Transportation Security
Efforts to Strengthen Aviation and Surface Transportation Security Continue to Progress, but More Work Remains Gao ID: GAO-08-651T April 15, 2008Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to protect the nation's transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation and surface modes of transportation. Other DHS components, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector also play a role in transportation security. GAO has examined (1) the progress TSA and other DHS components have made in securing the nation's aviation and surface transportation systems, and the challenges that remain, and (2) crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA's efforts in strengthening security. This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from February 2004 to February 2008 and ongoing work regarding the security of the nation's aviation and surface transportation systems, as well as selected updates to this work conducted in April 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents related to TSA security efforts and interviewed TSA and transportation industry officials.
DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in securing the aviation and surface transportation networks, but more work remains. With regard to commercial aviation, TSA has undertaken efforts to strengthen airport security; hire, train, and measure the performance of it screening workforce; prescreen passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. With regard to surface transportation modes, TSA has taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highways; establish security standards for certain transportation modes; and conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly passenger and freight rail. TSA also hired and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger and freight rail systems. While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the transportation network, DHS and TSA still face a number of key challenges in further securing these systems. For example, regarding commercial aviation, although TSA has made significant progress in its development of an advanced passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, challenges remain, including unreliable program cost and schedule estimates, among other things. In addition, TSA's efforts to enhance perimeter security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for effective security. For example, TSA has initiated efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems, but has not developed a plan for guiding airports with respect to future technology enhancements. While TSA is pursuing the procurement of several checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, it has not deployed technologies on a wide-scale basis, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. Further, TSA's efforts to develop security standards for surface transportation modes have been limited to passenger and freight rail, and TSA has not determined what its regulatory role will be with respect to commercial vehicles or highway infrastructure. A number of crosscutting issues have impeded DHS's and TSA's efforts to secure the transportation network, including the need to strengthen strategic planning and performance measurement, and more fully adopt and apply risk-based principles in the pursuit of its security initiatives.
GAO-08-651T, Transportation Security: Efforts to Strengthen Aviation and Surface Transportation Security Continue to Progress, but More Work Remains
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on:
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, April 15, 2008:
Transportation Security:
Efforts to Strengthen Aviation and Surface Transportation Security
Continue to Progress, but More Work Remains:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-08-651T:
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and
challenges in securing our nation's transportation systems. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is charged with securing
the transportation network while ensuring the free movement of people
and commerce. Other DHS components, federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector also play a role in transportation
security. In carrying out its broader homeland security
responsibilities, DHS faces the challenge of determining how to
allocate its finite resources within the transportation system and
across all sectors to address threats and strengthen security. My
testimony today focuses on (1) the progress TSA and other DHS
components have made in securing the nation's aviation and surface
transportation systems, and the challenges that remain, and (2)
crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA's efforts in strengthening
security. My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued
from February 2004 to February 2008 and selected updates to this work
obtained in April 2008. In obtaining these updates, we reviewed
documents related to TSA security efforts and interviewed TSA and
transportation industry officials. In addition, we included some of our
preliminary findings from ongoing work regarding the security of the
nation's aviation and surface transportation systems. We conducted
these performance audits in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives to strengthen the security
of the nation's commercial aviation and surface transportation systems.
Specifically, TSA has hired and deployed a federal workforce of over
50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners, and installed equipment
at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports to provide the
capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems, as mandated by law.[Footnote 1] TSA has since turned its
attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening-
-in general, the matching of passenger information against terrorist
watch lists prior to an aircraft's departure; more efficiently
allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation security officer
(TSO)--formerly known as screener--workforce; strengthening screening
procedures; researching and developing more effective and efficient
screening technologies; and strengthening procedures to ensure the
security of air cargo. TSA has also begun efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric
identification systems, to secure access to restricted areas at
airports. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has also taken
steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for passengers on
international flights operating to or from the United States, as well
as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.
DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken actions
to research and develop aviation security technologies. With regard to
surface transportation modes, TSA has developed a strategic approach
for securing these systems; established security standards for certain
transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets,
particularly related to passenger and freight rail. TSA has also hired
and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of
passenger and freight rail systems. Finally, DHS has developed and
administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes.
While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the
transportation network, DHS still faces a number of key challenges that
should be addressed to meet the goals and requirements set out for them
by Congress, the administration, and the department itself. For
example, regarding commercial aviation, although TSA has made much
progress in developing Secure Flight--a government-run passenger
prescreening system--in February 2008, we reported that it can further
strengthen its efforts by developing more-sound cost and schedule
estimates, and strengthening security controls. In addition, while TSA
has taken actions to enhance perimeter security and restrict access to
secure areas at airports, it can further strengthen its efforts to
reduce the risks posed by airport employees. TSA has also not developed
a plan to guide and support individual airports and the commercial
airport system as a whole with respect to future technology
enhancements for perimeter security and access controls. Further, TSA
is only recently beginning to deploy new checkpoint technologies to
address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and
implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. With regard to
surface transportation security, while TSA has initiated efforts to
develop security standards for surface transportation modes, these
efforts have been limited to passenger and freight rail. Moreover,
although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of
some surface transportation systems, inspectors' roles and missions
have not been fully defined.
A variety of crosscutting issues have affected DHS's and, as they
relate to transportation security, TSA's efforts in implementing its
mission and management functions. These key issues include strategic
planning and results management, risk management, and stakeholder
coordination. For example, TSA has not always implemented effective
strategic planning efforts, fully developed performance measures, or
put into place structures to help ensure that it is managing for
results. In addition, DHS and its components can more fully adopt and
apply a risk-management approach in implementing its security mission
and core management functions,[Footnote 2] and more fully coordinate
their activities with key stakeholders. DHS and TSA have strengthened
their efforts in these areas, but more work remains.
Background:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in
November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation.[Footnote 3] TSA's aviation security mission
includes strengthening the security of airport perimeters and
restricted airport areas; hiring and training a screening workforce;
prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening
passengers, baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports
nationwide, among other responsibilities. While TSA has operational
responsibility for physically screening passengers and their baggage at
most airports, TSA exercises regulatory, or oversight, responsibility
for the security of airports and air cargo. Specifically, airports, air
carriers, and other entities are required to implement security
measures in accordance with TSA security requirements, against which
TSA evaluates their compliance efforts.
TSA also oversees air carriers' efforts to prescreen passengers--in
general, the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch
lists prior to an aircraft's departure--and plans to take over
operational responsibility for this function with the implementation of
its Secure Flight program. CBP, which currently has responsibility for
prescreening airline passengers on international flights departing from
and bound for the United States, will continue to perform this function
until TSA assumes this function under Secure Flight. DHS's S&T is
responsible for researching and developing technologies to secure the
transportation sector.
TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes
with federal, state, and local governments and the private sector.
TSA's security mission includes establishing security standards and
conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes,
including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and
commercial vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency's Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface
transportation operators and state and local governments, and in
conjunction with certain grants, the National Protection and Programs
Directorate conducts risk assessments of surface transportation
facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
have responsibilities for passenger rail safety and security. In
addition, public and private sector transportation operators are
responsible for implementing security measures for their systems.
DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation's Aviation and Surface
Transportation Systems, but More Work Remains:
DHS, primarily through TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives to
strengthen the security of the nation's aviation and surface
transportation systems. In large part, these efforts have been guided
by legislative mandates designed to strengthen the security of
commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. These efforts have also been affected by events external to
the department, including the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to
blow up commercial aircraft bound from London to the United States, and
the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London train bombings. While progress has been
made in many areas with respect to securing the transportation network,
we found that the department can strengthen its efforts in some key
areas outlined by Congress, the administration, and the department
itself, as discussed below.
Aviation Security:
Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. TSA has taken action to
strengthen the security of airport perimeters and access to restricted
airport areas. However, as we reported in June 2004, the agency can
further strengthen its efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of
security-related technologies and reduce the risks posed by airport
employees, among other things.[Footnote 4] In 2006, TSA completed the
last project in an access control pilot program that included 20
airports, and which was designed to test and evaluate new and emerging
technologies in an airport setting. TSA is also conducting an airport
perimeter security pilot at six airports, to test technologies such as
vehicle inspection systems. However, TSA has not developed a plan to
guide and support individual airports and the commercial airport system
as a whole with respect to future technology enhancements for perimeter
security and access controls. Without such a plan, TSA could be limited
in assessing and improving the effectiveness of its efforts to provide
technical support for enhancing security. In addition, we reported in
September 2006 and October 2007 on the status of the development and
testing of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program-
-DHS's effort to develop biometric access control systems to verify the
identity of individuals accessing secure transportation areas[Footnote
5]. However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will implement
a biometric identification system for access controls at commercial
airports. In June 2004, we reported that while background checks were
not required for all airport workers, TSA required most airport workers
who perform duties in selected areas to undergo a fingerprint-based
criminal history records check. TSA further required airport operators
to compare applicants' names against TSA's security watch lists. In
July 2004, consistent with our previous recommendation to determine the
need for additional security requirements to reduce the risks posed by
airport employees, TSA enhanced requirements for background checks for
employees working in restricted airport areas. Also consistent with our
recommendation, in 2007, TSA further expanded the Security Threat
Assessment--which determines, among other things, whether an employee
has any terrorist affiliations--to require airport employees who
receive an airport-issued identification badge to undergo a review of
citizenship status. Further, in March 2007, TSA implemented a random
employee screening initiative--the Aviation Direct Access Screening
Program--that uses TSOs to randomly screen airport workers and their
property for explosives and other threat items. TSA has allocated about
900 full-time equivalent positions to the program and has requested $36
million for FY 2009 for an additional 750 full-time equivalent
positions. As directed by Congress in 2008, TSA plans to pilot test
various employee screening methods at seven selected airports,
including conducting 100 percent employee screening at three of these
[Footnote 6]airports. TSA plans to begin pilot testing in May and
report on the results of its efforts--as directed--by September 1,
2008. Finally, consistent with our previous recommendation to develop
schedules and an analytical approach for completing vulnerability
assessments, TSA has developed criteria for prioritizing vulnerability
assessments at commercial airports. However, it has not compiled
national baseline data to fully assess security vulnerabilities across
airports. In 2004, TSA said an analysis of vulnerabilities on a
nationwide basis was essential since it would allow the agency to
assess the adequacy of security policies and help better direct limited
resources. GAO is currently reviewing TSA's efforts to enhance airport
perimeter and access control security and will report on our results
later this year.
Aviation Security Workforce. TSA has made progress in deploying,
training, and assessing the performance of its federal aviation
security workforce. For example, TSA has hired and deployed a federal
screening workforce at over 400 commercial airports nationwide, and
developed standards for determining TSO staffing levels at
airports.[Footnote 7] These standards form the basis of TSA's Staffing
Allocation Model, which the agency uses to determine TSO staffing
levels at airports. In response to our recommendation,[Footnote 8] in
December 2007 TSA developed a Staffing Allocation Model Rates and
Assumptions Validation Plan that identifies the process the agency
plans to use to review and validate the model's assumptions on a
periodic basis. TSA also established numerous programs to train and
test the performance of its screening workforce. Among other efforts,
TSA has provided enhanced explosives-detection training, and recently
reported developing a monthly recurrent (ongoing) training plan for all
TSOs. In addition, TSA has trained and deployed federal air marshals on
high-risk flights; established standards for training flight and cabin
crews; and established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select,
train, and allow authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to
defend against any terrorist or criminal acts. In April 2006, TSA
implemented a performance accountability and standards system to assess
agency personnel at all levels on various competencies, including
training and development, readiness for duty, management skills, and
technical proficiency. Finally, in April 2007, TSA redesigned its local
covert testing program conducted at individual airports. This new
program, known as the Aviation Screening Assessment Program or ASAP, is
intended to test the performance of the passenger and checked baggage
screening systems, to include the TSO workforce. During our ongoing
review of TSA's covert testing program, we identified that TSA has
implemented risk-based national and local covert testing programs to
identify vulnerabilities in and measure the performance of selected
aspects of the aviation system. However, we found that TSA could
strengthen its program by developing a more systematic process for (1)
recording the causes of covert test failures, and (2) evaluating the
test results and developing approaches for mitigating vulnerabilities
identified in the commercial aviation security system. We will report
on the complete results of this review later this year.
Passenger Prescreening. Over the past several years, TSA has faced a
number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight,[Footnote 9] which will
allow TSA to assume responsibility from air carriers for comparing
domestic passenger information against the No Fly List and Selectee
List.[Footnote 10] In February 2008, we reported that TSA had made
substantial progress in instilling more discipline and rigor into
Secure Flight's development and implementation, including preparing key
systems development documentation and strengthening privacy
protections.[Footnote 11] However, challenges remain that may hinder
the program's progress moving forward. Specifically, TSA had not (1)
developed program cost and schedule estimates consistent with best
practices; (2) fully implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned
for system end-to-end testing in test plans; and (4) ensured that
information-security requirements are fully implemented. To address
these challenges, we made several recommendations to DHS and TSA to
incorporate best practices in Secure Flight's cost and schedule
estimates and to fully implement the program's risk-management,
testing, and information-security requirements. DHS and TSA officials
generally agreed with these recommendations. We are continuing to
assess TSA's efforts in developing and implementing Secure Flight--
which, according to TSA's planned schedule, will allow the agency to
fully assume the watch list matching function from air carriers in
fiscal year 2010. TSA has also taken steps to integrate the domestic
watch-list matching function with the international watch-list matching
function currently operated by CBP, consistent with our past
recommendations. Specifically, TSA and CBP have coordinated to develop
a strategy called the One DHS Solution, which is to align the two
agencies' domestic and international watch-list matching processes,
information technology systems, and regulatory procedures to provide a
seamless interface between DHS and the airline industry. TSA and CBP
also agreed that TSA will take over the screening of passengers against
the watch list for international flights from CBP, though CBP will
continue to match passenger information to the watch list in
fulfillment of its border-related functions. Full implementation of an
integrated system is not planned to take place until after Secure
Flight acquires the watch-list matching function for domestic flights.
Checkpoint Screening. TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger
checkpoint screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited
items and strengthen security; however, TSA could improve its
evaluation and documentation of proposed procedures. In April 2007, we
reported that modifications to checkpoint screening standard operating
procedures (SOP) were proposed based on the professional judgment of
TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff, as well as threat
information and the results of covert testing.[Footnote 12] We also
reported on steps TSA had taken to address new and emerging threats,
such as establishing the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique
(SPOT) program, which provides TSOs with a nonintrusive, behavior-based
means of identifying potentially high-risk individuals. For proposed
screening modifications deemed significant, such as SPOT, TSA
operationally tested these proposed modifications at selected airports
before determining whether they should be implemented nationwide.
However, we reported that TSA's data collection and analysis of
proposed SOP modifications could be improved, and recommended that TSA
develop sound evaluation methods, when possible, to assess whether
proposed screening changes would achieve their intended purpose. TSA
has since reported taking steps to work with subject-matter experts to
ensure that the agency's operational testing of proposed screening
modifications are well designed and executed, and produce results that
are scientifically valid and reliable. With regard to checkpoint
screening technologies, TSA and S&T have researched, developed, tested,
and initiated procurements of various technologies to address security
vulnerabilities that may be exploited; however, limited progress has
been made in fielding emerging technologies. For example, of the
various emerging checkpoint screening projects funded by TSA and
S&T,[Footnote 13] only the explosives trace portal and a bottled
liquids scanning device have been deployed for use in day-to-day
operations. However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA
halted the acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006.
Also, in February 2008, we testified that TSA lacked a strategic plan
to guide its efforts to acquire and deploy screening technologies,
which could limit its ability to deploy emerging technologies to
airports deemed at highest risk.[Footnote 14] According to TSA
officials, the agency plans to submit a strategic plan to Congress by
June 2008. We have ongoing work reviewing S&T and TSA checkpoint
screening technologies efforts and will report on our results later
this year.
Checked Baggage Screening. TSA has made progress in installing
explosive detection systems to provide the capability to screen checked
baggage at the nation's commercial airports, as mandated by law. From
November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace
Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at
over 400 commercial airports.[Footnote 15] In addition, based in part
on recommendations we made, TSA moved stand-alone EDS machines that
were located at airports that received new in-line EDS baggage
screening systems to 32 airports that did not previously have them from
May 2004 through December 2007. TSA also replaced ETD machines at 53
airports with 158 new EDS machines from March 2005 through December
2007. In response to mandates to field the equipment quickly and to
account for limitations in airport design that made it difficult to
quickly install in-line EDS systems, TSA generally placed baggage
screening equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies-
-to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for
explosives.[Footnote 16] Based, in part, on our recommendations, TSA
later developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD machines in-line with
airport baggage conveyor systems. The installation of in-line systems
can result in considerable savings to TSA through the reduction of
personnel needed to operate the equipment, as well as increased
security. In addition, according to TSA estimates, the number of
checked bags screened per hour can more than double when EDS machines
are placed in-line versus being placed in the stand alone mode. Despite
delays in the widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the high
upfront capital investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation
of these systems and is seeking creative financing solutions to fund
their deployment. However, It is incumbent upon airports of whether or
not they will pursue the installation of in-line baggage systems. In
February 2008, TSA submitted a legislative proposal to increase the
Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF) through a new surcharge on the
passenger security fee. According to TSA, this proposal, if adopted,
would accelerate the deployment of optimal checked baggage screening
systems and address the need to re-capitalize existing equipment
deployed immediately after September, 2001. The Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act reiterates a requirement
that DHS submit a cost-sharing study for the installation of in-line
baggage screening systems, along with a plan and schedule for
implementing provisions of the study, and requires TSA to establish a
prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects related to the
installation of in-line or other optimal baggage screening systems. As
of April 3, 2008, TSA had not completed the prioritization schedule,
corresponding timeline, and description of the funding allocation for
these projects.
Air Cargo Security. TSA has taken steps to secure air cargo, including
initializing efforts to provide the capability to screen 100 percent of
air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by 2010, but its efforts
are not yet complete. In April 2007, we reported that TSA's Air Cargo
strategic plan contained a strategy for securing domestic air cargo but
did not include goals and objectives for addressing inbound air cargo,
or cargo transported into the United States from a foreign
country.[Footnote 17] We recommended that DHS develop a risk-based
strategy for securing inbound air cargo including defining TSA's and
CBP's inbound air cargo security responsibilities. CBP subsequently
issued its International Air Cargo Security strategic plan in June
2007, and TSA plans to revise its Air Cargo strategic plan during the
third quarter of fiscal year 2008 to incorporate a strategy for
addressing inbound air cargo security, including how the agency will
partner with CBP. We also reported that TSA had not conducted
vulnerability assessments to identify the range of air cargo security
weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists, and recommended that
TSA develop a methodology and schedule for completing these
assessments.[Footnote 18] In response in part to our recommendation,
TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment program in
November 2006 and, as of April 2008, had completed vulnerability
assessments at five domestic airports. TSA plans to complete
assessments of all high-risk airports by 2009. In addition, although
TSA has established requirements for air carriers to randomly screen
air cargo, the agency had exempted some domestic and inbound cargo from
these requirements. While TSA has since revised its screening
exemptions for domestic air cargo, it has not done so for inbound air
cargo. TSA is also working with DHS S&T to develop and pilot test a
number of technologies to assess their applicability to screening and
securing air cargo.[Footnote 19] However, as of February 2008, TSA had
provided a completion date for only one of its five air cargo
technology pilot programs. According to TSA officials, the agency will
determine whether it will require the use of these technologies once it
has completed its assessments and analyzed the results. We also
reported in April 2007 that TSA did not systematically compile and
analyze information on air cargo security practices used abroad to
identify those that may strengthen the department's overall air cargo
security program, and we recommended that it do so.[Footnote 20] TSA
has since begun development of a certified cargo screening program
based in part on its review of screening models used in two foreign
countries that rely on government-certified screeners to screen air
cargo early in the supply chain.[Footnote 21] According to TSA, the
agency plans to deploy this program to assist it in meeting the
statutory requirement to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by August 2010 (and to screen 50 percent of such
cargo by February 2009), as mandated by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.[Footnote 22] In January
2008, TSA began phase one of the program's pilot tests, and as of April
2008, had completed tests at six airports. TSA plans to conduct tests
at three additional airports by June 2008.
Surface Transportation Security:
Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions. In September
2005, DHS completed the National Strategy for Transportation Security.
This strategy identified and evaluated transportation assets in the
United States that could be at risk of a terrorist attack and addressed
transportation sector security needs. Further, in May 2007, DHS issued
a strategic plan for securing the transportation sector and supporting
annexes for each of the surface transportation modes, and reported
taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the plan.
The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security
framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make
effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation
decisions within the transportation network. TSA has begun to implement
some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan
and supporting modal plans. Additionally, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11Commission Act imposes a deadline of May
2008, for the Secretary of DHS to develop and implement the National
Strategy for Public Transportation Security. Our work assessing DHS's
efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface
transportation modes is being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews
of mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and
highway infrastructure security. We will report on the results of this
work later this year.
Threat, Criticality, and Vulnerability Assessments. TSA has taken
actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets,
particularly for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, but
its efforts related to commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure
are in the early stages. For example, TSA had conducted threat
assessments of all surface modes of transportation. TSA has also
conducted assessments of the vulnerabilities associated with some
surface transportation assets. For example, regarding freight rail, TSA
has conducted vulnerability assessments of rail corridors in eight High
Threat Urban Areas where toxic-inhalation-hazard shipments are
transported. With respect to commercial vehicles and highway
infrastructure, TSA's vulnerability assessment efforts are ongoing.
According to TSA, the agency performed 113 corporate security reviews
on highway transportation organizations through fiscal year 2007, such
as trucking companies, state Departments of Transportation, and motor
coach companies.[Footnote 23] However, TSA does not have a plan or a
time frame for conducting these reviews on a nationwide basis.
Furthermore, DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate's
Office of Infrastructure Protection conducts vulnerability assessments
of surface transportation assets to identify protective measures to
reduce or mitigate asset vulnerability. With regard to criticality
assessments, TSA reported in April 2008 that the agency had conducted
1,345 assessments of passenger rail stations.[Footnote 24]
Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11Commission
Act has several provisions related to security assessments. For
instance, the act requires DHS to review existing security assessments
for public transportation systems as well as conduct additional
assessments as necessary to ensure that all high-risk public
transportation agencies have security assessments. Moreover, the act
also requires DHS to establish a federal task force to complete a
nationwide risk assessment of a terrorist attack on rail carriers. We
will continue to review threat, vulnerability, and criticality
assessments conducted by TSA related to securing surface modes of
transportation during our ongoing work.[Footnote 25]
Issuance of Security Standards. TSA has taken actions to develop and
issue security standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight
rail transportation modes. However, TSA has not yet developed or issued
security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as
commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, or determined whether
standards are necessary for these modes of transportation.
Specifically, TSA has developed and issued both mandatory rail security
directives and recommended voluntary best practices--known as Security
Action Items--for transit agencies and passenger rail operators to
implement as part of their security programs to enhance both security
and emergency-management preparedness. TSA also issued a notice of
proposed rule making in December 2006, which if finalized as proposed,
would include additional security requirements for passenger and
freight rail transportation operators.[Footnote 26] For example, the
rule would include additional security requirements designed to ensure
that freight railroads have protocols for the secure custody transfers
of toxic-inhalation-hazard rail cars in High Threat Urban Areas. DHS
and other federal partners have also been collaborating with the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and public and
private security professionals to develop industry wide security
standards for mass transit systems. APTA officials reported that they
expect several of the voluntary standards to be released in mid-2008.
Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11Commission
Act requires DHS to issue regulations establishing standards and
guidelines for developing and implementing vulnerability assessments
and security plans for high-risk railroad carriers and over-the-road
bus operators.[Footnote 27] The deadlines for the regulations are
August 2008 and February 2009, respectively. With respect to freight
rail, TSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing that
high-risk rail carriers conduct vulnerability assessments and develop
and implement security plans. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts
to issue security standards for other surface transportation modes
during our ongoing reviews.
Compliance Inspections. TSA has hired and deployed surface
transportation security inspectors who conduct compliance inspections
for both passenger and freight rail modes of transportation; however,
questions exist regarding how TSA will employ the inspectors to enforce
new regulations proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and regulations to be developed in accordance with the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.[Footnote 28]
TSA officials reported having 100 surface transportation inspectors
during fiscal year 2005 and, as of December 2007, were maintaining an
inspector workforce of about the same number. The agency's budget
request for fiscal year 2009 includes $11.6 million to fund 100 surface
transportation security inspectors--which would maintain its current
staffing level. Inspectors' responsibilities include conducting on-
site inspections of key facilities for freight rail, passenger rail,
and transit systems; assessing transit systems' implementation of core
transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action items;
conducting examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance
with security directives; identifying security gaps; and developing
effective practices. To meet these compliance responsibilities, TSA
reported in December 2007 that it had conducted voluntary assessments
of 50 of the 100 largest transit agencies, including 34 passenger rail
and 16 bus-only agencies, and has plans to continue these assessments
with the next 50 largest transit agencies during fiscal year 2008. With
respect to freight rail, TSA reported visiting, during 2007, almost 300
railroad facilities including terminal and railroad yards to assess the
railroads' implementation of 17 DHS-recommended Security Action Items
associated with the transportation of toxic-inhalation-hazard
materials.
TSA has raised concerns about the agency's ability to continue to meet
anticipated inspection responsibilities given the new regulations
proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act. For example, the act mandates that high-risk over-the-road bus
operators, railroad carriers, and public transportation agencies
develop and implement security plans which must include, among other
requirements, procedures to be implemented in response to a terrorist
attack.[Footnote 29] The act further requires the Secretary of DHS to
review each plan within 6 months of receiving it. TSA officials stated
that they believe TSA inspectors will likely be tasked to conduct these
reviews. The act also requires that the Secretary of DHS develop and
issue interim final regulations by November 2007, for a public
transportation security training program.[Footnote 30] As of April
2008, these interim regulations have not been issued. According to TSA
officials, TSA inspectors will likely be involved in ensuring
compliance with these regulations as well. To help address these
additional requirements, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11Commission Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ
additional surface transportation inspectors, and requires that surface
transportation inspectors have relevant transportation experience and
appropriate security and inspection qualifications.[Footnote 31]
However, it is not clear how TSA will meet these new requirements since
the agency has not requested funding for additional surface
transportation security inspectors for fiscal year 2009. We will
continue to assess TSA's inspection efforts during our ongoing
work.[Footnote 32]
Grant Programs. DHS has developed and administered grant programs for
various surface transportation modes, although stakeholders have raised
concerns regarding the current grant process. For example, the DHS
Office of Grants and Training, now called the Grant Programs
Directorate, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security
since 2003. Through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program,
the Grant Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to
help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent,
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs
Directorate used fiscal year 2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to
build on the work under way through the Urban Areas Security Initiative
program, and create and administer new programs focused specifically on
transportation security, including the Transit Security Grant Program,
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program, and the Freight Rail
Security Grant Program. However, some industry stakeholders have raised
concerns regarding DHS's current grant process, including the shifting
of funding priorities, the lack of program flexibility, and other
barriers to the provision of grant funding. For example, transit
agencies have reported that the lack of predictability in how TSA will
assess grant projects against funding priorities makes it difficult to
engage in long-term planning of security initiatives. Specifically,
transit agencies have reported receiving funding to begin projects--
such as retrofitting their transit fleet with security cameras or
installing digital video recording systems--but not being able to
finish these projects in subsequent years because TSA had changed its
funding priorities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act codifies surface transportation grant programs and
imposes statutory requirements on the administration of the
programs.[Footnote 33] For example, the act lists authorized uses of
these grant funds and requires DHS to award the grants based on
risk.[Footnote 34] It also requires that DHS and DOT determine the most
effective and efficient way to distribute grant funds, authorizing DHS
to transfer funds to DOT for the purpose of disbursement.[Footnote 35]
According to the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification, to ensure
that the selected projects are focused on increasing security, DHS
grants are to be awarded based on risk. We will continue assessing
surface transportation related grant programs as part of our ongoing
work.[Footnote 36]
Crosscutting Issues Have Hindered DHS's Efforts in Implementing Its
Mission and Management Functions:
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across
DHS's mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded
the department's progress since its inception and will continue to
confront DHS as it moves forward. These issues include (1) establishing
baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in effective
strategic planning efforts; (2) applying and strengthening a risk-
management approach for implementing missions and making resource
allocation decisions; and, (3) coordinating and partnering with
federal, state, and local agencies, and the private sector. We have
made numerous recommendations to DHS and its components, including TSA,
to strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in
implementing some of these recommendations.
DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and
has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place
structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. For
example, with regard to TSA's efforts to secure air cargo, we reported
in October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA completed an Air Cargo
Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk-
management approach to securing the nation's domestic air cargo system,
and that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions
for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, cost, and
deadlines.[Footnote 37] However, TSA had not developed a similar
strategy for addressing the security of inbound air cargo--cargo
transported into the United States from foreign countries--including
how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders.
In another example, we reported in April 2007 that TSA had not yet
developed outcome-based performance measures for its foreign airport
assessment and air carrier inspection programs, such as the percentage
of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result of TSA's on-
site assistance and recommendations, to identify any aspects of these
programs that may need attention. We recommended that DHS direct TSA
and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including specific goals and
objectives, for securing air cargo;[Footnote 38] and develop outcome-
based performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air
carrier inspection programs.[Footnote 39] DHS generally concurred with
GAO's recommendations with regard to air cargo, and is taking steps to
strengthen its efforts in this area.
Although DHS and TSA have made risk-based decision-making a cornerstone
of departmental and agency policy, DHS and TSA could strengthen their
application of risk management in implementing their mission functions.
Several DHS component agencies and TSA have worked towards integrating
risk-based decision making into their security efforts, but we reported
that these efforts can be strengthened. For example, TSA has
incorporated certain risk-management principles into securing air
cargo, but has not completed assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities
or critical assets--two crucial elements of a risk-based approach. TSA
has also incorporated risk-based decision making when making
modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to include
modifying procedures based on intelligence information and
vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport
checkpoints. However, in April 2007, we reported that TSA's analyses
that supported screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For
example, TSA officials based their decision to revise the prohibited
items list to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto
aircraft based on their review of threat information--which indicated
that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system--so
that TSOs could concentrate on higher threat items.[Footnote 40]
However, TSA officials did not conduct the analysis necessary to help
them determine whether this screening change would affect TSO's ability
to focus on higher-risk threats.[Footnote 41] As noted earlier in this
statement, TSA is taking steps to strengthen its efforts in both of
these areas.
In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland
security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of
key stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. Although
improvements are being made, we have found that the appropriate
homeland security roles and responsibilities within and between the
levels of government, and with the private sector, are evolving and
need to be clarified. For example, we reported that opportunities exist
for TSA to work with foreign governments and industry to identify best
practices for securing passenger rail and air cargo, and recommended
that TSA systematically compile and analyze information on practices
used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the department's
overall security efforts.[Footnote 42] With regard to air cargo, TSA
has subsequently reviewed the models used in two foreign countries that
rely on government-certified screeners to screen air cargo to
facilitate the design of the agency's proposed certified-cargo
screening program. Further, in September 2005, we reported that TSA did
not effectively involve private sector stakeholders in its decision
making process for developing security standards for passenger rail
assets.[Footnote 43] We recommended that DHS develop security standards
that reflect industry best practices and can be measured, monitored,
and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, if appropriate, rail asset
owners. DHS agreed with these recommendations. Regarding efforts to
respond to in-flight security threats, which, depending on the nature
of the threat, could involve more than 15 federal agencies and agency
components, in July 2007 we also recommended that DHS and other
departments document and share their respective coordination and
communication strategies and response procedures, to which DHS
agreed.[Footnote 44] The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act includes provisions designed to improve coordination
with stakeholders. For example, the act requires DHS and DOT to develop
an annex to the Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments
governing the specific roles, responsibilities, resources, and
commitments in addressing motor carrier transportation security
matters, including the processes the departments will follow to promote
communications and efficiency, and avoid duplication of
effort.[Footnote 45] The act also requires DHS, in consultation with
DOT, to establish a program to provide appropriate information that DHS
has gathered or developed on the performance, use, and testing of
technologies that may be used to enhance surface transportation
security to surface transportation entities.[Footnote 46] According to
TSA, the agency has begun to provide transit agencies with information
on recommended available security technologies through security
roundtables for the top 50 transit agencies; the posting of an
authorized equipment list on the Homeland Security Information Network
Web site; and periodic briefings to other federal agencies.
Concluding Observations:
The magnitude of DHS's and TSA's responsibilities in securing the
nation's transportation system is significant, and we commend the
department on the work it has done and is currently doing to secure
this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA plays in
securing the homeland, it is critical that the agency continually
strive to strengthen its programs and initiatives to counter emerging
threats and improve security. In the almost 6-½ years since its
creation, TSA has had to undertake its critical mission while also
establishing and forming a new agency. At the same time, a variety of
factors, including threats to and attacks on transportation systems
around the world, as well as new legislative requirements, have led the
agency to reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address
key events, and to respond to emerging threats. Although TSA has made
considerable progress in addressing key aspects of commercial aviation
security, more work remains in some key areas, such as the deployment
of technologies to detect explosives at checkpoints and in air cargo.
Further, although TSA has more recently taken action in a number of
areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, its efforts are
still largely in the early stage, and the nature of its regulatory role
and relationship with transportation operators is still being defined.
As DHS and TSA move forward, it will be important for the department to
address the challenges that have affected its operations thus far,
while continuing to adapt to new threats and needs, and well as
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of existing programs and
operations. We will continue to review DHS's and TSA's progress in
securing the transportation network, and will provide information to
Congress and the public on these efforts.
Madam Chairwoman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen
Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Steve D. Morris, Assistant
Director; Jason Berman; Kristy Brown; Martene Bryan; Tony Cheesebrough;
Fatema Choudhury; Chris Currie; Joe Dewechter; Dorian Dunbar; Barbara
Guffy; John Hansen; Dawn Hoff; Daniel Klabunde; Anne Laffoon; Gary
Malavenda; Sara Margraf; Victoria Miller; Dan Rodriguez; Maria
Strudwick; Spencer Tacktill; Gabriele A. Tonsil; Margaret A. Ullengren;
Margaret Vo; and Su Jin Yon.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007); GAO, Department of Homeland
Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management
Functions, GAO-07-1081T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2007); and GAO,
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
18, 2007).
[2] A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing
risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and
objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting
initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those
initiatives.
[3] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[4] GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the
Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-
728 (Washington, D.C.: June 2004).
[5] GAO, Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges
before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006) and
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain, GAO-08-133T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007).
[6] The Explanatory Statement accompanying Division E of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, 121
Stat. 1844, 2042 (2007), allocates $15,000,000 in appropriated funds
for TSA to pilot-test various forms of employee screening at seven
commercial airports. Among other things, TSA is to collect data on the
benefits, costs, and impacts of 100-percent airport employee screening
as well as of the alternative screening approaches, and brief the
Committees on Appropriations on the progress and results of the pilot
projects no later than September 1, 2008.
[7] TSA also oversees screening operations at airports utilizing
private screeners under TSA's Screening Partnership Program. See 49
U.S.C. § 44920.
[8] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful
for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be
Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007).
[9] GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006) and GAO, Aviation Security:
Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007).
[10] Passengers identified as being on the No Fly List must be denied
boarding passes and must not be permitted to fly unless cleared in
accordance with TSA security requirements. Passengers on the Selectee
List are to be issued boarding passes, but they and their baggage are
to undergo additional security measures.
[11] GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has
Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security
Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO-08-456T (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2008).
[12] GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns
Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation
and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007).
[13] Examples of projects currently in research and development include
the checkpoint explosives detection system and the whole body imager.
Projects that have undergone initiated procurements include the cast
and prosthesis scanner and the advanced technology systems.
[14] GAO-07-448T .
[15] Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to detect
characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it
moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by
detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect
samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object
that TSOs determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD
machine, which then chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any
traces of explosive materials.
[16] See GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage
Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2006), GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in
Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-
371T (Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006), and GAO-07-448T.
[17] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air
Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2007).
[18] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,
2005) and GAO-07-660.
[19] TSA's air cargo pilot programs include an air cargo explosives
detection program; an EDS pilot program; an air cargo security seals
pilot; the testing of hardened unit-loading devices; and, the testing
of pulsed fast neutron analysis technology.
[20] GAO-07-660.
[21] According to TSA, the program will allow TSA-certified shippers
and manufacturers to screen air cargo before it leaves the factory. The
screened cargo would then be secured with a tamper-resistant seal and
transported to the airport for shipment.
[22] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. at 477-480 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)).
[23] TSA conducts corporate security reviews in multiple modes of
transportation to establish baseline data against which to evaluate
minimum-security standards and identify coverage gaps in reviewed
systems.
[24] According to TSA, the agency completed 945 criticality assessments
in fiscal year 2007 and 400 assessments in fiscal year 2008. TSA
officials stated that some of these assessments may have been conducted
to update previously completed ones.
[25] For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced
Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-
07-225T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2007).
[26] See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006).
[27] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 429-33, 454-
57.
[28] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1534, 121 Stat at 461-62.
[29] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1405, 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 402-05,
429-33, 454-57.
[30] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1408, 121 Stat. at 409-11 (requiring
that the Secretary develop and issue final regulations for the training
program by August 2008).
[31] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1304, 121 Stat. at 393-94.
[32] For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced
Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-
06-181T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2005).
[33] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. 405-08, 433-
35, 457-60.
[34] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1406(b), (c)(2), 121 Stat. at 405-
07.
[35] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1406(d), 1532(e), 121 Stat. at 407,
459.
[36] For more information see GAO-06-181T.
[37] GAO-07-660.
[38] GAO-07-660.
[39] GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These
Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-729 (Washington, D.C.: May 11,
2007).
[40] GAO-07-634.
[41] GAO-07-634.
[42] See GAO-07-660 and GAO-05-851.
[43] See GAO-05-851.
[44] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-
flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-07-891R (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
[45] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1541, 121 Stat. at 469.
[46] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1305, 121 Stat. at 394-95.
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