Flood Insurance
FEMA's Rate-Setting Process Warrants Attention Gao ID: GAO-09-12 October 31, 2008Questions about the financial status of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) have increased since the 2005 hurricanes, which left the program with an unprecedented $17.4 billion deficit--a debt that resulted in GAO placing NFIP on its high-risk list in March 2006. Among the concerns are the subsidized rates NFIP must provide for about 25 percent of the policies, mostly for older buildings in high-risk flood zones. And although fully risk-based rates are supposed to reflect actual flood risk, concerns have been raised that they do not. This report evaluates (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) process for setting full-risk rates to determine whether it produces rates that accurately reflect the risk of flooding and (2) the process that FEMA uses to set subsidized rates and their effect on the financial condition of NFIP. To do this work, GAO evaluated the NFIP rate model, examined data from FEMA, surveyed relevant literature, and interviewed other relevant agencies and risk-modeling firms.
FEMA's method for setting its full-risk rates may not ensure that the rates accurately reflect the actual risk of flood damage. The NFIP model combines estimated flood risk with expected flood damage, but a number of factors may affect the accuracy of the rates the model generates. First, some data inputs are outdated or inaccurate. FEMA relies on flood probabilities from the 1980s and damage estimates that do not fully reflect recent NFIP damage experience. Moreover, while FEMA has made updating its flood maps a priority, most of the maps used in rate setting have not yet been updated. Second, FEMA does not require all properties remapped into higher-risk areas to pay rates based on the new designation. This policy, known as grandfathering, erodes NFIP's ability to charge rates that reflect the risk of flooding. The policy is intended to increase participation, but FEMA does not track the number of grandfathered properties and cannot determine their financial impact on the program. Third, FEMA uses a nationwide rating system that combines flood zones across many geographic areas, so individual policies do not always reflect topographical features that affect flood risk. In fact, some patterns in historical claims and premium data suggest that NFIP's full-risk rates may not always reflect actual flood risk. Collectively, these factors increase the risk that premiums collected on full-risk policies may be insufficient to cover future losses, adding to concerns about NFIP's financial stability. FEMA's rate-setting process for subsidized properties depends in part on the accuracy of the full-risk rates, raising concerns about how these rates are calculated as well. To set subsidized rates, FEMA first subtracts the total amount it expects to collect in full-risk premiums from the average historical loss year--that is, the minimum (target) amount that the program needs to collect from all premiums to cover at least average annual losses, as determined by historical data. The remainder becomes the aggregate target amount the program must collect in subsidized premiums. To set individual subsidized rates, FEMA officials then consider their knowledge of flood risk, previous rate increases for various locations, and statutory limits on increases. The resulting subsidized premiums continue to be a financial strain on the NFIP and contribute to its ongoing financial instability. Evidence suggests that flooding is likely to become more severe in the future, resulting in increased risk exposure, the potential for more catastrophic losses, and ongoing financial instability for the program. Currently, the annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and subsidized premiums is not enough to cover its operating costs, claim losses, and principal and interest payments to the Department of the Treasury, thereby exposing the federal government and ultimately taxpayers to ever-greater financial risks, especially in years of catastrophic flooding.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-12, Flood Insurance: FEMA's Rate-Setting Process Warrants Attention
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-12
entitled 'Flood Insurance: FEMA's Rate-Setting Process Warrants
Attention' which was released on December 1, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2008:
Flood Insurance:
FEMA's Rate-Setting Process Warrants Attention:
GAO-09-12:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-12, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Questions about the financial status of the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) have increased since the 2005 hurricanes, which left the
program with an unprecedented $17.4 billion deficit”a debt that
resulted in GAO placing NFIP on its high-risk list in March 2006. Among
the concerns are the subsidized rates NFIP must provide for about 25
percent of the policies, mostly for older buildings in high-risk flood
zones. And although fully risk-based rates are supposed to reflect
actual flood risk, concerns have been raised that they do not. This
report evaluates (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency‘s (FEMA)
process for setting full-risk rates to determine whether it produces
rates that accurately reflect the risk of flooding and (2) the process
that FEMA uses to set subsidized rates and their effect on the
financial condition of NFIP. To do this work, GAO evaluated the NFIP
rate model, examined data from FEMA, surveyed relevant literature, and
interviewed other relevant agencies and risk-modeling firms.
What GAO Found:
FEMA‘s method for setting its full-risk rates may not ensure that the
rates accurately reflect the actual risk of flood damage. The NFIP
model combines estimated flood risk with expected flood damage, but a
number of factors may affect the accuracy of the rates the model
generates. First, some data inputs are outdated or inaccurate. FEMA
relies on flood probabilities from the 1980s and damage estimates that
do not fully reflect recent NFIP damage experience. Moreover, while
FEMA has made updating its flood maps a priority, most of the maps used
in rate setting have not yet been updated. Second, FEMA does not
require all properties remapped into higher-risk areas to pay rates
based on the new designation. This policy, known as grandfathering,
erodes NFIP‘s ability to charge rates that reflect the risk of
flooding. The policy is intended to increase participation, but FEMA
does not track the number of grandfathered properties and cannot
determine their financial impact on the program. Third, FEMA uses a
nationwide rating system that combines flood zones across many
geographic areas, so individual policies do not always reflect
topographical features that affect flood risk. In fact, some patterns
in historical claims and premium data suggest that NFIP‘s full-risk
rates may not always reflect actual flood risk. Collectively, these
factors increase the risk that premiums collected on full-risk policies
may be insufficient to cover future losses, adding to concerns about
NFIP‘s financial stability.
FEMA‘s rate-setting process for subsidized properties depends in part
on the accuracy of the full-risk rates, raising concerns about how
these rates are calculated as well. To set subsidized rates, FEMA first
subtracts the total amount it expects to collect in full-risk premiums
from the average historical loss year”that is, the minimum (target)
amount that the program needs to collect from all premiums to cover at
least average annual losses, as determined by historical data. The
remainder becomes the aggregate target amount the program must collect
in subsidized premiums. To set individual subsidized rates, FEMA
officials then consider their knowledge of flood risk, previous rate
increases for various locations, and statutory limits on increases. The
resulting subsidized premiums continue to be a financial strain on the
NFIP and contribute to its ongoing financial instability. Evidence
suggests that flooding is likely to become more severe in the future,
resulting in increased risk exposure, the potential for more
catastrophic losses, and ongoing financial instability for the program.
Currently, the annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and
subsidized premiums is not enough to cover its operating costs, claim
losses, and principal and interest payments to the Department of the
Treasury, thereby exposing the federal government and ultimately
taxpayers to ever-greater financial risks, especially in years of
catastrophic flooding.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that FEMA (1) ensure that its rate-setting methods
result in rates that accurately reflect flood risks and (2) collect
data to analyze the impact of newly created grandfathered properties on
the NFIP. FEMA generally concurred with both recommendations but
expressed two reservations with our recommendation regarding rate
setting.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-12]. For more
information, contact Orice M. Williams at (202) 512-8678 or
williamso@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FEMA's Method of Setting Full-Risk Premiums May Not Ensure That Rates
Accurately Reflect Risk:
FEMA's Process for Setting Subsidized Rates May Further Compromise the
Ongoing Financial Stability of the Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: State-by-State Analysis of Claims and Premiums Data:
Appendix III: Comments from FEMA:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Amounts of NFIP Insurance Available, as of May 1, 2008:
Table 2: Average Premium per Policy in Force by Flood Zone, 1997-2006:
Table 3: States Where Claims Frequently or Rarely Exceeded Premiums,
1978-2007:
Table 4: Claims and Premiums Data (in constant 2007 dollars), 1978-
2007:
Abbreviations:
BFE: base flood elevation:
CBO: Congressional Budget Office:
CRS: Congressional Research Service:
DELV: damage by elevation:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FIRM: Flood Insurance Rate Map:
GAAP: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles:
GDP: gross domestic product:
NFIP: National Flood Insurance Program:
PELV: probability of elevation:
SFHA: Special Flood Hazard Area:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 31, 2008:
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Shelby:
As of June 2008, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) owed
approximately $17.4 billion to the U.S. Treasury, primarily as a result
of loans that the program received to pay claims resulting from the
2005 hurricane season. According to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which
administers the program, this debt is greater than the sum of all
previous losses since the program's inception in 1968. Until 2004, NFIP
was able to cover most of its losses with the premiums it collected and
occasional loans from the Treasury that were either repaid or retired
by Congress. However, after the 2005 hurricanes--primarily Hurricane
Katrina--the program borrowed $16.8 billion from the Treasury to cover
the enormous number of claims. As a result, in part because of the
level of indebtedness, we placed NFIP on our high-risk list in March
2006.[Footnote 1]
As a result of this unprecedented deficit, questions have been raised
about the fiscal sustainability of the flood insurance program,
particularly given the potential for similar natural disasters in the
future. Congress and others have raised questions about the scope of
the information and quality of the data on which the program relies to
set premium rates and the accuracy of the maps NFIP uses to assess the
risk of flooding.[Footnote 2] FEMA's process for setting premium rates
determines how much policyholders will pay for their flood insurance
policies and thus the income available to FEMA for losses and expenses.
By statute, NFIP was not designed to be actuarially sound. Premium
rates for most properties--around 75 percent--are intended to fully
reflect the risk of flooding, but the remaining 25 percent are
subsidized, as mandated by statute. While these subsidized premiums do
not contribute sufficient revenues to cover potential losses, according
to FEMA officials, they promote participation in the program, an
important program goal. But as a result, the program does not collect
sufficient premium income to build capital to cover flood losses.
In response to the questions that have been raised about NFIP's
financial condition, this report evaluates (1) FEMA's process for
setting full-risk premiums to determine whether it produces rates that
accurately reflect the risk of flooding and (2) the process that FEMA
uses to set subsidized rates and their financial impact on NFIP.
To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed FEMA's flood risk
model and related methods for assessing risk and setting premium rates
for policyholders. We discussed FEMA's method for setting rates with
officials from FEMA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), and the U.S.
Geological Survey. We also met with risk-modeling firms, academics, and
the American Academy of Actuaries and reviewed studies of flood risk
and flood insurance, including reviews from the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). We also
analyzed premiums received and losses paid by NFIP for the period from
1978 to 2007. We assessed the reliability of these data, and found them
to be reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, we
obtained and reviewed information on FEMA's current and past borrowings
and repayments. We also analyzed FEMA's premiums and claims data to
determine the number of high-loss years on a state-by-state basis in
order to assess each state's financial impact on NFIP. In order to
conduct the state loss analysis, we reviewed the claims and premium
data from NFIP's BureauNet database.[Footnote 3] Appendix I provides
additional details about our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to September
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
The evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
FEMA's method for setting full-risk rates may not ensure that the rates
accurately reflect the actual risk of flood damage.[Footnote 4] FEMA's
model for setting these rates incorporates data on flood risks
generated by a hydrologic model that is based on largely the same
principles as hazard risk models used by private insurers and other
federal agencies.[Footnote 5] More specifically, FEMA generates rates
for flood insurance according to estimates of flood risk and expected
flood damage. However, a number of factors may affect the accuracy of
rates generated by the process. First, the data that FEMA uses to
define flood probabilities are outdated or inaccurate. For example,
some of the data used to estimate the probability of flooding have not
been updated since the 1980s. Similarly, the claims data used as inputs
to the model may be inaccurate because of incomplete claims records and
missing data. Further, the maps FEMA uses to set premium rates remain
substantially out of date despite recent modernization efforts. In
addition, an NFIP policy decision allows certain properties remapped
into riskier flood zones to keep their previous lower rates, which,
like subsidized rates, do not reflect the actual risk of flooding to
the properties and do not generate sufficient premiums to cover
expected losses.[Footnote 6] Moreover, FEMA does not collect data on
these properties--known as grandfathered properties--or measure their
financial impact on the program and does not know how many of these
properties exist, their exact location, or how much they generate in
losses. FEMA's rate-setting process also does not fully take into
account ongoing and planned development, long-term trends in erosion,
or the effects of global climate change, although private sector models
are incorporating some of these factors. Finally, FEMA sets flood
insurance rates on a nationwide basis, combining and averaging many
topographic factors that are relevant to flood risk, so that these
factors are not specifically accounted for in setting rates for
individual properties. Moreover, some patterns in historical claims and
premium data suggest that NFIP's rates may not accurately reflect
differences in flood risk. Collectively, these factors increase the
risk that full-risk premiums may be insufficient to cover future
losses, adding to concerns about NFIP's financial stability.
FEMA's rate-setting process for subsidized properties depends in part
on the accuracy of the full-risk rates, raising concerns about how
subsidized rates are calculated as well. To determine subsidized rates,
FEMA first subtracts the total amount that it expects to collect on
full-risk rate premiums from the average historical loss year target.
This target is the minimum amount of premiums the program needs to
collect to cover at least average annual losses, as determined by
historical loss data. The amount remaining from this calculation is the
aggregate target amount of subsidized premiums that the program needs
to collect. To set individual subsidized rates, FEMA officials then
consider their knowledge of flood risks, previous rate increases for
various areas, and statutory limits on increases. According to FEMA
documents, the method for determining the average historical loss year
target was changed in 2006 because fully incorporating the 2005 loss
year, with its catastrophic losses, would have resulted in substantial
increases in subsidized rates. Currently, the annual amount that NFIP
collects in both full-risk and subsidized premiums is not enough to
cover its operating costs, claim losses, and principal and interest
payments to the Department of the Treasury. Evidence suggests that
flooding is likely to become more severe in the future, resulting in
increased risk exposure, the potential for more catastrophic losses,
and ongoing financial instability for the program. Without changes to
its current rate-setting processes, NFIP premiums will be unlikely to
be able to cover the program's claims, expenses, and debt, exposing the
federal government and ultimately taxpayers to ever-greater financial
risks, especially in years of catastrophic flooding.
This report makes two recommendations aimed at helping improve NFIP's
rate-setting process. First, we recommend that FEMA take steps to
ensure that its rate-setting methods and data used to set rates result
in full-risk premiums rates that accurately reflect the risk of losses
from flooding. Second, we recommend that FEMA collect information on
the location, number, and losses associated with existing and newly
created grandfathered properties and analyze the financial impact of
these properties on the program.
We provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with a draft of this
report for review and comment. On October 14, 2008, FEMA provided
written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix III). FEMA
generally concurred with both of the report's recommendations but had
two reservations about our recommendation to ensure that FEMA's rate-
setting methods result in full-risk rates that accurately reflect the
risk of losses from flooding. FEMA also took exception to some of our
analyses and characterizations, which it believes overstate the
potential effect of different factors on the accuracy of the rate-
setting process. While we acknowledge the complexity of FEMA's rate-
setting process, the issues we have identified raise questions about
the accuracy of the resulting premium rates and highlights areas that
warrant additional analysis by FEMA. FEMA's comments are summarized
near the end of this report, and FEMA's letter is reprinted in appendix
III. FEMA also provided us with technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
NFIP is a federal program created by the National Flood Insurance Act
of 1968 that enables property owners in participating communities to
purchase insurance protection against losses from flooding. This
program is administered by FEMA. Participation in NFIP is based on an
agreement between local communities and the federal government. The
federal government makes flood insurance available to any community
that adopts and enforces a floodplain management ordinance to reduce
future flood risks to new construction in areas known as Special Flood
Hazard Areas (SFHA).[Footnote 7] Property owners located in the SFHA
with mortgages from federally regulated lenders are required to
purchase and maintain flood insurance policies. In these areas, new
construction and substantial improvements must conform to NFIP's
building standards.[Footnote 8] For example, the lowest floor of a
structure must be elevated to or above the base flood elevation (BFE)-
-the level at which there is a 1 percent chance of flooding in a given
year.[Footnote 9]
NFIP offers two types of flood insurance premiums: subsidized and full
risk. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 requires that NFIP offer
subsidized premiums to owners of certain properties. These subsidized
rates are not based on flood risk and, according to FEMA, represent
only about 35 to 40 percent of the full flood risk. Subsidized
properties account for about 25 percent of all NFIP policies, while
those with full-risk premiums account for the remaining 75 percent. The
type of policy and the subsequent rate a policyholder pays depend on
several property characteristics--for example, whether the structure
was built after or prior to the development of the community's Flood
Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) and where the structure is located relative
to the floodplain. NFIP studies and maps flood risks, assigning flood
zone designations based on the risk level for flooding. For our
purposes, in this report we generally refer to risk levels as moderate-
to low-risk, high-risk, high-risk coastal, and undetermined risk.
[Footnote 10] Potential policyholders can purchase both building and
contents flood insurance for residential and commercial properties
(table 1).[Footnote 11]
Table 1: Amounts of NFIP Insurance Available, as of May 1, 2008:
Type of coverage: Building coverage: Single-family dwelling;
Emergency program: $35,000;
Regular program: Basic limit: $50,000;
Regular program: Additional limit: $200,000;
Regular program: Total limit: $250,000.
Type of coverage: Building coverage: Two-to-four-family dwelling;
Emergency program: $35,000;
Regular program: Basic limit: $50,000;
Regular program: Additional limit: $200,000;
Regular program: Total limit: $250,000.
Type of coverage: Building coverage: Other residential;
Emergency program: $100,000;
Regular program: Basic limit: $150,000;
Regular program: Additional limit: $100,000;
Regular program: Total limit: $250,000.
Type of coverage: Building coverage: Nonresidential;
Emergency program: $100,000;
Regular program: Basic limit: $150,000;
Regular program: Additional limit: $350,000;
Regular program: Total limit: $500,000.
Type of coverage: Contents coverage: Residential;
Emergency program: $10,000;
Regular program: Basic limit: $20,000;
Regular program: Additional limit: $80,000;
Regular program: Total limit: $100,000.
Type of coverage: Building coverage: Nonresidential;
Emergency program: $100,000;
Regular program: Basic limit: $130,000;
Regular program: Additional limit: $370,000;
Regular program: Total limit: $500,000.
Source: NFIP rate manual.
Note: Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands have different
amounts of coverage for the first and second layers of coverage;
however, their total limit is also $250,000. The Emergency Flood
Insurance Program is intended as a program to provide a first layer
amount of insurance on all insurable structures before the effective
date of the initial FIRM.
[End of table]
Congress mandated the use of subsidized premiums to encourage
communities to join the program and mitigate concerns that charging
rates that fully and accurately reflected flood risk would be a burden
to some property owners. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 made
the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for the protection of
properties within SFHAs that are secured by mortgages from federally
regulated lenders, thus expanding the use of subsidized premiums. In
addition, NFIP was authorized to begin charging full-risk premiums for
all construction built after 1974 or the date of the community's
initial FIRM. According to FEMA, Congress made these changes to
encourage further participation in NFIP through low premiums. More
recently, legislation has been introduced that would limit NFIP
subsidies aimed at improving the financial stability of the program.
[Footnote 12]
Pre-FIRM structures generally are more prone to flood damage (that is,
riskier) than structures built later because they were not constructed
according to the program's building standards. Owners of post-FIRM
structures generally are not eligible to receive subsidized rates.
Largely because subsidized properties tend to be riskier than
properties insured at full-risk premiums, in 2007, the average annual
premium for a subsidized policy was about $869, while the average
annual premium for a full-risk policy was about $378.[Footnote 13]
Flood insurance rates are calculated for each flood zone. However, as
shown in table 2, flood insurance rates also depend on flood zone.
Table 2: Average Premium per Policy in Force by Flood Zone, 1997-2006:
(In constant 2006 dollars):
Calendar year: 1997;
High-risk: $521;
High-risk coastal: $1,039;
Moderate-to low-risk: $377;
Undetermined risk level: $794.
Calendar year: 1998;
High-risk: $538;
High-risk coastal: $1,041;
Moderate-to low-risk: $384;
Undetermined risk level: $814.
Calendar year: 1999;
High-risk: $525;
High-risk coastal: $1,053;
Moderate-to low-risk: $380;
Undetermined risk level: $824.
Calendar year: 2000;
High-risk: $497;
High-risk coastal: $1,049;
Moderate-to low-risk: $363;
Undetermined risk level: $788.
Calendar year: 2001;
High-risk: $482;
High-risk coastal: $1,059;
Moderate-to low-risk: $350;
Undetermined risk level: $766.
Calendar year: 2002;
High-risk: $472;
High-risk coastal: $1,118;
Moderate-to low-risk: $343;
Undetermined risk level: $775.
Calendar year: 2003;
High-risk: $478;
High-risk coastal: $1,232;
Moderate-to low-risk: $349;
Undetermined risk level: $824.
Calendar year: 2004;
High-risk: $492;
High-risk coastal: $1,343;
Moderate-to low-risk: $344;
Undetermined risk level: $842.
Calendar year: 2005;
High-risk: $502;
High-risk coastal: $1,398;
Moderate-to low-risk: $340;
Undetermined risk level: $912.
Calendar year: 2006;
High-risk: $521;
High-risk coastal: $1,463;
Moderate-to low-risk: $336;
Undetermined risk level: $980.
Source: GAO analysis of NFIP data.
[End of table]
The insurance operations of NFIP differ from those of most private
insurers in a number of ways. First, unlike private insurers that can
reject applicants with properties whose potential losses would not be
offset by premiums, NFIP is required to accept virtually all
applications for insurance. Therefore, NFIP is less able to offset the
effects of adverse selection--that is, the phenomenon that those who
are most likely to purchase insurance are also most likely to
experience losses.[Footnote 14] Adverse selection may lead to a
concentration of policyholders in the riskiest areas; the problem is
compounded by the fact that those at greatest risk are required to
purchase NFIP insurance if they have a mortgage from a federally
insured lender.
Second, NFIP's ability to adjust premiums is limited by statute. While
most states regulate premium prices, they tend to allow private
insurers considerable flexibility in their ability to set prices.
Third, NFIP assumes all the risks for the policies it sells. Private
insurers typically retain only part of the risk that they accept from
policyholders, ceding a portion of the risk to reinsurers.[Footnote 15]
This mechanism is particularly important in the case of insurance for
catastrophic events, because the availability of reinsurance allows an
insurer to limit the possibility that it will experience losses beyond
its ability to pay.
Finally, NFIP is not authorized to charge premiums that are sufficient
to build the capital that most private insurers have to offset losses
or purchase reinsurance in the private global market. For example,
private insurers have a capital surplus that they use to pay expected
claims. In contrast, NFIP operates on a cash flow basis, backed by
borrowing authority from the U.S. Treasury. As a result, NFIP does not
follow all of the traditional accounting practices that private
insurers use--for example, NFIP reports using only Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) accounting, which is an ongoing operations
accounting basis, while private insurers must report both GAAP and
statutory accounting basis.[Footnote 16]
FEMA's Method of Setting Full-Risk Premiums May Not Ensure That Rates
Accurately Reflect Risk:
FEMA uses a rate model to generate prices for flood insurance according
to flood risk and expected flood damage. However, we found that in some
cases these full-risk premiums may not accurately reflect actual risk
because of limitations in the data used as inputs for the model and the
effects of certain policy decisions. For instance:
* Some data FEMA used in rate setting are outdated or inaccurate,
including data on flood probabilities, damage estimates, and flood
maps.
* FEMA allows some properties that were remapped into riskier flood
zones to keep their previous lower rates.
* FEMA's rate-setting process does not fully take into account ongoing
and planned development, long-term trends in erosion, and effects of
global climate change.
* FEMA sets rates on a nationwide basis, combining and averaging across
many geographically diverse areas.[Footnote 17]
Furthermore, our analysis of the difference between claims payments and
premiums collected for all 50 states and the District of Columbia
suggests that NFIP's pricing has not accurately reflected differences
in flood risk. Collectively, these factors increase the risk that
premiums collected on full-risk rates do not accurately reflect the
risks of flooding and therefore may not be sufficient to cover future
losses.
FEMA's Rate-Setting Process Uses a Model That Is Based on Flood Risk
and Expected Flood Damage:
According to FEMA, rates that are based on the probability of a given
level of flooding, damage estimates based on that level of flooding,
and accepted actuarial principles are considered to be "full risk."
[Footnote 18] To set rates for flood insurance that accurately reflect
risk, information about the differential risk of flooding is key, with
greater flood risks resulting in higher rates. Rates also vary
depending on how much insurance is purchased. As claims are more likely
to be made against the first several thousand dollars of coverage than
against much higher levels of coverage (that is, smaller dollar-value
losses are generally expected to occur more frequently than larger ones
and thus pose a greater risk), rates per $100 of insurance coverage are
lower for higher levels of coverage.[Footnote 19]
FEMA uses a model to set rates for flood insurance for post-FIRM
construction within the 1 percent, or 100-year, floodplain according to
flood risk and expected resulting flood damage.[Footnote 20] This
method of estimating flood damage is based on the hydrologic model
described in a 1966 report by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which was based on studies conducted in the 1960s and
developed and used by the Corps for a number of years.[Footnote 21]
While the Corps has revised its model for estimating flood damage, it
still makes use of the hydrologic model to estimate flood damage.
In the high-risk and high-risk coastal zones, the model combines
estimates of the frequency of flooding with estimates of the magnitude
of damage caused by flooding, producing "pure premium" costs intended
to cover the actual flood losses. FEMA uses such inputs as the
elevation of the lowest floor of the building, the type of building,
the number of floors, the presence of a basement, claims data, and
mapping information to generate the estimates. This pure premium amount
is then adjusted to capture certain program costs, compensate for
underinsurance by policyholders, and reflect the fact that the program
has a deductible.[Footnote 22] For the moderate-to low-risk and other
full-risk premium zones, rates have been developed based on actuarial
and engineering judgments, using the rates generated by the model and
the historical experience of the high-risk zones as benchmarks.
[Footnote 23]
While other entities employing flood models may use more sophisticated
computer modeling techniques, the NFIP rate model is based largely on
the same principles. In 2000, FEMA completed a feasibility study on
using private market reinsurance to cover a portion of its flood risk
that required modeling the frequency and size of catastrophic flood
events, and determined that the results of the study were not
inconsistent with the results of NFIP's rating structure. For other
lines of catastrophe insurance, private insurers rely heavily on
computer models of simulated damage over many possible events to price
their products.[Footnote 24] Like NFIP, other federal agencies and
private insurers involved in flood modeling also rely on flood maps and
data on the likelihood of flooding and damages. According to FEMA, it
has contracted for actuarial services with an external consultant to
assess the current state of hazard modeling and the possible
applicability of those models to NFIP.
Some Key Data Elements Used in the Rate-Setting Model Are Outdated or
Based on Erroneous Information:
Questions remain about the age and quality of the underlying data FEMA
uses in its model to calculate full-risk premiums. The NFIP model for
setting full-risk premium rates relies on flood probability estimates
and expected damage data, which rely in part on outdated or potentially
inaccurate information, including outdated FIRMs. As discussed more
fully below, flood probability estimates have not been updated since
the 1970s and 1980s, most FIRMs are out of date despite FEMA's recent
modernization efforts, and the claims data used to calculate full-risk
premiums may be inaccurate. As a result, the premium rates set by NFIP
may not fully reflect the risk of loss due to flooding.
Data Used to Determine Flood Probabilities Have Not Been Updated since
the 1970s and 1980s:
FEMA's estimates of probabilities that floods of different severities
(relative to the BFE) will occur in a given year, or "probability of
elevation" (PELV) values, were generated in the 1970s. Within any zone,
the risk that floodwaters will reach the BFE in any year is 1 percent,
but across zones the likelihood that floodwaters will reach a foot
above or below that level varies. PELV tables provide detailed
information, by zone, about the frequency with which floods of
different elevations are expected to occur. These data were generated
using detailed engineering studies, available flood data, simulations,
and professional judgment and were established for each flood zone to
meet generally accepted scientific parameters and legal considerations
of the time. FEMA later concluded that flood probabilities were likely
underestimated in some cases because of the short flood histories used
in some of the studies. As a result, according to FEMA officials, some
of the original PELV values were modified in the early 1980s to account
for this statistical bias. They have not been revisited or updated
since that time.
FEMA currently uses both the original and modified PELV values in the
rate-setting process. The original PELV values contribute 80 percent to
the ultimate results and the modified values 20 percent, reflecting
weights set out by policies from the early 1980s, according to FEMA
officials. Flood risk experts have suggested that flood probabilities
(and thus flood insurance rates) are likely to change as land use (such
as urban or suburban development), infrastructure (such as new bridges
and culverts), and weather patterns change. FEMA could capture such
changes by updating its flood probability data but has not done so.
FEMA officials also acknowledged that the weighting for the original
and modified PELV values was likely out of date but said that other
competing priorities, including supporting post-Katrina-related
activities and other studies had been given priority.[Footnote 25]
Moreover, a FEMA official noted that the weighting might introduce a
degree of "conservatism" to the rate-setting process because it would
lead to higher rather than lower premium rates.[Footnote 26] Further,
according to the officials, the geographic mix of NFIP policies had
become more concentrated in Florida and other communities where the
PELV values were more accurate. Nevertheless, FEMA has not updated the
PELV data since the 1980s or updated the weighting of the original and
modified PELV data. As a result, the accuracy of the flood probability
estimates and the probability of elevation values are uncertain, and we
could not determine whether the rates based on such data were accurate.
Moreover, FEMA was not able to provide any analysis that it had done to
determine that the current weighting remained appropriate or that the
probabilities had not changed in over 30 years.
The Claims Data Used in the Model May Be Inaccurate:
In addition, some claims data--which are updated on a periodic basis--
may suffer from errors and thus misinform damage estimates and, in
turn, the rates generated by the model. FEMA relies on estimates of the
percentage of the value of a structure that is expected to be damaged
when a flood occurs, or the "damage by elevation" (DELV) values. DELV
information is measured in 1-foot increments of the flood level within
the structure and is expressed as the expected percentage of the
property's value that will be damaged by a flood of that elevation.
[Footnote 27] As with the PELV data, information used in establishing
DELV values was obtained primarily from engineering studies. In 1973,
data for DELVs were selected on the basis of studies done by the Corps
and available flood claims at that time. Currently, FEMA modifies the
Army Corps DELV values based on its NFIP claims experience. When FEMA
determines that its own loss data are "credible," it uses these data
rather than the original data generated by the Corps.[Footnote 28]
However, FEMA also currently uses updated Corps damage data to
supplement NFIP claims data where it lacks sufficient credible loss
data. According to a FEMA official, for the most common type of
property insured by NFIP, the claims process has become fully credible
for a wide range of water depths in the structure.
However, evidence suggests that there are inaccuracies in the actual
claims data used to update the DELV values. An external study noted
some internal control problems with NFIP's claims database.[Footnote
29] For instance, claims records were often incomplete because the
claims data had been collected in the field by local adjustors for
purposes of processing claims. As a result, many records did not
indicate BFE or depth of flooding, clearly differentiate between wind
and water losses, or capture losses above the insurance limit when
damage exceeded coverage limits. In addition, Corps officials told us
that they had reviewed FEMA's claims between 1998 and 2000 databases
and found the data to be unreliable for their purposes. For example,
according to the Corps, in some cases the claims data indicated flood
damage, but flood height data were missing. FEMA's database recorded
these missing height data as a flood height of zero. Our analysis of
NFIP claims paid between 1978 and 2007 further supports what the Corps
told us. We found an increasing percentage of claims with "0" water
depth until they leveled off at between 44 and 49 percent from 1998
until 2004. In 2005 when the Gulf Coast hurricanes occurred, this
percentage dropped to about 13 percent, but has risen above 22 percent
in the more recent years. Thus, an erroneous data combination of
positive flood damage and zero flood height was being used to develop
damage curves. As a result, the Corps began to collect its own damage
data, which FEMA now uses to supplement its own data.
While FEMA has acknowledged that some problems exist, it believes that
these types of errors relate primarily to the most severe flooding
events, which have a lower probability of occurring, involve greater
water depths, and would contribute only marginally to insurance rates.
FEMA officials said that they had reviewed the possible impact of such
data errors and did not consider them to be significant because they
believed that the zero-elevation water depth errors would overstate the
amount of damage from zero amount of water in a property.[Footnote 30]
However, this analysis is incomplete because it does not evaluate the
impact of omitting these damage amounts from the actual flood depth
levels. As a result, FEMA may be unable to fully assess the overall
impact of these errors or omissions on its full-risk rates, creating a
risk that these premiums may not accurately reflect the actual risk of
flood loss.
Maps That Provide Information for Base Flood Elevations Remain
Substantially Out of Date despite Modernization Efforts:
FIRMs provide the information that determines BFEs, a key input in the
rate-setting model. FEMA formally undertook map modernization efforts
in fiscal year 2003. According to FEMA, the agency undertook map
modernization for several reasons:
* Flood hazard conditions are dynamic, and many NFIP maps may not
reflect recent development and/or natural changes in the environment.
* Updated NFIP maps can take advantage of revised data and improved
technologies for identifying flood hazards.
* Up-to-date maps support a flood insurance program that is more
closely aligned with actual risk, encourages wise community-based
floodplain management, and improves citizens' flood hazard awareness.
* Local communities and various stakeholders want more timely updates
of flood maps and easier access to the flood hazard data used to create
the maps.
In 2005, FEMA adjusted its goals and currently expects to provide
updated flood boundaries for 75 percent of stream miles reflected on
FEMA's issued maps and 0.30 percent of those mapped stream miles will
be based on new or updated engineering studies by the end of the
program in 2010. FEMA also revised its goal of having digitized maps
that covered 100 percent of the population to having digitized maps for
92 percent of the population so that it could better focus its efforts
and thus improve map quality. FEMA undertook these changes in response
to concerns expressed by Congress and DHS's Inspector General's office
and in response to our prior work on this issue.[Footnote 31] FEMA
officials stated that changes in land use and structural development
that had occurred over time would be captured when FEMA updated the
FIRMs, each of which is required to be reassessed every 5 years.
[Footnote 32]
According to FEMA, as of May 2008, approximately 4 percent of U.S.
counties had maps that accurately reflect the current risk of flooding
(fully updated) and were newly digitized and 2 percent had old maps
that may or may not accurately reflect the actual risk of flooding but
were newly digitized. For the remaining 94 percent of U.S. counties,
the maps were a combination of new and old mapping data that were in
production or have not yet begun the process. According to FEMA
officials, although maps for 94 percent of U.S. counties had not been
fully updated or newly digitized, all counties had received a partial
update to their flood hazard information and more than a third had
received updates that exceeded one of FEMA's national map quality
targets.[Footnote 33] FEMA further stated that in March 2008,
approximately 68 percent of the nation's population had received a map
that met, exceeded or at least approached map quality targets of map
modernization. An additional 27 percent of the population has received
a preliminary map. FEMA informed us that it anticipates that 92 percent
of the nation's population will have a modernized map by 2010.
However, although FEMA has been working to update FIRMs and improve
their quality, a significant portion of the maps reflect data at least
15 years old, which may or may not accurately reflect actual risk of
flooding. As of April 2008, 50 percent of the nation's approximately
105,700 flood maps were at least 15 years old, 58 percent were more
than 10 years old, and 70 percent were at least 5 years old. To the
extent that these older maps are inaccurate and the risk of flooding
has changed, reliance on these older maps could lead to inaccurate
flood risk assessments, which in turn could lead to inaccurate premium
rates.
FEMA Does Not Track the Number or Location of Remapped Grandfathered
Properties That Pay Less than Full-Risk Premiums:
FEMA made a policy decision to grandfather into the program certain
properties, that is, it allowed properties that have been remapped into
riskier flood zones to keep their previous lower rates. FEMA is in the
process of updating FIRMs through its Map Modernization program, but
these new maps may not lead to more accurate pricing due to this policy
decision, which was based primarily on concerns about the affordability
of the resulting rates.[Footnote 34] FEMA documents state that
properties are grandfathered in order to recognize policyholders who
have complied with their original FIRM, have remained loyal NFIP
customers, or both. In general, two categories of buildings may be
grandfathered into the program: (1) those built in compliance with the
FIRM that was in effect at the time of construction and (2) those built
before a FIRM was in effect or that were not in compliance at the time
of construction.[Footnote 35] For those buildings in compliance at the
time of construction, property owners need to provide documentation of
the date of the original FIRM and the property's flood zone, BFE, and
other map-related information. Properties that were not in compliance
generally can be grandfathered if they have had continuous flood
insurance and if the building has not been altered in certain ways.
FEMA officials told us that while grandfathering can work as a
disincentive for sound floodplain management, the decision to
grandfather rates was based on consideration of (1) equity, (2) ease of
administration, and (3) goals of promoting flood plain management.
[Footnote 36]
While FEMA does not consider the premiums on these properties to be
subsidized because they are based on the average risk for the whole
class to which they had been assigned previously, they share two
characteristics with subsidized rates. First, rates based on new FIRMs
should more accurately reflect flood risk, but grandfathered properties
will not be charged those rates. Second, the grandfathered status of a
property continues indefinitely, even when the property is sold. FEMA
officials acknowledged that property owners that obtain grandfathered
rates for their homes are being cross-subsidized by other policyholders
in the same zone that are paying higher rates.[Footnote 37] For
example, under grandfathering, repetitive loss properties remapped into
a higher-risk zone instead would pay a rate generally charged to lower-
risk properties.
While grandfathered rates are used to keep existing policyholders, FEMA
has not taken steps to measure the impact of these rates on the
program's financial condition. FEMA officials said that they currently
had limited data on new or existing grandfathered properties and are
just beginning to explore ways to track these properties. For example,
they had not tracked the number of grandfathered properties or
calculated how much lower grandfathered premiums are than the actual
rates. As a result, they did not know the effect of grandfathered
properties on the program's total premium collection and the extent to
which these rates deviate from fully risk-based rates. Without this
information, FEMA's ability to address the financial impact of such
properties on NFIP's financial health is limited. FEMA officials
acknowledged the importance of tracking information related to
grandfathered properties and told us they plan to start a tracking
process in May 2009.[Footnote 38] However, they said that this process
will not capture the inventory of existing grandfathered properties.
FEMA Does Not Consider Risk Factors Such as Erosion and Climate Change
when Setting Flood Insurance Rates:
Some experts with whom we spoke have suggested that incorporating
ongoing and planned development, erosion trends, and climate change
into flood risk modeling would more fully capture longer-term flood
risk exposure, but FEMA does not take these variables into account.
FEMA's present policy is to map SFHAs based on current development
conditions. However, as floodplains are developed and more ground
surfaces are paved or made impervious (nonabsorbent), the risks and
expected elevations of flooding increase. As the predicted elevation of
the base flood increases, SFHAs subsequently spread beyond mapped
boundaries. As a result, in rapidly developing watersheds or where
characteristics change significantly due to flood control projects or
other natural events, some FIRMs may become outdated shortly after
their completion. In addition, some properties could be constructed
without proper protection from the flood hazard they may face
throughout their life span, and others could be uninsured or subject to
insurance rates that do not accurately reflect flood risk.
FEMA's current flood hazard mapping procedures for coastal areas
incorporate storm-induced coastal erosion but not long-term erosion.
[Footnote 39] While shorelines, dunes, and bluffs can retreat during a
single storm, long-term erosion at a shoreline is the net result of a
variety of factors such as sediment losses from storms and inundation
from sea level rise, averaged over several decades.[Footnote 40] A 2000
study conducted for FEMA by the H. John Heinz Center estimated that
over the next 60 years, losses due to the effects of coastal erosion
would average $80 million annually.[Footnote 41] If coastal development
continues at its current pace, or if sea levels rise as some scientists
have predicted, such losses could be even greater. In the absence of
the authority needed to establish erosion zones, FEMA has taken action
based on the results of the study, namely, a steady annual increase in
rates for the high-risk coastal zone at a pace it says is commensurate
with the study's projections.[Footnote 42] In addition, according to
FEMA officials, they formed an internal working group to determine
additional actions that could be taken to implement the report's
recommendations under the existing laws and regulations that govern
NFIP. The working group concluded that because of the statutory
limitations, implementing the recommendations would require direct
congressional authorization.[Footnote 43] Therefore, FEMA, which does
not currently map erosion hazard areas, is unable, through its rate-
setting process, to inform policyholders of the risk to their property
from erosion. Consequently, in some cases flood insurance rates may
send a false signal that understates the risk exposure faced by current
policyholders or prospective development.
FEMA also does not incorporate the potential effects of climate change
into its rate-setting considerations. Our 2007 report on climate change
discussed the effects of climate change on weather-related events and,
subsequently, insured and uninsured losses. We found that leading
scientific bodies expect warmer temperatures to increase the frequency
and severity of damaging extreme weather-related events.[Footnote 44]
In addition, population growth in hazard-prone areas and the resulting
development and increasing real estate values have increased the
exposure of federal and private insurers. In particular, heavily
populated areas along the Northeast, Southeast, and Texas coasts, which
are at the highest risk for major hurricanes, also have some of the
highest value properties in the United States. Because of these and
other factors, our report estimates that NFIP's exposure has grown
substantially, quadrupling since 1980 and nearing $1 trillion.
While many private insurers are beginning to take climate change into
account, FEMA has done little to develop the kind of information needed
to understand the long-term exposure of NFIP to climate change for a
variety of reasons. For instance, NFIP's goals are fundamentally
different from those of private insurers. Specifically, private
insurers stress the financial success of their business operations, but
the law authorizing the federal flood insurance program promotes
affordable coverage and broad participation by individuals at risk. In
addition, although FEMA manages its risk within statutory guidelines,
unlike private insurers, NFIP is neither required nor permitted to
limit its catastrophic risk strictly within its ability to pay claims
on an annual basis. One important implication of this lack of limits on
managing catastrophic risk is that FEMA has little reason to develop
information on NFIP's long-term exposure to the potential risk of
increased low-frequency, high-severity weather events associated with
climate change. NFIP's risk management processes adapt to near-term
changes in weather as they affect existing data. As a result, NFIP is
designed to assess and insure against current--not future--risks and
currently does not have the information necessary to adjust rates for
the potential impacts of events associated with climate.[Footnote 45]
FEMA told us that it has commissioned a study to assess the long-term
exposure to climate change that will investigate changes in sea levels,
intensity and frequency of hurricanes, and precipitation patterns.
FEMA's Rating System Combines and Averages Many Different Risks to
Create Nationwide Rates:
FEMA classifies properties according to flood risk using a single,
nationwide class-rating system rather than an individual property or
community-by-community rating system. That is, all properties grouped
into a class--based on structure type and elevation relative to the
BFE--are assumed to have the same risk.[Footnote 46] Further, FEMA
charges the same rate for a given class in the high-risk zone (or
separately, in the high-risk coastal zone) regardless of location
within the zone. Thus, two properties in the same class but located on
vastly different terrain--for example, one in a shallow floodplain and
the other in a steep and narrow mountain valley--are charged the same
rate per $100 of insurance coverage despite the fact that they may have
different expected loss.
The NFIP model can incorporate specific topographic (that is, flood
zone) information in rate setting. However, according to FEMA, it was
determined that more averaging could be justified, because the
differences in rates across flood zones were not significant enough to
warrant that level of detail. According to FEMA officials, the class-
rating approach balanced the need to recognize significant differences
in risk with a simplified process for determining rates that was easier
for the sales force and others to use. FEMA has not revisited its class-
rating approach since its inception although certain program elements
have changed since that time. For example, program participation has
more than doubled from just over 2 million policies to more than 5.2
million from the late 1980s to 2007 and increased numbers of properties
have been constructed on SFHAs. As a result of the growth in the
program, the rate classes may not accurately reflect the actual flood
risk to individual properties and averaging may no longer accurately
reflect differences in rates within zones.
Our Analysis of Historical Claims and Premium Data Raises Questions
about a Potential Mismatch between Rates and Risk:
We analyzed 30 years of NFIP data on claims and premiums and found
patterns based on differences among states indicating that NFIP rates
may not have always accurately reflected differences in flood risk.
[Footnote 47] As we have seen, FEMA sets premium rates that apply
nationwide. Our state-by-state analysis of annual claims and premiums
data dating back to 1978 showed that some states consistently had more
years in which claims exceeded premiums than did other states over this
period, raising questions about a potential mismatch between rates and
risk.[Footnote 48] It is important to note that claims equaling
premiums in a given year would not indicate a break-even year, because
in addition to covering expected claims in a year, a portion of
premiums is also intended to cover expenses necessary to operate NFIP.
For example, in the year ending May 1, 2008, NFIP projects about 53
percent of its total expenses would pay for claims, while the rest
would cover other expenses such as interest on debt, loss adjustment
expense, and agents' commissions. For the purposes of this report, we
assigned the title of high-loss year to any year in which a state's
claims exceeded its premiums, because in these years, these states
would not have had any premium dollars left over to contribute toward
administrative expenses once claims had been paid.
On an annual basis, we found that for 1978-2007, nine states had high-
loss years more often than once every 4 years (table 3). Missouri and
West Virginia had the most high-loss years, with 11; Alabama, Illinois,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Texas followed, with
from 8 to 10 such years. Other states had very few high-loss years, and
some had none. For example, Alaska, Colorado, and New Mexico had no
high-loss years, while Florida, Idaho, Oregon, South Carolina, and
Vermont had 1, and Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming had 2.[Footnote 49] The
consistency with which some states were at one extreme of the high-
loss-year distribution or the other since the late 1970s suggests that
NFIP's method of setting flood insurance rates on a nationwide basis
may not accurately reflect differences in flood risk among states,
because rates for similar properties do not vary by state.
Table 3: States Where Claims Frequently or Rarely Exceeded Premiums,
1978-2007 (In constant 2007 dollars):
State: Missouri;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: ($384,344,855);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($350,344,220);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 11.
State: West Virginia;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: ($146,896,812);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($118,874,830);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 11.
State: Mississippi;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: ($40,584,822);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($2,498,544,520);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 10.
State: Louisiana;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $428,383,041;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($11,777,260,456);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 10.
State: Texas;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: ($728,796,632);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($222,265,084);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: Alabama;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: ($505,212,107);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($746,166,995);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: Illinois;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $90,321,291;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $162,050,972;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: Ohio;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $101,547,985;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $100,111,514;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: New Hampshire;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $36,648,547;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $21,531,170;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 8.
State: Utah;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $15,372,336;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $21,207,776;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 2.
State: Wyoming;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $16,597,320;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $21,134,460;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 2.
State: Nevada;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $70,283,808;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $82,293,838;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 2.
State: Vermont;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $23,425,436;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $30,590,342;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Idaho;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $32,991,914;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $42,892,136;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Oregon;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $104,014,018;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $133,186,375;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: South Carolina;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $313,400,772;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $590,371,633;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Florida;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $8,035,673,802;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $9,938,638,592;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Alaska;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $23,003,446;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $27,770,628;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 0.
State: New Mexico;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $79,909,374;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $97,876,034;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 0.
State: Colorado;
1978-2004 premiums minus claims: $135,763,975;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $170,139,136;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data.
Note: We analyzed two time periods so we could separately consider the
impact of the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The numbers in
parenthesis denote negative values.
[End of table]
We recognize that flooding is a highly variable event, with losses
varying widely from year to year, and that even an analysis of nearly
three decades of historical data could lead to unreliable conclusions
about the actual flood risk faced by a given state. In addition, we
note that Florida, Texas, and Louisiana are among the states with the
most NFIP policies, and therefore have a more significant impact on the
amount of premiums collected than other states. Some discrepancies in
high-loss years among states are to be expected and do not necessarily
indicate that NFIP premium rates are mispriced. However, if some states
frequently have high-loss years or rarely or never have such years,
questions arise about the rate structure, because policyholders in
states with frequent high-loss years are paying the same rates as
policyholders with similar properties in states with fewer losses.
Additional study would be required to determine whether policyholders
in some states with lower losses are paying a higher premium than is
appropriate for their risk, and others paying too little. For example,
our analysis did not control for differences in the type of policy
purchased, such as the mix of certain property types across states and
insurance coverage amounts, which could affect both premiums and
claims. In addition, we did not control for differences in the mix of
subsidized and full-risk policies or the impact of subsidized premiums
on our results, which could also affect the results.[Footnote 50]
Despite these limitations, however, this analysis raises a number of
questions that may warrant further study that could provide useful
insights into the use of nationwide rates as well as other aspects of
the program.
Collectively, these factors raise questions about FEMA's rate-setting
process and increase the risk that NFIP full-risk premiums rates may
not accurately reflect the underlying risk of flood loss. As a result,
the premiums collected by FEMA for full-risk policies may not be
sufficient to cover the risks associated with those policies. If the
premiums are not sufficient, FEMA will likely have to continue to
borrow from the Treasury and could face a future of financial
instability because of its ongoing inability to cover claims and
expenses.
FEMA's Process for Setting Subsidized Rates May Further Compromise the
Ongoing Financial Stability of the Program:
FEMA's rate-setting process for subsidized properties, which depends in
part on the accuracy of the full-risk rates, has evolved over time.
Currently, to determine subsidized rates, FEMA first subtracts the
total amount that it expects to collect on full-risk rate premiums from
the average historical loss year target--the minimum amount of premiums
the program needs to collect to cover at least average annual losses
based on historical loss data. The amount remaining from this
calculation is the aggregate target amount of subsidized premiums that
the program needs to collect. Then to set individual subsidized rates,
FEMA officials consider their knowledge of flood risks, previous rate
increases for various areas, and statutory limits on rate increases.
Currently, the annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and
subsidized premiums is not enough to cover its operating costs, claim
losses, and principal and interest payments to the Department of the
Treasury. Without changes to its current rate-setting processes, NFIP
premiums will be unlikely to be able to cover the program's claims,
expenses, and debt, exposing the federal government and ultimately
taxpayers to ever-greater financial risks, especially in years of
catastrophic flooding.
The Process Used to Set Subsidized Rates Has Evolved over Time:
In designing NFIP, Congress required that premiums for certain
properties be offered at prices below those for full-risk premiums to
encourage participation in the program and to ensure that premiums were
affordable for existing structures in the floodplain. However, the
statute does not provide a formula or methodology for setting the
subsidies, leaving it up to the program to develop one. When the
program began, NFIP administrators set the subsidized rates on the
basis of what they believed would be affordable, but this process
resulted in losses that had to be covered by borrowings as discussed
previously. Some of the resulting deficit was later forgiven by
Congress.
In 1981, NFIP administrators, after discussions with Congress, started
setting NFIP's subsidized premium rates based on the average historical
loss year calculations.[Footnote 51] According to FEMA, this change
allowed the agency to resist external pressures in setting premium
rates and provided a more objective standard for determining subsidized
rates. FEMA documents from most years between 2001 and 2006 state that
the average historical loss year target, which is based on losses from
previous years averaged over time, generally is considered a floor for
premium collection. To account for the potential of catastrophic
losses, and the additional funds required to pay such losses, FEMA sets
premium rates so that the total premiums collected will be
approximately 15 to 25 percent greater than the average historical loss
year estimate.
However, FEMA can adjust, and has recently adjusted, the way it
calculates the average historical loss year. Although loss years can
vary markedly, none of those taken into account before 2005 included
the kinds of catastrophic losses seen after Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
According to FEMA officials, including the 2005 losses in calculations
of the average historical loss year would have resulted in premium
increases well above the 10 percent statutory limit.[Footnote 52] As a
result, FEMA officials instituted a weighting factor for the 2005
losses, and as a result the full amount of the losses was not
incorporated into the rate-setting model. According to FEMA officials,
they incorporated losses of $2.1 billion of the estimated $23.2 billion
in losses from 2005.[Footnote 53] NFIP set the 2007 and 2008 flood
insurance rates based on this modified methodology.
Although FEMA has incorporated more objective criteria against which to
set rates for subsidized premiums, the process also depends on the
accuracy of calculations for full-risk premiums.[Footnote 54] After
FEMA derives the full-risk premiums, it deducts the total amount of
full-risk premiums that it expects to collect from the average
historical loss year target; the remainder is the amount in premiums
that it needs to collect from subsidized policies. Subsidized rates are
then set based on this amount. Thus, the level of subsidized rates
charged to policyholders depends, in part, on the full-risk premiums
determined by FEMA. For example, if full-risk premiums are too low
because they do not accurately reflect flood risk, the total amount
FEMA will need to collect from subsidized policies will be higher,
resulting in higher subsidized premiums.
Finally, according to FEMA, the rate-setting process for subsidized
premiums also involves other considerations. Officials said once they
had calculated the aggregate amount of subsidized premiums they would
need, they determined the subsidized rate increases and ultimately the
rates for the individual zones based on their knowledge and
understanding of flood risks. FEMA officials told us that their
decisions on how much to raise rates on various zones took into account
concerns about the effect of increases on policyholders, the level and
extent of past rate increases, and knowledge of relative flood risks in
those areas. FEMA did not provide us with any written documentation
describing how these decisions were reached. As mentioned previously,
by law FEMA can raise rates on each zone by no more than 10 percent a
year. Our review of FEMA documents show that FEMA raised rates
significantly for a small number of policies and by very little for a
large number of policies from 2002 through 2006. For example, FEMA
raised rates by an average of more than 9 percent on about 1 percent of
all NFIP policies--specifically, on certain subsidized policies located
in high-risk coastal zones. In contrast, FEMA raised rates by an
average of around 2 percent on 40 percent of total policies in high-
risk zones that were paying full-risk rates. Ultimately, the generally
small increases will not help ensure NFIP's financial stability and may
in fact decrease it by adding to its operating deficit.
NFIP's Current Rate-Setting Processes Result in Premiums That Are Not
Sufficient to Cover Current Debt and Future Claims:
The processes and policies that FEMA uses to set both full-risk and
subsidized premium rates have contributed to NFIP's inability to
generate enough in premiums to cover the program's operating costs,
claims losses, and debt to the Treasury. From 1978 through 2004, NFIP
had a net loss of $2 billion. These years had historically low
flooding, but NFIP had yearly deficits for about half of these years.
Over that period, Congress retired about $1.2 billion of this total
debt. However, the introduction of average historical loss year targets
in the 1980s resulted in a series of rate increases that contributed to
a sizeable reduction of the net loss.
The 2005 hurricanes significantly altered NFIP's financial landscape.
The 2005 hurricanes, especially Katrina, left the program with debt of
more than $17.4 billion as of June 2008. To service the debt to the
Treasury, FEMA owes two annual interest payments of around $365 million
that are generally due in April and October of each year. FEMA
officials told us that they were able to make the two payments in 2007
without borrowing because, according to FEMA documents, NFIP faced
unusually light flooding in 2006 and 2007. In addition, FEMA made an
unscheduled principal payment of $225 million in November 2007.
However, in April 2008, FEMA borrowed $50 million to pay the $364
million interest payment owed to the Treasury. FEMA estimates that it
will owe a total of $734 million in interest charges in fiscal year
2008.
FEMA officials informed us that they did not know whether NFIP would be
able to make future interest payments without borrowing because of
uncertainty about future flooding. According to FEMA documents, FEMA
has paid $1.6 billion in interest to the Treasury since 2005. NFIP
currently has about 5.6 million policies in force, resulting in
approximately $2.6 billion in total premium. Historically, program
expenses (excluding loss and allocated loss adjustment expenses) have
averaged around 38 percent of premiums, or $1 billion of current total
premium collection. As of June 2008, NFIP's average noncatastrophic
historical loss year (which excludes Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma) is about $1.3 billion. The combined outlays for loss and loss
adjustment expenses of around $1.3 billion, administrative expenses of
approximately $1 billion, and interest payments of approximately $0.7
billion exceed the program's current premium collection of
approximately $2.6 billion. Under current conditions, it is unlikely
that NFIP will be able to meet its interest payments in most years, and
the program's debt will likely grow as the program borrows to meet the
interest payments.
Conclusions:
Over the years, FEMA has taken a number of steps to improve the rate-
setting process, which was established more than two decades ago, but a
number of factors raise questions about whether the resulting rates
reflect the actual flood risk. First, potentially outdated and
inaccurate data about flood probabilities, damage claims, and flood
maps are increasing the risk that full-risk premiums do not reflect
actual risk of flooding. Second, unlike many insurers in the private
sector, FEMA has done little to understand the long-term impact of
planned and ongoing development on damage estimates. While this is due,
in part, to the fact that FEMA lacks the authority to factor potential
or long-term development into potential flood damage, FEMA has not, for
example, evaluated how such developments could affect the accuracy of
its maps. Finally, FEMA's continued use of a nationwide rating
structure that combines zones across geographic areas despite the
substantial growth of the program introduces additional uncertainties.
While additional analysis of the data is needed, our analysis found
that some patterns in historical claims and premiums collected raise
questions about whether this approach is still appropriate and
reasonable given the growth in the program. Collectively, these factors
call into question the accuracy of the full-risk rates generated by
FEMA's rate model. By updating elements of its flood rate model and
certain rate-setting policies, FEMA could help ensure that data used in
its model such as flood probabilities, damage estimates, and
information from flood maps are as accurate as possible. In addition,
by reconsidering risk aggregation across flood zones and the effects of
development and climate change into the rate-setting process, FEMA has
the opportunity to make its model more robust and increase the accuracy
of its rates.
Similarly, FEMA's policy of allowing properties that have been remapped
to higher-risk zones to retain lower rates results in rates that do not
accurately reflect flood risk. Because the premiums are not based on
the actual risk of flooding, these policyholders are receiving a
subsidy from other policyholders in the same zone and the federal
government--and ultimately from taxpayers. We are encouraged that FEMA
plans to implement a monitoring process for grandfathered properties,
which would allow it to better determine the impact of these properties
on the program's financial stability. However, because FEMA plans to
track only grandfathered properties in the future, not existing
properties, it will not be able to fully evaluate whether
grandfathering actually is fulfilling the desired goals in a cost-
effective way. Unless there is a full accounting of grandfathered
properties, these properties expose the program to an unknown level of
risk. Prompt attention to this issue could allow NFIP to refine its
rate-setting process in the short term and provide valuable information
on the effects of its policy decision on the financial stability of the
program.
Finally, FEMA's rate-setting process for subsidized properties depends
in part on the accuracy of full-risk rates, raising concerns about how
these rates are calculated as well. While FEMA is statutorily required
to subsidize rates, the method used for setting subsidized rates has
evolved from one that is based largely on affordability to one based on
the average historical loss year estimate. The resulting subsidized
premiums continue to be a financial strain on NFIP and contribute to
its ongoing financial instability. Based on NFIP's current premium
collections, it is not only unlikely that NFIP will be unable to repay
its debt but also unlikely that it will be able to make interest
payments in years with any significant amount of flood activities, and
the program's debt will likely grow as it borrows to meet the interest
payments, as was the case in mid-2008. Unless NFIP addresses issues
with its rate-setting processes, premiums collected will remain
insufficient in the face of future flood losses--even in average flood
loss years--leaving both the program and taxpayers at increased
financial risk. While a robust rate-setting process that accurately
reflects underlying flood risk is a key step in helping to improve the
long-term financial stability of NFIP, no process can ensure that
premiums will always cover losses because of the potential for large
claim losses associated with catastrophic events. However, any efforts
to improve the accuracy of the premiums charged by the program will
help reduce the financial risk to which the federal government and,
ultimately, taxpayers are exposed from the flood insurance program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
direct FEMA to take steps to ensure that its rate-setting methods and
the data it uses to set rates result in full-risk premiums rates that
accurately reflect the risk of losses from flooding. These steps should
include, for example, verifying the accuracy of flood probabilities,
damage estimates, and flood maps; ensuring that the effects of long-
term planned and ongoing development, as well as climate change, are
reflected in the flood probabilities used; and reevaluating the
practice of aggregating risks across zones.
We also recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security direct FEMA to ensure that information is collected on the
location, number, and losses associated with existing and newly created
grandfathered properties in NFIP and to analyze the financial impact of
these properties on the flood insurance program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with a draft of this
report for review and comment. On October 14, 2008, FEMA provided
written comments on a draft of this report. FEMA generally concurred
with both of the report's recommendations but had two reservations
about our recommendation to ensure that FEMA's rate-setting methods
result in full-risk rates that accurately reflect the risk of losses
from flooding. Moreover, while FEMA noted that the report makes a
number of constructive suggestions, it took exception to some of our
analyses and characterizations, which it believes overstate their
potential impact on the accuracy of the rate-setting process. These
comments are summarized below and FEMA's letter is reprinted in
appendix III. FEMA also provided us with technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
FEMA generally concurred with our recommendation that it take steps to
ensure that FEMA's rate-setting methods result in full-risk rates that
accurately reflect the risk of losses from flooding, but expressed two
reservations. First, it said that the report taken as a whole presents
a view of the accuracy of the current FEMA rate-setting process that is
"far too negative," especially given the complexity and difficulty of
setting flood insurance premium rates. We recognize that determining
full-risk premium rates for flood insurance is an inherently
challenging process, especially given the potential for catastrophic
losses in any given year. However, in objectively reviewing the rate-
setting process and applying generally accepted principles of insurance
and actuarial rate setting, we found a number of areas that, when
considered collectively, raise questions about the accuracy of the
resulting rates and highlight areas that warrant additional analysis by
FEMA. For example, for the period of 1978-2003, prior to the
catastrophic losses resulting from the hurricanes of 2005, the low to
moderate full-risk zones had a cumulative deficit of approximately $685
million. This deficit would seem to indicate that the rates for these
risk classes were not adequate to cover the expected losses--a basic
actuarial principle. And while the entire full-risk portion of the
program did have an overall surplus of approximately $382 million over
the same period, this would appear only to indicate the existence of a
large cross subsidy between the rated zones, which reinforces our
recommendation that FEMA revisit its nationwide class-rating system.
Second, FEMA said that the report does not accurately present the
status of its map modernization efforts and their impact on premium
rates. Specifically, with respect to map modernization, FEMA stated
that (1) our characterization of the progress on the updating of flood
maps was misleading; (2) we overstate the impact of older maps on rate
setting; and (3) we failed to note that FEMA allows communities to
reflect future conditions in flood maps the communities help develop.
With respect to the progress of map modernization, FEMA provided the
data that we presented in the report, which represents a status of
modernization efforts to date. FEMA appears to take issue with
measuring the status of map modernization in terms of the number of
flood maps that had been updated. We note that in its comment letter,
FEMA analyzed progress in terms of the population living within areas
covered by updated maps. Each form of analysis provides a different
picture of the progress of map modernization, and we have now added
FEMA's data to reflect population measures in order to present an
additional perspective. With respect to the impact of older maps on
rate setting, FEMA states that older maps are not always outdated, and
that in many areas the flood hazard has not changed or is possibly
decreasing. While some maps may not have changed over the past 10 to 15
years, it is uncertain how many maps fall into this category and FEMA
provided no analysis to support this contention. In addition, as we
note in our report, FEMA stated that it undertook map modernization for
several reasons, including that flood hazard conditions are dynamic and
many flood maps may not reflect recent development or environmental
changes; updated maps can take advantage of revised data and improved
technologies for identifying flood hazards; and up-to-date maps support
a flood insurance program that is more aligned with actual risks. These
reasons would seem to reflect a concern that older maps can become
outdated. Moreover, we also note that FEMA plans to update its maps
every 5 years to make sure they remain accurate. With respect to
allowing communities to voluntarily reflect future conditions in flood
maps, we were not made aware of these efforts in time to evaluate them
for inclusion in this report but we plan to review these efforts in
future work. FEMA had additional comments on how we characterized its
rate-setting process. We address these comments below.
First, FEMA stated that our finding that probability curves for
floodwaters exceeding a specific elevation had not been updated since
the 1980s was unfounded because these probabilities are relative to the
base flood elevation (BFE), and BFEs are revised as flood maps are
updated. As we noted in our report, flood risk experts told us that
flood probabilities are likely to change as land use, infrastructure,
and weather patterns change. As a result, even if the probability
curves are adjusted to reflect a new BFE, other changes since the 1980s
could result in the probability curves themselves no longer being
accurate. FEMA stated that it prepared a sensitivity analysis that
showed that reestimating the probability curves would have a minimal
impact on rates. We were not provided this analysis until FEMA gave us
its comments on this report, and therefore cannot comment on the
accuracy of the analysis. Nonetheless, it illustrates the type of
analysis that FEMA should perform periodically to ensure the integrity
of its rate-setting process and are encouraged by this effort. Finally,
while we understand that the data used to develop probability curves
were based on detailed engineering studies, available flood data,
simulations, and professional judgments, neither FEMA nor the Corps was
able to provide us with the specific data set used to develop the
original probability curves. As a result, we could not review the
reliability of those data.
Second, in response to FEMA comments about the Corps' use of the
hydrologic model that underlies FEMA's flood insurance rate-setting
process, we have clarified the language in our report to make clear
that while the Corps has revised its model for estimating flood damage,
it continues to use the hydrologic model.
Third, FEMA stated that we dismissed its contention that it is
adequately pricing the premiums for the class of business that includes
grandfathered properties. Considering the class of grandfathered
properties as a subset of policyholders, owners of grandfathered
properties pay less than full-risk premiums. Although FEMA may raise
premiums for others to compensate for the potential shortfall from this
subset, the extent and effect of this cross-subsidization deserves
scrutiny and should be analyzed. FEMA concurred with our recommendation
to gather additional information on grandfathered properties and
analyze their financial impact on NFIP.
Fourth, FEMA challenged our discussion about the number of risk groups
used for rate setting and contended that we failed to consider the
complexity and cost of using more refined risk classifications. We did
recognize and consider the challenges associated with using more
refined risk groups and therefore did not specifically recommend that
FEMA change its risk rating system. Instead, we recommended that FEMA
reevaluate its practice of aggregating risks across zones in light of
the program's expansion to determine whether the current risk groups
are still relevant. As we noted in our report, FEMA has not revisited
its class rating approach since its inception, when it had around 2
million policyholders. The program currently has over 5.5 million
policyholders. Since then, there have been significant changes in both
the number and location of properties insured by NFIP that would
warrant revisiting of FEMA's approach to aggregating risks.
Finally, concerning our analysis of historical claims data, FEMA
commented that we did not compare historical losses across states to a
theoretical distribution and stated that it believed that the
distribution we observed could be explained by analyzing the
interaction of the variability of flood risk and the declining number
of policyholders receiving discounted premiums. However, FEMA provided
no analytical basis for this belief and has not conducted any such
analysis to support this assertion. Moreover, FEMA also commented that
until such analysis is done, it cannot be sure of the results. We would
encourage FEMA to build upon our analysis and continue to explore ways
to leverage existing data to evaluate the effective of its rate-setting
process and identify ways to strengthen the process. In addition, FEMA
expressed its disappointment that we did not include the results of our
analysis of losses across states in our report. While we included a
shorter version of this analysis in the body of the report, we
continued to present the full results of our analysis in appendix II of
the report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will provide
copies to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the House Committee on Financial Services; the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security; and other
interested committees. We are also sending a copy of this report to the
Secretary of Homeland Security and other interested parties. In
addition, the report will available at no charge on our Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8678 or williamso@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Orice Williams:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) rate-setting
process and determine whether it produces rates that accurately reflect
the risk of flooding for properties that do not receive subsidies, we
reviewed and analyzed FEMA's model for evaluating potential flood
damage to properties as well as the methods used for assessing risk and
setting premium rates for policyholders. We discussed FEMA's method for
rate setting with officials from FEMA, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps),
and the U.S Geological Survey. We met with risk-modeling agencies,
academics and the American Academy of Actuaries to obtain views on
FEMA's model and information on private sector flood-risk-modeling
methods and data sources. We met with FEMA officials to obtain relevant
information and data on FEMA's Map Modernization program. We reviewed
FEMA documents and met with FEMA officials in order to understand
FEMA's process and policies for grandfathering properties and the
impact on the program. We analyzed FEMA's premiums and claims data to
determine the number of high-loss years on a state-by-state basis in
order to assess each state's financial impact on NFIP. In order to
conduct the state loss analysis, we reviewed the claims and premium
data from NFIP's BureauNet database. For premium data, we used
"Historical Policy Summary" and "All States" each year, individually
from 1978 through 2007. For the claims data, we used "Claims Data
Summary" and obtained Closed Claims, CWOP, and Open Claims by using the
"State Name" and "Calendar Year" sort fields. These numbers were then
adjusted for inflation using historic calendar year gross domestic
product (GDP) data. Finally, we subtracted claims values from the
premiums values, and sorted the states by the number of years in which
each state experienced a high-loss year, or a year in which claims
exceeded premiums. We also calculated aggregate inflation adjusted
claims amounts for each state. Because of the catastrophic effects of
the 2005 hurricanes, we also calculated pre-Katrina (1978 through 2004)
numbers, which were displayed in table 3. To assess the impact of the
rate-setting process and other factors on NFIP's long-term financial
stability, we interviewed officials to obtain specific information on
NFIP's current and past financial status. We also collected and
analyzed information on NFIP's financial status and reviewed existing
FEMA documents.
To evaluate the process that NFIP uses to set subsidized rates, we
interviewed officials from FEMA to obtain the methodology used to
assess total premium needs and set subsidized rates. We collected and
analyzed information on FEMA's process for setting rates for subsidized
flood insurance and reviewed documents on NFIP program subsidies and
recommendations to eliminate them. We also reviewed academic and other
studies of studies of flood risk and flood insurance including reviews
from the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget
Office.
We conducted this work from December 2007 to September 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We note that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: State-by-State Analysis of Claims and Premiums Data:
Because rare but large events can account for a large portion of the
long-term aggregate experience, we supplemented the aggregate data
analysis with the annual high-loss year analysis. Nevertheless, on a
cumulative basis for 1978-2004, a period before Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita policyholders in several states received markedly more in claims
paid out than NFIP collected from them in premiums.[Footnote 55] Five
of the nine states with at least 8 high-loss years--Alabama, Missouri,
Mississippi, Texas, and West Virginia--had more in aggregate claims
than policyholders paid out in aggregate premiums. Five other states--
Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Oklahoma--had
aggregate claims exceeding aggregate premiums, all of them experiencing
between 5 and 7 high-loss years. By expanding the totals to include all
years through 2007, Louisiana joins the other nine states with
aggregate claims exceeding aggregate premiums, primarily because of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. On the other extreme, three states--
California, Florida, and New Jersey--had aggregate premiums exceed
aggregate claims by more than $1 billion, with Florida having an $8
billion surplus.
Table 4: Claims and Premiums Data (in constant 2007 dollars), 1978-
2007:
State: Missouri;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($384,344,855);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($350,344,220);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 11.
State: West Virginia;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($146,896,812);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($118,874,830);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 11.
State: Mississippi;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($40,584,822);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($2,498,544,520);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 10.
State: Louisiana[A];
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $428,383,041;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($11,777,260,456);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 10.
State: Texas[A];
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($728,796,632);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($222,265,084);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: Alabama;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($505,212,107);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($746,166,995);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: Illinois;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $90,321,291;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $162,050,972;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: Ohio;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $101,547,985;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $100,111,514;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 9.
State: New Hampshire;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $36,648,547;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $21,531,170;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 8.
State: Oklahoma;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($18,199,240);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($25,642,039);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 7.
State: South Dakota;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $5,295,971;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $8,404,092;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 7.
State: Kansas;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $20,948,695;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $20,247,134;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 7.
State: Washington;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $85,320,803;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $66,244,958;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 7.
State: Indiana;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $131,316,681;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $166,958,946;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 7.
State: North Carolina;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($169,814,330);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($8,457,439);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 6.
State: Minnesota;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($63,190,911);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($52,511,837);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 6.
State: Arkansas;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $52,001,936;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $74,966,251;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 6.
State: Pennsylvania;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $84,458,562;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $23,509,354;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 6.
State: Connecticut;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $209,580,515;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $266,043,856;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 6.
State: North Dakota;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($111,305,692);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($103,851,773);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: Kentucky;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: ($56,850,302);
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: ($42,009,555);
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: District of Columbia;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $1,030,982;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $1,734,592;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: Maine;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $39,784,737;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $46,807,732;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: Tennessee;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $47,004,528;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $82,337,301;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: Virginia;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $60,909,715;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $172,548,603;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: Rhode Island;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $127,856,579;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $152,323,748;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: New York;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $574,475,012;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $648,183,499;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 5.
State: Iowa;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $15,016,861;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $32,394,824;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 4.
State: Massachusetts;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $165,750,753;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $227,224,840;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 4.
State: New Jersey[A];
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $1,071,199,191;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $1,271,686,111;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 4.
State: California[A];
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $2,042,968,575;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $2,431,519,768;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 4.
State: Montana;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $20,618,089;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $26,387,334;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Maryland;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $63,198,089;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $139,162,073;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Wisconsin;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $68,781,850;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $90,093,940;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Nebraska;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $77,523,305;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $98,540,480;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Delaware;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $79,318,937;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $115,022,170;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Michigan;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $173,141,113;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $222,803,680;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Hawaii;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $185,512,050;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $245,450,036;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Arizona;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $204,216,092;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $251,713,046;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Georgia;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $265,586,974;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $389,183,828;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 3.
State: Utah;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $15,372,336;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $21,207,776;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 2.
State: Wyoming;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $16,597,320;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $21,134,460;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 2.
State: Nevada;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $70,283,808;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $82,293,838;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 2.
State: Vermont;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $23,425,436;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $30,590,342;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Idaho;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $32,991,914;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $42,892,136;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Oregon;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $104,014,018;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $133,186,375;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: South Carolina;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $313,400,772;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $590,371,633;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Florida[A];
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $8,035,673,802;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $9,938,638,592;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 1.
State: Alaska;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $23,003,446;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $27,770,628;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 0.
State: New Mexico;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $79,909,374;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $97,876,034;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 0.
State: Colorado;
1978-2004 Premiums minus claims: $135,763,975;
1978-2007 premiums minus claims: $170,139,136;
1978-2007 Number of years that claims exceeded premiums: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data.
Note: We analyzed two time periods so we could separately consider the
impact of the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
[A] Denotes the five states with the highest number of subsidized
policies.
[End of table]
As noted in the report, additional study would be required to determine
whether policyholders in some states with lower losses are paying a
higher premium than is appropriate for their risk, and others paying
too little. For example, our analysis did not control for differences
in the type of policy purchased, such as the mix of certain property
types across states and insurance coverage amounts, which could affect
both premiums and claims. In addition, we did not control for
differences in the mix of subsidized and full-risk policies or the
impact of subsidized premiums on our results, which could also affect
the results. For example, some states have a relatively large number or
proportion of subsidized properties (including grandfathered
properties) that generally would lead to higher expected claims
relative to premiums, but we were unable to link the separate NFIP
claims and premiums data at the state and zone levels in a way that
would allow us to perform a more refined analysis. The limitations in
setting full-risk rates that we have discussed could result in
systematic mispricing relative to risk that becomes apparent only over
long periods; however, our analysis included both subsidized and full-
risk properties, and so the results should be considered in this
context.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from FEMA:
Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20538:
October 14, 2008:
Ms. Orice M. Williams:
Director:
Financial Markets and Community Investment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G St, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Williams:
The US, Department of Homeland Security (DI-IS) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) draft report GAO-09-12 titled Flood Insurance: FEMA's
Rate-Setting Process Warrants Attention (250387).
While the GAO raises valid concerns, DHS believes that the analysis
does not grasp some generally accepted principles of insurance and
actuarial rate-setting and misrepresents the status of the Map
Modernization effort and its impact on rate adequacy. We appreciate GAO
presenting a generally accurate description of the methodology and
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) premium rates. Few individuals
understand the model and methodology and we appreciate GAO staff
learning many of the intricacies of the rate-setting process. The
report has made a number of constructive suggestions, some of which DHS
is actively pursuing, others that we will take under advisement and, as
discussed below, a few with which we disagree.
GAO raised concerns in several areas of the NFIP rate-setting
methodology, including: (1) data quality of probability estimates,
claim severity estimates, and maps; (2) future conditions impacted by
climate change, erosion. and future development; and (3) underwriting
results. OHS believes that GAO is overestimating the potential impact
of each of these areas. Below, is our response to the major points
highlighted in the report; they are sorted by the headings used in the
report,
Data Used to Determine Flood Probabilities Have Not Been Updated Since
the 1970s and 1980s:
GAO expressed concern that the probability curves for floodwater
exceeding a specific elevation had not been updated since the I 980s.
Since these probabilities are expressed relative to the Base Flood
Elevation (BFE), GAO concerns are unfounded. As flood maps are updated
to reflect revised BFEs, the PELV curves are automatically re-
benchmarked to the revised BFEs. Since the various PELV curves for
zones A01 through A30 arc based on the relative elevation difference
between a "10-year flood" and a "100-year flood" it is very likely
that the floodwater depths for the "250-year flood" or the "500-year
flood" remain stable within a specific zone. If the water depth for the
"500-year flood" changes significantly in relation to the BEE, then it
is likely that the "10-year flood" has also changed in relation to the
BFE, resulting in a flood zone change. When the zone changes, the PELV
associated with the new zone would be reflected in the appropriate
probabilities. FEMA updates its probabilities by re-estimating the
annual chance of exceeding the one percent flood (i.e., the BFE). FEMA
prepared a sensitivity analysis of the impact on rates and
preliminarily concluded there would be a minimal impact.
The Claims Data Used in the Model May Be Inaccurate:
Water Depth Data:
FEMA agrees with the suggestion to improve the collection of data on
water depth in the structure. GAO correctly describes FEMA's method of
handling claims where the depth of water is missing or erroneously
reported as zero in the claims database. As GAO notes, the effect will
he to overstate the flood damage for flood events with only a few
inches of water in the structure, However, GAO points out that the
impact is unknown for the flood events of greater water depth. FEMA
believes this is worth investigating and will conduct a sensitivity
analysis of the impact of this type of claim on the rate setting
method. As the GAO report points out. FEMA has reviewed the impact of
such errors in the past and believes that they generally would result
in more conservative premium rates.
Army Corps of Engineers Use of NFIP Claims Data:
GAO contends that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has
moved away from the hydrologic model that underlies the NFIP rate model
and developed independent damage estimates for their use.
We reviewed the USACE document ER-1105-2-101. We disagree with the
characterization that it no longer relies on the hydrologic model
described in FEMA material. The document describes the change they made
to their methodology. The "Standard Project Flood" (SPF) is defined in
several documents. In the context of ER 1105-2-100 and risk analysis
guidance, the SPF is no longer a valid design target. Instead, a full
range of floods, including those that would exceed the SPF is to be
used in formulation and evaluation of alternatives. Based on that
description, we believe that their revision now much more closely
follows FEMA methodology. The USACE's historical methodology seems to
model only one possible loss event, which they labeled the SPF.
By contrast, the NFIP Rate Model has always considered "a full range of
floods" by use of the PELV and PELV500 curves. Instead, based on our
read of that document, it appears that the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers
has revised its model to resemble closely the NFIP Rate Model. We
believe that new approach, which considers a MI range of floods, is a
much more robust approach which is the reason why we have always used
it.
GAO states that "As a result [of NFIP claims data quality issues], the
Corps began to collect its own damage data, which FEMA now uses to
supplement its own data." It is true that FEMA has always used the
USACE's data to supplement NFIP claims data where NFIP claims data is
too thin to be actuarially credible. However, we provide in Table 1 an
analysis of the previous and newly revised USACE data compared to NFIP
claims data. It appears either that the USACE is still using NFIP data
or that the alternative data that they now use is very similar to NFIP
data.
Table 1: Comparison of USACE Studies to NFIP Data: One story, no
basement structures, percent damage by depth:
Depth: -1;
1973 USACE Study: [Empty];
Revised USACE Study: 2.50%;
NFIP Experience: 11.23%.
Depth: 0;
1973 USACE Study: 7.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 13.40%;
NFIP Experience: 19.52%.
Depth: 1;
1973 USACE Study: 10.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 23.30%;
NFIP Experience: 22.34%.
Depth: 2;
1973 USACE Study: 14.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 32.10%;
NFIP Experience: 31.16%.
Depth: 3;
1973 USACE Study: 26.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 40.10%;
NFIP Experience: 37.55%.
Depth: 4;
1973 USACE Study: 28.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 47.10%;
NFIP Experience: 48.26%.
Depth: 5;
1973 USACE Study: 29.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 53.20%;
NFIP Experience: 60.11%.
Depth: 6;
1973 USACE Study: 41.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 58.60%;
NFIP Experience: 58.43%.
Depth: 7;
1973 USACE Study: 43.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 63.20%;
NFIP Experience: 70.50%.
Depth: 8;
1973 USACE Study: 44.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 67.20%;
NFIP Experience: 68.73%.
Depth: 9;
1973 USACE Study: 45.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 70.50%;
NFIP Experience: 72.23%.
Depth: 10;
1973 USACE Study: 46.00%;
Revised USACE Study: 73.20%;
NFIP Experience: 79.68%.
[End of table]
Maps that Provide Information for Base Flood Elevations Remain
Substantially Out-of-Date Despite Modernization Efforts:
Maps will never be fully up-to-date everywhere in the country and thus
never fully reflect the current flood risk. FEMA believes that GAO
significantly understates the overall quality of current maps and, as a
result, is over-estimating the possible impact of these older maps on
pricing. FEMA believes that the Hydrologic Rate Model used in
estimating rates has sufficient additional conservatism to compensate
for these factors and can state with confidence that the premiums from
the Rate Model are it reasonable estimate of the full risk premium
based on the full range of flood loss probabilities.
FEMA is concerned that the figures GAO references regarding the number
of maps that are at least 5, 10, or 15 years old may be misleading.
Many of those maps are still being updated as part of Map
Modernization. It generally takes between two to three years to
finalize flood map changes in coordination with state and local
governments. That being the case, current map age can be misleading. As
of March 2008, approximately 68% of the nation's population has already
received updated maps that met, exceed, or at least approach the map
quality targets of Map Modernization, while another 27% of the
population has received a preliminary map. By the end of FY 2010, FEMA
anticipates that at least 92% of the nation's population will have a
modernized flood map.
GAO seems to have a concern that an old map is an incorrect map that
understates the flood risk and therefore adversely affects insurance
pricing. Older maps are not always outdated. In many areas with older
flood maps, the flood hazard has not significantly changed or is
possibly decreasing. Further, there are instances where areas have not
been re-studied because the stream gauge or historical data does not
include any new flooding events, even of small magnitude, so there is
no additional data with which to update the maps.
GAO has also expressed concern about the possible deterioration of a
map's quality between the scheduled five-year update. While this
happens in some areas of the country for a variety of reasons, it is
also true that some States or local communities attempt to lessen the
impact of the changes in the flood risk. When deterioration of the
flood risk occurs, local communities are required to communicate to
FEMA as soon as practical, but no later than six months, appropriate
data to use to update the community's maps to reflect current flooding
conditions. In this way, FEMA assures that maps are updated more
frequently than every live years to reflect changing conditions, These
and other changes to the maps are usually done through the Letter of
Map Amendment/Letter of Map Revision process. These amendments and
revisions currently average about 22,000 a year.
GAO fails to note the advancements FEMA has made in allowing
communities to reflect future conditions in maps they develop.
Currently, communities can choose to use future conditions hydrology
for mapping per a Federal Register notice published on November 27,
2001. Future conditions hydrology are based on projected land-use
conditions of the watershed, which could increase surface water runoff
such as an increase in impervious areas created by future parking lots
or structures or future construction/improvement of drainage networks
that accompany urbanization. While FEMA does not require future
conditions mapping, we are working to encourage local communities to
adopt it voluntarily through these procedures and through NFIP
Community Rating System credits.
FEMA Does Not Track the Number or Location of Remapped Grandfathered
Properties That Pay Less Than Full Risk Premiums:
The report correctly describes the current FEMA program of
grandfathering currently. GAO acknowledges FEMA's belief that it is
adequately pricing the premiums for the class of business which
includes the grandfathered policies because the methodology that the
NEW uses in setting rates for the X-Standard risk group includes these
grandfathered properties. However, GAO dismisses this contention. We
allow X-Standard policies to continue to use the X-Zone for rating
purpose but set the overall premium level that we estimate to reflect
the full-risk of that risk group as a whole. The report does not
mention that the grandfathered X-Standard premium is substantially
higher than the previous X-Preferred Risk that most of these
policyholders had been charged. FEMA provided GAO premium charts that
showed that the X-Zone standard premium is now higher than the premium
for some AE-Zone compliant strictures. In addition a significant
portion of these grandfathered policies are older Pre-FIRM policies
that would be eligible for subsidized premiums and would no longer be
part of a risk class that is charged on average their full-risk
premiums.
FEMA Does Not Consider Risk Factors Such as Erosion and Climate Chance
When Setting Flood Insurance Rates:
Although FEMA has not investigated the issue of climate change and its
impact on the NFIP in totality, we conducted a study in 1991 that
focused on one aspect of climate change, sea level rise, The study,
titled Projected Impact of Relative Sea Level Rise on the National
Flood Insurance Program[Footnote 56] concluded that the NFIP would not
be impacted significantly under sea level rise scenarios put forth in
the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report
released in 1990. FEMA has initiated a new study on climate change
titled, Impact of Climate Change on the NFIP and Improving Coastal
Floodplain Mapping. The study will include an investigation of the
impacts of sea level rise, changes in hurricane frequency and
intensity, and changes in precipitation patterns and how they might
affect the NFIP. FEMA will use the latest information contained in the
most recent IPCC and Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) projections
and findings in the conduct of this study. We expect to complete the
study in early 2010 and will carefully evaluate its findings to
determine how to best account for climate change in setting flood
insurance rates.
In the absence of the authority to establish erosion zones, FEMA has
taken actions based on the Heinz Center study an coastal erosion, which
projected increased damages due to the effects of long-term coastal
erosion over a 60-year period. We have increased rates for all V-Zone
properties at apace commensurate with the Heinz Center projections,
since we cannot explicitly identify those properties most at risk from
erosion.
The FEMA Rating System Combines and Averages Many Different Risks to
Create Nationwide Rates:
GAO concerns regarding the current amount of risk groups are misplaced.
CIAO correctly notes that the flood risk for individual policyholders
varies within the current risk groups. This is also true for risk
groups in the private insurance industry. In establishing risk groups,
FEMA must balance the administrative complexity of a highly refined
number of risk groups against the degree of heterogeneity of risk
within those groups. FEMA continues to believe that we have found the
appropriate balance, GAO does not consider the amount of complexity
that their recommendation for more highly refined risk groups would
create. The size of the rate manual would increase many-fold, as would
the difficulty of making accurate zone determinations in those
communities that have a variety of A-numbered zones.
FEMA has considered the implications on our current risk group
classifications if future legislative changes require the NFIP to
reduce significantly the classes of buildings that are eligible far
premium subsidies. Whereas, the current risk groups may not result in
significant cross-subsidization among compliant structures that will
probably not be true for older non-compliant structures. Simply
extending the current practice of manually rating non-compliant
structures to these older structures, will not work since FEMA does not
have the staff to support the increased workload. FEMA has begun
considering how to revise its rate structure if future subsidy
reduction is mandated.
Our Analysis of Historical Claims and Premium Data Raises Questions
about a Potential Mismatch between Rates and Risk:
GAO conclusions from this analysis appear to inject its expectations as
to how the results should have behaved if rates were actuarial. We
believe the NFIP actual experience compares to estimates of the
theoretical distribution, which GAO did not do. Unfortunately, FEMA did
not have time to develop a theoretical distribution to make this
comparison. We believe that the distribution of the results that GAO
observed in their analysis is explained by understanding the
interaction of the variable flood risk and the greatly declining
percentage through the years of policyholders who receive discounted
premiums, However, until a more refined model is constructed, we will
not know which is correct.
GAO had prepared an analysis of how often the annual loss experience
for a state was above or below the median result for the year. We were
disappointed to see GAO did not include this analysis in the report.
FEMA believes that with more refinement and adjustments the analysis
had the potential to be useful.
The FEMA Process for Setting Subsidized Rates May Further Compromise
the Ongoing Financial Stability of the Program:
The report is critical of FEMA methodology for setting the premium
rates for the subsidized policies. The process used to set subsidized
rates has evolved over time, and the report accurately describes the
current process. We consider many factors in setting subsidized rates,
and the 2005 hurricanes have had a major impact on those
considerations. FEMA is in the process of reviewing its methodology
with respect to the premium rates of the subsidized business. We are
looking for guidance from the Congress on who should continue to be
eligible for subsidized rates and the level of subsidy provided to
them.
DHS generally concurs with both of the report's recommendation with two
reservations. Following are our recommendation-specific comments;
technical comments were provided under separate covet,
GAO Recommendation 1: We recommend that FEMA take steps to ensure that
its rate setting methods and data used to set rates result in full-risk
premiums rates that accurately reflect the risk of losses from
flooding. For example, verifying the accuracy of flood probabilities,
damage estimates, and flood maps; ensuring that the effects of long-
term planned and ongoing development, as well as climate change, are
reflected in the flood probabilities used; and reevaluating the
practice of aggregating risks across zones.
DHS Response: Concur with reservation. In general. FEMA concurs with
the first recommendation with two reservations. One, the GAO commentary
taken as a whole presents far too negative a picture of the accuracy of
the current NFIP pricing model and methodology. FEMA notes that the
NFIP rate-setting process has evolved over a number of years and is
dependent on many complicated inputs, estimations, modeling techniques
and actuarial judgments. This type of process is always an inexact
science, and we are always looking for, and will continue to
incorporate, improvements in each of those areas as the needs and our
resources allow, Two, FEMA believes that the report does not accurately
present the status of the Map Modernization effort and its impact on
rate adequacy.
There are many lines of insurance where precise measurement is
practically impossible. As an example, in Workers' Compensation
insurance there is uncertainty as to how workplace safety will vary
over time due to technological advancements, workplace safety measures,
the size of court awards to injured plaintiffs, future interest rates
that will affect benefit levels, and future medical costs. The
challenges and practical impossibility of precisely quantifying these
factors do not mean that workers compensation insurance is not
actuarially sound.
Rather in workers compensation insurance, like flood insurance,
actuaries make judgments to establish rates that deal with a variety of
uncertainties. Like Workers' Compensation insurance, where there is
imprecision in estimating the parameters of the Rate Model or in the
application of those indicated rates in the real world of selling flood
insurance, FEMA actuaries have a history of consulting with other
subject matter experts, such as hydrologic and/or hydraulic scientists,
and the building science and mapping experts within FEMA. This has
allowed them to estimate appropriately the impact of these parameters
of the rate model.
GAO Recommendation 2: We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct FEMA to ensure that information is collected on the
location, number, and losses associated with existing and newly created
grandfather properties in NFIP and to analyze the financial impact of
these properties on the flood insurance.
DHS Response: Concur. DHS agrees with the need to start identifying the
number of grandfather policies, While there are sound public policy
reasons why the NFIP introduced and has maintained its grandfathered
policies, there are also benefits to charging these policyholders a
premium that is close to their specific risk instead of a premium based
on a wider class of risks. Such as change would more fully communicate
to the property owner the flood risk faced and encourage the property
owner to take action to reduce that risk.
We are implementing a data collection effort for all newly
grandfathered policies effective on or alter May 1, 2009. However,
collecting such data on currently insured structures is far more
difficult. FEMA intends to work out a methodology to do that and to
develop the financial analysis recommended.
FEMA believes that the NFIP rate setting process is sound and is
conducted in accordance with the body of statutory and regulatory
authority governing the NFIP and within the standards of actuarial
practice and acknowledge there is always room for improvement. We thank
the GAO staff for presenting in this report a number of constructive
suggestions for improvements in our rate-setting process.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security would like to thank you for the
opportunity to review and provide comments on the draft report. We look
forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental DHS GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Orice M. Williams, (202) 512-8678 or williamso@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Lawrence Cluff (retired) and
Patrick Ward, Assistant Directors, Nima Patel Edwards, Christopher
Forys, Emily Chalmers, Martha Chow, Melvin Thomas, Joseph Applebaum,
Tania Calhoun, Christopher Krzeminski and Rudy Chatlos and Richard
Vagnoni made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High-Risk Program: National Flood Insurance Program,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-497T] (Washington D.C.:
Mar. 15, 2006).
[2] To assess the risk of flooding, FEMA uses Flood Insurance Rate Maps
(FIRM) that show the level of flood risk in communities that
participate in NFIP.
[3] BureauNet is the system that FEMA uses to collect, manage, and
access its policy, claims, and policyholder data.
[4] We use the term "full risk" to describe rates that FEMA refers to
as "actuarial." These are the risk premium rates specified in the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, which FEMA maintains accurately
reflect flood risk and thus are not explicitly subsidized--that is,
these rates contemplate the full range of loss potential including
catastrophic levels, according to FEMA. The National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001 et. seq.
[5] A hydrologic model is a static or dynamic representation of the
process that affects surface water runoff. Hydrologic models are used
to describe present conditions or predict future behavior of the
hydrologic regime at a specific area of land that "caches" and
"releases" surface water runoff (referred to as catchment.) Examples of
hydrologic model inputs are precipitation and snow melt and example
outputs are stream discharge and evapotranspiration. According to
insurance market participants, to generate the loss estimates, private
insurance companies and state authorities use models, which are
computer programs with large databases that catalog the past incidence
and severity of natural catastrophes, as well as proprietary insurance
company data on policies written in particular states or areas. Using
the estimates provided by these computer programs, insurers can attempt
to manage their exposures in particular high-risk areas. See GAO,
Catastrophe Risk: U.S. and European Approaches to Insure Natural
Catastrophe and Insurance Risks, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-199] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2005)
[6] A flood zone is an area that is designated to have a predicted
likelihood of experiencing flood damage.
[7] SFHAs, which are depicted on NFIP maps, represent the land area
that would be submerged by the floodwaters of the "base," or 1 percent
annual chance of flood. The SFHA is also referred to as the 100-year or
1 percent floodplain. NFIP's floodplain management regulations must be
enforced in, and the mandatory purchase of flood insurance applies to,
SFHAs.
[8] A substantial improvement is any reconstruction, rehabilitation,
addition, or other improvement of a structure, the cost of which equals
or exceeds 50 percent of the market value of the structure before the
"start of construction" of the improvement. If a building is
"substantially damaged" or "substantially improved," it must be brought
into compliance with local flood damage prevention regulations,
including elevating the building to or above the 100-year flood
elevation.
[9] The BFE is the elevation relative to mean sea level at which there
is a 1 percent chance of floodwaters rising in a given year. The level
of the BFE within a community can change throughout the floodplain.
[10] Some programs are also designated as having Emergency Program
status. The Emergency Flood Insurance Program is intended as a program
to provide a first layer amount of insurance on all insurable
structures before the effective date of the initial FIRM.
[11] The rate-setting methods discussed in this report are used for the
building structure as well as the insured's personal belongings, or the
"contents," contained within the structure. Rates differ for these
types of coverage, and insurance buyers specifically purchase each type
of coverage in order to be covered for both. However, most of our
discussion focuses on coverage for the structure.
[12] The Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act, H.R. 3121, 110th
Cong. (2007) and the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act, S.
2289, 110th Cong. (2007), both include provisions aimed at limiting
subsidized properties.
[13] Various factors such as flood zone, structure elevation, type of
structure, and amount of coverage affect the premiums.
[14] Adverse selection occurs when insurers cannot distinguish between
less risky and more risky properties, although homeowners can. When
premiums do not reflect differences in risk that are known to potential
policyholders, those who buy insurance are often those at greatest risk
for the hazards covered. Adverse selection in the market for natural
catastrophe suggests that homeowners who are at the highest risk of
experiencing a natural catastrophe will buy available insurance.
[15] Reinsurance is essentially insurance for insurers--that is,
companies buy coverage for all or a part of a policy's liability from
other insurers in order to offset exposure.
[16] This is on a conservative basis required by state insurance
regulators.
[17] Two properties that are of the same NFIP risk class (for example,
both are one-story, single-family homes with no basement and are
elevated a certain number of feet above a reference level) are charged
the same rate per $100 of insurance although they may be located in
different states with differing flood experiences or rest on different
topography such as a shallow floodplain versus a steep, mountainous
valley.
[18] A premium system for a given insurance coverage typically takes
into account expected claims costs, based on projections from relevant,
credible prior experience; the administrative cost of providing the
coverage, including but not limited to underwriting, sales, and claims
administration; and, a margin for profits and for losses that are worse
than expected. In addition, for a rate-setting system to be considered
actuarially based, the premium charged to each insured should be
reasonably related to the risk posed by coverage of that insured.
[19] For example, for a given property type, the rate per $100 of
insurance on the first $50,000 of coverage for a single-family
structure in the Regular Program (that is, what NFIP terms "basic"
coverage) is $1.31. The rate per $100 of insurance on amounts in excess
of $50,000 (that is, what NFIP terms "additional" coverage) is $0.10.
[20] The "1 percent annual chance flood," also known as the "100-year
flood," is a statistical construct: It is a flood that has a certain
discharge that produces a specific flood elevation and an estimated 1
percent chance of occurrence in any one year. In reality, the 1 percent
flood represents a range of discharge and elevation values because of
the uncertainties and other limitations in the information available
for its computation and the resulting need to use specific types of
probability distributions to portray the possibilities. The SFHA flood
zones on the FIRMs can reflect varying degrees of analysis, in some
cases using approximate methods while in others using more detailed
methods. The accuracy of the flood hazard data depicted on the FIRMs
and the delineation of the SFHA are dependent on the data limitations
of the computation of the 1 percent flood and the topographic
information available for the area being mapped. The variety of factors
and uncertainties involved in generating flood maps render these maps
less definitive and authoritative than communities frequently assume
them to be--for example, many interpret the 1 percent flood line as an
assurance that development above that elevation or outside that line is
guaranteed to be safe from the 1 percent flood. The 1 percent flood
zones reflect only existing conditions and not future development.
[21] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Insurance and
Other Programs for Financial Assistance to Flood Victims: A Report from
the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the
President, as Required by the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act
of 1965," Public Law 89-339, 89th Congress, H.R. 11539, Nov. 8, 1965
(Washington, D.C.: August 1966).
[22] Property owners are underinsured when they purchase insurance
coverage for less than the value of the property, either by or because
of limits on the amount of available coverage. To compensate for this
possibility, FEMA increases premium rates by an "underinsurance factor"
that is based on claims data going back to 1978 for different zones and
types of structures. More recent experience is given a greater weight
in determining the factors.
[23] FEMA has taken this approach for pricing in these zones because it
believes the cost of obtaining the information necessary to develop
detailed flood frequency-magnitude relationships for use in the
hydrologic model would be extremely high in relation to the benefits.
[24] Highly variable events (events with losses varying widely from
year to year) and greatly skewed events (very rare but very large
catastrophic events) such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes do not
lend themselves to traditional actuarial pricing techniques. Results
can vary dramatically from year to year and average results have little
predictive value even when gathered over a long period of time, thus
rendering the use of historical flood loss experience for setting rates
problematic.
[25] Studies include those by CRS, CBO, GAO, and the DHS Office of
Inspector General.
[26] A FEMA official explained to us that by not updating the PELV
data, NFIP essentially was assuming that the difference between the 10
percent annual chance of flood (that is, the 10-year flood) and the 1
percent annual chance of flood has not changed since the data were
published in the 1970s and 1980s. FEMA told us that the PELV data have
been used in such a way as to make the rates less sensitive to factors
such as changes in land use, structural development, or climate trends.
FEMA also noted that actuarial judgments during rate setting deal with
a variety of uncertainties, such as those that go beyond simply relying
on the calculation based on the hydrologic model. According to FEMA,
other efforts, such as contingency loading or across-the-board rate
increases on a zone, and improved floodplain management, have been made
to compensate for the impact of these factors.
[27] For DELV estimates, if water reached a depth of 2 feet relative to
the BFE within a one-story, no-basement structure located in the high-
risk zone, 25 percent of the property's value would be damaged;
however, if water reached a depth of 4 feet within the same structure,
30 percent of the property's value would be damaged.
[28] "Credible" refers to the degree of belief that the entity's prior
experience is a valid predictor of future costs.
[29] American Institutes for Research, Assessing the Adequacy of the
National Flood Insurance Program's 1 Percent Flood Standard, American
Institutes for Research, prepared under subcontract to the American
Institutes for Research as part of the 2001-2006 Evaluation of the
National Flood Insurance Program, Water Policy Collaborative, (College
Park, Md.: University of Maryland, October 2006).
[30] According to FEMA officials, zero elevation water is a depth that
encompasses up to the first 5 inches of floodwater in a property. This
depth is also sometimes referred to as a "carpet soaker" flood.
[31] See GAO, Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise,
but Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-417] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
2004).
[32] FEMA has produced FIRMs that depict SFHAs for approximately 20,000
communities nationwide. The SFHA represents the flood that has a 1
percent annual chance of occurring in any given year, sometimes
referred to as the "base flood." The base flood is the national
standard used by NFIP and all federal agencies for the purposes of
regulating development and requiring the purchase of flood insurance.
Reliance on the 100-year flood as an adequate standard was brought into
question in a recent report. See American Institutes for Research,
Assessing the Adequacy of the National Flood Insurance Program's 1
Percent Flood Standard.
[33] FEMA has established national map quality targets under Map
Modernization by tracking compliance with the Floodplain Boundary
Standard and the new, validated, or updated Engineering metric.
Compliance with the boundary standard indicates that the mapped
floodplain matches the underlying topographic information. Compliance
with the engineering metric indicates that engineering analyses used to
determine the extent of the flood hazard have been either newly
established or updated. The national map quality targets under Map
Modernization are 75 percent of mapped stream miles compliant with
boundary standard and 30 percent of mapped stream miles compliant with
the engineering metric.
[34] According to FEMA, an important reason for making the
grandfathering decision was that policyholders who were in compliance
with their existing FIRMs should not be required to pay higher prices
for new conditions of which they were previously unaware.
[35] These are pre-FIRM properties that were built before detailed
flood hazard data and flood elevations were provided to the community
and usually before the community enacted comprehensive regulations on
floodplain regulation.
[36] FEMA officials stated that grandfathering presented a disincentive
for sound floodplain management because grandfathered owners would be
unaware of the true risk of flooding to their properties and would
therefore be less likely to mitigate. But the officials also stated
that in making this decision they took into consideration several
concerns: (1) potentially higher rates that could cause property owners
not to buy insurance or to lose their properties, (2) adverse reactions
to FEMA as the result of these higher rates, (3) the burden on
insurance agents of obtaining new map determinations and information
for every policyholder, and (4) the likelihood of communities resisting
new maps due to the potential for large rate increases.
[37] In most property and casualty insurance lines, state assessments
are often passed through to policyholders. As a result, policyholders
living in less risky locations also contribute to cover the shortfall-
-a scenario known as cross-subsidization. In those states where
assessments cannot be passed through in some manner, private insurers
must pay the assessments while at the same time paying large claims
from their own policyholders. In such instances, some companies may be
reluctant to continue offering coverage in the state or may become
insolvent.
[38] The two types of policies in the moderate-to low-risk zones are
referred to as preferred risk policies and the standard policy. The
preferred risk policyholders generally pay the lowest flood rates.
Preferred risk policies are available on buildings that are outside of
the SFHA and have not flooded more than once.
[39] Coastal erosion is long-term erosion such that a shoreline
retreats at or around an average rate over a period of decades.
[40] Shorelines rarely recede at a constant rate; instead, erosion
occurs in a cyclic fashion, with seasonal and episodic influences
resulting in periods of erosion, periods of stability, and periods of
accretion. On shorelines suffering from long-term erosion, the periods
of erosion outweigh or overwhelm the periods of stability and
accretion.
[41] The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the
Environment, Evaluation of Erosion Hazards, Prepared for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency Contract EMW-97-CO-0375, (Washington D.C.:
April 2000).
[42] The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, authorizes
FEMA to carry out NFIP to enable persons to buy insurance against
losses arising from flood. The statute defines flood as including
sudden, flood-event-triggered collapses or subsidences of land along
the shore of a body of water, but the statute's definition of flood
does not include the gradual, long-term erosion that may endanger
coastal communities. See 42 USC 4001, 4002 and 42 USC 4121(c).
[43] FEMA officials told us that they could likely map erosion hazard
areas on FIRMs for informational, but not rate-setting, purposes under
its existing authority. However, FEMA estimates the total cost of this
effort could range between $50 million and $100 million.
[44] GAO, Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private
Insurers in Coming Decades Are Potentially Significant, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-285] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,
2007).
[45] This is consistent with standard actuarial practice for pricing 1-
year term insurance.
[46] NFIP implemented the nationwide class-rating system because of the
nature of the program and the desire to make it less complex and easier
for agents and customers to understand. In the early years of the
program, rates were set on a community-by-community basis. But as the
number of communities participating grew, this system became unwieldy
and costly to maintain. FEMA analysis indicated that from a technical
perspective, this system was not essential to the estimation of flood
damages since, for example, flood frequency data were found to be
similar across communities.
[47] We computed the difference between the dollar amount of losses on
claims paid out in that state by NFIP and the dollar amount of premiums
collected in that state by NFIP.
[48] Because of the data limitations, our analysis was performed using
claims and premiums data from both full-risk and explicitly subsidized
policies.
[49] See appendix II for a full listing of states.
[50] Some states have a relatively large number or proportion of
subsidized properties (including grandfathered properties) that
generally would lead to higher expected claims relative to premiums,
but we were unable to link the separate NFIP claims and premiums data
at the state and zone levels in a way that would allow us to perform a
more refined analysis. The limitations in setting full-risk rates that
we have discussed could result in systematic mispricing relative to
risk that becomes apparent only over long periods; however, our
analysis included both subsidized and full risk properties, and so the
results should be considered in this context.
[51] The average historical loss is calculated by adjusting the loss
payouts of prior years to account for inflation and increases in the
number of NFIP policies.
[52] By statute, rates may not be increased by an amount that would
result in the average of such rate increases for properties within the
risk classification during any 12-month period exceeding 10 percent of
the average of the risk premium rates for properties within the zone.
[53] FEMA officials told us that through various calculations, they
updated the $17.4 billion in losses from Katrina in 2006 to $23.2
billion presently. These calculations included an increase of 20
percent in NFIP policies and an increase of 10 percent for inflation.
[54] According to FEMA, this process was established jointly by
Congress and FEMA.
[55] We found qualitatively similar results for the period 1978-2007,
which includes the effects of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
[56] FEMA, Projected Impact of Relative Sea Level Rise on the National
Flood Insurance Program, October 1991, available at [hyperlink,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/flood_insurance.pdf]
The Heinz Center, Evaluation of Erosion Hazards, April 2000, available
at [hyperlink, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/linrary/erosion.pdf].
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
