Homeland Defense
U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues Gao ID: GAO-08-251 April 16, 2008It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in the United States. Planning operations in the United States poses unique challenges for traditional military planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, (2) the number, experience, and training of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do this, GAO reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those at other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for interagency coordination.
NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of the major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine required plans. However, NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans. NORTHCOM faces challenges in three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the states on the specific requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the command's plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the risk that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil support mission because its plans do not specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM has undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new national planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take additional actions to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of its mission. NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff needed to perform the command's planning function. NORTHCOM's planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized positions. NORTHCOM's military planning staff receives the same planning training and education as planners in other combatant commands. To draw upon experience in planning and conducting domestic operations, NORTHCOM has integrated National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard personnel into its headquarters staff. NORTHCOM has also developed a curriculum for required mission-related training courses. Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures--such as memorandums of understanding or charters--to help ensure that interagency coordination efforts or agreements that are reached can be fully relied on. This is important because responding to a major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from DHS and DOD.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-251, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2008:
Homeland Defense:
U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force
Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues:
Homeland Defense:
GAO-08-251:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-251, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) established
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil
support missions in the United States. Planning operations in the
United States poses unique challenges for traditional military
planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NORTHCOM‘s plans
and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, (2)
the number, experience, and training of planning personnel, and (3) the
extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do
this, GAO reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint
operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those at
other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for
interagency coordination.
What GAO Found:
NORTHCOM has completed”or is in the process of revising”all of the
major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and
civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning
for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine
required plans. However, NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting
plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist
NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a
process to track and assess these plans. NORTHCOM faces challenges in
three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying
requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does
not have more detailed information from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) or the states on the specific requirements needed from
the military in the event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few
regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans.
DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the
command‘s plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces would
not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and
the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the risk
that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more of
its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness
of military units for its civil support mission because its plans do
not specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM
has undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new
national planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in
addressing the challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take
additional actions to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the
risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of its
mission.
NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command
is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for
staff needed to perform the command‘s planning function. NORTHCOM‘s
planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized
positions. NORTHCOM‘s military planning staff receives the same
planning training and education as planners in other combatant
commands. To draw upon experience in planning and conducting domestic
operations, NORTHCOM has integrated National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard
personnel into its headquarters staff. NORTHCOM has also developed a
curriculum for required mission-related training courses.
Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its
homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal
agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures”such as
memorandums of understanding or charters”to help ensure that
interagency coordination efforts or agreements that are reached can be
fully relied on. This is important because responding to a major
disaster in the United States”natural or man-made”is a shared
responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring
federal assistance from DHS and DOD.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making several recommendations to DOD to direct NORTHCOM to take
actions to address the challenges it faces in its planning and
interagency coordination efforts. GAO is also recommending that DOD
develop metrics by which to measure readiness for civil support
missions. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations and suggested
ongoing and future efforts to satisfy the intent of the
recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]. For more
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or
dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background 1:
NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable Challenges
That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to Execute Its Plans 1:
NORTHCOM's Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and Are
Expanding Experience and Training 1:
NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency Coordination but
Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That Coordination Efforts Are Adopted
1:
Conclusions 1:
Recommendations for Executive Action 1:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 1:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 84:
Appendix II: NORHTCOM's 25 Prescripted Mission Assignments 87:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 89:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 95:
Related GAO Products 95:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of NORTHCOM's Plans 1:
Table 2: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios
Incorporated into NORTHCOM Plans 1:
Table 3: Staffing Level of Planning Personnel, by Combatant Command 1:
Table 4: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Planners, by Combatant
Command 1:
Table 5: Agencies and Organizations Represented at NORTHCOM 1:
Table 6: Prescripted Mission Assignments 1:
Figures:
Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility 1:
Figure 2: NORTHCOM Organization 1:
Figure 3: FEMA Regions 1:
Abbreviations:
CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive:
CCMRF: CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force:
CONPLAN: concept plan:
DC:O defense coordinating officer:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
IMPT: Incident Management Planning Team:
JIACG: Joint Interagency Coordination Group:
OPLAN: operations plan:
NGB: National Guard Bureau:
NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command:
NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 16, 2008:
Congressional Requesters:
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the need for a more integrated
military response to an attack on the homeland. In response, DOD
established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)[Footnote 1] in October
2002 to provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and
to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. These two
activities are among DOD's contribution to homeland security. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for
homeland security, which is a national effort to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do
occur.[Footnote 2] DOD contributes to homeland security through its
military missions overseas and homeland defense and civil support
operations. DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense, which
it defines as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external
threats and aggression against the United States.[Footnote 3] This
involves strictly military actions, such as air defense. Civil support
is DOD support to US civil authorities--such as DHS or other agency--
for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other
activities.[Footnote 4]
NORTHCOM differs from the other combatant commands--such as the U.S.
European Command and U.S. Central Command--in that, in addition to
Canada and Mexico, its area of responsibility includes all 49 states on
the North American continent and the District of Columbia. This poses a
unique challenge for military planning and coordination in a U.S.
domestic context and with respect to 49 separate and individual state
governments. NORTHCOM also has to coordinate with numerous federal
agencies that also have a role in planning for and responding to a wide
variety of incidents in the homeland as reflected in the National
Response Framework.[Footnote 5]
Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002,[Footnote 6] we have
periodically evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to
carry out its missions. In our first report in July 2003, we reported
that at the time it was too early to assess the adequacy of NORTHCOM's
planning for operations in the homeland but that there was a need for
an assessment of the DOD force structure necessary to conduct homeland
defense and civil support missions.[Footnote 7] Reports since then have
consistently shown the need for clearly defined roles and
responsibilities among responder agencies, the need for state and local
involvement in the development of response plans, and the need to
ensure response capabilities are developed and ready.[Footnote 8] Many
of these issues were highlighted in 2005, when despite a massive
deployment of resources and support from both military and civil
agencies in response to Hurricane Katrina, confusion arose as to what
responsibilities the military had and what capabilities it would
provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic event.
Homeland defense and civil support operations are major
responsibilities of NORTHCOM. DOD is the lead federal agency for
homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is to command federal
military forces conducting homeland defense operations in the United
States. For civil support operations, although disaster preparedness
and response is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government
and its agencies, NORTHCOM must be prepared to assist when requested or
when an incident overwhelms local, state, tribal, and other federal
authorities.[Footnote 9] DOD is not the lead federal agency for civil
support missions (unless designated so by the President) and operates
in support of civil authorities only when directed to do so by the
President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM would command only the
federal military[Footnote 10] portion of such operations and would do
so in direct support of another federal agency, such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).[Footnote 11]
In planning for both homeland defense and civil support missions,
NORTHCOM relies on other DOD organizations and commands to prepare
plans that will support NORTHCOM in its missions. These organizations
include NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, such as Joint Task Force
Alaska and Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region; component
commands, such as Army Forces North, Air Forces North, and Marine
Forces North; and supporting commands, such as Navy Fleet Forces
Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and DOD agencies such as the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency.
Following the joint planning process,[Footnote 12] NORTHCOM provides
its subordinate commands with planning guidance, such as types of
incidents to prepare for, and collectively these plans should help to
facilitate an adequate response to an incident in the homeland.
Moreover, the joint planning process calls for required capabilities to
be identified and allocated to ensure mission success and for the
readiness of those units providing the capabilities for assigned
missions to be monitored.
As requested, this report addresses the extent to which NORTHCOM (1)
has prepared plans to conduct its homeland defense and civil support
missions and the challenges it faces in planning for and conducting
these operations, (2) has an adequate number of planning personnel with
the relevant experience and training to perform the planning function
for the command, and (3) coordinates the development of its plans and
operations with federal agencies and other organizations. We prepared a
separate report to address NORTHCOM's coordination with the National
Guard Bureau (NGB) and the states.[Footnote 13]As agreed with your
staff, we will address matters related to NORTHCOM exercises and
training as part of a follow-on effort.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has prepared plans to execute
its homeland defense and civil support missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM's
available major plans and supporting plans, comparing them to
established DOD joint operational planning criteria for completeness
and adequacy. We also met with knowledgeable NORTHCOM officials to
discuss the status of each of the plans NORTHCOM is required to prepare
and the process by which the plans were developed and assessed.
Although we reviewed the assumptions, constraints, and other portions
of the plans for general adherence to DOD's joint operational planning
criteria, we did not independently validate those elements. Therefore,
we did not attempt to determine the extent to which NORTHCOM's plans
are executable. To assess the challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for
and conducting homeland defense and civil support operations, we
developed a methodology comparing a series of questions and topics for
joint operational planning to the information related to the plans
themselves. The methodology was based on DOD's standards for joint
operational planning for identifying needed capabilities, allocating
those capabilities to accomplish the mission, monitoring the readiness
of military units to meet the capability requirements of their
missions, and capturing and incorporating lessons learned into
planning. We used the results of this analysis and our discussions with
a broad range of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if any, exist in
NORTHCOM's planning efforts stemming from these challenges. Although we
reviewed all of NORTHCOM's plans according to these criteria, we
concentrated on the two primary homeland defense and civil support
plans. To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM's planning personnel
have relevant and adequate training and experience, we discussed
staffing and training with a wide range of NORTHCOM and DOD officials
and compared information on planning personnel at NORTHCOM with that of
other combatant commands. We assessed the reliability of these data and
found them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates in planning for
and conducting its missions, we reviewed the documentation and
mechanisms for coordination with organizations outside NORTHCOM and
interviewed officials from NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, DHS, the
FEMA, and NGB. Additional information on our scope and methodology
appears in appendix I.
We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains further detail on
our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of the
major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and
civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning
for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed the nine
major plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
other DOD guidance and is in the process of revising four plans,
including its Homeland Defense plan.[Footnote 14] However, it does not
know whether supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD
organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it has only
recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans.
Further, although NORTHCOM's plans adhere to DOD standards, the
challenges NORTHCOM faces in three key planning areas increase the risk
to NORTHCOM's ability to execute its homeland defense and civil support
plans. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for
capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does not have more
detailed information from DHS and the states on the specific
requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster.
Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly assigned military forces (units,
trained personnel, and equipment), and it has only one major plan with
which specific forces and units are associated. NORTHCOM therefore
faces uncertainty about which DOD forces or capabilities are available
to it to respond to a mission requirement. Although DOD stresses that
homeland defense is a major priority, it has routinely chosen not to
assign forces to NORTHCOM. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and
assign specific forces to the command's plans, but this would not
guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere.
However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM Commander with a better
basis to assess the risk that the command would be unable to
successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has
difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil
support mission because, in addition to having few forces associated
with plans, most of NORTHCOM's plans do not specify tasks against which
units can be assessed in DOD's existing readiness system.[Footnote 15]
NORTHCOM has begun risk mitigation efforts for these challenges, and
new national planning guidance and requirements may further assist
NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges.[Footnote 16] However,
there are additional actions that NORTHCOM and DOD could take--
independently or as part of newly required planning efforts--that would
reduce the overall risk to NORTHCOM's ability to execute its missions.
We are recommending that (1) NORTHCOM track the status and assess the
suitability of all supporting plans, (2) DOD assign forces to NORTHCOM
and require NORTHCOM to develop dedicated force deployment lists for
each of its major plans, and (3) NORTHCOM develop mission tasks for its
civil support plans. DOD generally agreed with the intent of our
recommendations and discussed steps it is taking or planning to take to
ensure that NORTHCOM reviews supporting plans, assign certain
specialized forces to NORTHCOM, and develop metrics against which
military units can be measured for readiness for the civil support
mission.
NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and they are
pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff
needed to perform the command's planning function. Because of the need
to plan for and conduct operations within the United States, NORTHCOM
presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned solely in a
military planning environment. NORTHCOM has over 96 percent of its
authorized planning positions, which is higher than the percentages for
the other combatant commands, except U.S. Central Command. The military
officers who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive the same basic planning
training and education as planners in other combatant commands.
NORTHCOM has also integrated 36 National Guard and 22 U.S. Coast Guard
personnel--who have experience working in the state environment--into
most of the directorates that conducts some form of operational
planning. This improves the command's ability to plan for and
coordinate with non-DOD entities to accomplish its domestic missions.
NORTHCOM also supplements military planning training and education with
mission-specific training that provides planners with the skills they
need to properly plan its missions. NORTHCOM has also developed a
curriculum for its staff and monitors this training to ensure the
completion of curriculum courses in a timely manner. Expanding the
knowledge base of military staff at NORTHCOM should help improve the
level of homeland defense and civil support knowledge in planners
throughout DOD. At some point, this may allow NORTHCOM to require
homeland defense and civil support training, education, and experience
requirements for military personnel wishing to transfer to the command
in a planning position and for civilian employees the command may hire.
Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its
homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal
agencies, it lacks formalized procedures--such as memorandums of
understanding or charters--to ensure that agreements or arrangements
made between the command and agency representatives can be relied on
for planning purposes. NORTHCOM has improved interagency coordination
through such efforts as establishing a headquarters directorate focused
solely on coordination and integrating representatives from 40 agencies
into the command's headquarters. However, we found that federal agency
representatives at NORTHCOM have varying degrees of authority from
their respective headquarters to agree on coordination efforts.
Moreover, several agency representatives told us that as they rotate
out of NORTHCOM, previously made agreements with these representatives
may change as new representatives rotate in. As a result, NORTHCOM may
base its plans or responses on information that is not fully vetted and
risks the possibility of planning with invalid information or
responding to an incident with inadequate resources. Among other
actions it has taken to improve coordination, the command participates
in an interagency incident management planning team. However, officials
from several agencies on the team expressed concern that their
agreements with NORTHCOM may not be completely viable because there was
no formal process to obtain their headquarters' concurrence with their
agreements made with NORTHCOM. As we have reported, key practices that
can enhance and sustain interagency coordination efforts include
formalizing interagency agreements on such things as roles and
responsibilities through a memorandum of understanding, a charter, or
some other formal planning document between partner agencies.[Footnote
17] This is important because responding to a major disaster in the
United States--natural or man-made--is a shared responsibility of many
government agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from
DHS and DOD. Without effective interagency coordination and planning,
there is a risk that NORTHCOM'S, DOD's, and other federal agencies'
response to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 18] The new integrated
planning system required by national planning guidance issued by the
President and DHS may help address the gaps we identified. Therefore,
in conjunction with the development of the integrated planning system,
we are recommending that NORTHCOM, in consultation with its federal
interagency partners, develop clear guidance and procedures for
interagency planning coordination efforts. DOD agreed with this
recommendation and stated that it has begun to incorporate such
direction into its major planning documents.
Background:
As with other joint combatant commands, NORTHCOM's organization
includes subordinate commands that report directly to NORTHCOM;
component commands, which are military service commands that assist
NORTHCOM operations; and other supporting commands and DOD agencies.
Each of these has a significant role in planning for NORTHCOM's
missions. NORTHCOM planning efforts are guided by DOD policies and
procedures on joint planning that specify what should be included in
the plans as well as what organizations are required to submit plans in
order for the command to complete its planning process.
NORTHCOM Mission and Organization:
NORTHCOM is the military command responsible for the planning,
organizing, and executing DOD's homeland defense mission within its
area of responsibility--the continental United States (including
Alaska) and territorial waters--and civil support missions within the
United States[Footnote 19] (see fig. 1). Homeland defense is the
protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
critical defense infrastructure against external attacks and
aggression. DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense
operations, such as air defense.[Footnote 20] Other federal agencies
would act in support of DOD in those circumstances. NORTHCOM's homeland
defense mission incorporates air and space defense, land defense, and
maritime defense against external threats. One example of how the
homeland defense mission is conducted is Operation Noble Eagle, the
ongoing effort to protect against an air attack, such as those that
occurred on September 11, 2001.
Figure 1: NORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility:
This figure is a map showing area of NORTHCOM responsibility.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
NORTHCOM consists of a combatant command headquarters, a series of
smaller subordinate commands focused on particular missions or regions,
and component commands of the military services, which support
NORTHCOM's planning and operations and command the land, maritime, and
air portions of a NORTHCOM joint operation. The NORTHCOM Commander also
commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi-
national U.S. and Canadian organization charged with air and maritime
warning and airspace control. Figure 2 shows NORTHCOM's structure.
Figure 2: NORTHCOM Organization:
This figure is a chart showing the NORTHCOM organization.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information.
[End of figure]
Civil support is DOD support to US civil authorities--such as DHS or
other agency--for domestic emergencies and for designated law
enforcement and other activities.[Footnote 21] DOD is not a lead
federal agency for such missions and thus operates in support of civil
authorities only when directed to do so by the President or the
Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM would command only the federal military
portion of such operations and would do so in direct support of another
federal agency, such as FEMA.[Footnote 22]
Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United States
is guided by the National Response Framework, which involves a stepped
series of response, beginning with local authorities, state
authorities, and outside assistance from other states. Only when these
capabilities are exceeded would federal assistance become involved. It
is at this point that DOD may be asked to provide assistance.[Footnote
23] NORTHCOM would command that DOD assistance. For civil support
operations, there are three primary situations in which DOD takes part
in a federal response to a domestic incident. Federal assistance,
including assistance from DOD, can be provided (1) at the direction of
the President, (2) at the request of another federal agency, such as
DHS or FEMA, or (3) in response to a request from local authorities
when time is of the essence.[Footnote 24]
The Joint Operation Planning Process:
Guidance for developing plans, such as NORTHCOM's homeland defense and
civil support plans, is provided by DOD's joint operation planning
process.[Footnote 25] This process establishes objectives, assesses
threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a
given environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military
forces to deliver those capabilities) are allocated to ensure mission
success. Joint operation planning and execution procedures also include
assessing and monitoring the readiness of those units providing the
capabilities for the missions they are assigned. Overall, the purpose
of joint operation planning is to reduce the risks inherent in military
operations.
Joint operations plans themselves can take several forms, from the more
detailed to the more general. Examples of more detailed operations
plans include those prepared by several combatant commands for the
kinds of military operations dictated by a specific foreign threat or
scenario, such as the need to oppose a landward invasion of the
territory of a U.S. ally by a hostile nation. Such operations plans
(OPLAN) are meant to cover contingencies that are critical to U.S.
national security and require detailed planning in order to reduce risk
to potential operations. These plans are accompanied by detailed lists
of military forces that would provide required capabilities in order to
execute the plan. Other plans are prepared for less compelling but
otherwise important national interest contingencies and for unspecific
threats (e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or peace
operations fall under this category). These are referred to as concept
plans (CONPLAN) and are much more general in nature but nonetheless are
required to adhere to joint operational planning standards.[Footnote
26] All of NORTHCOM's plans are currently categorized as CONPLANs.
Once a plan is drafted, it is reviewed several times by a number of DOD
stakeholders, primarily from the Joint Planning and Execution
Community, which consists of a broad range of military stakeholders,
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military
services, the combatant commands, and the major DOD agencies. These
stakeholders provide input into all phases of planning, from mission
analysis to the final detailed plan.
In the last several years, DOD has begun to use what it refers to as an
adaptive planning process, whereby major plans are reviewed much more
often than in the past. All plans are now reviewed by DOD stakeholders
every 6 months.
NORTHCOM Planning Process for Homeland Defense and Civil Support:
Part of NORTHCOM's responsibility is to create plans to address its
role in various potential threats to the homeland, whether from
potential enemy attack or a natural disaster. Because the potential
threats are so broad, whether they involve terrorist attacks or
potential natural disasters, the plans NORTHCOM was required to develop
by DOD usually take the form of CONPLANs. Among the specific areas for
which NORTHCOM prepares plans are chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management;
pandemic influenza; and nuclear accident response.
The specific contingencies for which NORTHCOM should plan are directed
by the President and the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM follows several
sets of strategies and guidance when planning for homeland defense and
civil support. Homeland defense planning follows DOD guidance, such as
the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, the
Unified Command Plan, and Contingency Planning Guidance. Civil support
planning requires additional guidance. In addition to the military
guidance, because DOD is not the lead federal agency for civil support
missions involving domestic emergencies, natural disasters, and similar
events, it also follows the guidance prepared by the Homeland Security
Council and DHS in order to frame its civil support planning, including
the National Response Framework. To further guide planning efforts for
all hazards, the Homeland Security Council and DHS--along with the
federal interagency, and state and local homeland security agencies--
created the national planning scenarios. The scenarios provide
parameters for 15 highly plausible terrorist attack and natural
disaster situations, such as the detonation of a nuclear device by
terrorists or a major earthquake. The scenarios focus on the
consequences that federal, state, and local first responders will have
to address and are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of
large-scale, catastrophic events for which the nation needs to be
prepared.
NORTHCOM prepares individual plans to cover its broad homeland defense
and civil support missions as well as subsets of those missions. For
example, while NORTHCOM has a major plan each for homeland defense and
civil support, it also has plans for air defense and for CBRNE
consequence management. NORTHCOM's plans provide its subordinate,
component, and supporting commands and agencies with planning guidance,
such as types of incidents to prepare for and what kinds of plans to
prepare to support NORTHCOM's plans.
NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable Challenges
That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to Execute Its Plans:
NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of its
major plans. However, NORTHCOM does not regularly track or assess the
required supporting plans from other DOD commands and agencies. This
heightens the risk that NORTHCOM cannot properly assess whether the
supporting organizations have adequately planned to assist the command
when an event takes place. Further, although NORTHCOM plans adhere to
military guidance in both content and structure, the command faces
additional challenges in such areas as (1) identifying required civil
support capabilities, (2) allocating capabilities (units, trained
personnel, and equipment) to meet potential requirements, and (3)
monitoring the readiness of forces delivering those capabilities.
NORTHCOM and DOD have some risk mitigation efforts under way in each of
these areas that partially address the challenges we found. However, it
could take additional steps to reduce the remaining level of risk to
its ability to effectively achieve its mission.
Major Plans Are Complete or Are Undergoing Revision:
To date, NORTHCOM has completed nine major homeland defense and civil
support plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
DOD guidance, and is in the process of revising several of its plans in
accordance with the DOD requirement to review plans every 6 months for
potential revision,[Footnote 27] including its homeland defense plan.
NORTHCOM officials told us that they have placed priority on completing
all of their major plans over the last 2 years. In addition, NORTHCOM's
plans are now undergoing review and consideration for major revision
more often than when the command was first established. Table 1 lists
NORTHCOM's required major plans and the status of each with estimated
completion and revision dates where applicable.
Table 1: Status of NORTHCOM's Plans:
NORTHCOM plan: Defense Support of Civil Authorities;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing
revision;
Estimated completion/revision date: Revision due March 2008 but
postponed.
NORTHCOM plan: Homeland Defense;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing
major revisions to delineate air, land, and maritime domains;
NORTHCOM also coordinated with an interagency planning team for
interagency coordination annex;
Estimated completion/revision date: Revision due March 2008.
NORTHCOM plan: Pandemic Influenza;
Status of draft or revision: Global plan complete and approved;
regional plan completed and approved in January 2008;
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete.
NORTHCOM plan: CBRNE Consequence Management;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing
revision;
Estimated completion/revision date: Revision due April 2008.
NORTHCOM plan: Civil Disturbance;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Plan undergoing its first
revision;
Estimated completion/ revision date: Revision due February 2008.
NORTHCOM plan: National Capital Region Emergency Preparedness;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Its first revision is
upcoming, but NORTHCOM officials do not anticipate major changes;
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete.
NORTHCOM plan: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations;
Status of draft or revision: Plan completed;
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete.
NORTHCOM plan: Aerospace Defense;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete. Long-established NORAD
plan;
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete.
NORTHCOM plan: Nuclear Weapon Accident Response;
Status of draft or revision: Plan complete;
Estimated completion/revision date: Complete.
Source: NORTHCOM.
Notes: One additional plan dealing with Caribbean mass migration was
previously considered by NORTHCOM, but U.S. Southern Command has
assumed responsibility for this plan because a major portion of its
area of responsibility includes the majority of the Caribbean Sea,
including the islands in the sea and Central and South America.
NORTHCOM officials told us that their responsibility for mass migration
issues once people arrive in the United States is covered in the civil
support plan, in support of DHS as the lead agency. Some of these
changes were caused by DOD's decision in 2006 to shift some land and
ocean areas in the Caribbean (including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands) from NORTHCOM's to U.S. Southern Command's area of
responsibility.
[End of table]
NORTHCOM has also anticipated that DOD will require a 10th plan--
Strategic Communications--and has fully drafted a plan in advance of
this guidance.
NORTHCOM Plans Adhere to Military Guidance:
Although the majority of our review was focused on the two major
homeland defense and civil support plans, we also reviewed each of the
other plans and compared them to DOD's established joint planning
standards for concept plans as well as NORTHCOM's own concept of
operations for how it should plan for and conduct its missions. We
found that the plans met DOD's standards for completeness in accordance
with DOD's joint planning doctrine and adhered to NORTHCOM's overall
concept of operations. For example, the plans include the required
concept, objectives, assumptions, and constraints sections that frame
the rest of the plan. We also reviewed the assumptions listed in the
plans for potential contradictions between one or more plans and found
none. We did not, however, independently validate the assumptions in
the plans. Some assumptions--such as assuming that adequate DOD forces
would be available to execute a plan--seemed broad and had the
potential to affect the entire plan if the assumption was proved
invalid during a crisis. However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us
that some broad assumptions are always necessary in order to even begin
planning. They said that once a plan needs to be executed, the
assumptions are reviewed again and the plan altered to account for an
assumption that was determined to be invalid. We also found that
NORTHCOM's civil support plan adheres closely to the National Response
Framework concept in that NORTHCOM is to provide support for civil
authorities upon request by a lead federal agency.
NORTHCOM Plans Incorporate National Planning Scenarios:
We also found that NORTHCOM's plans incorporate 14 of the 15 national
planning scenarios developed by the Homeland Security Council in order
to guide federal agencies' general planning and exercises. The one
scenario not incorporated into NORTHCOM's plans is the cyber attack
planning scenario, which falls under U.S. Strategic Command's area of
responsibility.[Footnote 28] Table 2 summarizes each of the 15 planning
scenarios and indicates where NORTHCOM planners have taken these
scenarios into consideration in their plans.
Table 2: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios
Incorporated into NORTHCOM Plans:
Planning scenario: Nuclear detonation;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear
device in a large city;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Defense Support of Civil Authorities;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror[A].
Planning scenario: Biological attack;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a
city using a concealed spray device;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Biological disease outbreak--pandemic influenza;
Planning scenario description: Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza
that begins in China and spreads to other countries;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * Global and Regional Pandemic
Influenza.
Planning scenario: Biological attack--plague;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists release pneumonic plague into
three areas of a large city;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Chemical attack--blister agent;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists spray a combination of
blister agents into a crowded football stadium;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Chemical attack--toxic industrial chemicals;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists use grenades and explosive
devices at petroleum facilities;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans:
* CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Chemical attack--nerve agent;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists spray Sarin into the
ventilation system of three commercial buildings in a city;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Chemical attack--chlorine tank explosion;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists use explosives to release a
large quantity of chlorine gas;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Natural disaster--major earthquake;
Planning scenario description: A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a
major metropolitan area;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.
Planning scenario: Natural disaster--major hurricane;
Planning scenario description: Category 5 hurricane strikes a major
city;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.
Planning scenario: Radiological attack--radiological dispersal device;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists detonate "dirty bombs" in
three cities in proximity to each other;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Explosives attack--bombing using improvised
explosive devise;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists detonate improvised explosive
device in a sports arena, and use suicide bombers in a public transit
concourse and in a parking facility;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Biological attack--food contamination;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax
in processing facilities;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Biological attack--Foreign Animal Disease;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists infect livestock at specific
locations;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * CBRNE Consequence Management;
* Homeland Defense;
* Regional War on Terror.
Planning scenario: Cyber attack;
Planning scenario description: Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S.
financial infrastructure;
Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans: * NORTHCOM does not plan against
civilian computer system attacks. This is addressed in U.S. Strategic
Command's plans.
Source: NORTHCOM.
Note: The scenarios appear in the same order they were published by the
Homeland Security Council. They are not in any order of probability or
impact.
[A] NORTHCOM's Regional War on Terror plan is a supporting plan for
U.S. Special Operations Command's main plan.
[End of table]
Limited Progress in Tracking and Reviewing Supporting Plans Increases
Risk to the Planning Process:
Because NORTHCOM officials have spent considerable time and effort in
completing or revising their major plans, they have not focused
adequately on the supporting plans that have been--or are to be--
developed by other organizations within DOD to assist NORTHCOM. Like
all CONPLANs, NORTHCOM's plans require supporting plans from NORTHCOM's
subordinate and component commands as well as other DOD agencies to
assist the responsible command--NORTHCOM--when an event occurs. Because
NORTHCOM's major plans are less detailed and focused than the
operational plans of other combatant commands, these supporting plans
are critical for providing the operational level detail that is
otherwise lacking in the major plans. Supporting plans must also adhere
to the same joint doctrine standards as the broader plans and should
contain objectives, assumptions and constraints, and sections on such
areas as command and control, task organization, intelligence, and
logistics.[Footnote 29] Although there is no explicit DOD requirement
that NORTHCOM systematically review and track supporting plans, DOD
guidance on joint operation planning indicates that "in the absence of
Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will
review and approve supporting plans."[Footnote 30] Regardless of
whether there is an explicit requirement, we believe it is prudent to
perform these reviews to reduce the risk that supporting agencies have
not adequately planned to support NORTHCOM when needed following a
natural or man-made disaster.
The number of supporting plans required varies with the type of major
plan. For example, NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan required supporting
plans from 25 commands and agencies, whereas the civil support plan
required supporting plans from only 6 commands and agencies. Of the 6
supporting plans required by the civil support concept plan, NORTHCOM
officials had 4 in their possession when we reviewed the plans at
NORTHCOM headquarters. Similarly, of the 25 supporting plans required
by NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan, NORTHCOM also had only 3 at the
time we reviewed plans. Some of the other 22 organizations expected to
develop supporting plans for homeland defense are the Defense
Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, and Defense Contract Management Agency. With the
exception of supporting plans by NORTHCOM's subordinate commands--such
as Joint Task Force Alaska and Joint Task Force Civil Support--and the
component commands[Footnote 31] whose plans they could provide copies
of, NORTHCOM officials could not report to us how many of the other
supporting plans are completed. As we report separately, NORTHCOM
officials were uncertain about the status and completeness of the
supporting plans that the homeland defense CONPLAN required NGB to
coordinate with the states and forward to the command.[Footnote 32]
We reviewed all the supporting plans NORTHCOM was able to locate for
the Homeland Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and CBRNE
Consequence Management plans, as well as several others we saw during
visits to other commands and DOD organizations. We found that in
general the supporting plans met the intent and objectives of the major
strategic-level plans and had compatible assumptions. We did not,
however, review the supporting plans to the degree NORTHCOM officials
would have to in order to satisfy themselves that the plans meet the
command's needs, nor did we independently validate the assumptions in
the supporting plans. NORTHCOM officials acknowledged that because they
had devoted most of their effort to completing and revising the major
plans, until recently they had not devoted enough attention to the
supporting plans. NORTHCOM officials told us that they are developing a
process to track the status of subordinate commands' supporting plans.
In fact, the officials provided us an update on the status of these
supporting plans. But this did not include other DOD agencies, such as
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and
Defense Information Support Agency, that are also supposed to be
developing supporting plans for some of NORTHCOM's concept plans.
Additionally, NORTHCOM officials told us that they were planning to
start reviewing supporting plans in a manner similar to how DOD
stakeholders[Footnote 33] review major plans. As long as this approach
encompasses all supporting plans, it could provide NORTHCOM planning
and operations officials with a much more detailed analysis of the
extent to which supporting plans meet their needs as well as help them
identify potential planning gaps. Without knowledge about the
completeness of supporting plans and the extent to which these plans
address NORTHCOM's objectives, NORTHCOM officials face increased
uncertainty about the extent of planning and preparedness of other DOD
agencies if and when these agencies are called to respond.
NORTHCOM Has Difficulty Determining Required Capabilities for Its Civil
Support Mission Because It Lacks Information on States:
According to the strategic vision contained in NORTHCOM's concept of
operations, NORTHCOM should facilitate the synchronization of national,
state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation and
support civilian authorities.[Footnote 34] One of the fundamental
elements of operational planning is determining the capabilities
requirements for the mission to be performed. Because NORTHCOM's plans
are broader CONPLANs rather than more detailed OPLANs, they are not
focused on specific scenarios and discrete sets of required
capabilities needed to accomplish objectives. Without an understanding
of the capabilities necessary for DOD to conduct an operation, it is
more difficult to plan in advance for the types, numbers, and timing of
capabilities (trained personnel and equipment) to actually conduct an
operation. For NORTHCOM's homeland defense mission, the required
capabilities are based on an assessment of threats and a number of
factors that NORTHCOM and other DOD commands and organizations assess.
For NORTHCOM's civil support mission, the requirements the command
faces are established by the needs of the federal, state, and local
agencies and organizations that DOD would be supporting in an actual
event.
Given the diverse environment that NORTHCOM is responsible for within
its area of responsibility, its civil support role varies by area,
incident, and other factors, which makes NORTHCOM's ability to know its
capability requirements for any given civil support operation
uncertain. Further, NORTHCOM officials told us that they do not have
access to enough detail about from DHS or from the states in order to
know what capabilities exist at the state level and the extent to which
there are capability gaps. DHS has reported on the weaknesses in state
and federal emergency plans both in terms of the adequacy of the plans
themselves and the lack of information on required
capabilities.[Footnote 35] As we report in a separate letter, NORTHCOM
has also not systematically reviewed state emergency plans in order to
obtain detailed information about the specific challenges it may face
in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations.
Coordination between NORTHCOM, DHS, NGB, and the states is therefore
important for emergency planning, particularly for civil support
operations.
NORTHCOM officials told us that understanding National Guard
capabilities is also problematic. For example, as we have reported,
neither DOD nor the states have fully determined the National Guard's
requirements for civil support operations in the United
States.[Footnote 36] The National Guard serves as a critical portion of
the response to a disaster, whether in its normal role under the direct
command of a state governor or as part of a federal response once the
President has made a determination to federalize the Guard. In either
case, uncertainty about the National Guard's civil support capabilities
increases the risk to the adequacy of NORTHCOM's and DOD's overall
civil support planning effort.
In 2006, Congress required that DOD develop and maintain a database
that includes the types of emergency response capabilities DOD may be
able to provide in support of the National Response Framework's
emergency support functions[Footnote 37] and the types of emergency
response capabilities each state's National Guard may be able to
provide in response to a domestic natural or man-made
disaster.[Footnote 38] DOD is also required to identify in this
database the specific units that are able to provide these
capabilities.[Footnote 39] Also, in 2006, Congress required FEMA to
accelerate the completion of an inventory of federal response
capabilities and to develop a list of organizations and functions
within DOD that may be used to provide support to civil authorities
during natural or man-made disasters.[Footnote 40] FEMA is still
developing this list, and DOD is still developing the required
database. In January 2008, Congress required DOD to work with DHS to
determine the military-unique capabilities DOD needs to provide for
civil support operations and to prepare a plan to provide funds and
resources to maintain existing military-unique civil support
capabilities or any additional capabilities required for homeland
defense and civil support missions.[Footnote 41] In addition to
descriptions of the emergency support functions, the annexes to the
previous National Response Plan[Footnote 42]--such as the catastrophic
incident annex--contain information about agency roles and
responsibilities as well as descriptions of capabilities. These annexes
are being revised as part of the new National Response Framework.
Until these efforts are completed and are coordinated with similar
information from the states, there remains a gap in knowledge about
what capabilities exist at all levels for responding to natural and man-
made disasters. This, in turn, limits NORTHCOM's ability to fully
identify the civil support requirements for DOD forces.
NORTHCOM and DOD have taken some steps to mitigate the uncertainty in
civil support requirements. NORTHCOM officials reported to us that
through analyzing past disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, and
potential disasters--such as those represented by the national planning
scenarios--they can reasonably determine the types of capabilities
necessary to support civil authorities. NORTHCOM officials said that
this allows them to anticipate the needs of states and local
authorities in the event of a disaster to some extent but that they can
only "lean forward" so far without infringing on the intent of the
National Response Framework or the prerogatives of the state
governments. NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff are also assessing NORTHCOM's
major plans (including Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities) in order to determine where the potential gaps in required
capabilities may be and what specific military capabilities are
potentially required to address them. This may better inform
capabilities requirements and resource decisions.
NORTHCOM has also worked with FEMA and DOD officials to develop
prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a set of
capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD in an emergency and
are written in such a way as to provide a common understanding of a
capability. NORTHCOM officials told us that the intent was to avoid
requests for specific DOD equipment that may or may not be suitable or
available to meet the request and to base requests on capabilities a
requesting agency needs that could potentially be addressed by a
broader range of DOD assets. For example, FEMA might request the
capability to move by air 40 metric tons rather than requesting a
specific aircraft. This enables DOD to apply a wide range of resources
for solving a problem and reduces confusion associated with varying
requirements and terminology across agencies. These mission assignments
are designed to leverage DOD's areas of expertise and capabilities
where civil agencies typically fall short. Appendix II shows the 25
prescriptive mission assignments that NORTHCOM and DOD have worked out
with FEMA.
These mitigation efforts help reduce the uncertainty NORTHCOM faces in
determining requirements for civil support planning. But only a broader
effort by NORTHCOM, DOD, DHS, and the states to comprehensively assess
capabilities and capability gaps will help all stakeholders understand
the true extent of requirements in order to plan for natural and man-
made disasters in the United States.
Few Capabilities Are Allocated to Execute NORTHCOM's Plans:
One of the major challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and
conducting both homeland defense and civil support operations is
ensuring that it has adequate capabilities assigned to conduct those
missions as required. The major combatant commands, such as U.S.
European Command and U.S. Pacific Command, normally have forces
allocated to their operational control on a regular basis to meet their
general capabilities requirements and to perform other missions, such
as demonstrations of military presence in support of U.S. foreign
policy objectives. Further, the OPLANs prepared by combatant commands
normally have lists that detail which military units will respond to
the plan, if needed, and the timing of that deployment. DOD refers to
this information as time-phased force deployment data. The combination
of regularly assigned forces and force deployment lists associated with
the more detailed operations plans provides combatant commanders with a
reasonable level of assurance that sufficient forces will be available
to execute a plan if necessary and allows the commander to monitor the
readiness of the units assigned to the respective area of
responsibility or specific plan.
Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002, DOD has routinely
considered the regular assignment of forces to the combatant commands
in what DOD refers to as a "Forces For Unified Commands" document.
However, despite the priority placed on homeland defense in the
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and other DOD
strategic guidance, DOD has only routinely assigned air defense and
supporting forces to NORTHCOM. A contributing factor may be that the
pace and scope of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere in the world has severely limited the number and types of
units available to respond to missions in the homeland. The assignment
of forces to combatant commands provides commanders with a means to
know which specific military forces are committed to that area of
responsibility and, conversely, allows commanders to perform risk
assessments if those forces must be committed elsewhere.
In addition to lacking regularly assigned forces, NORTHCOM officials
told us that their plans usually do not have lists that detail the
military units that will be used because the plans are meant to cover a
less-specific and broader range of threats, rather than specific
scenarios. Only one NORTHCOM plan--the CBRNE Consequence Management
plan--had a force deployment list at the time of our review of the
plans. NORTHCOM has since developed force deployment lists as part of
the revised homeland defense plan but not for the civil support plan.
NORTHCOM officials told us that they created the CBRNE consequence
management list in order to stress the importance of providing forces
to the CBRNE mission. The force deployment list lays out the
capabilities for what DOD calls the CBRNE Consequence Management
Response Force (CCMRF), which is intended to be a series of separate
units totaling roughly 15,000 personnel to provide initial response
assistance to civil authorities in the event of a major CBRNE incident
in the country. We reported previously on the lack of adequate
training, equipment, and availability of active and reserve chemical
and biological units and the potential difficulty DOD faced in meeting
NORTHCOM's CBRNE requirements.[Footnote 43] Despite being the only set
of capabilities dedicated to a NORTHCOM civil support plan, the CCMRF
has never been fully manned and equipped by DOD because many of the
units that would make up the force have been deployed to their wartime
missions or because of other availability or sourcing issues. DOD and
National Guard officials are currently negotiating a plan whereby Guard
units may provide the majority of CCMRF capabilities for a certain
period until the Active Army can resume responsibility. However, lack
of agreement between DOD and National Guard Bureau stakeholders on
sources of funding and command and control issues continues to delay
the effort.[Footnote 44]
While a force deployment list does not guarantee that the appropriate
units, trained personnel, and equipment will be available to execute a
military plan, such a list provides a known set of capabilities against
which to measure readiness and assess risk if all or part of the forces
on the list are unavailable. None of NORTHCOM's other civil support
plans have force deployment lists, which limits NORTHCOM's ability to
know which military units may respond to its homeland defense or civil
support missions if the need arises.
To help mitigate the uncertainties caused by the lack of forces being
assigned to execute NORTHCOM's plans, NORTHCOM and DOD have developed a
series of standing "execute orders" in the homeland defense and civil
support areas. These orders identify the general types and numbers of
forces necessary to execute missions in such areas as air and maritime
homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. One example
is the domestic air defense order associated with Operation Noble
Eagle. Additionally, during periods of heightened specific threats,
such as the yearly hurricane season, NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff have
prepared temporary execute orders that detail more specific military
forces that can be called upon to meet an emerging NORTHCOM need to
support civil authorities. The execute orders serve as the gateway to
the "request for forces" process whereby NORTHCOM requests forces from
U.S. Joint Forces Command,[Footnote 45] through the Joint Staff, and
Joint Forces Command assigns specific military forces from the services
to meet the specific requirement, if possible. The orders also allow
NORTHCOM to place units on notice to prepare to deploy for a short time
in advance of their actual assignment to NORTHCOM.
According to Joint Forces Command and NORTHCOM officials, about 40,000
military personnel are associated with all of NORTHCOM's execute orders
and the CBRNE Consequence Management plan. However, with the exception
of the dedicated homeland defense orders--such as Operation Noble
Eagle--the CCMRF deployment list and civil support execute orders have
very few units actually sourced to them.[Footnote 46] This means an
increased level of uncertainty about whether the appropriate number of
properly trained personnel and the correct equipment will be available
when a plan needs to be executed. NORTHCOM officials are concerned
about the high number of unsourced units and the corresponding level of
uncertainty about the availability of appropriate military forces to
meet their homeland defense and civil support needs. It should be
noted, however, that we found no instances where Joint Forces Command
could not meet NORTHCOM's operational needs for an actual homeland
defense or civil support mission. Fortunately, NORTHCOM's homeland
defense and civil support operations have mostly been manageable and
not large-scale events. For example, in addition to Operation Noble
Eagle, which NORTHCOM carries out every day, the command conducts
anticipated and unanticipated operations in support of civil
authorities, such as the response to the Minneapolis bridge collapse
and Hurricane Dean in August 2007 and in response to the California
wildfires in October 2007.
NORTHCOM officials told us that the execute order process has provided
them some limited measure of assurance that adequate military forces
will be available for their homeland defense and civil support plans.
However, the absence of regularly assigned forces in NORTHCOM's area of
responsibility and the lack of units specifically identified to execute
NORTHCOM's plans may increase the level of risk to homeland defense or
civil support operations in terms of the availability of a sufficient
number of personnel with the appropriate level of training and
equipment for conducting the domestic mission.
NORTHCOM's Ability to Monitor the Readiness of Forces to Respond to
Civil Support Missions Is Hampered:
NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of individual military
units because in part, few requirements or units that may respond to a
request for civil support have been identified. In contrast, through
its planning process for homeland defense, NORTHCOM has determined the
forces it needs for this mission and, through the services, monitors
the readiness of these forces. DOD normally measures the readiness of
military units by (1) assigning them to conduct missions associated
with specific plans and (2) using lists of mission-essential tasks that
correlate to the actual mission they would perform. The degree to which
units have the numbers of trained personnel and the equipment necessary
to accomplish those mission-essential tasks serves as the overall
measure of a unit's readiness.
According to NORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, Joint Staff, and U.S. Army
Forces Command officials, DOD generally assumes that a unit capable of
performing its military mission is also capable of performing a civil
support mission, but this may not always be true. Neither NORTHCOM nor
the military services have developed mission-essential tasks for civil
support missions. We have reported on the mismatch between assessments
of readiness based solely on wartime missions and the requirements of
domestic civil support missions. Whereas homeland defense missions in
and around the United States would be similar to traditional wartime
missions, those same mission tasks do not necessarily provide a
complete picture of readiness for a domestic civil support
mission.[Footnote 47] As a result, DOD does not have a direct method to
measure the readiness of units for the civil support mission.
DOD officials told us that it is often possible for a unit to be
considered not ready for its wartime mission but be able to execute a
civil support mission. For example, a U.S. Army air defense unit whose
surface-to-air missile launchers are still overseas or undergoing depot
repair is not considered ready to conduct its wartime mission. However,
to the extent that personnel, trucks, and other equipment were still
with the unit, it may be ready to conduct a civil support mission, such
as delivering supplies to a disaster area. This is not captured in
DOD's readiness system. Further, the lack of mission-essential tasks
for the range of civil support missions leads to a potential gap in
DOD's knowledge of whether sufficient trained personnel and equipment
are available. For example, NORTHCOM's civil disturbance plan assumes
that nonlethal equipment and methods would be necessary and that the
forces required to conduct such operations have been trained in
nonlethal methods. But without a set of mission tasks against which to
measure unit readiness, there is no objective means of determining if
military units can meet these tasks.
Because at the time of our review only one of NORTHCOM's major plans
has actual units assigned to it (CBRNE Consequence Management),
NORTHCOM officials were unable to monitor readiness of units that may
be asked to respond to other plans, even if there were specific civil
support-related mission tasks. We have work under way reviewing DOD's
Readiness Reporting System, and we did not assess the accuracy of that
system as part of this review. However, we asked NORTHCOM officials to
show us the extent to which they could use DOD's readiness systems to
monitor readiness for both its homeland defense and civil support
missions.
For the ability to respond to potential CBRNE attacks, NORTHCOM has
developed mission-essential tasks for the CCMRF. However, Joint Staff
and National Guard officials told us that they estimated that the
wartime military tasks of the units only met about 70 percent of the
CCMRF's total mission, which further indicates the mismatch between
wartime tasks a unit may face in comparison to tasks it may face in a
domestic, non-wartime environment. Joint Task Force Civil Support,
NORTHCOM's subordinate command for CBRNE consequence management,
routinely uses the CCMRF's mission-essential tasks, the existing DOD
readiness system, and direct interaction with Joint Forces Command and
Army officials to monitor the readiness of CCMRF forces on a routine
basis. Even with this effort, NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force Civil
Support officials told us that it is difficult to track readiness
because, as we indicated earlier, so few of the units are actually
filled with the personnel and equipment necessary. Nonetheless, the
fact that the CBRNE forces have mission tasks against which to measure
readiness in the existing system provides a level of knowledge about
the overall state of readiness to execute the CBRNE plan. This, in
turn, provides the NORTHCOM Commander and DOD with a clearer picture of
the risk they face in that area. Because no mission tasks exist for
general civil support missions, NORTHCOM and DOD face greater
uncertainty about their ability to execute these plans.
Mission-essential tasks are also critical guides for training military
units for their missions and for conducting and evaluating exercises.
NORTHCOM conducts two major exercises each year that include both
homeland defense and civil support elements. The command also
participates in other commands' live exercises as well as tabletop
simulations of various homeland defense and civil support operations.
Further, NORTHCOM has a system for incorporating lessons learned from
training exercises into plans and future training exercises. The system
has a good structure for submitting and processing lessons, including
multiple layers of review to assess the validity of lessons and the
assignment of individuals with the responsibility of managing and
addressing lessons. NORTHCOM officials believe that the system is
adequate, and they continue to seek ways to improve the process.
Ensuring that appropriate mission-essential tasks are associated with
each of the missions for which NORTHCOM is responsible would further
help NORTHCOM officials evaluate exercises and actual operations and
incorporate lessons learned into future exercises and plan revisions.
The command would also be in a better position to conduct meaningful
analysis to identify recurring lessons and understand the causes of
various systemic issues. This, in turn, would allow NORTHCOM and DOD to
identify those areas where increased effort--and possibly resources--
may be required.
To mitigate the uncertainties in readiness for civil support
operations, NORTHCOM has worked with Joint Forces Command and the
military services in advance of some potential incidents, such as
hurricanes and wildfires, to gain a better understanding of what units
were likely to be assigned, if necessary. This interaction has allowed
NORTHCOM and other DOD stakeholders to directly monitor the personnel
and equipment status of military units to determine if they would be
prepared to adequately respond to a civil support mission. For the
remainder of NORTHCOM's potential civil support missions, NORTHCOM
still lacks an objective means to determine if the units that will be
conducting civil support operations in fact have the capabilities
needed to fully conduct these missions.
New National Planning Requirements May Help NORTHCOM Address Planning
Challenges:
In December 2007, the President issued an annex to the 2003 Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8 that establishes a standard and
comprehensive approach to national planning for homeland
security.[Footnote 48] Included in the new instructions is a
requirement that the federal government more closely integrate federal,
state, local, and tribal plans with respect to capability assessments.
This may further assist NORTHCOM in more accurately determining its
capability requirements for civil support missions.
Among the new requirements was also a series of cascading plans at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For example, all relevant
federal agencies are now required to prepare more detailed OPLANs with
respect to their specific homeland security missions. Thus far,
NORTHCOM has been required only to prepare less detailed CONPLANs. The
definition for OPLANs in the new guidance includes a requirement that
such a plan "identifies detailed resource, personnel and asset
allocations."[Footnote 49] This is similar to the level of detail DOD
requires in its OPLANs, including the force deployment lists we
discussed.
If these comprehensive national planning processes are pursued by DOD,
in coordination with DHS, NORTHCOM may be able to further address some
of the challenges and gaps we highlight.
NORTHCOM's Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and Are
Expanding Experience and Training:
NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command
is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for
staff needed to perform the command's planning function. While the
unique characteristics associated with a domestic military command
present challenges, NORTHCOM officials address these circumstances by
integrating National Guard and Coast Guard personnel with NORTHCOM
staff. NORTHCOM, independently and with other organizations, is also
developing educational opportunities that address the challenges
associated with the interagency and state/federal environment that
planners face.
NORTHCOM Planning Positions Staffed at High Levels:
We compared the numbers and general qualifications of NORTHCOM's
planning staff with those of other combatant commands as a way of
gaining a rough understanding of what NORTHCOM's staff looks like in
comparison to commands that have been established for a longer period
of time. NORTHCOM's planning staff is assigned at over 96 percent of
the command's authorized staffing level. These staff members include
all headquarters staff who have some form of planning function and not
just the staff of the plans directorates or those personnel with
specific designations as planners. As shown in table 3, with the
exception of the U.S. Central Command, NORTHCOM also has a greater
number of staff it considers to be planners and was staffed at a higher
percentage of its authorization than all other combatant commands
responding to our information requests.
Table 3: Staffing Level of Planning Personnel, by Combatant Command:
Combatant command: U.S. Central Command;
Authorized staffing level: 189;
Actual staffing level: 184;
Percentage of authorization: 97.4.
Combatant command: U.S. Northern Command;
Authorized staffing level: 171;
Actual staffing level: 165;
Percentage of authorization: 96.5.
Combatant command: U.S. European Command;
Authorized staffing level: 144;
Actual staffing level: 128;
Percentage of authorization: 88.9.
Combatant command: U.S. Southern Command;
Authorized staffing level: 93;
Actual staffing level: 74;
Percentage of authorization: 79.6.
Combatant command: U.S. Pacific Command;
Authorized staffing level: 123;
Actual staffing level: 110;
Percentage of authorization: 89.4.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
Note: These numbers are only general comparisons of personnel who have
planning functions at the commands and are not meant to reflect
specific personnel or budget-related categories.
[End of table]
We did not independently validate NORTHCOM's requirements for planning
personnel. However, NORTHCOM officials said that they believe they have
an adequate number of planning personnel. Further, NORTHCOM has been
conducting an ongoing assessment of its overall manpower needs and is
evaluating the extent to which changes in requirements for personnel
may be needed.
NORTHCOM officials stated that partially because of the need to support
other operations, such as ongoing military operations overseas, the
command attempts to maximize the use of civilian staff in its workforce
to maintain continuity and consistency. Civilian staff provides an
institutional knowledge base and experience level that compliments the
capabilities of military officers who rotate through the command's
directorates. Over one-half of the command's planning staff is civilian
or contractor personnel. As shown in table 4, two other commands in our
review, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command, also rely
heavily on civilian or contract personnel.
Table 4: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Planners, by Combatant
Command:
Combatant command: U.S. Central Command;
Military personnel: Number: 73;
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 39.7;
Civilian personnel: Number: 20;
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 10.9;
Contractor Personnel: Number: 91;
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 49.5.
Combatant command: U.S. Northern Command;
Military personnel: Number: 70;
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 42.4;
Civilian personnel: Number: 52;
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 31.5;
Contractor Personnel: Number: 43;
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 26.1.
Combatant command: U.S. Southern Command;
Military personnel: Number: 61;
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 82.4;
Civilian personnel: Number: 13;
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 17.6;
Contractor Personnel: Number: a;
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: a.
Combatant command: U.S. European Command;
Military personnel: Number: 110;
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 85.9;
Civilian personnel: Number: 8;
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 6.3;
Contractor Personnel: Number: 10;
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 7.8.
Combatant command: U.S. Pacific Command;
Military personnel: Number: 53;
Military personnel: Percentage of total: 48.2;
Civilian personnel: Number: 7;
Civilian personnel: Percentage of total: 6.4;
Contractor Personnel: Number: 50;
Contractor Personnel: Percentage of total: 45.5.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[A] U.S. Southern Command did not provide information on contractor
personnel.
[End of table]
The military personnel who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive basic
planning-related training similar to that of planners in other
combatant commands. DOD and the services provide educational
opportunities for members of the U.S. Armed Forces, international
officers, and federal government civilians. These opportunities provide
a broad body of knowledge that enables students to develop expertise in
the art and science of war. Many of NORTHCOM's military planners have
completed some of these courses. A number of these courses are also
offered to civilian planning personnel.
NORTHCOM's Staff Includes National Guard and Coast Guard Personnel:
To accomplish its homeland defense and civil support missions, NORTHCOM
must plan for and interact with other federal, state, and territorial
government agencies in addition to Canada and Mexico. The need to plan
for and conduct operations (1) within the United States and (2) in
support of other federal agencies, 49 state governments, and Canada and
Mexico presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned solely
in a military environment.
NORTHCOM has sought to address this challenge by integrating personnel
from the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard into NORTHCOM's
headquarters staff. These personnel have experience working in the
state environment and are incorporated into most, if not all, of the
NORTHCOM directorates that conduct some form of operational planning.
Thirty-six National Guard and 22 U.S. Coast Guard personnel are
stationed at NORTHCOM. These personnel provide command planners and
operations personnel with co-workers who have experience planning for
and conducting operations with other federal and state agencies.
In January 2008, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to review the military and civilian positions, job descriptions,
and assignments at NORTHCOM. The goal is to determine the feasibility
of increasing the number of reserve component military personnel or
civilian staff with experience in homeland defense and civil support at
NORTHCOM.[Footnote 50]
NORTHCOM Has Efforts Under Way to Train DOD Planners for Domestic
Operations:
Having an adequate number of properly trained personnel to ensure that
missions are successfully planned is a decisive factor in the success
of any mission. NORTHCOM officials have been attempting to establish
and maintain a cadre of personnel in the active military with knowledge
and experience in NORTHCOM planning, homeland defense, civil support,
and interagency planning and coordination that go beyond the basic
level training the military provides in joint planning. These efforts
extend from the level of basic orientation training all the way to
programs at the graduate level.
NORTHCOM planners are required to complete an orientation course that
serves as a "crosswalk" between DOD's homeland defense and civil
support plans and the plans of their agency partners. The orientation
course also provides students with a better understanding of DOD policy
regarding the protection of the homeland. DOD officials told us that
additional such planning courses are now offered at other DOD schools,
such as the Army's Command and General Staff College and School of
Advanced Military Studies.
As recommended in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, NORTHCOM
has taken steps to create training programs and partner with other
agencies and private institutions. The goal is to develop educational
opportunities for interagency and state/federal environment planners to
inform them of other agencies' homeland security responsibilities to
improve overall cooperation and coordination. For example, NORTHCOM has
developed a course for DOD and interagency personnel that focuses on
support to civil authorities. While the course does not directly
address the detailed aspects of planning, it provides an overview of
DOD and other agencies' responsibility for homeland security. Officials
from the Joint Forces Staff College believe this is a valuable course
and they are considering requiring students to complete it before they
can take certain other courses at the college. In addition, NORTHCOM
has developed a training curriculum for each of its planning personnel.
NORTHCOM officials stated that each planner's progress in completing
the curriculum is automatically tracked to ensure timely completion.
Several of the courses in the curriculum must be completed within
specific time periods.
To further expand the educational opportunities for its own staff as
well as staff from agencies across the federal government, NORTHCOM has
also partnered with the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs to
develop the Center for Homeland Security, located on the campus of the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, which provides research and
educational capabilities to meet specific needs regarding protection of
the homeland. One of the accomplishments of the center is the creation
of several programs of study in homeland defense, including
undergraduate and graduate certificates in homeland security and
homeland defense. According to a senior official with the center, the
four courses required for the graduate certificate can also be applied
toward a master of business administration and a master of public
affairs. The center, in cooperation with several of its partners,
including NORTHCOM, is also in the process of developing other
educational programs, such as a master of arts and a doctoral program
in homeland security.
According to NORTHCOM officials, a cooperative effort among the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, the Naval Postgraduate
School, and NORTHCOM helped found the Homeland Security/Defense
Education Consortium, which is a network of teaching and research
institutions focused on promoting education, research, and cooperation
related to and supporting the homeland security/defense mission. The
consortium conducts two symposia annually, one at NORTHCOM and a second
at a FEMA location. The Naval Postgraduate School also has a master's
degree program through its Center for Homeland Defense and Security.
This program, designed in cooperation with FEMA, includes strategy
development, organizational, planning, and interagency coordination
aspects. NORTHCOM personnel have started to take advantage of these
programs on a case-by-case basis, but there are no command requirements
for NORTHCOM staff to attend any of these courses or programs.
NORTHCOM's efforts to provide additional training and education for its
staff should help the command expand its experience in planning and
conducting operations with partners at the international, federal, and
state levels. NORTHCOM officials have recognized the need for such
education opportunities at all levels for their own staff as well as
for other military and civilian personnel. At some point, NORTHCOM may
be in a position to require certain prerequisites in this area for
military or civilian staff who may be considered for assignment to the
command.
NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency Coordination but
Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That Coordination Efforts Are Adopted:
NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its homeland
defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies.
Such coordination is important for ensuring that proper planning in
advance of an attack or a natural disaster and that such operations
proceed as smoothly as possible if they need to be conducted. However,
NORTHCOM lacks formal guidance to coordinate its planning effort with
its agency partners. This results in uncertainty about which planning
coordination efforts are continued or agreed to by higher authorities
and an increased risk that interagency planning will not be done
effectively.
NORTHCOM Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination:
We found several areas in which NORTHCOM has taken steps to improve
coordination with other agencies and organizations, many resulting from
the lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina. Coordination is
important not just for interagency planning but also to ensure that
NORTHCOM and its agency partners work together effectively when an
incident actually occurs. For example, NORTHCOM created an Interagency
Coordination Directorate in 2002 to assist in its collaboration
efforts. Today, 40 agencies and organizations are represented at
NORTHCOM, including a senior executive official from DHS as well as
officials from FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The directorate is designed to help build
effective relationships by facilitating, coordinating, and
synchronizing information sharing across organizational boundaries.
NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command are the only combatant commands with
directorates dedicated solely to interagency coordination. Table 5
shows the agencies currently represented at NORTHCOM.
Table 5: Agencies and Organizations Represented at NORTHCOM:
Department or agency of origin: DOD;
Represented agency: Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
NGB;
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
U.S. Special Operations Command.
Department or agency of origin: DHS;
Represented agency: FEMA;
U.S. Coast Guard;
Customs and Border Protection;
Transportation Security Administration;
Federal Air Marshal Service.
Department or agency of origin: Other federal agencies;
Represented agency: Department of State;
Department of Agriculture;
Department of the Interior;
Department of Health and Human Services;
U.S. Public Health Service;
Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Director of National Intelligence;
Central Intelligence Agency;
Environmental Protection Agency;
U.S. Geological Survey;
Federal Aviation Administration;
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Department or agency of origin: Canada and Mexico;
Represented agency: Canadian Forces Liaison Office;
Canadian Department of Public Safety and Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
Mexico Civil Response/Protection Organization.
Department or agency of origin: Other;
Represented agency: Humanitarian International Services Group.
Source: NORTHCOM.
[End of table]
The presence of agency representatives provides a regular opportunity
for direct interaction between them and NORTHCOM staff. NORTHCOM and
other agency officials with whom we spoke agreed that this level of
regular contact is beneficial for coordinating plans in advance but
also for the more immediate needs of coordination when an event
actually occurs. Such agency representatives should therefore have the
experience to provide an effective link to their parent agencies and
possess the appropriate level of access to agency leadership in order
to facilitate interagency decision-making. When a major incident
occurs, the agency representatives, known as the Interagency
Coordination Center, become a direct adjunct to the NORTHCOM
Commander's battle staff, assisting the command in its immediate crisis
planning and providing a direct link to their parent agencies.
The Interagency Directorate also administers NORAD-NORTHCOM's Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which is composed primarily of
the 40 resident agency representatives who are experts in interagency
planning and operations on the command's staff. The JIACG's role is to
coordinate with civilian federal agency partners to facilitate
interagency operational planning in contingency operations. All
combatant commands are establishing JIACGs. The JIACG supports day-to-
day planning and advises NORTHCOM planners regarding civilian agency
operations, capabilities, and limitations. Further, the JIACG provides
the command with day-to-day knowledge of the interagency situation and
links directly with agency partners at the command and in other
locations when an operation is necessary. The JIACG also conducts
focused planning on specific issues. For example, the group met with
officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
Department of Health and Human Services in August 2006 to coordinate
federal efforts for responding to a potential influenza pandemic. The
JIACG also formed a working group to integrate private sector
capabilities and interests into NORTHCOM plans and operations as
appropriate. Specifically, the group's objectives were to determine how
to provide NORTHCOM with private sector information regarding
facilities and operations, achieve coordination and cooperation with
the private sector, and gain and maintain awareness of technological
initiatives developed in the private sector. The JIACG also formed
working groups for law enforcement issues, earthquakes, and prescripted
mission assignments.
According to FEMA's Director, one of the most important interagency
planning tools developed as a result of the lessons learned during
Hurricane Katrina is the prescripted mission assignments discussed
earlier.[Footnote 51] NORTHCOM collaborated with FEMA and other
agencies to identify the most likely tasks DOD would be asked to
fulfill and drafted generic mission assignments for those tasks in
terms of capability requirements rather than specific resources. Twenty-
five prescripted mission assignments are included in NORTHCOM's
standing Defense Support for Civil Authorities Execute Order.
These mission assignments also include defense coordinating officers
(DCO) who are located in each of FEMA's 10 regional offices (see fig.
3). Officials from several agencies told us that locating the DCOs in
the FEMA regions and assigning greater emphasis to the DCOs' missions
has enhanced interagency coordination, particularly with states. The
DCOs are senior military officers with joint experience and training on
the National Response Framework, defense support to civil authorities,
and DHS's National Incident Management System. They are responsible for
assisting civil authorities, when requested by FEMA, by providing
liaison support and capabilities requirements validation. DCOs serve as
single points of contact for state, local, and other federal
authorities that need DOD support. DCOs work closely with federal,
state, and local officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities
are necessary and can be used to help mitigate the effects of a natural
or man-made disaster. For example, during the recent California
wildfires, NORTHCOM's subordinate command, Army Forces North, deployed
the Region IX DCO to support the Joint Field Office in Pasadena,
California, and assess and coordinate defense support of civil
authorities to FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by state and
federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the National
Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Airborne
Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting the wildfires.
Figure 3: FEMA Regions:
This figure is a picture map of FEMA regions.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FEMA; Map Resources (maps).
[End of figure]
NORTHCOM has also improved interagency coordination through its
involvement in hurricane preparation with a wide range of state and
federal partners, including state adjutants general, FEMA, NGB, and
state and local emergency managers. NORTHCOM facilitates weekly
hurricane teleconferences throughout the hurricane season, which lasts
from June to November every year, to provide the opportunity for
agencies to discuss potential storms; resources available in the
affected area as well as through other sources, such as the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)[Footnote 52] or FEMA; and
potential needs or unique capabilities that DOD may be asked to
provide. As a result of this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM, DHS, and
state officials believe the command has begun to build more productive
and effective relationships with the hurricane states and participating
agencies. For example, in anticipation of Hurricane Dean being upgraded
from a tropical storm in August 2007, at FEMA's request NORTHCOM
deployed a DCO and supporting team to the Caribbean in preparation for
landfall. The DCO was prepared to coordinate requests for military
assistance and resources and provide direct support to federal, state,
and local agencies responding to the incident.
In addition to efforts to coordinate with federal agencies and
organizations, NORTHCOM recently began efforts to increase coordination
with private sector businesses and nongovernmental organizations in
planning for and responding to disasters to help NORTHCOM better focus
resources and ensure that efforts are not duplicated. For example,
during Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart was able to deliver bottled water to
some locations more quickly than federal agencies could. Since many of
NORTHCOM's coordination efforts with nongovernmental organizations are
recent, it is too soon to determine how successful they will be.
NORTHCOM Lacks Formal Procedures to Ensure That Integrated Planning
Will Be Fully Adopted:
Despite the steps that NORTHCOM has taken to improve federal
interagency coordination, we found that it lacks formalized procedures-
-such as memorandums of understanding or charters--to ensure that
agreements or arrangements made between the command and agency
representatives can be relied on for planning purposes. As we have
reported in the past, key practices that can enhance and sustain
interagency planning coordination efforts include--among others--
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, agreeing on
roles and responsibilities, and identifying and addressing needs by
leveraging resources. We also reported that interagency coordination
can be enhanced by articulating agreements in formal documents, such as
a memorandum of understanding, interagency guidance, or interagency
planning document, signed by senior officials in the respective
agencies.[Footnote 53] DOD's adaptive planning--that is, the joint
capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as
circumstances require--includes interagency coordination as a key part
of the plan development process. Further, the nature of NORTHCOM's
homeland defense and civil support missions requires interagency
coordination and support throughout all levels of planning and
operations. This is particularly important since so many government
agencies share the responsibility to ensure an effective response to
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. It is therefore crucial that DOD-
-through NORTHCOM--plan and coordinate thoroughly with all relevant
federal agencies.
NORTHCOM planners have achieved some success in coordinating NORTHCOM's
homeland defense plan with an Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT),
an interagency team created by DHS to provide contingency and crisis
action incident management planning based on the 15 national planning
scenarios.[Footnote 54] However, the planners told us that their
successful collaboration with the IMPT is largely because of the
dedicated personalities involved. For example, NORTHCOM planners have
informally instituted workshops and biweekly teleconferences with the
IMPT core and on-call groups to review NORTHCOM's homeland defense
plan, as well as to discuss the overarching objectives of homeland
defense and security. NORTHCOM officials told us that the IMPT offers a
unique avenue of coordination direct to various agency partners and has
helped to break down institutional barriers by promoting more
constructive relationships between the agencies involved. However,
without a formal charter or memorandum of understanding that
institutionalizes the structure for integrated interagency planning,
there is a risk that these efforts to coordinate with agency partners
will not continue when the current planning staff move to their next
assignments. Further, these and other coordination efforts do not have
mechanisms for obtaining parent agency approval of agreements reached,
and it is unclear what will be done with the results of their efforts.
Consequently, many otherwise valuable interagency efforts may not be
sufficiently supported by one or more participating agencies, and key
agency staff can be confused about which coordination mechanisms serve
a particular function.
As part of the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive annex on
national planning, DHS is required to coordinate with the heads of
other federal agencies and develop an integrated planning system. This
planning system is required to:
1. provide common processes for developing plans;
2. serve to implement phase one of DHS's Homeland Security Management
System; and:
3. include the following:
* national planning doctrine and planning guidance, instruction, and
process to ensure consistent planning across the federal government;
* a mechanism that provides for concept development to identify and
analyze the mission and potential courses of action;
* a description of the process that allows for plan refinement and
proper execution to reflect developments in risk, capabilities, or
policies, as well as to incorporate lessons learned from exercises and
actual events;
* a description of the process that links regional, state, local, and
tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to
inform the development of federal plans;
* a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of
federal, state, local, and tribal plans that allows for state, local,
and tribal capability assessments to feed into federal plans; and:
* a guide for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical
guidance and instruction on fundamental planning principles that can be
used at federal, state, local, and tribal levels to assist the planning
process.[Footnote 55]
Such an integrated planning system, if developed and institutionalized
across the federal government in coordination with state and local
governments, should further address the interagency coordination gaps
we identified.
Conclusions:
After being in operation for over 5 years, NORTHCOM has begun to
establish itself as a major combatant command and plan for its role in
leading homeland defense operations and assisting civil authorities in
the event of major disasters.
NORTHCOM has developed, refined, and is now revising a body of major
homeland defense and civil support plans. Nonetheless, NORTHCOM's
limited progress in adequately tracking and assessing the supporting
plans necessary to carry out homeland defense and civil support
operations introduces increased risk in the planning process. The
review process NORTHCOM officials told us they are developing to track
and assess supporting plans from other commands and agencies should
help them close this gap, but only if their process is consistently
applied and includes supporting plans from all commands, organizations,
and agencies required to submit them. Further, the considerable
challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland
defense and civil support missions are exacerbated by decisions DOD and
the command have made. DOD's decision not to assign regular forces to
NORTHCOM, the decision not to associate specific military capabilities
and units with NORTHCOM's plans, and the decision not to develop
mission-essential tasks for civil support missions each introduce
increased uncertainty into NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil
support planning efforts. When considering their compounding effects
together, the risk to NORTHCOM's planning effort are increased even
further. To some degree, NORTHCOM will always face challenges and risk
in planning because it has to be prepared for a wide variety of
incidents that can range from a regional flood to a catastrophic
nuclear incident to a widespread terrorist attack. The capabilities
allocation and other planning challenges we discuss can be further
addressed, but there is no guarantee that this will compensate for the
scarcity of units and equipment because of the pace of ongoing
operations overseas. However, addressing the planning gaps we
identified would permit NORTHCOM and DOD a much more accurate
understanding of the risk associated with homeland defense and civil
support operations in the United States. Such risk mitigation efforts
have recently been required as part of the President's and DHS's
national preparedness guidance on national planning, and these
requirements provide an opportunity for DOD and NORTHCOM to address the
gaps we identified.
NORTHCOM's federal interagency coordination efforts have helped address
some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil support
planning process and have improved NORTHCOM's ability to coordinate in
the event of actual incidents. This is important because responding to
a major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared
responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring
federal assistance from DHS and DOD. Without clear guidance and
procedures on interagency roles and responsibilities across the federal
government and an understanding about which interagency planning
efforts or coordination mechanisms are authoritative, the multiple
interagency efforts that have been ongoing might not meet their
potential for integrating operational planning dealing with all threats
to the homeland, natural or man-made. If the integrated planning system
required by the President's new homeland security guidance is developed
and institutionalized across the federal government in coordination
with state and local governments, it should further assist NORTHCOM and
DOD in addressing the interagency coordination gaps we identified.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help NORTHCOM reduce the level of risk to its homeland defense and
civil support planning efforts, in conjunction with the new national
planning requirements of the National Response Framework and the
national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8,
we are making three recommendations:
* We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of
NORTHCOM to complete the process to track the status of all supporting
plans, coordinate the completion of those plans by other commands and
agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to meet the intent
and objectives of NORTHCOM's major plans.
* Given the priority DOD places on homeland defense, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense assign forces to NORTHCOM--as is done for
other combatant commands--as well as require NORTHCOM to develop
dedicated time-phased force deployment data lists for each of its major
plans.
* We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of
NORTHCOM, in consultation and coordination with the services, to
develop mission-essential tasks for its civil support plans. Individual
units required for these missions should be identified, and these
mission-essential tasks should be included as part of DOD's readiness
assessment systems in order to permit consistent tracking of readiness
for specific elements of NORTHCOM's plans.
To help NORTHCOM and DOD better integrate their operational planning
practices into the interagency and national preparedness structure, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Commander of NORTHCOM and other appropriate federal agencies, develop
clear guidance and procedures for interagency planning efforts,
including appropriate memorandums of understanding and charters for
interagency planning groups. This should be done in conjunction with
the integrated planning system required in the national planning annex
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the
intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and
planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where
appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM complete the process to
track the status of supporting plans, coordinate the completion of
those plans by other commands and agencies, and assess the suitability
of those plans to meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM's major
plans, DOD agreed with the need for these actions but stated that the
existing guidance we noted in our report already provides sufficient
direction. We agree that further formal guidance or direction may be
unnecessary as long as NORTHCOM consistently pursues its effort to
review supporting plans, including the supporting plans of all
commands, agencies, and organizations required to prepare such plans.
For example, some plans call for other DOD agencies and even non-DOD
agencies to prepare supporting plans. In these cases, while NORTHCOM
may not have the authority to compel compliance, it should nevertheless
review these supporting plans for adequacy.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense assign
forces to NORTHCOM, DOD agreed that certain specialized forces, such as
those trained and equipped for CBRNE consequence management, should be
regularly assigned to NORTHCOM but said that it was not practical to
attempt to assign general purpose forces to meet all possible civil
support contingencies. DOD did not agree that all NORTHCOM plans should
have force deployment lists because it would not provide the level of
readiness tracking that we highlighted as being necessary in our
report. We agree that it is not practical to assign forces to NORTHCOM
in an attempt to cover all possible contingencies. Our concern was that
the NORTHCOM Commander should have a similar level of flexibility and
day-to-day readiness assurance that regularly assigned forces provide
to other combatant commanders. Assigning some specialized forces to
NORTHCOM would contribute to providing such flexibility and assurance.
DOD stated that it will work to develop civil support readiness metrics
for general purpose forces rather than prepare specific force
deployment lists for individual plans that were not already required to
have them. We believe this effort would help institutionalize the
importance of DOD's domestic mission and provide NORTHCOM and other DOD
authorities a means of monitoring readiness to accomplish domestic
missions.
With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop mission-essential
tasks for NORTHCOM's civil support plans and identify the units
required for these missions, DOD agreed with our assessment that
NORTHCOM needs to track units' readiness to complete civil support
missions but said that identifying units for all its civil support
tasks would be impractical. DOD reiterated its proposal to develop
civil support-specific metrics against which all general purpose forces
could be measured. We believe that developing such metrics would meet
the intent of our recommendation and would further institutionalize
DOD's domestic mission throughout the force.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that clear guidance be developed for
interagency planning efforts. DOD stated that it had begun to
incorporate such direction in its major planning documents and would
continue to expand on this guidance in the future. We believe DOD's
efforts as part of the Integrated Planning System and on its own, if
pursued consistently, should help better focus interagency planning to
meet the range of natural and man-made threats.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix III.
DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key staff members who contributed to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of
Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Kit Bond:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Gene Taylor:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has
prepared plans to execute its homeland defense and civil support
missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM's available major plans and supporting
plans, comparing them to established Department of Defense (DOD) joint
operational planning criteria for completeness and adequacy. We also
met with knowledgeable NORTHCOM officials to discuss the status of each
of the plans NORTHCOM is required to prepare and the process whereby
the plans were developed and assessed. We did not independently
validate the planning elements, such as the assumptions NORTHCOM used.
We therefore did not attempt to state the extent to which the plans are
executable. We compared the 15 national planning scenarios with
NORTHCOM's plans and discussed the incorporation of the scenarios
within those plans with NORTHCOM officials. To assess the challenges
NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland defense and
civil support, we developed a methodology based on DOD's standards for
joint operational planning. Although we included all of NORTHCOM's
plans in our review, we concentrated on the two primary homeland
defense and civil support plans as well as the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence Management
plan. The methodology involved a series of questions and topics to
determine the extent to which NORTHCOM and DOD have considered the
following as part of their planning for homeland defense and civil
support:
* Identification of required capabilities:
* Allocation of military capabilities to meet identified capability
requirements:
* Readiness of forces (trained personnel and equipment) to meet the
missions for which they are assigned:
* Conduct of exercises and evaluation of lessons learned that can be
fed back into the planning process:
We discussed this methodology with officials from the National Defense
University, NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Staff
College to ensure that it was a reasonable approach to evaluating joint
operational planning.
We used the results of this analysis and our discussions with a broad
range of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if any, exist in
NORTHCOM's planning efforts stemming from these challenges. We also
reviewed the structure of NORTHCOM's lessons learned process and
collected information on the origin, analysis, and disposition of
homeland defense and civil support lessons. As part of this effort, we
observed a major exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the
Indianapolis area in May 2007. During our review, the NORTHCOM
Inspector General's Office was conducting an assessment of the
command's lessons learned process, including oversight mechanisms and
internal controls. Therefore, we did not conduct a deeper analysis of
those elements.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has adequate planning
personnel with the relevant experience and training to perform the
planning function for the command, we discussed personnel staffing and
training with officials from NORTHCOM headquarters, NORTHCOM
subordinate commands, and Joint Forces Staff College who were
knowledgeable of training courses available to planning personnel. We
discussed the extent to which NORTHCOM addresses planning challenges
unique to the command in its planning staff structure. In addition, we
compared basic information on planning personnel at NORTHCOM with that
of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command,
and U.S. Pacific Command in such areas as overall staffing levels;
numbers of military, civilian, and contractor personnel on staff; and
number of planning personnel who had received Joint Professional
Military Education credit. Since our intention was to look at all the
staff who have a direct relation to planning at the commands, and not
just the staff of the plans directorates, we left it up to the commands
to define who should be included. We did not validate the commands'
requirements for specific numbers of planning personnel, and we did not
independently validate the personnel data we received from the
combatant commands. However, we assessed the data reliability measures
the commands took to gather and maintain the data and determined that
the information originated with the commands themselves and represented
the best available source. We did not obtain the data from other
sources, such as databases maintained by the military services'
personnel centers. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report.
To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with federal
agencies and other organizations in planning for and conducting its
missions, we met with officials from NORTHCOM's Interagency
Coordination Directorate; reviewed the documentation and mechanisms for
coordination with organizations outside NORTHCOM; and interviewed
officials from NORTHCOM's subordinate commands, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). We also surveyed the
adjutants general from the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, and the
District of Columbia and obtained information from NORTHCOM, DHS, and
NGB on NORTHCOM's coordination with the states. We are reporting
separately on the results of that work.
In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents,
obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following
locations:
* NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
Colorado:
* Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:
* The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
* The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
* Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
* U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas:
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia:
* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia:
* Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair,
Washington, D.C.
* Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:
* NGB, Arlington, Virginia:
* DHS, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* FEMA, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: NORHTCOM's 25 Prescripted Mission Assignments:
Table 6 shows the 25 prescripted mission assignments that NORTHCOM and
FEMA officials coordinated in order to facilitate the process for
requesting DOD capabilities in the event of an emergency.
Table 6: Prescripted Mission Assignments:
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Defense coordinating
officer/defense coordinating element;
Capability providers: Army Forces North coordinated colonel and nine-
person emergency preparedness liaison officer staff.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Rotary wing lift (heavy);
Capability providers: Marine Corps CH-53E helicopter squadron, Navy MH-
53 helicopter squadron, or Army CH-47 helicopter detachment.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Rotary wing lift (medium);
Capability providers: Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter squadron, Army UH-
60 helicopter detachment, or Navy MH-60 helicopter detachment.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Tactical transportation;
Capability providers: Army transportation company or light-medium truck
company.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Strategic transportation;
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command provides strategic
airlift and the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
provides ground transportation (commercial trucks).
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Communications - first
responders;
Capability providers: NORTHCOM or Army Forces North communications van.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Communications - 25 user
package;
Capability providers: Army communications company (detachment) or
Marine Corps communications battalion (detachment);
and a satellite communications ground station (four-person team).
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Communications - 75 user
package;
Capability providers: Army communications company (detachment) or
Marine Corps communications battalion (detachment);
and a satellite communications ground station (four-person team).
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Emergency route clearance;
Capability providers: Army or Marine Corps heavy equipment engineer
battalion/company with infantry battalion/company in direct support or
Air Force civil engineering squadron[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Aerial damage assessment;
Capability providers: Marine Corps CH-46 squadron, Army CH-47/UH-60
helicopter detachment, Navy MH-60 helicopter detachment, or Air Force
Global Hawk (unmanned aerial vehicle).
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Prepare temporary housing
sites;
Capability providers: Air Force civil engineering squadron or Navy
naval mobile construction battalion[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Mobilization centers;
Capability providers: Army personnel support detachment[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Operational staging areas;
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command Joint Task Force for
port opening[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Fuel distribution points
(ground);
Capability providers: Army bulk fuel unit or Marine Corps bulk fuel
detachment[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Rotary wing medical
evacuation;
Capability providers: Army air ambulance squadron[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Temporary medical facilities;
Capability providers: Air Force medical rapid response force[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Air component coordination
element;
Capability providers: Air Force/AFNORTH-coordinated eight- person
detachment.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Air fuel distribution points;
Capability providers: Air Force air expeditionary force fuel detachment
or Marine Corps forward arming and refueling point detachment[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Strategic patient movement
(formerly contingency aeromedical staging facility);
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command coordinated joint
patient movement team.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Airborne command and control
in support of emergency management authorities;
Capability providers: U.S. Strategic Command command and control
aircraft[A].
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Mortuary affairs;
Capability providers: Army mortuary affairs company.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Full Motion video capability;
Capability providers: Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Public affairs support;
Capability providers: Military public affairs detachment-joint.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Regional/state emergency
preparedness liaison officer;
Capability providers: Military-provided liaison officer.
NORTHCOM Prescripted mission assignments: Air space control (ground);
Capability providers: U.S. Transportation Command coordinated Joint
Task Force for port opening.
Source: NORTHCOM.
[A] These are recommended units only and are not sourced, because
NORTHCOM has never executed this mission assignment.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Homeland Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2600:
March 26, 2008:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "Homeland Defense: U.S.
Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force
Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues," dated February
27, 2008 (GAO Code 350863/GAO- 08-251).
Our responses to GAO's recommendations are attached. The DoD partially
concurs with GAO's first three recommendations and fully concurs with
the fourth recommendation.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul McHale:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated March 2008 GAO 08-251/(350863):
"Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends, in conjunction with the new
national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and
the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
8, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM to
complete the process to track the status of all supporting plans,
coordinate the completion of those plans by other commands and
agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to meet the intent
and objectives of NORTHCOM's major plans.
DOD Response: Partially concur. DoD agrees with GAO's assessment that
NORTHCOM's tracking, coordination, and suitability assessment of
supporting plans is desirable. However, this direction is reflected in
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff standing guidance in the
Joint Operation Execution and Planning System (JOPES), referenced by
GAO, that commanders review their supporting plans.
During the period of GAO's report, NORTHCOM has been focused on writing
its tasked plans for homeland defense and civil support missions. As
noted in the draft report (page 6), NORTHCOM has already begun the
effort to track, coordinate, and assess supporting plans. These efforts
will continue, making additional direction from the Secretary of
Defense unnecessary to complete this process or satisfy GAO's
recommendation.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends, in conjunction with the new
national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and
the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
8, that the Secretary of Defense, assign forces to NORTHCOM”as is done
for other combatant commands”as well as require NORTHCOM to develop
dedicated time-phased force deployment data lists for each of its major
plans.
DOD Response: Partially concur. To clarify DoD's response to GAO's
recommendations, please see the term appendix at the end of our
responses. The statement "as is done for other combatant commands,"
does not accurately reflect the process to assign, apportion, allocate,
and/or attach forces for operational planning and execution. Forces are
apportioned, not assigned, to Combatant Commands for contingency plans
and are allocated during crisis action planning and attached by a
Secretary of Defense-approved deployment order. GAO's recommendation
lacks this definitional clarity. DoD concurs that NORTHCOM needs the
ability to assess unit readiness for civil support missions. This
requirement is especially critical for highly specialized forces
trained and equipped for specific technical missions involving domestic
consequence management in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and high explosive (CBRNE) environments. Those forces ought to be
allocated or assigned to NORTHCOM. On the other hand, some civil
support contingencies for which NORTHCOM plans, like a 10 kiloton
nuclear detonation in a metropolitan area, could conceivably require
several hundred thousand general utility forces. Such a vast number of
forces cannot be assigned to NORTHCOM without dramatically increasing
DoD's end strength or deviating from DoD's historical force structure.
To keep NORTHCOM in a supporting rather than a leading role in the
homeland, DoD will work to develop readiness metrics for civil support
for those general utility forces but will wait to allocate and attach
general utility forces to NORTHCOM until support operations are
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
DoD does not concur with the recommendation that the Secretary produce
additional guidance regarding development of time-phased force
deployment data (TPFDDs). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
already provides NORTHCOM detailed guidance to develop TPFDDs for
specified plans. And since TPFDDs usually identify units by type rather
than by Unit Identification Codes (UICs) (e.g. "TICONDEROGA-class
Cruiser instead of "USS LAKE ERIE" a specific Cruiser), TPFDDs would
not provide the level of unit readiness tracking that GAO recommends.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends, in conjunction with the new
national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and
the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
8, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM, in
consultation and coordination with the Services, to develop mission
essential tasks for its civil support plans. Individual units required
for these missions should be identified and these mission essential
tasks should be included as part of DoD's readiness assessment systems
in order to permit consistent tracking of readiness for specific
elements of NORTHCOM's plans.
DOD Response: Partially concur. To properly respond, we must break the
recommendation into its component parts: 1) that NORTHCOM develop
mission essential tasks for its civil support plans; 2) that units be
identified to complete these mission essential tasks; and 3) that the
mission essential tasks be included in units' readiness assessment
metrics.
NORTHCOM has developed mission essential tasks for its civil support
plans and will continue to do so as supported entities identify other
gaps and seams that NORTHCOM must augment.
Having NORTHCOM identify individual units for all of its civil support
mission essential tasks is neither possible nor desirable. The tasks
are not limited to specialized domestic consequence management tasks in
CBRNE environments. The mission essential tasks for NORTHCOM's civil
support plans could require anywhere from several hundred to several
hundred thousand general utility forces. Thus DoD cannot predict the
individual units that would be allocated to NORTHCOM for civil support
missions. Assigning or apportioning a vast complement of forces to
NORTHCOM is not the solution for the problem that GAO identifies”that
NORTHCOM may not be ready when directed to accomplish civil support
missions.
Instead, the solution centers on defining and instituting civil support
readiness metrics across DoD's general utility forces. DoD concurs with
GAO's assessment that NORTHCOM needs to track units' readiness to
complete civil support missions”even "dual-use" general purpose forces.
Rather than identifying general utility forces by UIC for civil support
readiness tracking, all general purpose forces should have civil
support-specific readiness metrics. DoD could then produce a single
readiness report for each dual-use unit that includes overseas combat
and domestic civil support readiness. That information should be
available to NORTHCOM for use in determining how ready forces are to
carry out possible tasks.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Commander of NORTHCOM and other appropriate
federal agencies develop clear guidance for interagency planning
efforts, including appropriate memoranda of understanding and charters
for interagency planning groups. This should be done in conjunction
with the integrated planning system required in the national planning
annex to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. DOD RESPONSE:
Concur. Better integration of DoD Components with interagency groups
requires continuing clarification of roles and responsibilities. These
are particularly critical for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and NORTHCOM under the Integrated Planning System (IPS) and
the National Response Framework (NRF). DoD has begun to incorporate
such direction in its major planning documents, such as the Guidance
for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and will continue to expand and
clarify that guidance in the future.
GAO Draft Report - Dated March 2008 GAO 08-251/(350863):
"Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues"
Terms Appendix:
The following terms are from "Forces For Unified Commands FY 2006."
COCOM: Nontransferable command authority that cannot be delegated and
normally is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and
Service and/or functional component commanders. It includes
budget/PPBES input and assignment of subordinate commanders.
Assigned Forces: Those forces and resources that have been placed under
COCOM of a unified commander. [they] are available for normal peacetime
operations of that command.
Apportioned Forces: Those forces and resources assumed to be available
for adaptive planning as of a specified date. They may include those
assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed.
Allocated Forces: Those forces and resources provided by the President
or Secretary of Defense for crisis action planning or execution. The
allocation of forces is accomplished through procedures established for
crisis action planning.
Attach: The placement of units or personnel in an organization where
such placement is relatively temporary.
Note: A force is assigned in accordance with the guidance contained
with the "Forces For" document. Forces are allocated for crisis action
planning or execution through JOPES. Forces become attached when
deployed via a Secretary of Defense-approved deployment order.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant
Director; Steven D. Boyles; Yecenia C. Camarillo; Angela S. Jacobs;
David F. Keefer; Joseph W. Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Robert D.
Malpass; Lonnie J. McAllister; Erin S. Noel; Pamela Valentine; and Jena
R. Whitley made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, But
Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs'
Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on
National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of
Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains. GAO-08-457T.
Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical
Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private
Sector Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to
Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership
Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. GAO-07-1257T. Washington, D.C.:
September 26, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.:
September 18, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2007.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk
Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.:
January 26, 2007.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close
the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National
Priorities. GAO-07-143. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st
Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498.
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-808T.
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.:
November 10, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington,
D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally
Chartered Commissions. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The command is combined with the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). DOD often refers to this command as NORAD-NORTHCOM.
[2] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005).
[3] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, 5.
[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Sep. 14,
2007), vii.
[5] The National Response Framework--formerly called the National
Response Plan--is a national level guide to how local, state, and
federal governments respond to incidents resulting from all kinds of
hazards. The framework is based on the principal of tiered response,
starting from local communities and working up to include support from
the other levels of government and the private sector. Department of
Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.:
January 2008).
[6] The command was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified
Command Plan, which outlines the areas of responsibility for the
combatant commands. It became officially operational on October 1,
2002.
[7] GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S.
Forces for Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670 (Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2003).
[8] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness
Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and
Risk Mitigation, GAO-07-696 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Reserve
Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment
Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26,
2007); Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed
to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated
National Priorities, GAO-07-143 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007);
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises
Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural
Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[9] DOD refers to civil support operations conducted in accordance with
the National Response Framework as Defense Support of Civil
Authorities. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support
, GL-7.
[10] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under
DHS.
[11] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support , vii.
[12] A number of DOD doctrine publications and other guidance govern
the conduct of joint operational planning. The principal guidance is
published in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning (Dec. 26, 2006).
[13] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Ongoing Efforts
to Improve Coordination with the States and National Guard Bureau but
Additional Efforts Are Needed, GAO-08-252 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4,
2008).
[14] As part of DOD's new adaptive planning process, plans are being
reviewed and revised more often in order to keep them relevant.
[15] DOD refers to these tasks as mission essential tasks. Monitoring
the readiness of military forces is ultimately the responsibility of
the military services that train and equip the units in question.
Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of
Defense and Its Major Components, § 6.4 (Aug. 1, 2002) (certified
current as of Nov. 21, 2003). Nonetheless, monitoring unit readiness is
also a means by which joint commanders assure themselves that the
military units that will respond to their mission are indeed prepared.
[16] See White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8,
National Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); White House,
HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007); and
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.
[17] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[18] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Feb. 23, 2006); House of Representatives, A Failure of
Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Feb.
15, 2006); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (May 2006); and
GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-808T
(Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006).
[19] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, 8.
[20] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, 5. Homeland defense is considered DOD's portion of the broader
area of homeland security. DHS is the lead federal agency responsible
for homeland security, which is a concerted national effort to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from
attacks that do occur. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for
Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007), 3 and Department of
Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5.
[21] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii and
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.
[22] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii.
[23] See Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.
[24] See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support and
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework for a full
description of these mechanisms and authorities.
[25] Among the DOD guidance for joint operation planning is Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Pub. 5-0 and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning
and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures
(Sept. 29, 2006); Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES)Volume II, Planning Formats (Feb. 28, 2006);
and Manual 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) Volume III, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
Development and Deployment Execution (Mar. 22, 2004) (current as of
July 19, 2006).
[26] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
[27] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3141.01C,
Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans
(Sept. 12, 2006).
[28] U.S. Strategic Command is a unified command with worldwide
responsibilities for such functions as space operations; strategic
deterrence; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and global
command and control.
[29] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning
Policies and Procedures, C-3 and Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats, and
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, I-25.
[30] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning
Policies and Procedures, C-25, D-9; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, I-25.
[31] Component commands are generally the military service commands
that directly support the combatant commands.
[32] NGB forwarded these plans to NORTHCOM but received no indication
that they had been reviewed and assessed. See GAO-08-252.
[33] As mentioned in the background section of this report, the Joint
Planning and Execution Community is composed of the DOD stakeholders
for reviewing and contributing to joint operation plans.
[34] U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations (June 13, 2005), 3-
11.
[35] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2
Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).
[36] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
[37] Emergency support functions are how the federal government and
many state governments organize much of their resources and
capabilities. The 15 emergency support functions are transportation;
communications; public works and engineering; firefighting; emergency
management; mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human
services; logistics management and resource support; public health and
medical services; search and rescue; oil and hazardous materials
response; agriculture and natural resources; energy; public safety;
long-term community recovery; and external affairs. Each function has a
federal agency coordinator. See Department of Homeland Security,
National Response Framework.
[38] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1406 (2006).
[39] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1406(2) (2006).
[40] Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 651 (2006).
[41] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1815 (2008).
[42] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2004).
[43] GAO-07-143.
[44] The CCMRF was designed to provide federal military assistance to a
lead federal agency in the event of a CBRNE attack. The National Guard
units that would fulfill this mission may be in a nonfederalized state
active duty status, which means they remain under the command of their
respective governors. Because of the state of negotiations, there
remains the issue of whether the units would be federalized and placed
under NORTHCOM if needed.
[45] Joint Forces Command is the force provider for NORTHCOM and the
other combatant commands. The commands transmit their force
requirements (forces needed to execute their planned operations) to
Joint Forces Command (through the Joint Staff), and it determines which
mix of trained military service units (Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines) will provide the requested forces. See White House, Unified
Command Plan (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2006), and Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, p. I-10. In addition,
any other combatant command to which forces have been assigned by DOD,
such as U.S. Pacific Command, could also be directed to provide forces
to NORTHCOM.
[46] Joint Forces Command officials explained to us that sourced units
are those that Joint Forces Command has actually identified as specific
units for meeting specific requirements. Unsourced units are units for
which Joint Forces Command has not identified a specific unit in
advance but will attempt to do so when the order or plan is executed.
[47] GAO has reported in the past on DOD's focus on units' wartime
combat missions as opposed to domestic civil support missions. See GAO,
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670 (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003), and Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are
Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and
Stated National Priorities, GAO-07-143 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19,
2007).
[48] White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National
Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003), and White House, HSPD-
8 Annex 1, National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). The January
2008 National Response Framework also incorporates the recent national
planning requirements.
[49] White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning, 2.
[50] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1821 (2008).
[51] The federal government uses prescripted mission assignments to
assist in planning and to reduce the time it takes to deploy response
resources. Prescripted mission assignments identify resources or
capabilities of government organizations that are commonly called upon
during response to an incident. Department of Homeland Security,
National Response Framework, 29.
[52] EMAC provides a means for states affected by disasters to access
resources from other states, including emergency managers, National
Guard assets, and first responders.
[53] GAO-06-15.
[54] The IMPT includes a core group of 15 full-time senior-level
planners from 8 different agencies: DHS, DOD, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation,
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the American Red Cross. In addition, the IMPT
has an on-call group that is assembled during training or emergencies
consisting of 33 officials representing 20 agencies.
[55] See White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning and National
Response Framework.
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