Homeland Security
DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain
Gao ID: GAO-08-542T March 6, 2008
Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between ports of entry--government-designated locations where DHS inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter the country illegally and undetected. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on DHS's efforts on selected border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United States and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's observations are based on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior reports, GAO has recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things, help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and processes, and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and documents. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken various actions to address them.
CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBP's ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain identification documents when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative's requirements include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007, the agency has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program over 4 years and biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will verify when travelers exit the country. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects. Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide sufficient field training. To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United States, the federal government has implemented new policies and programs, including enhancing visa security and providing counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States, CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has not yet determined whether to make the program permanent.
GAO-08-542T, Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST:
Thursday, March 6, 2008:
Homeland Security:
DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security Programs and
Operations, but Challenges Remain:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-08-542T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-542T, a report to Subcommittee on Homeland
Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased
in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars
to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between
ports of entry”government designated locations where DHS inspects
persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted
into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of
such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter
the country illegally and undetected. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in
charge of securing our nation‘s borders.
This testimony summarizes GAO‘s work on DHS‘s efforts on selected
border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting
travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting
to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3)
screening of international travelers before they arrive at U.S. ports
and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO‘s observations are based
on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior
reports, GAO recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things,
help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and
processes. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has
taken various actions to address them.
What GAO Found:
CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of
entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of
effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in
interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures
and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBP‘s
ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent
documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens
of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain
identification documents when entering the United States. As of
December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative‘s requirements
include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and
developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has
developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected
foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007,
DHS has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program since 2003 and
biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300
ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since
2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will
verify when travelers exit the country.
In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration
of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected
between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS
accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles
along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras
and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects.
Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles
of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged
to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as
acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to
estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are
not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be
constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the
number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the
academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns
about the agency‘s ability to provide sufficient field training.
To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United
States, the federal government has implemented new policies and
programs, including enhancing visa security and providing
counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO
previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a
program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United
States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the
prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States,
CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers
and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their
departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has
not yet determined whether to make the program permanent.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[Hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-542T]. For more information, contact Rich
Stana at (202) 512-8816 or StanaR@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to secure
our nation's borders. In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks,
the need to secure U.S. borders has taken on added importance and has
received increasing attention from Congress and the public. In August
of last year, we issued our report on the progress DHS has made in
implementing its mission and management functions.[Footnote 1] We
reported that while DHS made some level of progress in all of its
mission and management areas, more work remains. Regarding the border
security mission area, we reported that DHS had made modest progress in
achieving border security performance expectations. My testimony today
summarizes the results of our work on DHS's efforts on selected border
security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at
our nation's ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to
enter the country illegally between the ports of entry and (3)
screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United
States.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--a major component within DHS-
-is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders.
CBP employs nearly 18,000 CBP officers responsible for inspecting
travelers seeking to enter the United States at 326 air, land, and sea
ports of entry. To prevent individuals and contraband from illegally
entering the country between the ports of entry, CBP's Office of Border
Patrol employs nearly 15,000 agents responsible for patrolling our
northern and southwest land borders as well as our coastal areas. In
addition, DHS, along with the Department of State, is responsible for
screening international travelers before they arrive in the United
States, including mitigating any risk associated with the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP), which enables citizens of participating countries to
travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa. The
administration has requested about $9.5 billion for CBP for fiscal year
2009.
My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from May
2006 through February 2008 addressing border security operations and
programs. We conducted these performance audits in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards from September 2005
through February 2008. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
DHS has taken various actions to improve the inspection of travelers at
our nation's ports of entry, but challenges remain. For example, we
reported that CBP management has emphasized the importance of carrying
out effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in,
among other things, interviewing travelers and checking travel
documents. Nevertheless, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures,
lack of physical infrastructure, and lack of staff have hampered CBP's
ability to inspect travelers. Specifically, although passports and
visas contain newly-added security features, some CBP officers lack the
technology and training that would enable them to take full advantage
of these features. DHS has worked with the Department of State to
implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) in response
to post-9/11 legislation requiring citizens of the United States,
Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico, who previously had not been required to do
so, to present certain identification documents or combinations thereof
when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to
meet WHTI requirements include finalizing and implementing document
requirements at air ports of entry and selecting technology to be used
with a new passport card at the 39 highest-volume land ports of entry.
DHS plans to move forward by deploying the selected technology and
staffing and training officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), a
program designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected
foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea,
and land ports of entry. As of October 2007, DHS has invested more than
$1.5 billion on US-VISIT since 2003. Biometrically-enabled entry
capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry but this
represents delivery of one-half of the program. That is, DHS has
allocated about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts but
lacks the ability to verify when travelers exit the United States.
Today, because no detailed exit program plans are available, prospects
for successfully delivering this half of US-VISIT remain unclear.
DHS also faces challenges securing the border between land ports of
entry. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at
securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter
the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One
component of this program, Project 28, is to secure 28 miles along the
southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars.
DHS has formally accepted Project 28 from its contractor, Boeing, at a
cost of about $20.6 million. However, DHS officials told us that
Project 28 has not fully met their expectations. Boeing developed the
system with very little input from the border patrol agents that are to
use the system. Another component of the program, 370 miles of
pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, will be challenging to
complete by its December 2008 deadline because of various factors,
including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands.
Furthermore, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component
because various factors are not yet known, such as the type of terrain
where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced
unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. Between
the end of fiscal year 2006 and December 2008, the total number of new
Border Patrol agents is expected to increase by 6,000. CBP officials
believe that CBP's training academy can handle the influx of new
agents, but expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide
sufficient training to new agents in the field.
The federal government has done a creditable job screening
international travelers before they arrive in the United States by
implementing several measures to strengthen the visa process.
Specifically, new policies and programs have been implemented to, among
other things, enhance visa security, improve applicant screening, and
provide counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials.
Nevertheless, DHS could better manage risks posed by VWP, which allows
nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a
visa for certain durations and purposes. One DHS screening program, the
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), is a pilot program that provides
additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign
airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes
through the pilot but has not taken steps to determine whether to make
the program permanent.
We have recommended various actions to enhance DHS's ability to better
secure the border and enhance our nation's security. Among them are
actions to help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection program
and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and the
documents they present for inspection; to develop a comprehensive
strategy detailing how DHS will develop and deploy US-VISIT exit
capabilities at air, sea, and land ports of entry; and to enhance
controls over to VWP to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities posed by
Visa Waiver travelers. DHS has generally agreed with our
recommendations and has taken various actions to address them.
Inspecting Travelers at Ports of Entry:
CBP's ability to inspect travelers at our nation's ports of entry has
been hampered by weaknesses in travel inspection procedures, inadequate
physical infrastructure, and lack of staff at the air, land, and sea
ports of entry. The use of fraudulent identity and citizenship
documents by some travelers to the United States as well as limited
availability or use of technology and lack of timely and recurring
training have also hampered CBP's efforts in carrying out thorough
inspections. DHS has taken several actions to implement WHTI at air,
land, and sea ports of entry nationwide so that it can better secure
the border by requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada,
and Mexico to present documents to show identity and citizenship when
entering the United States from certain countries in North, Central, or
South America. DHS plans to move forward to deploy technology to
implement WHTI at land ports of entry, and staff and train officers to
use it. Finally, DHS has enhanced border security by deploying US-VISIT
biometric entry capability at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of
entry nationwide, but the prospects for successfully delivering an
operational exit solution remain uncertain because DHS has not detailed
how it plans to develop and deploy an exit capability at the ports.
Traveler Inspection Procedures and Physical Infrastructure:
Each year individuals make hundreds of millions of border crossings
into the United States through the 326 land, air, and sea ports of
entry. About three-fourths of these crossings occur at land ports of
entry. In November 2007, we reported that while CBP has had some
success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators,
weaknesses in its traveler inspection procedures and related physical
infrastructure increase the potential that dangerous people and illegal
goods could enter the country.[Footnote 2] For example, CBP's analyses
indicated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators
entered the country at land and air ports of entry in fiscal year 2006.
One factor that contributed to failed inspections was weaknesses in
travel inspection procedures. In mid-2006, CBP reviewed videotapes from
about 150 large and small ports of entry and, according to CBP
officials, determined that while CBP officers carried out thorough
traveler inspections in many instances, they also identified numerous
instances where traveler inspections at land ports of entry were weak
in that they did not determine the citizenship and admissibility of
travelers entering the country as required by law, such as officers not
stopping vehicles for inspection and pedestrians crossing the border
without any visual or verbal contact from a CBP officer despite
operating procedures that required officers to do so. In the summer of
2006, CBP management took actions to place greater management emphasis
on traveler inspections by holding meetings with senior management to
reinforce the importance of carrying out effective inspections and by
providing training to all supervisors and officers on the importance of
interviewing travelers, checking travel documents, and having adequate
supervisory presence. However, tests our investigators conducted in
October 2006 and January 2007--as many as 5 months after CBP issued
guidance and conducted the training--showed similar weaknesses as those
on the videotape were still occurring in traveler inspections at ports
of entry. At two ports, our investigators were not asked to provide a
travel document to verify their identity--a procedure that management
had called on officers to carry out--as part of the inspection. The
extent of continued noncompliance is unknown, but these results point
to the challenge CBP management faces in ensuring its directives are
carried out.
In July 2007, CBP issued new internal policies and procedures for
agency officials responsible for its traveler inspection program at
land ports of entry. The new policies and procedures require field
office managers to conduct periodic audits and assessments to ensure
compliance with the new inspection procedures. However, they do not
call on managers to share the results of their assessments with
headquarters management. Without this communication, CBP management may
be hindering its ability to efficiently use the information to overcome
weaknesses in traveler inspections.
Another weakness involved inadequate physical infrastructure. While we
could not generalize our findings, at several ports of entry of entry
that we examined, barriers designed to ensure that vehicles pass
through a CBP inspection booth were not in place, increasing the risk
that vehicles could enter the country without inspection. CBP
recognizes that it has infrastructure weaknesses and has estimated it
needs about $4 billion to make the capital improvements needed at all
163 land crossings. CBP has prioritized the ports with the greatest
need. Each year, depending upon funding availability, CBP submits its
proposed capital improvement projects based upon the prioritized list
it has developed. Several factors affect CBP's ability to make
improvements, including the fact that some ports of entry are owned by
other governmental or private entities, potentially adding to the time
needed to agree on infrastructure changes and put them in place. As of
September 2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different
ports of entry in various stages of development.
Lack of inspection staff was also a problem. Based upon a staffing
model it developed, CBP estimated it may need several thousand more CBP
officers at its ports of entry. According to CBP field officials, lack
of staff affected their ability to carry out border security
responsibilities. For example, we examined requests for resources from
CBP's 20 field offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office for
January 2007 and reported that managers at 19 of the 21 offices cited
examples of anti-terrorism activities not being carried out, new or
expanded facilities that were not fully operational, and radiation
monitors and other inspection technologies not being fully used because
of staff shortages. At seven of the eight major ports we visited,
officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff
contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support, and
safety issues when officers inspect travelers--increasing the potential
that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could enter
the country.
CBP also had difficulty in providing required training to its officers.
CBP developed 37 courses on such topics as how to carry out inspections
and detect fraudulent documents and has instituted national guidelines
for a 12-week on-the-job training program that new officers should
receive at land ports of entry. However, managers at seven of the eight
ports of entry we visited said that they were challenged in putting
staff through training because staffing shortfalls force the ports to
choose between performing port operations and providing training.
Lastly, although CBP has developed strategic goals that call for, among
other things, establishing ports of entry where threats are deterred
and inadmissible people and goods are intercepted--a key goal related
to traveler inspections--it faces challenges in developing a
performance measure that tracks progress in achieving this goal.
We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland
Security to help address weaknesses in traveler inspections, challenges
in training, and problems with using performance data. DHS said it is
taking steps to address our recommendations.
Identifying Fraudulent Travel Documents:
We also reported that CBP's ability to do thorough inspections is made
more difficult by a lack of technology and training to help CBP
officers identify foreign nationals who attempt to enter the United
States using fraudulent travel documents. In July 2007, we reported
that although the State Department had improved the security features
in the passports and visas it issues, CBP officers in primary
inspection--the first and most critical opportunity at U.S. ports of
entry to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States with
fraudulent travel documents--were unable to take full advantage of the
security features in passports and visas.[Footnote 3] This was due to
(1) limited availability or use of technology at primary inspection and
(2) lack of timely and recurring training on the security features and
fraudulent trends for passports and visas. For example, at the time of
our review, DHS had provided the technology tools to make use of the
electronic chips in electronic passports, also known as e-passports, to
the 33 airports of entry with the highest volume of travelers from Visa
Waiver Program countries. However, not all inspection lanes at these
air ports of entry had the technology nor did the remaining ports of
entry. Further, CBP did not have a process in place for primary
inspection officers to utilize the fingerprint features of visas,
including Border Crossing Cards (BCC) which permit limited travel by
Mexican citizens--without additional documentation--25 miles inside the
border of the United States (75 miles if entering through certain ports
of entry in Arizona) for fewer than 30 days. For example, although BCC
imposter fraud is fairly pervasive, primary officers at southern land
ports of entry were not able to use the available fingerprint records
of BCC holders to confirm the identity of travelers and did not
routinely refer BCC holders to secondary inspection,[Footnote 4] where
officers had the capability to utilize fingerprint records. Moreover,
training materials provided to officers were not updated to include
exemplars--genuine documents used for training purposes--of the e-
passport and the emergency passport in advance of the issuance of these
documents. As a consequence, CBP officers were not familiar with the
look and feel of security features in these new documents before
inspecting them. Without updated and ongoing training on fraudulent
document detection, officers told us they felt less prepared to
understand the security features and fraud trends associated with all
valid generations of passports and visas.
Although CBP faces an extensive workload at many ports of entry and has
resource constraints, there are opportunities to do more to utilize the
security features in passports and visas during the inspection process
to detect their fraudulent use. We recommended that the Secretary of
Homeland Security make better use of the security features in passports
and visas in the inspection process and improve training for inspection
officers on the features and fraud trends for these travel documents.
We recommended that DHS take steps, including developing a schedule for
deploying technology to other ports of entry and updating training. DHS
generally concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions it
had taken or planned to take to implement them.
We currently have work ongoing to examine DHS efforts to identify and
mitigate fraud associated with DHS documents used for travel and
employment verification purposes, such as the Permanent Resident Card
and the Employment Authorization Document. We expect to issue a report
on efforts to address fraud with these DHS documents later this year.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative:
One of the major challenges for CBP officers at our nation's ports of
entry is the ability to determine the identity and citizenship of those
who present themselves for inspection. For years, millions of citizens
of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda could enter the United States
from certain parts of the Western Hemisphere using a wide variety of
documents, including a driver's license issued by a state motor vehicle
administration or a birth certificate, or in some cases for U.S. and
Canadian citizens, without showing any documents. To help provide
better assurance that border officials have the tools and resources to
establish that people are who they say they are, section 7209 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended,
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, to develop and implement a plan that requires a
passport or other document or combination of documents that the
Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity and
citizenship for U.S. citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and
Mexico when entering the United States from certain countries in North,
Central, or South America.[Footnote 5] DHS' and the State Department's
effort to specify acceptable documents and implement these document
requirements is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI).
In May 2006, we reported that DHS and State had not made decisions
about what documents would be acceptable, had not begun to finalize
those decisions, and were in the early stages of studying costs and
benefits of WHTI. In addition, DHS and State needed to choose a
technology to use with the new passport card--which State is developing
specifically for WHTI. DHS also faced an array of implementation
challenges, including training staff and informing the public.[Footnote
6] In December 2007, we reported that DHS and State had taken important
actions toward implementing WHTI document requirements.[Footnote 7] DHS
and State had taken actions in the five areas we identified in our 2006
report:
* DHS and State published a final rule for document requirements at air
ports of entry. The agencies also published a notice of proposed rule
making for document requirements at land and sea ports of entry.
* By publishing a final rule for document requirements at air ports of
entry, DHS and State have established acceptable documents for air
travel. DHS has also published a notice of proposed rule making which
includes proposed documents for land and sea travel. Under current law,
DHS cannot implement WHTI land and sea document requirements until June
1, 2009, or 3 months after the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State have certified compliance with specified
requirements, whichever is later.[Footnote 8] In the meantime, in
January 2008, CBP ended the practice of oral declaration. According to
CBP, until the WHTI document requirements are fully implemented, all
U.S. and Canadian citizens are required to show one of the documents
described in the proposed rule or a government issued photo
identification, such as a driver's license, and proof of citizenship,
such as a birth certificate.[Footnote 9]
* DHS has performed a cost-benefit study, but data limitations
prevented DHS from quantifying the precise effect that WHTI will have
on wait times at land ports of entry--a substantial source of
uncertainty in its analysis. DHS plans to do baseline studies at
selected ports before WHTI implementation so that it can compare the
effects of WHTI document requirements on wait times after the
requirements are implemented.
* DHS and State have selected technology to be used with the passport
card. To support the card and other documents that use the same
technology, DHS is planning technological upgrades at land ports of
entry. These upgrades are intended to help reduce traveler wait times
and more effectively verify identity and citizenship. DHS has outlined
a general strategy for the upgrades at the 39 highest volume land
ports, beginning in January 2008 and continuing over roughly the next 2
years.
* DHS has developed general strategies for implementing WHTI--including
staffing and training. According to DHS officials, they also planned to
work with a contractor on a public relations campaign to communicate
clear and timely information about document requirements. In addition,
State has approved contracting with a public relations firm to assist
with educating the public, particularly border resident communities
about the new passport card and the requirements of WHTI in general.
Earlier this year, DHS selected a contractor for the public relations
campaign and began devising specific milestones and deadlines for
testing and deploying new hardware and training officers on the new
technology.
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT):
Another major initiative underway at the ports of entry is a program
designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign
nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land
ports of entry, called the US-VISIT Program. These data, including
biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to
screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record
arrival and departure. The purpose of US-VISIT is to enhance the
security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel
and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and
protect visitors' privacy.
As of October 2007, after investing about $1.5 billion since 2003, DHS
has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that
biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at more than 300
air, sea, and land ports of entry, but comparable operational exit
capabilities are not. That is, DHS still does not have the other half
of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its
funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars
since 2003 to exit-related efforts.[Footnote 10]
To the department's credit, operational entry capabilities have
produced results, including, as of June 2007, more than 1,500 people
having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them.
Another likely consequence is the deterrent effect of having an
operational entry capability, which officials have cited as a byproduct
of having a publicized capability at the border to screen entry on the
basis of identity verification and matching against watch lists of
known and suspected terrorists. Related to identity verification, DHS
has also taken steps to implement US-VISIT's Unique Identity program to
enable CBP and other agencies to be better equipped to identify persons
of interest and generally enhance law enforcement. Integral to Unique
Identity is the capability to capture 10 fingerprints and match them
with data in DHS and FBI databases. The capability to capture and match
10 fingerprints at ports of entry is not only intended to enhance CBP's
ability to verify identity, but, according to DHS, is intended to
quicken processing times and eliminate the likelihood of misidentifying
a traveler as being on a US-VISIT watchlist.
Nonetheless, the prospects for successfully delivering an operational
exit solution remain uncertain. In June 2007, we reported that DHS's
documentation showed that, since 2003, little has changed in how DHS is
approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit
efforts.[Footnote 11] As of that time, DHS indicated that it intended
to spend about $27.3 million on air and sea exit capabilities. However,
it had not produced either plans or analyses that adequately defined
and justified how it intended to invest these funds. Rather, it had
only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for
biometric exit capabilities at air and sea ports of entry. Beyond this
high-level schedule, no other exit program plans were available that
defined what would be done by what entities and at what cost. In the
absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit
intentions, it is unclear whether the department's efforts to deliver
near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different
from the past.
The prospect for an exit capability at land ports of entry is also
unclear. DHS has acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for
land ports of entry is currently not feasible. According to DHS, at
this time, the only proven technology available for biometric land exit
verification would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use
for entry at these ports of entry, which would create costly staffing
demands and infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade,
commerce, and environmental impacts. A pilot project to examine an
alternative technology at land ports of entry did not produce a viable
solution. US-VISIT officials stated that they believe that
technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it
possible to utilize alternative technologies that provide biometric
verification of persons exiting the country without major changes to
facility infrastructure and without requiring those exiting to stop
and/or exit their vehicles, thereby precluding traffic backup,
congestion, and resulting delays.
US-VISIT also faces technological and management challenges. In March
2007, we reported that while US-VISIT has improved DHS's ability to
process visitors and verify identities upon entry, we found that
management controls in place to identify and evaluate computer and
other operational problems at land ports of entry were insufficient and
inconsistently administered.[Footnote 12] In addition, DHS had not
articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land border
security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that these
programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost
effectively. DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an overall
immigration and border management strategy and the plan has been under
review by OMB. Further, critical acquisition management processes had
not been established to ensure that program capabilities and expected
mission outcomes are delivered on time and within budget. These
processes include effective project planning, requirements management,
contract tracking and oversight, test management, and financial
management.
We currently have work underway examining DHS' strategic solution,
including a comprehensive exit capability, and plan to issue a report
on the results of our work in Spring 2008.
Between the Ports of Entry:
As part of its Secure Border Initiative (SBI), DHS recently announced
final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million dollar project designed
to secure 28 miles of southwestern border. However, DHS officials said
that the project did not fully meet agency expectations and will not be
replicated. Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been
using the system since December 2007 and 312 agents had received
updated training. Still, some had not been trained to use the system at
all. Deployment of fencing along the southwest border is on schedule,
but meeting CBP's December 2008 goal to deploy 370 miles of pedestrian
and 300 miles of vehicle fencing will be challenging because of factors
that include difficulties acquiring rights to border land and an
inability to estimate costs for installation. Besides undergoing
technological and infrastructure improvements along the border, the
Border Patrol has experienced unprecedented growth and plans to
increase its number of agents by 6,000 by December 2008. Border Patrol
officials are confident that the academy can accommodate this influx
but are also concerned about the sectors' ability to provide sufficient
field training.
The Secure Border Initiative:
In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI aimed at securing
U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements of SBI are to
be carried out by several organizations within DHS. One component is
CBP's SBI program office[Footnote 13] which is responsible for
developing a comprehensive border protection system using people,
technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing,
roads, and lighting.
In February 2008, we testified that DHS had announced its final
acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles
along the southwest border, and was gathering lessons learned to inform
future border security technology development.[Footnote 14] The scope
of the project, as described in the task order between DHS and Boeing-
-the prime contractor DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain the
SBInet system across the U.S. borders--was to provide a system with the
detection, identification, and classification capabilities required to
control the border, at a minimum, along 28 miles in the Border Patrol's
Tucson sector.[Footnote 15] After working with Boeing to resolve
problems identified with Project 28, DHS formally accepted the system,
noting that it met contract requirements. Officials from the SBInet
program office said that although Project 28 did not fully meet their
expectations, they are continuing to develop SBInet with a revised
approach and have identified areas for improvement based on their
experience with Project 28. For example, both SBInet and Border Patrol
officials reported that Project 28 was initially designed and developed
by Boeing with limited input from the Border Patrol, whose agents are
now operating Project 28 in the Tucson sector; however, they said that
future SBInet development will include increased input from the
intended operators. The schedule for future deployments of technology
to the southwest border that are planned to replace most Project 28
capabilities has been extended and officials estimated that the first
planned deployment of technology will occur in other areas of the
Tucson sector by the end of calendar year 2008. In February 2008, the
SBI program office estimated that the remaining deployments of the
first phase of technology development planned for the Border Patrol's
Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors are expected to be completed by the
end of calendar year 2011.
Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been using the
system as they conduct their border security activities since December
2007, and as of January 2008, 312 agents in the Project 28 location had
received updated training. According to Border Patrol agents, while
Project 28 is not an optimal system to support their operations, it has
provided them with greater technological capabilities--such as improved
cameras and radars--than the legacy equipment that preceded Project 28.
Not all of the Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have
been trained to use the system's equipment and capabilities, as it is
expected to be replaced with updated technologies developed for SBInet.
Deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest
border is on schedule, but meeting the SBI program office's goal to
have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence in
place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging and the total cost is
not yet known. As of February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported
that it had constructed 168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of
vehicle fence. Although the deployment is on schedule, SBI program
office officials reported that keeping on schedule will be challenging
because of various factors, including difficulties in acquiring rights
to border lands. In addition, SBI program office officials are unable
to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because of
various factors that are not yet known, such as the type of terrain
where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, and
the cost to acquire the land. Furthermore, as the SBI program office
moves forward with tactical infrastructure construction, it is making
modifications based on lessons learned from previous fencing efforts.
For example, for future fencing projects, the SBI program office plans
to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use approved fence
designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair of the tactical
infrastructure.
The SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for
fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal, and published
its human capital plan in December 2007; however, the SBI program
office is in the early stages of implementing this plan. As of February
1, 2008, SBI program office reported having 142 government staff and
163 contractor support staff for a total of 305 employees. SBI program
office officials told us that they believe they will be able to meet
their staffing goal of 470 staff by the end of September 2008. In
December 2007, the SBI program office published the first version of
its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in its early
implementation phase. The plan outlines seven main goals for the office
and activities to accomplish those goals, which align with federal
government best practices.
Border Patrol:
In addition to technological and infrastructure improvements along the
border, the Border Patrol has experienced an unprecedented growth in
the number of its agents. As we reported last year, in a little over 2
years, between fiscal year 2006 and December 2008, the Border Patrol
plans to increase its number of agents by 6,000.[Footnote 16] This is
nearly equivalent to the increase in the number of agents over the
previous 10 years, from 1996 through 2006. As of September 30, 2007,
CBP had 14,567 Border Patrol agents onboard. It plans to have 18,319
Border Patrol agents on board by the end of calendar year 2008. While
Border Patrol officials are confident that the academy can accommodate
the large influx of new trainees anticipated, they have expressed
concerns over the sectors' ability to provide sufficient field
training. For example, officials are concerned with having a sufficient
number of experienced agents available in the sectors to serve as field
training officers and first-line supervisors. The large influx of new
agents and the planned transfer of more experienced agents from the
southwest border to the northern border could further exacerbate the
already higher than desired agent-to-supervisor ratio in some southwest
border sectors.
Screening of International Travelers Before They Arrive in the United
States:
Because citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States
on a temporary basis generally must apply for and obtain a nonimmigrant
visa, the visa process is important to homeland security. While it is
generally acknowledged that the visa process can never be entirely
failsafe, the government has done a creditable job since September 11
in strengthening the visa process as a first line of defense to prevent
entry into the country by terrorists.[Footnote 17] Before September 11,
U.S. visa operations focused primarily on illegal immigration concerns-
-whether applicants sought to reside and work illegally in the country.
Since the attacks, Congress, the State Department, and DHS have
implemented several measures to strengthen the entire visa process as a
tool to combat terrorism. New policies and programs have since been
implemented to enhance visa security, improve applicant screening,
provide counterterrorism training to consular officials who administer
the visa process overseas, and help prevent the fraudulent use of visas
for those seeking to gain entry to the country. The State Department
also has taken steps to mitigate the potential for visa fraud at
consular posts by deploying visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies
and consulates and conducting more in-depth analysis of the visa
information collected by consulates to identify patterns that may
indicate fraud, among other things. (Notably, 2 of the 19 terrorist
hijackers on September 11th used passports that were manipulated in a
fraudulent manner to obtain visas.)
The Visa Waiver Program allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to
the United States for 90 days or less for business and tourism purposes
without first having to obtain a visa.[Footnote 18] The program's
purpose is to facilitate international travel for millions of people
each year and promote the effective use of government resources. While
valuable, the program can pose risks to U.S. security, law enforcement,
and immigration interests because some foreign citizens may try to
exploit the program to enter the United States. Effective oversight of
the program entails balancing the benefits against the program's
potential risks. To find this balance, we reported in July 2006 that
the U.S. government needs to fully identify the vulnerabilities posed
by visa waiver travelers, and be in a position to mitigate them.
[Footnote 19] In particular, we recommended that DHS provide the
program's oversight unit with additional resources to strengthen
monitoring activities and improve DHS's communication with U.S.
officials overseas regarding security concerns of visa waiver
countries. We also recommended that DHS communicate to visa waiver
countries clear reporting requirements for lost and stolen passports
and that the department implement a plan to make Interpol's lost and
stolen passport database automatically available during the primary
inspection process at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 20] DHS is in the
process of implementing these recommendations and we plan to report
later this year on the department's progress.
Until recently, U.S. law required that a country may be considered for
admission into the Visa Waiver Program if its nationals' refusal rate
for short-term business and tourism visas was less than 3 percent in
the prior fiscal year. According to DHS, some of the countries seeking
admission to the program are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have
high expectations that they will join the program due to their close
economic, political, and military ties to the United States. The
executive branch has supported more flexible criteria for admission,
and, in August 2007, Congress passed legislation that provides DHS with
the authority to admit countries with refusal rates between 3 percent
and 10 percent, if the countries meet certain conditions.[Footnote 21]
For example, countries must meet all mandated Visa Waiver Program
security requirements and cooperate with the United States on
counterterrorism initiatives.
Before DHS can exercise this new authority, the legislation also
requires that the department complete certain actions aimed at
enhancing security of the Visa Waiver Program. These actions include:
Electronic Travel Authorization System:
The August 2007 law requires that DHS certify that a "fully
operational" electronic travel authorization (ETA) system is in place
before expanding Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal rates
between 3 and 10 percent. This system would require nationals from visa
waiver countries to provide the United States with biographical
information before boarding a U.S.-bound flight to determine the
eligibility of, and whether there exists a law enforcement or security
risk in permitting, the foreign national to travel to the United States
under the program. In calling for an ETA, members of Congress and the
administration stated that this system was an important tool to help
mitigate security risks in the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion.
DHS has not yet announced when or how it will roll out the ETA system.
Air Exit System:
The August 2007 law also required that, before DHS can admit countries
with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent to the Visa Waiver
Program, DHS must certify that an air exit system is in place that can
verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals
who depart through U.S. airports.[Footnote 22] Last month, we testified
that DHS's plan to implement this provision had several weaknesses.
[Footnote 23] Using this methodology, DHS stated that it can attain a
match rate above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify
compliance with the air exit system requirement in the legislation. On
December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records,
reported by airlines, of visitors departing the country to the
department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration status
changes, or prior departures from the United States. On February 21,
2008, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the
methodology the department would use to certify compliance.
Nevertheless, the department confirmed that the basic structure of its
methodology would not change, and that it would use departure records
as the starting point. Because DHS's approach does not begin with
arrival records to determine if those foreign nationals stayed in the
United States beyond their authorized periods of admission, information
from this system will not inform overall and country-specific overstay
rates--key factors in determining illegal immigration risks in the Visa
Waiver Program. The inability of the U.S. government to track the
status of visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their
authorized period of visit, and to use these data to compute overstay
rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa
Waiver Program. We reported that DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent"
requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address
these weaknesses.
DHS Pilot on the Immigration Advisory Program:
DHS has also has begun to pilot the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP),
which is designed to provide additional scrutiny to passengers and
their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure for
the United States.[Footnote 24] This pilot program began in 2004 and
was designed to identify and target potential high-risk passengers.
Under the IAP pilot, CBP has assigned trained officers to foreign
airports where they personally interview pre-identified high-risk
passengers, conduct behavioral assessments, and evaluate the
authenticity of travel documents prior to the passenger's departure to
the United States. The pilot program has been tested in several foreign
airports, and CBP is negotiating with other countries to expand it
elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites permanent.
CBP has reported several successes through the IAP pilot. According to
CBP documents, from the start of the IAP pilot in June 2004 through
February 2006, IAP teams made more than 700 no-board recommendations
for inadmissible passengers and intercepted approximately 70 fraudulent
travel documents. CBP estimated that these accomplishments equate to
about $1.1 million in cost avoidance for the U.S. government associated
with detaining and removing passengers who would have been turned away
after their flights landed, and $1.5 million in air carrier savings in
avoided fines and passenger return costs. According to CBP, these
monetary savings have defrayed the costs of implementing the program.
In May 2007, we reported that CBP has not taken all of the steps
necessary to fully learn from its pilot sites in order to determine
whether the program should be made permanent and the number of sites
that should exist.[Footnote 25] These steps are part of a risk
management approach to developing and evaluating homeland security
programs. A risk management framework includes such elements as
formally outlining the goals of the program, setting measurable
performance measures, and evaluating program effectiveness. Although
CBP is currently taking steps to make its IAP sites permanent and to
expand the program to other foreign locations, CBP has not finalized a
strategic plan for the program that delineates program goals,
objectives, constraints, and evaluative criteria. CBP officials told us
that they have drafted a strategic plan for the IAP, which contains
program goals and performance measures. CBP stated that the plan has
not yet been finalized.
Concluding Remarks:
CBP has made progress in taking actions to secure our nation's borders.
It has enhanced its ability to screen travelers before they arrive in
the United States as well as once they arrive at a port of entry.
Nevertheless, vulnerabilities still exist and additional actions are
required to address them. How long it will take and how much it will
cost are two questions that plague two of DHS's major border security
initiatives. Whether DHS can implement the exit portion of US-VISIT is
uncertain. For land ports of entry, according to DHS, there is no near-
term solution. Completing the SBI initiative within time and cost
estimates will be challenging, including the building of nearly 700
miles of fencing. These issues underscore Congress' need to stay
closely attuned to DHS's progress in these programs to help ensure
performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and the nation's
border security needs are fully addressed.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that you or members of subcommittees may have.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at
(202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Other key contributors to this statement were
John Brummet, Assistant Director; Deborah Davis, Assistant Director;
Michael Dino, Assistant Director; John Mortin, Assistant Director;
Teresa Abruzzo; Richard Ascarate; Katherine Bernet; Jeanette Espinola;
Adam Hoffman; and Bintou Njie.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, D.C.: August 2007).
[2] See GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, GAO-08-219
(Washington, D.C.: November 2007).
[3] See GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas
Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use,
GAO-07-1006, (Washington, D.C.: July 2007).
[4] A secondary inspection occurs when persons whose admissibility
cannot be readily determined and those selected as part of a random
selection process are subjected to a more detailed review. This
involves a closer inspection of travel documents and possessions,
additional questioning and checks of multiple law enforcement databases
to verify the traveler's identity, background, purpose for entering the
country, and other corroborating information. This process may result
in an individual being admitted, refused entry, returned to the country
of origin, or detained.
[5] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823 (2004), amended
by Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-295, § 546, 120 Stat. 1355, 1386-87 (2006) and Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 545, 121 Stat. 1844,
2080 (2007). This provision applies to citizens of Bermuda, Canada and
Mexico entering the United States as nonimmigrant visitors.
[6] See GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada, GAO-06-
741R (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
[7] See GAO, Observations on Implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative, GAO-08-274R (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2007).
[8] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 545,
121 Stat. 1844, 2080 (2007). These requirements include (1) National
Institute of Standards and Technology certification that DHS and State
have selected a card architecture that meets or exceeds the security
standards set by the International Organization for Standardization,
(2) sharing the technology used for the passport card with the
governments of Canada and Mexico, (3) submitting a detailed
justification to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
concerning the fee that will be charged to individuals by the U.S.
Postal Service for the passport card, (4) developing an alternative
procedure for groups of children entering the United States under adult
supervision and with parental consent, (5) ensuring that the
infrastructure needed to process the passport cards has been installed
at ports of entry, (6) training CBP officers at those ports of entry to
use the new technology, (7) ensuring that the passport card is
available to U.S. citizens, and (8) establishing a single date for
implementing the program at sea and land ports of entry.
[9] According to CBP officials at the ports of entry we visited at the
time of our review, they did not expect the end of oral declaration to
represent a significant operational change for them, because the
majority of people crossing at their ports already present documents
rather than attempt entry by oral declaration alone.
[10] See GAO, Homeland Security: Prospects for US-VISIT Biometric Exit
Capability Remain Unclear, GAO-07-1044T (Washington, D.C.: June 2007).
[11] See GAO-07-1044T.
[12] See GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational,
Technological, and Management Challenges, GAO-07-632T (Washington,
D.C.: March 2007).
[13] The CBP SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this
testimony as the SBI program office, is responsible for overseeing all
SBI activities; for acquisition and implementation, including
establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules; for
overseeing contractor performance; and for coordinating among DHS
agencies.
[14] See GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance
of Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, GAO-08-508T
(Washington, D.C.: February 2008).
[15] The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting,
interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt illegal entry or
smuggle people--including terrorists or contraband, including weapons
of mass destruction--across U.S. borders between official ports of
entry.
[16] See GAO, Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border
Patrol Agents, GAO-07-540R (Washington, D.C.: May 2007).
[17] See GAO Homeland Security: Progress has been Made to Address the
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action is Needed
to Further Mitigate Security Risks, GAO-07-375 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
[18] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3359, created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot
program. In 2000, the program became permanent under the Visa Waiver
Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637.
[19] GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and
Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.:
July, 2006).
[20] Interpol is the world's largest international police organization,
with 184 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border
police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations,
authorities, and services whose mission is to prevent or combat
international crime. In July 2002, Interpol established a database on
lost and stolen travel documents. As of June 2006, the database
contained about 11.6 million records of lost and stolen passports
[21] Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
Pub .L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 267.
[22] In addition, Public Law 110-53 required the implementation of a
biometric exit system at U.S. airports. If this is not in place by mid-
2009, the flexibility DHS could have obtained to admit countries with
refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent will be suspended until
it is in place.
[23] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-08-458T
(Washington, D.C.: February 2008).
[24] See GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International
Prescreening are Underway, but Planning and Implementation Issues
Remain, GAO-07-346 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007).
[25] See GAO-07-346.
[End of section]
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