53 § 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding section
210A to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
[6] See Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and
Options for Congress, RL34070 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).
[7] For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer
to centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and
intrastate regions.
[8] Data were not available to determine the total number of local
fusion centers.
[9] We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local
areas. However, 1 state did not plan a fusion center. For that reason,
we have responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15 in the
planning or early stages of development.
[10] We present information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing
and operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more
than one challenge related to a particular area, for example, related
to guidance and training.
[11] HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool
for communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security
information. LEO serves as a real-time online controlled access
communications and information-sharing data repository for sensitive
but unclassified information about, among other things, antiterrorism,
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice.
[12] A primary federal funding source for fusion centers is DHS's
Homeland Security Grant Program, which awards funds to state, local,
and tribal governments to enhance their ability to prepare for,
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters.
The Homeland Security Grant Program consists of five interconnected
programs, three of which can be used by states and local jurisdictions,
at their discretion, for fusion center-related funding.
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