Northern Border Security
DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities Gao ID: GAO-09-93 November 25, 2008Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world. Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides recommendations and required resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials.
The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the component agencies' priorities for action and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed. DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS's testing of new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying nuclear detection equipment--which DHS and other agencies generally agreed to take action to implement--have remained open for at least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-93, Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2008:
Northern Border Security:
DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions,
Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities:
GAO-09-93:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-93, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine,
the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world.
Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share
responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state,
local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to
submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along
the northern border, and provides recommendations and required
resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and
comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1)
the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the
legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to
address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions
addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans,
reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found:
The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to
legislative requirements in providing information for improving
northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of
northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but
did not include recommendations and additional resources that are
needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several
reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information,
including the fact that the component agencies‘ priorities for action
and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that
they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report.
However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time
to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information
makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and
resources needed.
DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management
process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully
implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also
provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities.
DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to
provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern
border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to
assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest
benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success
of various pilot projects, such as DHS‘s testing of new technology,
will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the
northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce
vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past
evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to
improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully
addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the
last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and
marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and
deploying nuclear detection equipment”which DHS and other agencies
generally agreed to take action to implement”have remained open for at
least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these
outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be
implemented.
Figure: Vehicle Inspections and Agent Patrols at and between Northern
Border Ports of Entry:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure contains two photographs of vehicle inspections and agent
patrols at and between northern border ports of entry.
Sources: GAO and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security provide more
specific information in future reports on actions and resources needed
to achieve northern border security, and in what time frame they are
needed. DHS and CBP concurred with our recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-93]. For more
information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing Information
for Improving Northern Border Security:
DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and
Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide Benefit:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations from GAO on Various Border
Security Issues:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a Primary
Mission to Secure the Northern Border:
Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border Security That
Have Not Been Fully Implemented:
Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General Border
Security Issues with Potential Implications for Northern Border
Security:
Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear Security
with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security:
Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet with
Potential Implications for Northern Border Security:
Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Partnerships and
Joint Operations with Potential Implications for Northern Border
Security:
Abbreviations:
9/11 Act: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007:
ASP: advanced spectroscopic portal:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7:
HSPD-11: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11:
IBET: Integrated Border Enforcement Team:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
NFCCG: National Fusion Center Coordination Group:
OBP: Office of Border Patrol:
OES: Office of the Executive Secretariat:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
PM-ISE: Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment:
PNNL: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory:
POE: port of entry:
RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
USCG: U.S. Coast Guard:
US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 25, 2008:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The U.S.-Canadian border stands as the longest undefended border in the
world, covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water,[Footnote 1] most
of which is sparsely populated with limited law enforcement presence.
Historically, U.S. attention and resources have been focused primarily
on the U.S. border with Mexico, which continues to experience
significantly higher levels of drug trafficking and illegal immigration
than the U.S-Canadian border. However, the extensive volume of trade
and travel between the two countries, and large expanse of areas with
limited law enforcement presence, provide potential for terrorists and
other criminal elements to enter the United States undetected at or
between the northern ports of entry.
Securing the northern border is the primary responsibility of various
components within DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state,
local, tribal, and Canadian entities. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) is the frontline agency responsible for
interdiction of persons and contraband crossing the border illegally;
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for
investigating the source of cross-border crimes and dismantling their
operations; and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) executes its maritime
security mission on all navigable waterways on the northern border,
including the Great Lakes.
DHS submitted a report to Congress in February 2008, discussing ongoing
initiatives of these agencies to improve security along the northern
border, as required by law. Specifically, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required
the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report within 180 days
of enactment that was to (1) address the vulnerabilities along the
northern border, and (2) provide recommendations to address such
vulnerabilities, including required resources needed to protect the
border.[Footnote 2]
The 9/11 Act also directed us to submit to Congress, within 270 days of
DHS's report, a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and
to provide recommendations regarding any additional actions necessary
to protect the northern border.[Footnote 3] In response to this
mandate, we prepared this report to answer the following key questions:
* To what extent is the DHS report to Congress responsive to the
legislative requirements to report on ongoing initiatives to improve
U.S. northern border security, address the vulnerabilities along the
northern border, and provide recommendations to address these
vulnerabilities and required resources to protect the northern border?
* In addition to the actions addressed in the report, what actions may
be necessary to address northern border security vulnerabilities?
In conducting our work, we reviewed the DHS report structure and
content against requirements in the 9/11 Act. We also reviewed whether
the DHS report content was complete and consistent with information
provided in its key management documents including strategic plans,
performance and accountability reports, budget requests, and other
documentation produced by relevant DHS agencies. We interviewed DHS
officials from CBP, ICE, and USCG located at headquarters and Detroit,
Michigan, who had roles and responsibilities for northern border
security to obtain their perspectives on documented information. For
this reason, we also interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) officials
with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has national
responsibility for drug enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which has national responsibility for terrorism.
We selected Detroit, Michigan, among CBP's Office of Border Patrol's
(OBP) eight northern border sectors based on factors including relative
threat and vulnerabilities, priority for resources, and demonstration
site for new technology. Our observations from the Detroit sector
cannot be generalized across the other seven sectors; however, we
believe that they were sufficient for the purposes of this report in
comparing the headquarters and field perspective. While in Detroit, we
also spoke with state and Canadian officials involved in northern
border security to obtain their perspectives on northern border
security threats and vulnerabilities, DHS actions to address them, and
the effectiveness of binational and national partnerships. To determine
actions that could help address northern border security
vulnerabilities, we reviewed whether the information reported by DHS
reflected a strategic risk-informed approach as required in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 4] and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). We also identified report
recommendations for strengthening national border security from past
GAO evaluations from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that when fully
implemented have potential to help address northern border
vulnerabilities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through November
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The DHS report to Congress is not fully responsive in providing
information for improving northern border security as required in the
9/11 Act. DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and
initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and
additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border.
DHS officials responsible for preparing the report provided several
reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information,
including the fact that DHS reflects its priorities for action and
resources in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing
further to recommend or request. However, the budget process provides
Congress with a 5-year plan to meet prioritized needs within projected
resource constraints, not the time frame and resources needed to
achieve control of the northern border. The lack of information
regarding the extent that vulnerabilities remain unaddressed on the
northern border and the time and resources it will take to address them
makes it challenging for Congress to consider future actions and
resources necessary for the northern border in the broader context of
national security. DHS has an opportunity to increase the value of
information it provides to Congress in fulfilling other reporting
requirements established in law.
DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management
process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully
implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also
provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities.
DHS officials are currently developing strategic plans that are
intended to provide its component agencies with overall direction in
addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security, as well as more-
targeted direction specific to vulnerabilities in the air and water
environments. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to
assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest
benefit to national security. DHS officials said the success of various
pilot projects will likely change the level and mix of resources needed
to protect the northern border. For example, DHS is testing new
technology that, if successful, may change the mix of technology and
personnel deployed along the border, and partnerships among federal,
state, and local agencies to coordinate information and operations may
also create efficiencies that change resource requirements. DHS can
also act to timely implement recommendations made in recent and past
GAO evaluations. At the time of our review, DHS had implemented 11 GAO
recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39
recommendations had not been fully implemented. Eighteen of these open
recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21
recommendations for improving screening processes at the ports of
entry, expediting deployment of nuclear detection equipment, and
improving the use of air and marine assets have not been fully
implemented in the course of at least 1 and, in some cases, over 3
years. Internal control standards for the federal government state that
agencies are to ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are
promptly resolved. We believe that these outstanding recommendations
continue to have merit and should be implemented.
We are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
provide more specific information in addressing future reporting
requirements to Congress, including planned actions, resource
requirements, and time frames for increasing and achieving northern
border security, and the basis used for prioritizing such action and
resources in the context of other national security risks. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DHS and CBP concurred with this
recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the department to
implement the recommendation through the approved budget process.
Written comments from DHS are in appendix II.
Background:
The United States shares nearly 4,000 miles of border with Canada
stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, and the U.S.-
Canadian border is considered to be the world's longest open border
between two nations. There is a great deal of trade and travel across
this border, and approximately 90 percent of Canada's population lives
within 100 miles of the U.S. border. While legal trade is predominant,
DHS reports networks of illicit criminal activity and smuggling of
drugs, currency, people, and weapons between the two countries.
Annually, CBP reports making approximately 4,000 arrests and interdicts
approximately 40,000 pounds of illegal drugs at and between the
northern border ports of entry. Historically, these numbers have been
significantly lower than those of the southwest border;[Footnote 5]
however, DHS reports that the terrorist threat on the northern border
is higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement
coverage.
DHS agencies are charged with protecting the nation and its citizens
from threats of terrorism, as shown in table 1. CBP is the lead federal
agency in charge of securing our nation's borders, and has three
components with a mission to interdict illegal contraband and persons
seeking to enter illegally at and between the land ports of entry. Two
other DHS agencies, ICE and USCG, also have key roles. The ICE mission
includes investigating and dismantling criminal organizations that
transport persons and goods across the border illegally, while USCG
executes its maritime security mission by providing patrol presence and
operational response for all navigable waterways on the northern
border, including the Great Lakes.
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a Primary
Mission to Secure the Northern Border:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP);
Role and responsibility on northern border: Lead federal component
agency in charge of securing U.S. borders.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: Office of Border
Patrol (OBP);
Role and responsibility on northern border: Prevents terrorists,
terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other
contraband from entering the U.S. between ports of entry.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: Office of Field
Operations;
Role and responsibility on northern border: Prevents terrorists,
terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other
contraband from entering the U.S, while facilitating legitimate trade
and travel, at the nation's air, land, and sea ports of entry.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: Office of Air and
Marine;
Role and responsibility on northern border: Operates integrated air and
marine forces to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and
the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband
toward or across U.S. borders.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE);
Role and responsibility on northern border: Enforces federal
immigration and customs laws--along with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--in
relation to activities occurring at, or with a nexus to, the border.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG);
Role and responsibility on northern border: Executes maritime security
mission on and over the major waterways using marine and air assets.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
DHS agencies leverage their border security efforts through
partnerships with state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement
agencies to share intelligence, information, and conduct joint
operations for interdiction and investigation of cross-border crime.
DHS considers these collaborative efforts particularly important for
the northern border in remote, sparsely populated areas.
There has been growing concern within Congress over the number of
personnel assigned to the northern border, the increasing amount of
illegal activity, and the potential for terrorists to gain unlawful
entry into the United States. There has also been concern with respect
to the adequacy of facilities and physical infrastructure to
accommodate the increasing volume of traffic.[Footnote 6] Congress has
shown increasing interest in issues surrounding security of the
northern border--first authorizing, and later directing--resource
allocations to the northern border for personnel and improved
technology.[Footnote 7] Congress has also established various reporting
requirements in laws that are to provide updates on the status of
northern border security. In addition to the 9/11 Act, for example, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,[Footnote 8] directs DHS to
prepare and submit a biennial National Land Border Security Plan. This
plan is to include a vulnerability, risk, and threat assessment of each
port of entry located on the northern border or the southern border,
beginning in January 2009.
The DHS report--issued to Congress on February 29, 2008--was overseen
and facilitated by CBP's Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES). OES
was formed in August 2007 to assign responsibilities for and coordinate
the development of all CBP congressional reports, correspondence, and
external requests for information. OES tasked the CBP Office for Secure
Border Initiative with taking the lead in coordinating information
gathering from the relevant CBP components.[Footnote 9] OES also
received input from ICE and USCG in formulating the report. The
information from these sources was compiled and reviewed within CBP,
DHS, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before submission to
Congress.
DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing Information
for Improving Northern Border Security:
While the DHS report to Congress discusses northern border
vulnerabilities and ongoing initiatives in place as required in law,
information is missing that identifies the extent that various
vulnerabilities remain unaddressed, and recommendations and resources
to address these security gaps. Without this information, it is
difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed
on the northern border in the broader context of national security.
The DHS Report Discusses Vulnerabilities and Initiatives Reflected in
Key Management Documents, but Does Not Link This Information to
Identify Security Gaps:
The DHS report to Congress discusses northern border vulnerabilities
and ongoing initiatives to improve northern border security consistent
with the content of its planning, performance, and budget documents,
but DHS does not link this information to show the extent that security
gaps remain on the northern border. The DHS report states that the
northern border is vulnerable to the primary threats of terrorism, drug
trafficking, and illegal immigration. These facts were consistently
supported by threat information obtained from Canadian officials, and
officials from DHS and CBP.[Footnote 10] According to these sources,
northern border vulnerabilities are most actively exploited to smuggle
illegal drugs and contraband; illegal immigration is a lesser problem.
While DHS reports significant concern that terrorists can enter the
United States undetected at or between the northern ports of entry,
U.S. and Canadian officials agree that there is currently no credible
intelligence or evidence indicating that there are terrorists in Canada
planning an attack on U.S. soil.
The DHS report lists initiatives its component agencies have underway
to address vulnerabilities and achieve operational control of the
border but does not mention progress made in this regard, or how many
border miles are under operational control.[Footnote 11] CBP reports on
these indicators--border miles under effective (or operational)
control, and border miles with increased situational awareness--as two
of its key performance measures and reports that it plans to increase
and achieve control of the northern border by deploying a proper mix of
personnel, technology, facilities, and partnerships at and between the
ports of entry. While the DHS report lists initiatives in each of these
areas, they are not linked to the reported vulnerabilities, and the
extent that these initiatives mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities at
and between the ports of entry is not mentioned. Also not mentioned in
the report is the timeline DHS is using to request and deploy resources
necessary to increase the levels of control of the northern border. The
absence of such information makes it difficult for Congress to consider
future action and resources needed on the northern border in the
context of other areas of national security.
Personnel:
In terms of personnel, DHS lists ongoing initiatives for adequately
staffing the northern ports of entry, and hiring initiatives to
increase staffing between the ports of entry by 2010. For the ports of
entry, DHS describes its implementation of a workload staffing model
that considers workload and processing times to help identify the
number of personnel that should be deployed at each location, which has
resulted in the deployment of 190 CBP officers. Between the ports of
entry, DHS does not provide its methodology for identifying adequate
staffing, but does describe initiatives to more than double the number
of border patrol agents from fiscal years 2007 to 2010, in response to
direction from Congress. It is unclear, however, to what extent these
staffing initiatives will result in obtaining effective control of the
border. For example, the report states that 190 CBP officers have been
deployed to ports of entry as indicated in part by the workload
staffing model; however, DHS reports in its strategic plan for fiscal
years 2008-2013 that additional CBP officers are needed at many ports
of entry. Similarly, while DHS reports a commitment to meet statutory
staffing goals between the ports of entry by the year 2010, OBP
officials indicated that a greater number of agents would be needed to
gain operational control of the northern border.
Technology:
In discussing technology initiatives, CBP reports that technology has
been employed at the northern ports of entry to address a number of
vulnerabilities, but between the ports of entry, discussion is focused
on pilot projects intended to test capabilities for potential use on
the northern border. At the ports of entry, CBP reports that much
technology is in place to address vulnerabilities related to the
transport of illegal radiological and nuclear materials, illegal
contraband, and misrepresentation of identity through the use of
fraudulent documents. Between the ports of entry, pilot projects
address vulnerabilities related to the inability to detect low-flying
aircraft; the inability to detect unauthorized border crossings in
areas without law enforcement patrol; and to share communications. The
report does not discuss when the results of the projects will be
available or the extent that DHS would use these technologies, if
successful, to address existing vulnerabilities. DHS also does not
discuss initiatives to address the vulnerabilities cited in the report
related to maritime security, such as the lack of video capabilities in
marinas, unregulated access that small private vessels have on the
Great Lakes and other border waterways, and insufficient resources to
access boats on the open water. Subsequent to the report issued to
Congress, DHS provided a thorough discussion of the vulnerabilities and
challenges in addressing these aspects of maritime security in the DHS
Small Vessel Security Strategy, issued April 2008. USCG stated that an
implementation plan would be finalized at the end of December 2008, to
guide agency actions in implementing the strategy, but this plan would
not be released to the public due to its security classification.
[Footnote 12]
Facilities:
In discussing facilities, the DHS report describes ongoing initiatives
to systematically review the port of entry inspection facilities to
identify the need for upgrade or replacement, and to develop a new
standard station concept[Footnote 13] to accommodate the growth in
number of border agents between the ports of entry. The report
describes the age and condition of some facilities and volume of
traffic and use. However, while the DHS strategic plan states that the
department's secure border program depends significantly on modernizing
the ports of entry, there is no discussion in the report to Congress on
the status of these efforts, when they will be completed, and how they
currently affect northern border security.[Footnote 14]
Partnerships:
The DHS report lists various initiatives underway that establish
binational partnerships or partnerships among U.S. federal, state, and
local agencies to share information and improve communication and
cooperation among agencies working along the border. Five binational
partnerships were discussed, four with a broad focus on cross-border
law enforcement efforts,[Footnote 15] and one with a specific focus on
preventing illegal air incursions.[Footnote 16] Six U.S. partnerships
were also mentioned, one specific to smuggling on Indian reservations,
[Footnote 17] two related to drug trafficking,[Footnote 18] two related
to intelligence gathering,[Footnote 19] and one related to augmenting
enforcement capacity by cross-designating federal authority to other
agencies.[Footnote 20] DHS and CBP management documents support the
report's discussion of these partnerships as a key strategy for
northern border security; however, there is no discussion of the extent
that these partnerships were responsible for increasing the level of
control across the border or how they will do so in the future.
DHS Report Does Not Provide Recommendations or Resource Requirements to
Improve Northern Border Security:
The DHS report contains a section for recommendations to address
northern border vulnerabilities, but the information provided is a
restatement of initiatives in place without mention of recommendations
for further action or additional resources as required by law.
Officials from DHS component agencies provided several reasons this
information was missing from the report. One reason was that the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI) office--which was tasked with coordinating
component agency contributions to the report--directed them to discuss
their resource needs in terms of the existing budget; therefore, they
did not discuss actions or resource requirements for future years. A
second reason was that some components were satisfied with their
current budget allocation. CBP officials stated that they supported the
President's budget and had nothing further to recommend or request in
the report to Congress.[Footnote 21] A third reason is that some
components did not have the information necessary to identify
recommendations or additional resources. USCG officials indicated that
the lack of departmentwide strategic direction for the northern border
has made it difficult to identify specific resource needs. Similarly,
ICE officials said that information was lacking to compare and assess
overall resources devoted across various northern border agencies,
initiatives, and border locations.
DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and
Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide Benefit:
DHS is developing strategic plans, a risk-management process, and new
initiatives that could change the level and mix of resources needed to
protect the northern border; however, most efforts were incomplete and
unavailable for our review. Over the years, we have conducted
evaluations of various border security activities and our reports
included a number of recommendations for improvement. DHS action to
fully implement these recommendations would provide benefit in
addressing northern border vulnerabilities.
DHS Is Developing Strategic Plans and a Risk-Management Process:
DHS and CBP have reported the need to provide a coherent framework to
coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal northern border security
efforts, and are developing northern border strategic plans, as well as
a risk-management process to further these goals. Completion of these
efforts should provide DHS with useful information in developing future
reports to Congress on northern border security.
DHS has completed, or begun efforts to develop, three strategic plans
that will help address vulnerabilities on the northern border.
Strategic plans help ensure that missions requiring a multiagency
response are firmly aligned with articulated goals and objectives, and
help keep agencies focused on the desired "end state." While DHS has
developed a broad strategic plan to outline the department's overall
mission and objectives, it has begun to focus on the need to develop
coordinated and unified strategies to address more specific concerns,
such as northern border security. A key effort under development is an
overall northern border strategic plan that will, for the first time,
take all DHS component agencies into account in efforts to address
vulnerabilities necessary for control of the northern border. CBP did
not indicate when this plan may be completed. A second strategic plan
under development will address security vulnerabilities in the air
environment, such as the inability to detect low-flying aircraft. CBP
officials stated that they were working on performance measures for
this plan, and estimate that it will be released in April 2009. DHS
issued its third strategic plan, the Small Vessel Security Strategy, in
April 2008 to help close existing maritime security gaps on waterways
such as the Great Lakes, related to the small vessel environment.
To help component agencies achieve the major goals outlined in each of
these strategic plans, DHS plans to develop implementation plans that
are to describe specific actions component agencies will take in
support of each objective, identify lead component agencies for these
actions, and provide target completion dates. USCG has stated that the
implementation plan for the small vessel strategic plan is scheduled to
be issued for use by component agencies at the end of December 2009,
but will be considered security sensitive.[Footnote 22] Dates are not
yet available for implementation plans to follow the remaining two
strategic plans.
Some DHS component agencies have acted to incorporate risk-management
principles that provide information to prioritize and allocate
resources for their individual programs and activities as required by
law and presidential directive,[Footnote 23] but DHS has not yet
completed efforts to implement this approach departmentwide. Risk
management is important for strengthening homeland security resource
allocations, as the nation cannot afford to fully protect against every
type of threat. Therefore, an approach is needed that considers how
best to allocate resources based on factors such as probability and
adverse consequence. The DHS goal is to develop a risk-management
process that will assess risk and inform strategic planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution processes across all of its
component agencies and that will evaluate the risk-reduction effects
among relevant DHS programs. However, achieving this goal has been
difficult. While risk management has been used in the private and
public sectors for decades, its application for homeland security and
combating terrorism is relatively new and without a precedent
framework.[Footnote 24] As such, the effort to assess risk across DHS
component agencies and programs is still in its very early stages of
development.
Future DHS Action to Improve Northern Border Security Is Influenced by
Success of Pilot Projects, Partnerships, and External Factors:
DHS component agencies have identified resources to increase and
achieve northern border security, but the need for these resources
constantly evolves in response to various factors. For example, the DHS
report described many pilot projects for new technology. If successful,
OBP officials report that these projects could reduce security
vulnerabilities and current needs for other resources, such as existing
technology, personnel, or infrastructure. However, these officials also
indicate that new technology must be fully tested for operational
effectiveness, and delays coupled with uncertainties of success have
made it difficult to balance future resource investments in new
technology with current investments in existing technology. Such
balance is necessary to ensure security as well as effective
stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Similarly, DHS officials discussed partnerships among federal, state,
and local agencies to coordinate information and operations--either
newly created or still in development--that could result in greater
efficiencies in border security. However, time will tell if these
partnerships are sustainable and warrant a decrease or change in
current estimated needs for personnel.
External factors--such as the interplay among private parties,
governments, and agencies--also influence actions in addressing
security vulnerabilities. In Detroit, for example, CBP officials said
that action to improve facilities at northern ports of entry was
stymied by private ownership of property and landlocked facilities. In
addition, the Small Vessel Security Strategy indicates that efforts to
address maritime vulnerabilities were challenged by different practices
or views among federal, state, and Canadian governments in balancing
security needs with the freedom of the waterways expected by the small-
vessel community. Further, ICE officials said that the scope of their
authority in pursuing narcotics investigations influenced their actions
in addressing some cross-border crimes.
DHS Action to Implement Past GAO Recommendations Would Strengthen
Northern Border Security:
DHS has an opportunity to address some northern border vulnerabilities
by fully implementing recommendations made in past evaluations of its
security efforts. Over the past few years, we have conducted
evaluations and issued a number of reports related to the security of
the U.S. border both at and between ports of entry (see Related GAO
Products section at end of this report). In some instances, our reports
included recommendations addressing vulnerabilities in border security--
including the northern border--while in other cases, our reports and
recommendations were more general, but when implemented, would provide
benefit to the northern border.
We reviewed recommendations resulting from GAO evaluations conducted
from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and identified 11 reports
containing 50 recommendations that had potential to address
vulnerabilities in border security, or to address weaknesses in key
initiatives. At the time of our review, DHS had implemented 11 of these
50 recommendations. For example, DHS implemented a recommendation to
formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection program
that would help agency management and Congress monitor effectiveness in
apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators.
However, 39 recommendations from the 11 GAO reports are still open. In
some cases, recommendations were open because DHS and other federal
agencies[Footnote 25] had not yet had time to implement them. For
example, 18 of the 39 open recommendations were from GAO reports issued
within the last fiscal year. In regard to the remaining 21
recommendations, DHS and other agencies agreed to take action, but at
least 1 and, in some cases, over 3 years have passed without full
implementation.[Footnote 26] Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government state that agencies are to ensure that findings of
audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.[Footnote 27] The time
necessary to resolve recommendations varies depending on the type of
action required. However, DHS does not have a transparent process to
show how long it will take to implement each recommendation considering
the resources, risk level, and complexity of effort required. Timely
implementation of recommendations would help address vulnerabilities
related to a variety of border security initiatives. Some of the older
recommendations that have not been fully implemented include those to
improve screening of travelers at ports of entry to ensure legal entry,
preclude cross-border transport of illicit nuclear materials, reduce
risks in delivering key technology for border surveillance and for
information sharing, and increase information sharing and coordination
among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as shown in
table 2 and appendix I. We believe that these outstanding
recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented.
Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border Security That
Have Not Been Fully Implemented:
Traveler Screening:
Number and year of recommendation: 4 (fiscal year 2007);
Purpose of recommendations: Achieve benefits from investment in the US-
VISIT program at land ports of entry by developing performance measures
for assessing US-VISIT operations, and ensuring reports to Congress
include information regarding deployment of biometric exit
capabilities, and how these capabilities align with existing land
border security initiatives.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248], December 2006.
Number and year of recommendation: 3 (fiscal year 2007);
Purpose of recommendations: Prevent fraudulent use of passports and
visas by periodically reassessing and fully utilizing their security
features, and establishing a comprehensive oversight program of
passport acceptance facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006], July 2007.
Number and year of recommendation: 5 (fiscal year 2008);
Purpose of recommendations: Mitigate vulnerabilities in terrorist watch
list screening processes, enhance the use of the terrorist watch list
as a counterterrorism tool and ensure its effectiveness, and ensure
governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have oversight,
accountability, and guidance.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-110], October 2007.
Number and year of recommendation: 2 (fiscal year 2008);
Purpose of recommendations: Mitigate the risk of failed traveler
inspections at ports of entry by developing data on training programs
and incorporating specific tasks and requirements into CBP's procedures
for its on-the-job training program.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219], November 2007.
Nuclear Security:
Number and year of recommendation: 6 (fiscal year 2006);
Purpose of recommendations: Reduce delays in acquisition and deployment
of radiation detection equipment to ports of entry, take steps to
increase the chances that inspection officers find illicit radiological
material, and ensure the reliability and effective use of cost-benefit
information for risk assessment and acquisition decisions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389], March 2006.
Number and year of recommendation: 4 (fiscal year 2007);
Purpose of recommendations: Test the capabilities and limitations of
radiation detection equipment before making production and acquisition
decisions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T], September 2007.
Number and year of recommendation: 3 (fiscal year 2008);
Purpose of recommendations: Better track and detect radioactive
materials and ensure that for materials transported across the U.S.
border, personnel at ports of entry comply with guidance for verifying
that materials licenses are legitimate.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-598], June 2008.
Secure Border Initiative Technology (SBInet):
Number and year of recommendation: 7 (fiscal year 2008);
Purpose of recommendations: Improve acquisition, testing, and
implementation of SBInet technology for improving surveillance and
communications technologies along U.S. borders, and to permit
meaningful measurement, oversight, and accountability of the SBInet
program to CBP, DHS senior leadership, and Congress.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086], September 2008.
Federal, State, and Local Coordination:
Number and year of recommendation: 2 (fiscal year 2005);
Purpose of recommendations: Ensure that air and marine assets among DHS
agencies are effectively coordinated to meet border security needs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-543], August 2005.
Number and year of recommendation: 2 (fiscal year 2007);
Purpose of recommendations: Provide guidance and support to enhance
collaboration at operations centers staffed by multiple DHS agencies.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-89], October 2006.
Number and year of recommendation: 1 (fiscal year 2008);
Purpose of recommendations: Improve efforts to create and support a
national network of state and local information fusion centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35], October 2007.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Conclusions:
Federal agency reporting requirements, such as those contained in the
9/11 Act, can provide Congress with important information for debating
policy and allocating scarce resources, and the level of agency
responsiveness can either support or hinder these efforts. While the
DHS report to Congress provided information on the status of its
efforts, there is little sense of the relative effect these efforts
have had in protecting the northern border, and what additional action
or resources may be needed in the future. Requirements in law to
periodically assess the status of northern border security provide DHS
with additional opportunity to highlight information that can best meet
congressional needs.
Completion of DHS efforts to develop a northern border strategic plan
and risk management process to prioritize action and funding could lead
to better understanding among DHS, its component agencies, and Congress
in determining whether resources are most effectively allocated across
initiatives, border locations, and responsible agencies. However,
balancing current and future funding for border security will remain
challenging as the resource needs for the northern border will continue
to evolve in response to the relative success of new initiatives. In
the meantime, implementing recommendations for improving border
security in a more timely fashion would help reduce the nation's risk
due to unaddressed vulnerabilities.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To provide Congress with information that will facilitate policy
discussions and resource decisions for northern border security, we
recommend that for future reporting requirements the Secretary of
Homeland Security include more specific information on the actions,
resources, and time frame needed to improve security of the northern
border along with any attendant uncertainties, and the basis used to
prioritize action and resources for northern border security relative
to other areas of national security.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security and Attorney General. In its response, DHS and CBP
agreed with our recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the
department to implement it through the approved budget process. DOJ did
not provide formal comments.
In its comments, DHS stated that our report said DHS and other agencies
should proceed to adopt and address all of the recommendations from
previous reports without any assessment of priority based on risk. Our
intent in discussing these recommendations was to point out potential
security vulnerabilities that exist, not to imply that all of these
recommendations were of equal importance, or that risk-based
prioritization should not be applied when addressing them. GAO has
advocated the use of risk management principles, and using them to
sequence actions on open recommendations would seem to be appropriate.
We have added language to clarify that while the definition of timely
implementation will vary across recommendations, DHS lacks a
transparent process to show how long it will take to implement each
recommendation considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of
effort required.
DHS's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS and DOJ also offered
technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where
appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Senate and House
committees that have authorization and oversight responsibilities for
homeland security. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777, or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations from GAO on Various Border
Security Issues:
In the past, GAO has offered numerous recommendations to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) related to border security. Although
previous recommendations are not specific to the northern border, many
touch on different aspects that do affect various elements of northern
border security. Many recommendations made by GAO concerning general
border security, nuclear security, technology, and interagency
cooperation and information sharing, have yet to be implemented by DHS.
Fully implementing these recommendations could provide great benefits
to DHS and the nation in terms of strengthening general border
security, and by extension, security of the northern border. Tables 3
through 6 detail 39 selected open recommendations related to border
security vulnerabilities.
Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General Border
Security Issues with Potential Implications for Northern Border
Security:
GAO report: GAO-07-248: Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces
Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of
Entry (Dec. 6, 2006);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248]
Recommendation:
To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) at land
ports of entry (POE), and security goals and objectives, the Secretary
of Homeland Security should direct the US-VISIT Program Director, in
collaboration with the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection
to:
(1) Develop performance measures for assessing the effect of US-VISIT
operations specifically at land POEs.
As DHS finalized the statutorily mandated report describing a
comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for US-VISIT, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to ensure that the
report include, among other things:
(2) Information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying
biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs.
(3) A discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit
capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a
reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements.
(4) A description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border
security initiatives with US-VISIT and what facility or facility
modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that technology
and process work in harmony.
GAO report: GAO-07-1006: Border Security: Security of New Passports and
Visas Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent
Use (July 31, 2007);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006]
Recommendation:
To improve the integrity of its travel documents, the Secretary of
State should:
(5) Develop a process and schedule for periodically reassessing the
security features and planning the redesign of its travel documents.
(6) Establish a comprehensive oversight program of passport acceptance
facilities. In doing so, the Department of State should consider
conducting performance audits of acceptance facilities, agents, and
accepted applications and establishing an appropriate system of
internal controls over the acceptance facilities.
To more fully utilize the security features of passports and visas, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should:
(7) Develop a deployment schedule for providing sufficient e-passport
readers to U.S. POEs, which would enable inspection officials to better
utilize the security features in the new U.S. e-passport.
GAO report: GAO-08-110: Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities
Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency
Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List (Oct. 11, 2007);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-110]
Recommendation:
In order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list
screening processes, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
should:
(8) Assess to what extent there are vulnerabilities in the current
screening processes that arise when screening agencies do not accept
relevant records due to the designs of their computer systems, the
extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a security risk, and what
actions, if any, should be taken in response.
To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a
counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads
of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private
sector entities:
(9) Develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to
support private sector screening processes that have a substantial
bearing on homeland security, as called for in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6.
To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a
counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads
of other appropriate federal departments:
(10) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated
strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-
related screening as called for in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 11 (HSPD-11), which, among other things, (a) identifies all
appropriate screening opportunities to use watch list records to
detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to
homeland security and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy
and civil liberties.
(11) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated
investment and implementation plan that describes the scope,
governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives,
metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary for implementing a
terrorist-related screening strategy, as called for in HSPD-11.
To help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts
have the oversight, accountability, and guidance necessary to achieve
the administration's vision of a comprehensive and coordinated
approach, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism should:
(12) Ensure that the governance structure proposed by the plan affords
clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a) provide
monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts governmentwide,
(b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess
progress toward intended outcomes.
GAO report: GAO-08-219: Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses
in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry (Nov. 5,
2007);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219]
Recommendation:
To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry,
we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take the following
actions:
(13) Develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the
individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency
management is in a better position to measure progress toward achieving
training goals.
(14) Incorporate into CBP's procedures for its on-the-job training
program (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-
the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency
in performing those tasks.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear Security
with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security:
GAO report: GAO-06-389: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-
Entry, but Concerns Remain (Mar. 22, 2006);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389]
Recommendation:
Since DHS provides Congress with information concerning the acquisition
and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS's procedures to obtain
internal agreement on this information are lengthy and cumbersome--
often resulting in delays--the Secretary of Homeland Security, working
with the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and
the Commissioner of CBP, should:
(15) Review these approval procedures and take actions necessary to
ensure that DHS submits information to the Congress early in the fiscal
year.
In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program as
planned, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director
of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), should:
(16) Devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate
and the rate needed to complete deployments by September 2009.
To ensure that DHS's substantial investment in radiation detection
technology yields the greatest possible level of detection capability
at the lowest possible cost, the Secretary of Homeland Security, once
the costs and capabilities of advanced technology portal monitors are
well understood, and before any of the new equipment is purchased,
should:
(17) Work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs
of deploying advanced portal monitors. This analysis should focus on
determining whether any additional detection capability provided by the
advanced equipment is worth its additional cost. After completing this
cost-benefit analysis, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with
the Director of DNDO, should revise its total program cost estimates to
reflect current decisions.
To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail
deployments proceed on time, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, should:
(18) Develop procedures for effectively screening rail containers and
develop new technologies to facilitate inspections.
To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological
material, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the
Commissioner of CBP, should:
(19) Consider modifying the agency's standard operating procedures for
secondary inspections to include physically opening cargo containers
during secondary inspections at all ports of entry when the external
inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological material
inside.
To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should:
(20) Direct PNNL to have its earned value management system validated
so that it complies with guidance developed by the American National
Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance. In addition, the
Secretary of Homeland Security should direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an
Integrated Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data
is reliable for assessing risk and developing alternatives.
GAO report: GAO-07-1247T: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional
Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation
Detection Equipment (Sept. 18, 2007);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]
Recommendation:
The Secretary of Homeland Security should:
(21) Delay Secretarial Certification and full-scale production
decisions of the advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) until all relevant
tests and studies have been completed and limitations to these tests
and studies have been identified and addressed. Furthermore, results of
these tests and studies should be validated and made fully transparent
to the Department of Energy (DOE), CBP, and other relevant parties.
(22) Once the tests and studies have been completed, evaluated, and
validated, determine in cooperation with CBP, DOE, and other
stakeholders including independent reviewers, if additional testing is
needed.
(23) If additional testing is needed, appoint an independent group
within DHS, not aligned with the ASP acquisition process, to conduct
objective, comprehensive, and transparent testing that realistically
demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of the ASP system. This
independent group would be separate from the recently appointed
independent review panel.
(24) Report the results of the tests and analyses to the appropriate
congressional committees before large scale purchases of ASPs are made.
GAO report: GAO-08-598: Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take
Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials (June
19, 2008);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-598]
Recommendation:
Given the repeated delays in implementing improvements to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's ability to monitor and track radioactive sealed
sources, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should take
steps, consistent with sound systems development practices, to:
(25) Ensure that priority attention is given to meeting the current
January 2009 and summer 2010 target dates for launching the National
Source Tracking System, Web-based licensing system, and the new license
verification system, respectively.
Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially
dangerous to human health if not properly handled, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission should:
(26) Complete the steps needed to include all potentially dangerous
radioactive sources (category 3 and the larger category 4 sources, as
well as categories 1 and 2) in the National Source Tracking System as
quickly as is reasonably possible.
To improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and
materials from being smuggled into the United States, the Secretary of
Homeland Security should:
(27) Direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take
measures to ensure that this guidance is being followed.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet with
Potential Implications for Northern Border Security:
GAO report: GAO-08-1086: Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address
Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment (Sept. 22,
2008);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]
Recommendation:
To improve DHS's efforts to acquire and implement SBInet[A], we made
the following recommendations:
To permit meaningful measurement and oversight of and accountability
for the program, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner to:
(28) Ensure that the risks associated with planned SBInet acquisition,
development, testing, and deployment activities are immediately
assessed.
(29) Ensure that the results, including proposed alternative courses of
action for mitigating the risks, are provided to the Commissioner and
DHS's senior leadership, as well as to the department's congressional
authorization and appropriation committees.
We further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the CBP Commissioner to have the Acting SBInet Program Manager take the
following additional actions:
(30) Finalize and approve an integrated master schedule that reflects
the timing and sequencing of the work needed to achieve these
commitments.
(31) Revise and approve versions of the SBInet life cycle management
approach, including the draft Systems Engineering Plan and draft Test
and Evaluation Management Plan, and in doing so, ensure that these
revised and approved versions are consistent with one another, reflect
program officials' recently described changes to the engineering and
testing approaches, and reflect relevant federal guidance and
associated leading practices.
(32) Ensure that the revised and approved life cycle management
approach is fully implemented.
(33) Implement key requirements development and management practices to
include (1) baselining requirements before system design and
development efforts begin; (2) analyzing requirements prior to being
baselined to ensure that they are complete, achievable, and verifiable;
and (3) tracing requirements to higher-level requirements, lower-level
requirements, and test cases.
(34) Implement key test management practices to include (1) developing
and documenting test plans prior to the start of testing; (2)
conducting appropriate component level testing prior to integrating
system components; and (3) approving a test management strategy that,
at a minimum, includes a relevant testing schedule, establishes
accountability for testing activities by clearly defining testing roles
and responsibilities, and includes sufficient detail to allow for
testing and oversight activities to be clearly understood and
communicated to test stakeholders.
Source: GAO.
[A] In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI),
a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders
through enhanced surveillance technologies, increased staffing levels,
improved infrastructure, and increased domestic enforcement of
immigration laws. One component of SBI, known as SBInet, is focused on
the acquisition and deployment of surveillance and communications
technologies.
[End of table]
Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Partnerships and
Joint Operations with Potential Implications for Northern Border
Security:
GAO report: GAO-05-543: Border Security: Opportunities to Increase
Coordination of Air and Marine Assets (Aug. 12, 2005);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-543]
Recommendation:
In order to help ensure that the use of available air and marine assets
is effectively coordinated to meet border security needs, the Secretary
of Homeland Security should:
(35) Provide guidance that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of
the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP, the primary DHS agencies
that employ air and marine assets, in their homeland security missions,
as well as how asset use should be coordinated.
(36) Determine whether the Homeland Security Act's prohibition on
diversion of USCG assets, or any similar restriction in appropriations
laws, limits the ability of USCG to coordinate assets with other
agencies, and if so, evaluate the merits, including the costs and
benefits of proposing a change in relevant laws to Congress.
GAO report: GAO-07-89: Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple
DHS Agencies (Oct. 20, 2006);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-89]
Recommendation:
To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff
at each multiagency 24/7/365 operations center, the Secretary of
Homeland Security should charge the Director of the Operations
Directorate with developing and providing guidance and helping to
ensure the agencies that sponsor the center:
(37) Conduct staffing needs assessments.
(38) Address collaborative efforts at the four multiagency operations
centers in plans and reports on the level of each operation center's
managing agency.
GAO report: GAO-08-35: Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping
to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information
Fusion Centers (Oct. 30, 2007);
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]
Recommendation:
To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, the
National Fusion Center Coordination Group (NFCCG), through the
Information Sharing Council and the Program Manager for the Information
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), should:
(39) Determine and articulate the federal government's role in, and
whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the
long term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular emphasis
should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions
that support a national information sharing capability as critical
nodes of the ISE.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
November 17, 2008:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Homeland Security and Justice:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Thank you for providing us with a copy of the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) draft report entitled, "NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY: DHS'
Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources
and Timeframes Needed to Address Vulnerabilities," GAO-09-93, dated
November 2008. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007
required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to
Congress within 180 days of enactment that addresses the
vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provide recommendations
to address such vulnerabilities, including required resources needed to
protect the border. The Act also required GAO to submit to Congress
within 270 days of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) report,
a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and to provide
recommendations regarding additional actions necessary to protect the
northern border.
DHS submitted its report to Congress in February 2008, discussing
ongoing initiatives to improve security along the northern border as
required by law. GAO found that the DHS report to Congress is not fully
responsive in providing information for improving northern border
security as required in the 9/11 Act. GAO stated that DHS provided a
listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address
them but did not include recommendations and additional resources that
are needed to protect the northern border. GAO stated that the lack of
information regarding the extent that vulnerabilities remain
unaddressed on the northern border and the time and resources it will
take to address them makes it challenging for Congress to consider
future actions and resources necessary for the northern border in the
broader context of national security. While we all grapple with
resource issues and needs the Department makes requests to Congress for
resources and programs through the approved budget justification
process. GAO also stated that DHS could take action to reduce
vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past
evaluations.
The report rightly says that risk assessment should drive resource
requests, and that DHS is working on plans and strategies that will
guide resource decisions (based on risk assessment) to address northern
border vulnerabilities. However, not all vulnerabilities have the same
priority to address, depending on the assessment of risk that the
vulnerability poses; i.e., a vulnerability that is not very likely to
be attacked and/or would have little consequence if penetrated is not a
high-risk and not the highest priority to address. However, the report
then goes on to say that DHS (and other agencies) should proceed to
adopt and address all of the recommendations from previous reports
without any assessment of priority based on risk. While all of the
recommendations previously made have merit, the Departments' ability to
implement them will depend on many factors, including resources, the
interplay between other relevant actors (the private sector, state,
local enforcement, etc.) which the report also acknowledges are a
reason why certain programs have not been able to get off the ground
and risk.
Many of the projects undertaken by DHS on the northern border (and
overall) are dictated by various authorizing committees, which
themselves do not take any risk assessment or prioritize across
committee areas of jurisdiction. This creates difficulty for the
Department in determining most appropriate allocation of resources.
Streamlining oversight so that there is a unified approach will
increase the likelihood the Department can craft a unified plan.
GAO made one recommendation in its report. GAO is recommending that the
DHS Secretary provide more specific information in future reporting
requirements to Congress, including planned actions, resource
requirements, and timeframes for increasing and achieving northern
border security and the basis used for prioritizing such action and
resources in the context of other national security risks. CBP concurs
with the recommendation and will work with the Department to implement
the recommendation through the approved budget process.
We thank you again for the opportunity to review the report, to discuss
the content, and to provide comments.
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant
Director, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this
assignment. David Holt made significant contributions to the work.
Amanda Miller and Michele Fejfar assisted with design, methodology, and
data analysis. Linda Miller provided assistance in report preparation;
and Frances Cook provided legal support.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology Investment.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. Washington, D.C.:
September 22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in
Homeland Security.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-904T]. Washington, D.C.:
June 25, 2008.
Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better
Track and Detect Radioactive Materials.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-598]. Washington, D.C.:
June 19, 2008.
Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for
the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-757]. Washington, D.C.:
May 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security
Program and Operations, but Challenges Remain.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-542T]. Washington, D.C.:
March 6, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T]. Washington, D.C.:
January 3, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219]. Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]. Washington, D.C.:
October 30, 2007.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet
Program Implementation.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T]. Washington, D.C.:
October 24, 2007.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening
Processes, and Expand Use of the List.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-110]. Washington, D.C.:
October 11, 2007.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-123SU]. Washington,
D.C.: October 5, 2007, SBU.
Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored
U.S. Border Locations.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-884T]. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but More
Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006]. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2007.
Border Security: Long-term Strategy Needed to Keep Pace with Increasing
Demand for Visas.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-847]. Washington, D.C.:
July 13, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-378T]. Washington, D.C.:
January 31, 2007.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248]. Washington, D.C.:
December 6, 2006.
Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-56SU]. Washington, D.C.:
November 13, 2006 SBU.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7
Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-89]. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 2006.
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
of the Visa Waiver Program.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1090T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 7, 2006.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
United States.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-976T]. Washington, D.C.:
August 2, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389]. March 22, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91]. December 15, 2005.
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and
Marine Assets.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-543]. August 12, 2005.
Footnotes:
[1] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines the U.S.-Canadian
border as stretching from the state of Washington to Maine, and does
not include the Alaskan border with Canada.
[2] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 731(a)-(b), 121 Stat. 266, 351.
[3] Id. § 731(c), 121 Stat. at 351.
[4] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
[5] For example, OBP data shows that in fiscal year 2008, apprehensions
of inadmissible aliens along the northern border were approximately 1.1
percent of apprehensions along the southwest border, and pounds of
illegal narcotics seized along the northern border were about 0.6
percent of pounds seized along the southwest border.
[6] For example, see Congressional Research Service, Border Security:
U.S.-Canada Immigration Border Issues, RS21258 (updated Dec. 28, 2004).
[7] For example, the United and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) authorized funding to triple the number of
border patrol and inspection personnel along the northern border and to
improve technology for monitoring the northern border. See Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 402, 115 Stat. 272, 342-43. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland
Security to assign to the northern border no less than 20 percent of
the net increase in border patrol agents each year for fiscal years
2006 through 2010. See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5202, 118 Stat. 3638,
3734. Also, in March 2007, the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations both wrote to the Secretary of DHS expressing the
committees' expectation that DHS redirect $20,000,000 of its Border
Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology expenditure plan to
begin addressing security needs along the northern border.
[8] Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, § 604, 121 Stat. 1844, 2095-96 (2007)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1403).
[9] OES tasked the following CBP components to provide input to the
Report to Congress: Office of Field Operations, OBP, Office of Air &
Marine, the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, and the
Office of Information Technology.
[10] Our discussions with FBI officials on the terrorist threat, and
DEA officials on the drug trafficking threat, were generally consistent
with DHS-reported information.
[11] OBP defines operational control as the ability to detect entries
when they occur, identify the entry and classify its level of threat,
effectively and efficiently respond to the entry and bring the
situation to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. OBP data from
fiscal year 2008 showed that few northern border miles were under
operational control, but that a greater number of miles have shown
progress toward this goal.
[12] USCG also stated that a public strategic communication plan
regarding the implementation plan would be released sometime in the
spring of 2009.
[13] The standard station concept is a base design that may be utilized
at multiple locations to reduce design costs and time frame. The
standard station being implemented on the northern border is capable of
supporting 50 agents and their support personnel, and allows for
addition or expansion as needed.
[14] CBP officials commented that CBP conducts strategic resource
assessments for ports of entry to gather facility and planning data,
assess the facilities to determine critical needs in support of the
mission, and make facility recommendations for budgeting and
programming. CBP completed an initial round of these assessments at all
land ports of entry from 2004 through 2006, and plans to soon begin a
second round of expanded assessments that will include air and sea
ports. CBP anticipates completing this second round of assessments
within 3 years and repeating the process on a 2 to 3 year cycle.
[15] The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) are a multi-DHS-
agency law enforcement initiative with Canada with a goal to ensure
comprehensive and permanent coordination of cross-border law
enforcement, antiterrorism efforts, and information sharing between the
two countries. The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is an
interagency task force designed to enhance border security and combat
violence related to smuggling through coordinated effort involving
federal, state, local, and Canadian law enforcement agencies. Upon
completion of a bilateral agreement currently under negotiation,
Shiprider operations will support IBETs and include joint cross-border
maritime patrols of USCG and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
In this effort, designated USCG and RCMP maritime law enforcement
officers will embark on the other party's vessels for patrolling and
enforcing U.S. and Canadian law on either side of the maritime border.
Project North Star provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement managers
a mechanism to enhance communications, cooperation, and partnership.
[16] The Airfields Initiative is a binational partnership between
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies of the United States
and Canada involving the aviation community and the public as sources
of information and intelligence on aircraft incursions.
[17] ICE patrol officers, known as Shadow Wolves, were established by
congressional mandate to remedy smuggling of narcotics across Indian
reservations.
[18] The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program is an antidrug
support program providing a mechanism for federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies to share information and intelligence. The
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force is a mechanism to promote
cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies engaged in narcotics and money laundering
investigations.
[19] Border Security Evaluation Teams gather intelligence from state
and local law enforcement agencies, local civic leaders, and the public
to determine if suspected cross-border activities indicate a need for
deployment of border patrol resources in those areas. Operation Last
Call was created by the ICE Office of Deportation and Removal
Operations to maximize intelligence collection through systematic
debriefing of ICE detainees.
[20] ICE reports cross-designating other federal, state, and local
officers to supplement the ICE investigative mission and participate on
task forces.
[21] The budget process provides Congress with a 1-year President's
budget, and a 5-year plan to meet prioritized needs within projected
resource constraints. However, these documents do not reflect the
resources and time frame needed to achieve control of the northern
border.
[22] An unclassified notice to the public is to be published sometime
in spring 2009.
[23] This requirement is found in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7).
[24] Our previous work pointed out the challenges DHS faces in
developing its risk-management process. See GAO, Risk Management:
Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective
Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15,
2005), and GAO, Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller
General of the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management
Principles in Homeland Security, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-627SP] (Washington, D.C.: April
2008).
[25] Other federal agencies included the FBI, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the National Fusion Center Coordination Group
(NFCCG), Department of State, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL).
[26] DHS officials provided us with reasons why two of the 21 GAO
recommendations had not been implemented. DHS did not implement these
fiscal year 2005 recommendations regarding coordination of its air and
marine assets due to inadvertent exclusion of these recommendations
from the agency tracking system. DHS and the Department of State report
making progress towards implementing seven of the remaining pre-fiscal
year 2008 recommendations.
[27] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[End of section]
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