Immigration Benefits
Actions Needed to Address Vulnerabilities in Process for Granting Permanent Residency Gao ID: GAO-09-55 December 5, 2008Since September 11, 2001, a concern has been that terrorists or their supporters would seek to immigrate to the United States (i.e., seek lawful permanent residency (LPR)). The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts background checks and the FBI conducts name checks for those applying for LPR. GAO was asked to review USCIS's processes for screening individuals applying for LPR. GAO assessed: (1) what available data show about the extent to which national security concerns were discovered during USCIS background checks for LPR applications, (2) what issues USCIS has encountered in its background check processes and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues, and (3) the extent to which USCIS has addressed fraud vulnerabilities in its adjudication procedures for LPR. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed USCIS background check and adjudication procedures, USCIS data on adjudications, and its assessments of fraud in applications for LPR, and interviewed USCIS and FBI officials.
Available data show that of the approximately 917,000 applications for LPR USCIS received from January 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 (0.05 percent) were referred to USCIS's Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) for national security concerns. According to FDNS, the cases referred to it involved individuals on a watch list which included names of known and suspected terrorists, or posed other national security concerns such as individuals who associated with suspected terrorists or engaged in espionage. While USCIS's application case management system was not designed to capture and routinely generate detailed statistics on those posing national security concerns, FDNS has developed a separate system to capture such data. USCIS had encountered delays in obtaining the results of FBI name checks--FBI checks of its investigative files--for LPR applicants and others, and had issues regarding the usefulness of these results, but USCIS and the FBI have taken a number of actions that have improved these checks. The FBI dedicated more staff to process name checks, and USCIS provided additional funding and training to FBI staff. As a result, the number of pending name checks has decreased 90 percent, from 329,000 in May 2007 to 32,000 as of September 30, 2008. The FBI plans on being able to complete all name checks within 90 days of receipt by June 2009. USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities identified in one of its assessments of fraud, called Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments (BFCA), but has yet to complete actions to address vulnerabilities identified in four other BFCAs. To conduct BFCAs, FDNS selected a sample of petitions to determine the extent of fraud and identify any systemic vulnerabilities in USCIS's adjudications processes. Internal control standards call for agency managers to promptly evaluate findings from audits and reviews, determine proper actions to take, and complete them within established time frames. Although FDNS completed all of these assessments between June 2006 and September 2007, USCIS has not established time frames for evaluating these findings and implementing any necessary corrective actions. Until USCIS takes corrective actions, vulnerabilities identified by these BFCAs will persist, increasing the risk that ineligible individuals will obtain LPR status. Lack of verification of the evidence submitted with petitions is one of the major vulnerabilities identified in these BFCAs. For example, FDNS staff found that individuals claiming to be married were not, employers did not exist, and aliens did not have the education or skills they claimed. USCIS procedures give its staff discretion on deciding whether to verify evidence submitted with petitions. The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have approved fraudulent petitions. Verifying all petitioner-submitted evidence is impossible. Procedures that require verifying certain evidence under certain circumstances would help adjudicators better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud detection and USCIS's customer service and production-related objectives.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-55, Immigration Benefits: Actions Needed to Address Vulnerabilities in Process for Granting Permanent Residency
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2008:
Immigration Benefits:
Actions Needed to Address Vulnerabilities in Process for Granting
Permanent Residency:
Permanent Residence Application Fraud:
GAO-09-55:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-55, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Available data show that of the approximately 917,000 applications for
LPR USCIS received from January 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516
(0.05 percent) were referred to USCIS‘s Office of Fraud Detection and
National Security (FDNS) for national security concerns. According to
FDNS, the cases referred to it involved individuals on a watch list
which included names of known and suspected terrorists, or posed other
national security concerns such as individuals who associated with
suspected terrorists or engaged in espionage. While USCIS‘s application
case management system was not designed to capture and routinely
generate detailed statistics on those posing national security
concerns, FDNS has developed a separate system to capture such data.
USCIS had encountered delays in obtaining the results of FBI name
checks”FBI checks of its investigative files”for LPR applicants and
others, and had issues regarding the usefulness of these results, but
USCIS and the FBI have taken a number of actions that have improved
these checks. The FBI dedicated more staff to process name checks, and
USCIS provided additional funding and training to FBI staff. As a
result, the number of pending name checks has decreased 90 percent,
from 329,000 in May 2007 to 32,000 as of September 30, 2008. The FBI
plans on being able to complete all name checks within 90 days of
receipt by June 2009.
USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities identified in
one of its assessments of fraud, called Benefit Fraud and Compliance
Assessments (BFCA), but has yet to complete actions to address
vulnerabilities identified in four other BFCAs. To conduct BFCAs, FDNS
selected a sample of petitions to determine the extent of fraud and
identify any systemic vulnerabilities in USCIS‘s adjudications
processes. Internal control standards call for agency managers to
promptly evaluate findings from audits and reviews, determine proper
actions to take, and complete them within established time frames.
Although FDNS completed all of these assessments between June 2006 and
September 2007, USCIS has not established time frames for evaluating
these findings and implementing any necessary corrective actions. Until
USCIS takes corrective actions, vulnerabilities identified by these
BFCAs will persist, increasing the risk that ineligible individuals
will obtain LPR status. Lack of verification of the evidence submitted
with petitions is one of the major vulnerabilities identified in these
BFCAs. For example, FDNS staff found that individuals claiming to be
married were not, employers did not exist, and aliens did not have the
education or skills they claimed. USCIS procedures give its staff
discretion on deciding whether to verify evidence submitted with
petitions. The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these
procedures have approved fraudulent petitions. Verifying all petitioner-
submitted evidence is impossible. Procedures that require verifying
certain evidence under certain circumstances would help adjudicators
better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud
detection and USCIS‘s customer service and production-related
objectives. What GAO Found:
Since September 11, 2001, a concern has been that terrorists or their
supporters would seek to immigrate to the United States (i.e., seek
lawful permanent residency (LPR)). The Department of Homeland
Security‘s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts
background checks and the FBI conducts name checks for those applying
for LPR. GAO was asked to review USCIS‘s processes for screening
individuals applying for LPR. GAO assessed: (1) what available data
show about the extent to which national security concerns were
discovered during USCIS background checks for LPR applications, (2)
what issues USCIS has encountered in its background check processes and
what actions have been taken to resolve those issues, and (3) the
extent to which USCIS has addressed fraud vulnerabilities in its
adjudication procedures for LPR. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed
USCIS background check and adjudication procedures, USCIS data on
adjudications, and its assessments of fraud in applications for LPR,
and interviewed USCIS and FBI officials.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Director of USCIS (1) establish timetables for
addressing findings from its four benefit fraud assessments, and (2)
establish requirements in LPR adjudications procedures on what evidence
petitioner should be verified. USCIS agreed with our recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-55]. For more
information, contact Rich Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Available Data Show That USCIS Has Identified Some Lawful Permanent
Residence Applicants with National Security Concerns:
USCIS and the FBI Have Taken a Number of Actions to Improve the
Timeliness and Usefulness of FBI Name Check Results:
USCIS Has Not Completed Actions Necessary to Address Identified
Vulnerabilities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: USCIS and FBI Joint Plan Milestones for Processing All Name
Checks within 90 Days:
Table: 2 Status of Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments, July 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: USCIS's Organization:
Figure 2: Percentage of Aliens Granted Lawful Permanent Residence
Status by Major Category of Admission, 2007:
Figure 3: Process for Adjudicating Applications for Adjustment of
Status to Lawful Permanent Residence:
Abbreviations:
BFCA: Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment:
CCD: Consolidated Consular Database:
CLAIMS: Computer Linked Application Information Management:
System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FDNS: Fraud Detection and National Security:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
INA: Immigration and Nationality Act:
KST: Known or suspected terrorist:
LPR: Lawful Permanent Residence (or Resident):
Non-KST: Non-known or suspected terrorist:
NSRV: National Security and Records Verification:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
OSI: Office of Security and Integrity:
TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communications System:
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center:
USCIS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 5, 2008:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In 2004, the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (the 9/11 Commission) reported that, while there were
efforts to enhance border security prior to the September 2001
terrorist attacks, no agency of the U.S. government thought of the
immigration process as an antiterrorism tool at that time. The 9/11
Commission's staff found that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service's "inability to adjudicate applications quickly or with
adequate security checks made it easier for terrorists to wrongfully
enter and remain in the United States throughout the 1990s." While all
19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued
nonimmigrant visas, the 9/11 Staff Report stated that terrorist group
members could seek to become lawful permanent residents, thus
"embedding" themselves in the United States indefinitely, to conduct or
support terrorist activities. Becoming lawful permanent residents would
also allow them to travel freely in and out of the country, thus making
it easier to plan a terrorist attack.
Aliens granted lawful permanent resident status are formally classified
as immigrants and receive a permanent residence card commonly referred
to as a green card. Aliens can obtain lawful permanent resident status
in the United States in one of two ways. Aliens overseas can apply for
an immigrant visa with the Department of State and enter directly as an
immigrant. Aliens already in the United States with a temporary visa
(nonimmigrant status), such as foreign students and certain temporary
workers, can apply to adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent
resident if they are eligible for an immigrant visa category. Asylees
who have been in the United States for 1 year also may apply to adjust
their status in the United States while individuals admitted as
refugees are required, by regulation, to apply for adjustment of status
after one year of admission. Within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is primarily
responsible for processing applications of aliens seeking the ability
to either live or work in the United States permanently or on a
temporary basis or to become United States citizens. In recent years,
the majority of aliens who became lawful permanent residents were
already in the United States and applied to USCIS for lawful permanent
residency. In general, aliens who seek to immigrate permanently must be
sponsored by a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or a business
entity. Immigration law identifies a number of different immigration
categories that allow aliens to become lawful permanent residents, such
as family members of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents or
employees of companies in the United States.
USCIS has instituted three background check procedures to identify
applicants for lawful permanent residency who may pose a risk to
national security or public safety.[Footnote 1] USCIS checks an alien's
name against the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS)
which includes data exported from the Terrorist Screening Center's
(TSC) watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists (KST).
USCIS also conducts fingerprint checks carried out by the Department of
Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to determine if an
alien has a criminal conviction that may make the alien ineligible to
become a permanent resident. In addition, USCIS requests that the FBI
conduct a name check against the FBI's administrative and investigative
files to identify individuals the FBI has investigated due to national
security or public safety concerns. While TECS and FBI fingerprint
checks are completed early in the application process, USCIS data have
shown the FBI name check results may not be completed for several
months or more, thereby delaying a final adjudication decision. Such
delays may allow individuals with potential national security concerns
to remain in the United States for an extended period of time before
USCIS becomes aware of these concerns.
In response to your request, we reported on the fraud risks that
complicate the Department of State's ability to screen certain visa
applicants.[Footnote 2] You also requested that we review USCIS's
processes for screening aliens already in the United States applying to
adjust their status:
to that of a lawful permanent resident. This report addresses the
following questions:
* What do available data show about the extent of national security
concerns discovered during USCIS background checks for lawful permanent
residence applications?
* What issues has USCIS encountered in its background check processes
and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues?
* To what extent has USCIS addressed identified vulnerabilities in its
adjudications procedures for permanent residency?
To determine what available data show about the extent of national
security concerns discovered during USCIS background checks for lawful
permanent residence applicants, we obtained data about the number of
permanent residence applications that were referred to USCIS's Office
of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) for national security
reasons from January 2006, when FDNS began capturing these data,
through May 2007, the date of our request for this information. We
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the source of the data
and the controls FDNS had in place to maintain the integrity of the
data and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. We also interviewed USCIS and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials on the extent to which individuals
posing threats to national security or public safety applied for
permanent residency under various immigration categories, such as
special immigrant religious workers and alien relatives. We also
obtained statistics on the national security cases referred to FDNS.
Because FDNS's system that tracks national security cases does not yet
capture the visa categories used (e.g., family-or employment-based
applications) and whether the immigration benefits were granted or
denied, we requested FDNS to provide these data by matching FDNS's data
with data in USCIS's application case management system. We analyzed
USCIS procedures and guidance for referring national security cases to
FDNS, as well as eligibility requirements defined in the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). To better understand the nature of the
national security cases and the related information provided by the FBI
about them, we performed a content analysis of a random sample of 100
FBI name check responses received from January through June 2007. FDNS
originally selected this sample to determine how often the FBI name
check provided unique information not available from the other two
background checks. To identify what issues USCIS has encountered in its
background check processes and what actions have been taken to resolve
those issues, we analyzed (1) USCIS policies and procedures for
conducting TECS queries, FBI fingerprint checks, and FBI name checks,
as well as related interagency memoranda of understanding on requesting
and conducting FBI name checks, (2) USCIS data on the number of pending
FBI name check requests, and (3) the FBI's and USCIS's actions to
improve the name check program. We interviewed knowledgeable agency
officials about the source of USCIS's pending FBI name check data and
the controls USCIS had in place to maintain the integrity of the data
and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. We discussed the actions USCIS and the FBI had
taken and planned to take to improve the name check program with key
agency officials, including the Associate Director of USCIS's National
Security and Records Verification Directorate (NSRV) and the Section
Chief of the FBI's National Name Check Program. To determine the extent
to which USCIS was addressing vulnerabilities in its adjudications
procedures for permanent residency, we analyzed current USCIS standard
operating procedures and other guidance provided to adjudicators for
processing applications for lawful permanent residency. We also
analyzed FDNS reports on assessments it completed to determine the
extent and nature of fraud in certain application types that may lead
to permanent residency, known as Benefit Fraud and Compliance
Assessments (BFCA). We interviewed FDNS managers responsible for
administering the BFCAs, reviewed documentation outlining the BFCAs'
design, methodology, and implementation, and determined that the
results were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We
also compared how USCIS addressed the findings of its BFCAs with
criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government[Footnote 3] and with standard practices in program and
project management for defining, designing, and executing
programs.[Footnote 4] We conducted this performance audit from May 2007
through November 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix I includes more detailed information on our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
Summary data provided by FDNS showed that of the approximately 917,000
applications for lawful permanent residency USCIS received from January
1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 were referred to FDNS for national
security reasons. According to FDNS officials, approximately 10 percent
of all the cases referred to it--including applications for lawful
permanent residency and other benefits--involved individuals on TSC's
watch list. The other national security cases referred to FDNS involved
individuals who were not on the terrorist watch list, but whose
background checks indicated other possible national security concerns,
such as those having associations with known or suspected terrorists or
terrorist organizations, or involved in espionage. USCIS's case
management system that tracks applications was not designed to capture
and routinely generate reports on the extent, type, and nature of
national security threats posed by applicants. Therefore, to provide
USCIS with more comprehensive data on those applicants who may pose a
national security threat and those who try to obtain immigration
benefits through fraud, FDNS is developing a separate system to capture
and analyze information such as visa category and eligibility decision
information on those cases referred to FDNS for national security
reasons. However, this system does not yet routinely provide statistics
on the visa categories used (e.g., family-or employment-based
applications) and whether the immigration benefits were granted or
denied. Having the capability to analyze trends in application types
used and strategies employed by individuals with national security
concerns on a continuous basis should help identify those types of
applications that may need additional scrutiny and whether USCIS
adjudications procedures need strengthening. FDNS plans to have this
capability by the middle of fiscal year 2009.
Of the three background checks--TECS check, FBI fingerprint check, and
FBI name check--conducted on lawful permanent residence applicants,
USCIS raised concerns about the timeliness and usefulness of FBI name
check results, and has taken several actions in conjunction with the
FBI to address these issues. To improve timeliness, in April 2008,
USCIS and the FBI announced a joint plan with the ultimate goal of
completing 98 percent of the name checks within 30 days of receipt by
the FBI, and the remaining 2 percent within 90 days, by June 30, 2009.
To achieve this goal, the FBI assigned additional staff and hired
contractors, with funds contributed by USCIS, to work exclusively on
USCIS name check requests. The FBI also developed plans for improving
its business processes and file management systems. As a result of
these actions, significant progress has been made in reducing the
number of pending name checks. As of September 30, 2008:
* the total number of pending name checks decreased 90 percent, from
about 329,000 in May 2007 to about 32,000;
* the number of name checks pending longer than 90 days decreased about
92 percent from about 211,000 in May 2007 to about 18,000;
* the number pending more than 2 years decreased 99 percent from about
24,000 in May 2007 to 46; and:
* the FBI had eliminated all name checks pending more than 3 years.
According to FDNS, the name check results USCIS received from the FBI
were often vague or not useful for making eligibility determinations.
To improve the usefulness of the FBI name check results, USCIS began
assigning staff to the FBI name check program in February 2008 to train
FBI staff on identifying and providing more relevant information to
USCIS adjudicators when making eligibility determinations. USCIS
officials told us that since USCIS staff began working with FBI staff,
the quality of the information the FBI provides has improved, for
example, by including such things as summaries of the nature and extent
of the national security concerns.
USCIS has taken actions to address vulnerabilities identified in one of
six Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments (BFCA) of certain
immigration petitions and applications that may lead to permanent
residency, did not need to take action on one BFCA, but has not
completed the actions necessary to address the vulnerabilities
identified in the remaining four BFCAs. Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government require that agency managers complete, within
established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve
the matters brought to management's attention. Also, standard practices
for program management call for establishing specific milestones to
achieve results. Standard practices for program management also call
for assigning responsibility and accountability for ensuring the
results of program activities are carried out. FDNS issued reports on
three of the six BFCAs begun in 2005 and 2006. One of the three reports
contained recommendations to address vulnerabilities related to
petitions for religious workers, another for petitions for skilled and
unskilled workers. One report related to applications to replace green
cards did not recommend any changes to existing procedures. USCIS has
taken some actions to implement recommendations to mitigate fraudulent
petitions for religious workers, but has yet to address the findings
from its BFCA on petitions for skilled and unskilled alien workers and
has not established a timetable for doing so. In addition, USCIS has
yet to address the findings from three other BFCAs--petitions for alien
spouses, for alien relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum.
As of July 2008, FDNS officials told us they were still collecting
comments about what actions are needed to address the findings from
these BFCAs from various USCIS offices that would be involved in
implementing any proposed recommendations. However, USCIS management
had not established timetables for collecting these comments,
evaluating and making decisions about what actions are necessary to
address the findings and any recommendations from these assessments,
and implementing any agreed upon actions as called for by internal
control standards.
Until USCIS addresses vulnerabilities identified in the BFCAs and
implements corrective actions, these vulnerabilities will persist,
increasing the risk that ineligible individuals will obtain lawful
permanent residency. Failure to verify the evidence applicants and
their petitioners provide is one of the vulnerabilities identified in
these BFCAs and one that we reported on in 2006.[Footnote 5] USCIS's
standard operating procedures give adjudicators the discretion to
decide when and under what circumstances they will check petitioner-
submitted evidence against internal and external databases. The BFCAs
have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have approved
fraudulent petitions. The findings from the BFCAs have also shown the
kinds of petitioner-submitted evidence that may need to be verified,
such as whether couples claiming to be married live together, whether
employers exist, and whether aliens seeking employment have the
education or skills they claim. Procedures that require verifying
certain petitioner-submitted evidence under certain circumstances, as
indicated by BFCA findings, would help adjudicators better detect
fraud.
To help ensure that findings from USCIS benefit fraud and compliance
assessments are acted upon, and to enhance USCIS's overall fraud
detection efforts, we recommend that the Director of USCIS take the
following actions.
* Prepare a roadmap for each of the four outstanding benefit fraud and
compliance assessments (petitions for skilled and unskilled workers,
spouses, relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum) that
delineates (1) timetables for deciding what actions to take, (2) what
USCIS organizational units will be responsible for implementing those
actions, and (3) a timetable for implementing agreed upon actions.
* Modify adjudication procedures for family-and employment-based
petitions to include requirements on what evidence should be verified.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of Justice
for official comment. DHS and USCIS agreed with our recommendations and
their comments are reprinted in appendix II. USCIS also provided
technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where
appropriate. The Department of Justice had no comments on the report.
Background:
USCIS is responsible for processing applications for immigration
benefits--the ability of an alien to live and in some cases work in the
United States either permanently or on a temporary basis. As of
September 2008, USCIS had a staff of 10,477 federal employees and 8,005
full-time equivalent contractor staff and a budget of over $2.6
billion. Approximately $2.5 billion was from fees it collects from
applicants for immigration benefits and the rest was from congressional
appropriations. Figure 1 shows USCIS's organization.
Figure 1: USCIS's Organization:
This figure is a chart showing the hierarchy of USCIS organization.
[See PDF for image]
Source: USCIS.
[End of figure]
USCIS carries out its function through its headquarters office in
Washington D.C., and its network of service centers and field offices.
USCIS has three main operational directorates. The Directorate for
Domestic Operations is responsible for adjudicating immigration
benefits for those individuals in the United States, including those
seeking permanent residency and citizenship. Adjudicators--USCIS staff
that determine eligibility for immigration benefits--are located in
four service centers that generally adjudicate applications that do not
require interviews with the applicants, as well as 90 offices (26
districts responsible for 64 field offices) located around the country
that generally adjudicate applications that require interviews with
applicants. In addition, the National Benefits Center, within Domestic
Operations, serves as a central processing hub for certain immigration
benefit applications that are ultimately adjudicated in USCIS field
offices.[Footnote 6] The Directorate for Refugee, Asylum, and
International Operations adjudicates applications for asylum in eight
offices in the United States, has staff located in 27 countries, and
according to a directorate official, deploys officers to 50-70
countries to interview approximately 100,000 refugee applicants each
year.
The Directorate for National Security and Records Verification (NSRV)
is responsible for detecting fraud, facilitating the resolution of
national security-related background check cases and other concerns,
and maintaining files on aliens, commonly known as A-files. FDNS within
NSRV is responsible for detecting, pursuing, and deterring immigration
benefit fraud, and identifying persons seeking benefits who pose a
threat to national security and public safety. As of July 2008, FDNS
had 474 staff (including 10 contractors), 359 of which were located in
USCIS service centers, asylum offices, and district offices. FDNS is
USCIS's primary conduit to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
FDNS staff, among other things, also review applications forwarded by
adjudicators to determine if there is sufficient evidence to forward
the case to ICE for criminal investigation. In addition, FDNS staff
conduct site visits and follow up with law enforcement and intelligence
agencies on potential national security risks identified during
background checks on immigration benefit applications.
One of FDNS's main goals is to identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in
USCIS policies, practices, and procedures that threaten the integrity
of the legal immigration benefit process and make it vulnerable to
exploitation by individuals--including potential terrorists--seeking
benefits for which they are not eligible. To help achieve this goal, in
2005 FDNS began a series of assessments, called Benefit Fraud and
Compliance Assessments (BFCA), to determine the extent of fraud for
selected immigration benefits it considered high risk for fraud and
identify any systemic vulnerabilities in USCIS's adjudications
processes. The results of these assessments would serve as a basis for
any proposed changes in policies, procedures, or regulations to
mitigate any identified vulnerabilities.
Over the last 3 years, USCIS processed about 6 million applications for
immigration benefits each year, of which about 1 million individuals
were granted lawful permanent resident status each year. For example,
in 2007, of the 1,052,000 aliens who were granted lawful permanent
residence status, about 621,000 (59 percent) were already living in the
United States under a different status, including refugees, certain
temporary workers, foreign students, and family members, or were
undocumented.[Footnote 7]
Immigration law gives priority, or preference, to foreign nationals who
have a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident, have needed job skills, or who have refugee or
asylum status. Immigration law limits the number of family-and employer-
sponsored immigrants.[Footnote 8] There is no limit, however, on the
number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens seeking lawful permanent
residency.[Footnote 9] In 2007, immediate relatives represented 47
percent of all aliens granted lawful permanent resident status. Figure
2 shows the percentage of aliens granted lawful permanent resident
status in 2007 by major categories of admission.
Figure 2: Percentage of Aliens Granted Lawful Permanent Residence
Status by Major Category of Admission, 2007:
This figure is a pie graph showing the percentage of aliens granted
lawful permanent residence status by major category of admissions,
2007.
Immediate relatives: 47%;
Family based: 19%;
Employment-based: 15%;
Refugees and asylees: 13%;
Other: 6%.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DHS's Office of Immigration Statistics.
[End of figure]
Adjusting status to lawful permanent residency is a two-part process.
First, in general, an eligible U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident, called a petitioner, must file a petition with USCIS on
behalf of the alien applying for lawful permanent resident
status.[Footnote 10] Generally, the petitioner can be either a relative
or employer.[Footnote 11] The purpose of this step in the process is
for USCIS to determine if the relationship claimed between the
petitioner--either as a family member or a prospective employer--and
the alien is valid. USCIS requires petitioners to include evidence that
supports the claimed relationship, such as a marriage or birth
certificate (for family-based applications) or evidence of a job offer
and the alien's work qualifications (for employment-based
applications). An adjudicator then reviews the information in the
petition and the evidence submitted and makes a decision about the
petitioner's eligibility to sponsor the alien intending to adjust
status in the United States.
If USCIS approves the petition, the alien seeking lawful permanent
residency in the United States must file with USCIS a form I-485,
called an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status,
along with evidence supporting the applicant's eligibility, such as a
birth certificate or diploma.[Footnote 12] An adjudicator is to then
review the information in the application and the evidence submitted,
as well as the results of USCIS background checks, and make a decision
about the alien's eligibility to adjust status.[Footnote 13]
Adjudicators at field offices generally interview aliens applying for a
family-based adjustment of status. Employment-based applications to
adjust status are generally adjudicated at a service center and the
interview waived. Even though USCIS may determine that the relationship
between the petitioner and the alien was valid, the alien may be
ineligible for permanent residency under immigration law. USCIS tracks
these applications and petitions in its Computer Linked Application and
Information Management System (CLAIMS). Figure 3 provides an overview
of the general process for adjudicating applications for lawful
permanent residency.
Figure 3: Process for Adjudicating Applications for Adjustment of
Status to Lawful Permanent Residence:
This figure is a flowchart showing the process of adjusting
applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of USCIS data.
[A] USCIS may determine that any applicant--including an employment-
based adjustment of status applicant--is required to undergo an
interview. However, some family-based applicants are granted interview
waivers, such as children or parents of U.S. citizens, or Cuban
nationals filing under the Cuban Adjustment Act.
[End of figure]
As part of the process of adjudicating applications for lawful
permanent residency, USCIS requests that the FBI conduct a name check
against the FBI's administrative and investigative files to identify
individuals the FBI has investigated due to national security or public
safety concerns. In fiscal year 2007, USCIS requested the FBI conduct
about 2.1 million name checks, including nearly 796,000 relating to
adjustment of status applications. According to USCIS officials, nearly
all FBI name checks (over 99 percent) result in either no record of the
individual in the FBI's files or the information contained in the files
is not relevant to the permanent residency application. According to
USCIS officials, 0.14 percent of all FBI name checks historically yield
information about an applicant, and about 0.12 percent of these results
yield criminal or national security-related information that may be
pertinent to the adjudication.
In June 2008, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Inspector
General (OIG) raised concerns about the quality of the FBI's name check
process.[Footnote 14] Specifically, the DOJ OIG reported that the
algorithm used to match submitted names against the FBI's files was
outdated and potentially ineffective, increasing the risks that
submitted names were not accurately searched and matched against FBI
files. The FBI agreed with the OIG's recommendations to improve the
algorithm.[Footnote 15]
If, however, any of the background checks (TECS, fingerprint, or FBI
name check) indicate a potential national security concern, it is
USCIS's policy to withhold the adjudication of the application until
any national security concerns are resolved with the appropriate law
enforcement or intelligence agency. While some background checks could
indicate that an applicant has, or may have, criminal or national
security issues, such information will not always render the applicant
ineligible for the benefit. For example, inclusion on TSC's watch list
does not automatically prohibit an individual from obtaining a visa,
entering the United States, or adjusting status to remain in the United
States.[Footnote 16] After consulting with law enforcement or
intelligence agency officials, USCIS decides whether or not to grant
the benefit and accordingly makes an eligibility determination.
In 2006, USCIS embarked on a transformation of its business processes
and technology aimed at increasing national security and integrity,
improving customer service, and achieving operational efficiency.
According to the USCIS Transformation Program's Concept of Operations
announced in March 2007, the objective is to transform USCIS from a
fragmented, paper-based operational environment to one that will use
state of the art case management tools and adjudicate applications in a
paperless environment. USCIS plans to change its business processes by,
for example, obtaining biometrics from all individuals who petition or
apply for immigration benefits to verify identity, something it does
now only for asylum benefit applications. The operational concept calls
for USCIS to link all individuals' transactions with USCIS based on
biometrics enabling USCIS adjudicators to see all of a person's
transactions with USCIS. The concept paper also calls for USCIS
adjudicators to be able to directly access other automated systems,
such as those of other government agencies, to verify information
submitted by applicants. USCIS anticipates completing the
transformation at the end of 2013 at an estimated cost of $545 million.
Available Data Show That USCIS Has Identified Some Lawful Permanent
Residence Applicants with National Security Concerns:
Available data show that USCIS background checks identified individuals
who were (1) KSTs, (2) associates of terrorists, (3) involved in
providing material support to terrorists or terrorist organizations,
and (4) agents of a foreign government involved in espionage. From
March 2003 through December 1, 2007, FDNS received about 14,500
national security referrals for all application types. According to
FDNS officials, about 10 percent involved individuals on TSC's watch
list and the balance of these cases involved individuals who were not
on the terrorist watch list, but whose background checks indicated
other possible national security concerns, such as those having
associations with known or suspected terrorists. USCIS identified these
nonwatch list cases based on information placed in TECS by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, FBI checks of names in its
investigative files, and through other referrals.
Terrorists and other individuals posing a threat to national security
have applied for lawful permanent residency. At our request, USCIS
provided summary data regarding lawful permanent residence applications
with potential national security concerns by comparing information from
CLAIMS and FDNS's national security data. These data showed that of
approximately 917,000 applications for permanent residency filed from
January 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 (about one-half of 1
percent) were referred to FDNS for national security reasons. Of these
516 national security referrals, USCIS identified 109 as KSTs on TSC's
watch list and 407 were referred to FDNS for other national security
reasons. According to USCIS officials, these non-KST cases included
associates of KSTs, unindicted co-conspirators, terrorist organization
members, persons involved with providing material support to terrorists
or terrorist organizations, agents of foreign governments, and
individuals involved in espionage[Footnote 17]. USCIS denied or
rejected 41 applications to adjust status to permanent resident,
including 18 KSTs and 23 non-KSTS, and granted permanent resident
status to 9 KSTs and 41 non-KSTs following resolution of the national
security concern. Another 15 applications were either administratively
closed or abandoned. The remaining 410 applications were still pending
adjudication decisions as of August 2008.
In addition to identifying potential national security concerns from
checking an alien's name against watch lists in TECS, name checks
against the FBI's investigative files have uncovered individuals who
raised national security concerns. We reviewed a random sample created
by FDNS of FBI name check results provided to USCIS to ascertain the
types of national security concerns identified during the name check
process. We found that the FBI provided information to USCIS that these
individuals:
* had associated with terrorist organizations,
* were agents of foreign governments,
* were involved in criminal activities, or:
* had engaged in espionage against the United Sates.
In addition, these FBI name check results included individuals whose
names were mentioned in FBI national security investigations, but who
were not subjects of the investigation or believed to be involved in
other criminal activity. For example, as part of the 9/11 terrorist
attack investigation, the FBI interviewed many individuals who were not
involved in the 9/11 attack, but may have been able to provide the FBI
with investigative information. Some of these individuals eventually
applied for an immigration benefit and their name was matched against
FBI files during the name check process.
While USCIS has some data on applicants with national security
concerns, the data are limited because USCIS's CLAIMS system was not
designed to capture and routinely generate reports on the extent, type,
and nature of national security threats posed by applicants. For
example, this system does not routinely provide statistics on the visa
categories used (e.g., family-or employment-based applications) and
whether the immigration benefits were granted or denied. Such
information could be useful to help identify the characteristics of
applicants who could pose national security and terrorism-related
concerns, and the avenues they may use to stay in the United States.
Therefore, to provide USCIS with more comprehensive data on those
applicants who may pose a national security threat and those who try to
obtain immigration benefits through fraud, FDNS is developing a data
system called FDNS-DS. FDNS-DS is designed to collect data from
applications referred to FDNS for reasons of national security and
public safety as well as suspected fraud, and includes the disposition
and resolution of these referrals. Currently, FDNS-DS's analytical
capability is limited. For example, FDNS-DS cannot generate reports on
how often and under which immigration categories individuals with
potential national security concerns applied for lawful permanent
residency. Also, FDNS-DS is not yet integrated into CLAIMS and
therefore cannot track related adjudication decisions for these
national security referrals. FDNS officials told us that they plan to
have visa category and eligibility decision information automatically
integrated into FDNS-DS, but the date for this is uncertain. These
officials also said that by the middle of fiscal year 2009 FDNS-DS
should have the capability to analyze national security referral data
when USCIS completes other information technology improvements as part
of its information technology transformation program. FDNS officials
said that having an automated analysis capability will facilitate
identifying trends in application types used, and strategies employed
by individuals with national security concerns on a continuous basis.
According to FDNS, this type of analysis will help identify those types
of applications that may need additional scrutiny and whether USCIS
adjudications procedures need strengthening.
USCIS and the FBI Have Taken a Number of Actions to Improve the
Timeliness and Usefulness of FBI Name Check Results:
Of the three background checks--TECS query, FBI fingerprint check, and
FBI name check--conducted on lawful permanent residence applicants,
USCIS raised concerns about the timeliness and usefulness of FBI name
check results and has taken several actions in conjunction with the FBI
to address these issues. The number of pending FBI name check requests
increased from about 236,000 in May 2006 to about 329,000 in May 2007,
about a 40 percent increase. Also, the number of USCIS's FBI name
checks requests pending more than 90 days increased 38 percent, from
about 153,000 in May 2006 to about 211,000 in May 2007. As a result of
having to wait for the name check results, USCIS could not adjudicate
applications, resulting in some applicants waiting years before USCIS
made a decision.
In Spring 2007, USCIS began working with the FBI to develop solutions
to improve the processing times for the name checks as well as the
usefulness of the name check results provided to USCIS. As part of this
effort, USCIS and the FBI recognized that additional staff were needed
for researching FBI's investigative files and that FBI staff would
benefit from additional training and guidance about which investigative
files should be reviewed and what information was relevant to USCIS
adjudicators for determining an applicant's eligibility.
In April 2008, USCIS and the FBI announced a joint plan with a goal to
process 98 percent of all name check requests within 30 days and
process the remaining 2 percent within 90 days by June 30, 2009. USCIS
and the FBI have taken a number of actions to achieve these goals. The
FBI has assigned additional FBI staff and hired contractor staff
jointly funded by the FBI and USCIS out of recent fee increases by
USCIS and the FBI[Footnote 18] and from USCIS and FBI appropriations
for fiscal year 2007 and 2008. Specifically, the FBI increased its
USCIS-dedicated name check program staff from 50 to 61 and hired 290
contract staff to work exclusively on USCIS name check requests. The
FBI also plans to improve its business processes and case management
and file management systems that will allow electronic access to
investigative files rather than the time consuming process of locating
and reviewing investigative files manually. The FBI also plans to
eliminate investigations of nonrelevant administrative files, for
example, administrative files containing the names of government
employees and individuals who may have had a background check performed
for employment purposes. As a result, fewer names will require
additional vetting. Table 1 shows the milestones FBI has set to
eliminate the oldest pending name checks requested by USCIS.
Table 1: USCIS and FBI Joint Plan Milestones for Processing All Name
Checks within 90 Days:
Process all name checks pending more than: 3 years;
By: May 31, 2008.
Process all name checks pending more than: 2 years;
By: July 31, 2008.
Process all name checks pending more than: 1 year;
By: November 30, 2008.
Process all name checks pending more than: 6 months;
By: February 28, 2009.
Process all name checks pending more than: 3 months;
By: May 31, 2009.
Process all name checks pending more than: Process 98 percent of name
checks within 30 days, and remaining 2 percent within 90 days;
By: June 30, 2009.
Source: FBI and USCIS.
[End of table]
The FBI has made significant progress in decreasing the overall number
of pending name checks requested by USCIS. As of September 30, 2008:
* the total number of pending name checks decreased 90 percent, from
about 329,000 in May 2007 to about 32,000,
* the number of name checks pending longer than 90 days decreased about
92 percent from about 211,000 in May 2007 to about 18,000,
* the number pending more than 2 years decreased 99 percent from about
24,000 in May 2007 to 46, and:
* the FBI had eliminated all names checks pending more than 3 years.
On the basis of the progress to date, the Section Chief of the FBI Name
Check Program told us that he is confident that the November 2008,
February 2009, and June 2009 goals will be met.
To help the FBI provide more useful information for adjudicators in
making eligibility determinations, USCIS has assigned staff to the
FBI's Name Check Program office. On the basis of a review in 2004 of
nearly 400 name check results provided to USCIS in formal FBI
letterhead memoranda, FDNS found that, among other things, the
information the FBI provided was often vague or not useful for
adjudicators to determine whether or not an individual was eligible for
an immigration benefit. Since February 2008, USCIS staff have
participated in training FBI analysts to identify and provide
information that USCIS adjudicators can use in making eligibility
determinations. According to USCIS officials, this effort resulted in
more detailed and relevant information being provided in letterhead
memoranda summarizing the nature and extent of the national security
and other public safety concerns.
USCIS Has Not Completed Actions Necessary to Address Identified
Vulnerabilities:
USCIS has taken actions to address vulnerabilities identified in one of
its BFCAs, but has not completed the actions necessary to address the
vulnerabilities identified in four of its other BFCAs. During 2005 and
2006, FDNS initiated six BFCAs and has taken some actions to address
the findings in one of these related to petitions for religious
workers. USCIS determined that no actions were necessary based upon the
findings of the BFCA for the replacement of lost, stolen, or destroyed
permanent resident cards (green cards). For the remaining four BFCAs,
USCIS has not determined what actions are necessary to address the
findings, nor has it established timetables for deciding on what
actions to take and for implementing any agreed upon actions. Until
USCIS takes these steps, the vulnerabilities FDNS identified in these
BFCAs will persist, increasing the risk that ineligible individuals
will obtain immigration benefits. Lack of verification of the evidence
applicants and their petitioners provide is one of the vulnerabilities
identified in these BFCAs and one that we reported on in 2006.[Footnote
19] USCIS's standard operating procedures give adjudicators the
discretion to decide when and under what circumstances they will check
petitioner-submitted evidence against internal and external databases.
The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have
approved fraudulent petitions. Procedures that require verifying
certain petitioner-submitted evidence under certain circumstances,
where the BFCAs have indicated potential fraud, would help adjudicators
better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud
detection and its customer service and production-related objectives.
Finally, internal conspiracies and employee misconduct have compromised
the adjudications process allowing ineligible individuals to receive
lawful permanent residency. To address these internal vulnerabilities,
USCIS's Office of Security and Integrity (OSI) is developing a
systematic approach to identifying internal fraud and evaluating its
internal fraud controls related to detecting and deterring such fraud.
USCIS Lacks Timelines for Evaluating and Addressing Findings and
Recommendations from Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments:
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for
agency managers to complete, within established time frames, all
actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to
management's attention.[Footnote 20] In addition, internal control
standards require that findings of audits and other reviews are
promptly resolved. These standards also state that managers are to (1)
promptly evaluate findings from audits and reviews, (2) determine
proper actions in response to findings and recommendations for audits
and reviews, and (3) complete, within established time frames, all
actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to
management's attention. Moreover, standard practices for program
management call for specific milestones to be established to achieve
results.[Footnote 21] Standard practices for program management also
call for assigning responsibility and accountability for ensuring the
results of program activities are carried out.
As of July 2008, FDNS had conducted six BFCA's of immigration benefits
that may lead to lawful permanent residency.[Footnote 22] For each
BFCA, FDNS selected a random sample of completed or in-process
petitions and conducted activities, such as visiting sites, checking
internal USCIS systems and other external databases, and reviewing
administrative files to determine if any of the information that
petitioners submitted was false. For each of these assessments, FDNS
prepared a report on each of the assessments' findings, which in some
cases has included suggested changes to regulations, policies, or
procedures that could address systemic vulnerabilities found during an
assessment. Table 2 summarizes the status and results of the six BFCAs.
Table 2: 2 Status of Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments, July
2008:
Benefit assessed: Petition for religious workers;
Initiation date: Feb. 2005;
FDNS report date[A]: Final report issued Aug. 2005;
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Identified 33 percent fraud
rate;
USCIS actions taken or planned: Actions taken: Increased site visits
and requirements to verify legitimacy of petitioning religious
institutions;
Actions planned: Employ contract staff for site visits;
proposed change in rulemaking to require institutions to petition for
religious workers instead of applicant petitioning for self;
established FDNS compliance review procedures to verify petitioner-
provided information, including additional checks of law enforcement
databases, targeted site visits, and electronic and telephone
verifications.
Benefit assessed: Application for green card replacement;
Initiation date: May 2005;
FDNS report date[A]: Final report issued Nov. 2005;
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Identified less than 1
percent fraud rate[B];
USCIS actions taken or planned: FDNS recommended no changes and USCIS
determined no actions were needed.
Benefit assessed: Petitions for skilled and unskilled workers;
Initiation date: May 2005;
FDNS report date[A]: Final report issued June 2006;
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Identified 11 percent fraud
rate;
USCIS actions taken or planned: Actions planned: Assign FDNS staff to
overseas offices to verify application information, such as whether the
alien worker has the required education and/or skills.
Benefit assessed: Petition for spouse;
Initiation date: Apr. 2006;
FDNS report date[A]: Draft report completed Mar. 2007;
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Circulated for comment within
USCIS in April 2007 and again in June 2008;
USCIS actions taken or planned: None to date.
Benefit assessed: Petition for Yemeni relatives;
Initiation date: Mar. 2006;
FDNS report date[A]: Draft report completed June 2007;
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Circulated for comment within
USCIS June 2008;
USCIS actions taken or planned: None to date.
Benefit assessed: Application for asylum;
Initiation date: Feb. 2006;
FDNS report date[A]: Draft report completed Sept. 2007;
BFCA findings and status as of July 2008: Circulated for comment within
USCIS January 2008;
USCIS actions taken or planned: None to date.
Source: FDNS.
[A] USCIS issued public versions of the reports for the religious
worker and green card replacement BFCAs in July 2006, but has not
issued a public version of the skilled and unskilled worker BFCA.
[B] Of the 245 application files sampled, USCIS found one case of
fraud. In this case, had the adjudicator compared the photo of the
applicant with the photo stored in USCIS databases as required, USCIS
would not have approved the application. On the basis of the assessment
results, FDNS determined that its procedures for adjudicating
applications for a replacement green card did not need to be changed.
[End of table]
USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities identified in
its assessments of petitions for religious workers. In August 2005,
FDNS issued its report on religious workers, finding that 33 percent of
the petitions in its sample were fraudulent.[Footnote 23] In some cases
FDNS found that the religious institution cited on the petition did not
exist or that the applicant was not in fact a religious worker. FDNS
recommended USCIS strengthen its procedures for adjudicating religious
worker petitions by verifying, prior to granting the petition, that the
religious institution exists and that the applicant is in fact a
religious worker. In addition, USCIS has proposed a regulatory change
that would require a religious institution to file a petition for a
religious worker. Under current law, an alien seeking to enter as a
religious worker can "self-sponsor," that is, the alien does not need
the religious institution to file a petition on behalf of the alien.
Based upon the results of the assessment, USCIS changed its
adjudications procedures in July 2006 to require additional systems
checks, including examining public records to verify the legitimacy of
the religious institution for which the applicant intended to work, as
well as conducting site visits.
USCIS plans to take other actions it believes will help deter and
detect religious worker fraud. USCIS officials told us in July 2008
that it planned to hire contract staff to conduct site visits to verify
both the legitimacy of the religious institution as well as the
applicant. In April 2007, USCIS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
that would, among other things, require religious institutions to file
a petition on behalf of the immigrant and not allow an alien to
petition for him or herself. USCIS anticipated issuing a final rule
before the end of 2008.
While USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities found in
the petition for religious workers, USCIS has yet to take action to
address vulnerabilities identified in four other BFCAs. In June 2006,
FDNS completed its report on fraud in petitions for skilled and
unskilled workers. For these petitions, in general, the petitioner must
be a legitimate employer with the ability to pay the alien the
prevailing wage. Skilled workers must be aliens with at least 2 years
of specialized training or experience. Unskilled workers can have less
than 2 years of training or experience. Both skilled and unskilled
workers must be coming to perform labor that is not temporary or
seasonal and for which qualified workers are not available in the
United States.
Overall, FDNS found that 11 percent of the petitions in its sample were
fraudulent, but FDNS believed the actual fraud rate was higher because
FDNS's sample included only approved petitions. FDNS did not include in
its sample those petitions that USCIS had denied or where the
petitioner withdrew the petition. According to the FDNS report, the
overall fraud rate reported would have been higher had the sample
included petitions that had already been adjudicated and denied for
fraud, but limitations in CLAIMS did not allow their identification and
potential inclusion in the sample drawn.
Evidence of fraud that FDNS staff found included:
* tampering or fabricating supporting documentation, or material
misrepresentations within a document,
* misrepresentation of the alien beneficiary's qualifications, that is,
the beneficiary did not have the required education or work experience,
* nonexistent employers, and:
* failure of the employer to pay the alien the salary noted in the
petition.
To address these vulnerabilities, FDNS recommended a number of
enhancements to USCIS procedures for adjudicating petitions for skilled
and unskilled workers, including the following.
* Perform a name and address check on the petitioner to help establish
the legitimacy of the petitioner. Current USICS policy only requires
record checks be done on the alien beneficiary.
* Conduct targeted site visits to verify the legitimacy and eligibility
of both the petitioner and alien beneficiary including, for example,
verifying the location of the employer and the employer's ability to
pay the offered wage, as well as the alien beneficiary's credentials.
* Enable adjudicators to electronically e-mail or telephone the
employer to verify that the employer filed the petition and intends to
employ the alien beneficiary.
* Verify the work experience alien beneficiaries claim to have acquired
outside the United States because their work experience is vital to
determining their qualifications and therefore whether they are
eligible for the benefit sought.
* Require the employer to notify USCIS or withdraw the petition when
the position is no longer available, or when there is a change in
employment. According to FDNS's report, many of the alien beneficiaries
do not report to work for the employer, or the applications are for
family members or friends. In these cases, the employer had no intent
to hire the alien beneficiary and the beneficiary had no intent to work
for the employer. According to FDNS's report, both were using the
employment petition as a vehicle for the alien beneficiary to obtain
lawful permanent resident status. According to FDNS, to close this
loophole, a regulatory/statutory amendment would have to be made that
requires an employer to notify USCIS every time the alien beneficiary
leaves employment, or when the job offer is no longer valid. This
notification would have to be performed before the alien beneficiary
adjusts status to permanent resident.
* Require that the beneficiary be placed in a 2-year conditional
resident status and requiring that the beneficiary remain employed by
the petitioner in the stated capacity for a minimum of 2 years. If the
beneficiary remains employed in the stated capacity during the 2 year
time period, the conditions on their residence would be removed. If the
beneficiary fails to report or remain on the job in the stated
capacity, then the beneficiary would be subject to termination of
status and removal from the United States. According to FDNS, this
would require regulatory and statutory changes.
Although FDNS's June 2006 report recommended a number of proposed
enhancements to address vulnerabilities in the process for adjudicating
petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, USCIS has yet to take
action. In July 2008, the NSRV Associate Director and FDNS Chief told
us that USCIS had not taken any actions to address the findings and
proposed enhancements made in FDNS's June 2006 report,[Footnote 24] but
could not explain why USCIS had not taken any action and had no set
timelines for (1) deciding what actions to take, (2) identifying which
USCIS components would be responsible for implementing these actions,
and (3) establishing timetables for implementing these actions. Until
USCIS decides what additional actions are needed to address the
vulnerabilities related to petitions for skilled and unskilled alien
workers, and assigns responsibility and establishes timetables for
completing them, these vulnerabilities will persist, allowing
ineligible applicants to continue to obtain lawful permanent residence.
FDNS has prepared draft reports summarizing the findings related to its
three other assessments involving (1) petitions for alien spouses, (2)
petitions for relatives from Yemen, and (3) applications for asylum.
FDNS officials told us that in conducting these assessments, FDNS staff
also identified vulnerabilities in USCIS adjudication procedures.
According to NSRV officials, the vulnerabilities were generally similar
to those reported in previous assessments: petitioners submitted false
documents or made false statements on their petitions. For example,
FDNS staff found that couples claiming to be married and living
together were not living together or they had submitted false marriage
and birth certificates to support their marriage claim. Some asylum
applicants submitted false arrest and medical reports to support their
claims of persecution. Some of the fraudulent applications detected
during the BFCAs had been approved by USCIS adjudicators.
USCIS had not yet completed its review of the findings from these three
BFCAs or decided on actions needed to address identified
vulnerabilities, although the draft reports were made available by FDNS
in March, June, and September 2007, respectively. In July 2008, FDNS
officials told us that they were still collecting comments about what
actions are needed to address identified vulnerabilities from the
various USCIS offices that would be involved in implementing any
proposed recommendations. However, USCIS senior management had not
established timetables for collecting these comments, evaluating and
making decisions about what actions are necessary to address the
findings and any recommendations from these assessments, and
implementing any needed actions as called for by internal control
standards.
Not addressing these vulnerabilities can lead to further immigration
benefit fraud as well as impede the opportunity for other legitimate
applicants for lawful permanent residency. For example, there is a
statutory limit on the number of employment visas that can be issued
each year. Applicants who fraudulently obtain lawful permanent
residency through employment limit the ability of legitimate applicants
to obtain employment in the United States because the limit may have
already been reached when the legitimate applicant applies, thereby
denying legitimate applicants the opportunity to immigrate based upon
their occupation, profession, or specialized skills. In addition,
applicants who have fraudulently obtained lawful permanent residence
can subsequently file applications to become U.S. citizens or petitions
for their alien relatives, further perpetuating their fraud.
As part of its ongoing program to transform its business processes for
adjudicating immigration benefits, in late 2009, USCIS plans to develop
and implement technologies and new business processes for immigration
benefits leading to permanent residency. The BFCAs could be an
important source of information on risks USCIS faces from external
fraud in evaluating what actions may be required to manage these risks
and in deciding upon new business processes to address them. However,
without established timetables for completing the fraud assessments--
including reaching agreement on and implementing those changes that are
needed in response to findings and recommendations--there is less
assurance that decisions about USCIS's transformation efforts will
benefit from those assessments.
NSRV recognizes that improvements are needed in the linkage between
reporting BFCA findings and recommendations and USCIS's process for
reviewing and evaluating BFCA findings and recommendations, and
deciding what actions to take and implement. As part of its 2008
strategic plan, NSRV has an objective to enhance and expedite the
current assessment review process in part by involving other USCIS
components earlier in the process to help identify BFCA priorities and
research approaches that would yield useful results and
recommendations. However, without a timetable for promptly evaluating
BFCA findings, deciding on what corrective actions are necessary, and
implementing them, it will be difficult for USCIS to ensure that needed
procedural improvements will take place that will preclude, for
example, the granting of fraudulent petitions that may lead to lawful
permanent residency.
Lack of Requirements to Verify Petitioner-Submitted Evidence Continues
to Leave USCIS Vulnerable to Fraud:
In 2006, we reported that an obvious vulnerability to the immigration
benefit system was the submission of false eligibility
evidence.[Footnote 25] USCIS procedures did not require the
verification of any eligibility evidence for any benefit, despite the
potential for verification to help mitigate vulnerability to fraud. We
also reported that verification of such evidence--by comparing it to
other information in USCIS databases, by checking it against external
sources of information, or by interviewing applicants--is the most
direct and effective strategy for mitigating this vulnerability. On the
other hand, we reported that verifying all key information or
interviewing all individuals would be impossible and that verifying
applicant-submitted evidence represented a resource commitment that
would need to be balanced with its customer service and production-
related objectives. At that time, USCIS had just begun its BFCA program
that was intended to identify ways to strengthen USCIS procedures,
including identifying the kinds of information that needs to be
verified.
USCIS procedures, in general, do not require adjudicators to verify
petitioner-submitted evidence. Guidance provided in USCIS's
adjudicator's field manual instructs adjudicators to consider taking
steps to verify information submitted by a petitioner--such as
conducting internal research, requesting additional evidence,
interviewing individuals, or requesting site visits--if they cannot
decide whether to approve a petition based solely on their review of
the evidence submitted. However, standard operating procedures for
these petitions generally do not require adjudicators to take these
additional steps. The decision as to when, and under what
circumstances, to verify petitioner-submitted evidence is left to the
discretion of the adjudicator.
USCIS guidance suggests a variety of sources, both internal and
external, against which to check petitioner evidence. The Adjudicator's
Field Manual states that USCIS's internal systems, such as CLAIMS, are
some of the most valuable, yet often overlooked, sources of information
to verify a claimed family relationship, such as a spouse. In addition,
a 2003 USCIS report prepared by an independent consultant highlighted
the need for additional checks to verify evidence submitted by
immigration benefit applicants.[Footnote 26] In particular, the report
recommended that, at a minimum, USCIS check all family-based (I-130)
and employment-based (I-140) petitions against records in CLAIMS to,
among other things, identify previously filed petitions that could be
an indication of fraud. According to FDNS, based upon BFCA findings,
those adjudicators who choose not to verify information will be more
vulnerable to approving fraudulent applications and petitions.
Verifying petitioner-submitted information prior to making a decision
will reduce the likelihood of adjudicators approving ineligible
applicants. As discussed earlier, FDNS's BFCA for skilled and unskilled
workers found that 11 percent of the approved petitions were fraudulent
and recommended a number of actions to verify petitioner-submitted
information. In addition, ICE agents told us that much of the
immigration fraud they encounter--such as applicants submitting false
documents and lying on their applications--could be mitigated by USCIS
adjudicators checking internal and external databases to verify
petitioner information. These agents suggested that USCIS adjudicators
could use other agencies' databases, such as the State Department's
Consolidated Consular Database (CCD),[Footnote 27] and commercially
available databases, such as AutoTrack, Choice Point,[Footnote 28] and
Lexis/Nexis,[Footnote 29] to confirm certain information such as
whether a petitioner and spouse reside at the same address or whether
an employer petitioning for an immigrant worker appears to be a
legitimate firm with a valid employment offer. Adjudicators at all
USCIS's district and field offices and service centers can access these
databases. According to FDNS officials, taking such steps to verify
petitioner information led to FDNS officers identifying fraud in the
BFCAs. For example, FDNS stated that commercial databases such as
Choice Point and Lexis/Nexis can yield valuable information about the
identity, residence, and duration of time an individual has been in the
United States. By checking government and commercial databases and
conducting site visits, FDNS officers determined that individuals
claiming to be married were not, employers did not exist, and aliens
did not have the education or skills they claimed.
Marriage fraud continues to be a problem, according to USCIS and ICE.
In some cases, U.S. citizens have, in return for money, married and
filed multiple petitions for several different aliens. For example, in
one fraud investigation, ICE agents arrested a Miami woman in December
2007 who was charged with nine counts of bigamy. In January 2008, ICE
arrested the woman's boyfriend for allegedly marrying four other women
for profit so that the four women could obtain lawful status. According
to these ICE agents, the investigation revealed that USCIS's personnel
had not identified the prior petitions filed for the other claimed
spouses. According to these ICE agents, a check of USCIS's CLAIMS
system would have revealed the previously filed petitions by these
individuals. However, adjudicators are not required to verify
petitioner-submitted evidence, including routinely checking CLAIMS to
determine whether a petitioner had previously filed for another
spouse.[Footnote 30]
Verifying petitioner-submitted evidence has been shown to better detect
and deter fraud. As discussed previously, in July 2006 USCIS changed
its procedures and began verifying certain information submitted with
religious worker petitions, such as whether the religious institution
existed. According to FDNS, the number of petitions filed for religious
workers decreased 21 percent from July 2006 to July 2007. In addition,
over the same time period:
* the approval rate of religious worker petitions fell from 76 percent
to 44 percent, and:
* the denial rate of these petitions, including petitions withdrawn,
increased from 24 percent to 55 percent.
FDNS attributed these changes to the additional verification efforts
taken by USCIS since USCIS had made no other changes in its procedures
for adjudicating religious worker petitions.
USCIS's standard operating procedures allow adjudicators wide
discretion on whether or not to verify petitioner-submitted evidence.
The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have
approved fraudulent petitions. The findings from the BFCAs have shown
the kinds of petitioner-submitted evidence that may need to be
verified, such as whether couples claiming to be married live together,
employers exist, and whether aliens seeking employment have the
education or skills they claim. Procedures that require verifying
certain petitioner-submitted evidence under certain circumstances,
where the BFCAs have indicated potential fraud, would help adjudicators
better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud
detection and its customer service and production-related objectives.
USCIS recognizes the fraud vulnerabilities in its current adjudication
procedures. USCIS's transformation program's concept of operations
describes the creation of a separate verification unit, apart from
FDNS, to verify application information as part of a new business
process model. According to USCIS officials, however, USCIS has not yet
made a decision on whether to implement this new concept of operations
as part of its new business model.
USCIS Is In the Process of Addressing Internal Fraud Vulnerabilities:
USCIS's adjudication procedures are also vulnerable to internal
conspiracies that have allowed ineligible individuals to receive lawful
permanent residency. For example, in June 2006, ICE arrested a USCIS
adjudicator for conspiring with a business that prepared applications
for permanent residency based on fraudulent marriages and
documentation. According to ICE agents and USCIS officials familiar
with the case, the adjudicator instructed applicants for permanent
residency not to show up for their scheduled interview. According to
USCIS field office officials, at the end of the business day, this
adjudicator would find the application files of the applicants who were
instructed not to show up for the interview that day, and process them
himself. He would approve the application and order their permanent
residency cards. As a result of this arrest, this particular field
office has changed its procedures for assigning "no-show" cases to
adjudicators. Instead of adjudicators being able to select which of
these cases they will process, the field office now randomly assigns
them to adjudicators. In another case, a former Supervisory District
Adjudications Officer pled guilty to bribery of a public official who
used brokers who were willing to pay for falsely made immigration
documents. The former supervisor personally received $600,000 in bribes
and the brokers together received more than $2,500,000.
USCIS does not know the extent of this vulnerability or if others like
it exist in other offices. According to the Chief of USCIS's Internal
Review Field Programs, within OSI, USCIS is in the process of
developing a systematic approach to identifying internal fraud and
evaluating its internal controls to prevent internal conspiracies and
employee misconduct that contribute to vulnerabilities in USCIS's
adjudication processes. For example, OSI convened a task force that
analyzed the results of previous DHS Inspector General investigations
for internal fraud schemes. On the basis of this analysis, the task
force identified several major internal controls, such as access to
approval stamps and controls over the creation of alien files, that it
plans to evaluate. On the basis of the results of these reviews, OSI
plans to determine if changes are needed to USCIS's internal control
procedures and whether to recommend such changes to USCIS's senior
management committee. In addition, OSI is developing work plans with
major milestones and time frames for implementing recommendations
approved by USCIS's senior management.
Conclusions:
USCIS initiated a series of Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments 3
years ago as the initial step toward mitigating or eliminating
vulnerabilities in its processes for granting immigration benefits,
including the benefit of lawful permanent residency. While four of
these assessments--petitions for skilled and unskilled workers,
spouses, and relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum--have
identified vulnerabilities that need to be addressed, USCIS has not
established a roadmap with timetables for deciding what actions to
take, what USCIS organizational units will be responsible for
implementing those actions, and a timetable for implementing agreed-
upon actions. Without such a roadmap, USCIS will not have reasonable
assurance that the vulnerabilities will be addressed in a timely
manner. Moreover, the vulnerabilities identified will persist,
increasing the risk that ineligible individuals will be granted lawful
permanent residency.
Current guidance that leaves decisions to verify petitioner-submitted
evidence to the discretion of adjudicators is not effective for
identifying and preventing fraud. USCIS benefit fraud and compliance
assessments have revealed that USCIS has approved fraudulent petitions
and that verifying petitioner-submitted evidence could have mitigated
this fraud. While various USCIS internal systems, as well as external
databases, can be valuable in verifying petitioner-submitted evidence,
USCIS procedures giving adjudicators discretion on whether to check
petitioner-submitted evidence does not require that these valuable
resources be used. We recognize that it would be impossible to verify
all petitioner-submitted information and that verifying submitted
evidence represents a resource commitment that needs to be balanced
with USCIS's customer service and production-related objectives.
However, without requirements on what evidence for family-and
employment-based petitions should be verified, this vulnerability will
remain, allowing ineligible individuals to obtain lawful permanent
residency.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that findings from USCIS benefit fraud and compliance
assessments are acted upon, and to enhance USCIS's overall fraud
detection efforts, we recommend that the Director of USCIS:
* prepare a roadmap for each of the four outstanding benefit fraud and
compliance assessments (petitions for skilled and unskilled workers,
spouses, and relatives from Yemen, and applications for asylum) that
delineates (1) timetables for deciding what actions to take, (2) which
USCIS organizational units will be responsible for implementing those
actions, and (3) a timetable for implementing agreed-upon actions; and:
* modify adjudication procedures for family-and employment-based
petitions to include requirements on what evidence should be verified.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for official comment.
DHS and USCIS agreed with our recommendations and their comments are
reprinted in appendix II. Regarding our recommendation to modify
adjudication procedures to include requirements on what evidence should
be verified, USCIS stated that it will modify adjudication guidance and
procedures when the results of a BFCA indicates the need to do so.
USCIS also provided technical comments, which we considered and
incorporated where appropriate. DOJ had no comments on the report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and other interested parties. The report also will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report addresses the following questions:
* What do available data show about the extent of national security
concerns discovered during United States Citizenship and Immigration
Service (USCIS) background checks for lawful permanent residence
applications?
* What issues has USCIS encountered in its background check processes
and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues?
* To what extent has USCIS addressed identified vulnerabilities in its
adjudications procedures for permanent residency?
To determine what available data show about of the extent of national
security concerns discovered during USCIS background checks for lawful
permanent residence applicants, we obtained data on the number of
permanent residence applications that were referred to USCIS's Office
of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) for national security
reasons from January 2006, when FDNS began capturing these data,
through May 2007, the date of our request for this information and
related adjudication decision information about those applications. We
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the source of the data
and the controls FDNS had in place to maintain the integrity of the
data and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
purposes of our report. We also interviewed USCIS and Immigration,
Customs, and Enforcement (ICE) officials about the extent to which
individuals posing threats to national security or public safety
applied for permanent residency under various immigration categories,
such as religious workers and alien workers, and obtained statistics on
national security cases referred to FDNS. Specifically, we obtained
FDNS data for all benefit applications showing the extent to which
cases referred to FDNS for national security reasons involved known or
suspected terrorists (KST) and non-KSTs. To better understand the
nature of the national security cases and the related information
provided by the FBI about them--i.e., whether the individual was the
subject of an investigation or was mentioned in association with
another investigation, and whether the concern was related to national
security or criminal activity--we performed a content analysis of a
random sample of 100 FBI name check responses received from January
through June 2007. FDNS originally selected this sample to determine
how often the FBI name check provided unique information not available
from the other two background checks. We also analyzed USCIS's
policies, procedures and guidance for referring national security cases
to FDNS, as well as eligibility requirements defined in section 212 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and deportability provisions
defined in section 237 of the INA.
To identify what issues USCIS has encountered in its background check
processes and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues, we
analyzed USCIS policies and procedures for conducting queries of the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), FBI fingerprint
checks, and FBI name checks, as well as related interagency memoranda
of understanding on requesting and conducting FBI name checks. We also
analyzed USCIS data on pending FBI name check responses from May 2006
through September 2008 and assessed USCIS's and the FBI's joint plan to
eliminate the backlog of pending name checks and improve the FBI's
efficiency in conducting name checks. We interviewed knowledgeable
agency officials about the source of USCIS's pending FBI name check
data and the controls USCIS had in place to maintain the integrity of
the data and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of our report. We discussed the actions the FBI and USCIS
had taken and planned to take to improve the name check program with
USCIS's Deputy Director, the Directors of USCIS's National Security and
Records Verification Directorate (NSRV) and FDNS, and the Section Chief
for the FBI's National Name Check Program. We also discussed background
check issues with officials from the FBI's Office of General Counsel
and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force; ICE; and the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman.
To determine the extent to which USCIS was addressing vulnerabilities
in its adjudication procedures, we collected and analyzed FDNS reports
on benefit fraud and compliance assessments (BFCA) of applications for
replacement permanent resident cards, petitions for religious workers,
and petitions for immigrant employment benefits, as well as the
proposed rule changes for filing petitions for religious workers
published in the Federal Register. We interviewed FDNS managers
responsible for administering the BFCAs, reviewed documentation
outlining the BFCAs' design and implementation, and determined that the
results were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We
also obtained information on high-profile ICE investigations of
immigration fraud and discussed with ICE agents familiar with these
cases the potential vulnerabilities in USCIS adjudications processes
that facilitate fraud. In addition, we analyzed current standard
operating procedures and other guidance provided to adjudicators
related to permanent residence applications and related petitions as
well as related policy memoranda. We also compared how USCIS addressed
the findings of its BFCAs with criteria in Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 31] and with standard
practices in program and project management for defining, designing,
and executing programs.[Footnote 32] We also interviewed the Chief of
the Internal Review Division and the Chief of Internal Review Field
Programs within USCIS's Office of Security and Integrity (OSI) to
determine the extent of internal fraud and actions being taken to
mitigate internal fraud. Finally, we obtained USCIS's draft responses
to recommendations in our previous report on immigration benefit
fraud[Footnote 33] and discussed the status of USCIS's efforts to
address those recommendations with appropriate USCIS officials.
In addition to those officials mentioned above, we visited and
interviewed officials in three USCIS service centers--the National
Benefits Center, the California Service Center, and the Nebraska
Service Center--to discuss their views on the extent to which
individuals who pose threats to national security attempt to become
lawful permanent residents, issues concerning background checks of
individuals applying or petitioning for permanent residency, and
vulnerabilities in current adjudications procedures. We also visited
and interviewed officials in 4 USCIS field offices located in Atlanta,
Georgia; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; and New York, New
York, for the same purposes. We chose these offices because together
they adjudicated about 35 percent of all permanent resident
applications in 2007, as well as nearly half of all family-and
employment-based petitions (48 percent and 47 percent, respectively).
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of service centers and
field offices to visit, the results from our interviews with USCIS
officials in these offices cannot be generalized to USCIS offices
nationwide.[Footnote 34] However, our interviews with officials in
these offices enhanced our understanding of the extent to which
individuals who pose threats to national security attempt to become
lawful permanent residents, as well as issues with background checks
and procedural vulnerabilities.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
December 2, 2008:
Homeland Security:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Re: Draft Report GAO-09-55, Immigration Benefits: Actions Needed to
Address Vulnerabilities in Process for Granting Permanent Residency
(GAO Job Code 440628):
The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the opportunity to
review and comment on the draft report referenced above. The United
States Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends that the
Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) take two steps to help ensure that findings from USCIS benefit
fraud and compliance assessments are acted upon and to enhance overall
fraud detection efforts.
Specifically GAO recommends that USCIS prepare a roadmap for each of
the four outstanding benefit fraud and compliance assessments
(petitions for skilled and unskilled workers, spouses, relatives from
Yemen, and applications for asylum) that delineates (1) timetables for
deciding what actions to take, (2) what USCIS organizational units will
be responsible for implementing those actions, and (3) a timetable for
implementing agreed upon actions. USCIS officials agree with the
recommendation.
GAO also recommends that USCIS modify adjudication procedures for
family- and employment- based petitions to include requirements on what
evidence should be verified. USCIS officials agree. When a Benefit
Fraud and Compliance Assessment (BFCA) relating to an 1-130 (Immigrant
Petition for Alien Relative) and/or 1-140 (Immigrant Petition for Alien
Worker) petition is issued and modifications to the adjudicative
processes are required, USCIS will modify its guidance and procedures
to ensure compliance with the requirements outlined in the BFCA. Under
documented special circumstances, officers may need to retain a certain
amount of flexible discretion.
Technical comments have been provided under separate cover and should
help clarify particular statements prior to finalizing the report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Michael P. Dino, Assistant
Director, and E. Jerry Seigler, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this
assignment. Carlos M. Garcia and Danielle Pakdaman made significant
contributions to the work. Amanda Miller and Virginia Chanley assisted
with design and methodology. Frances Cook provided legal support, John
Brummet and Kate Brentzel provided expertise on overseas immigrant
application issues, and Avrum Ashery and Lydia Araya developed the
report's graphics.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] USCIS would conduct these three background checks again for those
Asylees who apply for permanent residency.
[2] GAO, Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State's Ability to
Manage Diversity Visa Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1174] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21,
2007).
[3] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to the
requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982
(FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining
internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to FMFIA, the
Office of Management and Budget issued Circular A-123, revised December
21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for assessing the
reporting on internal controls. Internal control standards and the
definition of internal control in Circular A-123 are based on GAO's
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
[4] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
ManagementŠ, (Newton Square, PA: 2006).
[5] GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions
Strategy Could Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-259] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 10, 2006).
[6] The National Benefits Center processes (1) applications for
adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, (2) applications for
employment authorization, (3) applications for travel documents, and
(4) petitions for alien relatives.
[7] In some cases, undocumented aliens living in the United States who
are eligible for permanent residency cannot apply for adjustment of
status in the United States and must return to their country of origin
to apply for an immigrant visa.
[8] There are, for example, four categories for granting permanent
residence based on employment for priority workers, professionals with
advanced degrees or persons with exceptional ability, skilled or
professional workers, and special immigrants, and various visa
subcategories. Family-based visa categories include the immediate
relatives of a U.S. citizen and the spouse or unmarried son or daughter
of a lawful permanent resident.
[9] Immediate relatives include spouses, parents of citizens ages 21
and older, and citizens' unmarried children under age 21. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(b)(1).
[10] Eligible U.S. relatives file a Form I-130 Immigrant Petition for
Alien Relative and U.S. employers file a Form I-140 Immigrant Petition
for Alien Worker. Certain categories of immigrants, such as special
immigrant religious workers and battered or abused spouses and children
of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and others may file
their own petition (Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or
Special Immigrant) at this stage of the process. Other individuals may
apply for certain kinds of immigration benefits, such as refugee status
or asylum, which may lead to an application for lawful permanent
residency.
[11] For U.S. citizens who are petitioning for a relative, the family
member must be (1) a spouse, (2) a son or daughter, (3) a sibling, or
(4) a parent. For lawful permanent residents, the family member must be
(1) a spouse or (2) an unmarried son or daughter.
[12] Aliens outside the United States who are seeking lawful permanent
residency also need an approved petition, but the second step for them
is to apply for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in their
current country of residence which enables them to seek admission to
the United States as a lawful permanent resident.
[13] U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, The
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Security Check Procedures for
Immigration Applications and Petitions, Audit Report 08-24,
(Washington, D.C.: June 2008).
[14] We did not include an assessment of the quality of the FBI name
check process as part of our review since the DOJ OIG had already begun
its assessment.
[15] See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to
Promote a Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to Terrorist-Related
Screening, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-253T]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2007).
[16] According to FDNS, the status of a KST or non-KST may change over
time by moving between these categories or a non-national security
concern for a number of reasons, including the removal from or addition
to the terrorist watch list.
[17] The FBI raised its name check fees effective October 1, 2007, and
USCIS raised fees for processing immigrant benefit applications
effective July 30, 2007.
[18] See GAO-06-259.
[19] See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
[20] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
ManagementŠ, (Newton Square, PA: 2006).
[21] In addition, in September 2008 FDNS released its BFCA on the H-1B
visa for nonimmigrant workers in specialty occupations, such as
computer professionals, engineers, accountants, attorneys, or
university professors and teachers. However, because the H-1B visa
pertains solely to nonimmigrants, we did not include the results of
this assessment in this report.
[22] FDNS sampled cases involving only special immigrant religious
workers who can apply for permanent residency, not nonimmigrant
religious workers who are not eligible to do so.
[23] FDNS, however, plans to assign staff at overseas USCIS offices to
assist adjudicators in the verification of aliens' educational or work
experience claims.
[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-259].
[25] U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Security
Matrix Project Recommendations Report, prepared by BearingPoint,
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).
[26] The CCD stores information about U.S. citizens, immigrant visa
applicants, and nonimmigrant visa applicants, including names,
addresses, birth dates, race, identification numbers such as Social
Security numbers and alien registration numbers, and country of origin.
[27] AutoTrack is a transaction-based service provided by Choice Point,
Inc., that provides access to billions of publicly available current
and historical public records. Choice Point is a commercial service
that provides credentialing, background screening, authentication,
direct marketing and public records services to businesses and
nonprofit organizations, as well as information, analysis, and
distribution solutions to advance the efforts of law enforcement,
public safety, health care, child support enforcement, entitlement, and
other public agencies.
[28] Lexis/Nexis is a commercial provider of business information
solutions to professionals in a variety of areas, including: legal,
corporate, government, law enforcement, tax, accounting, academia, and
risk and compliance assessment.
[29] Procedures instruct an adjudicator to search CLAIMS only if the
petitioner has not submitted evidence of being a lawful permanent
resident or naturalized U.S. citizen. The purpose of this search is to
verify the petitioner's status.
[30] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[31] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
ManagementŠ, (Newton Square, PA: 2006).
[32] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-259].
[33] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Because each
unit in a population does not have an equal chance to be selected, it
is possible for a nonprobability sample to contain a systematic bias
that limits its ability to describe the entire population.
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Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
