National Disaster Response
FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors Gao ID: GAO-08-369 February 27, 2008Using lessons from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the federal government released the National Response Framework (NRF) in January 2008. This report examines (1) why the primary role for mass care in the NRF shifted from the Red Cross to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and potential issues with implementation, (2) whether National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (NVOAD)--an umbrella organization of 49 voluntary agencies--is equipped to fulfill its NRF role, (3) the extent to which FEMA has addressed issues with mass care for the disabled since the hurricanes, (4) the extent to which major voluntary agencies have prepared to better serve the disabled since the hurricanes, and (5) the extent to which FEMA has addressed issues voluntary agencies faced in receiving Public Assistance reimbursement. To analyze these issues, GAO reviewed the NRF and other documents, and interviewed officials from FEMA, voluntary agencies, and state and local governments.
FEMA and the Red Cross agreed that FEMA should be the primary agency for mass care in the NRF because the primary agency should be able to direct federal agencies' resources to meet mass care needs, which the Red Cross cannot do. The shifting roles present several implementation issues. For example, while FEMA has enhanced responsibilities for coordinating the activities of voluntary organizations, it does not currently have a sufficient number of specialized staff to meet this responsibility. NVOAD has characteristics that help it carry out its broad role of facilitating voluntary organization and government coordination, but limited staff resources constrain its ability to effectively fulfill its role in disaster response situations. NVOAD held daily conference calls with its members after Hurricane Katrina, but these calls were not an effective means of sharing information, reflecting the fact that NVOAD had only one employee at the time of Katrina. FEMA has begun taking steps in several areas to improve mass care for the disabled based on lessons learned from the Gulf Coast hurricanes. For example, FEMA hired a Disability Coordinator to integrate disability issues into federal emergency planning and preparedness efforts. However, FEMA has generally not coordinated with a key federal disability agency, the National Council on Disability, in the implementation of various initiatives, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Red Cross has taken steps to improve mass care services for the disabled, but still faces challenges. For example, the Red Cross developed a shelter intake form to assist staff in determining whether a particular shelter can meet an individual's needs. However, Red Cross officials said that some local chapters are still not fully prepared to serve individuals with disabilities. Other voluntary organizations had not identified a need to improve services for individuals with disabilities, and we did not identify concerns with their services. FEMA has partially addressed the issues faced by local voluntary organizations, such as churches, in seeking Public Assistance reimbursement for mass care-related expenses after the hurricanes. At the time of the hurricanes, a key FEMA reimbursement program was not designed for a disaster of Katrina's magnitude, but FEMA has changed its regulations to address this issue. Local voluntary organizations also had difficulty getting accurate information about reimbursement opportunities. Key FEMA staff had not received training on reimbursement policies and sometimes did not provide accurate information, and some of the information on FEMA's Web site was not presented in a user-friendly format. FEMA has not addressed these communication issues.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-369, National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2008:
National Disaster Response:
FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and Coordination between
Government and Voluntary Sectors:
GAO-08-369:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-369, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Using lessons from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the federal
government released the National Response Framework (NRF) in January
2008. This report examines (1) why the primary role for mass care in
the NRF shifted from the Red Cross to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), and potential issues with implementation, (2) whether
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (NVOAD)”an
umbrella organization of 49 voluntary agencies”is equipped to fulfill
its NRF role, (3) the extent to which FEMA has addressed issues with
mass care for the disabled since the hurricanes, (4) the extent to
which major voluntary agencies have prepared to better serve the
disabled since the hurricanes, and (5) the extent to which FEMA has
addressed issues voluntary agencies faced in receiving Public
Assistance reimbursement. To analyze these issues, GAO reviewed the NRF
and other documents, and interviewed officials from FEMA, voluntary
agencies, and state and local governments.
What GAO Found:
FEMA and the Red Cross agreed that FEMA should be the primary agency
for mass care in the NRF because the primary agency should be able to
direct federal agencies‘ resources to meet mass care needs, which the
Red Cross cannot do. The shifting roles present several implementation
issues. For example, while FEMA has enhanced responsibilities for
coordinating the activities of voluntary organizations, it does not
currently have a sufficient number of specialized staff to meet this
responsibility.
NVOAD has characteristics that help it carry out its broad role of
facilitating voluntary organization and government coordination, but
limited staff resources constrain its ability to effectively fulfill
its role in disaster response situations. NVOAD held daily conference
calls with its members after Hurricane Katrina, but these calls were
not an effective means of sharing information, reflecting the fact that
NVOAD had only one employee at the time of Katrina.
FEMA has begun taking steps in several areas to improve mass care for
the disabled based on lessons learned from the Gulf Coast hurricanes.
For example, FEMA hired a Disability Coordinator to integrate
disability issues into federal emergency planning and preparedness
efforts. However, FEMA has generally not coordinated with a key federal
disability agency, the National Council on Disability, in the
implementation of various initiatives, as required by the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.
The Red Cross has taken steps to improve mass care services for the
disabled, but still faces challenges. For example, the Red Cross
developed a shelter intake form to assist staff in determining whether
a particular shelter can meet an individual‘s needs. However, Red Cross
officials said that some local chapters are still not fully prepared to
serve individuals with disabilities. Other voluntary organizations had
not identified a need to improve services for individuals with
disabilities, and we did not identify concerns with their services.
FEMA has partially addressed the issues faced by local voluntary
organizations, such as churches, in seeking Public Assistance
reimbursement for mass care-related expenses after the hurricanes. At
the time of the hurricanes, a key FEMA reimbursement program was not
designed for a disaster of Katrina‘s magnitude, but FEMA has changed
its regulations to address this issue. Local voluntary organizations
also had difficulty getting accurate information about reimbursement
opportunities. Key FEMA staff had not received training on
reimbursement policies and sometimes did not provide accurate
information, and some of the information on FEMA‘s Web site was not
presented in a user-friendly format. FEMA has not addressed these
communication issues.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) FEMA improve coordination with voluntary
agencies, such as by enhancing capabilities of its specialized staff,
(2) NVOAD improve information-sharing during the response to disasters,
and (3) FEMA increase coordination with the National Council on
Disability. Agency officials agreed with the recommendations.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-369].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
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[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FEMA Became the Primary Mass Care Agency Because the Red Cross Cannot
Direct Federal Resources, and the Shifting Roles Present Several
Implementation Issues:
NVOAD Has Several Characteristics That Help It Carry Out Its ESF-6
Role, but Is Constrained by Limited Staff Resources:
FEMA Has Made Progress Addressing Mass Care Issues for the Disabled,
but Has Generally Not Coordinated as Required with NCD:
The Red Cross Has Taken Steps to Better Serve the Disabled, but
Continues to Face Challenges:
Local Voluntary Agencies Faced Several Problems in Obtaining
Reimbursement and FEMA Has Partially Addressed These Issues:
Conclusion:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: NVOAD Members:
Appendix III: Job Duties of FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons:
Appendix IV: Shelter Intake Form:
Appendix V: Comments from NVOAD:
Appendix VI: Comments from NCD:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Bibliography:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: NVOAD Responsibilities under the NRF:
Figures:
Figure 1: Red Cross Roles in Disaster Response:
Figure 2: FEMA Regions Covered by Voluntary Agency Liaisons, as of
December 2007:
Figure 3: Information Flow on NVOAD Conference Calls after Hurricane
Katrina:
Figure 4: FEMA Response to NCD Coordination Requirements in the Post-
Katrina Act, as of December 2007:
Abbreviations:
ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ESF: emergency support function:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
NCD: National Council on Disability:
NRF: National Response Framework:
NRP: National Response Plan:
NSS: National Shelter System:
NVOAD: National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters:
OIG: Office of the Inspector General:
VAL: Voluntary Agency Liaison:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 27, 2008:
Congressional Requesters:
The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes caused extensive human suffering and
damage along the Gulf Coast, and highlighted the need for improved
coordination of mass care services, such as shelter and feeding.
Voluntary organizations, including the American Red Cross and the
Salvation Army, play a critical role in providing these services after
disasters. Using lessons learned from the hurricanes, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has developed the National Response Framework
(NRF) that defines the roles of federal, state, local, tribal
governments; the private sector; and voluntary organizations in
response to disasters, including mass care. The NRF--which was released
in January 2008--designates 15 emergency support functions (ESF) that
address specific disaster response needs. The NRF made a key change to
the prior 2004 National Response Plan (NRP) by shifting the primary
agency responsibility for coordinating federal support for mass care
under the sixth emergency support function (ESF-6) from the Red Cross
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a federal agency
that is a component of DHS. [Footnote 1] As the primary agency for mass
care, FEMA is responsible for convening organizations that are part of
ESF-6 after disasters and responding to state requests for assistance
by directing resources from federal agencies to meet state needs. Under
the NRF, states continue to have principal responsibility for meeting
mass care needs.
When responding to a disaster, states utilize the mass care services of
voluntary organizations. The Red Cross--the nation's largest mass care
provider--has two distinct roles in disaster response. As a support
agency under ESF-6 of the NRF, the Red Cross assists FEMA and states in
coordinating mass care activities. The Red Cross also maintains a
separate role outside of the federal framework as a private mass care
service provider using donated funds. National Voluntary Organizations
Active in Disasters (NVOAD), an umbrella organization of 49 nonprofits
(see app. II for a list of NVOAD members as of December 2007), is also
a support agency under ESF-6. NVOAD has responsibility for sharing
information and facilitating collaboration among its members while
these organizations plan for and respond to disasters. As support
agencies, the Red Cross and NVOAD work with FEMA at the nation's
disaster response center after disasters. After Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, mass care services to the disabled and elderly were identified as
a key problem. Partly in response, Congress passed the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006[Footnote 2] (Post-Katrina Act
or the Act), which included provisions directing FEMA to assist states,
localities, and voluntary organizations in preparing to serve these
populations.
After Katrina, local voluntary organizations--such as churches--played
a critical role in providing mass care. At one point after Katrina,
nearly as many evacuees were staying in shelters operated by churches
and other small nonprofits as were staying in Red Cross shelters.
[Footnote 3] These organizations often sought reimbursement for related
expenses through the Public Assistance program, which is administered
by FEMA. The federal government generally provides funds to state and
local governments through the Public Assistance program, which then
reimburse voluntary organizations.
Our previous work on the federal response to the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes identified three main areas of concern: a lack of clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, the capabilities to perform those
roles and responsibilities, and accountability for resources.[Footnote
4] This report examines the following questions: (1) What was the
rationale of DHS for shifting the primary role for coordinating mass
care from the Red Cross to FEMA, and what are potential implementation
issues associated with this change? (2) How well equipped is NVOAD to
fulfill its role in ESF-6 of the NRF? (3) To what extent has FEMA
addressed issues that arose after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with the
provision of mass care services to the disabled and elderly? (4) To
what extent have major national voluntary organizations made
preparations since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to better meet the mass
care needs of the disabled and elderly? and (5) What difficulties did
local voluntary organizations providing mass care after Katrina and
Rita face in being reimbursed under FEMA's Public Assistance Program,
and to what extent has FEMA addressed these issues?
To obtain information on changes in the roles of FEMA and the Red Cross
under the NRF, we reviewed key FEMA and Red Cross documents, such as
the new NRF, and interviewed officials from FEMA, the Red Cross, other
major national voluntary organizations, including the Salvation Army
and Southern Baptists, and emergency management officials from a
selection of states that included Louisiana, Mississippi, and nine
other states throughout the country to help us identify potential
implementation issues with the shift in roles in the new ESF-6. We
gathered information about NVOAD's capability to perform its NRF role
by reviewing NVOAD documents about its member services, internal
governance, funding and plans for the future. We also interviewed
officials from NVOAD, eight of NVOAD's member organizations, and FEMA
to obtain additional information. To gather information about the
efforts made by FEMA and voluntary organizations to improve services
for individuals with disabilities and the elderly, we interviewed FEMA
officials, officials from five major national voluntary organizations-
the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, Southern Baptists,
and United Way-local-and state-level emergency managers from
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and officials from advocacy groups
for elderly and disabled populations.[Footnote 5] We also reviewed FEMA
and Red Cross documents that pertained to the elderly and disabled. To
examine issues related to the Public Assistance Program, we reviewed
FEMA's regulations, policies, and protocols for reimbursements at the
time of Katrina and subsequent changes to these regulations, policies
and procedures. We also reviewed FEMA's website and interviewed
officials within FEMA's Public Assistance Program, FEMA's Voluntary
Agency Liaisons, local voluntary organizations providing mass care that
sought reimbursement, and state and local governments in the Gulf Coast
region. Finally, we reviewed reports on the response to the Gulf Coast
hurricanes. For a list of the reports that we reviewed, see our
bibliography.
We conducted this performance audit between January 2007 and February
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DHS and the Red Cross agreed that the mass care primary agency role in
the NRF should be shifted from the Red Cross to FEMA in large part
because the primary agency needs to be able to direct federal
resources, which the Red Cross cannot do. Although the Red Cross'
specific responsibilities in ESF-6 have largely remained the same as it
shifts to a support agency role, a key change is that the Red Cross
will be responsible for reporting data from only Red Cross shelters--
not all shelters, as was previously required. States will report data
from non-Red Cross shelters. The changing ESF-6 roles of the Red Cross
and FEMA raise several potential implementation issues once the NRF
takes effect. First, the NRF includes expectations for the development
of a shelter database to be used for collecting and reporting shelter
data. Although FEMA and the Red Cross have developed an initial
database for collecting and reporting shelter data, FEMA is still
working to develop a federal shelter database that will track
demographic data on shelter populations. Second, officials in some
states we contacted were concerned about their ability to collect and
report complete information from shelters. In particular, state
officials were concerned about collecting data from unplanned shelters,
which are usually opened by organizations with no disaster response
experience. Third, while ESF-6 calls for an enhanced federal effort in
helping coordinate voluntary agency assistance, FEMA does not have
enough staff resources to fulfill this responsibility. Voluntary Agency
Liaisons (VAL) are FEMA employees who coordinate the activities of
voluntary organizations and FEMA, but currently there is only one full-
time VAL who can work on the full range of coordination issues in each
FEMA region, which can include up to eight states. In addition, VALs do
not currently receive any role-specific training. Last, although FEMA
has made progress, the agency has not yet completed its efforts to
identify and fill gaps in mass care capabilities. For example, FEMA has
completed an initial analysis of gaps in state mass care capabilities
in 18 states, but is still working to expand this initiative to all
states.
Although NVOAD has several characteristics that help it carry out its
role in coordinating the activities of voluntary organizations under
ESF-6, staff limitations constrain its ability to effectively fulfill
its role in disaster response. NVOAD is well positioned for its
coordination role because it does not compete with its members for
donor funds and brings together voluntary organizations with diverse
objectives under one organization. NVOAD's mission has historically
been building relationships among its members and sharing information
prior to disasters, and most NVOAD member organizations with which we
spoke said that it is effective in this role. NVOAD's ESF-6 role also
includes coordination responsibilities after disasters, but NVOAD's
coordination efforts in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were
not an effective way of providing key information, according to NVOAD
members we spoke with. NVOAD's primary form of communication with its
members during the Gulf Coast hurricanes was daily conference calls,
but the calls often ran long and dealt with many issues that were not
of relevance to the whole group. NVOAD's executive director told us
that these problems were due to staff limitations--during Katrina NVOAD
had only one staff person, and currently it has two. NVOAD's new
executive director agreed that the communication strategy after Katrina
was not effective, and told us that improving NVOAD's use of Web-
technology to better share information after disasters is one of
several key areas for improvement.
FEMA has made progress in addressing a number of the problems with the
provision of mass care for the disabled since the hurricanes, but has
generally not coordinated with disability experts as required by the
Post-Katrina Act. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, reports from
several federal agencies identified specific steps FEMA should take to
improve mass care services for the disabled in two key areas: providing
information to help states plan for meeting the needs of this
population and increasing the participation of people with disabilities
and subject matter experts in the planning process. FEMA has begun
addressing both of these issues as it implements requirements of the
Post-Katrina Act. To help with state planning efforts, FEMA has
developed a standard definition of "special needs" populations, which
refers to individuals who may need additional assistance after
disasters in functional areas such as maintaining independence,
communication, or medical care. In addition, in accordance with the
requirements of the Act, FEMA has appointed a Disability Coordinator
who is responsible for integrating disability issues into federal
emergency planning and preparedness efforts. However, FEMA has
generally not coordinated with the National Council on Disability
(NCD)--a federal agency that addresses disability issues--as required
by the Act. We found that FEMA did not coordinate with NCD on several
initiatives for which the Act specifically required coordination, such
as an initiative to define the disaster response capabilities state and
local governments should possess. As a result, disability-related
concerns may not be fully addressed.
Of the major national voluntary organizations we examined, only the Red
Cross has taken steps to better prepare for meeting the mass care needs
of disabled individuals, and the Red Cross faces continuing challenges
in ensuring that these needs will be met. We identified two major
concerns with the Red Cross' services after the Gulf Coast hurricanes:
a lack of appropriate intake procedures that resulted in some
individuals with disabilities who could have been served being turned
away from Red Cross shelters, and a lack of accessibility for the
disabled in some shelters. The Red Cross has developed a shelter intake
form that should allow volunteers to better determine whether a
particular shelter can meet an individual's needs. The Red Cross has
also developed new training for its mass care managers to help them
address the needs of the disabled. Red Cross headquarters officials
told us, however, that some Red Cross local chapters are still not
fully prepared to serve individuals with disabilities and that it has
been difficult to encourage local chapters to implement accessibility
policies. Officials from the other major national voluntary
organizations said that the hurricanes had heightened their awareness
of issues faced by the disabled but that they had not identified a need
to improve services for these individuals. We did not find issues with
these organizations' services, largely because these organizations
focus on feeding and other services that require fewer modifications
for the disabled than sheltering.
Voluntary organizations faced two types of difficulties in seeking
reimbursement under the Public Assistance program: limitations in the
scope of program coverage and communication difficulties. At the time
of Katrina, FEMA regulations only allowed voluntary organizations
providing services within disaster areas to be reimbursed by state and
local governments for mass care expenses, despite the fact that Katrina
evacuees dispersed throughout the country. FEMA has since amended these
regulations to allow voluntary organizations acting on behalf of
eligible disaster victims outside of declared disaster zones to be
reimbursed for services provided. Voluntary organizations also faced
problems in obtaining clear and accurate information about
reimbursement policies and procedures, but FEMA has not addressed this
issue. FEMA VALs--FEMA's key liaisons to the voluntary sector--do not
receive training on Public Assistance program policies, and many
representatives of voluntary organizations that sought assistance from
VALs told us that VALs either could not provide them with basic
information or provided them with the wrong information. In addition,
although FEMA Public Assistance program policies are available on
FEMA's Web site, we found that some of the information is not presented
in a user-friendly format that would help voluntary organizations
navigate Public Assistance opportunities and does not include contact
information for obtaining assistance.
We are making several recommendations to improve the ability of federal
agencies and voluntary organizations to coordinate and respond to
disasters. To ensure that FEMA has the staff resources necessary to
meet its role in coordinating with voluntary organizations, we
recommend that FEMA take action to enhance the capabilities of its VAL
workforce. We are also recommending that to improve its ability to meet
its NRF information-sharing responsibilities after disasters, NVOAD
assess its members' information needs and improve its communication
strategies, and that FEMA provide technical assistance to NVOAD in this
effort. To ensure that disability issues are fully included in FEMA's
planning efforts, we are recommending that FEMA develop specific action
steps for how it will coordinate with NCD with regard to relevant
provisions of the Post-Katrina Act. In addition, to help ensure that
voluntary organizations can readily obtain clear and accurate
information about the Public Assistance program, we are recommending
that FEMA take action to make the information on its Web site about
reimbursement opportunities for voluntary organizations more user-
friendly. Agency officials agreed with our recommendations.
Background:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused extensive human suffering and damage
in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Hurricane Katrina made landfall
in Mississippi and Louisiana on August 29, 2005, and alone caused more
damage than any other single natural disaster in the history of the
United States. Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an
estimated 300,000 homes--more than three times the total number of
homes destroyed by the four major hurricanes that hit the continental
United States in August and September 2004. Hurricane Rita followed on
September 24, 2005, making landfall in Texas and Louisiana and adding
to the devastation. Hurricane Katrina alone caused $96 billion property
damage.
Voluntary Organizations' Roles in Disasters:
Voluntary organizations have historically played a large role in the
nation's response to disasters. These organizations raised more than
$3.4 billion in cash donations in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes
as of February 2006, according to the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana
University. The American Red Cross raised more than $2.1 billion, about
two-thirds of all dollars raised. The Salvation Army raised the second-
highest amount, $325 million, Catholic Charities raised about $150
million, and the Southern Baptist National Convention raised about $20
million.
Voluntary organizations' roles in responding to disasters can vary.
Some, including the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, are
equipped to arrive at a disaster scene and provide immediate mass care,
including food, shelter, and clothing, and in some circumstances,
emergency financial assistance to affected persons. Other voluntary
organizations focus on providing longer-term assistance, such as job
training, scholarships, or mental health counseling. In addition,
churches and other community organizations that do not traditionally
play a role in disaster response may begin providing these services.
For example, many small churches and other organizations provided
sheltering services after the Gulf Coast hurricanes.
The Red Cross:
Since its founding in 1881, the Red Cross has offered humanitarian care
to the victims of war and devastating natural disasters. The
organization is a private nonprofit entity but, since 1905, has had a
congressional charter. Under the congressional charter the purposes of
the Red Cross are to provide volunteer humanitarian assistance to the
armed forces, serve as a medium of communication between the people of
the United States and the armed forces, and provide disaster prevention
and relief services. Although it is congressionally chartered, the Red
Cross provides these services as a private organization.
Following a disaster, the Red Cross serves as a direct service provider
to disaster victims. In this capacity, the organization provides
services that include feeding, sheltering, financial assistance, and
emergency first aid.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross estimated that it
provided more than 3.7 million hurricane victims with financial
assistance, 3.4 million overnight stays in almost 1,100 shelters, and
more than 27.4 million hot meals and 25.2 million snacks. According to
the Red Cross, its efforts after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were
larger than for any previous disaster relief effort. For example, the
Red Cross provided more than six times the number of shelter nights
after Katrina and Rita than it did in the entire 2004 hurricane season,
when four major hurricanes--Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne--struck
the continental United States in August and September.
The NRF:
The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards disaster
response, including support for voluntary organizations providing
shelter, food, and other mass care services. The NRF revises the
nation's prior disaster plan, the NRP, which was originally signed by
major federal government agencies, the Red Cross and NVOAD in 2004.
Major federal government agencies, the Red Cross, NVOAD, and other
voluntary organizations are included in the NRF. The NRF is designed on
the premise that disaster response is generally handled by local
jurisdictions. In the vast majority of disasters, local emergency
personnel, such as police, fire, public health, and emergency
management personnel, act as first responders and identify needed
resources to aid the community. Local jurisdictions can also call on
state resources to provide additional assistance. The federal
government responds to state or local requests for assistance when an
incident occurs that exceeds state or local response capability or when
an incident falls within its own response authorities. In such
situations it may use the National Response Framework to involve all
appropriate response partners. The primary authority under which the
federal government provides assistance to states after a disaster is
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act). [Footnote 6] It authorizes the President to issue a
major disaster or emergency declaration when a state's resources are
overwhelmed and the governor makes a request for federal assistance.
Under the Stafford Act, the federal government provides assistance for
mass care, debris removal, restoration of facilities, and financial aid
to families and individuals, among other activities. After disasters
that result in extraordinary levels of mass casualties or damage,
called catastrophes, the federal government can invoke the Catastrophic
Incident Annex of the NRF. The Annex does not assume that local
governments--which may no longer be functioning--will ask for
assistance, but rather that the federal government will provide
resources to the local level before being asked.
ESF-6:
In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond
to disasters, the National Response Framework designates 15 emergency
support functions. ESF-6 creates a working group of key federal
agencies and voluntary organizations to coordinate federal assistance
in support of state and local efforts to provide:
* mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid;
* emergency assistance, such as coordination with voluntary
organizations; reunification of families; pet evacuation and
sheltering; support to specialized shelters; and support to medical
shelters;
* housing, both short-and long-term; and:
* human services, such as counseling and processing of benefits.
The NRF assigned FEMA to be the primary agency for a new component of
ESF-6, called emergency assistance, to ensure that immediate needs that
are beyond the scope of traditional mass care are addressed. Emergency
assistance adds new expectations for coordination with voluntary
organizations by the ESF-6 working group, stating that the group works
with non-governmental and faith-based organizations to facilitate an
inclusive, coordinated response effort. In addition, the emergency
assistance component includes the expectation that a National Shelter
System (NSS) will provide data from shelters. The NSS is a Web-based
system that provides information on shelter facilities, capacity, and
population counts.
In addition to its role as a service provider, the Red Cross has
specific responsibilities as a support agency under ESF-6. ESF-6
specifies that these activities are separate from its role as a direct
service provider. The Red Cross announced in January 2008 that it
planned to make significant layoffs to its staff at the Red Cross
national headquarters. These layoffs could potentially have
implications for the Red Cross' capacity to meet its NRF
responsibilities. However, the Red Cross had not announced details of
these layoffs as of mid-February 2008. Figure 1 describes the Red
Cross' roles as a service provider, and in ESF-6.
Figure 1: Red Cross Roles in Disaster Response:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a listing of the following information:
American Red Cross as a private service provider:
* Shelters;
* Feeds;
* Provides emergency first-aid;
* Distributes emergency supplies;
* Provides mental health support;
* Provides emergency financial assistance to families;
* Assists in reuniting family members.
American Red Cross as an ESF-6 support agency:
FEMA, NRF; States; American Red Cross: combine to provide a safety net:
* Provides Red Cross staff to work daily at DHS/FEMA regional offices
in support of ESF #6 Mass Care activities;
* Provides specially trained liaisons to work at designated DHS/FEMA
locations to support ESF #6 Mass Care activities as requested;
* Provides subject-matter expertise on general mass care planning,
preparedness, and response activities, as well as Red Cross-specific
activities in these areas;
* Provides information on current Red Cross mass care activities as
requested prior to and during response operations.
Source: GAO analysis; images: Art Explosion.
[End of table]
Mass care for individuals with disabilities:
Estimates place the population of individuals with disabilities in the
United States at nearly 20 percent of the entire population, and the
percentage of people over age 80 with disabilities at 72 percent.
Although there are few statistics on the impact of Hurricane Katrina on
the disabled, the White House report on the federal response to Katrina
estimated that over two-thirds of the 1,300 victims who died were over
age 60. Individuals with disabilities are a diverse group, including
those with disabilities affecting individuals' functioning in a number
of different ways. For example, some disabilities, such as paraplegia,
affect individuals' mobility, and other disabilities, such as deafness,
affect communication. Many of these disabilities can be prepared for
and accommodated in general population shelters. For example, with
modifications to existing facilities, many mobility impairments can be
addressed. These modifications can include ensuring accessible routes
for people with wheelchairs, crutches, or walkers from sleeping
quarters to dining areas and toilet/bathing areas, ramps, and handrails
in toilet facilities. Modifications for communication-related
disabilities can include braille signs for the blind. State and local
governments operate medical shelters for those individuals with serious
medical needs, including some disabled individuals.
Post-Katrina Act:
On October 4, 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006. That Act elevated FEMA's status within
the Department of Homeland Security, enhanced its organizational
autonomy, and redefined its role. It provided that FEMA's primary
mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the
United States from all hazards by leading efforts to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
other man-made disasters, and catastrophic incidents. In partnership
with state, local, and tribal governments, emergency response
providers, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations as
well as other federal agencies, FEMA is tasked with building a national
system of emergency management. The Act included a number of provisions
that should provide a new focus on assistance to individuals with
disabilities in connection with these efforts. It directs the
Administrator of FEMA to appoint a Disability Coordinator who is
required to report directly to the Administrator to ensure that the
needs of individuals with disabilities are being properly addressed in
emergency preparedness and disaster relief, and assigns a detailed set
of responsibilities to the Coordinator. The Post-Katrina Act provides
authority for FEMA to address the needs of individuals with
disabilities by adding the Americans with Disabilities Act's definition
of "individual with a disability" to the Stafford Act and requires that
the FEMA Administrator develop guidelines concerning the provision of
services to individuals with disabilities in connection with emergency
facilities and equipment. The Post-Katrina Act adds individuals with
disabilities and those with limited English proficiency to the
discrimination prohibition provisions of the Stafford Act and directs
FEMA to work with state and local governments to identify critical gaps
in regional capabilities to respond to populations with special needs.
Public Assistance Program:
The Public Assistance program provides assistance primarily to state
and local governments to repair and rebuild damaged public
infrastructure and includes activities such as removing debris,
repairing roads, and reconstructing government buildings and utilities.
Specifically, applicants submit requests for work that are considered
for eligibility and subsequent funding. FEMA obligates funds for
approved projects, providing specific amounts to complete discrete work
segments on projects, while state and local governments pay the
remainder based on the state's cost share agreement with FEMA. As of
March 16, 2007, FEMA has obligated about $4.6 billion to Louisiana and
about $2 billion to Mississippi through its Public Assistance program.
Under the Public Assistance program, state and local governments can
reimburse voluntary organizations for several types of expenses. First,
they can be reimbursed for facility damage if they meet certain
eligibility criteria such as being an educational, medical or custodial
care facility. Second, voluntary organizations can be reimbursed for
evacuation and sheltering expenses (such as increased utility expenses,
cots, and food). The Post-Katrina Act expanded the universe of
voluntary organizations eligible for reimbursement for facilities
damage after future disasters. Private non-profit facilities that serve
certain specified functions (education, utility, irrigation, emergency,
medical, rehabilitation, and temporary custodial care) as defined by
the President, no longer need to provide essential services of a
governmental nature to the general public in order to be eligible for
reimbursement. The Act also added another group of private nonprofit
facilities potentially eligible for assistance by defining the term to
include any facility providing essential services of a governmental
nature to the general public (including museums, zoos, performing arts
facilities, and community arts centers), as defined by the President.
The facilities in this group are similar to those identified in FEMA
regulations. Under the Public Assistance program, the federal
government typically pays 75 percent of costs, and state governments
pay 25 percent, however, after Katrina the federal government paid 100
percent of the cost-share requirement in 45 states that sheltered
evacuees.
FEMA Became the Primary Mass Care Agency Because the Red Cross Cannot
Direct Federal Resources, and the Shifting Roles Present Several
Implementation Issues:
FEMA replaced the American Red Cross as the primary agency for mass
care in large part because the two organizations agreed that the
primary agency needs to be able to direct federal resources. Although
the Red Cross' specific responsibilities under the NRF have largely
remained the same, one change is that the Red Cross will no longer be
expected to report data for all shelters, only Red Cross shelters. The
changing roles of the Red Cross and FEMA present several implementation
issues. With respect to sheltering, the NRF includes the expectation
that a national shelter system will be developed to collect and report
shelter data. FEMA and the Red Cross have developed an initial system
for collecting and reporting data on shelters, but FEMA is still
working to develop a federal shelter database. Furthermore, some states
have indicated that they are concerned about their ability to collect
and report data from non-Red Cross shelters. In addition, the NRF
places increased responsibility on FEMA for coordinating with voluntary
organizations, but FEMA does not have sufficient staff resources to
meet this responsibility. Last, although FEMA has made progress, its
efforts to identify and fill gaps in mass care capabilities are not yet
complete.
FEMA and Red Cross Agreed That FEMA Should Be the Primary Mass Care
Agency Because It Can Direct Federal Resources:
The Red Cross and FEMA agreed in February 2007 letters that because the
Red Cross cannot legally direct federal resources, FEMA is better
positioned to be the primary agency for ESF-6 mass care. The letters
indicated that the primary agency for mass care should be able to
direct federal resources in response to state requests for assistance,
which the Red Cross--as a nongovernmental entity--does not have the
legal authority to do. The Red Cross' inability to direct federal
resources after the Gulf Coast hurricanes contributed to problems that
we highlighted in our June 2006 report.[Footnote 7] After Katrina, the
Red Cross could not go directly to federal agencies for resources to
fulfill requests for assistance, but instead had to request these items
through FEMA, which then directed the appropriate federal agencies to
supply the needed materials or services. This resulted in confusion
about roles and led to duplicative requests.
In the February 2007 letters, the Red Cross and FEMA also agreed that
the expansion of ESF-6 to include a new function--emergency assistance-
-provided another reason why FEMA should be the primary agency for mass
care. The primary agency for mass care will need to coordinate mass
care activities with the primary agency for emergency assistance--FEMA-
-and having different primary agencies could make this more difficult.
For example, Red Cross and FEMA officials told us that Red Cross is not
knowledgeable about activities in the emergency assistance function,
which would make it difficult for them to coordinate these activities
with mass care. FEMA and the Red Cross agreed that having FEMA serve as
the primary agency for all four functions of ESF-6 would help ensure a
unified command structure during operational response.
Although the Red Cross role for mass care under the NRF will shift from
that of a primary agency to a support agency, its specific
responsibilities will largely remain the same as under the NRP. For
example, the organization still provides staff to work at DHS offices
to support ESF-6 activities and supports DHS in working with state
agencies for mass care in planning and preparedness activities.
However, the Red Cross will no longer have two key responsibilities
that it had under the NRP. First, the Red Cross will no longer be
responsible for filling out requests from states and other local
organizations for federal assistance after a disaster and sending them
to FEMA. This activity will now be performed primarily by states. Under
the NRF, the Red Cross will provide guidance to states as they
determine their needs for federal assistance. FEMA did tell us,
however, that in some rare circumstances the Red Cross may fill out
requests independently of states. States also filled out these requests
under the NRP--along with the Red Cross--and state officials that we
interviewed told us that they were familiar with this process. Second,
the Red Cross will no longer be responsible for reporting data on the
number and characteristics of people in shelters that are operated by
organizations other than the Red Cross. After Katrina, the Red Cross
was responsible for reporting data on all shelters to FEMA, including
those operated by other organizations, but both FEMA and the Red Cross
reported problems with this process. Now, states are responsible for
reporting data on non-Red Cross shelters to FEMA.
Several Implementation Issues Are Associated with the Shift in Primary
Agency for Mass Care:
The shifting ESF-6 roles of the Red Cross and FEMA present several
implementation issues for FEMA, including reporting shelter data,
coordinating with voluntary organizations and identifying and filling
gaps in mass care capabilities.
National Shelter System:
In its role as primary agency, FEMA has made progress toward meeting
NRF expectations for an NSS, but still faces several challenges. An
initial NSS that is owned and was paid for by the Red Cross, with FEMA
as a partner agency, is currently operational. However, FEMA is still
working to develop a federal NSS that will be owned and housed at FEMA.
When the federal NSS is complete, the Red Cross will enter and verify
data for Red Cross shelters, and states will enter and verify data for
all other shelters. FEMA officials told us that the federal NSS will be
finished in spring 2008. Although the current version of the NSS can
provide information on shelter location, capacity, population, physical
accessibility for people with disabilities, and managing agency, the
system cannot track demographic data on the types of populations
residing in shelters. FEMA officials told us that FEMA is working to
address this and other issues that have been identified by states in
the federal NSS. For example, states identified the need for
integrating Geographic Information Systems (GIS) into the system to
provide data that are more accurate. FEMA told us that it would
incorporate these elements into the updated system.
In addition, many states still need to enter data into the system in
preparation for disasters. FEMA officials said that as of November
2007, no more than four states had inserted shelter location data and,
as a result, most of the data in the system is on Red Cross shelters.
The accuracy of the shelter data is contingent upon states reporting
information into the system and updating it frequently, according to
FEMA officials. Some state officials told us that they had just
recently received training on NSS and were currently in the process of
compiling the data needed. FEMA has offered states the opportunity to
have FEMA staff help include non-Red Cross shelter data in the NSS
after a disaster until NSS implementation is complete. FEMA officials
told us that it will take 2 to 3 years to fully implement the federal
NSS, because of training and time needed for states to collect, input,
and verify data.
During the 2007 California wildfires, FEMA deployed staff to help state
officials collect and report data from non-Red Cross shelters with the
NSS because California officials had not yet entered shelter data into
the system. California officials said that the NSS was useful because
it gave a single, accurate report on the shelter population.
Data from Unplanned Shelters:
State officials we spoke with told us that they could collect shelter
data from pre-planned shelters, but officials in some states were
concerned about their capacity to collect and report data from
unplanned shelters that are likely to open after a major disaster.
These shelters are likely to open if designated shelter sites are
overcrowded, evacuees are unable to reach designated sites, or the
designated sites are affected by the disaster. Officials from some
states told us that they do not have a mechanism in place to collect
data from the small, independent organizations that typically open
these shelters. In contrast, officials from another state told us that
they do not anticipate the need for unplanned shelters to open after a
major disaster, and, as a result, are not concerned about collecting
these data.
Collecting data on unplanned shelters was a significant challenge after
Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 8] There was no centralized system in place
for collecting and reporting these data after Hurricane Katrina and, as
a result, these data often went unreported, according to FEMA and Red
Cross officials. Because government and voluntary organizations did not
know where many of these people were staying, this led to problems
planning for and delivering needed resources.
Coordination with Voluntary Organizations:
Changes in FEMA's role under ESF-6 also present implementation issues
with respect to coordination with voluntary organizations. The NRF
includes a new component on voluntary organization coordination
requiring that the ESF-6 working group--for which FEMA is the primary
agency--coordinate federal response efforts with state, local, private,
non-governmental, and faith-based organizations' efforts. As the
primary agency for ESF-6, FEMA will be primarily responsible for
addressing these issues. These requirements for coordination with
voluntary organizations are more extensive and specific than in the
NRP, and FEMA officials told us that FEMA voluntary agency liaisons
(VAL) will fill this role. VALs are FEMA staff members who coordinate
the activities of voluntary organizations with FEMA. Most FEMA VALs are
based in FEMA regions and work with state and local voluntary
organizations, and the regional offices of national voluntary
organizations (see app. III for a job description for VALs).
While the NRF calls for an enhanced FEMA role in helping coordinate
voluntary agency assistance, FEMA does not have the staff resources
necessary to meet this objective. As of July 2007, each FEMA region had
one full-time VAL who could work on the entire range of coordination
issues with voluntary organizations, as shown in figure 2.[Footnote 9]
FEMA regions can include up to eight states. FEMA VALs are tasked with
coordinating FEMA activities and policies with voluntary organizations
across their regions and building the capacity of these organizations
according to voluntary organization and FEMA officials. Effective VALs
build relationships and network, however, many officials from voluntary
organizations and multiple senior FEMA VALs told us that there are not
enough full-time VALs for them to develop strong relationships in all
of the areas covered. For example, one of the primary responsibilities
of VALs is to improve coordination with state-and local-level voluntary
organizations, but officials from FEMA and voluntary organizations said
that in many states coordination between these organizations and
government is weak. In addition, officials from some voluntary
organizations told us that VALs have so much work it is difficult to
communicate with them. Officials from voluntary organizations also said
that there were not enough VALs after disasters. During the response to
disasters, VALs can be pulled out of their own regions to assist in
disaster-affected areas. For example, after Katrina, VALs from across
the country were brought to the Gulf Coast. As a result, during Katrina
these VALs were not available to respond to their own smaller scale
regional disasters, even though they had built relationships with
voluntary organizations in those states. At the time of Katrina, FEMA
was providing states with assistance for 38 other disasters across the
nation. Disaster research experts told us that there should be
additional FEMA VALs in each region.[Footnote 10] FEMA officials told
us that there are no plans to change the current staffing structure for
VALs. A review of the response to Katrina by the DHS Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) identified broader problems with human capital
management at FEMA. For example, the DHS OIG found that FEMA does not
have staff or plans adequate to meet its human capital needs during
catastrophic disasters.[Footnote 11]
Figure 2: FEMA Regions Covered By Voluntary Agency Liaisons, As Of
December 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the United States illustrating the ten FEMA
regions and indicating that there is one full-time VAL per region and 2
area offices. There are 36 Katrina VALs in the Gulf Coast States. 85
reserve VALs across the country only become active during disasters.
Source: GAO analysis; map, Map Resources.
[End of figure]
FEMA has two other types of VALs, reserves and Katrina VALs. However,
the job responsibilities of these individuals constrain them from
performing many VAL job duties. FEMA had 85 reserve VALs that it can
call upon in response to major disasters, and 36 Katrina VALs as of
December 2007. The reserve VALs are only activated during disasters,
however, and are not available to network and build the capacity of
voluntary organizations during preparedness. Furthermore, the Katrina
VALs are designated specifically to address Katrina-related issues and
FEMA is not planning to retain these individuals after Katrina-related
work is finished.
In addition, VALs do not receive role-specific training and, as a
result, some VALs have not been fully prepared for their duties. The
lack of specialized training has resulted in VALs not always being
prepared to coordinate FEMA activities with the voluntary sector. For
example, VALs do not receive any training on how voluntary
organizations can receive reimbursement for their mass care activities
during disasters. One voluntary organization official that we spoke
with said that, while some VALs were very helpful in that they had
access to information and resources that they would not have had
otherwise and understood FEMA policies, other VALs were not familiar
with key FEMA Public Assistance policies for the reimbursement of
voluntary organizations. A senior FEMA official told us that FEMA has
completed a VAL Handbook and is preparing to develop a pilot training
for VALs. The DHS OIG also found that FEMA does not have an organized
system of employee development.[Footnote 12]
Identifying and Filling Gaps in Mass Care Capabilities:
FEMA's broad new responsibilities under the Post-Katrina Act, and
FEMA's new role as the primary agency for mass care, also present
implementation issues for FEMA with regard to identifying and filling
gaps in mass care capabilities. Although FEMA has taken several steps
to address these issues, FEMA's efforts are not yet complete. For
example, the Post-Katrina Act specifically requires that FEMA identify
gaps in mass care capabilities at the state level. In response, FEMA
has undertaken a gap analysis initiative that examines, by state, the
gaps in disaster preparedness. This initiative, which began in 2007,
has begun identifying gaps in hurricane-prone states along the Eastern
seaboard and Gulf Coast. A FEMA official responsible for these efforts
told us that the initial gap analysis had been completed in 18 high-
risk states as of December 2007. Eventually, FEMA plans to roll this
initiative out in every state, and to make it all-hazards rather than
hurricane-specific.
FEMA officials told us that they are also working to identify resources
for situations in which the mass care capabilities of government and
voluntary organizations are exceeded, but that FEMA is still working to
develop a standardized system for coordinating these resources. FEMA
officials told us that FEMA has developed contracts with private
companies for mass care and other disaster resources for situations in
which federal capabilities are exceeded. After Katrina, FEMA made four
noncompetitive awards to companies for housing services. These
contracts have since been broadened through a competitive process so
that if a disaster struck now they could also include facility
assessment for shelters, facility rehabilitation--including making
facilities accessible--feeding, security, and staffing shelters. The
FEMA official in charge of these contracts said that contractors had
assessed facilities to determine whether they could be used as shelters
in the Gulf Coast during the summer of 2007. He said that these
contracts gave the federal government the option of purchasing whatever
resources it needs in response to disasters. FEMA officials told us,
however, that they prefer using federal resources when possible because
contract services are more expensive. Another round of contracts will
be awarded in May 2008 on a competitive basis.
However, FEMA is still working to standardize training, resources, and
terminology across the many different organizations--including the
private sector--involved in disaster response to improve coordination
among these organizations. FEMA is working to develop standardized
training that could be provided to staff from all of these
organizations. FEMA is currently working with the Red Cross to develop
a standardized training based on current Red Cross training, according
to a FEMA official responsible for these efforts. Having standardized
training could, for example, make it easier for employees of
organizations providing services contracted by the federal government
to work in shelters operated by other organizations. A key FEMA
official said that this standardized training should be complete by
summer 2008. FEMA is also working to standardize disaster relief
resources and terminology across the providers of mass care services.
The FEMA official said that this allows disaster service providers to
communicate more readily, and to share resources across organizations
when necessary. NVOAD is assisting FEMA by coordinating efforts among
voluntary organizations to standardize the types of resources used in
disaster response. FEMA and NVOAD officials told us that having
organizations use the same language and resources makes it easier to
scale up disaster response operations.
NVOAD Has Several Characteristics That Help It Carry Out Its ESF-6
Role, but Is Constrained by Limited Staff Resources:
NVOAD is in a unique position to coordinate voluntary organizations
active in disaster assistance under ESF-6. NVOAD brings together
voluntary organizations with diverse objectives and sizes under one
organization. Moreover, NVOAD does not compete with its members for
funds, since it is not a direct service provider. While NVOAD has
facilitated relationship building among its members prior to disasters,
its coordination efforts in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
were not an effective way of providing key information. Due to staff
limitations, the organization was unable to fully meet its information-
sharing responsibilities under ESF-6 during the Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Using lessons learned from Katrina, NVOAD has identified ways to
potentially improve information sharing with its members, such as
through enhanced use of web technology.
NVOAD Is Positioned to Be a Coordinating Body and Has Facilitated
Relationship Building among Members prior to Disasters:
For several reasons, NVOAD is well positioned to coordinate voluntary
organizations active in disaster assistance under ESF-6. First, NVOAD
is a coordinating agency, not a direct service provider. This means
NVOAD does not compete with its members for funds. Instead, the
organization is primarily funded by member organizations.
Second, NVOAD brings together voluntary organizations with diverse
objectives, and sizes. NVOAD brings together organizations that provide
various types of disaster response and recovery services, such as
sheltering, feeding, home-building, and case management services, as
well as both secular and faith-based organizations. Officials from
member organizations told us that NVOAD helps them prepare for
disasters by developing relationships with other individuals active in
disaster response and recovery. These officials told us that developing
these relationships is a critical part of preparing for disasters, and
that NVOAD provided an opportunity to get to know officials from other
organizations.
Although members we spoke with noted that NVOAD's efforts were useful
in providing opportunities for networking and collaboration, some of
the larger and older members maintained that the organization does not
represent their needs well. For example, officials from one member
organization told us that NVOAD is increasingly serving the needs of
new, start-up disaster response organizations, rather than focusing on
its larger members. NVOAD's executive director said that one strength
of the organization is that it gives smaller members representation in
ESF-6.
NVOAD Is Considering Enhancing Web Technology to Address Coordination
Problems after Katrina, but Has Limited Staff Resources:
NVOAD has historically helped organizations prepare for disaster
response through relationship building, but as shown in table 1, the
NRF also includes responsibilities for NVOAD in disaster response, in
addition to disaster preparedness. NVOAD's ESF-6 roles and
responsibilities have remained the same as those specified in the NRP,
and include information-sharing and convening voluntary organizations,
but do not include directing the activities of its members.[Footnote
13] NVOAD fulfills its ESF-6 information-sharing role in several ways.
First, NVOAD provides information about its members' services to FEMA,
such as where its members are operating and what services they are
providing. One FEMA official said that having NVOAD report information
for all of its members made it easy to get updates from the voluntary
sector. Second, the NVOAD organization structure provides a system for
coordination after disasters. NVOAD includes a number of committees
composed of NVOAD member organizations that address key mass care
issues after disasters, such as managing donations and long-term
recovery. For example, after the 2007 California wildfires the
donations management committee immediately met with state officials to
identify warehouse space to store goods donated by the private sector
until they were needed. Third, NVOAD shares information with voluntary
organizations about the situation on the ground and services being
provided by different organizations after disasters. For example, after
Katrina, NVOAD hosted daily conference calls for several months after
Katrina to coordinate with its members. These conference calls provided
situation updates, brought new organizations up to speed on the basics
of disaster response, and gave organizations a forum to share
information and collaborate with each other.
Table 1: NVOAD Responsibilities under the NRF:
* Facilitates and encourages collaboration, communication, cooperation,
and coordination, and builds relationships among members while groups
plan and prepare for emergencies and disaster incidents.
* Assists in communicating to the government and the public the
services provided by its national member organizations.
* Facilitates information sharing during planning, preparedness,
response, and recovery, and after a disaster incident.
* Provides members with information pertaining to the severity of the
disaster, needs identified, and actions of volunteers throughout the
response, relief, and recovery process.
* Provides guidance in sharing client information, in promoting
spiritual and emotional care, and in the management of unaffiliated
volunteers and unsolicited donated goods, as needed.
Source: FEMA documents.
[End of table]
We found that these conference calls were not an effective way of
communicating after the hurricanes. The conference calls included NVOAD
members, federal agencies, and voluntary organizations that were not
NVOAD members, some of which were new to the disaster response field.
FEMA officials provided information on the situation on the ground and
explained how FEMA was providing assistance. We participated in one
conference call and found that it was difficult to follow. It was
challenging to identify which region of the disaster zone speakers were
discussing, members were discussing different issues that were not
relevant to everyone on the call, and there were too many people on the
call. NVOAD members with whom we spoke identified similar concerns
about the effectiveness of the conference calls. NVOAD's executive
director said that there were often 75 to 100 people on a single
conference call after Katrina. Some NVOAD members also told us that the
conference calls often ran long, which could get in the way of
effectively meeting hurricane victims' needs. Figure 3 shows the flow
of information during NVOAD phone calls.
Figure 3: Information Flow on NVOAD Conference Calls after Hurricane
Katrina:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the Information Flow on NVOAD
Conference Calls after Hurricane Katrina. The following information is
depicted:
FEMA:
* send updates and situation reports to NVOAD;
* receive on-the-ground updates of current services from NVOAD.
NVOAD:
* receive updates and situation reports from FEMA;
* relay that information to NVOAD members, nonmembers, and other
federal agencies;
* receive on-the-ground updates of current services from NVOAD members,
nonmembers, and other federal agencies;
* relay that information to FEMA.
Source: GAO analysis; images (Art Explosion).
[End of figure]
NVOAD's executive director at the time of Katrina said that NVOAD was
limited by staff resources and, as a result, couldn't do more than
provide conference calls. During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, NVOAD had
one staff person. NVOAD currently has two staff persons: an executive
director and an administrative position. NVOAD's fiscal year 2006
operating budget was about $270,000, and NVOAD relies primarily on
funds from its members, According to NVOAD's current executive
director. NVOAD dues currently range from $3500 per member each year
for its largest members to $750 for its smaller members, according to
the executive director. Since the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, NVOAD has
increased its membership from 40 to 49, and the organization is
currently considering increasing membership further.
NVOAD's current executive director told us that the organization of the
conference calls after Katrina was not an effective way to communicate
with its members. NVOAD has identified ways to potentially enhance
information sharing with its members. The current executive director
told us that better use of web technology would allow NVOAD to provide
members with disaster updates and information about member services on
the ground in real time. NVOAD members that we spoke with told us that
it would be helpful if NVOAD used web technology to provide certain
information so that they wouldn't need to participate in lengthy
conference calls. One voluntary organization official suggested that
key information could be provided online, such as updates about the
situation on the ground, information about what organizations are
operating in the disaster zone, and what services are being provided by
those organizations. However, the executive director said that
improving the organization's use of Web technology would require
additional resources.
FEMA Has Made Progress Addressing Mass Care Issues for the Disabled,
but Has Generally Not Coordinated as Required with NCD:
FEMA has started addressing the problems with mass care services for
the disabled that occurred after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Various
assessments of FEMA's performance after the hurricanes identified
needed improvements by FEMA in two areas: providing guidance to assist
states and others in planning to better meet the needs of the disabled,
and increasing the participation of people with disabilities and
subject-matter experts in the planning process. The Post-Katrina Act
included requirements in each area, and FEMA has taken actions in both
of these areas. For example, in response to the Act, FEMA hired a
Disability Coordinator to integrate disability issues into federal
emergency planning and preparedness efforts. However, FEMA has
generally not coordinated with NCD as required by the Act, which could
result in disability-related concerns not being fully addressed.
Key Gaps in Federal and State Mass Care Planning Efforts for
Individuals with Disabilities Were Identified after the Hurricanes:
After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, reports from the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, DHS, and NCD identified
a lack of planning as one of the most significant problems related to
the provision of mass care to the disabled. For example, FEMA's
Nationwide Plan Review, released in June 2006, reviewed the planning
efforts of states and major urban areas. The report found that "One of
the most serious deficiencies uncovered in the Review was inadequate
planning for special needs populations,"[Footnote 14] and that no state
or urban area was found to have sufficiently planned for these
populations. The Nationwide Plan Review also recommended several
specific steps that FEMA should take to help state and local
governments with such planning:
* develop a consistent definition of "special needs" to clarify state
planning efforts;
* help local governments plan by providing guidance on disability-
related demographic analysis, and:
* increase the participation of people with disabilities and subject-
matter experts in the planning and preparedness process.
In addition to recommending actions to be taken by FEMA, the Nationwide
Plan Review also found that states need stronger accountability for the
provision of mass care to people with disabilities. The review
concluded that states should develop standards for the care of
individuals with disabilities, with an emphasis on ensuring that
accessibility for persons with disabilities is a priority factor in
selecting emergency shelter sites.
FEMA Has Begun Addressing the Issues with Mass Care for the Disabled,
but Has Generally Not Coordinated with NCD as Required:
FEMA has taken several steps to help improve planning for the disabled
population. For example, FEMA developed a consistent definition of the
term "special needs" that is used in the NRF. The Nationwide Plan
Review said that at the time of Katrina the term lacked the specificity
needed for emergency managers to accurately determine the capabilities
necessary to respond to community needs. Through a working group of
stakeholders, FEMA developed a definition of special needs that refers
to those who may have additional needs before, during, or after an
incident in one or more of the following functional areas: maintaining
independence, communication, transportation, supervision, and medical
care.[Footnote 15] For example, hearing-impaired individuals would be
categorized as those needing assistance with communication. FEMA is
also developing guidance for states as they plan for serving disabled
populations. One such initiative has been developing guidance on
collecting data on disabled populations, which was expected to be
released in December 2007 according to a FEMA official. This guidance
will respond to the Nationwide Plan Review's recommendation that the
federal government help state and local governments incorporate
disability-related demographic analysis into emergency planning. In
addition, in September 2007, FEMA released target capabilities that
define the disaster response capabilities that states should have,
including capabilities for the disabled. For example, the document
includes a capability that states should "Develop plans, policies, and
procedures to ensure maximum retention of people with disabilities in
general population shelters." A second phase of the target capabilities
project will include capabilities that states should have for
populations that require medical care.
The Post-Katrina Act required that FEMA take steps to include people
with disabilities, and subject-matter experts in the field, in planning
and preparedness efforts, as recommended by the Review. FEMA appointed
a Disability Coordinator, as required by the Act, who began work for
FEMA in the summer of 2007. FEMA officials told us that this individual
has begun working across FEMA to include disability-related concerns in
FEMA initiatives, and with disability organizations to ensure that
their concerns are addressed. For example, the Coordinator has been
involved in the drafting of the NRF according to a FEMA official. In
addition, the Coordinator was on the ground in California to assist
with meeting the needs of individuals with disabilities after the
wildfires in the fall of 2007. For example, the Coordinator worked to
ensure that information and materials disseminated to the public were
in alternative formats.
However, FEMA has generally not coordinated with NCD, as required by
the Act. The Act requires FEMA to coordinate with NCD in the
implementation of several different initiatives as shown in figure 4.
NCD and FEMA officials told us that NCD had not been consulted for many
of these initiatives. For example, NCD was not consulted about the
Comprehensive Assessment System, which assesses the nation's prevention
capabilities and overall readiness. FEMA officials who work on this
initiative said that they had not consulted directly with NCD, but were
coordinating with the officials within FEMA who are knowledgeable about
disability issues. Other FEMA officials said that NCD has provided
public comment on the NRF and other key FEMA documents. Officials from
NCD said that there has been little coordination with FEMA and that
they had not been offered the chance to provide input on a number of
these initiatives. As a result, disability-related issues may not be
fully addressed. In the Nationwide Plan Review, FEMA reported that it
is important to include the disabled in planning because it provides
responders with hands-on experience about the needs of people with
disabilities in disaster situations, and provides planners with the
ability to test their plans and modifications. The two organizations
have met several times to discuss how coordination would occur, most
recently in October 2007. However, as of January 2008, the agencies had
not agreed to specific action steps for how they would coordinate.
Figure 4: FEMA Response to NCD Coordination Requirements in the Post-
Katrina Act, as of December 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure depicts the following data:
Requirements of the Act: Coordinate with NCD in the development of
target capabilities[A];
FEMA implementation status: NCD not consulted; Phase I of the target
capabilities released in September 2007.
Requirements of the Act: Coordinate with NCD in development of a
National Training Program document for emergency responders[B];
FEMA implementation status: NCD not consulted for National Training
Program; Draft released in September 20007.
Requirements of the Act: Coordinate with NCD in development of a
Comprehensive Assessment System to assess the nation‘s prevention
capabilities and overall preparedness, including operational
readiness[C];
FEMA implementation status: NCD not consulted; Program was operational
when the Act was signed.
Requirements of the Act: Coordinate with NCD in development of a
Remedial Action Management Program to identify and disseminate lessons
learned and best practices and conduct remedial action tracking[D];
FEMA implementation status: NCD not consulted; Program was operational
when the Act was signed.
Requirements of the Act: Coordinate with NCD in the development of
guidelines for accommodating individuals with disabilities after
disaster[E];
FEMA implementation status: NCD provided input.
Requirements of the Act: Coordinate with NCD in the development of a
national disaster housing strategy[F];
FEMA implementation status: NCD provided input.
Source: Post Katrina Act and interviews with FEMA and NCD officials.
[A] Pub. L. No. 102-295, sec. 646, 120 Stat. 1426.
[B] Pub. L. No. 102-295, sec. 648, 120 Stat. 1427.
[C] Pub. L. No. 102-295, sec. 649, 120 Stat. 1428.
[D] Pub. L. No. 102-295, sec. 650, 120 Stat. 1428.
[E] Pub. L. No. 102-295, sec. 689, 120 Stat. 1448.
[F] Pub. L. No. 102-295, sec. 683, 120 Stat. 1446.
[End of figure]
In response to requirements of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA has also
taken steps to address the need for greater state accountability for
the mass care needs of individuals with disabilities. The Act requires
that, as part of FEMA's gap analysis initiative, FEMA identify gaps in
response capabilities for special needs populations at the state level.
The template used by state and federal planners to identify gaps
requires a substantial amount of information about special needs
sheltering. For example, one of the indicators of readiness is whether
states have formulas established for estimating the number of special
needs evacuees who will require public shelter.
In response to Post-Katrina Act requirements, FEMA also released
guidance in August 2007 on accommodating disabled individuals. The
guidance identifies laws that apply to nonprofits involved in disaster
response and provides short summaries of each law. The guidance does
not provide tools that states and nonprofits can use to implement these
requirements. FEMA is planning to release additional guidance to
provide state and local officials with additional information to
improve sheltering for individuals with disabilities. In July 2007, the
Department of Justice, which enforces the Americans with Disabilities
Act[Footnote 16] (ADA), released detailed operational guidance for
accommodating disabled populations in emergency shelters. This guidance
provides a checklist that can be used to evaluate the accessibility of
potential shelter sites. The checklist includes detailed questions that
could assist shelter managers in evaluating shelter sites, such as
whether there is an accessible route from shelter living space to the
shelter's health and medical facilities. FEMA's August 2007 guidance
includes a Web site link to the Department of Justice guidance.
The Red Cross Has Taken Steps to Better Serve the Disabled, but
Continues to Face Challenges:
The Red Cross has taken several steps to address problems that occurred
after the Gulf Coast hurricanes in meeting the mass care needs of
disabled individuals. These problems included a lack of appropriate
intake procedures, resulting in some disabled individuals being turned
away from Red Cross shelters, and a lack of accessible shelter
facilities. For example, in some shelters medical units were located on
upper floors or other inaccessible areas, and individuals with mobility
impairments were not provided with accessible alternatives. In response
to such problems, the Red Cross has developed an intake form intended
to assist volunteers in determining whether a particular shelter can
meet an individual's needs and also developed new training on serving
the disabled. However, the Red Cross continues to face challenges in
this area: Red Cross officials said that local chapters have
considerable autonomy within the organization and that it can be
difficult to encourage chapters to implement accessibility policies.
Other major national voluntary organizations that we examined had
increased their attention to services for the disabled, but did not
identify a need to improve their services for this population. We did
not identify concerns with the services of these organizations.
The Red Cross Has Taken Steps to Help Local Chapter Officials Serve the
Disabled, including Developing a Shelter Intake Form and Training:
After Hurricane Katrina, officials from the government and disability
organizations identified two main concerns with the mass care services
provided by the Red Cross to individuals with disabilities. The first
was that some Red Cross shelter managers did not use shelter intake
procedures that would have enabled them to identify individuals'
specific disabilities and determine whether the shelter could serve
those individuals. As a result, many individuals with disabilities were
sent to medical shelters, which could result in families being split up
or placing greater demands on the more resource intensive services
provided in medical shelters.
The Red Cross, in partnership with the Department of Health and Human
Services, has developed a shelter intake form to address this problem
after future disasters. The form provides a series of questions for
shelter workers in general shelters to ask incoming evacuees (see app.
IV for the shelter intake form). The form will allow shelter managers
to identify disabilities and determine whether the shelter can meet the
individual's needs, according to officials from the Red Cross and the
Department of Health and Human Services. NCD officials told us that
they think the form will help shelter managers make good decisions
about whether individuals with disabilities can enter a shelter. The
Red Cross distributed the form to its chapters along with guidance, but
the form was often not used after the California wildfires in Red Cross
shelters. Red Cross officials said that procedural changes like this
often take time to be fully implemented in chapters. Officials from
California also said that the form was not used in some cases because
it took too long to fill out.
The second problem identified after Hurricane Katrina was that the some
Red Cross shelters were not accessible to individuals with disabilities
and that the Red Cross was often not prepared to take action to make
these facilities accessible or provide accessible alternatives. For
example, one on-site volunteer repeatedly complained to Red Cross
officials and shelter managers about the lack of accessible medical
services for people with mobility disabilities. In a letter to the Red
Cross, he wrote:
"I have told Cajundome officials, medical staff, and Red Cross
personnel about this problem. But I have been unsuccessful in getting
it resolved. I have seen many frail people struggle to climb or descend
the stairs in order to get medical attention, and I have personally
seen two very exhausted men in wheelchairs almost decide to forego
triage or other medical attention because of the difficulty of
accessing this unit."[Footnote 17]
Other frequent concerns were that accessible shower and restroom
facilities were not provided, and that individuals with training to
serve disabled individuals were not permitted in Red Cross shelters.
NCD and other disability organizations have reported that these
problems and others existed prior to Katrina.
Officials from the Red Cross national headquarters told us that the Red
Cross is required to comply with the ADA and, therefore, its chapters
must make plans and take actions so that individuals with disabilities
can stay in Red Cross shelters.[Footnote 18] Red Cross officials said
that the only individuals who are not able to stay at Red Cross
shelters are those with serious medical needs, and that the
organization does not have the ability to serve these individuals. They
said that this policy was in place at the time of Katrina and Rita.
Federal officials and disability advocates agreed that there are some
individuals who are not able to stay at Red Cross shelters because
their needs are too serious. Red Cross officials also said that the Red
Cross does not own the facilities that it uses for sheltering in a
disaster, and that not every building that is large enough to shelter a
community and withstand a disaster was constructed in accordance with
current accessibility standards. The Red Cross said that it surveys
potential shelter facilities prior to disasters and that accessibility
to people with disabilities is one of the factors considered when
determining whether to use a facility as a shelter.
The Red Cross has begun addressing concerns about accessibility of its
shelters by developing training for Red Cross employees and volunteers
about meeting the needs of individuals with disabilities. The training
presents information about Red Cross policies on accessibility and
modification requirements for emergency shelters and provides examples
of how Red Cross staff could address specific situations. It does not
provide specific operational guidance for chapters about how to
implement these requirements. The training, which was developed in
collaboration with disability advocates, is required for Red Cross
workers who have leadership roles in providing mass care after
disasters. The training is not required for Red Cross volunteers,
although it is recommended for key Red Cross volunteers who respond to
disasters anywhere in the nation.
In addition, the Red Cross told us that it has prepositioned items that
will improve shelter accessibility for individuals with mobility
impairments in key warehouses across the country. These items included
8,000 cots that are designed for easy transitions from a wheelchair,
commode chairs, and shower stools.
Red Cross headquarters officials told us that some local chapters are
still not fully prepared to serve individuals with disabilities after
disasters. These officials said that, although the Red Cross has taken
steps to educate their employees and volunteers since Katrina, it has
been difficult to encourage chapters to prepare for and implement
accessibility policies. Red Cross headquarters officials said that Red
Cross chapters have considerable autonomy within the organization.
Katrina Made Other Major National Voluntary Organizations More Aware of
Disability Issues, but They Did Not Identify a Need to Improve Services
for the Disabled:
Officials from the Salvation Army, Southern Baptists, and Catholic
Charities told us that these organizations have not made changes to
their disaster services for the disabled, although they said that
Katrina made them more aware of disability issues. We did not identify
significant concerns with their services, however, largely because
sheltering--which requires many modifications for individuals with
disabilities--is not the focus of these organizations' services.
Instead, these organizations specialize in services such as feeding.
One official from a disability organization indicated that meeting
specialized dietary needs could sometimes be a disaster-response issue,
but that it is a much lower priority than problems with sheltering.
Local Voluntary Agencies Faced Several Problems in Obtaining
Reimbursement and FEMA Has Partially Addressed These Issues:
Voluntary organizations faced limitations in the scope of program
coverage and communication difficulties while trying to obtain
reimbursement under the Public Assistance program after Katrina. The
Public Assistance reimbursement program was not designed for a disaster
of Katrina's magnitude because it only offered reimbursement to
voluntary organizations in the disaster zone, even though evacuees
dispersed throughout the country. FEMA has since changed its
regulations so that after future disasters voluntary organizations
serving evacuees outside of declared disaster zones can be reimbursed.
Voluntary organizations also faced significant communication problems
as they sought reimbursement, but FEMA has not taken steps to address
these communication issues. Some voluntary organizations said that
VALs--FEMA's liaisons to the voluntary sector--could not provide them
with information about the Public Assistance program or provided them
with the wrong information. FEMA VALs do not receive training on Public
Assistance program policies. In addition, we found that some of the
information on FEMA's Web site about the Public Assistance program was
not presented in a user-friendly format that would help voluntary
organizations successfully navigate reimbursement policies and
procedures. As a result of these various communication problems, some
organizations said that they never found out about reimbursement
opportunities, or got so frustrated with the process that they chose
not to apply.
Limited Scope of Program Led to Reimbursement Difficulties, but FEMA
Revised Regulations to Address This Issue:
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, voluntary organizations were
potentially eligible to be reimbursed for mass care expenditures only
in areas that were within disaster zones, as declared by the President.
Because of the scale of the disaster, however, hundreds of thousands of
Gulf Coast residents evacuated to areas of the country outside of the
declared disaster zone. Many of these evacuees were sheltered by small
local voluntary organizations, such as churches, which were not
eligible for reimbursement under Public Assistance policies at the
time.
On September 9, 2005--about 2 weeks after Katrina made landfall--FEMA
issued a memorandum stating that the President had declared an
emergency in states receiving Katrina victims. This permitted voluntary
organizations in states across the nation that were sheltering evacuees
from Katrina to receive reimbursement for mass care expenses. FEMA
changed its regulations in July 2006 to allow eligible public and
private non-profit entities outside of a declared disaster zone to
receive reimbursement for mass care expenses, without the requirement
for presidential declarations in each area where disaster victims are
sheltered.
This change contributed to confusion among voluntary organizations
about the Public Assistance program after the hurricanes. Many
officials from voluntary organizations told us that changing
reimbursement policies caused confusion and made it difficult for them
to get reimbursed, and that in some cases they gave up on seeking
reimbursement.
FEMA Strategies for Communicating about the Public Assistance Program
Were Often Not Effective:
Although FEMA and affected states took steps to publicize the Public
Assistance program, many voluntary organizations did not receive key
information. Voluntary organizations reported numerous problems, such
as not learning about Public Assistance reimbursement opportunities,
not being able to obtain information about how to apply, and not being
able to obtain assistance with the application process. Clear and
accurate communication was particularly important because many of the
voluntary organizations that were providing services had not sought
reimbursement for services before.[Footnote 19] Because organizations
did not always receive needed information, some organizations either
never found out about reimbursement opportunities, or got so frustrated
with the process that they withdrew their applications.
FEMA officials told us that they communicate Public Assistance policies
to voluntary organizations after disasters in three ways. First, states
and FEMA coordinate in convening meetings to make voluntary
organizations aware of Public Assistance program reimbursement
opportunities. Second, FEMA officials, including VALs, often respond to
questions from applicants. Third, FEMA provides information about the
Public Assistance program via its Web site. As described in FEMA's
December 2005 review of the response to Katrina, FEMA's role in
publicizing reimbursement opportunities is particularly important after
large-scale disasters in which local governments are severely
compromised or no longer functioning.
There were several problems, however, with FEMA's efforts to publicize
and communicate about the Public Assistance program with voluntary
organizations after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. First, because many of
the organizations responding to Katrina were small and had not received
Public Assistance funding in the past, they often did not find out
about briefings on the program. As a result, they missed an opportunity
to receive information about being reimbursed.
Second, VALs--a key FEMA link to the voluntary sector--were not
provided with information about the program. VALs are often in the
field working with voluntary organizations providing disaster response
services, and are potentially well-positioned to inform these
organizations about Public Assistance opportunities and tell them where
they can go for additional information. Yet many officials from local
voluntary organizations told us that VALs had either not informed them
about the program, could not tell them where to get the needed forms,
or had provided them with information that was incorrect. For example,
one representative of a voluntary organization told us that VALs had
not told the organization about reimbursement opportunities, and that
when she found out about the program, the VAL could not tell her where
to obtain more information.
FEMA officials told us that the Public Assistance program has
traditionally not worked closely with VALs--who are part of FEMA's
Individual Assistance program, as opposed to the Public Assistance
program--to publicize the program. A Public Assistance official said
that FEMA has publicized the program through its Web site and state
efforts, and that there have been no efforts to work more closely with
FEMA VALs since Katrina. FEMA officials told us that there is currently
no training for VALs on Public Assistance policies. Several FEMA VALs
told us that closer coordination between the program and FEMA VALs
would help publicize the program.
Finally, our review of FEMA's Web site, and comments from a number of
voluntary organizations, indicate that the Web site was not effective
in providing these organizations with the information about Public
Assistance opportunities after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. The two
Public Assistance reimbursement opportunities that voluntary
organizations told us they applied for--reimbursement for mass care and
for facilities damage--include different eligibility and procedural
requirements for voluntary organizations.[Footnote 20] Voluntary
organization officials told us that they are not accustomed to working
with technical policies, and that they needed a clear, step-by-step
explanation of the Public Assistance opportunities and requirements.
FEMA provided an online fact sheet regarding the opportunity for
voluntary organizations to apply for Public Assistance reimbursement
for mass care costs several weeks after Hurricane Katrina made
landfall. However, the Web site does not include user-friendly
information for voluntary organizations about opportunities for
reimbursement for facilities damage. In addition, FEMA's Public
Assistance Web site does not include contact information for specific
offices or officials who can help organizations develop reimbursement
applications for either program.
Conclusion:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought widespread devastation and
challenged all levels of government and voluntary organizations. Using
lessons learned from Katrina, FEMA and voluntary organizations have
begun taking steps to improve mass care services for future disasters,
such as replacing the National Response Plan with the National Response
Framework.
The NRF includes an enhanced role for FEMA in coordinating with
voluntary organizations. FEMA VALs--employees who are FEMA's primary
link to the voluntary sector--will have primary responsibility for this
role. However, the size of FEMA's VAL workforce is not sufficient to
meet FEMA's NRF responsibilities for voluntary agency coordination.
Having only one full-time VAL in each region who can work on the entire
range of coordination issues with voluntary organizations can limit
VALs' ability to build successful relationships in their states, a
critical element of fulfilling their responsibilities. In addition,
VALs receive no role-specific training, and no training on a key
federal program that reimburses voluntary organizations after
disasters. If FEMA does not take steps to address these issues, it will
encounter difficulties in meeting its NRF role of coordinating with
voluntary organizations, and the nation is likely to see some of the
same coordination problems that occurred after the Gulf Coast
hurricanes.
Under the NRF, NVOAD plays a critical role in sharing disaster
information among national voluntary organizations, and FEMA plays an
important role in supporting coordination among these organizations.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, timely information was important for
organizations' efforts to provide disaster services, but the daily
conference calls hosted by NVOAD were an ineffective communication
strategy. NVOAD's executive director has indicated that improving the
organization's communication systems is a priority, but NVOAD has only
two staff members and limited funding. Without FEMA's assistance, NVOAD
may not have the technical capacity to adequately assess and improve
its communications systems. Unless NVOAD and FEMA work together to
systematically assess and expand NVOAD's information sharing efforts,
NVOAD members are likely to face continued communication problems after
disasters.
FEMA has begun taking actions to improve the mass care services
provided to the disabled after disasters, including actions to
implement relevant provisions of the Post-Katrina Act. As FEMA noted in
the Nationwide Plan Review, it is critical that federal, state, and
local governments increase the participation of people with
disabilities and subject-matter experts in the development and
execution of plans and training. However, FEMA has generally not
coordinated with NCD in its efforts to implement relevant provisions of
the Act, as required by the Act. Unless FEMA begins working more
closely with NCD, emergency planners may not fully incorporate this
population's needs into planning efforts.
Small voluntary organizations played a key role in the mass care
response to Katrina, but were often unfamiliar with how to navigate
these federal reimbursement procedures. Although FEMA has posted the
Public Assistance program policies for voluntary organizations on its
Web site, the site does not provide key information about opportunities
for voluntary organizations to be reimbursed for facilities damage in a
user-friendly format. In addition, the Web site does not include
contact information voluntary organizations could use to get more
information. Unless FEMA provides information in a more user-friendly
format, some voluntary organizations may be unable to take advantage of
reimbursement opportunities after future disasters, which could be an
incentive to stop providing mass care services.
Recommendations:
To provide greater assurance that FEMA has adequate staff capabilities
to support the agency's enhanced role under the NRF in helping
coordinate with voluntary organizations, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take
action to enhance the capabilities of its VAL workforce, such as:
* converting some Katrina VALs into full-time VALs able to work on the
entire range of coordination issues with voluntary organizations;
* increasing the number of full-time VALs; or:
* providing role-specific training to VALs, including providing them
with information about Public Assistance opportunities and policies for
voluntary organizations.
To improve NVOAD's effectiveness in meeting its NRF information-sharing
responsibilities after disasters, we recommend that NVOAD assess
members' information needs, and improve its communication strategies
after disasters. As part of this effort, NVOAD should examine how best
to fund improved communication strategies, which may include developing
a proposal for FEMA funding. To facilitate the implementation of
improved communication strategies, NVOAD may want to consider
strategies for increasing staff support for NVOAD after disasters, such
as having staff from NVOAD member organizations temporarily detailed to
NVOAD. In addition, in light of FEMA's enhanced role under the NRF in
helping coordinate the activities of voluntary organizations in
disasters, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the Administrator of FEMA to provide technical assistance to NVOAD, as
needed, as NVOAD works to improve its communication strategies.
To ensure that the needs of individuals with disabilities are fully
integrated into FEMA's efforts to implement provisions of the Act that
require FEMA to coordinate with NCD, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to develop a
detailed set of measurable action steps, in consultation with NCD, for
how FEMA will coordinate with NCD.
To help ensure that voluntary organizations can readily obtain clear
and accurate information about the reimbursement opportunities offered
by the Public Assistance program, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take action to
make the information on FEMA's Web site about reimbursement
opportunities for voluntary organizations more user-friendly. This
could include:
* developing a user-friendly guide or fact sheet that provides an
overview of opportunities for reimbursement for facilities damage; and:
* providing contact information for organizations to get more
information about Public Assistance program opportunities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DHS provided
technical comments only, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also
provided a draft of relevant sections of this report to the Red Cross.
The Red Cross provided several technical comments that we incorporated
as appropriate.
After reviewing the section of this report pertaining to NVOAD, the
NVOAD Board President and Executive Director agreed with our findings
and recommendation regarding improving information sharing after
disasters. NVOAD added that it would be in favor of FEMA providing
support to implement this recommendation through its Disaster
Assistance Directorate. NVOAD's comments are reprinted in appendix V.
In addition, we provided the Chairman of NCD with a draft copy of the
section of this report addressing issues with coordination between FEMA
and NCD under the Post-Katrina Act. NCD agreed with the report's
findings and recommendation for this section. NCD's comments are
reprinted in appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Red Cross, appropriate congressional
committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you or your
staff have any questions about this report. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Cynthia M. Fagnoni:
Managing Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Herb Kohl:
Chairman:
Special Committee on Aging:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
As part of our body of work examining the response of the federal
government and others to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we conducted a
review of various issues pertaining to the role of voluntary
organizations in providing mass care services. To obtain information
about the rationale for, and implications of, the shift in the primary
mass care role in the National Response Framework (NRF) from the Red
Cross to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we reviewed
letters between FEMA and the Red Cross documenting reasons for the
shift in the primary agency role from the Red Cross to FEMA, the
National Response Framework, information about the National Shelter
System, the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, and
information about the responsibilities of Voluntary Agency Liaisons. We
also observed a demonstration of the National Shelter System. We
interviewed officials from FEMA with responsibility for ESF-6,
including FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VALs) in headquarters and in
the field, and from national offices of voluntary organizations,
including the Red Cross, National Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disaster, the Salvation Army, the United Way, America's Second Harvest,
Catholic Charities, and the Southern Baptist Convention. We also
interviewed emergency management officials from a selection of states
that included Louisiana, Mississippi, and nine other randomly selected
states throughout the country.
To obtain information about NVOAD's efforts to coordinate with the
voluntary sector, we reviewed documents about its member services,
internal governance, funding, and plans for the future. We also
interviewed NVOAD's former and current executive directors, chairman of
the board, officials from eight of NVOAD's member organizations, and
FEMA officials and disaster response experts who have worked with
NVOAD. We also interviewed an official who manages a Web site used to
coordinate disaster relief by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees, and reviewed the Web site.
To obtain information about the efforts of FEMA and major national
voluntary organizations to improve services for the disabled since
Katrina, we reviewed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
(the Act), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and guidance
released by the Justice Department about ADA, and also and conducted
document reviews with FEMA, the American Red Cross, and the Southern
Baptist Convention. These included documents related to FEMA's efforts
to improve services for the disabled and respond to the Act's
requirements, such as the Target Capabilities and guidelines for
accommodating individuals with disabilities. In addition, we reviewed a
number of Red Cross documents related to services for individuals with
disabilities, including training materials and a shelter intake form.
We also interviewed officials from DHS, FEMA, the Red Cross, the
Southern Baptists, Salvation Army, the United Way, and Catholic
Charities, and state-level emergency managers from Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas. Our interviews with FEMA included individuals
from the various initiatives required by the Act to consult with the
National Council on Disability, and FEMA's Disability Coordinator. In
addition, we interviewed officials from the National Council on
Disabilities, a number of disability advocacy organizations, such as
the National Spinal Cord Injury Association, and several advocacy
groups for the elderly, such as the American Association of Retired
Persons. We also reviewed a survey of 95 Red Cross chapters that was
conducted by the Disability Relations Group, an organization that
conducts survey research on disability issues. Due to several
methodological limitations--for example, we could not determine the
response rate to the survey--we did not cite the results of this survey
in the report.
To collect information about how FEMA coordinated with small voluntary
organizations through the Public Assistance program, we conducted
document reviews of FEMA's Public Assistance program, including FEMA
Public Assistance policies, and documentation of changes to those
policies, and reviewed information about the program on FEMA's Web
site. We also interviewed FEMA officials from the Public Assistance
office, and several FEMA VALs. We spoke with representatives of
approximately 10 local voluntary organizations that provided services
in the Gulf Coast after the hurricanes, and the Director of Long-Term
Recovery for the Louisiana Association of Nonprofits--a group that
works with nonprofits that applied for reimbursement. In addition, we
spoke with state government officials from Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas, officials from Baton Rouge and Houston, and several disaster
response experts familiar with Public Assistance.
We reviewed reports on the response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued
by the DHS Office of Inspector General, the House of Representatives,
the White House, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the National Council on Disability, the Appleseed
Foundation, the American Association of Retired Persons, the
International Association of Assembly Managers, and the Aspen
Institute.
In addition, this report drew from research conducted for GAO-06-712,
which was released in June 2006. For that report, we conducted site
visits to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We toured damage caused by
the hurricanes in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Biloxi, Mississippi.
Additionally we toured the FEMA Joint Field Offices that were located
in Baton Rouge, Biloxi, and Austin; local emergency operations centers
in Baton Rouge and Austin; as well as distribution centers established
by the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. On these site visits, we met
with local chapters of the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Catholic
Charities, and the United Way. We held two additional discussion
groups--one in Jackson, Mississippi, and one in Houston, Texas--to
obtain the perspectives of local voluntary organizations that provided
disaster relief on their efforts to be reimbursed under the Public
Assistance program, and other issues. We spoke with key local emergency
managers from East Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Austin, and Houston, as
well as the State of Texas. We also spoke with FEMA Voluntary Agency
Liaisons in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
In addition, for the June 2006 report we conducted a discussion group
at a Board of Directors meeting for the National Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster that included representatives from the
United Methodist Committee on Relief, America's Second Harvest, and
Lutheran Disaster Response. We also observed a National Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster conference call in November 2005.
These conference calls took place daily after the Gulf Coast hurricanes
and included representatives from local and national voluntary
organizations, as well as federal agencies, such as FEMA.
We conducted this performance audit between January 2007 and February
2008, and work for the previous report, GAO-06-712, between October
2005 and June 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: NVOAD Members:
* Adventist Community Services:
* America's Second Harvest:
* American Baptist Men/USA:
* American Disaster Reserve:
* American Radio Relay League, Inc. (ARRL):
* American Red Cross:
* Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team (AMURT):
* Catholic Charities USA:
* Christian Disaster Response:
* Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC):
* Church of the Brethren-Brethren Disaster Ministries:
* Church World Service:
* Churches of Scientology Disaster Response:
* Convoy of Hope:
* Disaster Psychiatry Outreach:
* Episcopal Relief and Development:
* Feed the Children:
* Friends Disaster Service, Inc.
* HOPE Coalition America:
* Humane Society of the United States:
* International Aid:
* International Critical Incident Stress Foundation:
* International Relief and Development (IRD):
* International Relief Friendship Foundation (IRFF):
* Lutheran Disaster Response:
* Medical Teams International:
* Mennonite Disaster Service:
* Mercy Medical Airlift (Angel Flight):
* National Association of Jewish Chaplains:
* National Emergency Response Team:
* National Organization for Victim Assistance:
* Nazarene Disaster Response:
* Operation Blessing:
* Points of Light Foundation and Volunteer Center National Network:
* Presbyterian Church (USA):
* REACT International, Inc.
* Samaritan's Purse:
* Save the Children:
* Society of St. Vincent de Paul:
* Southern Baptist Convention:
* The Phoenix Society for Burn Survivors:
* The Salvation Army:
* Tzu Chi Foundation:
* United Church of Christ - Wider Church Ministries:
* United Jewish Communities:
* United Methodist Committee on Relief:
* United Way of America:
* Volunteers of America:
* World Vision:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Job Duties of FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons:
* Assist voluntary agencies in the development and promotion of state
and local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) and other
coalitions such as unmet needs/resource coordination committees for
long-term recovery.
* Initiate and maintain a close working relationship between FEMA and
voluntary agencies including soliciting participation of the voluntary
agencies in preparedness activities such as training and exercises to
improve response and recovery capacity.
* Provide technical advice to FEMA Regional and Area Offices, other
federal agencies, and state emergency management officials regarding
the roles and responsibilities of all VOAD members, and other voluntary
agencies active in disaster and emergency situations.
* Assist and collaborate with other FEMA Regional and Area Offices
staff, in the development and maintenance of emergency response and
recovery plans to ensure that voluntary agencies' capabilities,
specifically as they relate to emergency assistance, mass shelter and
feeding, donations management, and other voluntary agency disaster
relief activities are recognized in the plans.
* Assist with the collection and dissemination of information
concerning emergency incidents, including initial damage assessment,
emergency response activities, and continued response and long-term
recovery activities/plans of voluntary agencies.
* Assist and support the FEMA Individual Assistance officer on disaster
operations in providing consultative support to voluntary agency
leadership and encouraging collaboration among voluntary agencies.
* Provide or make available to the voluntary agencies information on
the status of federal and state response and recovery programs and
activities.
Source: FEMA documents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Shelter Intake Form:
[See PDF for image]
American Red Cross - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services:
Initial Intake and Assessment Tool:
Date/Time:
Shelter Name/Location:
DRO Name/Number:
Name of person:
Age:
Names/ages of all family members present:
Age, gender, NOK/guardian:
Home address:
Name of staff initiating assessment:
Contact number:
Initial Intake:
We will now be asking you a series of questions - Will you need
assistance with understanding or answering these questions?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, determine needs in conjunction with shelter
manager and Health Services.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
What language are you most comfortable with?
Action to be taken: If other than English, refer to shelter manager if
interpreter is needed. Once interpreter is available, return to initial
intake.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Do you have a medical or health concern right now?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, stop interview and refer to Health Services
immediately.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
How are you feeling? Physically? Emotionally?
Action to be taken: If life threatening, call 911. Other urgent needs -
refer to Health Services (HS) or Disaster mental Health (DMH) now.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Do you need any medicine, equipment, or other items for daily living?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, refer to Health Services and ask next
question.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Do you need a caregiver or personal assistant?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask next question. If no, skip next
question.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Is your caregiver present and planning to remain with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, name the person. If no, refer to Health
Services.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Do you use a service animal?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask the next two (2) questions. If no, skip
the next two (2) questions.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Is the animal with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, ask the next question.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
If No, do you know where the service animal is?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, notify local animal control of loss and
attempt to identify potential resources for replacement.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
In under the age of 18, do you have a family member or responsible
person with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, refer to Health Services or Disaster mental
Health. If yes, locate parent or guardian to continue interview.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
This question is only relevant for interviews conducted at HHS medical
facilities. Are you presently receiving any benefits
(Medicare/Medicaid)?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, list type and benefit number(s), if
available.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Do you have any severe environmental, food, or medication allergies?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, refer to Health Services.
Comments (include name of affected family members):
Initial Intake:
Question to interviewer: Would the person benefit from a more detailed
health or mental health assessment?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, refer to Health Services or Disaster mental
Health.
Comments (include name of affected family members): If client is
uncertain or unsure of answer to any question. re to HS or DMH for more
in-depth evaluation.
Referred to Health Services?
Yes/No:
Referred to Disaster Mental Health:
Yes/No:
Assistance and Support Information:
Have you been hospitalized or under the care of a physician in the past
month?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, list reason.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Do you have a conditions that requires any special medical
equipment/supplies? (Epipen, diabetes supplies, respirator, oxygen,
dialysis, ostomy supplies, etc.)
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, list and list potential sources if
available.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Medications: Do you take any medication(s) regularly?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: In no, skip to the question regarding hearing.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Medications: When did you last take your medication?
Action to be taken: Date/Time:
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Medications: When are you due for your next dose?
Action to be taken: Date/Time:
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Medications: Do you have the medication with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, identify medications and process for
replacement.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Do you need assistance in hearing me?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask the next question. If no, skip the next
question.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Would you like me to write the questions down?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, give the client paper and pen. If no, go to
the next category of questions.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Do you use a hearing aid?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask the next two questions. If no, skip the
next two questions.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Do you have your hearing aid with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask the next two questions. If no, skip the
next two questions.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Is the hearing aid working?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, identify potential resources for
replacement.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Do you need a battery?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, identify potential resources for
replacement.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: Do you need a sign language interpreter?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, identify potential resources in conjunction
with shelter manager.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Hearing: How do you best communicate with others?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: Sign language? Lip read? Use a TTY? Other
(explain).
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you wear prescription glasses?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask the next two questions. If no, skip the
next two questions.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you have your glasses with you or with your personal
belongings?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, identify potential resources for
replacement.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you have difficulty seeing even with glasses?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, skip the remaining vision/sight questions
and go to Activities of Daily living section.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you use a white cane?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask the next question. If no, skip the next
question.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you have your white cane with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, identify potential resources for
replacement.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you need assistance getting around, even with your
white cane?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, determine if accommodation can be made in
the shelter.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you need help moving around or getting in and out of
bed?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, skip the remaining vision/sight questions
and go to Activities of Daily living section.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you rely on a mobility device such as a cane, walker,
wheelchair or transfer board?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, skip the next question. If yes, list.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Vision/Sight: Do you have the mobility device/equipment with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, consult with HS and shelter manager to
determine if accommodation can be made in the shelter.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Activities of Daily Living: Do you need help getting dressed?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, explain.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Activities of Daily Living: Do you need assistance using the bathroom?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, explain.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Activities of Daily Living: Do you need help bathing?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, explain.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Activities of Daily Living: Do you need help eating? Cutting food?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, explain.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Activities of Daily Living: Do you have a family member, friend, or
caregiver with you to help with these activities.
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, consult with HS and shelter manager to
determine if general population shelter is appropriate.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Nutrition: Do you wear dentures?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, ask next question. If no, skip next two
questions.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Nutrition: Do you have them with you?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, identify potential sources for replacement.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Nutrition: Are you on any special diet?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, list special diet and notify feeding staff.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Nutrition: Do you have any allergies to food?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If yes, list allergies.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Interviewer Evaluation: Question to interviewer: Has the person been
able to express his/her needs and make choices?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no or uncertain, consult with DMH and shelter
manager.
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Interviewer Evaluation: Question to interviewer:
Yes/No:
Action to be taken:
Comments:
Assistance and Support Information:
Interviewer Evaluation: Question to interviewer: Can this shelter
provide the assistance and support needed?
Yes/No:
Action to be taken: If no, collaborate with shelter manager on
alternative sheltering options.
Comments:
Name of person collecting information:
Signature:
Date:
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from NVOAD:
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster:
Promoting Cooperation, Communication, Coordination and Collaboration
During Disaster Preparedness, Response, Relief and Recovery:
National VOAD:
1720 I Street NW, Suite 700:
Washington DC 20006:
202-955-8396:
202-955-5079 Fax:
[hyperlink, http://www.nvoad.orq]:
Andrew Sherrill:
Assistant Director:
Government Accountability Office:
202-512-7252:
sherrilla@gao.gov:
January 31, 2008:
Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and Coordination
between Government and Voluntary Sectors (GAO-08-369):
Dear Mr. Sherrill:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report "FEMA
Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and Coordination between
Government and Voluntary Sectors (GAO-08-369).
After reviewing the components of the report relevant to National
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD), we are in
support of the conclusions drawn. The National VOAD Board and national
office are very interested in building processes and systems to better
support the member organizations as they provide their services. We are
looking to develop communication systems that take better advantage of
current technologies to create seamless coordination, while striving to
maintain the grassroots approach that provides our members' speed and
flexibility in times of disaster.
The National VOAD role in the National Response Framework is not only
information sharing and convening voluntary organizations, but to also
serve as a coordinating entry point for member organizations to
actively engage in a national response. Our member organizations are
active in response, relief and recovery. In order to facilitate a more
rapid response, their activities related to these roles are coordinated
under the Disaster Assistance Directorate of FEMA.
The Disaster Assistance Directorate of FEMA has a tradition of support
for National VOAD and its member organizations. It is good to see a
recommendation that renews and enhances this relationship, and we would
be pleased to see this support grow. While the report is general in its
reference to FEMA, we would be in support of FEMA carrying out these
recommendations through their Disaster Assistance Directorate.
Sincerely,
Thomas Hazelwood:
National VOAD Board President:
Executive Secretary US Disaster Response:
United Methodist Committee on Relief:
Diana Rothe-Smith:
Executive Director:
National VOAD:
[End of section]
Appendix VI Comments from NCD:
National Council On Disability:
1331 F Street, NW, Suite 1050:
Washington, D.C. 20004-1107:
(202) 272-2004 Voice:
(202) 272-2074 TT:
(202) 272-2022 Fax:
An independent federal agency working with the President and the
Congress to increase the inclusion, independence, and empowerment of
all Americans with disabilities.
January 25, 2008:
Cynthia M. Fagnoni:
Managing Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Fagnoni:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide written comments on the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled "National
Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and
Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors." This is the
National Council on Disability's (NCD) response to your draft report.
We agree with the draft report's findings, analyses, and conclusions as
they reference NCD. We also agree with the following specific report
recommendation:
"To ensure that the needs of individuals with disabilities are fully
integrated into FEMA's efforts to implement provisions of the Act that
require FEMA to coordinate with NCD, we recommend that the
Administrator of FEMA develop a detailed set of measurable action
steps, in consultation with NCD, for how FEMA will coordinate with
NCD."
This report from GAO reflects both the progress and prospects of our
responsibilities to work with FEMA under the aegis of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act (PKA) of 2006, as enacted by the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law
109-295).
We realize that P.L. 109-295 included NCD at a critical time in FEMA's
history. We recognize that Congress believed NCD has valuable
perspective, knowledge and resources to, offer to FEMA during the
reorganization and redirection of its efforts. We also believe that
Congress intended for NCD to assume and exercise a supportive role with
FEMA under P.L.109-295.
As we have from the moment that the PKA was signed into law, NCD has
remained resolute in its commitment to implementing the requirements of
the law in the new role that Congress has crafted for us in relation to
FEMA. We have also been proactive in our attempts to work with FEMA,
and continue to seek opportunities to strengthen that partnership
wherever possible.
In the interest of completing these critical responsibilities, and on
behalf of millions of Americans with disabilities, we look forward to
working toward the implementation of this GAO report recommendation as
detailed above. Again, thank you for the opportunity to comment upon
the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John R. Vaughn:
NCD Chair:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cindy Fagnoni (202) 512-7215 or fagnonic@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Andrew Sherrill, Acting Director, and Scott Spicer, Analyst in Charge,
managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all
aspects of this report. Farahnaaz Khakoo and Danielle Pakdaman also
made significant contributions. Additionally, Cindy Bascetta, Mallory
Barg Bulman, Karen Doran, Tom James, Bill Jenkins, Gale Harris, Chuck
Wilson, and Walter Vance aided in this assignment. In addition, Jessica
Botsford assisted in the legal analysis, and Charlie Willson assisted
in the message and report development.
[End of section]
Bibliography:
The American Association of Retired Persons. We Can Do Better: Lessons
Learned for Protecting Older Persons in Disasters. Washington, D.C.:
2006.
The Appleseed Foundation. A Continuing Storm: The Ongoing Struggles of
Hurricane Katrina Evacuees. Minneapolis, Minnesota: August 2006.
The Aspen Institute. Weathering the Storm: The Role of Local Nonprofits
in the Hurricane Katrina Relief Effort. Washington, D.C.: 2006.
Congressional Research Service. Federal Emergency Management Policy
Changes after Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions.
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Congressional Research Service. Reimbursement of Local Private
Nonprofit Organizations under the Stafford Act. Washington, D.C.:
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Department of Homeland Security. Nationwide Plan Review: Phase II
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to Hurricane Katrina. OIG-06-32. Washington, D.C.: March 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash
Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. New Orleans, Louisiana: February 2006.
International Association of Assembly Managers. Mega-Shelter: Best
Practices for Planning, Activation, Operations. Coppell, Texas: July
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Rita on People with Disabilities: A Look Back and Remaining Challenges.
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United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006.
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Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared. Washington,
D.C.: 2006.
The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned. Washington, D.C.: February 2006.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. February 2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. July 31, 2006.
Child Welfare: Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to
Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters.
GAO-06-944. July 28, 2006.
Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More Timely
Disaster Assistance. GAO-06-860. July 28, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for
Health Facilities Should Be Addressed. GAO-06-826. July 20, 2006.
Purchase Cards: Control Weakness Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to
Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-957T. July 19, 2006.
Individual Disaster Assistance Programs: Framework for Fraud
Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution. GAO-06-954T. July 12, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse. GAO-06-655. June 16, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent
Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be between $600 Million and
$1.4 Billion. GAO-06-844T. June 14, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.
June 8, 2006.
Lessons Learned for Protecting and Educating Children after the Gulf
Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-680R. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster
Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans and
Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6
Months after Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. Washington, D.C.: March
28, 2006.
Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of
Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R. Washington,
D.C.: February 16, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-to-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R.
Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National Flood
Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee
Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project.
GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO-
06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The NRF will be effective as of March 22, 2008. Until that time,
the NRP will remain in effect.
[2] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-295, Title VI.
[3] For further information, see the Aspen Institute report in the
bibliography at the end of this report.
[4] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Systems, GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: September 2006).
[5] Advocates for the elderly and individuals with disabilities told us
that the mass care issues faced by these groups are similar. We use the
term individuals with disabilities to refer to both of these groups
throughout this report.
[6] Pub. L. No. 100-707, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et. seq.
[7] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the
Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-712
(Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[8] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C: Feb. 28,
2007).
[9] FEMA refers to these positions as Cadre of Regional Employees VALs.
They are employed under 4-year contracts.
[10] For example, the Aspen Institute report recommended that FEMA
significantly develop and expand its VAL staffing. For further
information, see the Aspen Institute report in our bibliography.
[11] The FEMA initial review of the response to Katrina concurred with
this finding. For more information, see the bibliography.
[12] A FEMA review of the response to Katrina also found that there is
virtually no training for personnel involved in response operations,
and that FEMA responders should receive specialized training. For more
information, see the bibliography.
[13] While there were several small language changes in the NRF to
NVOAD's responsibilities in ESF-6, NVOAD and FEMA told us that these
were for clarification and did not represent substantive changes in
NVOAD's responsibilities.
[14] The term "special needs" refers to individuals likely to need
special assistance after disasters, and includes the disabled and
elderly.
[15] ESF-6 specifies that this may include those who have disabilities,
live in institutional settings, are elderly, are from diverse cultures,
have limited English proficiency or are non-English speaking, are
children, or are transportation disadvantaged.
[16] Pub. L. No. 101-336, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The
ADA provides broad non-discrimination protection for individuals with
disabilities in employment, public services and public accommodations,
and services operated by private entities.
[17] Copy of correspondence from Nell Hahn, Advocacy Center of
Lafayette, La. (Sept. 8, 2005).
[18] 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. Under the ADA, shelters, whether provided
by government or entitles such as the Red Cross, must provide equal
access to all individuals. However, in general, the ADA does not
require any action that would result in a fundamental alteration in the
nature of a service, program, or activity or that would impose undue
financial or administrative burdens.
[19] The Aspen Institute found that many of the voluntary organizations
that responded spontaneously to the hurricanes found themselves outside
of FEMA's traditional funding circle because they do not typically
respond to disasters. In addition, the report maintained that clear and
accurate communication is needed because the Public Assistance
application process and requirements for voluntary organizations are
"byzantine." For more information, see the bibliography.
[20] FEMA's Public Assistance policies for voluntary organizations
provide specific eligibility guidelines. For example, FEMA policies
that allow nonprofits to be reimbursed for facilities damage have
specific requirements about the percentage of time and/or space that
the facility must devote to meeting essential public purposes.
[End of section]
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