Emergency Transit Assistance
Federal Funding for Recent Disasters, and Options for the Future
Gao ID: GAO-08-243 February 15, 2008
Major disasters can disrupt transit operations, destroy vehicles and facilities, and impede the ability of people to reach essential relief and medical services and return to their homes and jobs. GAO determined (1) the federal role in assisting transit agencies after a major disaster; (2) the amounts, sources, and uses of federal disaster assistance for transit since 1998; (3) the factors that affected the timeliness and effectiveness of transit assistance after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes; and (4) additional options for providing assistance to transit after a major disaster. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed DOT and FEMA data; and interviewed officials with FEMA, DOT, state and local agencies, and others.
The federal government provides transit services and assists transit agencies after a major disaster, primarily through two federal agencies--the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration (FTA). FEMA is authorized to provide emergency transportation services under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). FTA administers federal support for transit but does not have a specific ongoing program or funding to help restore transit after disasters. FEMA and FTA have provided approximately $5.0 billion in disaster assistance to fund transit services and assist transit agencies since 1998, primarily through supplemental appropriations. The agencies provided nearly $4.7 billion to New York City after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, primarily to rebuild destroyed transit infrastructure, and another $232 million after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, largely to provide transit services for displaced populations. FEMA and FTA have also provided at least $51 million for other disasters since 1998. FEMA's database for its Public Assistance program does not have the capability to sort transit projects from other projects. GAO took steps to identify this funding, but the information presented should be considered minimum amounts. Additional funds may have been dedicated for transit purposes. GAO believes the magnitude of uncertainty is small compared with the $5.0 billion in assistance for transit. After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA and FTA faced challenges that impeded both the timeliness and effectiveness of their assistance to transit. Although the Stafford Act authorizes federal assistance to meet emergency needs, neither FEMA nor FTA had mechanisms to provide transit funding immediately after the disasters. FEMA also lacked guidance on the types of transit services it would fund and criteria for determining the duration of funding. As a result, funding approvals after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes took from 1 month to as long as 4 months, and FEMA ended funding even though transit agencies in Louisiana and Mississippi believed that they had continuing needs. Additional options exist--at the state, local, and federal levels--for providing assistance to transit after a major disaster. At the state and local levels, mutual aid agreements between states and others can direct needed resources to transit agencies following a disaster. Existing programs and temporary authorities that Congress had provided to DOT also suggest options, including giving FTA permanent authority to allow transit agencies to use existing grant funds for disaster recovery. As another option, Congress could establish an emergency relief program for FTA, similar to the DOT program for highways, or expand the scope of the highway program to include transit. Such a program could include "quick release"--a mechanism used to approve and release emergency highway funds within 1 to 2 days. Each of these options has advantages, such as expedited release and better targeting of funds, and consequences, such as potentially increased costs to the federal government.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-08-243, Emergency Transit Assistance: Federal Funding for Recent Disasters, and Options for the Future
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate:
February 2008:
Emergency Transit Assistance:
Federal Funding for Recent Disasters, and Options for the Future:
GAO-08-243:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-243, a report to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Major disasters can disrupt transit operations, destroy vehicles and
facilities, and impede the ability of people to reach essential relief
and medical services and return to their homes and jobs. GAO determined
(1) the federal role in assisting transit agencies after a major
disaster; (2) the amounts, sources, and uses of federal disaster
assistance for transit since 1998; (3) the factors that affected the
timeliness and effectiveness of transit assistance after the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes; and (4) additional options for providing assistance
to transit after a major disaster. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and
guidance; analyzed DOT and FEMA data; and interviewed officials with
FEMA, DOT, state and local agencies, and others.
What GAO Found:
The federal government provides transit services and assists transit
agencies after a major disaster, primarily through two federal
agencies”the Department of Homeland Security‘s Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation‘s (DOT)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA). FEMA is authorized to provide
emergency transportation services under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). FTA administers
federal support for transit but does not have a specific ongoing
program or funding to help restore transit after disasters.
FEMA and FTA have provided approximately $5.0 billion in disaster
assistance to fund transit services and assist transit agencies since
1998, primarily through supplemental appropriations. The agencies
provided nearly $4.7 billion to New York City after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, primarily to rebuild destroyed transit
infrastructure, and another $232 million after the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes, largely to provide transit services for displaced
populations. FEMA and FTA have also provided at least $51 million for
other disasters since 1998. FEMA‘s database for its Public Assistance
program does not have the capability to sort transit projects from
other projects. GAO took steps to identify this funding, but the
information presented should be considered minimum amounts. Additional
funds may have been dedicated for transit purposes. GAO believes the
magnitude of uncertainty is small compared with the $5.0 billion in
assistance for transit.
After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA and FTA faced challenges
that impeded both the timeliness and effectiveness of their assistance
to transit. Although the Stafford Act authorizes federal assistance to
meet emergency needs, neither FEMA nor FTA had mechanisms to provide
transit funding immediately after the disasters. FEMA also lacked
guidance on the types of transit services it would fund and criteria
for determining the duration of funding. As a result, funding approvals
after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes took from 1 month to as long as 4
months, and FEMA ended funding even though transit agencies in
Louisiana and Mississippi believed that they had continuing needs.
Additional options exist”at the state, local, and federal levels”for
providing assistance to transit after a major disaster. At the state
and local levels, mutual aid agreements between states and others can
direct needed resources to transit agencies following a disaster.
Existing programs and temporary authorities that Congress had provided
to DOT also suggest options, including giving FTA permanent authority
to allow transit agencies to use existing grant funds for disaster
recovery. As another option, Congress could establish an emergency
relief program for FTA, similar to the DOT program for highways, or
expand the scope of the highway program to include transit. Such a
program could include ’quick release“”a mechanism used to approve and
release emergency highway funds within 1 to 2 days. Each of these
options has advantages, such as expedited release and better targeting
of funds, and consequences, such as potentially increased costs to the
federal government.
What GAO Recommends:
To promote timely and effective assistance to transit, FEMA should
develop guidance on the types of transit services that it will fund
after a disaster and criteria for the duration of funding. DOT should
evaluate the feasibility of options to increase FTA‘s authority to
provide financial disaster assistance to transit, and seek legislative
authority as appropriate. DHS and DOT generally agreed with the facts
presented, and DHS stated it would take the recommendations under
advisement. DOT agreed with the recommendations and said these options
would be considered by FTA in developing DOT‘s legislative proposal for
reauthorizing surface transportation programs.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-243]. For more information, contact
Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FEMA and FTA Share Responsibility for Helping Transit Recover after a
Disaster, but Funding Comes Primarily from FEMA:
Federal Disaster Assistance for Transit Services Has Totaled about $5
Billion since 1998:
Lack of an Immediate Funding Mechanism and Funding Guidance and
Criteria Affected Federal Transit Assistance after the 2005 Gulf Coast
Hurricanes:
Additional Options Exist for Providing Assistance for Transit after a
Major Disaster:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Funding Amounts, Sources, and Uses of Federal Assistance
Committed to State Transportation Departments and Transit Agencies for
Major Disasters, since 1998:
Table 2: Initial FEMA and FTA Emergency Public Transportation Projects
in Lower Manhattan:
Table 3: Transit Infrastructure Projects in Lower Manhattan:
Table 4: Amounts and Uses of Mission Assignment Funding That DOT
Awarded to Transit Agencies and State Transportation Departments:
Table 5: Amounts and Uses of FTA's $35 Million Supplemental
Appropriation for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Transit Relief, by State:
Table 6: Waivers and Conversions of Capital Grants to Operating Uses in
Louisiana and Mississippi:
Abbreviations:
APTA: American Public Transportation Association:
CTA: Coast Transit Authority:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact:
ESF: Emergency Support Function:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration:
FTA: Federal Transit Administration:
MTA: Metropolitan Transit Authority:
NEMIS: National Emergency Management Information System:
NORTA: New Orleans Regional Transit Authority:
PATH: Port Authority Trans-Hudson:
SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 15, 2008:
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:
United States Senate:
Major disasters or acts of terrorism can disrupt transit operations and
destroy transit agencies' vehicles and facilities. The loss of transit
can worsen the impact of a disaster by impeding a community's access to
relief services, medical care, and jobs. For example, when multiple
hurricanes struck the Gulf Coast in August and September, 2005, many
thousands of residents left their homes and resettled in group sites
established by FEMA that had no access to transit services. Tens of
thousands more residents relocated to Baton Rouge, where the existing
transit services were insufficient to meet the needs of the expanded
population. Major disasters may exhaust the available financial
capacity of transit agencies and state governments, precluding them
from restoring or providing essential services on their own. Yet, the
restoration or provision of transit services after a disaster can be
crucial to recovery, allowing people to reach essential relief and
medical services and return to their homes and jobs.
Federal funding to help restore transit services after a disaster comes
primarily from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FEMA was established to
respond to disasters and emergencies. In carrying out its mission, FEMA
supports emergency activities, including preparedness, response,
recovery, and hazard mitigation. FEMA's authority to provide major
disaster and emergency assistance to state and local governments and
others was established by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act),[Footnote 1] which includes
the authority to provide temporary public transportation services to
meet emergency needs and to help communities resume their normal
pattern of life as soon as possible.[Footnote 2] The Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), within the Department of Transportation (DOT),
administers federal programs that support public transit and may make
funding available for transit services after a disaster.
You asked us to evaluate the federal government's provision of
assistance to transit operations in the wake of a major disaster,
particularly after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. To do so, we
determined (1) the role of the federal government in providing transit
services and assisting transit agencies after a major disaster; (2) the
amounts, sources, and uses of federal disaster assistance provided for
transit since 1998; (3) factors that affected the timeliness and
effectiveness of federal assistance for transit after the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes; and (4) additional options for providing transit
services and assistance for transit after a major disaster.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant laws,
regulations, and guidance on FEMA's and FTA's authorities and
responsibilities in responding to disasters affecting transit, and we
interviewed FEMA and FTA officials. In addition, to determine the
amounts, sources, and uses of federal financial disaster assistance
provided to transit agencies since 1998--the earliest date for which
FEMA data were available--we reviewed and analyzed data from FEMA and
FTA to quantify the agencies' disaster assistance funding. We were
unable to reliably determine the total amounts provided for transit
from FEMA's Public Assistance program because FEMA's database for this
program information does not have the capability of sorting transit
projects from other projects. The information we present in this report
should be considered minimum amounts--additional funds may have been
dedicated for transit purposes--and the steps we took to identify this
funding are presented in appendix I. To identify factors that affected
the timeliness and effectiveness of the assistance that was provided to
transit agencies after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, we identified
the procedures that FEMA and FTA used to provide disaster assistance
for transit. We discussed these procedures with FEMA and FTA officials
and with representatives from two state transportation departments, and
selected major transit agencies affected by the hurricanes in Louisiana
and Mississippi. We assessed FEMA's and FTA's performance and reviewed
other documentation. To identify additional options for providing
services and assistance to transit after a major disaster, we reviewed
documents and interviewed selected officials from FTA, the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), the Community Transportation
Association of America, and the Florida Department of Transportation. A
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through
February 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The federal government provides transit services and assists transit
agencies after a major disaster, primarily through two federal
agencies--FEMA and FTA. FEMA is the federal government's primary agency
for disaster response. FEMA is also specifically authorized to provide
public transportation services in areas affected by a major disaster as
part of its authority under the Stafford Act. After the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, FEMA received supplemental appropriations to
the Disaster Relief Fund, which initially funded temporary facilities
and services for the resumption of services after the attacks and,
later, the construction of permanent subway and ferry terminals and
other facilities. After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA provided
financial disaster assistance to transit, primarily through (1) mission
assignments (i.e., requests to another federal agency for specific
services within that agency's functions) to fund transit operations in
New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf Coast, including supplemental
transit services to temporary FEMA group sites and other places where
displaced populations were living in Louisiana and Mississippi, and (2)
Public Assistance program grants to transit agencies to repair or
replace damaged equipment or facilities, such as maintenance facilities
and passenger shelters. FTA administers a variety of grant programs to
support urban and rural transit operations throughout the United
States. FTA programs fund planning, vehicle purchases, facility
construction, and other transit needs. However, FTA has no specific
program or funding dedicated to disaster response or recovery. Instead,
Congress has provided FTA with supplemental appropriations and other
temporary authority to aid transit, as FTA did after the September 11
terrorist attacks and after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Since 1998, congressional appropriations to FEMA and FTA have provided
approximately $5 billion for emergency transit services, rebuilding
transit infrastructure, and assisting transit agencies in repairing
facilities and replacing buses after disasters. About $4.7 billion of
the $5 billion was provided in response to the September 11 terrorist
attacks in New York City, and $232 million was provided in response to
the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. The differences in these two disasters
also required different responses by FEMA and FTA--financial assistance
in response to the September 11 attacks was mainly for funding new
infrastructure, such as the commuter facilities at the World Trade
Center site, while financial assistance after the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes was mainly for transit services for residents and evacuees.
Funding for these two events came from supplemental appropriations to
the Disaster Relief Fund--which supports FEMA's disaster relief
programs, including programs FEMA used to fund transportation recovery-
-and to FTA for emergency transit needs. In addition to the funding
provided in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2005
Gulf Coast hurricanes, FTA provided $5 million in discretionary program
funding to support expanded transit services in the Minneapolis area
following the August 1, 2007, collapse of the I-35 bridge. FEMA has
also provided at least $46 million, through its Public Assistance
program to restore transit after other disasters since 1998. Table 1
shows the amounts, sources, and uses of federal assistance provided to
transit agencies for major disasters, since 1998.
Table 1: Funding Amounts, Sources, and Uses of Federal Assistance
Committed to State Transportation Departments and Transit Agencies for
Major Disasters, since 1998 (Dollars in millions):
Major disaster: September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center;
Amount: $4,676[A];
Funding source: Supplemental appropriations to FTA and FEMA Public
Assistance grants;
Uses: To fund the reconstruction of transit and related infrastructure
in New York.
Major disaster: 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes;
Amount: $88;
Funding source: FEMA Disaster Relief Fund[B] mission assignments to
DOT;
Uses: To fund emergency public transportation service in Louisiana and
Mississippi.
Major disaster: 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes;
Amount: $70;
Funding source: FEMA Disaster Relief Fund[B]--Public Assistance grants;
Uses: To fund bus and bus facilities repair and replacement in
Louisiana and Mississippi.
Major disaster: 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes;
Amount: $35;
Funding source: Supplemental appropriation to FTA;
Uses: To provide operating and capital assistance for 19 transit
agencies in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas that
were directly impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Major disaster: 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes;
Amount: $39;
Funding source: FTA authorizing transit agencies to waive matching fund
requirements, and use other program funds for disaster recovery;
Uses: To provide financial support to state transportation departments
and transit agencies in Louisiana and Mississippi that were affected by
Hurricane Katrina.
Major disaster: Other disasters (since 1998);
Amount: $51[A];
Funding source: FEMA Public Assistance grants and FTA discretionary
program funds;
Uses: To support transit operations and the repair and replacement of
transit facilities and equipment after other disasters.
Major disaster: Total;
Amount: $4,959.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA and FTA information.
[A] FEMA's database that tracks Public Assistance program funding does
not have the capability of sorting transit projects from other
projects. Therefore, the information we present in this report should
be considered minimum amounts--other funds might have been dedicated
for transit purposes.
[B] The Disaster Relief Fund is funded through both annual and
supplemental appropriations.
[End of table]
Several factors affected the timeliness and effectiveness of FEMA's and
FTA's assistance to transit after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes,
including a lack of mechanisms to provide immediate funding for transit
services and FEMA's lack of guidance and criteria for the types and
duration of transit services it would fund. Although the Stafford Act
authorizes federal assistance to meet emergency needs and help affected
communities to resume their normal pattern of life as soon as possible,
neither FEMA nor FTA had mechanisms in place to provide funding to
transit providers immediately after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
FEMA provided funding as reimbursement, requiring recipients to spend
money from other sources first,[Footnote 3] and FTA had no program for
emergency assistance to transit. However, transit providers had little
money to spend from other sources before being reimbursed. According to
officials from the two major transit agencies affected by the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, transit operations shut down after the disasters, and
the agencies' revenues from fare collections and other sources were
curtailed, limiting their ability to begin restoring transit services
on their own. Furthermore, FEMA's timeliness and effectiveness in
providing assistance for transit after the hurricanes were limited by
the agency's lack of guidance on the types of services it could fund,
and lack of criteria for the duration of the funding. Without such
guidance and criteria, funding approvals took from 1 month to as long
as 4 months, and officials from the two major transit agencies affected
by the hurricanes contended that FEMA mission assignments ended before
some emergency needs were met. DHS and FEMA addressed a number of
issues raised by their response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes in
DHS's National Response Framework, issued in January 2008, which
replaced DHS's National Response Plan.[Footnote 4] However, the
Framework does little to help clarify the agencies' roles in responding
to a disaster affecting transit. FEMA has also begun drafting
"prescripted" mission assignments to facilitate common language between
FEMA, other federal agencies, and state and local organizations and,
thus, to expedite the issuance of mission assignments after a disaster.
However, a FEMA official indicated the agency does not plan to draft a
prescripted mission assignment for transit operations because FEMA will
assume parts of DOT's emergency response functions for transportation
under a memorandum of understanding signed by the two agencies in
October 2007. However, this memorandum states that DOT will continue to
be responsible for "alternative transportation services" after a
disaster. According to DOT officials, "alternative transportation
services" could include such things as transit services or ferry
services when a bridge has been damaged or destroyed. We are
recommending that FEMA develop guidance or regulations identifying the
types of transit services that FEMA will or will not fund after a
disaster, and criteria for determining the duration of funding for
those services to facilitate timely decision making following future
disasters--especially catastrophic disasters that affect multiple
states. We are also recommending that FEMA draft prescripted mission
assignments for public transportation services, which could reduce
ambiguity and expedite the issuance of mission assignments for these
services when time is critical in the aftermath of a future disaster.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS stated that it would take
these recommendations under advisement.
Additional options exist for providing transit services and assistance
for transit after a disaster. At the state and local levels, mutual aid
agreements can support transit recovery after a disaster by providing
transit agencies with needed resources and personnel from agencies
outside of the disaster area. For example, the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) provides for assistance between member states
when a disaster transcends state borders, and APTA has developed a
program that allows transit systems across the country to volunteer
their resources, including buses and drivers, for temporary emergency
transit needs. The Florida Department of Transportation has a similar
mutual aid agreement between transit systems in the state. At the
federal level, existing authorities and programs that Congress has
provided to DOT suggest additional potential options. One option would
be to give FTA permanent authority to waive certain grant fund
requirements in response to disasters. After the Gulf Coast hurricanes,
Congress gave FTA temporary authority (for 2 years) to allow transit
agencies directly affected by the hurricanes to use FTA grant funds--
generally intended for capital uses--for transit operations. If given
this authority permanently, FTA could quickly make grant funds
available to affected transit agencies for operations during disasters.
A second option would be to provide a disaster relief program for
transit similar to the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) program
for federal highways. FHWA's Emergency Relief program provides funds
for both emergency and permanent repairs of highways that have suffered
serious disaster damage. The program also provides a "quick release"
funding option that can be used when disaster damage is readily
evident, to begin the flow of funds to a state within 1 to 2 days. A
separate FTA program could be established to provide disaster relief
for transit, or transit disaster relief could be incorporated as an
eligible activity under FHWA's Emergency Relief program. Establishing
or expanding emergency relief for transit, however, could significantly
expand the scope and cost of emergency relief for DOT at a time when,
as we have reported,[Footnote 5] there are increasing demands placed on
the Emergency Relief program, while the purchasing power of the
principal revenues to its funding source, the Highway Trust Fund, is
eroding. We recommend that DOT evaluate the feasibility of options to
increase FTA's authority to provide immediate financial assistance, and
seek legislative authority as appropriate. DOT agreed with this
recommendation and stated that these options would be considered by an
FTA policy working group that is developing portions of the
department's legislative proposal for reauthorizing surface
transportation programs.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS and DOT also generally
agreed with the facts presented and provided technical comments, which
we incorporated into this report as appropriate.
Background:
In recent years, the United States has experienced two of the most
severe disasters in its history--the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. These disasters claimed
several thousand lives and resulted in billions of dollars in damage.
In addition, there have been over 500 declared disasters and
emergencies of smaller magnitude since 1998.
Catastrophic disasters, such as the terrorist attacks and Gulf Coast
hurricanes, place particularly wideranging demands on emergency
response capabilities. By their very nature, catastrophic disasters
involve high levels of casualties, damages, and disruptions that are
likely to immediately overwhelm state and local responders.
Historically, the federal role in disaster response has been to support
and assist states and localities, providing resources and other
assistance when the demands of the situation exceed their combined
capabilities. However, when a catastrophic disaster overwhelms the
ability of state, local, and voluntary agencies to adequately provide
essential services, the federal government generally plays a more
central role--providing selected resources where they are needed.
The Stafford Act authorizes the federal government to respond to
disasters, and to assist state and local governments and others in
saving lives, reducing human suffering, mitigating the effects of lost
income, and repairing or rebuilding damaged facilities. FEMA leads the
nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
and other man-made disasters. The Disaster Relief Fund, which supports
a wide range of the agency's disaster response programs, is funded
through both regular and supplemental appropriations. Before FEMA can
respond to a catastrophic disaster, the President has to declare that a
major disaster or emergency exists. This declaration is typically made
at the request of the governor of the affected state. A disaster
declaration activates an array of federal programs to assist in the
recovery effort. FEMA's response to a disaster begins with the
appointment of a Federal Coordinating Officer by the Director of FEMA.
The Federal Coordinating Officer manages and coordinates the
application of programs and funds under the Stafford Act. FEMA then
staffs the core management and administrative functions to respond to
the disaster, including a Joint Field Office, Regional Response
Coordination Center, and Emergency Response Teams.
Until 2008, the National Response Plan, issued by DHS in December 2004,
outlined the principal roles and responsibilities of federal agencies
in a major disaster. The plan has been superseded by DHS's National
Response Framework, which was issued in January 2008. The Framework,
like the National Response Plan before it, identifies Emergency Support
Functions (ESF), which provide the structure for coordinating federal
interagency support during declared disasters and emergencies. Whenever
there is a major incident, DOT must provide support under the Framework
through the department's role as primary agency for ESF-1 for
Transportation. This function is responsible for, among other things,
transportation safety and restoration of transportation infrastructure.
FTA administers federal funding to support a variety of local public
transportation systems throughout the United States, including bus,
subway, light rail, commuter rail, streetcar, passenger ferryboat, and
other transportation systems. FTA funds public transportation through a
number of grant programs; grant recipients include states, local
governments, transit authorities, and others. FTA programs fund
planning, vehicle purchases, facility construction, and other needs.
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)[Footnote 6] authorized funding levels
for each program, and Congress provides an annual appropriation to fund
them. FTA's funding comes, in part, from the general fund, but its
grant programs are primarily funded through the Mass Transit Account of
the Highway Trust Fund, which is funded partly by federal fuel taxes.
The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City and the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes caused severe damage to transit services in both
areas. The transit authority in New York City, the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA), provides New Yorkers with 2.4 billion
trips each year through bus, subway, and rail services. This
transportation network serves 14.6 million people in the New York City
area, including Long Island, southeastern New York State, and
Connecticut. The Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH)
operates a heavy rail transit system between Manhattan and neighboring
New Jersey communities that serves approximately 227,000 passengers
each weekday. As a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center,
subway stations and the PATH commuter rail terminal were destroyed,
sections of local roads became impassable due to damage or recovery
efforts, and the remaining transportation options were overcrowded as
commuters returned to work using different routes or means of
transportation. On the Gulf Coast, public transit consists of bus,
streetcar, and paratransit service--which is service for disabled
persons that complements bus or rail service--to a widely dispersed
population. The New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (NORTA) provides
approximately 30 bus routes, 3 streetcar lines, and paratransit service
for passengers with disabilities, and it carries more than 2 million
passengers each year. The transit provider on Mississippi's Gulf Coast,
Coast Transit Authority (CTA), serving Gulfport and Biloxi, offers
fixed-route bus service and demand-response service for seniors and
passengers with disabilities over a three-county area. According to
local transit agency officials in Louisiana and Mississippi, the 2005
Gulf Coast hurricanes flooded buses, administration buildings, and
roads; destroyed bridges, bus stop signs, and shelters; and forced tens
of thousands to evacuate. As a result, according to transit and FEMA
officials, transit agencies had to find working vehicles and create new
routes that allowed the dispersed population to reach disaster relief
centers and essential services.
FEMA and FTA Share Responsibility for Helping Transit Recover after a
Disaster, but Funding Comes Primarily from FEMA:
The federal government, through FEMA and FTA, provides transit services
and assists transit agencies after a major disaster. FEMA, the federal
government's primary agency for disaster response, is authorized to
provide emergency transportation services as part of its authority
under the Stafford Act. FTA administers federal programs and funding
that support transit operations across the United States, but it does
not have a specific program or designated funding to help transit
agencies recover from a disaster.
FEMA Provides Emergency Transportation Services through Its Authority
under the Stafford Act:
FEMA is the federal government's primary agency for disaster response.
In carrying out its mission, FEMA (1) funds and coordinates emergency
preparedness activities, (2) provides and coordinates the immediate
federal response to save lives and property, (3) funds the
reconstruction of damaged infrastructure to help stricken families and
communities recover, and (4) supports hazard mitigation activities to
lessen the destructive impact of future disasters. FEMA is authorized
to provide temporary public transportation service to meet emergency
needs and to provide transportation to governmental offices, supply
centers, stores, post offices, schools, major employment centers, and
other places that may be necessary for a community to resume its normal
pattern of life as soon as possible.[Footnote 7] Funding for FEMA's
disaster response programs comes from the Disaster Relief Fund.
Supplemental funding is requested when funds provided through the
regular appropriations to the fund are insufficient to respond to
certain disasters. The Disaster Relief Fund received supplemental
appropriations following both the terrorist attacks on New York City
and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA provided financial
disaster assistance to transit providers, primarily in two ways--
through mission assignments to DOT during the response phase and
through its Public Assistance program during the recovery phase.
Mission assignments are FEMA's requests to federal agencies to complete
specified disaster response tasks that are within that agency's
functions. Mission assignments can also authorize a dollar amount of
FEMA funding for the specified tasks. Because mission assignments are
used during the initial response to a disaster, they are intended for
immediate and short-term assistance that is essential to save lives,
protect property and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the
threat of a catastrophe. FEMA officials involved in providing transit
aid to the Gulf Coast after the hurricanes told us they did not have
transit expertise and largely relied on FTA, the states, and transit
agencies to define what was needed. FTA worked with the state
transportation departments and transit agencies to develop proposals
that identified needed transit services, indicated how and by whom
those services would be provided, and estimated the cost of the
services. Proposals for mission assignments were then negotiated with
FEMA, which subsequently issued mission assignments to DOT that
described the services to be provided, authorized funding from FEMA to
DOT, and set the start date and end date of the mission assignment. DOT
then contracted with the state transportation departments or transit
agencies that would receive the reimbursement funds from DOT. These
contracts further detailed the services to be provided.
A second type of financial assistance is available to states and
transit agencies through FEMA's Public Assistance program. As mission
assignments are concluded, the recovery phase begins, and transit
agencies and others can apply for additional financial assistance
through the Public Assistance program. This program provides grants to
state and local governments and some nonprofit organizations for
recovery needs, including debris removal, emergency protective
measures, and the repair or replacement of damaged equipment or
facilities. Many of the Public Assistance program grants awarded to
transit agencies after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes were for bus
replacement and for the repair or replacement of structures, such as
maintenance facilities and passenger shelters. For example, the CTA
used public assistance funding to replace bus stop shelters that were
destroyed during the storm.
FTA Administers Federal Transit Programs but Has Limited Ability to
Directly Assist Transit Agencies after a Disaster:
FTA administers a number of programs to support urban and rural transit
in the United States. FTA programs provide funding to support
transportation planning, capital investments, operating assistance in
rural and nonurban areas, and efforts to meet the transportation needs
of persons with disabilities and the elderly. FTA's Urbanized Area
Formula Program, for example, provides funding to transit authorities
and state governments to support planning; engineering; crime
prevention and security; the construction of passenger facilities; and
the replacement, overhaul, or rebuilding of buses. Generally, program
funds may not be used to pay operating expenses in urbanized areas
exceeding 200,000 in population.
Although FTA administers a variety of grant programs to serve local
communities throughout the United States, it does not have a specific
program or dedicated funding to help transit agencies recover from a
disaster. FTA will, on a case-by-case basis, allow transit agencies
impacted by a disaster to defer their matching local share contribution
required to receive FTA grants. In addition, transit agencies that
serve fewer than 200,000 people can also use FTA capital grant program
funds for operations, including operations in response to a disaster.
FTA has also provided emergency assistance when it has received
supplemental appropriations from Congress for that purpose, as it did
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes. In addition, Congress has granted FTA other specific
authority. For example, a 2006 supplemental appropriation act gave the
Secretary of Transportation authority, until June 15, 2008, to waive
(as opposed to defer) matching share requirements for transit
assistance program grants to agencies directly affected by Hurricane
Katrina and to allow these affected agencies to use certain capital
grant funds for disaster recovery.[Footnote 8]
Federal Disaster Assistance for Transit Services Has Totaled about $5
Billion since 1998:
Since 1998, the federal government has provided approximately $5
billion through FEMA and FTA to assist transit agencies and provide
transit services after disasters, with most of this assistance
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City
and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Both of these disasters devastated
transit where they occurred, but they resulted in different needs for
transit recovery and different responses by FEMA and FTA--primarily
rebuilding infrastructure in New York, and funding transit operations
on the Gulf Coast. Of the $5 billion, about $4.7 billion was for
transit services and reconstruction after the September 11 terrorist
attacks, $232 million was for transit recovery after the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, and at least $51 million was for transit services
following other disasters. This $51 million included $5 million in
funding from FTA for transit services after the August 2007 I-35 bridge
collapse in Minneapolis, Minnesota. It also includes at least $46
million of FEMA Public Assistance grants to support transit recovery
since 1998. FEMA's database that tracks Public Assistance program
funding does not have the capability to sort transit projects from
other projects. Therefore, we needed to identify transit grants by
searching the database records for key transit-related terms as
discussed in appendix I. Because there may be additional funding for
transit that we did not identify, the $46 million should be considered
a minimum amount.
Congress Provided about $4.7 Billion for Transit Recovery in New York
after September 11, 2001:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
severely damaged the public transportation system that was used by more
than a quarter-million daily commuters to Lower Manhattan. The PATH
commuter station beneath the World Trade Center was destroyed, and
subway stations serving the area were rendered unusable. In addition,
many streets were closed because of debris, and some tunnels were
temporarily closed. FEMA and FTA have committed about $4.7 billion to
fund emergency transit services and the reconstruction of transit and
related infrastructure in New York after the September 11 terrorist
attacks. This funding was provided through supplemental appropriations
following the attacks and includes (1) $200 million in FTA funding and
$176 million in FEMA Public Assistance grants to fund the resumption of
public transportation service after the attacks and (2) $4.3 billion of
FEMA and FTA funding committed to the permanent reconstruction of the
subway system and terminals at and near the World Trade Center site.
FEMA and FTA committed a combined $376 million to help restore
transportation operations in the initial response phase after the
attacks, as summarized in table 2.
Table 2: Initial FEMA and FTA Emergency Public Transportation Projects
in Lower Manhattan (Dollars in millions):
Project: Temporary Port Authority Trans-Hudson Terminal;
Project description: Temporary terminal to replace the destroyed
transit terminal under the World Trade Center;
Agency: FEMA;
Funding obligated: $140.0.
Project: Emergency Ferry Service;
Project description: Additional ferry service to support commuter
capacity diverted by the loss of subway service as well as vehicle
restrictions;
Agency: FEMA;
Funding obligated: $36.0[A].
Project: FEMA subtotal;
Funding obligated: $176.0.
Project: Ferry Facilities;
Project description: Eight projects to operate and construct ferry
facilities in New York and New Jersey;
Agency: FTA;
Funding obligated: $100.0[B].
Project: Meadows Maintenance Complex;
Project description: Accelerated modifications to New Jersey transit
system maintenance facility due to increased transit traffic on system;
Agency: FTA;
Funding obligated: $56.2[C].
Project: Penn Station;
Project description: Passenger connection improvements;
Agency: FTA;
Funding obligated: $4.6.
Project: Lincoln Tunnel Feasibility Study;
Project description: Feasibility study for a second exclusive bus lane
in the Lincoln Tunnel;
Agency: FTA;
Funding obligated: $1.1.
Project: Other;
Project description: Various projects to increase capacity, improve
travel conditions, enhance system safety, and oversight and
administration;
Agency: FTA;
Funding obligated: $38.2.
Project: FTA subtotal;
Funding obligated: $200.1.
Project: Total;
Funding obligated: $376.1.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA and FTA information.
[A] FEMA calculated this amount by searching its database of Public
Assistance grants for ferry funding in New York after the terrorist
attacks. This approach does not ensure that all funding for ferry
service was identified, and there may be other funding not included.
Therefore, the $36 million should be considered a minimum amount.
[B] FTA and FHWA jointly administered these projects.
[C] An additional $8.9 million in Department of Defense supplemental
grant funds, previously awarded to reconfigure track near Newark Penn
Station, was reallocated to the Meadows Maintenance Complex project.
[End of table]
FEMA funding came from the Disaster Relief Fund, which received about
$8.0 billion in supplemental appropriations for all response and
recovery purposes, including transit, after the terrorist attacks. DOT
funding included a $100 million supplemental appropriation to FTA for
various transit projects and a second $100 million appropriation from
the Highway Trust Fund for the operation and construction of ferries
and ferry facilities.
The next phase of the federal government's action to restore transit
services in New York after the terrorist attacks was the reconstruction
of transit facilities at and near the World Trade Center site. An
August 2002 memorandum of understanding between FEMA and FTA identified
FTA as the lead federal agency for the administration of the $2.75
billion committed by FEMA and the $1.8 billion appropriated to FTA--a
total of $4.55 billion--to replace public transportation facilities in
Lower Manhattan that had been damaged or destroyed by the terrorist
attacks. FEMA funding came from supplemental appropriations to the
Disaster Relief Fund. FTA funding for these projects came from an
August 2002 supplemental appropriation to FTA for emergency expenses to
replace, rebuild, or enhance the public transportation systems serving
Manhattan.[Footnote 9] Part of the FEMA funding has been made available
to FHWA for a highway project[Footnote 10] leaving approximately $4.3
billion of the $4.55 billion to fund transit projects. Four major
transit projects were identified. As of October 2007, the estimated
cost of these projects, including the costs of a construction command
center and of oversight and administration, was over $4.0 billion.
Table 3 summarizes these projects, their estimated cost, and their
scheduled completion dates.
Table 3: Transit Infrastructure Projects in Lower Manhattan (Dollars in
millions):
Project: The World Trade Center Permanent PATH Terminal;
Project description: Builds a new terminal that serves the subway
system that provided service to commuters between New York and New
Jersey;
Agency: FEMA and FTA;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $2,201.0;
Scheduled completion date: July 2013.
Project: Fulton Street Transit Center;
Project description: Builds a new center that will serve 12 different
subway lines and over 275,000 daily commuters;
Agency: FTA;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $847.0;
Scheduled completion date: April 2012.
Project: South Ferry Terminal Station;
Project description: Replaces the obsolete station that serves Staten
Island ferry riders;
Agency: FTA;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $420.0;
Scheduled completion date: November 2008.
Project: WTC Vehicle Security Center;
Project description: Screens all vehicles for security threats;
Agency: FEMA;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $478.0;
Scheduled completion date: August 2012.
Project: Lower Manhattan Construction Command Center;
Project description: Coordinates and oversees the large number of
construction projects planned for Lower Manhattan;
Agency: FEMA;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $12.4;
Scheduled completion date: Operational.
Project: Oversight and administration;
Project description: FEMA and FTA Project Oversight and Administration;
Agency: FEMA and FTA;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $86.7;
Scheduled completion date: Ongoing.
Project: Total;
Current estimated cost (as of October 2007): $4,045.1.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA and FTA information.
[End of table]
According to an FTA official, the difference between the current
estimated project costs and the total FTA and FEMA funds committed
consists of designated reserves for each project, plus an unassigned
reserve of $47.5 million that, by an agreement between FTA and the
state of New York, is available for use at the governor's discretion.
Responding to the scale of damage caused by the September 11 terrorist
attacks in New York, Congress expanded FEMA's and FTA's authority to
fund recovery efforts. After most disasters, assistance is available
only to rebuild or restore damaged infrastructure to its predisaster
condition. However, because the extensive destruction required large-
scale rebuilding of transit facilities at the World Trade Center site,
DOT was authorized to rebuild and improve the New York transportation
system substantially beyond its predisaster condition.[Footnote 11]
Similarly, in 2003, Congress authorized FEMA to go beyond the
assistance it typically would provide by permitting it to rebuild and
enhance infrastructure to substantially improve commuter
mobility.[Footnote 12]
The Federal Government Provided about $232 Million to Support Transit
Providers and State Agencies after the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes:
The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes caused heavy flooding in the Louisiana
and Mississippi Gulf Coast, bringing public transportation to a
standstill, with tens of thousands of Gulf Coast residents being forced
to relocate to Baton Rouge and other cities or to FEMA group sites. The
hurricanes created a need for assistance to fund transit operations,
including restoring transit in the devastated areas to connect
residents with relief services, providing new services to those who
evacuated to FEMA group sites, and expanding existing services in Baton
Rouge. The hurricanes also damaged and destroyed transit property and
equipment--administration and maintenance facilities were flooded and
their contents destroyed, and buses and other vehicles were damaged or
destroyed.
FEMA and FTA have provided a total of about $232 million in financial
assistance to support transit providers and state transportation
departments after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Of this amount, $158
million was provided by FEMA through mission assignments and Public
Assistance funding, while FTA provided $35 million from a fiscal year
2007 supplemental appropriation to assist transit agencies directly
affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FTA also assisted transit
agencies by allowing them to use an additional $39 million in existing
funds from other FTA grant programs for disaster recovery. Finally, in
addition to the funds provided to transit agencies and state
transportation departments, FEMA and FTA awarded a total of $65 million
in contracts for other transit services and support functions.
FEMA Provided $158 Million through Mission Assignments and Its Public
Assistance Program:
FEMA has provided approximately $158 million to support transit after
the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, including about $88 million awarded to
DOT from the Disaster Relief Fund for mission assignments and $70
million from the Public Assistance program. FEMA mission assignments to
DOT were used to fund transit operations in New Orleans and the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, such as supplemental transit service for
residents of temporary FEMA group sites and other displaced
populations. See table 4 for the amounts and uses of mission assignment
funding that DOT awarded to transit agencies and state transportation
departments.
Table 4: Amounts and Uses of Mission Assignment Funding That DOT
Awarded to Transit Agencies and State Transportation Departments:
DOT awardee: Louisiana; New Orleans Regional Transit Authority;
Contract amount: $67,343,537;
Uses: To provide supplemental emergency public transportation services
to Baton Rouge following the influx of displaced persons from New
Orleans. The services were intended to eliminate traffic congestion,
expand the service area, extend service hours and provide more frequent
service, and transport people from temporary FEMA trailers. The funding
also helped reestablish transit service in New Orleans.
DOT awardee: Louisiana; Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development;
Contract amount: $19,043,538;
Uses: To provide supplemental emergency public transportation service
to 62 parishes in Louisiana (excluding Baton Rouge and New Orleans).
Services included new routes and destinations, new service to temporary
FEMA trailers, paratransit service for the displaced disabled
population, and new routes to feed into the LA Swift emergency bus
service (a service that transports displaced people between Baton Rouge
and New Orleans).
DOT awardee: Mississippi; Coast Transit Authority;
Contract amount: $1,420,546;
Uses: To provide supplemental emergency public transportation service
to three Gulf Coast counties--Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson. The
service included both fixed-route and demand-response transit service
to housing and temporary shelters, medical transportation, and
transportation service for disaster recovery in support of the Red
Cross and essential government services as necessary.
DOT awardee: Mississippi; Mississippi Department of Transportation;
Contract amount: $316,710;
Uses: To provide supplemental emergency public transportation service
to three other counties located north of the Gulf Coast--Pearl River,
Stone, and George. This service included demand-response transit
service to local residents and evacuees to access essential government
and life-sustaining support services. Transit service provided access
to housing and temporary shelters, medical transportation, and
transportation for disaster recovery in support of the Red Cross.
DOT awardee: Total;
Contract amount: $88,124,331.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA information.
[End of table]
These four mission assignments have been concluded--the mission
assignment to the Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development was the last to end, on April 30, 2007.
As of September 2007, FEMA had committed $70 million to the 2 primary
Gulf Coast transit agencies through its existing Public Assistance
program, and these funds are primarily being used to repair and replace
buses and bus facilities. The 2 agencies provided us with information
on the funding they received. NORTA had over $66.4 million approved for
117 projects that include replacing buses, repairing streetcar lines,
and repairing and reequipping maintenance facilities. The CTA in
Mississippi had more than $3.2 million approved for 11 projects,
including a transit center, new vehicles and equipment, bus shelters,
and repairs and furnishings for its administrative building. Most of
the 2 transit agencies' Public Assistance projects are ongoing, and the
2 agencies have received only limited reimbursement to date.
FTA Provided $35 Million to Transit Providers from a Supplemental
Appropriation:
In May 2007, Congress enacted a $35 million supplemental appropriation
for FTA to provide services to transit agencies directly affected by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.[Footnote 13] In August 2007, FTA awarded
the $35 million to 19 transit agencies in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas to fund operating and capital costs incurred
from the hurricanes. See table 5 for the amounts and uses of FTA's $35
million supplemental appropriation.
Table 5: Amounts and Uses of FTA's $35 Million Supplemental
Appropriation for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Transit Relief, by State:
State: Alabama;
Number of agencies receiving grants: 2;
Amount: $646,064;
Uses: For facility and vehicle repairs.
State: Florida;
Number of agencies receiving grants: 1;
Amount: $475,476;
Uses: For facility repairs, operating assistance, and replacement of
signs for bus stations and shelters.
State: Louisiana;
Number of agencies receiving grants: 13;
Amount: $20,453,154;
Uses: For facility repairs, operating assistance, replacement buses and
shelters, and other uses.
State: Mississippi;
Number of agencies receiving grants: 1;
Amount: $12,704,800;
Uses: For bus replacement and operating assistance.
State: Texas;
Number of agencies receiving grants: 2;
Amount: $720,506;
Uses: For replacement buses, satellite telephones, and transport of
vehicles.
State: Total;
Number of agencies receiving grants: 19;
Amount: $35,000,000.
Source: Information provided by FTA.
[End of table]
FTA Allowed Transit Agencies to Redirect over $39 Million from Other
Programs to Disaster Recovery:
In addition to the $35 million from supplemental appropriations,
transit providers have access to an additional $39.5 million in funds
obtained through other FTA programs that FTA has allowed them to
redirect to support disaster recovery. The supplemental appropriation
in June 2006 gave the Secretary of Transportation authority--until June
15, 2008--to waive matching share requirements for transit assistance
program grants to agencies directly affected by Hurricane Katrina and
to allow these affected agencies to use certain grant funds for
disaster recovery.[Footnote 14] FTA grants are usually allocated by
formula and can be used for capital projects such as purchases of new
buses, passenger shelters, bus stop signs, and some other purposes.
Although this authority did not provide the transit agencies with new
funding, it enabled them to use funding that had been designated for
other purposes for disaster recovery. As of October 2007, these
affected entities were allowed to waive requirements for about $24.9
million in matching funds, and to convert over $14.6 million in grant
funds from capital uses to operating uses. See table 6 for the amounts
waived or converted to disaster recovery and their uses.
Table 6: Waivers and Conversions of Capital Grants to Operating Uses in
Louisiana and Mississippi:
Transit agency: Louisiana; Shreveport Transit Management;
Amount: Waived share: $138,252;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: [Empty];
Uses: For the purchase of two new buses, one for the expansion of night
service and the other to add to its fleet to accommodate the influx of
new transit riders.
Transit agency: Louisiana; Houma Terrebonne Parish Consolidated
Government;
Amount: Waived share: $848,856;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: [Empty];
Uses: For the purchase of eight new buses to replace buses currently in
its fleet.
Transit agency: Louisiana; Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development;
Amount: Waived share: $4,166,758;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: [Empty];
Uses: For repairing damage to the facility where the New Orleans
Regional Planning Commission performs its regional planning duties; and
for the administration of the LA Swift emergency bus service.
Transit agency: Louisiana; New Orleans Regional Transit Authority;
Amount: Waived share: $15,859,854;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: $14,410,590;
Uses: For operating assistance, and for repairing damage to
infrastructure and equipment that resulted in substantial loss of
riders and economic hardship.
Transit agency: Louisiana; St. Bernard Parish Government;
Amount: Waived share: $40,000;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: $40,000;
Uses: For operating assistance.
Transit agency: Louisiana; City of Monroe;
Amount: Waived share: $190,358;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: [Empty];
Uses: For the purchase of three buses.
Transit agency: Louisiana; Baton Rouge Capital Area Transit System;
Amount: Waived share: $50,312;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: $214,801;
Uses: For operating assistance.
Transit agency: Subtotal;
Amount: Waived share: $21,294,390;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: $14,665,391.
Transit agency: Mississippi; Coast Transit Authority;
Amount: Waived share: $3,586,132;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: [Empty];
Uses: For repairing damage to the multimodal bus transportation
facility, and other operating, capital, and preventive maintenance
costs.
Transit agency: Mississippi; Subtotal;
Amount: Waived share: $3,586,132;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: [Empty].
Transit agency: Total;
Amount: Waived share: $24,880,522;
Amount: Converted grant assistance: $14,665,391.
Source: GAO analysis of FTA information.
[End of table]
Another $65 Million in Contracts Was Awarded for Transportation
Services and Other Disaster Recovery Needs:
In addition to the funding provided to state transportation departments
and transit agencies, FEMA and FTA awarded over $65 million to
contractors and other entities to support transit recovery in the Gulf
Coast. FEMA issued an $8.5 million mission assignment to DOT for a
contract for bus service, known as LA Swift, between Baton Rouge and
New Orleans for 10 months, ending November 30, 2006. NORTA then
provided this service from December 2006 through June 2007 under
contract with the Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development, using FTA-approved grant funds and waivers of local
matching fund requirements. Effective July 1, 2007, the service was
extended for 1 year, under a contract with and funded by Louisiana. In
December 2006, FEMA also awarded a $55 million contract to Global
Charter Services, Ltd.,[Footnote 15] to provide essential transit
services for individuals residing in temporary FEMA housing and to
provide for the emergency evacuation of those residents if needed. FTA
also awarded about $1.6 million in contracts for technical assistance
to support transit agencies in preparing damage assessment reports and
estimates of costs to repair and replace assets. For example, FTA
awarded a contract for $350,000 for technical assistance to Gulf Coast
transit agencies for posthurricane transit service recovery.
FEMA and FTA Have Provided at least $51 million of Other Disaster
Assistance for Transit since 1998:
Congress responded to the August 1, 2007, collapse of the I-35 bridge
in Minneapolis by authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to
provide up to $5 million of discretionary Bus and Bus Facility program
funds, normally used for capital expenditures, for the operation of
transit services to substitute for the highway capacity lost with the
bridge collapse. The Minneapolis city and suburban transit agencies are
using this funding to cover the cost of drivers, mechanics, fuel, and
other operating costs associated with operating additional buses and
running longer trips needed to avoid closed roads.
In addition to the Public Assistance program funding provided for
transit in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and
2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA has provided Public Assistance grants
to repair, restore, reconstruct, or replace transit equipment and
facilities after other disasters. However, we were unable to reliably
determine the total amounts provided for transit from the Public
Assistance program. FEMA's Public Assistance program records are in its
National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) database, but
NEMIS does not have the capability to sort Public Assistance grants
that supported transit out of the total database. Therefore, we
searched Public Assistance records in the database for transit-related
key words, as described in appendix I. As a result of this search, we
identified at least $46.7 million in Public Assistance grants for
transit from 1998 through August 2007. The $46.7 million figure should
be considered a minimum level of Public Assistance funding for transit
because we cannot ensure that we were able to identify all Public
Assistance funding for transit.
Lack of an Immediate Funding Mechanism and Funding Guidance and
Criteria Affected Federal Transit Assistance after the 2005 Gulf Coast
Hurricanes:
Several factors affected the timeliness and effectiveness of FEMA's and
FTA's assistance to transit after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes,
including the lack of mechanisms to provide immediate funding for
transit services and FEMA's lack of guidance and criteria for the types
and duration of services it would fund. Although the Stafford Act
authorized transportation assistance to enable communities to resume
their normal pattern of life as soon as possible, neither FEMA nor FTA
had a mechanism in place to get funding to transit providers
immediately after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Furthermore, FEMA's
effectiveness in responding to the disaster was limited by the agency's
lack of guidance on the types of transit services it can fund and
criteria for the duration of funding. These factors contributed to
delays in getting funding approved and, according to some funding
recipients, led to ending mission assignment funding before some
transit needs were met. Although DHS and FEMA are taking actions to
address a number of issues raised by the response to the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, these actions largely have not addressed FEMA's
response to providing transit services after a disaster.
FEMA and FTA Lacked a Mechanism to Provide Financial Assistance
Immediately after the Hurricanes, and Existing Funding Mechanisms Took
Time:
Both of FEMA's main means of providing disaster funding for transit--
mission assignments and its Public Assistance program--provide
reimbursement funding, requiring transit agencies to have other funding
to pay for their recovery efforts before they get FEMA funding. In a
recent report, we noted that FEMA, following the 2004 hurricanes in
Florida, had developed a process for applying for limited, expedited
Public Assistance funding for emergency work to be carried out within
60 days after a disaster.[Footnote 16] However, a FEMA official
indicated that this expedited funding would be available only for
debris removal and emergency protective measures within the first 60
days after a disaster. Therefore, this process would not have been a
funding option for funding transit operations. FTA does not have a
program to provide financial assistance to transit agencies after a
disaster. FTA can allow its grant recipients to defer their matching
share of program funding, and an official of one transit agency we
contacted said that FTA's deferral of local matching requirements for
its grant funds after Hurricane Katrina was important in allowing the
agency to resume very limited operations, even though the deferral was
not an infusion of new funds. However, such a deferral of matching
requirements may not provide sufficient help for a transit system
recovering from a major disaster.
According to NORTA, the primary transit agency for New Orleans, a lack
of financial resources immediately after Hurricane Katrina delayed its
response to the disaster. NORTA officials told us that their agency
depends on fare box revenues and a sales tax for operating support.
After Hurricane Katrina struck, funding from these sources stopped, and
the agency had no financial resources other than its bank balances and
was unable to pay its employees. On September 5, 2005, NORTA requested
financial assistance from FTA. Because of the extensive flooding in New
Orleans, the general public was evacuated from New Orleans, and regular
transit service could not be restored there immediately after the
disaster. However, Baton Rouge had absorbed tens of thousands of
residents and needed additional transit support. Immediately after the
evacuation of New Orleans, NORTA began contacting employees and
locating equipment that could be used to restore transit services.
NORTA told us it had vehicles and operators that could have supported
service in Baton Rouge if funding had been available. It took just over
1 month after the hurricane to develop a FEMA mission assignment to DOT
for NORTA, and for DOT to award a contract to NORTA to implement the
mission assignment. In the interim, NORTA provided no services. NORTA
officials also stated that, before the mission assignment was approved,
they had considered obtaining a line of credit through their bank, but
decided against borrowing money to pay for their operations until
funding from FEMA to repay the borrowed funds was assured. FTA staff
assisted NORTA in its recovery, including assisting in establishing a
maintenance facility and defining NORTA's needs to support the proposal
for the mission assignment, and the DOT contract to implement the
mission assignment was drafted at the same time. The contract
implementing NORTA's mission assignment was signed on October 1, 2005.
According to NORTA officials, the day after reimbursement was assured,
and days after the general public was allowed to return to New Orleans,
NORTA began to provide limited service in New Orleans, and 2 weeks
later, the transit agency began to provide service in Baton Rouge and
to nearby communities.
FEMA's Timeliness and Effectiveness in Providing Assistance for Transit
Was Further Limited by a Lack of Guidance and Criteria:
FEMA had not developed any guidance to define the types of transit
assistance it could provide. According to some FEMA officials, this
lack of guidance provides the agency with flexibility in responding to
unpredictable situations and finding ways to save lives immediately
after a disaster. On the other hand, the experience following the 2005
Gulf Coast hurricanes suggests that this lack of guidance could also
delay decisions about funding transit services following a catastrophic
disaster. A FEMA official involved in developing mission assignments
for transit after the Gulf Coast hurricanes indicated that mission
assignments are ordinarily used to meet emergency response needs for up
to 60 days after a disaster. However, the scope of the damage left by
the hurricanes required long-term recovery assistance beyond what FEMA
typically provides through mission assignments, and deciding what
services could be funded without violating the Stafford Act was a
constant concern for FEMA staff who needed to consult FEMA's General
Counsel on all mission assignments. For their part, the transit
agencies and state transportation departments with whom we spoke
generally said that the DOT contracts in support of the mission
assignments were difficult and time-consuming to negotiate, requiring
multiple discussions to resolve a variety of issues, including types of
service, service routes, hours of service, and reimbursement rates for
services. This process added to the time needed to finalize the four
contracts in support of the mission assignments issued for emergency
public transportation services in Louisiana and Mississippi after the
Gulf Coast hurricanes. Finalizing these mission assignments, and the
contracts to implement them, took from just over 1 month to more than 4
months after the hurricane.
FEMA's lack of criteria for determining the duration of disaster
assistance for transit resulted in FEMA's ending funding while transit
agencies believed they had continuing needs. FEMA officials with whom
we spoke said that decisions to conclude the mission assignments for
transit reflected factors such as declines in ridership or the
availability of other funding. However, some transit and state agency
officials with whom we spoke indicated that transit services were
curtailed when the mission assignment funding ended. NORTA officials
said that when their mission assignment funding ended, they
discontinued their support for paratransit service in Baton Rouge as
well as for service on 12 routes that served Baton Rouge and nearby
trailer sites. In addition, NORTA officials told us they had to lay off
some employees.[Footnote 17] An official of the CTA in Mississippi also
indicated that his agency could not continue the services FEMA had
funded after the agency's mission assignment ended in February 2006,
and service reverted to the reduced levels provided before the mission
assignment began. The official also said that as of September 2007, 2
years after the hurricane, some FEMA group sites in Mississippi still
had no transit service.
According to the state transportation department and transit agency
officials with whom we spoke, FEMA decided when to let mission
assignments end and did not always consider the communities' need for
the funded services or the transit agency's ability to continue the
services on its own. For example, the Mississippi Department of
Transportation received funding through a FEMA mission assignment to
provide demand-response service in three rural counties. A department
official stated that FEMA's reason for allowing the mission assignment
funding to end was the low level of demand for the service. The
official acknowledged that demand for the service was less than
initially expected, but he stated that a real need for the service for
the elderly and other public transportation-dependent individuals
continued after the funding ended. He said that community organizations
were able to provide some of this service, but not at the levels
provided under FEMA funding.
The problems that arose in connection with providing disaster
assistance for transit after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes are not
unique to the transit sector. In our earlier report on the response to
Hurricane Katrina,[Footnote 18] we identified three basic elements
necessary to prepare for and respond to a major disaster--including
clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities, the capability
to fulfill those roles and responsibilities, and balance between the
need to respond quickly and to maintain accountability for the use of
resources. Both FEMA and FTA lacked the capability to provide funding
to transit agencies quickly after the disaster, and FEMA's lack of
guidance on its role in and responsibility for assisting transit was a
factor that FEMA had to resolve in deciding on the types and duration
of services it would support.
FEMA Changes after the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes Are Not Addressing
Issues Raised by the Agency's Experience with Transit:
FEMA has begun to make a number of changes in response to lessons
learned from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Thus far, however, none of
these changes directly addresses FEMA's assistance for public
transportation. DHS's National Response Framework reflects key lessons
learned from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, focusing particularly on
how the federal government is organized to support communities and
states after a catastrophic incident. Recognizing the need to issue
mission assignments quickly, FEMA is also developing prescripted
mission assignments to simplify and expedite the mission assignment
process.
According to DHS, the Framework is intended to accelerate and make more
disciplined the federal government's capacity to rapidly assess and
respond to an incident that will need federal assistance. The Framework
also identifies ESFs, which designate federal agencies' roles for
different aspects of disaster response. DOT remains the lead agency for
ESF 1 for transportation, with responsibility for assessing and
reporting on damage to the transportation system in a disaster and for
coordinating its restoration and recovery. However, a memorandum of
understanding signed by DHS and DOT in October 2007 shifts
responsibility for coordinating all emergency transportation services,
including the movement of commodities, goods, equipment, and emergency
response personnel, from DOT to FEMA. Neither the Framework nor the
memorandum of understanding helps clarify the federal government's
response to a disaster's impact on transit. For example, ESF-1 under
the Framework includes new wording, stating that FEMA should provide
timely funding to activate transportation activities that are eligible
for funding under the Stafford Act. However, this wording does not help
to clarify FEMA's or FTA's roles or to establish any new direction that
would result in more timely assistance to restore transit services. In
addition, under the memorandum of understanding, DOT will continue to
be responsible for "alternative transportation services" after a
disaster. According to DOT officials, "alternative transportation
services" could include providing ferry service when a bridge has been
damaged or destroyed, but could also include transit services.
In addition to issuing the Framework, to date FEMA has developed over
180 prescripted mission assignments for various agencies for disaster
response functions. The purpose of prescripted mission assignments is
to facilitate common language between FEMA, other federal agencies, and
state and local organizations to expedite their issuance, because
mission assignments are intended to be FEMA's mechanism for quickly
directing other federal agency actions. The use of prescripted mission
assignments could also promote consistency in an agency's response when
a major disaster affects multiple states. While some prescripted
mission assignments address DOT's role in evacuation and transporting
first responders--by, for example, identifying the personnel
responsible for aiding in an evacuation--FEMA has not yet drafted any
prescripted mission assignments for operating or restoring transit
services. According to a FEMA official, the agency does not plan to
draft a prescripted mission assignment for transit operations, because
under the memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT, FEMA is to
assume parts of DOT's emergency response functions for transportation,
and, therefore, prescripted mission assignments are not necessary.
Additional Options Exist for Providing Assistance for Transit after a
Major Disaster:
Additional options exist at the state, local, and federal levels for
providing transit services and assistance for transit after a major
disaster. At the state and local levels, mutual aid agreements can
support transit recovery after a disaster by allowing transit agencies
to obtain resources and personnel from agencies outside of the disaster
area. At the federal level, existing DOT authorities and programs
suggest potential additional options of (1) making permanent the
temporary authorities that FTA has been given to respond to the 2005
Gulf Coast hurricanes and (2) adopting the existing DOT emergency
program for highway repairs administered by FHWA, either by
establishing a comparable program for FTA and transit or incorporating
transit assistance as an eligible activity within FHWA's program.
Despite potential advantages, both options at the federal level face
certain challenges and consequences, including funding the expanded
scope and cost of an emergency relief program.
Mutual Aid Agreements Can Support Recovery at the State and Local
Levels:
Existing mutual aid agreement programs can also support transit
recovery after a disaster. Such agreements can allow transit agencies
to network across state and local jurisdictions to obtain needed
transit resources after a disaster. We recently reported on an
interstate mutual aid program, EMAC.[Footnote 19] This program
establishes a structure for states to collectively address issues that
transcend state borders by allowing member states to, among other
things, request assistance, reimburse assisting states, and be covered
by liability and workers' compensation protection. Representatives from
the affected state inform EMAC leadership that interstate assistance
may be needed. The assisting states work with the requesting state to
identify required resources and other details. Once the missions have
been completed and resources have returned home, the assisting states
prepare formal requests for reimbursement, which are then sent to, and
processed by, the requesting state. While EMAC reimbursement is
intended to be independent of any federal assistance, impacted states
can request funding from FEMA's Public Assistance program to help cover
eligible costs for missions under EMAC.
APTA has recently developed an Emergency Response and Preparedness
Program that allows transit systems to volunteer their resources--
including buses, fueling systems, trailer trucks, generators, drivers
and mechanics--for temporary emergency transit needs. APTA maintains
information on the resources of each member agency, and it gives
members' access to the national Emergency Response and Preparedness
Program resource so that transit agencies can locate needed resources
in an emergency. As of September 2007, no transit agencies had yet made
use of APTA's program.
Mutual aid agreements can also work within states. For example, the
Florida Department of Transportation established a mutual aid agreement
between all of the transit systems in the state, agreeing that they
would assist each other in times of disaster by providing transit
resources, such as buses, temporary facilities, and personnel, that can
be loaned immediately to meet the needs of agencies affected by a
disaster. According to Florida Department of Transportation officials,
public transportation agencies must become actively involved with
others in their communities in planning for emergencies. To this end,
the department also works with local transit agencies to support
disaster planning and response.
Modifying Existing Federal Authorities and Programs Could Enhance
Recovery Capabilities but Would Also Impose Costs:
At the federal level, existing DOT authorities and programs suggest
further potential options, including giving FTA permanent authority to
waive certain grant fund requirements and creating a disaster relief
program for transit similar to an FHWA program for federal highways. In
June 2006, Congress gave FTA temporary authority, for 2 years, to allow
transit agencies directly affected by Hurricane Katrina to use grant
funds--generally for capital expenditures--for operating expenses. FTA
was also authorized to waive the requirement for transit agencies to
provide matching funds in order to receive federal funds. If made
permanent, this authority would enable FTA to make an existing source
of funds immediately available for transit agencies to begin restoring
transit services after a disaster. Transit agencies in Louisiana and
Mississippi told us that immediate funding was one of their most urgent
needs after Hurricane Katrina, once regular revenue sources, such as
fare receipts, ceased. Under this option, however, funding would be
limited to the amount that the affected transit agency had received
from FTA through its regular grant programs, rather than being based on
specific needs. This amount might support only limited service. In
addition, the projects that the grant money was intended to fund would
be delayed or not done at all.
FHWA's Emergency Relief program could also serve as a model for
providing assistance for transit. This program makes funds available
for the repair or reconstruction of roadways on the federal-aid highway
system and on federal lands that have suffered serious damage as a
result of a natural disaster or catastrophic failure from an external
cause.[Footnote 20] Assistance for the repair or reconstruction of
roadways that are not on the federal system remains the responsibility
of FEMA. FHWA regulations and guidance provide detailed standards for
the nature and type of work that is eligible for federal funding and
criteria for the duration of assistance in the two major categories--
emergency repairs and permanent repairs. Emergency repairs are those
accomplished during and immediately following a disaster to restore
essential traffic, minimize damage, and protect remaining facilities.
Such assistance is generally limited to 180 days following a disaster
and includes activities such as removing debris and constructing
detours, but specifically prohibits other work such as repairing
roadway surfaces damaged by traffic. Permanent repairs are those done
to restore the highway to its predisaster condition. Again, FHWA
regulations and guidance provide eligibility parameters, including
prohibiting "betterments" that increase capacity, correct nondisaster-
related deficiencies, or otherwise improve highway facilities. For both
emergency repairs and permanent repairs, FHWA regulations and guidance
specify maximum percentages of project funding that the program will
provide and set a cap on the total program funding that can be provided
within a state for any disaster.
The Emergency Relief program also provides for a "quick release" of
funding in some cases. According to FHWA's guidance, the quick release
method is not appropriate for all disasters, but is generally used for
larger disasters where extensive damage is readily evident and where
there is a desire at the state and federal levels to have funds flowing
quickly to the state. No on-site damage surveys or formal disaster
assessments are required, as they normally are for the program;
instead, the assessment may be based on other readily available
information, such as credible media reports or aerial surveys done by
the state. The goal of the quick release method is to begin the flow of
funds to the state within 1 to 2 days.
FHWA's Emergency Relief program could be adapted for transit through
either of two approaches:
* First, Congress could establish a comparable emergency relief program
for FTA and transit. Under this approach, FTA could provide either
limited, short-term funding for transit operations after a disaster or
longer-term funding for the repair and replacement of facilities and
equipment. This approach would provide specific funding for FTA to meet
transit needs after a disaster; however, establishing such a program
would require defining criteria for transit disasters that would
qualify for assistance, setting limits on the amount or duration of
financial assistance, and ensuring accountability for the use of funds.
In addition, this approach would enable FTA to target funding to the
transit providers with the greatest needs, as opposed to allowing
transit agencies to use whatever grant funding they had already
received. Such a program could reduce or eliminate the need for FEMA
mission assignments and reduce the delays and uncertainty that
characterized the provision of assistance to Gulf Coast transit
agencies. Moreover, such a program, if modeled along the lines of the
FHWA program, could also include a quick release method of funding.
* Second, Congress could incorporate transit assistance as an eligible
activity within FHWA's Emergency Relief program. This approach would
have the advantage of using the existing FHWA processes for
administering the program, and it could support greater coordination
between the highway and transit communities in disaster recovery. Some
of the current program's eligibility criteria for disaster assistance-
-such as the thresholds for the minimum damage amounts that qualify for
program assistance---could be applicable to transit. Other criteria,
such as the types of work eligible for funding, would need to be
developed.
Despite potential advantages, both approaches to implementing a
disaster relief program for transit pose challenges and consequences.
For example, it would be necessary to determine the extent to which any
new or expanded DOT program would assume responsibility for assistance
formerly provided by FEMA. Developing consistent eligibility standards
for transit operations would also be daunting, given the diversity of
providers and differences in the size of transit operations and in the
scope of services that transit systems provide.
The most important challenge under either approach would be a
significant expansion of the scope and cost of DOT's Emergency Relief
program. As we have recently reported, this program already faces a
fiscal imbalance and its long-term sustainability is a
concern.[Footnote 21] Although funding for the program is provided
annually from the Highway Trust Fund, since 1990, 86 percent of the
program's costs have been funded through supplemental appropriations
because the program's annual demands have greatly exceeded the funding
provided. Contributing to these additional demands has been the gradual
expansion of eligibility criteria for disaster relief--for example,
projects have grown in scope and costs because of environmental and
community concerns, and Congress and FHWA have expanded the definition
of eligible disasters and added to the types of work that could be
funded. Identifying funding for an expanded or new emergency relief
program would be problematic. Revenues supporting the Highway Trust
Fund--the major source of federal highway and transit funding--are
eroding and may not be sufficient to support existing programs in the
coming years. According to a recent Congressional Budget Office
estimate, expenditures from the Mass Transit Account within the Trust
Fund will exceed revenues by 2012. Furthermore, as entitlement programs
grow and consume increasing shares of federal spending, the funding for
all discretionary federal programs will be constrained.
Conclusions:
The restoration of transit facilities and services after major
disasters has taken different forms since 1998, and each disaster has
posed unique challenges. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
New York City caused massive destruction of transit infrastructure at
the World Trade Center site, requiring over $4 billion in federal
assistance to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure. By comparison, the
2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes caused far less destruction to transit
infrastructure, but created a need to provide continuing transit
services for displaced populations.
Although the Stafford Act authorizes public transportation services to
meet emergency needs and to help communities resume their normal
pattern of life as soon as possible, FEMA's experiences after the 2005
Gulf Coast hurricanes illustrate the many hurdles that may be involved
in providing such services. Already burdened with a massive response
and recovery effort, FEMA had to make some difficult decisions about
the extent of its authority to fund transit operations. Without
guidance on the types of public transportation services that could be
funded and criteria for determining the duration of that funding, FEMA
took up to 4 months to make funding decisions. Such guidance and
criteria would provide a frame of reference for all parties involved in
responding to future disasters and could expedite future funding
decisions. Moreover, with such guidance, FEMA could develop prescripted
mission assignments for public transportation, as it has done for other
response and recovery activities, which could reduce ambiguity and
further expedite the mission assignment process when time is critical
following a disaster. Although FEMA officials do not believe it is
necessary to develop prescripted mission assignments for
transportation, because FEMA will be assuming parts of DOT's
responsibility for emergency response, DOT can still be tasked with
providing alternative transportation services that can be carried out
by others, and prescripted mission assignments could expedite its
provision of those services.
Additional options for increasing FTA's authority and capacity to
respond to disasters affecting transit require congressional action. A
careful examination of the advantages, consequences, and feasibility of
these options could help enhance the limited ability of the federal
government to provide immediate financial assistance to transit
agencies in response to a disaster, to fund emergency services and to
enable communities to quickly resume a normal pattern of life.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To promote timely and effective disaster assistance for public transit,
we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Administrator of FEMA to take the following two actions:
* Develop guidance or regulations outlining the types of operating
assistance for transit that FEMA will or will not fund following a
disaster and criteria for determining the duration of funding for these
services.
* Draft prescripted mission assignments for public transportation
services to provide a frame of reference for FEMA, FTA, and state
transportation departments in developing mission assignments after
future disasters. The prescripted mission assignments could reflect
FEMA's guidance and criteria for funding public transportation
services, reduce ambiguity, and potentially expedite their issuance so
that agencies that are relying on FEMA funding could begin their
disaster recovery.
To enable FTA to provide more direct and timely assistance to transit
agencies following a disaster, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation evaluate the feasibility of options to increase FTA's
authority to provide immediate financial assistance, and seek
legislative authority as appropriate.
Agency Comments:
We provided DHS and DOT with copies of this report for their review and
comment. DOT provided oral comments on January 17, 2008. DOT generally
agreed with the facts presented and with our recommendation that it
evaluate the feasibility of options to increase FTA's authority to
provide immediate financial assistance, and seek legislative authority
as appropriate. FTA stated that these options would be considered by
its policy working group that is developing portions of the
department's legislative proposal for reauthorizing surface
transportation programs. On January 22, 2008, DHS responded by e-mail
that it would take our two recommendations under advisement. DHS and
DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this
report as appropriate.
We will send copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
Transportation, and other interested parties. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact Katherine Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or
siggerudk@gao.gov if you or your staffs have any questions about this
report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff
who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the role of the
federal government in providing transit services and assisting transit
agencies after a major disaster; (2) the amounts, sources, and uses of
federal disaster assistance provided for transit since 1998; (3)
factors that affected the timeliness and effectiveness of federal
assistance for transit services after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes;
and (4) additional options for providing transit services and
assistance for transit after a major disaster.
To determine the role of the federal government in providing transit
services and assisting transit agencies after a major disaster, we
reviewed and analyzed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance on the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) and the Federal Transit
Administration's (FTA) authorities and responsibilities in responding
to disasters affecting transit. We interviewed FEMA and FTA officials
to determine their roles in providing disaster assistance to transit
agencies. We also reviewed applicable legal materials. In addition, we
reviewed emergency supplemental appropriations related to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001; the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes; and the
Minneapolis, Minnesota, I-35 bridge collapse of August 2007 to identify
appropriations designated for emergency transit. We analyzed
regulations and guidance--including FEMA's National Response Plan and
National Response Framework, FEMA Mission Assignment Standard Operating
Procedures, and FEMA Public Assistance guidance--to gain an
understanding of FEMA's role in disaster assistance to transit. We also
visited FEMA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; FEMA Region VI in
Denton, Texas; FTA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; FTA Region IV in
Atlanta, Georgia; and FTA Region VI in Fort Worth, Texas. During these
visits, we talked with agency officials about the role of the federal
government during recent disasters. Furthermore, to better understand
the federal response to disasters, we reviewed information included in
several GAO and Congressional Research Service products.
To determine the amounts, sources, and uses of federal disaster
assistance provided for transit since 1998, we reviewed and analyzed,
among other materials, supplemental appropriations funding designated
for transit recovery after September 11, 2001; the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes; and any other disaster since 1998. Through interviews and
documentation obtained from FTA officials, we quantified FTA indirect
financial support to transit provided through waivers of local matching
funds and conversions of capital grant funds to disaster recovery uses.
We also reviewed and analyzed FEMA and FTA financial assistance for
transit after recent disasters--specifically, the September 11
terrorist attacks on New York and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. FEMA
provided data on Public Assistance program funding for response actions
after the September 11 terrorist attacks, and two Gulf Coast transit
agencies provided data on funding they received from FEMA's Public
assistance program after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Finally, we
discussed the uses of this federal assistance with officials from the
New Orleans Regional Transit Authority, the Coast Transit Authority,
the Capital Area Transit System, the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development, and the Mississippi Department of
Transportation. On the basis of interviews with knowledgeable agency
officials and checks of the reasonableness of the information, we
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
In addition to information developed for the September 11 terrorist
attacks and the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, we also attempted to
quantify FEMA Public Assistance disaster funding to transit providers
over time. FEMA officials indicated they did not have information on
Public Assistance grants that supported transit; developing this
information would require a search of Public Assistance grant
information in their National Emergency Management Information System
(NEMIS) database. We limited the scope of our analysis to disasters
occurring from 1998 to August 2007 because FEMA officials indicated
that NEMIS data prior to 1998 were incomplete. The NEMIS system is not
able to sort transit grants from grants for other purposes. As an
alternative approach, we searched grant applicant names and scope of
work descriptions for any of several key words, such as "transit,"
"bus," or "rail," to identify Public Assistance grants that supported
transit. We then reviewed individual Public Assistance grants
identified by this process to select those that related to transit.
Because our methodology for searching the database did not ensure that
we identified all Public Assistance grants to transit for the time
period we searched, the amount we report for FEMA Pubic Assistance
grants for transit should be viewed as a minimum figure. There may have
been other funds provided for transit purposes that we did not
identify. In addition, FEMA staff used a similar approach to determine
the amount of Public Assistance program funding for emergency ferry
service in New York after the terrorist attacks, which resulted in the
same uncertainty about identifying all funding. Although the
reliability of these dollar amounts is undetermined, we believe their
magnitude of uncertainty is relatively small compared with the nearly
$5 billion in federal spending for emergency transit purposes.
Therefore, we found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. Also, the inclusion of these data does not affect our
conclusions or recommendations.
To determine the factors that affected the timeliness and effectiveness
of federal assistance for transit after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes,
we identified and analyzed the criteria and guidance that FEMA and FTA
use in providing disaster assistance for transit. We assessed FEMA's
and FTA's guidance and criteria related to the timeliness and duration
of assistance to transit agencies and discussed the implementation of
the guidance and criteria with FEMA and FTA officials. To evaluate the
timeliness of assistance, we reviewed mission assignment documentation
and determined the period between the date of the disaster and the date
of issuance for each mission assignment. To evaluate the duration of
assistance, we reviewed mission assignment documentation and determined
the period from the issuance date to the end date for each mission
assignment. To obtain transit agencies' perspectives on the timeliness
and effectiveness of federal assistance, we interviewed officials from
the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority, the Coast Transit
Authority, the Capital Area Transit System, the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development, and the Mississippi Department of
Transportation.
To identify additional options for providing transit services and
assistance for transit after a major disaster, we reviewed and
analyzed, among other materials, the Federal Highway Administration's
Emergency Relief program guidance; the American Public Transit
Association's Emergency Response and Preparedness Program guidance; the
Community Transportation Association of America's documents related to
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, including what is needed for
future disasters; the Florida Department of Transportation's Transit
Emergency Planning and Response Assessment Initiative; and our report
on the National Emergency Management Association's Emergency Assistance
Compact. We discussed alternative options for providing assistance for
transit after a catastrophic disaster with officials from FTA and the
American Public Transit Association, the Community Transportation
Association of America, and the Florida Department of Transportation
and determined whether these options were feasible for providing or
improving federal assistance for transit after a catastrophic disaster.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Steve Cohen, Assistant
Director; Dwayne Curry; Elizabeth Eisenstadt; Cynthia Grant; Kristin
Hughes; Bert Japikse; and Donald Kittler made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-288; codified at 42 U.S.C. ch. 68.
[2] 42 U.S.C. § 5186.
[3] FEMA can provide partial "immediate needs funding" under its Public
Assistance program, for debris removal and emergency protective
measures within the first 60 days after a disaster, but this funding
would not be available for transit operations.
[4] DHS's National Response Plan, issued in 2004, described how the
federal government coordinates with state, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector in responding to disasters. The
plan's Emergency Support Function annexes detailed specific federal
agencies' responsibilities.
[5] GAO, Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address
Fiscal Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability, GAO-07-245 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 23, 2007).
[6] The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59.
[7] 42 U.S.C. § 5186.
[8] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234 §
7025.
[9] The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for further Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-
206, ch. 11.
[10] In addition to funding transit projects, a portion of FEMA funds
went toward the restoration of Route 9A and the establishment of a
promenade adjacent to the World Trade Center site. The Route 9A and
promenade project is estimated to cost $287.3 million.
[11] Pub. L. No. 107-206, ch. 13.
[12] Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7.
[13] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, title IV,
ch. 8.
[14] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, §
7025.
[15] Global Charter Services, Ltd., operating under the name "The
BusBank," provides charter bus services.
[16] GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National
Disaster Response, GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).
[17] However, NORTA, through a contract with the Louisiana Department
of Transportation and Development, was able to begin operating the LA
Swift service between New Orleans and Baton Rouge in December 2006 with
FTA-approved funding from other grants and waived local matching funds.
[18] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[19] GAO-07-854.
[20] Federal-aid highway systems means the National Highway System, the
Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense
Highways, and all other public roads not classified as local roads or
rural minor collectors.
[21] GAO-07-245.
[End of section]
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