Transportation Security Administration's Suspension of the Butane Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft
Gao ID: GAO-09-177R December 5, 2008This letter formally transmits the briefing in response to the explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Division E). The statement directed the Comptroller General to report on its assessment of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) report to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives on the anticipated security benefits and vulnerabilities associated with TSA's decision to suspend enforcement of the prohibition on butane lighters onboard aircraft.
GAO-09-177R, Transportation Security Administration's Suspension of the Butane Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 5, 2008:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States House of Representatives:
Subject: Transportation Security Administration's Suspension of the
Butane Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft:
This letter formally transmits the enclosed briefing in response to the
explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Division E). The
statement directed the Comptroller General to report on its assessment
of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) report to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives
on the anticipated security benefits and vulnerabilities associated
with TSA's decision to suspend enforcement of the prohibition on butane
lighters onboard aircraft. For a summary of the results of our work,
see slide 13. Based on the results of our review, we are not making any
recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security for TSA. This report will also be available at no
charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you
or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact me
at (202) 512- 3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report were David Bruno,
Assistant Director; Tracey Cross; Robert Lowthian; Alana Finley;
Stanley Kostyla; Thomas Lombardi; and Adam Vogt.
Signed by:
Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Enclosure: Briefing Slides:
Transportation Security Administration‘s Suspension of the Butane
Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft:
Briefing to Congressional Committees:
November 20, 2008:
Contents:
Introduction:
Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Results in Brief:
Findings:
Agency Views:
Introduction:
The August 2006 attempt by individuals to carry liquid explosives
onboard multiple commercial aircraft bound for the United States from
the United Kingdom has highlighted both the continued importance of
securing the civil aviation system and the potential that improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) may be smuggled onboard passenger aircraft.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which has primary
responsibility for ensuring the security of civil aviation, maintains a
prohibited items list that informs both the Transportation Security
Officers (TSO)[Footnote 1] who conduct passenger screening and the
traveling public of items that will not be allowed into an airport
sterile area or onboard an aircraft.[Footnote 2]
Passenger screening is a process by which TSOs inspect individuals and
property at designated screening locations to deter and prevent the
carriage of any items included on TSA‘s prohibited items list onboard
an aircraft or into an airport sterile area.
Timeline of Events Related to TSA‘s Ban on Lighters:
December 2004: Section 4025 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) required TSA to add butane
lighters to its list of prohibited items.
March 2005: TSA stated that it would be difficult for TSOs to
distinguish between butane lighters and other common lighters fueled by
some other gas or liquid, so TSA modified the prohibited items list to
include all lighters.
July 2007: TSA notified Congress of its intent to suspend enforcement
of the ban on butane lighters in accordance with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295),
which provided TSA with the authority to refrain from enforcing the
statutory butane lighter ban if the Assistant Secretary determined that
butane lighters are not a significant threat.
August 2007: TSA began allowing passengers to carry butane and other
common lighters onboard aircraft.[Footnote 3] TSA continued to ban the
carriage of torch lighters.[Footnote 4]
May 2008: In accordance with the explanatory statement accompanying the
DHS Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Div.E), TSA issued a
report to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives (the ’May 2008 report to Congress“) on the anticipated
security benefits and vulnerabilities associated with its decision to
suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. The explanatory statement also
directed the Comptroller General to report on its assessment of TSA's
report 180 days after TSA‘s report is submitted.
The cornerstone of DHS‘s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
is its risk management framework.[Footnote 5] The framework includes:
* setting security goals and performance targets;
* identifying key assets and sector information; and:
* assessing risk information including both general and specific threat
information, potential vulnerabilities, and the potential consequences
of a successful terrorist attack.
The NIPP requires that federal agencies use this information to inform
the selection of risk-based priorities and for the continuous
improvement of security strategies and programs to protect people and
critical infrastructure through the reduction of risks from acts of
terrorism.
DHS‘s and TSA‘s Strategic Plan both promote a risk management approach.
* According to DHS‘s Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2008-2013, DHS
plans to use qualitative and quantitative risk assessments to inform
resource decisions.
* According to TSA‘s Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2005-2009, TSA
plans to make risk-based resource allocation decisions.
Objectives, Scope and Methodology Objectives:
1. On what basis did TSA suspend enforcement of the ban on lighters
onboard aircraft, and what are industry stakeholder views of this
change?
2. To what extent did TSA conduct analysis to determine the impacts its
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban had on public safety
and screening operations?
To describe TSA‘s basis for suspending enforcement of the ban on
lighters, we reviewed and analyzed TSA‘s:
* notification to Congress of its plan to suspend enforcement of the
lighter ban;
* confidential threat assessment on lighters;
* Office of Intelligence Civil Aviation Threat Assessment;
* Explosives Detection Improvement Task Force reports; and:
* May 2008 report to Congress on the Impact of the Decision to Suspend
Enforcement of the Ban on Butane Lighters Aboard Aircraft. We compared
TSA‘s decision-making to DHS‘s guidance on risk management.[Footnote 6]
* We interviewed officials from TSA‘s Office of Security Operations to
obtain information on their rationale behind the change.
To obtain aviation industry stakeholders‘ views on TSA‘s decision to
suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, we conducted interviews with 12
stakeholders within the aviation industry,[Footnote 7] including:
* representatives from seven aviation associations[Footnote 8] and:
* five aviation security experts, selected based on their depth of
experience in the field of aviation, employment history, and their
recognition in the aviation security community.
We interviewed officials at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
both within the Department of Transportation (DOT). In addition, we
interviewed officials at the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS), a
component of TSA. We interviewed these officials to obtain their views
regarding TSA‘s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. We
selected these organizations because of their role in ensuring the
safety or security of civil aviation.
To determine what TSA identified as the impacts of its decision to
suspend enforcement of the ban on lighters, we reviewed TSA‘s May 2008
report to Congress.
* To determine the impacts on public safety, we reviewed TSA‘s daily
security incident reports from August 2007, when the lighter ban was
suspended, to August 2008.[Footnote 9]
* To determine the impacts on screening operations, we analyzed TSA‘s
data[Footnote 10] on the:
- number of surrendered items at airport checkpoints;
- number of training hours completed by TSOs;
- lighter disposal costs; and:
- results of Threat Image Projection (TIP) testing and IED Screening
Checkpoint Drills.[Footnote 11]
* We compared TSA‘s evaluation methods used to determine the impacts on
screening operations to generally accepted social science
standards,[Footnote 12] and GAO guidelines on performance measures and
evaluation.[Footnote 13]
* We interviewed TSA officials and 10 Federal Security Directors (FSD)
to obtain their views on the impacts the change to the lighter ban had
on screening operations.[Footnote 14]
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to November 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Consistent with DHS risk management guidance, TSA used the results of
its threat assessment to support its decision to suspend enforcement of
the ban on lighters, and the majority of aviation industry stakeholders
we interviewed agreed with TSA‘s decision because they generally
believed that lighters did not pose a significant threat to the
security of civil aviation.
TSA reported in May 2008 that as a result of its decision to suspend
enforcement of the ban on lighters, there were no reported incidents
that involved the use of a lighter to ignite an IED and that screening
operations improved. The results of our analysis of TSA‘s security
incident reports support TSA‘s finding that there were no reported
incidents that involved the use of a lighter to ignite an IED; however,
we cannot validate all the results of TSA‘s evaluation because it did
not use generally accepted social science standards in evaluating the
impacts of its decision on screening operations.
* For example, TSA did not isolate the effects its decision had on
screening operations (such as TSO performance) to account for other
factors ” such as training” that could have affected TSO performance.
Thus, TSA could not demonstrate a direct correlation between the
results of its decision and the impact it had on screening operations.
Objective 1 - Findings:
TSA‘s Basis for Suspending the Ban on Lighters:
TSA based its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban
onboard aircraft primarily because it found lighters were not a
significant threat to the security of civil aviation. TSA used the
results of its threat assessment to support its decision, which is
consistent with DHS‘s risk management guidance.
* In making its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, TSA
reported that it determined that based on intelligence driven threat
assessments, lighters did not pose a significant threat to the security
of civil aviation. TSA also reported that the effectiveness of
screening operations would be enhanced if the time and resources
devoted to detecting, collecting, and disposing of low-threat, high
effort lighters was shifted to the search for higher threat items. TSA
also reported that shifting attention from lower security risks to
address markedly higher security risks was fundamental to a risk-based
approach.
We reviewed TSA‘s July 2007 confidential threat assessment on lighters
and determined that:
* TSA‘s utilization of threat assessment results to assist decision-
making is consistent with DHS‘s NIPP risk management guidance and DHS‘s
and TSA‘s Strategic Plans, and:
* TSA‘s determination that lighters do not pose a significant threat is
consistent with threat assessments conducted by TSA‘s Office of
Intelligence and TSA‘s Explosives Detection Task Force.[Footnote 15]
TSA provided information in its confidential threat assessment
regarding its claim that because TSOs are no longer searching for
lighters, they would be able to focus on other threats.
However, TSA officials acknowledged that no analysis was conducted
specifically to support the notion that suspending enforcement of the
lighter ban would save TSOs‘ time to focus on greater threats.[Footnote
16]
Stakeholders‘ Views:
The majority (9 of 12) of the aviation industry stakeholders we
interviewed supported TSA‘s decision to suspend enforcement of the ban
on lighters.
* In general, these stakeholders did not have a concern about allowing
lighters onboard aircraft, and did not see a difference between
allowing matches and allowing lighters onboard aircraft.[Footnote 17]
* Two of the 12 stakeholders we interviewed were opposed to TSA‘s
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, as they believed
that lighters do pose a safety and security concern onboard
aircraft.[Footnote 18] For example, one stakeholder stated a lighter
could be used to start a fire as a diversion method to attempt a
hijacking.
TSA‘s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban onboard
aircraft was generally supported by FAMS, FAA, and PHMSA.
* According to FAMS officials, FAMS personnel are trained to respond to
a wide range of in-flight threats and the presence of lighters raises
no additional specific safety or security concerns.
* FAA and PHMSA officials stated that they supported TSA‘s decision to
suspend enforcement of the lighter ban because the Hazardous Materials
Regulations[Footnote 19] permit airline crew members and passengers to
carry a lighter for personal use in carry-on baggage.[Footnote 20]
Objective 2 - Findings:
Impacts on Public Safety:
TSA reported that as a result of its decision to suspend enforcement of
the lighter ban, there were no security incidents in which a lighter
was used to initiate an IED.[Footnote 21] The results of our analysis
of TSA‘s security incident reports support TSA‘s findings that there
were no incidents related to a lighter being used to ignite an IED.
Incidents involving disruptive passengers using lighters were reported
to TSA.
* According to TSA‘s May 2008 report to Congress, no significant
security incidents related to lighters had occurred onboard aircraft
since TSA suspended enforcement of the lighter ban in August 2007. TSA
officials explained that for its May 2008 report, they defined
significant security incidents to be those incidents in which a lighter
was used to initiate an IED.
Our review of TSA‘s daily security incident reports from the time
period following the suspended enforcement of the lighter ban (August
2007) through August 2008, found:
* No significant security incidents in which a lighter was used to
initiate an IED.
* Seven incidents had been reported to TSA during this time period that
involved disruptive passengers using lighters.
In October 2008, TSA officials acknowledged that the absence of an
onboard incident involving lighters does not preclude the possibility
of such an incident occurring in the future. However, officials stated
they believed that the risk was low and that the benefits they
identified outweighed the risks.
Impacts on Screening Operations:
Although TSA performed some analysis to support its claims about the
benefits obtained as a result of its decision to suspend enforcement of
the lighter ban, TSA‘s analysis generally did not establish a causal
relationship between its decision and the reported benefits.
* GAO guidelines on performance measurement and evaluation state that
agencies should conduct evaluations to ensure that the anticipated
effect is achieved.[Footnote 22]
* Generally accepted social science standards identify that evaluations
should include elements such as whether evaluation data were collected
before and after program implementation, how program effects were
isolated, and the appropriateness of sampling, outcome measures,
statistical analyses and other reported results.[Footnote 23]
Although TSA conducted some analyses to determine the impact of its
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban, TSA did not isolate
the effects of suspending the lighter ban when evaluating the impact
its decision had on TSO performance and staffing flexibility.
TSA also did not collect data to determine if the number of physical
bag searches conducted at passenger screening checkpoints had been
reduced and did not conduct any analysis to determine the effect of
suspending the lighter ban on passenger anxiety.
Because of the limitations in TSA's evaluation, we can not validate its
results. However, given that TSA made its decision to suspend the ban
on lighters based on threat information, it would probably not be cost-
beneficial for TSA to reassess its evaluation of the impacts resulting
from its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban.
TSA cited the following benefits associated with its decision to
suspend the enforcement of the lighter ban:
* a reduction in the number of lighters surrendered by passengers,
* an improvement in TSOs‘ performance in detecting IEDs and other
dangerous items,
* a reduction in bag searches that accorded FSDs more staffing
flexibility, and:
* a reduction in passenger anxiety.
Lighters Surrendered:
TSA reported the number of lighters surrendered has decreased since the
lighter ban was suspended. Our analysis of TSA‘s data confirms this
assertion.
* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that the number of
lighters surrendered has decreased by approximately 98 percent since
the suspension of the lighter ban, allowing TSOs to focus on more
threatening items. Specifically, TSA reported that:
- in January 2007, there were almost 700,000 lighters collected, and:
- in April 2008, the number of lighters collected was about 10,000, as
torch lighters are still surrendered.
* As a result of the decrease in the number of lighters surrendered,
TSA reported that its disposal costs have declined from $4.3 million in
calendar year 2006 to $268,000 from January 2008 to July 2008.[Footnote
24]
* Our review of TSA‘s data on surrendered items from January 2007 to
April 2008, the time period reviewed by TSA, shows the decline in
lighters to be 98.5 percent.
* In addition to lighters, TSA tracks 13 other categories of
surrendered items, such as explosives and tools. In comparing the 12
months preceding TSA‘s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter
ban, August 2006 to July 2007, to the 12 months following TSA‘s
decision, August 2007 to July 2008, we found that most of the 14
categories of surrendered items did not decline at the same rate as
lighters.
- For example, during this same time frame, while the percent of
lighters surrendered decreased by 97 percent, 10 of the other
categories of surrendered items decreased by less than 20 percent. The
remaining three categories of surrendered items decreased by 28, 48,
and 90 percent during this time frame.
TSO Performance:
It is unclear if TSA‘s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter
ban has directly resulted in improved TSO performance, as reported by
TSA in May 2008 because TSA did not account for other factors that
could have improved TSO performance.
* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that suspending
enforcement of the lighter ban allowed TSOs to focus on the detection
of IEDs and other dangerous items. TSA reported that it based this
conclusion on:
- improvement in TIP scores,
- improvement in IED Screening Checkpoint Drills, and:
- field reports that confirmed an increase in TSO performance.[Footnote
25]
* The results of TSA TIP testing and IED Screening Checkpoint Drills
are considered sensitive security information and thus could not be
included in this report.
* TSA reported in May 2008 that field reports confirmed that TSOs had
been able to focus on detection of IEDs and other dangerous prohibited
items since the lighter ban was suspended.
* Our interviews with FSDs revealed that although nine of ten FSDs we
interviewed agreed that they have seen a shift in TSOs‘ focus to
greater threats as a result of the suspended enforcement of the lighter
ban, five FSDs noted that TSOs received a lot of testing on detecting
items or that there had also been training targeted at detecting IEDs
since the lighter ban was suspended which could have impacted TSO
performance.
* TSA did not isolate the effect the suspended enforcement of the
lighter ban had on TSOs‘ performance. Multiple factors could have
accounted for the changes in TSOs‘ performance over time. The following
initiatives were implemented at around the same time as the suspended
enforcement of the lighter ban, all of which could affect TSOs‘
performance:
- IED Screening Checkpoint Drills,
- TSOs training conducted by Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO),[Footnote 26
and:
- the deployment of new technology.
* In October 2008, TSA officials acknowledged that there was no
evidence of a direct correlation between the lighter ban and
improvement in TIP scores. However, officials stated that when combined
with other programs, such as Checkpoint Evolution[Footnote 27] and
training, the ability of TSOs to concentrate on IEDs improved and the
additional benefits of removing lighters from the TSOs‘ focus made the
training and IED drills more effective.
Staffing Flexibility:
Although TSA stated that its decision to suspend enforcement of the ban
on lighters onboard aircraft would allow FSDs more staffing flexibility
because of a reduction in bag searches, TSA did not collect the
necessary data to support this assertion.
* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that the number of bag
searches had declined as a result of the suspended enforcement of the
lighter ban.
* TSA also reported that the decline in bag searches provided FSDs with
additional flexibility in staffing and has allowed them to qualify TSOs
as Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) and Travel Document Checkers
(TDC).[Footnote 28] TSA reported that having staff in these new
positions strengthened TSA‘s layered approach to aviation security.
* In October 2008, TSA officials stated that they did not collect data
on the number of bag searches conducted at passenger screening
checkpoints.
* TSA officials stated that they based their determination that the
number of bag searches declined on an inference that suspending
enforcement of the ban on lighters reduced the number searches since
lighters accounted for a significant portion of the prohibited items
surrendered. Officials also stated that feedback from the airports
confirmed a drastic reduction in the number of bag searches
conducted.[Footnote 29]
* Four of the ten FSDs we interviewed stated that they believed that
the number of bag searches had not declined since the suspension of the
lighter ban, three were unsure, and three believed it had declined.
- Three of the four FSDs reported that they believed the number of bag
searches had not declined because TSOs are searching bags for other
prohibited items or they are conducting more random searches. The three
FSDs who reported a decline in the number of bag searches stated that
this was anecdotal information and was not based on data collected.
Since TSA did not collect data to determine that there was a reduction
in bag searches that resulted in increased staffing flexibility, TSA
can not attribute the increase in the number of BDOs and TDCs to its
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban.
* In October 2007, shortly after the suspended enforcement of the
lighter ban, TSA had over 1,500 TDCs and about 300 BDOs on staff. By
May 2008, TSA data shows that it had almost 32,000 TDCs and 800 BDOs.
This number has increased to over 37,000 and nearly 1,500,
respectively, by August 2008.[Footnote 30]
* Although TSA made the assertion that its decision to suspend
enforcement of the lighter ban would increase the number of BDOs that
FSDs could qualify in its May 2008 report to Congress, in October 2008,
TSA officials explained that since BDOs are part of a different
staffing allocation than TSOs, the number of BDOs was not affected by
its change to the lighter ban.
* Further, seven of the ten FSDs we interviewed stated that they have
noticed no increase in their flexibility for staffing as a result of
suspending enforcement of the lighter ban and two stated that they were
not able to determine whether there had been a difference in their
staffing flexibility.
* One FSD explained there had been an increase in staff flexibility as
a result of suspending enforcement of the lighter ban since not as many
directed bag searches were being conducted and staff could be devoted
to other activities without slowing the throughput at checkpoints.
Passenger Anxiety:
TSA reported that its decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter
ban would decrease passenger anxiety, but TSA did not conduct any
analysis to determine this and FSDs‘ views were mixed on whether they
believed TSA‘s decision impacted passenger anxiety.
* In its May 2008 report to Congress, TSA stated that it was
implementing a Checkpoint Evolution program that combines new screening
technologies and efforts to more easily distinguish between normal and
abnormal passenger behavior. TSA reported that eliminating the stress
and anxiety of passengers allows for a more effective detection of
certain behaviors by BDOs, and that passenger anxiety is reduced by the
suspended enforcement of the lighter ban.
* In October 2008, TSA officials stated that no specific analysis had
been performed to determine whether there had been a reduction in
passenger anxiety as a result of its decision to suspend enforcement of
the lighter ban. However, officials stated that a great deal of
experiential and anecdotal information supports the point that
passengers were distressed when they were required to surrender a
personal use lighter.
* The ten FSDs we interviewed had mixed views regarding whether
suspending enforcement of the lighter ban affected passenger anxiety.
- Four stated that they could not determine whether there was an impact
on passenger anxiety as a result of suspending enforcement of the
lighter ban.
- Four stated that they had not seen an impact on passenger anxiety as
a result of suspending enforcement of the lighter ban.
- Two reported that suspending enforcement of the lighter ban did
reduce passenger anxiety, although one stated that the change to the
lighter ban was just one of many initiatives that have helped reduce
passenger anxiety.
In October 2008, TSA acknowledged that various other factors, in
addition to the change to the lighter ban, contributed to the benefits
cited in its May 2008 report.
* Other variables or changes made contemporaneous with the suspension
of the lighter ban, include:
- deployment of BDOs,
- deployment of TDCs,
- implementation of new TSO training, including IED Screening
Checkpoint Drills and training conducted by BAOs, and:
- implementation of aspects of the Checkpoint Evolution initiative.
* Six of the ten FSDs we interviewed stated that it was difficult to
isolate the effect of the lighter ban suspension because of the various
other changes that occurred around the same time or after the lighter
ban was suspended. Two FSDs stated that they had not noticed any impact
as a result of the suspended enforcement of the lighter ban.[Footnote
31]
In addition, TSA reported that allowing lighters onboard aircraft
further harmonizes U.S. requirements with those of other countries, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and with
DOT.[Footnote 32]
* TSA reported that at the time the United States had banned passengers
from carrying lighters onboard commercial aircraft, it was the only
country doing so.[Footnote 33]
* ICAO allows crew members and passengers to carry a lighter onboard
aircraft.[Footnote 34]
* DOT regulations, promulgated by PHMSA, allow a passenger to carry a
lighter onboard aircraft for the individual‘s use on his or her person
or in carry-on baggage.[Footnote 35]
* The majority (8 of the 12) of stakeholders we interviewed emphasized
the importance of harmonizing security measures. Stakeholders
identified benefits of harmonization that included ensuring aircraft
flying into the United States are secure, optimizing resources so
screening does not have to be duplicated in all countries, and easing
passenger travel by having similar requirements.
Agency Views:
We provided a draft of the information included in this briefing to TSA
for review and comment. On November 13, 2008, TSA officials provided
oral comments to the briefing slides. TSA generally agreed with the
information presented and our findings. TSA also provided us with
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For purposes of this report, "TSO" includes both screeners employed
by TSA (TSOs) and screeners employed by private screening companies
under contract to TSA through its Screener Partnership Program.
[2] Sterile areas are locations within an airport that provide
passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which access generally is
controlled by TSA or a party under contract to TSA.
[3] For purposes of this report, "lighters" refers to butane or other
common-use lighters, other than torch lighters.
[4] Torch lighters create a thin, needle-like flame that is hotter
(reaching 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit) and more intense than those from
common lighters. Torch lighters are often used for 5 pipes and cigars,
and maintain a consistent stream of air-propelled fire regardless of
the angle at which it is held. According to a TSA official, TSOs are
well experienced and trained to determine a torch lighter from other
lighters. However, the official acknowledged that TSOs may not be
consistently detecting 100 percent of torch lighters.
[5] 5 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (Washington, D.C. 2006). NIPP provides a base plan that
is to serve as a road map for how DHS and other relevant stakeholders,
such as owners and operators of key critical infrastructure, should use
risk management principles to prioritize protection activities within
and across sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion.
[6] Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (Washington, D.C. 2006).
[7] Perspectives obtained from aviation industry stakeholders can not
be generalized to the entire population, but they provided additional
insight into aviation security.
[8] Specifically, we met with officials from the Air Transport
Association, National Air Carrier Association, Regional Airline
Association, Air Carrier Association of America, International Air 10
Transport Association, Air Line Pilots Association, and Association of
Flight Attendants.
[9] Although it is possible that there were some incidents involving
lighters that occurred during the time period of our review that were
not reported to TSA, and thus not recorded in the incident reports, we
found the incident reports sufficiently reliable for purposes of this
review.
[10] We determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report.
[11] The TIP system is designed to test TSOs‘ detection capabilities by
projecting threat images, including guns, knives, and explosives, onto
carry-on bags as they are screened during actual operations. TSOs are
responsible for identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to
be searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the TSO whether the
threat is real and then records the TSO‘s performance in a database
that could be analyzed for performance trends.
[12] Social science research standards are outlined in Donald T.
Campbell and Julian Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental
Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas D Cook and
Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues
for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Carol H. Weiss,
Evaluation Research: Methods for Assessing Program Effectiveness
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward Suchman,
Evaluation Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and
Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD–10.1.4
(Washington, D.C.: May 1991).
[13] GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and
Relationships, GAO/GGD-98-26 (Washington, D.C., April 1998).
[14] FSDs are the ranking authorities responsible for leading and
coordinating security activities at U.S. airports at which TSA provides
for or oversees the provision of screening activities. Information
obtained from our interviews with these FSDs cannot be generalized;
however, these interviews furthered our understanding of the impacts of
TSA‘s decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban.
[15] The TSA Office of Intelligence Civil Aviation Threat Assessment
addresses the threat to civil aviation aircraft and airports. The
Explosives Detection Task Force was established in October 2005 to
respond to the threat of IEDs being carried through airport
checkpoints. The goal of the Task Force was to apply a risk-based
approach to screening passengers and their baggage in order to enhance
TSA‘s ability to detect IEDs. These reports are considered sensitive
security information or for official use only and have not been
included in this report.
[16] In October 2008, TSA officials stated that checkpoint task
analysis and modeling conducted revealed that an average bag search was
estimated to take 3 minutes to perform. Given this information and the
11 million lighters surrendered in 2006, TSA concluded that the time
associated with conducting bag checks would decrease radically after
the ban. However, this analysis was conducted separate of TSA‘s
decision to suspend enforcement of the lighter ban. Further, TSA does
not collect metrics on whether surrendered lighters were divested by
the individual or discovered as a result of a bag search called in
response to the suspected presence of a lighter.
[17] TSA permits passengers to carry one book of safety (non-strike
anywhere) matches as a carry-on item.
[18] The final stakeholder did not provide an opinion on TSA‘s
decision.
[19] See 49 C.F.R. § 175.10(a)(2) (providing that aircraft passengers
or crewmembers may carry one packet of safety matches or a lighter
intended for use by an individual when carried on one‘s person or in
carry-on baggage only).
[20] The Hazardous Materials Regulations are issued by the PHMSA and
govern the transportation of hazardous materials by highway, rail,
vessel, and air. The Hazardous Materials Regulations do not distinguish
torch lighters from butane and other common lighters. See, e.g., 49
C.F.R. pt. 175 (governing the carriage of hazardous materials by
aircraft).
[21] TSA considers any incident that threatens the security or safety
of an aircraft or its passengers and flight crew to be a security
incident. These could include activities such as disruptive passenger
behavior, violence against a passenger or crew member, hijacking
attempts, or the use of an IED.
[22] GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and
Relationships, GAO/GGD-98-26 (Washington, D.C., April 1998).
[23] Social science research standards are outlined in Donald T.
Campbell and Julian Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental
Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas D Cook and
Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues
for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Carol H. Weiss,
Evaluation Research: 22 Methods for Assessing Program Effectiveness
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward Suchman,
Evaluation Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and
Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD–10.1.4
(Washington, D.C.: May 1991).
[24] Disposal costs include the fixed cost for the contract allocated
to the lighter disposal effort, the cost of containers to store
lighters, and the cost to have lighters picked up and removed.
[25] TSA officials stated that the field reports collected were
informal e-mails that were solicited from the Assistant FSDs for
Screening at about ten airports. These Assistant FSDs serve on the
National Advisory Council, and represent all airports.
[26] BAOs are available to respond to unresolved alarms at the
checkpoint that involve possible explosive devices.
[27] The Checkpoint Evolution initiative combines new screening
technologies, such as Advanced Technology that will improve carry-on
bag screening and enhance airline passenger security, additional
investments in TSA human resource capabilities and training, and
efforts to ’increase the contrast“ at airports whereby abnormal
behaviors stand out from normal airport routines.
[28] 28 BDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior
in individuals approaching the checkpoint. TDCs are specially trained
TSOs positioned in the front of the screening checkpoint who check
passengers‘ boarding passes and identification.
[29] TSA officials explained that feedback is obtained from various
interactions with airport personnel, such as interactions that occur at
FSD and Assistant FSD conferences.
[30] Data on BDOs came from the National Finance Center Personnel
Database.
[31] The other two FSDs did not state that it was hard to isolate the
impacts of the suspended enforcement of the lighter ban, but they did
indicate that other changes occurred around the same time as the
suspension the lighter ban that could have affected screening
operations.
[32] The term harmonization is defined differently by various
international aviation security stakeholders. In the context of this
report, the term harmonization is used to describe efforts to
coordinate security practices to enhance security and increase
efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort.
[33] We did not independently verify whether the United States was the
only country that had banned lighters onboard aircraft.
[34] Nations that are members of ICAO agree to cooperate with other
member states to meet standardized international aviation security
measures.
[35] See 49 C.F.R. § 175.10(a)(2).
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