Coast Guard
Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, and Related Challenges Gao ID: GAO-08-494T March 6, 2008The U.S. Coast Guard, a multi-mission maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security, has requested more than $9 billion for fiscal year 2009 to address its responsibilities for homeland security missions (such as undocumented migrant interdiction) and non-homeland security missions (such as environmental protection). Integral to conducting its missions, is the Deepwater program--a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace vessels and aircraft. This testimony discusses: budget request and trends, and performance statistics, challenges in balancing operations across multiple missions, and Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on operations. GAO's comments are based on products issued from 1997 to 2008. This testimony also discusses on-going work related to patrol boat operations. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed relevant officials.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget request is approximately 7 percent higher than its fiscal year 2008 enacted budget, generally because of proposed increases in both operating expenses and acquisition, construction, and improvements funding. The Coast Guard expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for fiscal year 2007, similar to the performance it reported for fiscal year 2006. The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional measures to better understand the links between resources expended and results achieved. The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various missions with its finite resources and has had difficulties funding and executing both its homeland security and non-homeland security missions. GAO's work has shown that the Coast Guard's homeland security requirements continue to increase and that it has been unable to keep up with these rising security demands. For example, the Coast Guard is not meeting its requirements for providing vessel escorts and conducting security patrols. The Coast Guard is also facing additional requirements to conduct more inspections of maritime facilities and provide security at a growing number of facilities that import hazardous cargos. The Deepwater acquisition program continues to be a source of challenges and progress for the Coast Guard. In terms of affordability, the magnitude of Deepwater funding--representing about 11 percent of the agency's proposed fiscal year 2009 budget--presents a long-term challenge. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has made changes to improve program management by moving away from reliance on a system integrator, increasing government monitoring of program outcomes and competitively purchasing selected assets. In terms of operations, delays in the procurement of new patrol boats have increased resource requirements to maintain older legacy patrol boats and keep them operating.
GAO-08-494T, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, and Related Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast
Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, March 6, 2008:
Coast Guard:
Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, and
Related Challenges:
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and
Justice Issues:
GAO-08-494T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-494T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. Coast Guard, a multi-mission maritime military service within
the Department of Homeland Security, has requested more than $9 billion
for fiscal year 2009 to address its responsibilities for homeland
security missions (such as undocumented migrant interdiction) and non-
homeland security missions (such as environmental protection). Integral
to conducting its missions, is the Deepwater program”a 25-year, $24
billion effort to upgrade or replace vessels and aircraft. This
testimony discusses: budget request and trends, and performance
statistics, challenges in balancing operations across multiple
missions, and Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on
operations. GAO‘s comments are based on products issued from 1997 to
2008. This testimony also discusses on-going work related to patrol
boat operations. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed documentation and
interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found:
The Coast Guard‘s fiscal year 2009 budget request is approximately 7
percent higher than its fiscal year 2008 enacted budget, generally
because of proposed increases in both operating expenses and
acquisition, construction, and improvements funding. The Coast Guard
expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for
fiscal year 2007, similar to the performance it reported for fiscal
year 2006. The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional
measures to better understand the links between resources expended and
results achieved.
The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various
missions with its finite resources and has had difficulties funding and
executing both its homeland security and non-homeland security
missions. GAO‘s work has shown that the Coast Guard‘s homeland
security requirements continue to increase and that it has been unable
to keep up with these rising security demands. For example, the Coast
Guard is not meeting its requirements for providing vessel escorts and
conducting security patrols. The Coast Guard is also facing additional
requirements to conduct more inspections of maritime facilities and
provide security at a growing number of facilities that import
hazardous cargos.
The Deepwater acquisition program continues to be a source of
challenges and progress for the Coast Guard. In terms of affordability,
the magnitude of Deepwater funding”representing about 11 percent of the
agency‘s proposed fiscal year 2009 budget”presents a long-term
challenge. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has made changes to
improve program management by moving away from reliance on a system
integrator, increasing government monitoring of program outcomes and
competitively purchasing selected assets. In terms of operations,
delays in the procurement of new patrol boats have increased resource
requirements to maintain older legacy patrol boats and keep them
operating.
Figure: The Coast Guard must balance its finite resources across
security and other missions.
This figure is a combination of two Coast guard photographs.
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to develop
strategic plans, better plan the use of its human capital, establish
performance measures, and improve program operations. DHS has generally
concurred with these recommendations and is making progress to address
them. We provided a draft of this information to DHS and the Coast
Guard and incorporated technical comments as appropriate.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-494T].
For more information, contact Stephen Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or
caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's fiscal year
2009 budget and related issues. For more than 10 years, we have
provided Congress with information and observations on the Coast
Guard's budget and related issues.[Footnote 1] Consistent with this
approach, this statement will periodically include information from our
prior work to help provide perspective as appropriate. During the last
10 years, the Coast Guard's budget and missions have continued to grow.
For example, the Coast Guard's budget was $3.8 billion for fiscal year
1997 compared to $9.35 billion for fiscal year 2009. In terms of
missions, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have led to a
myriad of additional and complex Coast Guard missions related to
homeland security, such as conducting harbor patrols, reducing the flow
of undocumented migrants, and participating in global military
operations.
To help fulfill its missions, the Coast Guard is implementing a program
to modernize its fleet. The Coast Guard's Deepwater program is a 25-
year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace existing vessels and
aircraft to carry out its missions along our coastlines and farther out
at sea. The program is eventually to include 10 major classes of new or
upgraded vessels and aircraft, and 5 other classes of projects,
including command, control, communications, computer, intelligence
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
This statement will discuss:
* budget request and trends, and performance statistics on achieving
its missions,
* challenges in balancing its operations across its multiple missions,
and:
* Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on operations.
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service within
the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard's responsibilities
fall into two general categories--those related to homeland security
missions, such as ports, waterways, and coastal security (including
conducting harbor patrols and other activities to prevent terrorist
attacks), defense readiness, and undocumented migrant interdiction; and
those related to non-homeland security missions, such as search and
rescue, marine environmental protection (including oil spill response),
illegal drug interdiction, and polar ice operations.
An assessment of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget should be
considered in the context of broader federal budgetary issues. As we
have reported elsewhere, the federal government's deteriorating long-
range financial condition and long-term fiscal imbalance are matters of
increasing concern. The nation faces large and growing structural
deficits due primarily to rising health care costs and known
demographic trends that will constrain the government's ability to pay
for other obligations and discretionary expenses.[Footnote 2]
Addressing this long-term fiscal issue is an overarching challenge. As
a result, there is a need to engage in a fundamental review,
repriorization, and reengineering of the base of the government.
Understanding and addressing the federal government's financial
condition and long-term fiscal imbalance are critical to maintain
fiscal flexibility so that we can respond to current and emerging
social, economic, and security challenges.[Footnote 3]
An assessment of the Coast Guard's budget should also be considered in
the context of risk management. Risk management is a strategy for
helping policy makers to make decisions about allocating finite
resources and take actions in the face of uncertainty. The Coast Guard
cannot afford to protect all maritime areas and facilities against all
possible threats. As a result, it must make choices about how to
allocate its resources to most effectively manage risk. Risk management
has been widely supported by the President and Congress, as a
management approach for homeland security, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security has made it the centerpiece of departmental policy.
The Coast Guard has used risk management to develop security plans for
port areas.[Footnote 4]
This statement is based in part on ongoing work being done for this
subcommittee and on prior GAO work focusing on the Coast Guard's
programmatic and management initiatives completed over the past ten
years.[Footnote 5] In assessing the Coast Guard's budget resources, we
analyzed budget, performance, and acquisitions documents and conducted
interviews with Coast Guard officials. With regard to the budget
assessment, our scope was limited due to the short time available since
the release of the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request.
Additionally, this review did not include evaluating whether the
proposed funding levels are appropriate for the Coast Guard's stated
needs. Our work on homeland security is based on a series of reviews we
conducted in the aftermath of 9/11. This work involved discussions with
appropriate Coast Guard and other federal officials at headquarters and
field units in domestic and international locations, reviews of related
program documents, analysis of program databases (including reliability
assessments), as well as discussions with other domestic and
international stakeholders in the maritime industry.
To assess the status of the Deepwater program, we reviewed key Coast
Guard documentation such as the Major Systems Acquisition Manual,
acquisition program baselines, and human capital plans. We also
conducted interviews with Coast Guard officials, including program
managers, contracting officials, and subject matter experts to discuss
acquisition planning efforts and actions being taken by the Coast Guard
and to obtain information on shipbuilding. In reviewing patrol boat
operations and Coast Guard efforts to mitigate the loss of the 123-foot
patrol boats, we reviewed reports, memoranda, operational hour data,
and other documents. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials
responsible for developing and implementing these sustainment and
mitigation strategies. Finally, we provided a draft of this testimony
to DHS and the Coast Guard and incorporated their technical comments as
appropriate.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to March 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget request is approximately 7
percent higher than its fiscal year 2008 enacted budget, which
continues the upward trend seen in recent years. Major increases in
this year's budget are attributable to operating expenses for the
funding of additional marine inspectors and new command and control
capabilities. Major increases in this year's budget are also attributed
to acquisition, construction and improvements for continued enhancement
and replacement of aging infrastructure. Within this budget, there are
also a number of reallocations that do not impact the total amount of
funding. With respect to the agency's performance, the Coast Guard
expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for
fiscal year 2007, consistent with its performance for fiscal year 2006.
The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional performance
measures in an effort to capture additional segments of program
activity and to develop ways to better understand the links between
resources it expends and the results it achieves.
The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various
missions within its finite resources. For several years, we have
reported that the Coast Guard has had difficulties fully funding and
executing both homeland security missions and its traditional non-
homeland security missions. Our work has shown that the Coast Guard's
requirements continue to increase in homeland security in part due to
additional statutory requirements. In several cases, the Coast Guard
has been unable to keep up with these security demands, for example, by
not meeting its own requirements for providing vessel escorts and
conducting security patrols at some ports. In other cases, the Coast
Guard is facing additional requirements to conduct more inspections of
maritime facilities or provide security at a growing number of
facilities that import hazardous cargos such as Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG). The Coast Guard faces additional non-homeland security
requirements such as updating port plans (as part of an all-hazards
approach) and updating regulations related to oil spills and the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund. The Coast Guard also has additional longer
term non-homeland security requirements, such as those related to the
protection of marine areas near Hawaii and increased vessel traffic in
the Arctic and surrounding areas.
The Deepwater acquisition program continues to present challenges and
progress in terms of affordability, management, and operations. With
respect to affordability, the Coast Guard faces challenges based on the
magnitude of the funding requirements--which represents about 11
percent of the agency's proposed budget for fiscal year 2009--compared
to the agency's overall and AC&I budgets. For example, Deepwater
represents nearly 82 percent of the Coast Guard's total AC&I budget of
$1.21 billion, leaving little room, in the AC&I budget especially, for
other pressing needs such as inland aids to navigation vessels. With
respect to the management of the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard has
made progress through a number of actions to improve the management of
the program. These actions include taking over many of the management
functions that the contractor formerly conducted. The Coast Guard also
continues to make progress in implementing some of our prior
recommendations on how to better manage the program. With respect to
operations, the delay in the acquisition of new assets has created
challenges in keeping older legacy assets operating until they can be
replaced. For example, problems and delays with the Coast Guard's
acquisition of new patrol boats forced the agency to incur additional
costs to maintain older patrol boats and incur opportunity costs in
terms of lost or reallocated missions. The Coast Guard plans to acquire
replacement patrol boats beginning in 2010.
Background:
The Coast Guard is an Armed Service of the United States and the only
military organization within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
It is the principle federal agency responsible for maritime safety,
security, and environmental stewardship through multi-mission
resources, authorities, and capabilities. To accomplish its
responsibilities, the Coast Guard is organized into two major commands
that are responsible for overall mission execution--one in the Pacific
area and the other in the Atlantic area. These commands are divided
into 9 districts, which in turn are organized into 35 sectors that
unify command and control of field units and resources, such as
multimission stations and patrol boats. In its fiscal year 2009 posture
statement, the Coast Guard reported having nearly 49,100 full-time
positions--about 42,000 military and 7,100 civilians. In addition, the
agency reported that it has about 8,100 reservists who support the
national military strategy or provide additional operational support
and surge capacity during times of emergency, such as natural
disasters. Finally, the Coast Guard reported that it utilizes the
services of about 29,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel who conduct a
wide array of activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating
safety education. The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under
two broad missions--homeland security and non-homeland security. The
Coast Guard responsibilities are further divided into 11 programs, as
shown in table 1.
Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area:
Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: * Ports,
waterways, and coastal security;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Conducting harbor
patrols, vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and
analysis, and other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and
minimize the damage from attacks that occur.
Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: * Undocumented
migrant interdiction;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Deploying cutters and
aircraft to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the
United States by maritime routes.
Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: * Defense
readiness;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Participating with
the Department of Defense (DOD) in global military operations,
deploying cutters and other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD
force mobilization operations.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Search
and rescue;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Operating
multimission stations and a national distress and response
communication system, conducting search and rescue operations for
mariners in distress.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Living
marine resources;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Enforcing domestic
fishing laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Aids to
navigation and waterways management;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Managing U.S.
waterways and providing a safe, efficient, and navigable marine
transportation system, maintaining the extensive system of navigation
aids, monitoring marine traffic through vessel traffic service centers.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Ice
operations;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Conducting polar
operations to facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel
in support of scientific and national security activity, conducting
domestic icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round commerce,
conducting international ice operations to track icebergs below the
48th north latitude.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Marine
environmental protection;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Preventing and
responding to marine oil and chemical spills, preventing the illegal
dumping of plastics and garbage in U.S. waters, preventing biological
invasions by aquatic nuisance species.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Marine
safety;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Setting standards and
conducting vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers
and crew aboard commercial vessels, partnering with states and boating
safety organizations to reduce recreational boating deaths.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Illegal
drug interdiction;
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Deploying cutters and
aircraft in high drug-trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to
reduce the flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes.
Mission and program: Non-homeland security mission-programs: * Other
law enforcement (foreign fish enforcement);
Activities and functions of each mission-program: Protecting U.S.
fishing grounds by ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally
harvest U.S. fish stocks.
Source: Coast Guard.
Note: The Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security
missions are delineated in section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (2002)). Starting with the
fiscal year 2007 budget, however, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) designated the Coast Guard's illegal drug interdiction and other
law enforcement mission-programs--which were originally homeland
security missions--as non-homeland security missions for budgetary
purposes.
[End of table]
For each of these 11 mission-programs, the Coast Guard has developed
performance measures to communicate agency performance and provide
information for the budgeting process to Congress, other policymakers,
and taxpayers. The Coast Guard's performance measures are published in
various documents, including the Coast Guard's Posture Statement, which
includes the fiscal year 2009 Budget-in-Brief. The Coast Guard's 2009
Budget-in-Brief reports performance information to assess the
effectiveness of the agency's performance as well as a summary of the
agency's most recent budget request. The performance information
provides performance measures for each of the Coast Guard's mission-
programs, as well as descriptions of the measures and explanations of
performance results.
To carry out these missions, the Coast Guard has a program underway--
called the Deepwater program--to acquire a number of assets such as
vessels, aircraft, and command, control, communications, computer,
intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Appendix I
provides additional details on specific vessels and aircraft. The Coast
Guard began the Deepwater program in the mid-1990s and it is the
largest acquisition program in the agency's history. Rather than using
a traditional acquisition approach of replacing individual classes of
legacy vessels and aircraft through a series of individual
acquisitions, the Coast Guard chose a system-of-systems strategy, that
would replace the legacy assets with a single, integrated
package.[Footnote 6] To carry out this acquisition, the Coast Guard
decided to use a systems integrator--a private sector contractor
responsible for designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and
integrating the various assets to meet projected Deepwater operational
requirements at the lowest possible costs, either directly or through
subcontractors. In June 2002, the Coast Guard awarded the Deepwater
systems integrator contract to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)--
a business entity led and jointly owned by Lockheed Martin and Northrup
Grumman Ship Systems. For 10 years, we have reviewed the Deepwater
program and have informed Congress, the Departments of Transportation
and Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard of the risks and
uncertainties inherent in such a large acquisition.[Footnote 7]
Budget Increases are for Both OE and AC&I, Recent Performance is
Steady:
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget is about 6.9 percent higher
than its 2008 enacted levels.[Footnote 8] Major increases in this
year's budget are attributable to operating expenses for the funding of
additional marine inspectors and new command and control capabilities.
Major increases in this year's budget are also attributed to
acquisition, construction and improvements for continued enhancement
and replacement of aging vessels, aircraft, and infrastructure. The
Coast Guard expects to meet 6 of 11 performance targets for fiscal year
2007, the same level of performance as fiscal year 2006.
Overall Budget Request is 6.9 Percent Higher than Previous Year's
Enacted Budget:
The Coast Guard's budget request in fiscal year 2009 is $9.35 billion,
or 6.9 percent more than the enacted fiscal year 2008 budget (see fig.
1).[Footnote 9] About $6.2 billion, or approximately 66 percent, is for
operating expenses. This operating expense funding supports 11
statutorily identified mission-programs and increases in salaries,
infrastructure and maintenance costs. This also includes increased
funding for additional marine inspectors, new and existing command and
control and intelligence capabilities, and to address rulemaking
projects. The greatest change from the previous year is in the AC&I
request, which at $1.2 billion reflects about a 35 percent increase
from fiscal year 2008. This increase includes funding for such things
as Deepwater program enhancements to the Coast Guard's operational
fleet of vessels and aircraft, and for continued development of new
assets, as well as emergency maintenance. The remaining part of the
overall budget request consists primarily of retiree pay and health
care fund contributions. If the Coast Guard's total budget request is
granted, overall funding will have increased by over 37 percent (or 17
percent after inflation) since fiscal year 2003. Looking back further,
overall funding will have increased by approximately 143 percent (or 87
percent after inflation) since fiscal year 1997.
Figure 1: Coast Guard Budget from Fiscal Year 2003 to Fiscal Year 2009:
This figure is a combination line graph showing Coast Guard budget from
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2009. The X axis represents actual,
enacted, and requested. The Y axis represents dollars in millions. One
line represents OE, one represents ACI, and the other represents Total.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: The Coast Guard's budget consists of discretionary and mandatory
funding line items. The operating expenses and acquisition,
construction, and improvements line items make up the biggest portion
of discretionary funding. Other line items in the Coast Guard's
discretionary budget include environmental compliance and restoration,
health care contributions, research and development, and reserve
training costs. Retiree pay is the largest item in the Coast Guard's
mandatory funding budget, and the Coast Guard is requesting $1.23
billion for retiree pay in 2009. Other mandatory funding line items
include boating safety, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, and the
gift fund.
[End of figure]
Overall, the Coast Guard's budget request for homeland security
missions represents approximately 40 percent of the overall budget,
with the non-homeland security funding representing approximately 60
percent. However, the Coast Guard does not request funding by mission;
it does so by appropriation account. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard
provides a comparison of homeland security versus non-homeland security
funding as part of the President's fiscal year budget request.
According to the Coast Guard, an activity-based cost model is used to
estimate homeland security versus non-homeland security funding for its
missions. This is done by averaging past expenditures to forecast
future spending, and these amounts are revised from the estimates
reported previously. Although the Coast Guard reports summary financial
data by homeland security and non-homeland security missions to the
Office of Management and Budget, as a multi-mission agency, the Coast
Guard can be conducting multiple mission activities simultaneously. For
example, a multi-mission asset conducting a security escort is also
monitoring safety within the harbor and could be diverted to conduct a
search and rescue case. As a result, it is difficult to accurately
detail the level of resources dedicated to each mission. Figure 2 shows
the estimated funding levels for fiscal year 2009 by each mission
program. However, actual expenditures are expected to vary from these
estimates, according to the Coast Guard.
Figure 2: Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request by Mission-
Program as Estimated by the Coast Guard's Mission Cost Model:
This figure is a bar graph showing Coast Guard fiscal year budget
request by mission program as estimated by the Coast Guard's mission
cost model. The X axis represents Non-homeland security, and Homeland
Security. The Y axis represents millions of dollars.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[End of figure]
Performance Remains Steady:
The Coast Guard expects to meet 6 of 11 performance targets in fiscal
year 2007, the same overall level of performance as 2006, and overall
performance trends for most mission-programs remain steady.[Footnote
10] In fiscal year 2007, as in fiscal year 2006, the Coast Guard met 5
targets--Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Undocumented Migrant
Interdiction; Marine Environmental Protection; Other Law Enforcement;
and Ice Operations--and agency officials reported that the Coast Guard
expects to meet the target for one additional program, Illegal Drug
Interdiction, when results become available in August 2008.[Footnote
11] This potentially brings the number of met targets to 6 out of 11.
In addition, the Coast Guard narrowly missed performance targets for 3
of its non-homeland security mission-programs, Search and Rescue,
Living Marine Resources, and Aids to Navigation; and more widely missed
performance targets for two other mission-programs, Marine Safety and
Defense Readiness. Performance in 6 of 11 Coast Guard mission-programs
improved in the last year, although improvements in the Marine Safety
and Search and Rescue mission-programs were insufficient to meet 2007
performance targets. Alternatively, while performance decreased for the
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security program, the performance target
was still met. Meanwhile, three mission-programs that did not meet 2007
performance targets, Defense Readiness, Living Marine Resources, and
Aids to Navigation, demonstrated lowered performance in 2007 compared
to 2006 performance. (See App. II for more information on Coast Guard
performance results.)
In 2006, we completed an examination of the Coast Guard's non-homeland
security performance measures to assess their quality.[Footnote 12] We
reported that while the Coast Guard's non-homeland security measures
are generally sound and the data used to collect them are generally
reliable, the Coast Guard had challenges associated with using
performance measures to link resources to results. Such challenges
included comprehensiveness (that is, using a single measure per mission-
program may not convey complete information about overall performance)
and external factors outside of the agency's control (such as weather
conditions, which can, for example, affect the amount of ice that needs
to be cleared or the number of mariners who must be rescued). According
to Coast Guard officials, new performance measures are currently under
development to further capture performance for its mission-programs,
and that link resources to results. For example, officials described
efforts to develop a new measure that captures an additional segment
under its search and rescue mission-program, called Lives Unaccounted
For. Also, two new measures are under development to further capture
the Coast Guard's risk management efforts and link resources to results
under the ports, waterways and coastal security mission-program. As we
have reported, the Coast Guard appears to be moving in the right
direction with these efforts. However, since these efforts are long-
term in nature, it remains too soon to determine how effective the
Coast Guard's larger efforts will be at clearly linking resources to
performance results as certain initiatives are not expected to be
implemented until 2010.[Footnote 13]
Coast Guard Continues to Face Challenges in Balancing Its Homeland
Security and Non-Homeland Security Missions:
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard's
priorities and focus had to shift suddenly and dramatically toward
protecting the nation's vast and sprawling network of ports and
waterways. Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, boats and personnel normally
used for non-homeland security missions were shifted to homeland
security missions, which previously consumed only a small portion of
the agency's operating resources. Although we have previously reported
that the Coast Guard was restoring activity levels for many of its non-
homeland security mission-programs, the Coast Guard continues to face
challenges in balancing its resources among each of its mission-
programs. Further complicating this balance issue is the understanding
that any unexpected events--a man-made disaster (such as a terrorist
attack) or a natural disaster (such as Hurricane Katrina)--could result
in again shifting resources between homeland security and non-homeland
security missions. It is also important to note that assets designed to
fulfill homeland security missions can also be used for non-homeland
security missions. For example, new interagency operational centers
(discussed in more detail below) can be used to coordinate Coast Guard
and other federal and non-federal participants across a wide spectrum
of activities, including non-homeland security missions.
Homeland Security Mission Requirements Continue to Increase:
The Coast Guard's heightened responsibilities to protect America's
ports, waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks owe
much of their origin to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
of 2002.[Footnote 14] This legislation, enacted in November 2002
established, among other things, a port security framework that was
designed to protect the nation's ports and waterways from terrorist
attacks by requiring a wide range of security improvements. The SAFE
Port Act, enacted in October 2006, made a number of adjustments to
programs within the MTSA-established framework, creating some
additional programs or lines of efforts and altering others.[Footnote
15] The additional requirements established by the SAFE Port Act have
added to the resource challenges already faced by the Coast Guard as
described below:
* Inspecting domestic maritime facilities: Pursuant to Coast Guard
guidance, the Coast Guard has been conducting annual inspections of
domestic maritime facilities to ensure that they are in compliance with
their security plans. The Coast Guard conducted 2,126 of these
inspections in 2006. However, Coast Guard policy directed that they be
announced in advance. The SAFE Port Act added additional requirements
that inspections be conducted at least twice per year and that one of
these inspections be conducted unannounced. More recently, the Coast
Guard has issued guidance requiring that unannounced inspections be
more rigorous than before. In February 2008, we reported that
fulfilling the requirement of additional and potentially more rigorous
inspections, may require additional resources in terms of Coast Guard
inspectors. Thus, we recommended that the Coast Guard reassess the
adequacy of its resources for conducting facility inspections. The
Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation.[Footnote 16]
* Inspecting foreign ports: In response to a MTSA requirement, the
Coast Guard established the International Port Security Program to
assess and, if appropriate, make recommendations to improve security in
foreign ports. Under this program, teams of Coast Guard officials
conduct country visits to evaluate the implementation of security
measures in the host nations' ports and to collect and share best
practices to help ensure a comprehensive and consistent approach to
maritime security in ports worldwide. The SAFE Port Act established a
minimum number of assessments and congressional direction has called
for the Coast Guard to increase the pace of its visits to foreign
ports. However, to increase its pace, the Coast Guard may have to hire
and train new staff, in part because a number of experienced personnel
associated with this inspection program are rotating to other positions
as part of the Coast Guard's standard personnel rotation policy. Coast
Guard officials also said that they have limited ability to help
countries build on or enhance their own capacity to implement security
requirements because--other than sharing best practices or providing
presentations on security practices--the program does not currently
have the resources or authority to directly assist countries with more
in-depth training or technical assistance.[Footnote 17]
* Fulfilling port security operational requirements: The Coast Guard
conducts a number of operations at U.S. ports to deter and prevent
terrorist attacks. Operation Neptune Shield, first issued in 2003, is
the Coast Guard's operations order that sets specific security
activities (such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts) for each port.
As individual port security concerns change, the level of security
activities also change, which affects the resources required to
complete the activities. As we reported in October 2007, many ports are
having difficulty meeting their port security requirements, with
resource constraints being a major factor.[Footnote 18] Thus, we made a
number of recommendations to the Coast Guard concerning resources,
partnerships, and exercises. The Coast Guard concurred with our
recommendations.[Footnote 19]
* Meeting security requirements for additional LNG terminals: The Coast
Guard is also faced with providing security for vessels arriving at
four domestic onshore LNG import facilities. However, the number of LNG
tankers bringing shipments to these facilities will increase
considerably because of expansions that are planned or underway. For
example, industry analysts expect approximately 12 more LNG facilities
to be built over the next decade. As a result of these changes, Coast
Guard field units will likely be required to significantly expand their
security workloads to conduct new LNG security missions. To address
this issue, in December 2007 we recommended that the Coast Guard
develop a national resource allocation plan that addresses the need to
meet new LNG security requirements. The Coast Guard generally concurred
with our recommendation.[Footnote 20]
* Boarding and inspecting foreign vessels: Security compliance
examinations and boardings, which include identifying vessels that pose
either a high risk for non-compliance with international and domestic
regulations, or a high relative security risk to the port, are a key
component in the Coast Guard's layered security strategy.[Footnote 21]
According to Coast Guard officials and supporting data, the agency has
completed nearly all examinations and boardings of targeted vessels.
However, an increasing number of vessel arrivals in U.S. ports may
impact the pace of operations for conducting security compliance
examinations and boardings in the future. For example, in the 3-year
period from 2004 through 2006, distinct vessel arrivals rose by nearly
13 percent and, according to the Coast Guard, this increase is likely
to continue.[Footnote 22] Moreover, officials anticipate that the
increase in arrivals will also likely include larger vessels, such as
tankers, that require more time and resources to examine. Similarly,
the potential increase in the number of arrivals and the size of
vessels is likely to impact security boardings, which take place 12
miles offshore, and are consequently even more time-and resource-
intensive. While targeted vessels remain the priority for receiving
examinations and boardings, it is unclear to what extent increased
resource demands may impact the ability of the Coast Guard field units
to complete these activities on all targeted vessels.[Footnote 23]
* Establishing interagency operational centers: The SAFE Port Act
called for the establishment of interagency operational centers
(command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational
efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants), directing the
Secretary of Homeland Security to establish such centers at all high-
priority ports no later than 3 years after the Act's
enactment.[Footnote 24] The Act required that the centers include a
wide range of agencies and stakeholders, as the Secretary deems
appropriate, and carry out specified maritime security functions. Four
existing sector command centers the Coast Guard operates in partnership
with the Navy are a significant step toward meeting these requirements,
according to a senior Coast Guard official. The Coast Guard is also
piloting various aspects of future interagency operational centers at
existing centers and is also working with multiple interagency partners
to further develop this project.[Footnote 25] The Coast Guard estimates
that the total acquisition cost of upgrading sector command centers
into interagency operational centers at the nation's 24 high priority
ports will be approximately $260 million. This includes investments in
information systems, sensor networks, and facilities upgrades and
expansions. Congress funded a total of $60 million for the construction
of interagency operational centers for fiscal year 2008. The Coast
Guard has not requested any additional funding for the construction of
these centers as part of its fiscal year 2009 budget request. However,
the Coast Guard is requesting $1 million to support its Command 21
acquisition project (which includes the continued development of its
information management and sharing technology in command
centers).[Footnote 26] So, while the Coast Guard's estimates indicate
that it will need additional financial resources to establish the
interagency operational centers required by law, its current budget and
longer term plans do not include all of the necessary funding.
* Updating area maritime security plans: MTSA, as amended, required
that the Coast Guard develop, in conjunction with local public and
private port stakeholders, Area Maritime Security Plans. The plans
describe how port stakeholders are to deter a terrorist attack or other
transportation security incident, or secure the port in the event such
an attack occurs. These plans were initially developed and approved by
the Coast Guard by June 2004. MTSA also requires that the plans be
updated at least every five years. The SAFE Port Act added a
requirement to the plans specifying that they include recovery issues
by identifying salvage equipment able to restore operational trade
capacity. This requirement was established to ensure that the waterways
are cleared and the flow of commerce through United States ports is
reestablished as efficiently and quickly as possible after a security
incident.[Footnote 27] The Coast Guard, working with local public and
private port stakeholders, is required to revise their plans and have
them completed and approved by June 2009. This planning process may
require an investment of Coast Guard resources, in the form of time and
human capital at the local port level for existing plan revision and
salvage recovery development, as well as at the national level for the
review and approval of all the plans by Coast Guard headquarters. In
December 2007, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop national
level guidance that ports can use to plan for addressing economic
consequences, particularly in the case of port closures. The Coast
Guard generally concurred with this recommendation.[Footnote 28]
Non-Homeland Security Mission Requirements Also Continue to Increase:
While the Coast Guard continues to be in the vortex of the nation's
response to maritime-related homeland security concerns, it is still
responsible for rescuing those in distress, protecting the nation's
fisheries, keeping vital marine highways operating efficiently, and
responding effectively to marine accidents and natural disasters. Some
of the Coast Guard's non-homeland security mission-programs are facing
the same challenges as its homeland security mission-programs with
regard to increased mission requirements as detailed below:
* Revising port plans into all hazard plans: In February 2007, we
reported that most port authorities conduct planning for natural
disasters separately from planning for homeland security
threats.[Footnote 29] However, port and industry experts, as well as
recent federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to
disaster planning and recovery--that is, disaster preparedness planning
that considers all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such
as hurricanes) and man-made (such as a terrorist attack). For homeland
security planning, federal law provides for the establishment of Area
Maritime Security Committees with wide stakeholder representation, and
some ports are using these committees, or another similar forum with
wide representation, in their disaster planning efforts. Federal law
also provides for the establishment of separate committees (called Area
Committees) for maritime spills of oil and hazardous
materials.[Footnote 30] We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums such as
these that include a range of stakeholders to discuss all-hazards
planning efforts.[Footnote 31] Revising area plans using an all-hazards
approach may require additional Coast Guard resources at the local port
level and at the national level.
* Revising oil spill regulations to protect the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund: As the recent accident in San Francisco Bay illustrates,
the potential for an oil spill exists daily across coastal and inland
waters of the United States. Spills can be expensive with considerable
costs to the federal government and the private sector. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990[Footnote 32] (OPA) authorized the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund, which is administered by the Coast Guard, to pay
for costs related to removing oil spilled and damages incurred by the
spill when the vessel owner or operator responsible for the spill--that
is, the responsible party--is unable to pay.[Footnote 33] In September
2007, we reported that the fund has been able to cover costs from major
spills--i.e., spills for which the total costs and claims paid was at
least $1 million--that responsible parties have not paid, but
additional risks to the fund remain, particularly from issues with
limits of liability.[Footnote 34] Limits of liability are the amount,
under certain circumstances, above which responsible parties are no
longer financially liable for spill removal costs and damage claims.
The current liability limits for certain vessel types, notably tank
barges, may be disproportionately low relative to costs associated with
such spills, even though limits of liability were raised for the first
time in 2006.[Footnote 35] In addition, although OPA calls for periodic
regulatory increases in liability limits to account for significant
increases in inflation, such increases have never been made.[Footnote
36] To improve and sustain the balance of the fund, we recommended that
the Coast Guard determine what changes in the liability limits were
needed. The Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation. Aside from
issues related to limits of liability, the fund faces other potential
drains on its resources, including ongoing claims from existing spills,
spills that may occur without an identifiable source, and therefore, no
responsible party, and a catastrophic spill that could strain the
fund's resources.[Footnote 37]
* Safeguarding the new national marine monument: In December 2000,
Executive Order 13178 authorized the creation of the Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve, called
Papahanaumokuakea. The Reserve is about 140,000 square miles in area--
slightly smaller than the state of Montana, our 4TH largest state. In
2006 the President declared this region a national monument to be
monitored by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, with support from the State of Hawaii
and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's stewardship mission includes
preserving the marine environment, which includes monitoring fishing
activities and law enforcement, marine species protection, debris
recovery and oil spill clean-up and prevention. These activities are
supported by collaboration with other organizations, but nevertheless
require regular aerial surveillance patrols and monitoring of vessel
traffic. To ensure that commercial fishing is limited to selected
vessels until 2011, several Coast Guard vessels patrol the region and
conduct search and rescue missions, protect threatened species, or
respond to potential hazards such as debris or damaged vessels.
According to the Coast Guard, monument surveillance has added an
additional enforcement responsibility onto an existing mission workload
without the benefit of increased funding, personnel, or vessels and
aircraft.
* Increasing polar activity: The combination of expanding maritime
trade, tourism, exploratory activities and the shrinking Arctic ice cap
may increase the demand for Coast Guard resources across a variety of
non-homeland security missions. Moreover, multiple polar nations have
recognized the value of natural resources in the Arctic region and have
therefore sought to define and claim their own Arctic seabed and supply-
chain access. However, the increase in Arctic activity has not seen a
corresponding increase in Coast Guard capabilities. For example, two of
the three Coast Guard polar ice-breakers are more than 30 years
old.[Footnote 38] The continued presence of U.S.-flagged heavy
icebreakers capable of keeping supply routes open and safe may be
needed to maintain U.S. interests, energy security, and supply chain
security. These new demands, combined with the traditional Polar
mission to assist partner agencies such as the National Science
Foundation in research while protecting the environment and commercial
vessels in U.S. waterways, reflect a need for an updated assessment of
current and projected capabilities. In the explanatory statement
accompanying the DHS fiscal year 2008 appropriations, the Committees on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate directed the
Coast Guard to submit a report that assesses the Coast Guard's Arctic
mission capability and an analysis of the effect a changing environment
may have on the current and projected polar operations, including any
additional resources in the form of personnel, equipment, and vessels.
Coast Guard Deepwater Program Continues to Experience Challenges and
Progress Related to Affordability, Management, and Operations:
Over the years, our testimonies on the Coast Guard's budget and
performance have included details on the Deepwater program related to
affordability, management, and operations.[Footnote 39] Given the size
of Deepwater funding requirements, the Coast Guard will have a long
term challenge in funding the program within its overall and AC&I
budgets. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has taken a number of
steps to improve program management and implement our previous
recommendations. Finally, problems with selected Deepwater assets--the
110-foot patrol boats that were upgraded and converted to 123-foot
boats and subsequently grounded due to structural problems --have
forced the Coast Guard to take various measures to mitigate the loss of
these boats. These mitigating measures have resulted in increased costs
to maintain the older 110-foot patrol boats and reallocation of
operations across the various missions. These additional costs and
mission shifts are likely to continue until the Coast Guard acquires
new patrol boats.
Funding Deepwater Poses a Long Term Affordability Challenge:
The Deepwater program represents a significant portion of the Coast
Guard's budget, especially for acquisition, construction and
improvements (AC&I). The Deepwater program, at $990 million, accounts
for approximately 11 percent of the Coast Guard's overall $9.3 billion
budget request for the entire agency for fiscal year 2009. As noted at
the beginning of this statement, the overall federal government faces a
long-term fiscal imbalance, which will put increased pressure on
discretionary spending at individual agencies. In addition, Deepwater
dominates the Coast Guard's capital spending as it represents nearly 82
percent of the agency's total AC&I request of $1.21 billion. This
leaves relatively little funding for non-homeland security assets
which--as we reported last year--compete with the Deepwater program for
AC&I resources. For example, many inland aids-to-navigation vessels are
reaching the end of their designed service lives and, without major
rehabilitation or replacement, their ability to carry out their
designated missions will likely decline in the future.[Footnote 40]
While the Coast Guard has considered options for systematically
rehabilitating or replacing these vessels, it has requested relatively
little funding in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. Specifically,
the Coast Guard has requested $5 million in AC&I funds for survey and
design activities to allow them to begin examining options for a new
vessel to replace the aging inland river aids-to-navigation cutters.
As we reported last year, Deepwater continues to represent a
significant source of unobligated balances--money appropriated but not
yet spent for projects included in previous years' budgets.[Footnote
41] The unobligated balances for Deepwater total $566 million as of the
end of fiscal year 2007, which is about 56 percent of the Coast Guard's
fiscal year 2009 request for Deepwater.[Footnote 42] These unobligated
balances have accumulated for a variety of reasons--such as technical
design problems and related delays--where the Coast Guard has found
itself unable to spend previous year acquisition appropriations. For
two Deepwater assets where the Coast Guard has postponed acquisition--
the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle--
the Coast Guard did not request funds for fiscal year 2008. In the
fiscal year 2008 appropriation, Congress rescinded $132 million dollars
in unobligated balances for these two assets. For fiscal year 2009, the
Coast Guard has requested relatively small amounts (approximately $3
million each) for these two assets.
Given the magnitude of the program within Coast Guard's overall and
AC&I budgets, affordability of the Deepwater program has been an
ongoing concern over the years. Our 1998 report on Deepwater indicated
that the Coast Guard's initial planning estimate for Deepwater was $9.8
billion (in then-year constant dollars) over a 20-year period.[Footnote
43] At that time, we said that the agency could face major financial
obstacles in proceeding with a Deepwater program at that funding level
because it would consume virtually all of the Coast Guard's projected
capital spending. Our 2001 testimony noted that affordability was the
biggest risk for the Deepwater program because the Coast Guard's
contracting approach depended on a sustained level of funding each
fiscal year over the life of the program.[Footnote 44] In 2005, the
Coast Guard revised the Deepwater implementation plan to consider post-
9/11 security requirements.[Footnote 45] The revised plan increased
overall cost estimates from $17 billion to $24 billion, to include
annual appropriations ranging from $650 million to $1.5 billion per
year through fiscal year 2026. Continuing into future budgets,
Deepwater affordability will continue to be a major challenge to the
Coast Guard given the other demands upon the agency for both capital
and operations spending.
Coast Guard Making Changes to Improve Management of Deepwater:
In the wake of serious performance and management problems, the Coast
Guard is making a number of changes to improve the management of the
Deepwater program.[Footnote 46] The Coast Guard is moving away from the
ICGS contract and the "system-of-systems" model, with the contractor as
systems integrator, to a more traditional acquisition strategy, where
the Coast Guard will manage the acquisition of each asset separately.
It has recognized that it needs to increase government management and
oversight and has begun to transfer system integration and program
management responsibilities back to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
began taking formal steps to reclaim authority over decision-making and
to more closely monitor program outcomes. It has also begun to
competitively purchase selected assets, expand the role of third
parties to perform independent analysis, and reorganize and consolidate
its acquisition function to strengthen its ability to manage projects.
The Coast Guard also continues to make progress in implementing our
earlier recommendations to better manage the Deepwater program. In
March 2004, we made 11 recommendations to the Coast Guard to address
three broad areas of concern: improving program management,
strengthening contractor accountability, and promoting cost control
through greater competition among subcontractors.[Footnote 47] Of the
five recommendations that remained open as of our June 2007 report, we
have closed two, pertaining to the Coast Guard's use of models and
metrics to measure the contractor's progress toward improving
operational effectiveness and establishing criteria for when to adjust
the total ownership baseline.[Footnote 48] The Coast Guard has taken
actions on the three recommendations that remain open, such as
designating Coast Guard officials as the lead on integrated product
teams, developing a draft maintenance and logistics plan for the
Deepwater assets, and decreasing their reliance on ICGS, including
potentially eliminating the award term provision from the ICGS
contract.
Problems with Assets and Delays Create Operational and Resource
Challenges:
Deferring acquisitions of new vessels and aircraft can affect the cost
of operations, in that the cost-savings and reliability advantages of
new or modernized assets may not be realized, and the cost of
maintaining older assets can increase. For example, delays in the
acquisition of new patrol boats have forced the Coast Guard to incur
additional costs to maintain the older patrol boats. As part of its
Deepwater program, the Coast Guard planned to have ICGS convert all 49
existing 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats with
additional capabilities. This conversion project was halted after the
first eight 110-foot patrol boats were converted and began to suffer
structural and operational problems. In November 2006, all eight 123-
foot patrol boats were removed from service and the Coast Guard had to
take steps to better sustain its remaining 110-foot patrol boats. In
fiscal year 2005, as the 123-foot patrol boats conversion was
experiencing problems, the Coast Guard initiated the Mission
Effectiveness Project to replace portions of the hull structure and
mechanical equipment on selected 110-foot patrol boats to improve their
overall mission effectiveness until a new replacement patrol boat is
ultimately delivered. The Coast Guard has been appropriated a total of
$109.7 million for this effort through fiscal year 2008, and in its
fiscal Year 2009-2013 Five Year Capital Investment Plan indicates it
will need an additional $56.3 million through fiscal year 2012. In
addition, the Coast Guard plans on implementing a ’high tempo, high
maintenance“ initiative for eight of its 110-foot patrol boats. This
initiative is aimed at increasing the number of annual operational
hours for these eight patrol boats, at a cost of $11.5 million in
fiscal year 2008.
The removal of the 123-foot patrol boats from service has also
increased operational costs in terms of lost or reallocated missions.
The loss of the eight 123-foot patrol boats created a shortage of
vessels in District 7, where they were all homeported (i.e.,
based).[Footnote 49] As a result, the Coast Guard developed various
strategies to mitigate the loss of these boats in District 7--which
impacted the ability of the Coast Guard to interdict illegal migrants.
One of the Coast Guard's strategies was to shift deployments of some
vessels to District 7 from other districts within the Coast Guard's
Atlantic Area. In fiscal year 2007 the Coast Guard redeployed several
vessels--which contributed approximately 6,600 operational hours in
District 7-from Districts 1, 5, 8 and the Atlantic Area Command. As
discussed in the previous section, the Coast Guard faced a trade off
between homeland security missions and non-homeland security missions.
In general, this mitigating strategy has led to increased homeland
security operations in District 7 (e.g., for migrant interdiction) at
the expense of some non-homeland security missions (e.g., living marine
resources and aids to navigation) in the Districts providing the
assets. For example, District 5 officials estimated that the loss of
one medium-endurance cutter deployment from its district to District 7
reduced its non-homeland security operations by potentially preventing
District 5 from performing approximately 24 vessel boardings and
issuing 17 violation notices in its living marine resources
mission.[Footnote 50]
These additional costs will likely continue until the Coast Guard can
acquire the replacement patrol boat--the Fast Response Cutter (FRC)--
the FRC was conceived as a patrol boat with high readiness, speed,
adaptability and endurance. ICGS proposed a fleet of 58 FRCs
constructed of composite materials (later termed FRC-As). Although
estimates of the initial acquisition cost for these composite materials
were high, they were chosen for their perceived advantages over other
materials (e.g., steel), such as lower maintenance and life-cycle
costs, longer service life, and lower weight. However, in February 2006
the Coast Guard suspended FRC-A design work in order to assess and
mitigate technical risks.[Footnote 51] As an alternative to the FRC-A,
the Coast Guard planned to purchase 12 modified commercially available
patrol boats (termed FRC-Bs). In June 2007, the Coast Guard issued a
request for proposals for the design, construction and delivery of a
modified commercially available patrol boat for the FRC-B. In late
2006, the Coast Guard estimated that the total acquisition cost for 12
FRC-Bs would be $593 million. The Coast Guard expects to award the FRC-
B contract in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, with the lead
patrol boat to be delivered in 2010. Coast Guard officials stated that
their goal is still to acquire 12 FRC-Bs by 2012. The Coast Guard
intends to award a fixed price contract for design and construction of
the FRC-B, with the potential to acquire a total of 34 cutters.
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions that you or
other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For information about this statement, please Contact Stephen L.
Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-
9610, or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. This testimony was prepared under the direction
of Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director. Other individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Jonathan Bachman, Christopher
Conrad, Adam Couvillion, Anthony DeFrank, Wayne Ekblad, Susan Fleming,
Jessica Gerrard-Gough, Geoffrey Hamilton, Maura Hardy, Christopher
Hatscher, John Hutton, Lara Kaskie, Monica Kelly, J. Kristopher Keener,
Daniel Klabunde, Richard Krashevski, Ryan Lambert, Scott Purdy, Ralph
Roffo, Michele Mackin, James McTigue, Linda Miller, Kate Siggerud,
April Thompson, Tatiana Winger, and Susan Zimmerman.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Status of Selected Deepwater Assets:
Appendix I provides information on key vessels and aircraft that are
part of the Deepwater program. In 2005, the Coast Guard revised its
Deepwater acquisition program baseline to reflect updated cost,
schedule, and performance measures. The revised baseline accounted for,
among other things, new requirements imposed by the events of September
11. The initially-envisioned designs for some assets, such as the
Offshore Patrol Cutter and Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, are being
rethought. Other assets, such as the National Security Cutter and
Maritime Patrol Aircraft, are in production. Table 2 shows the 2005
baseline and current status of selected Deepwater assets.
Table 2: Progress of Selected Deepwater Assets:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents.
[End of figure]
Appendix II: Performance Results by Mission-Program from Fiscal Year
2003 through Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 3: Performance Results by Mission-Program from Fiscal Year 2003
Through Fiscal Year 2007:
Mission-program: Mission-programs meeting 2007 targets: Ports,
Waterways, and Coastal Security;
Mission- program performance measure: Percent reduction in maritime
terrorism risk over which the Coast Guard has influence;
Performance Results 2003: n/a;
2004: n/a;
2005: 14%;
2006: 17%;
2007: 15%;
Performance target for 2007: 15%.
Mission-program: Mission-programs meeting 2007 targets: Undocumented
Migrant Interdiction;
Mission-program performance measure: Percentage of interdicted or
deterred illegal migrants entering the United States through illegal
means;
Performance Results 2003: 85.3%;
2004: 87.1%;
2005: 85.5%;
2006: 89.1%;
2007: 93.7%;
Performance target for 2007: 91%.
Mission-program: Mission-programs meeting 2007 targets: Marine
Environmental Protection;
Mission-program performance measure: Average of oil and chemical spills
greater than 100 gallons per 100 million tons shipped;
Performance Results 2003: 29.4;
2004: 22.1;
2005: 18.5;
2006: 16.3; 2007: 15;
Performance target for 2007: 19.
Mission-program: Mission-programs meeting 2007 targets: U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone Enforcement;
Mission- program performance measure: Number of detected Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) incursions by foreign fishing vessels;
Performance Results 2003: 152;
2004: 247;
2005: 174;
2006: 164;
2007: 119;
Performance target for 2007: 199.
Mission-program: Mission-programs meeting 2007 targets: Ice Operations
(domestic icebreaking);
Mission- program performance measure: Number of waterway closure days;
Performance Results 2003: 7;
2004: 4;
2005: 0;
2006: 0;
2007: 0;
Performance target for 2007: 2[A].
Mission-program: Mission-program expected to meet 2007 target: Illegal
Drug Interdiction;
Mission-program performance measure: Percentage of cocaine removed out
of total estimated cocaine entering through the United States through
maritime means[B];
Performance Results 2003: Not reported;
2004: 30.7%;
2005: 27.3%;
2006: 25.3%;
2007: 31.4%[C];
Performance target for 2007: 26%.
Mission-program: Mission-programs that did not meet their 2007 targets:
Marine Safety;
Mission-program performance measure: 5-year average annual mariner,
passenger, and boating deaths and injuries;
Performance Results 2003: 5,561;
2004: 5,387;
2005: 5,169;
2006: 5,036;
2007: 4,770;
Performance target for 2007: 4,539.
Mission-program: Mission-programs that did not meet their 2007 targets:
Search and Rescue;
Mission-program performance measure: Percentage of distressed mariners'
lives saved;
Performance Results 2003: 87.7%;
2004: 86.8%;
2005: 86.1%;
2006: 85.3%;
2007: 85.4%;
Performance target for 2007: 86%.
Mission-program: Mission-programs that did not meet their 2007 targets:
Defense Readiness;
Mission-program performance measure: Percentage of time that units meet
combat readiness level;
Performance Results 2003: 78%;
2004: 76%;
2005: 67%;
2006: 62%;
2007: 51%;
Performance target for 2007: 100%.
Mission-program: Mission-programs that did not meet their 2007 targets:
Living Marine Resources;
Mission-program performance measure: Percentage of fishermen found in
compliance with federal regulations;
Performance Results 2003: 97.1%;
2004: 96.3%;
2005: 96.4%;
2006: 96.6%;
2007: 96.2%;
Performance target for 2007: 97%.
Mission-program: Mission-programs that did not meet their 2007 targets:
Aids to Navigation;
Mission-program performance measure: 5-year average number of
collisions, allisions, and groundings;
Performance Results 2003: 2,000;
2004: 1,876;
2005: 1,825;
2006: 1,765;
2007: 1,823;
Performance target for 2007: 1,664.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: n/a, not available. Bold numbers indicate that performance
targets were met previously. Performance targets for previous fiscal
years may have been different than fiscal year 2007 targets.
[A] The target for ice operations noted here is for domestic
icebreaking only, and the target level varies according to the index
for an entire winter. Thus, for those winters designated as severe, the
target is 8 or fewer closure days. For winters designated as average,
the target is 2 or fewer closure days.
[B] The performance measure for the illegal drug interdiction program,
the percentage of cocaine removed, was revised in fiscal year 2004 from
the percentage of cocaine seized in order to more accurately report the
impact Coast Guard counterdrug activities have on the illicit drug
trade. As a result, the cocaine removal rates for fiscal year 2002-2003
are not available.
[C] Complete data are not yet available for the illegal drug
interdiction program. However, the Coast Guard estimates it will
surpass the FY 2007 performance target of 26 percent with an estimated
31.4 percent Cocaine Removal Rate.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Management Initiatives and Key Homeland
Security Missions. GAO-08-531T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct
Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing,
Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008.
Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Action Is Needed to Avoid the Possibility of
Serious Economic Disruption in the Future. GAO-08-411T. Washington,
D.C.: Jan 29, 2008.
Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur Infrequently, but Risks
to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain. GAO-08-357T. Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 18, 2007.
A Call for Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's Ability to
Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges. GAO-08-93SP.
Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity
Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007.
Homeland Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain. GAO-08-133T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.
Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur Infrequently, but Risks
to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain. GAO-07-1085. Washington, D.C.:
Sep. 7, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
Management and Efforts to Address Them. GAO-07-874. Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Performance,
Reorganization, and Related Challenges. GAO-07-489T. Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 18, 2007.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain. GAO-07-681T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in
Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28,
2007.
Maritime Security: Public Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a
Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316.
Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2007.
Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids to Navigation and Domestic
Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined: Effect on Mission Performance Appears
Mixed. GAO-06-979. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 22, 2006.
Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally
Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816. Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006.
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts.
GAO-06-764. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2004.
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380.
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004.
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2003.
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond. GAO-
02-538T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2002.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks. GAO-
01-659T. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001.
Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
and Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly. GAO/RCED-99-6,
Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998.
Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints. GAO/RCED-97-
110. Washington, D.C.: May 1997.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The back of this statement includes a listing of related GAO
products, including budget reviews going back to 1997.
[2] See GAO, Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Action Is Needed to Avoid the
Possibility of a Serious Economic Disruption in the Future, GAO-08-411T
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2008).
[3] See GAO, A Call for Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's
Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges, GAO-
08-93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007).
[4] For more information on risk management and the Coast Guard's
related efforts, see GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[5] In conjunction with this testimony, we are releasing: GAO, Maritime
Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility
Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing,
Practices, and Data, GAO-08-12 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008).
[6] The Coast Guard's "system of systems" approach integrates ships,
aircraft, sensors, and communication links together as a system to
accomplish mission objectives.
[7] For example, see Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater
Project's Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More
Thoroughly, GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1999).
[8] According to Coast Guard officials, when also taking into account
supplemental funding appropriated for fiscal year 2008, such as
operating expenses emergency funding, the fiscal year 2009 increase is
4.6% percent.
[9] GAO's analysis of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget request
is presented in nominal terms. Supplemental funding received during
fiscal year 2008 is not included in the analysis.
[10] For each major Coast Guard mission-program, the Coast Guard
reports on both a performance measure target and actual performance
achieved, by fiscal year. In addition, performance results are based
upon targets that may change from year to year.
[11] The Other Law Enforcement mission-program is also known as U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone Enforcement, and is referred to accordingly in
Appendix II.
[12] GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are
Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-816
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006).
[13] For more details on the Coast Guard's efforts to match resources
to performance results, see GAO-06-816 (App. III).
[14] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
[15] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
[16] GAO-08-12.
[17] For more information on these foreign port inspections, see GAO,
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin, GAO-07-804R
(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).
[18] See GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and
Implementation One Year Later, GAO-08-126T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30,
2007).
[19] The details of this recommendation are contained in a report that
is restricted from public release and cannot be further disclosed.
[20] For additional information on the challenges the Coast Guard faces
with regard to energy commodity shipments, see GAO, Maritime Security:
Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Responding to Terrorist
Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
10, 2007) and Maritime Security: Public Consequences of a Terrorist
Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification,
GAO-07-316 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2007).
[21] Security compliance examinations are integrated into the Coast
Guard's Port State Control program and are carried out by marine
inspectors, who are also responsible for ensuring compliance of safety
and environmental regulations. These examinations may be completed in
port or at-sea depending on the relative risk factors of the vessel.
Security boardings are a related, but separate, effort conducted by
armed law enforcement officers. Security boardings are typically
carried out at-sea before the vessel arrives at a U.S. port.
[22] "Distinct" vessel arrivals include vessels, greater than or equal
to 500 gross tons, which called upon at least one U.S. port during the
calendar year. It also includes passenger vessels carrying more than 12
passengers on an international voyage. A vessel that called upon
numerous U.S. ports in a given year only counts as one distinct
arrival.
[23] According to Coast Guard officials, they have revised the
targeting matrix for security boardings, which has resulted in a
reduction in the number of vessels boarded. Coast Guard officials noted
that other factors may also decrease the need for the number of
required examinations and boardings over time. These factors include
increased awareness by vessel operators of the security code
requirements as well as enhancements to the Coast Guard's own maritime
domain awareness, such as the Automatic Identification System--which
uses a device to electronically track vessels--that they anticipate
will provide more information on vessel activities.
[24] For additional information on these centers, see GAO, Maritime
Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but
Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005).
[25] According to the Coast Guard, these multiple interagency partners
include Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Defense, the Secure Border Initiative
Network (SBInet) Program Office, and State and local partners. A pilot
interagency operational center located in Charleston, South Carolina,
known as Project Seahawk, is managed by the Department of Justice. It
was created through an appropriation in the fiscal year 2003
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.
11, 53 (2003.)). The Department of Justice has committed to funding
Project Seahawk through fiscal year 2009.
[26] The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009-2013 Five Year Capital
Investment Plan does not include funds for the construction of these
interagency operational centers, but the plan does include a total of
$40 million in future requests to support the Command 21 acquisition
project. According to the Coast Guard, they are using the Command 21
effort as the vehicle to deliver interagency operational capacity to
its existing command centers.
[27] Coast Guard officials have noted that any changes to the recovery
sections of these plans need to be consistent with the national
protocols developed for the SAFE Port Act, such as DHS's Strategy to
Enhance the International Supply Chain released in July 2007. This
strategy contains a plan to speed the resumption of trade in the event
of a terrorist attack on our ports or waterways, in response to a SAFE
Port Act requirement.
[28] GAO-08-141.
[29] See Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid
Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery, GAO-07-412 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 28, 2007).
[30] The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484
(1990)).
[31] DHS generally agreed that existing forums provide a good
opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by stakeholders
from various federal, state, and local agencies and as appropriate,
industry and governmental organizations; however, the department said
it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency
planning on existing committees. We found during the course of our
field work that some ports were already using existing port communities
effectively to plan for all hazards, and we believe DHS could continue
to use these forums as a way to engage all relevant parties in
discussing natural disaster planning for ports.
[32] Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
[33] OPA applies to oil discharged from vessels or facilities into
navigable waters of the United States and adjoining shorelines. OPA
also covers substantial threats of discharge, even if an actual
discharge does not occur.
[34] GAO, Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur Infrequently,
but Risks to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain, GAO-07-1085
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2007).
[35] The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 (Pub. L.
No. 109-241, 120 Stat. 516 (2006)) significantly increased the limits
of liability from the limits set by OPA in 1990.
[36] If the liability limits had been adjusted for inflation between
1990 and 2006, the Fund could have saved approximately $39 million.
[37] During the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the vessel discharged
about 20 percent of the oil it was carrying. Clean up costs for the
Exxon Valdez alone totaled about $2.2 billion, according to the
vessel's owner. A catastrophic spill from a vessel could result in
costs that exceed those of the Exxon Valdez, particularly if the entire
contents of a tanker were released in a 'worst-case discharge'
scenario.
[38] For more information on polar icebreakers, see pp. 31-33 of Coast
Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Performance,
Reorganization, and Related Challenges, GAO-07-489T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr.18, 2007).
[39] See, for example, Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater
Asset Deployment and Management Efforts to Address Them, GAO-07-874
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007); Coast Guard, Observations on Agency
Performance, Operations, and Future Challenges, GAO-06-448T
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006); Coast Guard: Observations on Agency
Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request, GAO-05-364T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 17, 2005); Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges
for Fiscal Year 2005 and Beyond, GAO-04-636T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7,
2004); Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004); Coast Guard: Budget and Management
Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-02-538T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19,
2002); and Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints,
GAO/RCED-97-110 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).
[40] See GAO, Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids to Navigation and
Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined: Effect on Mission
Performance Appears Mixed, GAO-06-979 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 22,
2006).
[41] GAO-07-489T .
[42] Of this $566 million, approximately $105 million was in the Fast
Response Cutter B-class account, $82 million in the National Security
Cutter account, and $47 million in the HC-130H Conversion/Sustainment
Projects account, among other items.
[43] GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's
Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly,
GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998).
[44] GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project
Risks, GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
[45] The new requirements generally related to improved capabilities to
operate in conditions of chemical, biological, and radiological
contamination; greater anti-terrorist weaponry; development of airborne
use of force capabilities; improved communications systems, and
enhanced flight decks.
[46] For example, the National Security Cutter (NSC), as designed, was
unlikely to meet fatigue life expectations (as confirmed by a U.S. Navy
study), leading to the Coast Guard's decision to correct structural
deficiencies for the first two NSCs at scheduled drydocks and implement
structural enhancements into design and production of future ships. The
NSC has also experienced delays in delivery. In addition, the Coast
Guard has had to suspend design work on the Fast Response Cutter-A due
to high technical risks, after obligating approximately $35 million.
[47] GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).
[48] See GAO, Contract Management: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset
Deployment and Management Efforts to Address Them, GAO-07-874
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007). The first of these recommendations,
on measuring contractor's progress, has been overcome by events, given
the changes in how the Coast Guard currently assesses contractor
performance.
[49] The Coast Guard's District 7 Command, based in Miami, FL,
generally covers the areas and adjacent waters of coastal South
Carolina, Florida, and Puerto Rico.
[50] We are currently reviewing the Coast Guard's strategies for
mitigating the loss of the eight 123-foot patrol boats in District 7
and will be reporting our results later in the Spring.
[51] For more information on the FRC-A, see GAO, Coast Guard: Status of
Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts, GAO-06-764 (Washington,
D.C.: June 23, 2006).
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