Aviation Security
Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains Gao ID: GAO-08-456T February 28, 2008Transportation Security Administration (TSA) funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system through passenger screening, air cargo, and watch-list matching programs, and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued between February 2004 and April 2007, including selected updates in February 2008. This testimony also addresses TSA's progress in developing the Secure Flight program, based on work conducted from August 2007 to January 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed systems development, privacy, and other documentation, and interviewed Department of Homeland Security (DHS), TSA, and contractor officials.
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's commercial aviation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. Specifically, TSA developed and implemented a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions, and proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk information. However, GAO reported that some assumptions in TSA's Staffing Allocation Model did not accurately reflect airport operating conditions, and that TSA could improve its process for evaluating the effectiveness of proposed procedural changes. In response, TSA developed a plan to review Staffing Allocation Model assumptions and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA has also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including conducting vulnerability assessments at airports and compliance inspections of air carriers. However, TSA has not developed an inspection plan that included performance goals and measures to determine whether air carriers transporting cargo into the United States were complying with security requirements. In response to GAO's recommendations, TSA has since established a working group to strengthen its compliance activities. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen aviation security. For example, TSA has made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. Further, TSA continues to face some program management challenges in developing Secure Flight. Specifically, TSA has not (1) developed program cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; (2) fully implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned for system end-to-end testing in test plans; and (4) ensured that information security requirements are fully implemented. If these challenges are not addressed effectively, the risk of the program not being completed on schedule and within estimated costs is increased, and the chances of it performing as intended are diminished. DHS and TSA lack performance measures to fully evaluate the effectiveness of current processes for passengers who apply for redress due to inconveniences experienced during the check-in and screening process. Without such measures, DHS and TSA lack a sound basis to monitor the effectiveness of the redress process.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-456T, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, February 28, 2008:
Aviation Security:
Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to
Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work
Remains:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
and:
Gregory C. Wilshusen:
Director, Information Security Issues:
GAO-08-456T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the security of our nation's aviation system. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established in 2001
with the mission to protect the transportation network while also
ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception,
TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to
secure commercial aviation. To implement these efforts, TSA funding for
aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004.
Other parties also play a role in securing commercial aviation,
including air carriers that are responsible for screening air cargo,
among other things, and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), which is responsible for the
research and development of aviation security technologies. In carrying
out its broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the
daunting challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources
within the aviation system and across all sectors to address threats
and strengthen security.
Our testimony today focuses on TSA's efforts to ensure the security of
the following key areas of the commercial aviation system, which
represents about $4.5 billion of the $6.0 billion President's fiscal
year 2009 budget request for aviation security: 1) screening
operations, including transportation security officer (TSO) and private
screener allocations, and checkpoint screening technologies; 2) air
cargo; and 3) and passenger watch-list matching. In particular, we will
address the numerous efforts TSA has taken or plans to take to
strengthen security in these areas and the challenges that remain.
Our comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued between
February 2004 and April 2007 addressing the security of the nation's
aviation system, including selected updates to this work conducted in
February 2008. Our comments are also based on the results from our
recently completed work assessing the status of TSA's development of
the Secure Flight program, conducted in response to the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.[Footnote 1] This
statement will address the following issues raised by the mandate: (1)
overall progress made in strengthening the Secure Flight program,
including privacy protection issues and coordination of international
and domestic watch-list matching functions, (2) development of Secure
Flight's cost and schedule estimates, (3) efforts made in Secure
Flight's system development including risk management, end-to-end
testing, and information security, and (4) DHS and TSA's efforts to
evaluate redress. We conducted this mandated review from August 2007 to
January 2008. For our review, we interviewed officials from the Secure
Flight program and Customs and Border Protection and reviewed relevant
laws and regulations and program management and planning documents. We
conducted these performance audits in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Summary:
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's commercial aviation system and more
effectively guide program investments, including steps to address many
of our prior recommendations. Meeting the statutory mandates to screen
airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage alone was a
tremendous challenge. TSA has since turned its attention to, among
other things, to more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing
the TSO--formerly known as screeners--workforce; strengthening
screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and
efficient screening technologies; strengthening air cargo security; and
developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as
Secure Flight. More specifically, DHS and TSA have, among other things,
developed and implemented a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO
staffing levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions,
and provided TSOs with additional training intended to enhance the
detection of threat objects, particularly improvised explosive devices.
TSA also proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint
screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability)
information, while considering efficiency and customer service needs.
TSA also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to
enhance the detection of explosives and other threats. Further, TSA
took steps to strengthen air cargo security, such as conducting
vulnerability assessments at several domestic airports, revising air
cargo screening exemptions, and conducting inspections of air carriers
to ensure that they are complying with existing security requirements.
Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure
Flight's development and implementation since we last reported on the
program in February 2007, including preparing key systems development
documentation and strengthening privacy protections.
While these efforts should be commended, we have reported on several
areas in which TSA could do more to strengthen aviation security. For
example, in our previous work, we reported that some assumptions in
TSA's Staffing Allocation Model did not accurately reflect airport
operating conditions. We recommended that TSA establish a formal,
documented plan for reviewing all of the model assumptions on a
periodic basis. TSA agreed with our recommendation and, in December
2007, developed a Staffing Allocation Model Rates and Assumption
Validation Plan that the agency will use to review and validate model
assumptions. In addition, we reported that TSA could improve its
process for evaluating the effectiveness of proposed changes to
passenger screening procedures. For example, while in some cases TSA
tested proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening
procedures before they were implemented to help determine whether the
changes would achieve their intended purposes, we found that TSA's data
collection and analyses could be strengthened. DHS generally agreed
with our findings and recommendations and TSA has taken steps to
implement them. We also testified that limited progress has been made
in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and
management challenges. For example, we reported that TSA made limited
progress in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger
screening checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA
previously faced in coordinating research and development efforts. We
further reported that TSA halted the deployment of one technology due
to high installation and maintenance costs. With respect to air cargo,
we reported that while TSA conducted a variety of compliance
inspections to determine whether air carriers or indirect air carriers-
-entities that consolidate air cargo for delivery and transport--were
complying with TSA security requirements, and had begun to analyze the
results of these inspections, it has not developed an inspection plan
that included performance goals and measures to determine the extent to
which air carriers transporting cargo into the United States were
complying with security requirements. While TSA has made considerable
progress in the development and implementation of Secure Flight, it has
not fully addressed program management issues including (1) developing
cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices, (2) fully
implementing its risk management plan, (3) developing a comprehensive
testing strategy, and (4) ensuring that information security
requirements are fully implemented. If these challenges are not
addressed effectively, the risk of the program not being completed on
schedule and within estimated costs is increased, and the chances of it
performing as intended are diminished. Also, DHS and TSA lack
performance measures to fully evaluate the effectiveness of current
processes for passengers who apply for redress due to inconveniences
experienced during the check-in and screening processes. Having such
measures will allow the program to fully measure all of its priorities
and make future adjustments to the program.
To strengthen TSA's development and implementation of the Secure Flight
program, we are making recommendations to DHS to incorporate best
practices in the Secure Flight program and to fully implement the
program's risk management plan and information security requirements
and develop a comprehensive testing strategy. We are also making a
recommendation to DHS and TSA to develop additional performance
measures for their current redress process. We provided a draft of
information included in this statement related to our recently
completed work on Secure Flight to DHS and TSA for review and comment.
In commenting on this information, DHS and TSA generally agreed with
our recommendations.
Background:
With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
in November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation
security from the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and
checked baggage screening from air carriers.[Footnote 2] As part of
this responsibility, TSA oversees security operations at the nation's
more than 400 commercial airports, including establishing requirements
for passenger and checked baggage screening and ensuring the security
of air cargo transported to, from, and within the United States. In
addition, TSA has operational responsibility for conducting passenger
and checked baggage screening at most airports, and has regulatory, or
oversight, responsibility, for air carriers who conduct air cargo
screening. While TSA took over responsibility for passenger checkpoint
and baggage screening, air carriers have continued to conduct passenger
watch-list matching in accordance with TSA requirements, which includes
the process of matching passenger information against federal watch-
list data before flights depart. TSA is currently developing a program
to take over this responsibility from air carriers for passengers on
domestic flights, and plans to assume from the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) the pre-departure name-matching function for
passengers on international flights traveling to or from the United
States.
Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening:
One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from
the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening
operations to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs).
Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked baggage screening had been
performed by private screening companies under contract to airlines.
ATSA established TSA and required it to create a federal workforce to
assume the job of conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at
commercial airports. The federal screener workforce was put into place,
as required, by November 2002.[Footnote 3]
Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
into a sterile area or onboard an aircraft.[Footnote 4] Passenger
screening personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited items at
designated screening locations. The four passenger screening functions
are X-ray screening of property, walk-through metal detector screening
of individuals, hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and
physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.
Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their
carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector.
Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm
the walk-through metal detector, or who are designated as selectees--
that is, passengers selected by the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-
Screening System (CAPPS) or other TSA-approved processes to designate
passengers for additional screening--are screened by hand-wand or pat-
down and have their carry-on items either screened for explosives
traces or physically searched. [Footnote 5]
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or
weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is accomplished
through the use of explosive detection systems[Footnote 6] or explosive
trace detection systems,[Footnote 7] and through the use of approved
alternative means, such as manual searches and canine teams when the
explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems are
unavailable.
The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of
three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the
screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked
baggage, the technology used during the screening process, and the
procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these
elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of
passenger and checked baggage screening operations.
Air Cargo Security:
Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type
from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry
goods, fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish,
and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including
large containers known as unit loading devices that allow many packages
to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded onto an
aircraft, wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/
boxed pieces, known as break bulk cargo.
Participants in the air cargo shipping process include shippers, such
as individuals and manufacturers; indirect air carriers, also referred
to as freight forwarders or regulated agents; air cargo handling
agents, who process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air
carriers; and passenger and all-cargo carriers that store, load, and
transport air cargo. A shipper may take its packages to a freight
forwarder, or regulated agent, which consolidates cargo from many
shippers and delivers it to air carriers. A shipper may also send
freight by directly packaging and delivering it to an air carrier's
ticket counter or sorting center where either the air carrier or a
cargo handling agent will sort and load cargo onto the aircraft. The
shipper may also have cargo picked up and delivered by an all-cargo
carrier, or choose to take cargo directly to a carriers' retail
facility for delivery.
TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other
things, establishing security rules and regulations governing domestic
and foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and
foreign all-cargo carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect
air carriers. TSA is also responsible for overseeing the implementation
of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and indirect air
carriers through compliance inspections, and, in coordination with
DHS's S&T Director, for conducting research and development of air
cargo security technologies. Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are
responsible for implementing TSA security requirements, predominantly
through a TSA-approved security program that describes the security
policies, procedures, and systems the air carrier will implement and
maintain in order to comply with TSA security requirements. Air
carriers must also abide by security requirements issued by TSA through
security directives or emergency amendments to air carrier security
programs.
Air carriers use several methods and technologies to screen domestic
and inbound air cargo.[Footnote 8] These include manual physical
searches and comparisons between airway bills and cargo contents to
ensure that the contents of the cargo shipment matches the cargo
identified in documents filed by the shipper, as well as using approved
technology, such as X-ray systems, explosive trace detection systems,
decompression chambers, explosive detection systems, and certified
explosive detection canine teams.[Footnote 9] Under TSA's security
requirements for domestic and inbound air cargo, passenger air carriers
are currently required to randomly screen a specific percentage of non
exempt air cargo pieces listed on each airway bill. All-cargo carriers
are required to screen 100 percent of air cargo that exceeds a specific
weight threshold. As of October 2006, domestic indirect air carriers
are also required, under certain conditions, to screen a certain
percentage of air cargo prior to its consolidation. TSA, however, does
not regulate foreign freight forwarders, or individuals or businesses
that have their cargo shipped by air to the United States. Under the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS is
required to implement a system to screen 50 percent of air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009, and 100 percent of
such cargo by August 2010.[Footnote 10]
Passenger Watch-List Matching:
The prescreening of airline passengers who may pose a security risk
before they board an aircraft is one of many layers of security
intended to strengthen commercial aviation. One component of
prescreening is passenger watch-list matching--or the process of
matching passenger information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists to
identify passengers who should be denied boarding or who should undergo
additional security scrutiny.[Footnote 11]
Aircraft operators are currently responsible for checking passenger
information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists to identify
passengers who should be denied boarding or who should undergo
additional security scrutiny. To further enhance commercial aviation
security and in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), TSA is developing a program to assume
from air carriers the function of matching passenger information
against government-supplied terrorist watch-lists for domestic
flights.[Footnote 12] Secure Flight is the program through which TSA
plans to meet this requirement. Following domestic implementation, TSA,
through Secure Flight, plans to assume responsibility from CBP for
watch-list matching of passengers on international flights bound to and
from the United States. Secure Flight's mission is to enhance the
security of commercial air travel by:
* eliminating inconsistencies in current air carrier watch-list
matching procedures;
* reducing the number of individuals who are misidentified as being on
the No Fly or Selectee list;
* reducing the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive watch-list
information, and:
* integrating the redress process so that individuals are less likely
to be improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an
aircraft.
TSA plans to implement Secure Flight in three releases. During Release
One, which is currently ongoing and is scheduled to be completed in
March 2008, TSA is developing and testing the Secure Flight system.
During Release Two, scheduled to be conducted from April 2008 through
August 2008, TSA plans to begin parallel testing with air carriers
during which both Secure Flight and air carriers will perform watch-
list matching. Finally, during Release Three, TSA is to develop the
capability for "airline cutovers" during which Secure Flight plans to
begin conducting all watch-list matching for domestic air passengers.
Release Three is scheduled to begin in September 2008. After Release
Three, domestic cutovers are expected to begin in January 2009 and be
completed in July 2009. TSA plans to assume from CBP watch-list
matching for flights departing from and to the United States some time
after domestic cutovers are completed.
Over the last 4 years, we have reported that the Secure Flight program
(and its predecessor CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized
its goals, objectives, and requirements, and faced significant
development and implementation challenges.[Footnote 13] Acknowledging
the challenges it faced with the program, TSA suspended the development
of Secure Flight and initiated a reassessment, or re-baselining, of the
program in February 2006, which was completed in January 2007. Since
our last testimony on Secure Flight in February 2007, we were mandated
by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
to assess various aspects of Secure Flight's development and
implementation.[Footnote 14] In accordance with the act, we reviewed
(1) TSA's efforts to develop reliable cost and schedule estimates for
Secure Flight; (2) progress made by TSA in developing and implementing
the Secure Flight system, including the implementation of security
controls; (3) TSA's efforts to coordinate with CBP to integrate Secure
Flight with CBP's watch-list matching function for international
flights; (4) TSA's plans to protect private passenger information under
Secure Flight; and (5) DHS's efforts to assess the effectiveness of the
current redress process for passengers misidentified as being on or
wrongly assigned to the No Fly or Selectee list.[Footnote 15]
TSA's available funding for the Secure Flight program during fiscal
year 2007 was $32.5 million.[Footnote 16] In fiscal year 2008, TSA
received $50 million along with statutory authority to transfer up to
$24 million to the program, making as much as $74 million available for
the program in fiscal year 2008, if necessary.[Footnote 17] For fiscal
year 2009, TSA has requested $82 million in funding to allow the agency
to continue development and implementation of the Secure Flight program
and the full assumption of the watch-list matching function in fiscal
year 2010.
Aviation Security Fiscal Years 2004 through 2008 Funding and Fiscal
Year 2009 Budget Request:
According to DHS's budget execution reports and TSA's congressional
budget justifications, TSA received appropriations for aviation
security that total about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004.[Footnote
18] During fiscal year 2004--the first year for which data were
available--TSA received about $3.9 billion for aviation security
programs, and during fiscal year 2008, received about $6.1 billion. The
President's budget request for fiscal year 2009 includes about $6.0
billion to continue TSA's aviation security activities. This total
includes about $5.3 billion specifically designated for aviation
security and about $0.76 billion for aviation-security related
programs, such as Secure Flight, and mandatory fee accounts, such as
the Aviation Security Capital Fund. Figure 1 identifies reported
aviation security funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2008.
Figure 1: TSA's Reported Aviation Security Funding for Fiscal Years
2004 through 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
information:
Fiscal year: 2004[A];
Designated funding for aviation security: approximately $3.7 billion;
Funding for programs, project, and activities (PPAs) related to
aviation security[C]: approximately $0.2 billion;
Total: approximately$3.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2005[A];
Designated funding for aviation security: approximately $4.3 billion;
Funding for programs, project, and activities (PPAs) related to
aviation security[C]: approximately $0.4 billion;
Total: approximately $4.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2006[B];
Designated funding for aviation security: approximately $4.5 billion;
Funding for programs, project, and activities (PPAs) related to
aviation security[C]: approximately $1.0 billion;
Total: approximately $5.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2007[B];
Designated funding for aviation security: approximately $4.7 billion;
Funding for programs, project, and activities (PPAs) related to
aviation security[C]: approximately $0.8 billion;
Total: approximately$5.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2008[B];
Designated funding for aviation security: approximately $4.7 billion;
Funding for programs, project, and activities (PPAs) related to
aviation security[C]: approximately $1.3 billion;
Total: approximately $6.0 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA budget execution reports for fiscal years
2004 to 2007 and TSA‘s Congressional Budget Justification for fiscal
year 2009.
Note: We used the September 30th budget execution reports for our
analysis of TSA funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. For fiscal
years 2007 and 2008, we used TSA's fiscal year 2009 congressional
budget justification. According to the budget execution reports and
congressional budget justification, figures presented include all
rescissions and supplemental funding for the fiscal years.
[A] Fiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in
research and development funding for aviation security. Beginning in
fiscal year 2006, research and development funding was consolidated
within DHS S&T. Therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA's budget
documentation, is not included as part of TSA's appropriation from
fiscal year 2006 forward.
[B] Fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 include approximately $680
million, $720 million, and $770 million respectively, in funding for
the Federal Air Marshals Service, which was transferred back to TSA
from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in October 2005. Federal
Air Marshal Service funding is included within totals for related
aviation security programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years
2006, 2007, and 2008.
[C] Funding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and
activities is reported separately. However, TSA designated funds from
other programs, projects, and activities to aviation security as well,
which represents the unshaded areas.
[End of figure]
TSA Has Made Significant Enhancements to Its Passenger Screening
Operations, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts:
TSA has taken significant steps to strengthen the three key elements of
the screening system--people (TSOs and private screeners), screening
procedures, and technology--but has faced management, planning, and
funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing Allocation
Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current
operating conditions, and implemented several initiatives intended to
enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised
explosives. We reported that TSA also proposed modifications to
passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and
vulnerability information), among other factors, but, as we previously
reported, could do more evaluation of proposed procedures before they
are implemented to help ensure that they achieve their intended
results. Finally, TSA is exploring new technologies to enhance the
detection of explosives and other threats, but continues to face
management and funding challenges in developing and fielding
technologies at airport checkpoints.
Of the approximately $6.0 billion requested for aviation security in
the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request, about $4.0 billion, or
approximately 66 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage
screening. This includes approximately $3.9 billion to support
passenger and checked baggage screening operations, such as TSO
salaries and training, and about $154 million for the procurement and
installation of checked baggage explosive detection systems.[Footnote
19]
TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Allocation of Its TSO
Workforce:
TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the
allocation of its TSO workforce. We reported in February 2004 that
staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability of
some Federal Security Directors (FSD)--the ranking TSA authorities
responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at
airports--to provide sufficient resources to staff screening
checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints
without using additional measures such as overtime.[Footnote 20] Since
that time, TSA has developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine
TSO staffing levels at airports.[Footnote 21] In determining staffing
allocations, the model takes into account the workload demands unique
to each airport based on an estimate of each airport's peak passenger
volume. This input is then processed against certain TSA assumptions
about screening passengers and checked baggage--including expected
processing rates, required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage
equipment based on standard operating procedures, and historical
equipment alarm rates. In August 2005, TSA determined that the Staffing
Allocation Model contained complete and accurate information on each
airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the agency used the
model to identify TSO allocations for each airport. At that time, the
staffing model identified a total TSO full-time equivalent allocation
need of 42,303 TSOs.
In addition to the staffing levels identified by the model, TSA sets
aside TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered
by the model in its annual allocation run for airports. For example,
during the course of the year, certain airports may experience
significant changes to their screening operations, such as the arrival
of a new airline or opening of a new terminal. According to TSA
officials, the agency established a reserve of 413 TSO full-time
equivalents during fiscal year 2007 that can be used to augment the
existing force, and began fiscal year 2008 with a reserve of 170 TSO
full-time equivalents. TSA plans to continue with its use of a reserve
force during fiscal year 2009 due to the dynamic nature of airport
operations and the need to make staffing adjustments to meet changing
operational requirements. Additionally, in order to handle short-term
extraordinary needs at airports, TSA established a National Deployment
Force--formerly known as the National Screening Force--comprised of
TSOs and other TSA security staff who can be sent to airports to
augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high passenger
volume, such as the Super Bowl. According to TSA, as of February 13,
2008, there were 451 TSOs in the National Deployment Force. The TSA
fiscal year 2009 budget justification request identifies that TSA
analyzes each request for support from the National Deployment Force
from a cost, benefit, and risk perspective to ensure the optimal use of
resources. The budget justification requests $34.3 million for
operational expenses for the National Deployment Office--the office
responsible for, among other things, deploying the National Deployment
Force to those airports experiencing significant staffing shortfalls.
FSDs we interviewed during 2006 as part of our review of TSA's staffing
model generally reported that the model is a more accurate predictor of
staffing needs than TSA's prior staffing model, which took into account
fewer factors that affect screening operations. However, FSDs
identified that some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006 staffing
model did not reflect actual operating conditions. For example, FSDs
noted that the staffing model's assumption of a 20 percent part-time
workforce--measured in terms of full-time equivalents--had been
difficult to achieve, particularly at larger (category X and I)
airports, because of, among other things, economic conditions leading
to competition for part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled
with a lack of mass transit, TSO base pay that had not changed since
fiscal year 2002, and part-time workers' desire to convert to full-time
status. We reported in February 2007 that TSA data showed that for
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the nation's category X airports had a TSO
workforce composed of about 9 percent part-time equivalents, and the
part-time TSO attrition rate nationwide remained considerably higher
than the rate for full-time personnel (approximately 46 percent versus
16 percent for full-time TSOs during fiscal year 2006).[Footnote 22]
According to TSA's fiscal year 2009 congressional budget justification,
full-time TSO attrition nationwide decreased to 11.6 percent during
2007, and part-time attrition decreased to 37.2 percent. FSDs also
expressed concern that the model did not specifically account for the
recurrent training requirement for TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged
over a fiscal year quarter. FSDs further identified that the model for
fiscal year 2006 did not account for TSO's time away from screening to
perform operational support duties, such as payroll processing,
scheduling, distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data entry, and
workman's compensation processing. To help ensure that TSOs are
effectively utilized, we recommended that TSA establish a policy for
when TSOs can be used to provide operational support. Consistent with
our recommendation, in March 2007, TSA issued a management directive
that provides guidance on assigning TSOs, through detail or permanent
promotion, to duties of another position for a specified period of
time.
In response to FSDs' input and the various mechanisms TSA had
implemented to monitor the sufficiency of the model's allocation
outputs, TSA made changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal
year 2007. For example, TSA recognized that some airports cannot likely
achieve a 20 percent part-time equivalent level and others, most likely
smaller airports, may operate more efficiently with other levels of
part-time TSO staff. As a result, for fiscal year 2007, TSA modified
the assumption in its Staffing Allocation Model to include a variable
part-time goal based on each airport's historic part-time to full-time
TSO ratio. TSA also included an allowance in the model for fiscal 2007
to provide additional assurance that TSOs complete required training on
detecting improvised explosive devices, as well as an allowance for
operational support duties to account for the current need for TSOs to
perform these duties. In our February 2007 report on the Staffing
Allocation Model, we recommended that TSA establish a formal,
documented plan for reviewing all of the model assumptions on a
periodic basis to ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing
allocations that accurately reflect operating conditions that may
change over time. TSA agreed with our recommendation and, in December
2007, developed a Staffing Allocation Model Rates and Assumptions
Validation Plan. The plan identifies the process TSA will use to review
and validate the model's assumptions on a periodic basis.
Although we did not independently review TSA's staffing allocation for
fiscal year 2008, the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification
identified that the agency has achieved operational and efficiency
gains that enabled them to implement or expand several workforce
initiatives involving TSOs, which are summarized in table 2. For
example, TSA reported making several changes to the fiscal year 2008
Staffing Allocation Model, such as decreasing the allocation for time
paid not worked (annual, sick, and military leave; compensatory time;
and injury time off) from a 14.5 percent to 14 percent based on past
performance data. TSA also reported revising the exit lane staffing
based on each checkpoint's unique operating hours rather than staffing
all exit lanes based on the maximum open hours for any checkpoint at an
airport.
Table 2: TSA Workforce Initiatives Involving Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs):
Workforce initiative: Travel document checker;
Description of initiative: TSA implemented the travel document checker
initiative at over 250 smaller airports during fiscal year 2007.
According to the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification, through
savings realized through adjustments in the fiscal year 2008 Staffing
Allocation Model, TSA was able to fund 1,033 additional full-time-
equivalent TSOs for the travel document checker initiative. This
program is intended to ensure that only passengers with authentic
travel documents access the sterile areas of airports and board
aircraft. TSA's budget justification identifies that in fiscal year
2007 the agency implemented this program at over 340 of the 450
airports with federal TSOs.
Workforce initiative: Behavior detection officers;
Description of initiative: TSA completed its planned deployment of the
behavior detection officer program. These officers screen passengers by
observation technique (also known as SPOT) to identify potentially high-
risk passengers based on involuntary physical and physiological
reactions. During fiscal year 2007, 643 behavior detection officers
were deployed at 42 airports.
Workforce initiative: Bomb appraisal officers;
Description of initiative: TSA completed the planned deployment of the
Bomb Appraisal Officer program. These officers, who have undergone
training in the disposal of explosives, provide formal training to TSOs
to increase their ability to recognize potential improvised explosive
devices and components. The Bomb Appraisal Officer Program was formally
implemented at 107 airports during fiscal year 2007.
Workforce initiative: Visible Intermodal Protection and Response Teams;
Description of initiative: According to TSA, the agency deployed
Visible Intermodal Protection and Response Teams to airports around the
country. These teams--comprised of TSOs, behavior detection officers
and other aviation security employees--are responsible for screening
passengers, looking for suspicious behavior, and acting as a visible
deterrent in multiple transportation sectors, including buses, mass
transit stations, and airports. TSA's budget justification identified
that as of February 2008, TSA had deployed over 100 Visible Intermodal
Protection and Response Teams to airports and mass transit systems
around the country.
Workforce initiative: Aviation Direct Access Screening Program;
Description of initiative: The Aviation Direct Access Screening Program
is intended to provide uniform procedures and standards for TSOs to
screen individuals, their accessible property, and vehicles upon
entering secure airport areas, and conduct visual inspections of
aircraft. Under this program, TSOs are to screen aviation workers and
inspect for the presence of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and
other prohibited items, improper airport identification media, and
items identified through specific intelligence. In March 2007, TSA
required Federal Security Directors to implement the Aviation Direct
Screening Program at each of their assigned airports.
Source: TSA Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification.
[End of table]
TSA's fiscal year 2009 budget justification includes $2.7 billion for
the federal TSO workforce represents an increase of about $80 million
over fiscal year 2008. Of the $80 million increase, about $38 million
is for cost of living adjustments, and about $42 million is for the
annualization of the full-year cost of the Behavior Detection Officer
and Aviation Direct Access Screening Program positions. According to
the budget justification, the $2.7 billion includes funding for
compensation and benefits of 45,643 full-time equivalent personnel--
approximately 46,909 TSOs and about 1,100 screening managers.[Footnote
23] Table 3 identifies the total TSO and screening manager full-time
equivalents and the funding levels for fiscal years 2005 through 2008,
as reported by TSA.
Table 3: Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full-
time Equivalents and Actual Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation,
and Benefits, by Fiscal Year:
Total TSOs and screening managers at airports nationwide:
FY 2005: 45,690;
FY 2006: 42,187;
FY 2007: 42,592;
FY 2008[A]: 45,438.
Actual spending (dollars in thousands):
FY 2005: $2,291,572;
FY 2006: $2,251,503;
FY 2007: $2,444,455;
FY 2008[A]: $2,636,104.
Source: TSA.
[A] Fiscal year 2008 figures represent TSA's budget in accordance with
funds appropriated through Division E of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008.
[End of table]
TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger Screening Procedures, but
Could Improve Its Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Procedures:
In addition to TSA's efforts to deploy a federal TSO workforce, TSA has
taken steps to strengthen passenger checkpoint screening procedures to
enhance the detection of prohibited items. However, we have identified
areas where TSA could improve its evaluation and documentation of
proposed procedures. In April 2007, we reported that TSA officials
considered modifications to its standard operating procedure (SOP)
based on risk information (threat and vulnerability information), daily
experiences of staff working at airports, and complaints and concerns
raised by the traveling public.[Footnote 24] In addition to these
factors, consistent with its mission, TSA senior leadership made
efforts to balance the impact that proposed SOP modifications would
have on security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding
whether proposed SOP modifications should be implemented. For example,
in August 2006, TSA sought to increase security by banning liquids and
gels from being carried onboard aircraft in response to the alleged
terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft
en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. In September
2006, after obtaining more information about the alleged terrorist
plot--to include information from the United Kingdom and U.S.
intelligence communities, discussions with explosives experts, and
testing of explosives--TSA officials decided to lift the total ban on
liquids and gels to allow passengers to carry small amounts of liquids
and gels onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted the total ban
because banning liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown to affect
both efficiency and customer service. In an effort to harmonize its
liquid screening procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA
revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and
aerosols onboard aircraft.
We further reported that for more significant SOP modifications, TSA
first tested the proposed modifications at selected airports to help
determine whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose, as
well as to assess its impact on screening operations. TSA's efforts to
collect quantitative data through testing proposed procedures prior to
deciding whether to implement or reject them is consistent with our
past work that has shown the importance of data collection and analyses
to support agency decision making. However, we reported that TSA's data
collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether
proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their
intended purpose. Specifically, we found that for tests of proposed
screening procedures TSA conducted from April 2005 through December
2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools from the
prohibited items list, although TSA collected some data on the
efficiency of and customer response to the procedures at selected
airports, the agency generally did not collect the type of data or
conduct the necessary analysis that would yield information on whether
the proposed procedures would achieve their intended purpose. We also
found that TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening
procedures was not complete. We recommended that TSA develop sound
evaluation methods, when possible, to assess whether proposed screening
changes would achieve their intended purpose and generate and maintain
documentation on proposed screening changes that are deemed
significant. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and TSA has
taken steps to implement them. For example, for several proposed SOP
changes considered during the fall of 2007, TSA provided documentation
that identified the sources of the proposed changes and the reasons why
the agency decided to accept or reject the proposed changes. With
regard to our recommendation to develop sound evaluation methods when
assessing proposed SOP modifications, when possible, TSA reported that
it is working with subject matter experts to ensure that the agency's
operational tests related to proposed changes to screening procedures
are well designed and executed, and produce results that are
scientifically valid and reliable. These actions, when fully
implemented, should enable TSA to better justify its passenger
screening procedure modifications to Congress and the traveling public.
Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that
TSA have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with
established procedures. In our April 2007 report, we identified that
TSA monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs
through its performance accountability and standards system and through
local and national covert testing. According to TSA officials, the
performance accountability and standards system was developed in
response to a 2003 report by us that recommended that TSA establish a
performance management system that makes meaningful distinctions in
employee performance,[Footnote 25] and in response to input from TSA
airport staff on how to improve passenger and checked baggage screening
measures. This system is used by TSA to assess agency personnel at all
levels on various competencies, including, among other things,
technical proficiency. During fiscal year 2007, the technical
proficiency component of the performance accountability and standards
system for TSOs focused on TSO knowledge of screening procedures; image
recognition; proper screening techniques; and the ability to identify,
detect, and locate prohibited items. In addition to implementing the
performance accountability and standards system, TSA also conducts
local and national covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to
which TSOs' noncompliance with SOPs affects their ability to detect
simulated threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a
person. In our April 2007 report, we identified that some TSA airport
officials have experienced resource challenges in implementing these
compliance monitoring efforts. TSA headquarters officials stated that
they were taking steps, such as automating the performance
accountability and standards system data entry functions, to address
this challenge. Since then, TSA has also implemented a new local covert
testing program nationwide, known as the Aviation Screening Assessment
Program. This program is intended to measure TSO performance using
realistic and standardized test scenarios to achieve a national TSO
assessment measurement. According to TSA's fiscal year 2009
congressional budget justification, this national baseline measurement
will be achieved by conducting a total of 48,000 annual tests. TSA
plans to use the test results to identify vulnerabilities across
screening operations and to provide recommendations for addressing the
vulnerabilities to various stakeholders within TSA.
DHS and TSA Are Pursuing New Checkpoint Technologies to Enhance the
Detection of Explosives and Other Threats, but Continue to Face
Challenges:
We reported in February 2007[Footnote 26] that DHS S&T and TSA[Footnote
27] were exploring new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to
enhance the detection of explosives and other threats. However, we
found that limited progress had been made in fielding explosives
detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, in part due to
challenges DHS S&T and TSA faced in coordinating research and
development efforts. TSA requested $103.2 million in its fiscal year
2009 budget request for checkpoint technology and checkpoint
reconfiguration. Specifically, the request includes $91.7 million to,
among other things, procure and deploy Advanced Technology Systems to
further extend explosives and prohibited item detection coverage at
category X and I checkpoints. The budget request identifies that
equipment purchases may also include the Whole Body Imager, Bottled
Liquids Scanner, Cast and Prosthesis Imager, shoe scanner systems,
technology integration solutions, and additional units or upgrades to
legacy equipment, and other technologies. TSA further requested $11.5
million to support the optimization and reconfiguration of additional
checkpoint lanes to accommodate anticipated airport growth and maintain
throughput at the busiest airport checkpoints.
Of the various emerging checkpoint screening projects funded by TSA and
DHS S&T, the explosive trace portal and the bottled liquids scanning
device have been deployed to airport checkpoints, and a number of
additional projects have initiated procurements or are being researched
and developed.[Footnote 28] Projects which have initiated procurements
include the cast and prosthesis scanner and advanced technology
systems. Projects currently in research and development include the
checkpoint explosives detection system and the whole body imager. Table
4 provides a description of passenger checkpoint screening technologies
that have been deployed as well as technologies that have initiated
procurements or are in research and development. This list of
technologies is limited to those for which TSA could provide
documentation. TSA is planning to develop and deploy additional
technologies. We are continuing to assess TSA's deployment of new
checkpoint screening technologies in our ongoing work and expect to
report on the results of this work later this year.
Table 4: Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies
Deployed, Procured, or in Research and Development as of January 2008:
Technology: Explosives trace portals;
Description: Detects trace amounts of explosives on persons (will
reduce the size of the current explosives trace portals at
checkpoints);
Status: TSA initiated deployment of 95 portals to airports. However, in
June 2006, TSA halted the acquisition and deployment of the portals due
to performance and maintenance issues. Currently, 114 portals are in
storage, which were purchased at a total cost of over $20 million.
Technology: Bottled liquids scanners;
Description: Screens for liquid explosives;
Status: During fiscal year 2007, TSA procured 200 units. One-hundred
and forty three units have been deployed to airports. For fiscal year
2008, TSA plans to procure 700 units.
Technology: Cast and prosthesis scanners;
Description: Provides a 2-dimensional image of the area beneath a cast
or inside a prosthetic device;
Status: TSA procured 34 units during fiscal year 2007 and expects
delivery of the first unit in February 2008. TSA plans to deploy this
technology to airports during 2008.
Technology: Advanced Technology Systems;
Description: TSA plans to replace the Threat Image Projection Ready X-
ray machines currently used at category X airports with Advanced
Technology Systems that are intended to improve detection capability
and performance;
Status: During 2007, testing was conducted on this technology,
including operational testing at four airports. TSA procured 250 units
during fiscal year 2007, and plans to procure 677 units and deploy 429
units during fiscal year 2008.
Technology: Checkpoint explosives detection systems;
Description: Creates a three dimensional image of bags to detect
explosives and other nonmetallic items;
Status: This technology is currently undergoing various types of
testing, including operational testing. During fiscal year 2007, TSA
procured 20 units to be deployed starting in 2008.
Technology: Whole body imagers;
Description: Provides two-dimensional, full-body images of all items on
a passenger's body, including plastic explosives and concealed
metallic, non-metallic, and ceramic or plastic objects;
Status: TSA is conducting operational pilot testing of the whole body
imager at three airports. If the testing is successful, TSA plans to
procure and deploy the first units to airports during 2008.
Source: TSA.
[End of table]
Despite TSA's efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening
technologies, we reported that limited progress has been made in
fielding explosives detection technology at airport checkpoints. For
example, we reported that TSA had anticipated that the explosives trace
portals would be in operation throughout the country during fiscal year
2007. However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted
the acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006. As a
result, TSA has fielded less than 25 percent of the 434 portals it
projected it would deploy by fiscal year 2007. TSA officials are
considering what to do with the portals that were procured and are
currently in storage. In addition to the portals, TSA has fallen behind
in its projected acquisition of other emerging screening technologies.
For example, we reported that the acquisition of 91 Whole Body Imagers
was previously delayed in part because TSA needed to develop a means to
protect the privacy of passengers screened by this technology. TSA also
reduced the initial number of the cast and prosthesis scanner units to
be procured during fiscal year 2007 due to unexpected maintenance cost
increases. Furthermore, fiscal year 2008 funding to procure additional
cast and prosthesis scanners was shifted to procure more Whole Body
Imagers and Advanced Technology Systems due to a change in priorities.
While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research,
development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, we reported in
February 2007 that challenges remained. For example, TSA and DHS S&T
officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating
research and development efforts due to reorganizations within TSA and
S&T. A senior TSA official further stated at the time that, while TSA
and the DHS S&T have executed a memorandum of understanding to
establish the services that the Transportation Security Laboratory is
to provide to TSA, coordination with S&T remained a challenge because
the organizations had not fully implemented the terms of the agreement.
Since our February 2007 testimony, according to TSA and S&T,
coordination between them has improved.
We also reported that TSA did not have a strategic plan to guide its
efforts to acquire and deploy screening technologies, and that a lack
of a strategic plan or approach could limit TSA's ability to deploy
emerging technologies at those airport locations deemed at highest
risk. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, provides that, of
TSA's appropriated funds for Transportation Security Support,
$10,000,000 may not be obligated until the Secretary of Homeland
Security submits to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
detailed expenditure plans for checkpoint support and explosive
detection systems refurbishment, procurement, and installation on an
airport-by-airport basis for fiscal year 2008, along with the strategic
plan for checkpoint technologies previously requested by the
committees. The Act further requires that the expenditure and strategic
plans be submitted no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of
the Act (enacted December 26, 2007). According to TSA officials, they
currently plan to submit the strategic plan to Congress by June 2008.
We will continue to evaluate DHS S&T's and TSA's efforts to research,
develop and deploy checkpoint screening technologies as part of our
ongoing review.
TSA Has Taken Action to Strengthen Air Cargo Security, but Additional
Efforts Are Needed:
TSA has taken steps to enhance domestic and inbound air cargo security,
but more work remains to strengthen this area of aviation security. For
example, TSA has issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that focused on
securing the domestic air cargo supply chain. However, in April 2007,
we reported that this plan did not include goals and objectives for
addressing the security of air cargo transported into the United States
from another country, which presents different security challenges than
cargo transported domestically.[Footnote 29] We also reported that TSA
had not conducted vulnerability assessments to identify the range of
security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists related to
air cargo operations, and recommended that TSA develop a methodology
and schedule for completing these assessments. In response, in part, to
our recommendation, TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability
Assessment program and plans to complete assessments of all Category X
airports by 2009. In addition, we also reported that TSA had
established requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo,
but had exempted some domestic and inbound cargo from screening. To
address these exemptions, TSA issued a security directive and emergency
amendment in October 2006 to domestic and foreign air carriers
operating within and from the United States that limited the screening
exemptions. Moreover, based on our recommendation to systematically
analyze compliance inspection results and use the results to target
future inspections, TSA recently reported that the agency has increased
the number of inspectors dedicated to conducting domestic air cargo
compliance inspections, and has begun analyzing the results of these
inspections to prioritize their inspections on those entities that have
the highest rates of noncompliance, as well as newly approved entities
that have yet to be inspected. With respect to inbound air cargo, we
reported that TSA lacked an inspection plan with performance goals and
measures for its inspection efforts, and recommended that TSA develop
such a plan. In response to our recommendation, TSA officials stated
that the agency formed an International Cargo Working Group to develop
inspection prompts to guide inspectors in their examinations of foreign
and U.S. air cargo operators departing from foreign locations to the
United States.
In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA
is working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically,
we reported in October 2005 and again in April 2007 that TSA, working
with DHS's S&T, was developing and pilot testing a number of
technologies to assess their applicability to screening and securing
air cargo. According to TSA officials, the agency will determine
whether it will require the use of any of these technologies once it
has completed its assessments and analyzed the results. Finally, TSA is
taking steps to compile and analyze information on air cargo security
practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen DHS's
overall air cargo security program, as we recommended. According to TSA
officials, the design of the Certified Cargo Screening Program is based
on the agency's review of foreign countries' models for using
government-certified shippers and freight forwarders to screen air
cargo earlier in the supply chain. TSA officials believe that this
program will assist the agency in meeting the requirement to screen 100
percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010,
as mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007.[Footnote 30] We have not independently reviewed the
Certified Cargo Screening Program.
TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan and Vulnerability Assessments Can Be
Strengthened:
DHS has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach
to addressing air cargo security, including conducting assessments of
the threats posed to air cargo operations. However, we have reported
that opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts. Applying a risk
management framework to decision making is one tool to help provide
assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are properly
prioritized and focused. As part of TSA's risk-based approach, TSA
issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that focused on
securing the domestic air cargo supply chain. However, in April 2007,
we reported that this plan did not does not include goals and
objectives for addressing inbound air cargo security, or cargo that is
transported into the United States from another country, which presents
different security challenges than cargo transported
domestically.[Footnote 31] To ensure that a comprehensive strategy for
securing inbound air cargo exists, we recommended that DHS develop a
risk-based strategy to address inbound air cargo security that should
define TSA's and CBP's responsibilities for ensuring the security of
inbound air cargo. In response to our recommendation, CBP issued its
International Air Cargo Security Strategic Plan in June 2007. While
this plan identifies how CBP will partner with TSA, it does not
specifically address TSA's responsibilities in securing inbound air
cargo. According to TSA officials, the agency plans to revise its Air
Cargo Strategic Plan during the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, and
will incorporate a strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security,
including how the agency will partner with CBP. TSA reported that the
updated strategic plan will also incorporate the requirement that TSA
develop a system to screen 100 percent of air cargo prior to its
transport on passenger aircraft as required by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework
in the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which
typically involve three key elements--threats, vulnerabilities, and
criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments
provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives,
allocating resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September
2005, TSA's Office of Intelligence completed an overall threat
assessment for air cargo, which identified general and specific threats
to both domestic and inbound air cargo. However, in October 2005, and
again in April 2007, we reported that TSA had not conducted
vulnerability assessments to identify the range of security weaknesses
that could be exploited by terrorists related to air cargo operations,
and recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule for
completing these assessments.[Footnote 32] In response, in part, to our
recommendation, TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment
program in November 2006. TSA officials reported that to date, the
agency has completed vulnerability assessments at six domestic airports
and plans to complete vulnerability assessments at all domestic
Category X airports by 2009. Officials further stated that the results
of these assessments will assist the agency with its efforts to
collaborate with foreign governments to conduct joint assessments at
foreign airports that will include a review of air cargo
vulnerabilities.
TSA Is Working to Revise Inspection Exemptions, Enhance Its Compliance
Inspection Activities, and Develop Technologies for Air Cargo:
In October 2005 and April 2007, we also reported that TSA had
established requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo,
but had exempted some domestic and inbound cargo from screening. We
recommended that TSA examine the rationale for existing domestic and
inbound air cargo screening exemptions and determine whether such
exemptions left the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable. TSA
established a working group to examine the rationale for these
exemptions, and in October 2006, issued a security directive and
emergency amendment to domestic and foreign passenger air carriers
operating within and from the United States that limited the screening
exemptions.[Footnote 33] The security directive and emergency
amendment, however, did not apply to inbound air cargo. The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
requires DHS to conduct an assessment of screening exemptions granted
under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i)(1) for cargo transported on passenger
aircraft and an analysis to assess the risk of maintaining such
exemptions. According to TSA, the agency will propose a number of
revisions to certain alternate means of screening for particular cargo
types transported on passenger aircraft departing from both domestic
and foreign locations in its assessment of current screening
exemptions. Although this report was due to Congress by December 3,
2007, it has yet to be submitted.
We also reported that TSA conducted compliance inspections of air
carriers to ensure that they are meeting existing air cargo security
requirements. However, in October 2005, we found that TSA had not
developed measures to assess the adequacy of air carrier compliance
with air cargo security requirements, or assessed the results of its
domestic compliance inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or
indirect air carriers for future reviews. TSA has since reported that
the agency has increased the number of inspectors dedicated to
conducting domestic air cargo inspections, and has begun analyzing the
results of the compliance inspections to prioritize their inspections
on those entities that have the highest rates of noncompliance, as well
as newly approved entities that have yet to be inspected. With respect
to inbound air cargo, we reported in April 2007 that TSA lacked an
inspection plan with performance goals and measures for its inspection
efforts, and recommended that TSA develop such a plan. In February
2008, TSA officials stated that the agency formed an International
Cargo Working Group to develop inspection prompts to guide
International Cargo Transportation Security Inspectors in their
inspections of the various air cargo operations. According to TSA,
using these prompts will allow the agency to evaluate both foreign and
U.S. air cargo operators departing from foreign locations to the United
States.
In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA
is working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically,
we reported in October 2005 and again in April 2007 that TSA, working
with S&T, was developing and pilot testing a number of technologies to
assess their applicability to screening and securing air cargo. These
efforts included an air cargo explosives detection pilot program
implemented at three airports; an EDS pilot program; an air cargo
security seals pilot; the use of hardened unit-loading devices; and the
use of pulsed fast neutron analysis.[Footnote 34] According to TSA
officials, the agency will determine whether it will require the use of
any of these technologies once it has completed its assessments and
analyzed the results. As of February 2008, TSA has provided timeframes
for completing one of these assessments, the EDS cargo pilot program.
DHS officials added that once the department has determined which
technologies it will approve for use for domestic air cargo, they will
consider the use of these technologies for enhancing the security of
inbound air cargo shipments. According to TSA officials, the federal
government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must
be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies to
screen or secure air cargo. These challenges include factors such as
the nature, type, and size of cargo to be screened; environmental and
climatic conditions that could impact the functionality of screening
equipment; slow screening throughput rates; staffing and training
issues for individuals who screen air cargo; the location of air cargo
facilities; the cost and availability of screening technologies; and
employee health and safety concerns, such as worker exposure to
radiation. According to TSA officials, there is no single technology
capable of efficiently and effectively screening all types of air cargo
for the full range of potential terrorist threats, including explosives
and weapons of mass destruction.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Review Air Cargo Practices Used Abroad to
Strengthen the Department's Overall Air Cargo Security Program:
Our review of inbound air cargo security also identified some security
practices that are currently not used by TSA but that could help
strengthen the security of inbound and domestic air cargo supply
chains. In April 2007, we recommended that TSA, in collaboration with
foreign governments and the U.S. air cargo industry, systematically
compile and analyze information on air cargo security practices used
abroad to identify those that may strengthen the department's overall
air cargo security program. TSA agreed with this recommendation and,
since the issuance of our report, proposed a new program, the Certified
Cargo Screening Program, to assist the agency in meeting the
requirement to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft by August 2010, as mandated by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. According to TSA
officials, the agency reviewed the models used by two foreign countries
to use government-certified screeners to screen air cargo earlier in
the supply chain, when designing their Certified Cargo Screening
Program. TSA officials stated that the intention of the Certified Cargo
Screening Program is to allow large shippers and/or manufacturers, who
are certified by TSA, referred to as TSA-Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities, to screen air cargo before it leaves the factory. According
to TSA officials, employees performing the screening at these certified
facilities would need to undergo a security threat assessment, and be
trained in screening and inspection procedures. The facilities would
also have to purchase the necessary screening equipment. After
screening, the cargo would be secured with a tamper resistant seal and
transported to the airport for shipment. The air carriers will be
responsible for ensuring that 100 percent of cargo that they accept for
transport has been screened by the TSA-Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities. In January 2008, TSA began phase one of its pilot testing
at one airport and plans to expand this pilot program to five other
airports within three months. According to TSA, as part of its plans to
screen 100 percent of air cargo on passenger aircraft, the agency also
plans to pilot test a proposed system for targeting specific domestic
air cargo shipments, referred to as Freight Assessment. Specifically,
the Freight Assessment System will identify elevated risk cargo at
various points in the supply chain for additional scrutiny, which could
include secondary screening. TSA, however, did not provide us with
information on the duration of the pilot test or when the Freight
Assessment System would be fully operational.
For fiscal year 2009, the President's budget includes a request of
about $100 million for TSA's air cargo security program, Specifically,
TSA is requesting $51.9 million for 450 air cargo inspectors, $26.5
million for 170 canine teams, and $15.9 million for the Certified Cargo
Screening Program.[Footnote 35]
TSA Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Secure Flight
Program, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts:
TSA has made substantial progress in instilling more discipline and
rigor into Secure Flight's development and implementation since we last
reported on the program in February 2007, but challenges remain that
may hinder the program's progress moving forward. TSA developed a
detailed concept of operations, established a cost and schedule
baseline, and drafted key management and systems development documents,
among other systems development efforts. TSA also has plans to
integrate DHS's domestic and international watch-list matching
functions, and has strengthened efforts to protect passenger
information, including publishing a proposed rulemaking for the Secure
Flight Program and privacy notices that address key privacy protection
principles, consistent with our past recommendations. However, despite
these successes, TSA continues to face some program management
challenges in developing the program. Specifically, while TSA developed
a life-cycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule for Secure
Flight, the program has not fully followed best practices that would
help to ensure reliable and valid cost and schedule estimates, and the
program schedule has experienced slippages. We also found that TSA can
strengthen its systems development efforts by demonstrating that it has
fully implemented its risk management plan, incorporated end-to-end
testing[Footnote 36] as part of the program's testing strategy, and
more fully addressed system security requirements and vulnerabilities.
We also found that DHS and TSA can strengthen their assessment of the
current redress process for passengers who believe they were
inappropriately inconvenienced during the watch-list matching process.
TSA officials stated that they have considerably strengthened Secure
Flight's systems development efforts, and have already taken or plan to
take action to address the issues we identified.
TSA Has Made Progress in Strengthening Secure Flight's Development and
Implementation:
TSA has taken numerous steps to address previous GAO recommendations
related to strengthening Secure Flight's development and
implementation, as well as additional steps designed to strengthen the
program.[Footnote 37] TSA has, among other things, developed a
detailed, conceptual description of how the system is to operate,
commonly referred to as a concept of operations; established a cost and
schedule baseline; developed security requirements; developed test
plans; conducted outreach with key stakeholders; published a notice of
proposed rulemaking on how Secure Flight is to operate; and issued a
guide to key stakeholders (e.g., air carriers and CBP) that defines,
among other things, system data requirements. Collectively, these
efforts have enabled TSA to more effectively manage the program's
development and implementation.
TSA has also taken steps to integrate the domestic watch-list matching
function with the international watch-list matching function currently
operated by CBP. We previously reported that TSA was developing Secure
Flight to conduct watch-list matching for passengers on domestic
flights while, separately, CBP was revising its process for conducting
watch-list matching for passengers on flights bound to and from the
United States, with limited coordination in their efforts. We reported
that this lack of coordination could result in a duplication of effort
and conflicting results from domestic and international watch-list
matching, as well as create burdens for air carriers who may have been
required to operate two separate systems to conduct the domestic and
international watch-list matching functions.[Footnote 38] We
recommended that DHS take additional steps and make key policy and
technical decisions that were necessary to more fully coordinate these
programs. TSA and CBP have since worked with DHS to develop a strategy
called the One DHS Solution, which is to align the two agencies'
domestic and international watch-list matching processes, information
technology systems, and regulatory procedures to provide a seamless
interface between DHS and the airline industry.[Footnote 39]In line
with this strategy, the agencies have agreed that TSA will take over
international watch-list matching from CBP, with CBP continuing to
perform, among other things, its border-related functions. Further, TSA
and CBP have coordinated their efforts to facilitate consistency across
their programs. For example, in August 2007, they jointly developed and
issued a user's guide to the airlines and other stakeholders specifying
the data that agencies will need to request from passengers in the
future to minimize the impact on systems programming due to the
integration of the two programs. TSA and CBP officials plan to pursue
further integration as they progress towards developing and
implementing the watch-list matching function for international
flights.
TSA has also taken steps to address key privacy principles in plans to
protect private passenger information for the Secure Flight program. We
previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements development
process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of the Secure
Flight system or the full actions it planned to take to mitigate them.
Specifically, we reported that TSA had not made final determinations
about its requirements for passenger data, and the program's systems
development documentation did not fully address how passenger privacy
protections were to be met and, as a result, it was not possible to
assess potential system impacts on individual privacy protections. We
also reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act by not
fully disclosing its use of personal information during systems
testing.[Footnote 40] In March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify
how Secure Flight will protect personal privacy.[Footnote 41] In August
2007, TSA published, for public comment, the required privacy impact
assessment[Footnote 42] and system of records notice[Footnote 43] that
address key privacy protection principles. For example, these notices
describe the information that will be collected from passengers and air
carriers, as well as the purpose and planned uses of the data to be
collected.[Footnote 44] TSA also developed a Program Privacy
Architecture describing key aspects of TSA's plans to protect private
passenger information, such as embedding privacy experts into program
teams, developing privacy requirements documentation, and implementing
technical controls to protect privacy such as network security
controls. We will continue to monitor their efforts as part of our
ongoing work to ensure that privacy protections continue to be
appropriately considered.
TSA Has Not Fully Followed Best Practices for Developing Reliable and
Valid Cost and Schedule Estimates for Secure Flight:
Although TSA has developed a life-cycle cost estimate and maintains an
integrated master schedule for Secure Flight, the program has not fully
followed best practices for developing reliable and valid cost and
schedule estimates, and several program milestones have been missed or
have slipped. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) endorsed the
use[Footnote 45]of GAO's Cost Assessment Guide in the development of
life-cycle cost and program schedule estimates.[Footnote 46] The
ability to generate reliable cost and schedule estimates is a critical
function necessary to support OMB's capital programming process.
Without adhering to these best practices in the development of its cost
and schedule estimates, TSA is at risk of the Secure Flight program
experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance
shortfalls.
Life-cycle cost estimate. We found that TSA has not fully followed best
practices for developing a reliable and valid life-cycle cost estimate.
Using our Cost Assessment Guide's 12-step process for creating cost
estimates, we assessed the Secure Flight cost estimate against these
best practices. The Guide outlines a 12-step process, which if followed
correctly, should result in high quality, reliable, and valid cost
estimates.[Footnote 47] DHS's Cost -Benefit Analysis Guidebook, which
TSA program officials stated that TSA used to develop the life-cycle
cost estimate for Secure Flight, contains most of the best practices
outlined in our Guide. TSA followed some of these practices in
developing its cost estimate, including defining the purpose of the
program and estimate purpose; identifying many program cost elements,
including expenditures for facilities, hardware, and software; and
identifying the numbers of staff, their pay, and associated travel and
training costs, among other elements. However, it is unclear whether
TSA followed other best practices or did not address the practices in
developing its estimate. For example, it is unclear whether the cost
estimate had been updated to reflect the current program because the
detailed support for the estimate was produced between 2004 and 2006,
and does not reflect the current program plan. In addition, the cost
estimate does not capture all key costs. For example, the estimate does
not capture costs beyond 2012 even though the system is expected to be
operational beyond that date. Secure Flight's Acquisition Program
Baseline states that life-cycle costs will run from FY 2002 through FY
2020 and assumes operations of the program through 2020. The cost
estimate documentation also did not provide a step-by-step description
of the cost estimating process, data sources, and methods used to
develop the underlying cost elements consistent with best practices.
Finally, TSA did not analyze the amount of certainty it had in its
estimate and an independent cost estimate was not developed to assess
the reasonableness of the estimate, consistent with best practices. TSA
officials stated that the program's cost figures were updated in 2007
and continue to be updated as changes warrant. Officials further stated
that their estimates were prepared in accordance with DHS and OMB
guidance and were reviewed and approved by DHS and OMB. However,
without adhering to the best practices discussed above, as recommended
by OMB, TSA's cost estimate may not provide a meaningful baseline from
which to track progress, and effectively support investment decision
making.
Schedule estimate. We found that TSA also did not fully follow best
practices for developing a reliable and valid schedule estimate. GAO's
Cost Assessment Guide includes 9 best practices, which if followed
correctly, should result in high quality, reliable, and valid schedule
estimates.[Footnote 48] Without a reliable schedule baseline and
careful monitoring of its status, a program may not be able to
determine when forecasted completion dates differ from planned dates.
TSA has made progress in developing a reliable and valid schedule
estimate, including capturing key activities and accounting for the
development of program requirements and testing. However, TSA officials
could not provide evidence that their scheduling software can produce a
critical path (i.e., the longest path of sequential activities in a
schedule) driven by discrete lower level tasks. Best practices call for
the critical path to be generated using scheduling software. We also
found that the schedule is not fully integrated because several lower
level activities were not connected in a logical manner, as called for
by best practices. As a result, the Secure Flight schedule estimate may
not provide a meaningful benchmark from which to gauge progress,
identify and address potential problems, and make informed decisions.
For example, the inability to institute a reliable schedule could
affect TSA's ability to effectively measure contractor performance in
meeting deliverables. TSA officials stated that their scheduling
software can create a critical path, and that lower level tasks in
their schedule were logically linked together; however, they did not
provide evidence that supported this.
Since TSA completed a re-baselining of the Secure Flight program, and
began using its current schedule, the program has missed milestones and
experienced schedule slippages. For example, while TSA reports that it
has met most of its March 2007 schedule milestones to date, the August
2007 milestone for developing memoranda of understanding and other
written agreements (e.g. service level agreements) with key Secure
Flight stakeholders (e.g. CBP) was missed and has not yet been met. TSA
officials attributed schedule slippages in part to an extension in the
Secure Flight rulemaking comment period and underestimating the time
needed to complete key activities. In addition, TSA has not conducted a
schedule risk analysis to determine the level of confidence it has in
meeting the system's completion date, and has not conducted a cost and
schedule risk assessment, consistent with best practices. The cost and
schedule risk assessment recognizes the inter-relationship between
schedule and cost and captures the risk that schedule durations and
cost estimates may vary due to, among other things, limited data,
optimistic estimating, technical challenges, lack of qualified
personnel, and too few staff to do the work. Without these assessments,
TSA has less assurance that it is effectively managing risk associated
with Secure Flight's cost and schedule. We will continue to assess
TSA's life-cycle cost and schedule estimates as part of our ongoing
review of the Secure Flight Program.
TSA Has Made Progress in Strengthening Secure Flight's Development, but
Can Further Strengthen Efforts:
While TSA has taken numerous steps to strengthen the development of
Secure Flight, additional challenges remain. These challenges include:
1) implementing the program's risk management plan, 2) planning and
conducting end-to-end testing as part of their overall parallel testing
strategy, and 3) addressing information security requirements and
vulnerabilities.
Risk management. In October 2006, TSA issued a risk management plan for
identifying, managing, and mitigating Secure Flight program risks that
was consistent with relevant guidance and best practices. TSA also
acquired an electronic tool to guide its risk management efforts.
However, TSA has not yet provided us with evidence that it has
implemented all aspects of the plan, including developing an inventory
of risks and related information to demonstrate that its risk
management tool has been populated and is being used to identify,
prioritize, mitigate, and monitor risk. Federal guidance and related
best practices recognize the importance of proactively managing risks
during systems development and implementation,[Footnote 49] and
advocate a program's use of a risk management plan. However, although
TSA developed a risk management plan, the agency only recently, in
December 2007, established a risk management board to manage program
risks as called for by the plan. TSA officials stated that the risk
management board has met three times since December 2007, and, in
January 2008, compiled an updated and consolidated inventory of all
program risks, including ranking and mitigation strategies. However,
TSA officials have not provided us with documentation identifying the
board's activities and resulting risk inventory. Prior to December
2007, in lieu of a formal risk management board, program officials
stated that each project team addressed risks as part of biweekly
project management meetings. However, we found these efforts to be
limited in that the risks discussed did not include priority rankings
such as probability and impact, and many did not have mitigation
strategies, as required by the program's risk management plan. In
November 2007, TSA hired a risk management coordinator, a position that
had been vacant since June 2007. According to program officials, the
coordinator has been tasked with supporting the risk management board
in implementing the risk management plan and has provided related
training for its members. Secure Flight officials stated that although
they have not fully implemented their risk management plan, they
believe that they are effectively managing program risks through the
methods previously discussed, and that over the past few months, have
enhanced their risk management efforts. However, until the risk
management plan is appropriately implemented, there is an increased
chance that program risks will not be proactively mitigated and may
result in program cost overruns, and schedule and performance
shortfalls. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to mange risk as
part of our ongoing review of Secure Flight.
End-to-end test planning. Secure Flight does not fully outline plans
for end-to-end testing in its overall test and evaluation plan, or
other test plans. Federal guidance and related best practices recommend
end-to-end testing to verify that the systems that collectively support
a program like Secure Flight will interoperate as intended in an
operational environment, either actual or simulated.[Footnote 50] We
reported in March 2005 on the importance of Secure Flight end-to-end
testing and recommended that TSA perform such testing.[Footnote 51] TSA
agreed with this recommendation. However, Secure Flight's current test
and evaluation master plan only outlines plans for partner
organizational entities (e.g., CBP for integration of international
watch-list functions) to test their respective parts of the system on
their own--rather than a coordinated end-to-end test involving all
parties. TSA developed a preliminary working draft of an end-to-end
testing strategy, called the parallel testing strategy. However, the
plan does not contain provisions for (1) testing that ensures that
supporting systems will operate as intended in an operational
environment, (2) definitions and dates for key milestone activities and
parties responsible for completing them, or (3) the revision of other
test plans, such as the test and evaluation master plan, to reflect the
performance of end-to-end tests. Secure Flight officials stated that
they plan to conduct full end-to-end testing of the program, beginning
in the Spring of 2008, and that they will reflect this testing in test
plans that are still under development. While we commend TSA's plans to
conduct end-to-end testing, the draft of TSA's test plan that discusses
end-to-end testing does not define a scope that extends to all aspects
of the program. Until TSA has well-defined and approved end-to-end test
plans and procedures, it will be challenged in its ability to
demonstrate that Secure Flight will perform in a way that will allow it
to achieve intended program outcomes and results. We will continue to
assess TSA's testing strategy, to include end-to-end testing, as part
of our ongoing review of the program.
Information security. While the Secure Flight program office has
completed important steps to incorporate security into the system's
development, it has not fully completed other steps to ensure security
is effectively addressed. Federal standards and guidance identify the
need to address information security throughout the life-cycle of
information systems, and specifies a minimum set of security steps
needed to effectively incorporate security into a system during its
development.[Footnote 52] The Secure Flight program has performed
several steps that incorporate security into the system's development,
including performing a security risk assessment, identifying and
documenting recommended security control requirements, and testing and
evaluating security controls for the system and incorporating
identified weaknesses in remedial action plans. However, other steps
pertaining to ensuring that security requirements are tested, preparing
security documentation, and conducting certification and accreditation
activities were not adequately completed.[Footnote 53] For example,
security requirements planned for Release One did not always trace to
test activities for this release.[Footnote 54] Program officials stated
that some security requirements were deferred until future releases due
to delays in funding for acquiring specific hardware and other
requirements require coordination with the information system security
official to verify whether they were tested as part of security test
and evaluation. In addition, security documentation contained incorrect
or incomplete information. To illustrate, the systems security plan did
not identify all interconnecting systems that Secure Flight will
interface with, such as those operated by the DHS Watch-List Service,
the organization that will transmit the watch-list to Secure Flight.
Program officials stated that security documentation was outdated or
incorrect because there was insufficient time to update the
documentation for changes in the computing environment and security
requirements.
Furthermore, program officials granted an authorization to operate--one
of three possible accreditation decisions made in the certification and
accreditation process--although the system had 46 known
vulnerabilities, including 11 high-risk and 27 moderate-risk
vulnerabilities and the controls had not yet been implemented.[Footnote
55] Federal guidance as well as DHS policy provide for an interim
authority to operate accreditation when significant restrictions or
limitations exist and certain deficiencies and corrective actions need
to be addressed within a specified period. Although security officials
identified plans of actions and milestones for addressing the
vulnerabilities within 60 and 90 days for the high and moderate risks,
respectively, given their significance, an interim authorization to
operate would be the more appropriate determination. In addition,
hardware components used to implement controls over user identity and
account management (i.e., authentication, logins and passwords, and
user roles and privileges), as well as the alternate processing site
had not yet been implemented. Once implemented, the security controls
over these components could have an impact on the information security
and, therefore, may require a re-accreditation. Program officials chose
the authority to operate accreditation because they asserted that the
DHS Chief Information Security Officer does not allow interim
authorizations. If these security activities are not completed, there
is an increased risk that key security controls and requirements may
not be fully developed, tested, implemented or documented.
DHS and TSA Lack Performance Measures to Fully Evaluate the
Effectiveness of the Redress Process, But Plan Additional Measures
under Secure Flight:
DHS and TSA have not developed a complete set of performance measures
to assess the effectiveness of the redress process for passengers
inconvenienced as a result of watch-list matching.[Footnote 56]
Measuring performance allows organizations to track the progress they
are making toward their goals and gives managers critical information
on which to base decisions for improving their programs. DHS and TSA
are developing additional measures for the redress process that they
plan to implement when Secure Flight becomes operational.
TSA, supported by the Terrorist Screening Center, provides
opportunities for airline passengers to seek redress in cases where
they experienced inconveniences during the check-in and screening
processes due to the possibility they have been misidentified as being
on or wrongly assigned to the terrorist watch-list.[Footnote 57] The
redress process enables these individuals to file an inquiry to have
erroneous information corrected in DHS systems that may prevent future
delays and inconveniences at the airport. In February 2007, DHS
established the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) to serve as the
central processing point within the department for redress inquiries.
TSA's Office of Transportation Security Redress (OTSR) is responsible
for reviewing redress inquiries submitted by air passengers through
TRIP. According to a DHS official, in addition to handling redress
applications, TRIP officials review, attempt to address, and respond to
written complaint letters received from individuals who have gone
through the redress process but are still experiencing screening
issues.
TRIP and OTSR's redress program goals are to process redress
applications as quickly and as accurately as possible. However, to
measure program performance against these goals, TRIP and OTSR
currently track only one measure for redress related to the timeliness
of case completion, and do not track any performance measures related
to program accuracy. Previous GAO work identified that agencies
successful in evaluating performance had measures that used attributes
from GAO's best practices.[Footnote 58] Specifically, our previous work
identified that agencies successful in evaluating performance had
measures that demonstrated results, covered multiple priorities,
provided useful information for decision making, and successfully
addressed important and varied aspects of program performance. TRIP and
OTSR officials stated that they do not plan to develop additional
performance measures, such as measures related to accuracy of the
redress process, but rather are awaiting the implementation of Secure
Flight to determine the program's impact on the redress process before
creating additional measures. Secure Flight is intended to reduce the
inconveniences experienced by air passengers by taking over from air
carriers the responsibility for prescreening passengers in order to
ensure consistent and effective use of the cleared list,[Footnote 59]
which should impact the effectiveness of the redress process.[Footnote
60]
In addition to TRIP and OTSR's performance measures for the redress
process, the Secure Flight program office is working with OTSR to
develop redress performance measures for the Secure Flight Program. As
we reported in February 2007, Secure Flight will use the TSA redress
process that is currently available for individuals affected by the air
carrier identity-matching processes. Secure Flight is coordinating with
OTSR to determine how this process will be integrated with other Secure
Flight requirements. Secure Flight and OTSR are jointly developing a
set of performance measures and targets covering multiple priorities
for redress that are to be implemented when Secure Flight becomes
operational, and officials told us that they will follow best practices
in the development of these measures.
While we commend TSA for developing redress performance measures for
the Secure Flight Program, since the program is not scheduled to be
implemented until January 2009, DHS and OTSR's current redress process
lacks a complete set of measures with which they can assess performance
and make program improvements. Since measures are often the key
motivators of performance and goal achievement, the program's overall
success is at risk if all priorities are not addressed and information
is not obtained to make future adjustments and improvements to the
program. By developing and implementing measures that address all
program goals now, to include measures related to program accuracy, DHS
and TSA would have performance data that would allow them to better
manage the redress process in place today, identify and correct any
weaknesses, and help to ensure accountability towards the traveling
public that the process is effective. Moreover, such performance data
would provide a baseline against which to benchmark Secure Flight's
progress and planned improvements to the redress process.
Conclusions:
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the
security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for
these efforts. More specifically, TSA developed processes to more
efficiently allocate and deploy the TSO workforce, strengthened
screening procedures, is working to develop and deploy more effective
screening technologies, strengthened the security of air cargo, and
improved the development of a program to prescreen passengers against
the terrorist watch-list. However, opportunities exist to further
strengthen these efforts, in particular in the areas of risk management
and program planning and monitoring. Our work has shown--in homeland
security and in other areas--that a comprehensive risk management
approach can help inform decision makers in the allocation of finite
resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that risk
management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that TSA
has implemented risk-based decision making into a number of its
efforts. Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face
difficult decisions and trade-offs--particularly as threats to
commercial aviation evolve--regarding acceptable levels of risk and the
need to balance security with efficiency and customer service. We
recognize that doing so will not be easy. In implementing a risk-based
approach, DHS and TSA must also address the challenges we identified in
our work related to program planning and monitoring. Without rigorous
planning and monitoring, and knowledge of the effectiveness of aviation
security programs implemented, DHS and TSA cannot be sure that they are
focusing their finite resources on the areas of greatest need, and that
security programs implemented are achieving their desired purpose.
One area in which TSA has made considerable progress is in the
development and implementation of the Secure Flight Program. Since we
last reported on the program in February 2007, TSA has instilled more
discipline and rigor into the systems development, and has completed
key development and privacy protection activities. Despite this
progress, however, it is important that TSA continue to work to
strengthen the management of the program. TSA needs to take immediate
and strong actions to keep the program on track and increase the
likelihood that it will successfully implement Secure Flight on time,
within budget and meeting all performance expectations. We found that
TSA did not fully follow best practices for developing Secure Flight's
life-cycle cost and schedule estimates. The ability to generate
reliable cost and schedule estimates is a critical function necessary
to support the Office of Management and Budget capital programming
process. Without adhering to these best practices in the development of
its cost and schedule estimates, TSA is at risk of the Secure Flight
Program experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance
shortfalls. In order to help inform management's decisions regarding
the program and assist them in providing effective program oversight,
it is also important that TSA fully implement the provisions in the
program's risk management plan to include developing an inventory of
risks and reporting the status of risks to management. TSA should also
work to plan for complete end-to-end testing of the system to ensure
that all interrelated components operate as intended, and strengthen
key security controls and activities for the program, including
ensuring that security requirements are tested and implemented, and
that security documentation is maintained and updated. It is also
important that TSA ensure that security risks are addressed in action
plans, and that security risks are appropriately monitored so that the
system is protected from unauthorized users and abuse. Finally, with
respect to passenger redress, DHS and TSA should more thoroughly assess
the effectiveness of the current redress process, to include the
development of additional performance measures that assess program
accuracy, a key goal of the program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist TSA in further strengthening the development and
implementation of the Secure Flight program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of the
Transportation Security Administration to take the following three
actions:
* Fully incorporate best practices into the development of Secure
Flight life-cycle cost and schedule estimates, to include:
- updating life-cycle cost and schedule estimates;
- demonstrating that the Secure Flight schedule has the logic in place
to identify the critical path, integrates lower level activities in a
logical manner, and identifies the level of confidence in meeting the
desired end date; and:
- developing and implementing a plan for managing and mitigating cost
and schedule risks, including performing a schedule risk analysis and a
cost and schedule risk assessment.
* Fully implement the provisions in the program's risk management plan
to include developing an inventory of risks with prioritization and
mitigation strategies, report the status of risks and progress to
management, and maintain documentation of these efforts.
* Finalize and approve Secure Flight's end-to-end testing strategy, and
incorporate end-to-end testing requirements in other relevant test
plans, to include the test and evaluation master plan. The strategy and
plans should contain provisions for:
- testing that ensures that the interrelated systems that collectively
support Secure Flight will interoperate as intended in an operational
environment; and:
- defining and setting dates for key milestone activities and
identifying who is responsible for completing each of those milestones
and when.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
TSA Chief Information Officer to take the following three actions
regarding information security for the Secure Flight Program:
* coordinate with Secure Flight program officials to ensure security
requirements are tested and implemented;
* maintain and update security documentation to align with the current
or planned Secure Flight computing environment, including
interconnection agreements, in support of certification and
accreditation activities; and:
* correct identified high and moderate risk vulnerabilities, as
addressed in remedial action plans, and assess changes to the computing
environment to determine whether re-accreditation of the system is
warranted.
Finally, to ensure that DHS is able to fully assess the effectiveness
of the current redress process for passengers who may have been
misidentified during the watch-list matching process, we recommend that
the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary of the
Transportation Security Administration re-evaluate redress performance
measures and consider creating and implementing additional measures
that, consistent with best practices, demonstrate results, cover
multiple priorities, and provide useful information for decision
making. These measures should further address all program goals, to
include the accuracy of the redress process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of information included in this statement related
to our recently completed work on Secure Flight to DHS and TSA for
review and comment. We incorporated technical changes to this statement
based on TSA's comments. In commenting on this information, DHS and TSA
generally agreed with our recommendations.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov, or Gregory C. Wilshusen
at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement.
In addition to the contacts named above, Don Adams, Idris Adjerid,
Kristy Brown, Chris Currie, Katherine Davis, John DeFerrari, Joe
Dewechter, Jennifer Echard, Eric Erdman, Randolph Hite, James Houtz,
Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, Gary Malavenda, Steve Morris, Sara
Margraf, Vernetta Marquis, Vickie Miller, Gary Mountjoy, David Plocher,
Jamie Pressman, Karen Richey, Karl Seifert, Maria Strudwick, Meg
Ullengren, Margaret Vo, and Jenniffer Wilson made contributions to this
testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1605(b), 121 Stat. 266, 481-82 (2007).
[2] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[3] ATSA further required TSA to allow airports to apply to opt-out of
federal screening and to use private screeners under contract with TSA.
See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. Ten airports and 1 heliport currently have
screening operations conducted by private screening contractors under
TSA's Screening Partnership Program.
[4] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are
provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is
controlled by TSOs (or by non-federal screeners at airports
participating in the Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where
they conduct physical screening of individuals and their carry-on
baggage for weapons and explosives.
[5] CAPPS identifies passengers for secondary screening based on
certain travel behaviors reflected in their reservation information
that are associated with threats to aviation security, as well as
through a random selection of passengers. At some airports, some
passengers may also be screened by walking through an explosives trace
portal--a machine that detects trace amounts of explosives on persons.
[6] Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays to
examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. This equipment operates in an
automated mode.
[7] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials.
[8] The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
defines the term 'screening' for purposes of air cargo to mean a
physical examination or non-intrusive methods of assessing whether
cargo poses a threat to transportation security. See 49 U.S.C. §
44901(g)(5). Such methods of screening include x-ray systems,
explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection, explosives
detection canine teams certified by TSA, or a physical search together
with manifest verification. While additional methods may be approved to
ensure that cargo does not pose a threat to transportation security,
these additional methods cannot include solely performing a review of
information about the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a
shipper of the cargo if not performed in conjunction with other
authorized security methods, including whether a shipper is registered
in the known shipper database.
[9] Certified explosive detection canine teams have been evaluated by
TSA and shown to effectively detect explosive devices. Decompression
chambers simulate the pressures acting on aircraft by simulating flight
conditions, which cause explosives that are attached to barometric
fuses to detonate.
[10] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. 266, 477-480 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)).
[11] The No Fly and Selectee lists contain the names of individuals
with known or suspected links to terrorism. These lists are subsets of
the consolidated terrorist watch-list that is maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening Center.
[12] See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C).
[13] GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to
Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T
(Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).
[14] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1605(b), 121 Stat. 266, at 481-82.
[15] GAO is also mandated to review DHS's certification of 10
conditions outlined in section 522(a) of the DHS Appropriations Act,
2005, related to the development and implementation of the Secure
Flight program. See Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 513, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007).
[16] Fifteen million was appropriated during fiscal year 2007 and $17.5
million was carried over from the prior fiscal year, for a total of
$32.5 million.
[17] See Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 550, 121 Stat. 1844.
[18] DHS's budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect
the department's financial activity. In our analysis of DHS's budget
execution reports and TSA Congressional Budget Justification, we
included funding that we determined to be specifically designated for
aviation security and funding for all programs, projects, and
activities related to aviation security, to the extent they were
identifiable, in order to present consistent total funding amounts
across fiscal years. In addition, these aviation security totals do not
reflect funding for activities that may support TSA's aviation security
programs and projects, such as intelligence and administration, because
DHS's documentation does not identify the proportion of funding
dedicated to support aviation security. During this time period, a
number of aviation security related activities were transferred in or
out of TSA's jurisdiction, which affects TSA funding levels for the
affected fiscal years.
[19] According to TSA's Congressional Justification, the $154 million
requested for procurement and installation of checked baggage explosive
detection systems is in addition to the $676 in mandatory fees
requested for the Aviation Security Capital Fund, which would provide
$830 million in total funding for the procurement and installation of
such systems.
[20] GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
[21] As part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program, 10 airports and 1
heliport use private contract screeners in lieu of federal TSOs.
Although these airports and heliport do not use federal screeners, TSA
uses the Staffing Allocation Model to determine the full-time
equivalent screening staff at each of these airports. These staffing
levels, as determined by the model, serve as a limit on the number of
private screeners that the private screening contractors could employ.
[22] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful
for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be
Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 (Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2007).
[23] The TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification includes about $151
million for the Screening Partnership Program.
[24] GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns
Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation
and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634
(Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007).
[25] GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to
Build a Results Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January
2003).
[26] GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to
Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T
(Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007).
[27] DHS S&T is responsible for research and development of checkpoint
technologies related to aviation security, managing the activities
conducted at the Transportation Security Laboratory, and coordinating
these efforts with TSA. TSA's Passenger Screening Program is
responsible for evaluating and deploying systems to detect explosives
and weapons concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while
strengthening access control, improving screener performance, and
reducing staffing requirements.
[28] Research and development projects generally fall within the
following phases: (1) basic research includes all scientific efforts
and experimentation directed to increase knowledge and understanding in
the fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied
research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems
with a focus on developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed
solutions; (3) advanced development includes efforts directed toward
the development of hardware for field experiments; and (4) operational
testing includes evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating
environment to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of
advanced technology.
[29] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air
Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007).
[30] In fulfilling this mandate, DHS must provide for the screening of
50 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft by February
2009, 18 months after enactment of the Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g).
[31] See GAO-07-660.
[32] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005)
and GAO-07-660.
[33] TSA also issued a security directive to passenger air carriers
with flights operating from and/or within the United States in July
2007 further clarifying the air cargo screening exemptions. This
security directive, however, did not apply to air carriers transporting
cargo into the United States.
[34] Specifically, the air cargo explosives detection program,
implemented at three airports, tested the use of explosive detection
systems, explosive trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine
teams, technologies that can locate a stowaway, and manual screening of
air cargo. The EDS pilot program tested the use of computer-aided
tomography t o measure the densities of objectives in order to identify
potential explosives in air cargo. Further, the air cargo security
seals project is exploring the viability of potential security
countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security seals. TSA is also
testing the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers
made of blast-resistant material that could withstand an explosion
onboard an aircraft. Finally, the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis,
which allows for the identification of the material signatures of
contraband, explosives, and other threat objects, is also being tested
in the air cargo environment.
[35] According to TSA, the funding requested for the Certified Cargo
Screening Program could change if the agency has any contract activity
in fiscal year 2008 for this program.
[36] End-to-end testing is conducted to verify that the entire system,
including any external systems with which it interfaces, functions as
intended in an operational environment.
[37] GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing
Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System is Further Developed,
GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005); and GAO, Aviation
Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect
Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's Secure
Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006).
[38] See GAO-07-448T.
[39] In August 2007, DHS took two regulatory actions: (1) CBP issued
the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) pre-departure final
rule, which requires air carriers to submit passenger manifest
information for international flights departing from or arriving in the
United States to CBP prior to securing the aircraft (72 Fed. Reg.
48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007)); and (2) TSA issued the Secure Flight Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which identifies DHS' plans to assume watch-
list matching responsibilities from air carriers for domestic flights.
(72 Fed. Req. 48,356 (Aug. 23, 2007)).
[40] See GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure
Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently
Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public, GAO-05-864R (Washington,
D.C.: July 22, 2005).
[41] See GAO-05-356.
[42] The E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct privacy
impact assessments (PIA). Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208, 116 Stat. 2899,
2921-23 (2002). A PIA is an analysis of how personal information is
collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. Agencies
are required to make their PIAs publicly available.
[43] The Privacy Act places limitations on agencies' collection,
disclosure, and use of personal information maintained in systems of
records and requires agencies to publish a public notice, known as a
System of Records Notice (SORN), in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a.
[44] TSA will not issue final notices until it completes its evaluation
of public comments on notice of proposed rulemaking. The comment period
for the Secure Flight rulemaking closed on November 21, 2007.
[45] OMB's Capital Programming Guide (Supplement to Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-11, Part 7: Planning, Budgeting, and
Acquisition of Capital Assets) identifies that there are certain key
criteria that OMB will look for in the justification of spending for
proposed new capital assets including credible cost estimates. Appendix
9 of the guide identifies that following the guidelines in GAO's Cost
Assessment Guide will help agencies meet most cost estimating
requirements.
[46] See GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and
Managing Program Costs, Exposure Draft, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington,
D.C.: July 2007).
[47] The 12 steps involved in developing a high-quality cost estimating
process are 1) define the estimate's purpose, 2) develop the estimating
plan, 3) define the program, 4) determine the estimating structure, 5)
identify ground rules and assumptions, 6) obtain the data, 7) develop
the point estimate and compare it to an independent cost estimate, 8)
conduct sensitivity analysis, 9) conduct risk and uncertainty analysis,
10) document the estimate, 11) present estimate to management, and 12)
update the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes.
[48] The 9 best practices are 1) capturing key activities, 2)
sequencing key activities, 3) establishing the duration of key
activities, 4) establishing the critical path for key activities, 5)
assigning resources to key activities, 6) identifying "float time"
between key activities, 7) distributing reserves to high risk
activities (including conducting an independent cost estimate), 8)
integrating key activities horizontally--to link products and outcomes
associated with already sequenced activities--and vertically--to ensure
that traceability exists among varying levels of activities and
supporting tasks, and 9) completing schedule risk analysis.
[49] See, for example, Software Engineering Institute, Capability
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) for Development, Guidelines for
Process Integration and Product Improvement, Second Edition, Version
1.2 (May 2007).
[50] Risks of testing in the production environment must be thoroughly
analyzed and precautions taken to preclude damage to systems and data.
See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: A Testing Guide, GAO/AIMD-10.1.21
(Washington. D.C.: November 1998).
[51] See GAO-05-356.
[52] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Security Considerations in
the Information System Development Life-Cycle, NIST Special Publication
800-64 (Gaithersburg, Md: June 2004).
[53] OMB requires that agency management officials formally authorize
their information systems to process information and accept the risk
associated with their operation. This management authorization
(accreditation) is to be supported by a formal technical evaluation
(certification) of the management, operational, and technical controls
established in an information system's security plan. See GAO,
Information Security: Although Progress Reported, Federal Agencies Need
to Resolve Significant Deficiencies, GAO-08-496T, (Washington, D.C.:
February 14, 2008).
[54] These activities include 1) system testing performed as part of
software development, and 2) security test and evaluation performed as
part of certification and accreditation.
[55] TSA defines high-risk vulnerabilities as those where there is a
strong need for corrective measures, the probability of serious
incident is likely and risks are not normally acceptable, corrective
action plans must in place as soon as possible, and the authorization
to operate may be receded or not granted. Moderate-risk vulnerabilities
are those where the probability of incident is elevated, with increased
probability of unauthorized disclosure or disruption of operations, and
risks are probably not acceptable.
[56] In general, performance measures are indicators, statistics, or
metrics used to gauge program performance.
[57] The term "misidentified" refers to a person initially matched by a
screening entity to a name on the watch-list, but upon closer
examination, the person is found to not match any watch-list record.
[58] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143, (Washington, D.C.:
November 22, 2002).
[59] The cleared list contains the names and other personal identifying
information of individuals who have gone through the redress process
and have been checked and cleared as being persons not on the No Fly or
Selectee lists.
[60] Under Secure Flight, as described by TSA's notice of proposed
rulemaking, TSA plans to introduce a unique redress number that would
enable Secure Flight to "pre-clear" individuals who have previously
been misidentified, have gone through the redress process, and who
provide additional identifying information when making a reservation.
TSA expects this to reduce the likelihood of travel delays at check-in
for those passengers.
[End of section]
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