Homeland Security
DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge Gao ID: GAO-08-488T March 11, 2008Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has distributed over $19 billion in homeland security grants to enhance the nation's preparedness and response capabilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for all preparedness efforts including allocating and managing these grants. This testimony examines (1) the process and methods to allocate homeland security grants to state and local governments, (2) how DHS communicates with states and localities in making grant allocation decisions, (3) what challenges affect the expeditious spending of DHS grant funds by states and localities; and (4) the extent that DHS measured program outcomes as part of its efforts to monitor the expenditure of grant dollars. GAO's testimony is based on products issued from April 2005 through July 2007 on DHS's grant management system, and on GAO's ongoing mandated work related to FEMA's risk-based grant distribution processes for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant documents on FEMA's risk analysis model and interviewed agency officials.
DHS uses an evolving risk-based methodology to identify the urban areas eligible for homeland security grants and the amount of funds states and urban areas receive. DHS designed the methodology to measure the relative risk of a given state or urban area using a risk analysis model that defined Risk as the product of Threat times Vulnerability and Consequences (R = T * (V & C)). Given the uncertainties inherent in risk assessment, the methodology uses a combination of empirical data (e.g., population, asset location) and policy judgment (e.g., the nature of the threat for specific areas and the weights to be assigned to specific variables in the model such as critical infrastructure, population, and population density). According to FEMA officials and GAO's review of homeland security grant assistance documents, FEMA communicates with its state and local stakeholders by (1) providing individual threat assessments that DHS is using for its risk analysis model to each state and urban area, (2) validating the nonpublic national infrastructure data that are also part of the risk analysis model, (3) reviewing states' and urban areas' draft investment proposals that are later submitted and rated during DHS's effectiveness assessment process, (4) providing technical assistance as states and urban areas prepare grant applications, and (5) holding post-award conferences to solicit stakeholder feedback. In April 2005, GAO reported that the ability of states and localities to spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the need to fulfill legal and procurement requirements, which in some cases added months to the purchasing process. GAO also reported a variety of steps that had been taken by states, DHS, and the Congress to streamline the expenditure of grant funds. However, GAO was unable to examine trends in obligations and expenditures for grant programs across fiscal years because the budget data FEMA provided did not specify grant expenditures by fiscal year and reporting categories were not consistent across fiscal years. Although DHS has taken some steps to establish goals, gather information, and measure progress, its monitoring of homeland security grant expenditures does not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program outcomes. FEMA's current efforts do not provide information on the effectiveness of those funds in improving the nation's capabilities or reducing risk. DHS leadership has identified this issue as a high priority, and is trying to develop a more quantitative approach to accomplish the goal of using this information for the more strategic purpose of monitoring the achievement of program goals, according to FEMA officials.
GAO-08-488T, Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge
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Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge' which was released
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 11, 2008:
Homeland Security:
DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' Allocation and Management
Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on National Capabilities
Remains a Challenge:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-08-488T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-488T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has distributed
over $19 billion in homeland security grants to enhance the nation‘s
preparedness and response capabilities. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for all preparedness efforts
including allocating and managing these grants. This testimony examines
(1) the process and methods to allocate homeland security grants to
state and local governments, (2) how DHS communicates with states and
localities in making grant allocation decisions, (3) what challenges
affect the expeditious spending of DHS grant funds by states and
localities; and (4) the extent that DHS measured program outcomes as
part of its efforts to monitor the expenditure of grant dollars. GAO‘s
testimony is based on products issued from April 2005 through July 2007
on DHS‘s grant management system, and on GAO‘s ongoing mandated work
related to FEMA‘s risk-based grant distribution processes for fiscal
years 2007 and 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant
documents on FEMA‘s risk analysis model and interviewed agency
officials.
What GAO Found:
DHS uses an evolving risk-based methodology to identify the urban areas
eligible for homeland security grants and the amount of funds states
and urban areas receive. DHS designed the methodology to measure the
relative risk of a given state or urban area using a risk analysis
model that defined Risk as the product of Threat times Vulnerability
and Consequences (R = T * (V & C)). Given the uncertainties inherent in
risk assessment, the methodology uses a combination of empirical data
(e.g., population, asset location) and policy judgment (e.g., the
nature of the threat for specific areas and the weights to be assigned
to specific variables in the model such as critical infrastructure,
population, and population density).
According to FEMA officials and GAO‘s review of homeland security grant
assistance documents, FEMA communicates with its state and local
stakeholders by (1) providing individual threat assessments that DHS is
using for its risk analysis model to each state and urban area, (2)
validating the nonpublic national infrastructure data that are also
part of the risk analysis model, (3) reviewing states‘ and urban areas‘
draft investment proposals that are later submitted and rated during
DHS‘s effectiveness assessment process, (4) providing technical
assistance as states and urban areas prepare grant applications, and
(5) holding post-award conferences to solicit stakeholder feedback.
In April 2005, GAO reported that the ability of states and localities
to spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the need to
fulfill legal and procurement requirements, which in some cases added
months to the purchasing process. GAO also reported a variety of steps
that had been taken by states, DHS, and the Congress to streamline the
expenditure of grant funds. However, GAO was unable to examine trends
in obligations and expenditures for grant programs across fiscal years
because the budget data FEMA provided did not specify grant
expenditures by fiscal year and reporting categories were not
consistent across fiscal years.
Although DHS has taken some steps to establish goals, gather
information, and measure progress, its monitoring of homeland security
grant expenditures does not provide a means to measure the achievement
of desired program outcomes. FEMA‘s current efforts do not provide
information on the effectiveness of those funds in improving the
nation‘s capabilities or reducing risk. DHS leadership has identified
this issue as a high priority, and is trying to develop a more
quantitative approach to accomplish the goal of using this information
for the more strategic purpose of monitoring the achievement of program
goals, according to FEMA officials.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to measure
emergency response capabilities and improve grant allocation decisions.
DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and is making
progress implementing them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-488T]. For more information, contact
William O. Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the allocation and use of
federal grants to enhance the nation's preparedness for and response to
major and catastrophic disasters. The goal of disaster preparedness and
response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as
follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set
the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major and catastrophic disasters is a difficult
task. It takes hard work, attention to details, and effective pre-and
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
Homeland security grants are the federal government's primary tool for
enhancing state, local, and tribal governments' emergency preparedness
and response capabilities. Since 2002, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has distributed over $19 billion in federal funding for
planning, equipment, and training to enhance the nation's capabilities
to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a lesser extent, natural and
accidental disasters.[Footnote 1] The Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act places responsibility for allocating and managing
DHS grants with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).[Footnote 2] Prior to the act, the organization within DHS
principally responsible for administering such grants had no
operational responsibilities for disaster response. The act also
includes provisions to strengthen FEMA's organizational capacity to
coordinate with states and localities in preparing for and responding
to major and catastrophic disasters regardless of cause by
consolidating federal emergency preparedness and response
responsibilities and authorities within FEMA. Now that FEMA has the
consolidated responsibilities and associated authorities for national
emergency preparedness, the agency has a unique opportunity to evaluate
how it can most effectively target the grants by viewing the grant
programs collectively, rather than only in terms of the individual
programs' objectives.
My statement describes GAO's past work as well as ongoing work on DHS's
grant management system, specifically, the grant management efforts
that are now the responsibility of FEMA and addresses the following
questions:
(1) What methods does DHS use to allocate homeland security grants to
state and local governments?
(2) How does DHS communicate with states and localities in making
federal grant allocation decisions?
(3) What are the challenges that affect the expeditious spending of DHS
grant funds by states and localities?
(4) To what extent does DHS measure program outcomes as part of its
efforts to monitor the expenditure of grant dollars?
My comments are based on GAO's historical body of work on DHS grants
management, including prior reviews of DHS's (1) risk management
efforts,[Footnote 3] (2) methodology for allocating Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) grants for fiscal years 2006 and 2007,[Footnote 4]
(3) processes for managing their state homeland security[Footnote 5]
and transportation sector-specific grants,[Footnote 6] and (4)
preparedness for disasters, including FEMA's reorganization based on
the Post-Katrina Reform Act.[Footnote 7] In addition, my comments are
based on our ongoing mandated work examining the risk-based grant
distribution processes used by FEMA to distribute the fiscal year 2008
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). This program includes the UASI
grants as well as the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) which
provides funding for state, local, and tribal governments. For our
ongoing work, we analyzed DHS documents including the fiscal years 2007
and 2008 risk analysis models, grant guidance, and presentations, and
interviewed DHS officials about the HSGP grant determination process in
fiscal year 2007 as well as any changes to the fiscal year 2008
process. We conducted this work according to generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
For fiscal years 2005 through 2008, DHS has used an evolving risk-based
methodology to identify the urban areas eligible for HSGP grants and
the amount of funds states and urban areas receive.[Footnote 8] DHS
designed the methodology to measure the relative risk of a given state
or urban area using a risk analysis model based on information about
each state and urban area. Initially, this relative risk measurement
relied primarily on information related to population and population
density, but the data DHS included in the model and how DHS used those
data to measure relative risk have evolved with each year's risk
assessment. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has adopted a more
sophisticated risk-based grant allocation approach to (1) determine
both states and urban areas' potential risk relative to other areas
that includes empirical analytical methods and policy judgments, and
(2) assess and score the effectiveness of the proposed investments
submitted by the eligible applicants and determine the final amount of
funds awarded. For the HSGP allocation process in fiscal year 2007, DHS
defined Risk as the product of Threat times Vulnerability and
Consequences (R= T* (V & C)).[Footnote 9] Our ongoing work has shown
that DHS has defined risk in the same manner for fiscal year 2008.
According to FEMA officials and HSGP grant assistance documents, FEMA
communicates with its state and local stakeholders by (1) providing to
each state and urban area the individual threat assessments DHS is
using for its risk analysis model, (2) validating the nonpublic
national infrastructure data that are also part of the risk analysis
model, (3) reviewing states' and urban areas' draft investment
proposals that are later submitted and rated during DHS's effectiveness
assessment process, (4) providing technical assistance as states and
urban areas prepare grant applications, and (5) holding post-award
conferences to solicit stakeholder feedback.
We reported in April 2005 that the ability of states and localities to
spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the need to fulfill
these state and local legal and procurement requirements, which in some
cases added months to the purchasing process. For example, once grant
funds are awarded to the states and then subgranted to the local
jurisdictions or urban areas, certain legal and procurement
requirements may have to be met, such as a city council's approval to
accept grant awards. Or, if the state legislature must approve how the
grant funds will be expended and is not in session when the grant funds
are awarded, it could take as long as 4 months to obtain state approval
to spend the funds. We also reported a variety of steps that had been
taken by states, DHS, and the Congress to streamline the expenditure of
grant funds such as some states establishing centralized purchasing
systems and the Congress passing a provision that exempted some
homeland security grant programs from requirements in the Cash
Management Improvement Act so that grantees could receive grant funds
in advance of the time that funds were needed to liquidate obligations
(e.g., pay for goods and services received). DHS has obligated about
$20 billion in grants for emergency preparedness and response from
fiscal years 2002 through 2007, about $7 billion was unexpended as of
January 2008. Because of inconsistencies in DHS's reporting of grant
expenditures over time, we are unable to analyze expenditure trends by
grant and fiscal year to determine if funds are now being spent more
quickly.
DHS has taken steps to establish goals, gather information, and measure
progress, yet its monitoring of grant expenditures does not provide a
means to measure the achievement of desired program outcomes to
strengthen the nation's homeland security capabilities. We still know
little about how states have used federal funds to build their
capabilities or reduce risks. This is because neither FEMA nor its
predecessor for grant management (from fiscal years 2003 through 2007)
has yet developed a system to compile grant information in a manner
that allows for effective analysis of the obligation, expenditure, and
use of homeland security grants funds. For example, FEMA officials said
that they currently rely on the grant monitoring process to assess the
extent that states and urban areas are building capabilities. However,
these efforts do not provide information on how states and localities
finance their efforts in this area, how federal funds have been used,
the extent to which federal funds supplement or supplant ongoing state
and local expenditures, and the effectiveness of those funds in
improving the nation's capabilities or reducing risk. According to FEMA
officials, DHS leadership has identified this issue as a high priority,
and is trying to come up with a more quantitative approach to
accomplish the goal of using this information for the more strategic
purpose of monitoring the achievement of program goals.
Background:
Risk management has been endorsed by the Congress, the President, and
Secretary of DHS as a way to direct finite resources to those areas
that are most at risk of terrorist attack under conditions of
uncertainty. The purpose of risk management is not to eliminate all
risks, as that is an impossible task. Rather, given limited resources,
risk management is a structured means of making informed trade-offs and
choices about how to use available resources effectively and monitoring
the effect of those choices. Thus, risk management is a continuous
process that includes the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences to determine what actions should be taken to reduce or
eliminate one or more of these elements of risk. Risk management
includes a feedback loop that continually incorporates new information,
such as changing threats or the effect of actions taken to reduce or
eliminate identified threats, vulnerabilities, and/or consequences.
Because we have imperfect information for assessing risks, there is a
degree of uncertainty in the information used for risk assessments
(e.g., what the threats are and how likely they are to be realized). As
a result, it is inevitable that assumptions and policy judgments must
be used in risk analysis and management. It is important that key
decision makers understand the basis for those assumptions and policy
judgments and their effect on the results of the risk analysis and the
resource decisions based on that analysis.
Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has applied a three-step process which
incorporates analyses of risk and effectiveness, to select eligible
urban areas and allocate UASI and SHSP funds (see fig. 1):
1. Implementation of a risk analysis model to calculate scores for
states and urban areas, defining relative Risk, as the product of
Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequences.
2. Implementation of an effectiveness assessment, including a peer
review process, to assess and score the effectiveness of the proposed
investments submitted by the eligible applicants.
3. Calculation of a final allocation of funds based on states' and
urban areas' risk scores as adjusted by their effectiveness scores.
Figure 1: Overview of the Grant Allocation Methodology for UASI and
SHSP:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the Overview of the Grant Allocation
Methodology for UASI and SHSP. The following information is depicted:
UASI:
Phase 1: Risk Analysis;
Risk estimator: R = T x (V&C) [Relative risk estimate];
Relative risk is presented as a graph. Where relative risk drops and a
cutoff point of about 42 urban areas is established, the result is a
risk score.
Phase 2: Effectiveness assessment:
Peer review of Investment Justifications: yields an Effectiveness
score.
Phase 3: Final allocation:
Effectiveness/risk matrix: Left axis is risk score; right axis is
effectiveness score. As both score increase, allocations increase.
SGSG:
Phase 1: Risk Analysis;
Risk estimator: R = T x (V&C) [Relative risk estimate];
Relative risk is presented as a graph. Where relative risk drops versus
the number of states and territories, the result is a risk score.
Phase 2: Effectiveness assessment:
Peer review of Investment Justifications: yields an Effectiveness
score.
Phase 3: Final allocation:
Effectiveness/risk matrix: Left axis is risk score; right axis is
effectiveness score. As both score increase, allocations increase.
There is a statutory minimum of .375%[A].
[A] The statutory minimum of 0.375 percent of the total funds
appropriated for SHSP and UASI is for fiscal year 2008. In fiscal years
2006 and 2007, the statutory per state minimum equaled 0.75 percent of
funds appropriated for SHSP only.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS documents and information provided in
interviews.
[End of figure]
As a result of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act, FEMA is now
responsible for the nation's homeland security preparedness effort to
define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and
responsibilities); how it should be done; and how well it should be
done--that is, according to what standards. This is a complex but
critically important responsibility. The principal national documents
designed to address each of these are, respectively, the National
Response Framework (and its associated annexes), the National Incident
Management System, and the National Preparedness Guidelines. To develop
preparedness goals and determine the tasks and capabilities needed by
first responders on a nationwide basis, DHS used an approach known as
capabilities-based planning to develop the national Target Capabilities
List. The list includes specific goals, requirements, and metrics for
36 capabilities needed at the local, state, or federal level to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from natural or man-made disasters. DHS
defined these capabilities generically and expressed them in terms of
desired operational outcomes and essential characteristics, rather than
dictating specific, quantifiable responsibilities to the various
jurisdictions. Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be
expected to perform every task, possession of a target capability could
involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to
regional and federal resources, or some combination of the two. The
original list has since been refined, and FEMA released the most recent
version of the list, with 37 capabilities, in September 2007.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act)
of 2007 further defined FEMA's role and coordination processes for
working with states and urban areas in awarding homeland security
grants.[Footnote 10] For example, the 9/11 Act requires FEMA to provide
eligible metropolitan areas with the opportunity to submit relevant
information prior to FEMA's initial assessment of the relative threat,
vulnerability, and consequences each area faces from acts of terrorism.
This opportunity is to allow potential grantees to correct any
erroneous or incomplete information that will be the basis of FEMA's
initial assessment.[Footnote 11]
DHS Has Used an Evolving Risk-Based Methodology to Allocate Federal
Grant Funds:
DHS has used an evolving risk-based methodology to identify the states
and urban areas eligible for HSGP grants and the amount of funds they
receive. For example, the fiscal year 2005 risk analysis model largely
relied on measures of population and population density to determine
the relative risk of potential grant recipients. The fiscal year 2006
process introduced assessments of threat, vulnerability and
consequences of a terrorist attack in assessing risk. The fiscal year
2006 risk analysis model estimated relative risk from two perspectives-
-asset-based and geographic--then combined the assessments, assigning
twice as much weight to geographic as asset-based risk. In DHS's view,
asset-based and geographic risks are complementary and provide a
"micro-and macro-" perspective of risk, respectively. In calculating
these relative risk scores and addressing the uncertainties in
estimating relative risk, policy and analytic judgments were required.
For example, according to DHS officials, DHS made the judgment to
assign geographic risk a weight of 1.0 and asset-based risk a weight of
0.5, since a potential loss of lives within an area would contribute to
how geographic risk is assessed. Some of the factors used in the fiscal
year 2006 risk analysis model included: the number of specific types of
reports or events, such as reports of suspicious incidents; the number
of visitors a state or urban area received from countries of interest;
and population. In addition to modifications to DHS's risk analysis
model, DHS adopted an effectiveness assessment for fiscal year 2006 to
determine the anticipated effectiveness of the various risk mitigation
investments urban areas proposed, which affected the final amount of
funds awarded to eligible areas.
The risk analysis method for fiscal year 2007--which is largely
unchanged for fiscal year 2008, according to our ongoing work--was
changed substantially from the fiscal year 2006 process, and further
exemplifies the continuing evolution in DHS's approach to its risk
methodology for grant allocation.[Footnote 12] Given the uncertainties
inherent in risk assessment, the methodology uses a combination of
empirical data (e.g., population, asset location) and policy judgment
(e.g., the nature of the threat for specific areas and the weights to
be assigned to specific variables in the model such as critical
infrastructure, and population and population density). According to
DHS officials, the fiscal year 2007 risk analysis model integrates the
separate analyses for asset-based and geographic-based risk used in
fiscal year 2006, and includes more sensitivity analysis in determining
what the final results of its risk analysis should be.[Footnote 13] DHS
officials said the primary goal was to make the process more
transparent and more easily understood, focusing on key variables and
incorporating comments from a variety of stakeholders regarding the
fiscal year 2006 process. Figure 2 provides an overview of the factors
included in the risk analysis model for fiscal year 2007 and, according
to our ongoing work, for fiscal year 2008 and their relative weights.
The maximum relative risk score possible for a given area was 100. The
Threat Index accounted for 20 percent of the total risk score;
Vulnerability and Consequences accounted for 80 percent. For the
purposes of the model, DHS considered all areas of the nation equally
vulnerable to attack and assigned every state and urban area a
vulnerability score of 1.0. Thus, as a practical matter, the final risk
score for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 is determined by the threat and
consequences scores.
Figure 2: DHS's Model Used in Determining Relative Risk Scores:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of DHS's Model Used in Determining
Relative Risk Scores. The following information is provided:
Risk = Threat Index (T) x Vulnerability and Consequence Index (V&C =
[P+E+I+N]):
Threat Index (T):
Data: On-going plot lines, credible reporting, relevant investigations
to create threat tiers;
Source: DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, intelligence community data.
Vulnerability and Consequence Index:
* Population Index (P):
Data: Total population (nighttime, commuter, visitor, military
dependent) and population density (constrained to 50 percent impact);
Source: Census, LandScan, Smith Travel, and DOD.
* Economic Index (E):
Data: Gross Metropolitan Product (UASI)/percent GDP (state analysis);
Source: Global Insight/Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Statistics.
* National Infrastructure Index (I):
Data: # Tier 1 Assets (x3) plus # Tier 2 assets;
Source: DHS/OIP, SSAs, States.
* National Security Index (N):
Data: Presence of Military Bases (yes/no) plus # DIB plus #
International border crossings;
Source: DOD, DHS/CBP.
Risk Scores:
Population index: 40%;
Economic index: 20%;
Threat index: 20%;
National Infrastructure index: 15%;
National Security index: 5%.
Source: DHS.
Note: "On-going plot lines" reflects DHS analysis of threat information
having a nexus with international terrorism or its affiliates. "DHS/
OIP" stands for DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection, "SSAs"
stands for Sector-Specific Federal Agencies, "DHS/CBP" stands for the
DHS's Customs and Border Protection, and "DIB" stands for "defense
industrial base."
[End of figure]
Threat: The Threat Index accounted for 20 percent of the total risk
score, which was calculated by the intelligence community by assessing
threat information for multiple years (generally, from 9/11 forward)
for all candidate urban areas and categorizing urban areas into one of
four tiers. Tier I included those at highest threat, relative to the
other areas, and tier IV included those at lowest threat relative to
the others. DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis performed this
review and provided these threat assessments and corresponding threat
values for each urban area. In contrast, for the 2006 grant cycle, DHS
used total counts of threats and suspicious incidents and incorporated
these into its model. The final threat assessments are approved by the
intelligence community--the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central
Intelligence Agency, National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency--along with the DHS Under Secretary for
Intelligence & Analysis and the Secretary of DHS, according to DHS
officials.
Vulnerability and Consequences: Vulnerability and Consequences
accounted for 80 percent of the total risk score and were represented
by the following four indexes:
* Population Index (40 percent): This variable included nighttime
population and military dependent populations for states and urban
areas, based upon U.S. Census Bureau and Department of Defense inputs.
In addition, for urban areas, population density, commuters, and
visitors were also factored into this variable, using data from private
entities.
* Economic Index (20 percent): This variable considered the economic
value of the goods and services produced in either a state or an urban
area. For states, this index was calculated using U.S. Department of
Commerce data on their percentage contribution to Gross Domestic
Product. For UASI urban areas, a parallel calculation of Gross
Metropolitan Product was incorporated.
* National Infrastructure Index (15 percent): This variable focused on
over 2,000 Tier I and Tier II critical infrastructure/key resource
assets that were identified by DHS's Office of Infrastructure
Protection. Tier I assets or systems are those that if attacked could
trigger major national or regional impacts similar to those experienced
during Hurricane Katrina or 9/11. Tier II assets are other highly
consequential assets with potential national or regional impacts if
attacked.
* National Security Index (5 percent): This variable considered the
presence of three key national security factors: whether military bases
are present in the state or urban area; how many critical defense
industrial base facilities are located in the state or urban area; and
the total number of people traversing international borders.
Information on these inputs comes from the Department of Defense and
DHS.
To assess vulnerability and consequences, DHS specifically wanted to
capture key land and sea ports of entry into the United States and the
location of defense industrial base facilities and nationally critical
infrastructure facilities.[Footnote 14] For fiscal year 2007 and,
according to our ongoing work, for fiscal year 2008, DHS considered
most areas of the country equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack,
given freedom of movement within the nation; and focused on the
seriousness of the consequences of a successful terrorist attack.
Nationwide more than 2,000 critical infrastructure assets were included
in the risk model and selected on the basis of analysis by DHS
infrastructure protection analysts, sector-specific federal agencies,
and the states. According to DHS, these critical infrastructure assets
were grouped into two tiers: Tier 1 assets encompassed those that if
attacked could cause major national or regional impacts similar to
those from Hurricane Katrina or 9/11, while Tier 2 assets were those
with potential national or regional impacts if attacked. On the basis
of DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection analysis, Tier I assets
were weighted using an average value three times as great as Tier II
assets. According to DHS officials, defense industrial base assets were
included in the national security index and all other assets in the
national infrastructure index.
Effectiveness Assessment Used to Adjust Risk Scores:
Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has also implemented an Effectiveness
Assessment to assess and score the effectiveness of the proposed
investments submitted by grant applicants in addition to determining
relative risk using the risk analysis model. This effectiveness
assessment process has remained largely unchanged since it was first
introduced by DHS. To assess the anticipated effectiveness of the
various risk mitigation investments that states and urban areas
proposed, DHS required states and urban areas to submit investment
justifications as part of their grant application. The investment
justifications included up to 15 "investments" or proposed solutions to
address homeland security needs, which were identified by the states
and urban areas through their strategic planning process. DHS used
subject-matter experts as peer reviewers to assess these investment
justifications. The criteria reviewers used to score the investment
justifications included the following categories: relevance to the
National Preparedness Guidance and to state and local homeland security
plans, anticipated impact, sustainability, regionalism, and the
implementation of each proposed investment. Reviewers on each panel
assigned scores for these investment justifications, which according to
DHS officials were averaged to determine a final effectiveness score
for each state and urban area applicant. DHS then used these
effectiveness assessment scores to calculate the final allocation of
funds to states and urban areas.
DHS Has a Variety of Mechanisms in Place to Communicate with States and
Localities about Grant Allocation Decisions:
According to DHS officials and HSGP grant assistance documents we
reviewed, DHS communicates with its state and local stakeholders by:
(1) providing to each state and urban area the individual threat
assessments that DHS is using to calculate the risk analysis model's
Threat Index; (2) validating the nonpublic, critical infrastructure
assets that comprise the risk analysis model's National Infrastructure
Index; (3) providing midpoint reviews of states' and urban areas' draft
investment justification proposals that are later reviewed during DHS's
effectiveness assessment process; (4) providing technical assistance as
states and urban areas prepare the documentation for their grant
applications; and (5) convening conferences to solicit stakeholder
feedback.
DHS provides threat assessments for state and urban areas. DHS's Office
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) officials said they develop and
provide threat assessments to the states' and urban areas' grant
applicants prior to the grant application process for their review.
State and urban area strategic planning and grant planning officials
use this information to develop their grant investment justifications,
according to DHS officials. I&A officials said they provide secret and
nonsecret versions of the information so that state or urban area
officials who do not have the appropriate clearances required to view
the secret version of their threat assessments will still have access
to some of the threat information. They said they are working with
local law enforcement agencies on a way to address such clearance
issues.
DHS validates the nonpublic, critical infrastructure assets used in the
risk analysis model. DHS officials also said that the agency uses a
collaborative, multistep process to create a list of national critical
infrastructure assets for use in the National Infrastructure Index, one
of the four indices that comprise the Vulnerability and Consequences
component of the risk analysis model. According to DHS officials, they
use a step-by-step process to identify the nation's Tier 1 and Tier 2
critical infrastructure assets. First, DHS's Office of Infrastructure
Protection (OIP) works with sector-specific agencies to develop
criteria used to determine which assets should be placed in a threat
tier. Second, private-sector companies vet the criteria through sector-
specific councils that review the criteria and provide feedback to DHS
OIP. Third, the infrastructure office finalizes the criteria list and
provides the list to the sector-specific agencies and asks states to
nominate assets within their jurisdictions that match the criteria.
Finally, the infrastructure office and the sector-specific agencies
review nominated assets to decide which assets comprise the final Tier
1/Tier 2 list. In 2007, DHS began to allow sector-specific agencies to
resubmit for reconsideration assets that are not initially selected for
the list to ensure the consideration of potential critical
infrastructure assets in future years.
Enacted in August 2007, the 9/11 Act required DHS to provide eligible
metropolitan areas with the opportunity to submit information that they
believe to be relevant to the determination of the threat,
vulnerability, and consequences they face from acts of terrorism, prior
to FEMA conducting each initial assessment, so that any erroneous or
incomplete information can be corrected.[Footnote 15] According to FEMA
officials, DHS implemented this provision mainly through the outreach
and communication efforts described above.
DHS provides midpoint reviews of states' and urban areas' investment
proposals. FEMA officials said that, for the fiscal year 2007
effectiveness assessment process, DHS offered a midpoint technical
review of states' and urban areas' draft 2007 Investment Justifications
prior to the formal submission of these proposals to FEMA's peer review
process. DHS officials said that they performed an after-action
analysis of this effort and found states and urban areas that made use
of the midpoint reviews had effectiveness scores that on average were 6
percent higher than those for states and urban areas that did not take
advantage of this DHS service.
DHS provides technical assistance as states and urban areas prepare
investment documentation. DHS also provides Program Management
Technical Assistance, and Investment Planning Technical Assistance
workshops to assist states and urban areas. For example, the Program
Management Technical Assistance service is designed to help the State
Administrative Agency with day-to-day program management in planning,
managing, and evaluating state programs in the context of the National
Preparedness Guidance, according to DHS. They said Program Management
Technical Assistance helps state administrators use DHS's Program
Management Handbook to manage programs that span agencies,
jurisdictions, and disciplines, including the private sector. DHS also
offers guidance on how to enhance existing state and urban area
Homeland Security Strategies and Enhancement Plans.
DHS convenes conferences to solicit stakeholder feedback. Finally, DHS
has convened conferences in an effort to solicit stakeholder feedback
after the fiscal years 2006 and 2007 grants were awarded. In July 2006,
DHS convened a Homeland Security Grant Program After-Action conference
to gather feedback on the UASI grant award process. DHS also assembled
working groups to discuss and assess homeland security planning, the
HSGP guidance and application, the risk assessment, and the
effectiveness assessment. DHS officials told us that the conference
provided a feedback loop intended to bolster stakeholder support and
promote transparency. The state and local partners who participated in
the working groups at the conference developed 32 recommendations to
improve the HSGP process. For example, one of the risk assessment
working group's recommendations was that DHS should provide detailed
briefings to state and local partners on the core components of the
risk methodology used in the fiscal year 2006 process as one step to
improve the transparency of the risk analysis process. DHS also
convened a similar after-action conference in early August 2007 to
solicit stakeholder feedback on the fiscal year 2007 HSGP and hosted
three regional conferences in the fall of 2007 to foster collaboration
among regional partners and seek additional feedback.
Prior DHS Efforts Improved the Timeliness of Transferring Grant Funds
to States and Localities:
From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, DHS obligated about $19.6 billion
in grants, the purpose of which was to strengthen the capabilities of
state, local, and tribal governments and others to prepare for and
respond to major disasters of any type or cause. About $7 billion of
this total was unexpended as of January 2008. As might be expected, the
more recent the fiscal year, the higher the unexpended balance (see
fig. 3). For example, the Homeland Security and UASI grant awards are
announced in May or June of each year--or about 3 to 4 months before
the end of the fiscal year. The awards for fiscal year 2007 were
announced in May 2007. Thus, one would expect large unexpended balances
for the most recent fiscal year because the grant recipients would have
had only a few months to use their funds prior to the end of the fiscal
year.
Figure 3: Percent of Obligated DHS Grant Funds for Fiscal Years 2002
through 2007 That Were Unexpended as of January 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked bar graph depicting the percent of Obligated
DHS Grant Funds for fiscal years 2002 through 2007 that were unexpended
as of January 2008. The following data is depicted:
Fiscal year: 2002;
Total obligated: $904,896,644;
Total unexpended balance: $8,778,762;
Percentage of obligated funds remaining unexpended: 0.97%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Total obligated: $4,212,657,367;
Total unexpended balance: $134,507,771;
Percentage of obligated funds remaining unexpended: 3.19%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total obligated: $4,115,804,654;
Total unexpended balance: $231,166,967;
Percentage of obligated funds remaining unexpended: 5.62%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total obligated: $3,613,950,575;
Total unexpended balance: $964,860,220;
Percentage of obligated funds remaining unexpended: 26.70%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total obligated: $2,870,988,081;
Total unexpended balance: $1,961,627,924;
Percentage of obligated funds remaining unexpended: 68.33%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Total obligated: $3,847,052,100;
Total unexpended balance: $3,731,808,088;
Percentage of obligated funds remaining unexpended: 97.00%.
Source: FEMA, as of January, 2008.
[End of figure]
In 2005, we reported on DHS's efforts to distribute grants and found
that the Congress, DHS, states, and localities had acted to expedite
grant awards and distribution by setting time limits for the grant
application, award, and distribution processes and by instituting other
procedures.[Footnote 16] We concluded that the ability of states and
localities to spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the
need to fulfill state and local legal and procurement requirements,
which in some cases added months to the purchasing process. We also
reported that some states had modified their procurement practices and
DHS was identifying best practices to aid in the effort, but challenges
remained, such as continuing legal and procurement requirements that
slowed the process. For example, once the grant funds are awarded to
the states and then subgranted to the local jurisdictions or urban
areas, certain legal and procurement requirements may have to be met,
such as a city council's approval to accept grant awards. Or, if the
state legislature must approve how the grant funds will be expended and
is not in session when the grant funds are awarded, it could take as
long as 4 months to obtain state approval to spend the funds.[Footnote
17] We reported a variety of steps that had been taken by states, DHS,
and the Congress to streamline the expenditure of grant funds. For
example:
* Some states, in conjunction with DHS, had modified their procurement
practices to expedite the procurement of equipment and services by
establishing centralized purchasing systems that allow equipment and
services to be purchased by the state on behalf of local jurisdictions,
freeing them from some local legal and procurement requirements.
Several states had developed statewide procurement contracts that allow
local jurisdictions to buy equipment and services using a prenegotiated
state contract.
* DHS had enhanced equipment procurement options through agreements
with the U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Logistics Agency and the
Marine Corps Systems Command, to allow state and local jurisdictions to
purchase equipment directly from their prime vendors. These agreements
provide an alternative to state and local procurement processes and,
according to DHS, often result in a more rapid product delivery at a
lower cost.
* The fiscal year 2005 DHS appropriations legislation included a
provision that exempted formula-based grants (e.g., the State Homeland
Security Grant Program grants) and discretionary grants, including the
Urban Areas Security Initiative and other grants, from requirements in
the Cash Management Improvement Act that provide for reimbursement to
states and localities only after they have incurred an obligation, such
as a purchase order, to pay for goods and services. Subsequent DHS
guidance allowed states and localities to draw down funds up to 120
days prior to expenditure.
We do not know the extent to which the actions that states and
localities have taken to address the obstacles that affected their
ability to use funds expeditiously (but effectively) have succeeded. We
were unable to examine trends in expended and unexpended obligations
for individual grants across fiscal years due to limitations in the
budget data provided by FEMA for this hearing. For example, we were
unable to track HSGP funding data across multiple fiscal years, such as
the amount of fiscal year 2005 funds that were expended in fiscal years
2005, 2006, and 2007. In addition, we found that reporting categories
were not consistent across fiscal years. Grant program data were
collapsed in one fiscal year and compiled differently in another year.
According to one DHS official, while the consolidation of all DHS grant
programs into FEMA provides FEMA with an opportunity to standardize and
enhance its management of grant allocation and distribution, this
administrative transition has also resulted in some reorganization of
accounting functions, and institutionalizing the maintenance of grant
funding data is still being addressed at this time. Whatever the cause,
the inconsistency in reporting on grant expenditures across fiscal
years could hinder FEMA's ability to provide the Congress with
information on trends in expenditures over time for specific grants. As
part of our ongoing work in reviewing DHS grant allocation and
management efforts, we plan to determine whether the data FEMA
maintains on grant expenditures across fiscal years allows FEMA to
analyze trends in grant obligations and expenditures.
DHS Does Not Yet Have a Means to Measure Program Outcomes to Further
the Nation's Homeland Security Preparedness Goals:
While DHS has distributed over $19 billion in federal emergency
preparedness funding to states, localities, and territories since
fiscal year 2002, and taken steps to gather information, establish
goals and measures, and measure progress, we still know little about
how states have used federal funds to build their capabilities or
reduce risks. Nor do we know how effective this national investment has
been because DHS's monitoring of homeland security grant expenditures
does not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program
outcomes to strengthen the nation's homeland security capabilities. In
March 2007, we testified before this Committee that a comprehensive and
in-depth oversight agenda requires assessing state and local
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining
those capabilities. However, all levels of government are still
struggling to define and act on the answers to basic--but hardly
simple--questions about emergency preparedness and response: What is
important (that is, what are our priorities)? How do we know what is
important (e.g., risk assessments, performance standards)? How do we
measure, attain, and sustain success? On what basis do we make
necessary trade-offs, given finite resources? DHS has limited
information on which to base the answers to these questions.
We have identified the need for such capabilities-based assessment and
reporting of the effectiveness of federal grant investments in several
DHS grant programs. For example, in our review of cargo tanker
emergency response in December 2007, we recommended that the Secretary
of Homeland Security work with federal, state, and local stakeholders
to develop explicit performance measures for emergency response
capabilities and use them in risk-based analyses to set priorities for
DHS grant programs in acquiring needed response resources.[Footnote 18]
DHS responded that it was taking the recommendation under advisement
and was exploring approaches to address our recommendation. Similarly,
in our review of DHS's efforts to improve interoperable communications
in April 2007, we reported that no process has been established for
ensuring that states' grant requests are consistent with their
statewide plans and long-term objectives for improving
interoperability.[Footnote 19] We recommended that DHS assess how
states' grant requests support their statewide communications plans and
include the assessment as a factor in making DHS grant allocation
decisions. Although DHS did not comment on this recommendation at the
time, in August 2007 DHS officials told us they were working to ensure
that all grant funding is tied to statewide interoperable
communications plans.[Footnote 20]
In a May 2007 testimony, we noted that more immediate congressional
attention might focus on evaluating the construction and effectiveness
of the National Preparedness System, which is mandated under the Post-
Katrina Reform Act. DHS has taken steps to develop and issue key
components of the system, including a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal and readiness metrics and standards for preparedness
in the form of target capabilities.[Footnote 21] Specifically, in
September 2007, DHS issued a goal for national preparedness, now
referred to as the National Preparedness Guidelines. According to DHS,
the guidelines establish "a vision for national preparedness and
provide a systematic approach for prioritizing preparedness efforts
across the Nation," and generally define a goal for the National
Preparedness system. The guidelines are based on a capability-based
planning process that identified target capabilities that are to be
then used to establish measures for preparedness.
According to DHS officials, one way DHS is attempting to monitor the
development of emergency preparedness capabilities is through the
Effectiveness Assessment described above, that began as part of DHS's
fiscal year 2006 HSPG grant guidance. According to program
requirements, eligible recipients must provide an "investment
justification" with their grant application that links their
investments to the initiatives outlined in their state's Program and
Capability Enhancement Plan. DHS officials have said that they cannot
yet assess how effective the actual investments from grant funds are in
enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have
the metrics to do so and there is insufficient historical information
from the grant monitoring process to assess the extent to which states
and urban areas are building capabilities.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act established a requirement to create another
source of information on state capabilities. The act calls for an
annual preparedness report from all states by January 4, 2008, and
annually thereafter, but FEMA has extended the deadline for this
requirement.[Footnote 22] In December 2007, FEMA extended the State
Preparedness Report deadline from January 4 to March 31, 2008 and
requested that each state administrative agency submit a brief letter
providing a status update on its State Preparedness Report by early
this year. The state reports are to include assessments of:
* State compliance with the national preparedness system, the National
Response Framework, the National Incident Management System, and other
related plans and strategies.
* Current capability levels and a description of target capability
levels.
* Resource needs to meet the preparedness priorities established in
conjunction with the Target Capabilities List, including (1) an
estimate of the amount of expenditure required to attain the
preparedness priorities, and (2) the extent to which the use of federal
assistance during the preceding fiscal year achieved the preparedness
priorities.
Beginning in October 2007, DHS is also responsible for an annual
federal preparedness report that is to include, among other things, an
assessment of the extent to which the use of federal assistance during
the preceding fiscal year achieved the preparedness priorities
established under the act.
Since 2005, DHS has produced an Annual Report on Preparedness Funding,
which includes data on the obligation, expenditure status, and use of
funds for all major federal preparedness grants--including non-DHS
grants--awarded to states, localities, and other nonfederal entities.
According to DHS, this effort is designed to provide decision makers
with critical preparedness funding information as they determine how to
best allocate resources to achieve target levels of capability to
prevent, prepare, respond to, and recover from major events, especially
terrorism. However, the report notes the information is of limited
usefulness because federal departments and agencies interpret and
define the terms obligation, expenditure status, and use of funds
differently. The report provides a national-level summary of the use of
grant funds such as equipment or training, rather than an assessment of
state capability enhancements provided as a result of federal grant
funding. According to DHS, subsequent reports may provide more detailed
analysis and findings, as consistent procedures and definitions are
implemented across grant programs and departments.
Conclusions:
The task of enhancing first responder capabilities across the nation is
a complex and daunting one. DHS must continue to support FEMA's efforts
to work with state, local, and tribal governments, and the private
sector on the tasks it has begun. At the same time, these stakeholders
must recognize that the process is iterative, will include periodic
adjustments and refinements, and that risks are not equally distributed
across the nation. As the principal federal agency now responsible for
preparedness and response, FEMA has a unique opportunity to evaluate
how it can most effectively target and integrate grants with its other
efforts to enhance the nation's all-hazard disaster preparedness and
response system. This can best be done by viewing these grants
collectively, rather than individually. It is also important that FEMA
and grant recipients be able to assess and report on how the grants
have been used to enhance emergency preparedness and response
capabilities and reduce risk.
We look forward to working constructively with this Committee, FEMA,
and DHS in the future to continue to build a national emergency
preparedness system that we all want and our nation deserves.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittees may have
at this time.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William O.
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals from
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors
to this testimony: Chris Keisling, Assistant Director; John Vocino,
Analyst-in-Charge; Michael Blinde, Analyst; and Linda Miller,
Communications Analyst.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.: August
17, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation, GAO-07-835T Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007.
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability, GAO-07-301 Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T.
Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February
7, 2007.
Homeland Security First Responder Grants: Cash Management Improvement
Act Exemption and Cash Advance Funding Require Additional DHS
Oversight. GAO-07-68. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency
Preparedness in the National Capital Region. GAO-05-889T. Washington,
D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs and
Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-530T .
Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2005.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has
Improved, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-121. Washington, D.C.: February
2, 2005.
Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance
Emergency Preparedness. GAO-04-1009. Washington, D.C.: September 15,
2004.
Homeland Security: Federal Leadership Needed to Facilitate
Interoperable Communications Between First Responders. GAO-04-1057T .
Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2004.
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region. GAO-04-
904T. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004.
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National
Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals. GAO-04-433. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Emergency Preparedness: Federal Funds for First Responders. GAO-04-
788T. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This figure includes such DHS grant programs as the Homeland
Security Grant Program (HSGP), Infrastructure Protection Programs, and
the Emergency Management Performance Grants.
[2] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394
(2006).
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to
Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7,
2007).
[4] GAO, Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to
Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas, GAO-07-381R (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 7, 2007); and Homeland Security Assistance for Nonprofits:
Department of Homeland Security Delegated Selection of Nonprofits to
Selected States and States Used a Variety of Approaches to Determine
Awards, GAO-06-663R (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006).
[5] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant
Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 2, 2005); and Homeland Security: Management of First
Responder Grant Programs and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue
to Evolve, GAO-05-530T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2005).
[6] GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced
Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Effort,
GAO-07-583T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2007).
[7] GAO, Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters,
GAO-07-395T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007); Homeland Security:
Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to
Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations
and Legislation, GAO-07-835T (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007); and
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation, GAO-07-1142T (Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2007).
[8] All states receive a statutorily specified minimum under the State
Homeland Security Grant program.
[9] For this formula, DHS defined Threat as international threat of
terrorism to locations and critical assets in the United States,
Vulnerability as the susceptibility of an area to successful attack,
and Consequences as the personal, physical, and economic consequences
to an area of a successful attack.
[10] Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. I, 121 Stat. 266, 271-94.
[11] 6 U.S.C. § 604(b)(2)(B).
[12] Fiscal year 2008 is the first year that FEMA has had
responsibility for the risk assessment and grant allocations for these
grants.
[13] Sensitivity analysis can help gauge what effects key sources of
uncertainty have on outcomes, which provides decision makers with
additional data on alternative risk estimates and funding allocations
resulting from analyses of varying data, judgments, and assumptions.
[14] Ports of entry are government-designated locations where DHS
inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully
admitted into the country.
[15] 6 U.S.C. § 604(b)(2)(B).
[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant
Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121, (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 2, 2005).
[17] Once these requirements are satisfied, states, local
jurisdictions, and urban areas can then obligate their funds for first
responder equipment, exercises, training, and services. Generally, when
a local jurisdiction or urban area directly incurs an expenditure, it
submits related procurement documents, such as invoices, to the state.
The state then draws down the funds.
[18] GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy
Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007).
[19] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability, GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2007).
[20] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007).
[21] GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to
Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address
Related Recommendations and Legislation, GAO-07-835T (Washington,
D.C.: May 15, 2007).
[22] In December 2007, FEMA extended the State Preparedness Report
deadline from January 4, to March 31, 2008, and required each state
administrative agency to submit a brief letter providing a status
update on its State Preparedness Report by January, 2008.
[End of section]
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Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
