Border Security
Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007
Gao ID: GAO-08-757 May 16, 2008
From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report.
GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations.
GAO-08-757, Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007
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Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2008:
Border Security:
Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate
Committee on Finance, 2003-2007:
GAO-08-757:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-757, a report to the Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee
on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists
could exploit to enter the country. GAO‘s first two testimonies focused
on covert testing at ports of entry”the air, sea, and land locations
where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In
its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of
unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry.
GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment
work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of
testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of
GAO‘s work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and
unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where
the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or
where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed
a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to
evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further,
GAO‘s work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent
systemic weaknesses.
In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous
border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since
2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS,
but has included the response in this report.
What GAO Found:
GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities,
both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border
locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry,
undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers‘ licenses, birth
certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents,
presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the
United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by
boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the
northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three
states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two
other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia).
In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions
and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof
of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total,
undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success
rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by
boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show
identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006,
an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver‘s license, but the
officer said, ’That‘s fine, you can go“ without looking at it. As a
result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use
counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of
entry with little chance of being detected.
In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and
primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and
unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO
visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the
request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.–Canada border, GAO found
state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear
to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border
allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into
the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned,
unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was
alerted to GAO‘s activities through the tip of an alert citizen.
However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to
locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the
northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in
one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were
unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment
was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an
individual from crossing the border into the United States was a
barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also
identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed
lands adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces
significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined
cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive
materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by
crossing the U.S.–Canada border at any of the assessed locations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-757]. For more
information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or
kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry:
Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border
Locations:
Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Tables:
Table 1: Entering the United States through Land Ports of Entry:
Table 2: Entering the United States through Sea and Air Ports of Entry:
Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned, Unmonitored Locations:
Figure:
Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States
in a Northern Border Location:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 16, 2008:
The Honorable Max Baucus:
Chairman:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
Intelligence officials believe that the United States will face a
persistent and evolving terrorist threat and that the terrorist group
al Qaeda will intensify its efforts to put operatives here. From
January 2003 to September 2007, we testified on three occasions before
your Committee to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists
could exploit to enter the country.[Footnote 1] The vulnerabilities are
related to traveler screening and border-protection efforts that were
consolidated under Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in March 2003. Our first two
testimonies were focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air,
sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter
the United States. For our third testimony, we focused on limited
security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between
ports of entry.[Footnote 2]
This report summarizes the findings of the covert tests and security
assessment work performed for your Committee and reported at hearings
on January 30, 2003; August 2, 2006; and September 27, 2007. It is
important to note that fugitives, smugglers, illegal immigrants, or
other criminals could also take advantage of the vulnerabilities we
identified. To summarize our work, we reviewed our prior testimonies
and the work papers associated with them. We also requested information
in writing from DHS related to recent efforts to secure U.S. borders
and address the vulnerabilities highlighted by our work.
For our testing at ports of entry, we entered the states of Washington,
Idaho, Michigan, and New York from Canada; the states of California,
Arizona, and Texas from Mexico; the state of Florida from Jamaica; and
the state of Virginia from the Bahamas. To create counterfeit documents
we used software, hardware, and materials that are available to the
public. The tested ports of entry were a nonrepresentative selection we
identified using publicly available information. Because we tested a
nonrepresentative selection, it is not possible to project the results
of our work to any other ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored
border areas we visited were defined as locations where CBP does not
maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no
apparent monitoring equipment in place. We performed limited security
assessments at a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did
not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security
vulnerabilities. Where possible, and at your request, investigators
attempted to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive
materials or other contraband to highlight the severity of the
vulnerability at these border areas. DHS considered some of our results
to be law-enforcement sensitive and requested that we not include
certain information in our report, such as the names of states we
visited for our September 2007 work on unmanned and unmonitored
locations.
We prepared this report from January to May 2008. However, all covert
tests and security assessment work were performed prior to DHS's
January 31, 2008, revised document procedures for U.S. citizens at
ports of entry and it is therefore not possible to project our results
to these new procedures. We are reporting on the results of testing at
land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of our work
was focused on land ports of entry. Further, the results of our covert
testing and security assessments are applicable only to U.S. border
security efforts and do not relate to efforts made by other
governments. Our work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to
represent systemic weaknesses in DHS border-protection efforts.
Further, it does not address the entry of terrorists into the Bahamas,
Canada, Jamaica, or Mexico. As noted in our prior testimonies, we
performed all covert testing and security assessment work in accordance
with standards prescribed by the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Results in Brief:
Our investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities,
both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border
locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry,
undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth
certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents,
presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the
United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by
boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the
northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three
states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two
other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia).
In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions
and counterfeit identification provided by our investigators as proof
of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total,
undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success
rate.[Footnote 3] On several occasions, while entering by foot from
Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to
show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in
2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a CBP officer his
counterfeit Virginia driver's license, but the officer said, "That's
fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these covert
tests, we concluded that terrorists or other criminals could use
counterfeit identification to pass freely through most of the tested
ports of entry with little chance of being detected.
In our most recent work, we shifted our focus from ports of entry and
primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and
unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states we
visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the
request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, we found
state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear
to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border
allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into
the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned,
unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was
alerted to our activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However,
the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the
investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern
border, investigators located several ports of entry in one state on
the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned
overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in
operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual
from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across
the road that could be driven around. We also identified potential
security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the
U.S.-Mexico border. We concluded that CBP faces significant challenges
on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator
would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband
undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at
any of the assessed locations. A brief video highlighting the
vulnerabilities we found during this investigation is available on the
Internet at: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-07-884t/].
We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to
discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our
August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to
identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land
border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP
officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative[Footnote 4] and were working to implement it. This
initiative has several parts, the most recent of which went into effect
on January 31, 2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP
indicated that resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents
from investigating all instances of suspicious activity. For example,
in the September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee,
a CBP official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were
patrolling the U.S.-Canada border at any given time. This represents a
quarter of all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border
during that period because the agents work in shifts, and may not be on
duty due to sick leave or vacation time. CBP stated that the northern
border presents more of a challenge than the southern border for
several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the
existence of many antiquated ports of entry.
In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous
border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since
2003. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but
have included the response in appendix I.
Background:
CBP is the lead federal agency in charge of securing the nation's
borders. When CBP was created, it represented a merger of components
from three agencies--the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, its
implementing regulations, and CBP policies and procedures, CBP officers
are required to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals
and whether they are eligible to enter the country at ports of entry.
All international travelers attempting to enter the country through
ports of entry undergo primary inspection, which is a preliminary
screening procedure to identify those legitimate international
travelers who can readily be identified as admissible.
Regarding land ports of entry, the United States shares over 5,000
miles of border with Canada to the north (including the state of
Alaska), and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south.
Individuals attempting to legally enter the United States by land
present themselves to a CBP officer at one of the 170 ports of entry
located along these borders. During the period of our investigations,
U.S. citizens could gain entry to the United States by establishing
their citizenship to the satisfaction of U.S. officials at a land port
of entry. While this frequently involved a citizen presenting their
birth certificate, photo identification (e.g., a driver's license), or
baptismal records, the law did not require U.S. citizens to present any
of these documents as proof of citizenship. Until recently, U.S.
citizens could enter the country at land ports of entry based only on
oral statements. However, as of January 31, 2008, U.S. citizens age 19
and older are required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
to present both proof of identity and citizenship when attempting to
enter the United States by land. Documents that would fulfill this
requirement could include a passport, a military ID with travel orders,
or an enhanced driver's license. In the absence of a single document
that establishes both proof of identity and citizenship, U.S. citizens
require multiple documents, such as a driver's license and a birth
certificate, to enter the United States. Requirements for entering the
United States by sea are similar to those for entering by land.
Regarding air ports of entry, starting on January 23, 2007, U.S.
citizens were required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
to present a passport or secure travel document when entering the
United States. Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S.
citizens entering the country by air from such locations as the
Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica could establish their citizenship by oral
assertions and documents such as drivers' licenses and birth
certificates.
It is illegal to enter the United States at any location other than a
port of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and
monitors areas between ports of entry. However, given limited resources
and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is limited
in its ability to monitor the border either through use of technology
or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with its perception
of the threat, CBP has distributed human resources differently on the
northern border than it has on the southern border. According to CBP,
as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the
northern border and 11,986 agents assigned to the southern border. The
number of agents actually providing border protection at any given time
is far smaller than these figures suggest. As mentioned above, in the
September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee, a CBP
official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were
patrolling the U.S.-Canada border at any given time--about a quarter of
all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border during
that period.
Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry:
We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at
ports of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the
government inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators'
counterfeit documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed
them to enter the country. Second, we found that government officials
did not always ask for identification. Although it was not a
requirement for government officials to ask for identification at the
time we performed our tests, we concluded that this was a major
vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other criminals to easily
enter the country.
In table 1 below, each individual instance of an investigator crossing
the border is noted separately, although, in some cases, investigators
crossed the border in groups of two or more.
Table 1: Entering the United States through Land Ports of Entry:
No.:
1;
Date: November 2002;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: No documents provided;
Result: Passed.
No.: 2;
Date: November 2002;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 3;
Date: November 2002;
Country of departure: Mexico; Documents provided:
Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 4;
Date: December 2002;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 5;
Date: December 2002;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 6;
Date: August 2003;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 7;
Date: August 2003;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 8;
Date: October 2003;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and employee ID;
Result: Passed.
No.: 9;
Date: October 2003; Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport and driver's license;
Result: Denied entry.
No.: 10;
Date: November 2003;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 11;
Date: November 2003;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport;
Result: Passed.
No.: 12;
Date: December 2003;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 13;
Date: December 2003;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport;
Result: Passed.
No.: 14; Date:
February 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 15; Date:
February 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 16; Date:
February 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: No documents provided;
Result: Passed.
No.: 17;
Date: February 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 18;
Date: March 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 19;
Date: March 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 20;
Date: March 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: No documents provided;
Result: Passed.
No.: 21;
Date: March 2006;
Country of departure: Mexico;
Documents provided: No documents provided;
Result: Passed.
No.: 22;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 23;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 24;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 25;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 26;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 27;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 28;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 29;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 30;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
No.: 31;
Date: May 2006;
Country of departure: Canada;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
Result: Passed.
Source: GAO.
Note: DHS considered the consolidated listing of destination states to
be law enforcement sensitive information. Therefore, this table does
not include the names of the states investigators entered.
[End of table]
We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports
of entry as different from our land crossings. For one thing, we did
not perform the same amount of testing that we performed at land ports
of entry. For another, the standard for admittance via air ports of
entry continues to be stricter than via land and sea routes. In table 2
below, each individual instance of an investigator entering the United
States via air or sea is noted separately.
Table 2: Entering the United States through Sea and Air Ports of Entry:
No.: 1;
Date: September 2002;
Country of departure: Canada;
Port type: Sea;
Documents provided: No documents provided;
Result: Passed.
No.: 2;
Date: September 2002;
Country of departure: Canada;
Port type: Sea;
Documents provided: No documents provided;
Result: Passed.
No.: 3;
Date: January 2003;
Country of departure: Jamaica;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 4;
Date: January 2003;
Country of departure: Jamaica;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 5;
Date: August 2003;
Country of departure: Canada;
Port type: Sea;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 6;
Date: August 2003;
Country of departure: Canada;
Port type: Sea;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 7;
Date: January 2004;
Country of departure: Jamaica;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport and driver's license;
Result: Denied entry.
No.: 8;
Date: January 2004;
Country of departure: Jamaica;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Denied entry.
No.: 9;
Date: March 2004;
Country of departure: Bahamas;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 10;
Date: March 2004;
Country of departure: Bahamas;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
No.: 11;
Date: March 2004;
Country of departure: Bahamas;
Port type: Air;
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
Result: Passed.
Source: GAO.
Note: DHS considered the consolidated listing of destination states to
be law enforcement sensitive information. Therefore, this table does
not include the names of the states investigators entered.
[End of table]
Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below.
Counterfeit Identification Accepted as Proof of Citizenship in Most
Cases:
For our 2003 testimony, investigators successfully entered the United
States using counterfeit drivers' licenses and other bogus
documentation through a land port of entry in Washington. They also
entered Florida via air from Jamaica using the same counterfeit
documentation. Similar follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and
2004, resulting in successful entry at locations in Washington, New
York, California, Texas, and Virginia using counterfeit identification.
In 2006, investigators successfully entered the United States using
counterfeit drivers' licenses and other bogus documentation through
seven land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, adding
the states of Michigan, Idaho, and Arizona to the list of states they
had entered.
In the majority of cases, investigators entered the country by land
using rental cars. When requested, they displayed counterfeit Virginia
and West Virginia drivers' licenses and birth certificates to the
government officials at ports of entry. They also used bogus U.S.
passports and, in one case, a fake employee identification card in the
name of a major U.S. airline. Government officials typically inspected
the documentation while inquiring whether our undercover investigators
were U.S. citizens. On some occasions, the officials asked whether our
investigators had purchased anything in Canada or Mexico. In several
instances, CBP officials asked our investigators to leave their
vehicles and inspected the vehicles; they appeared to be searching for
evidence of smuggling. In only one case on the northern border, one of
our undercover investigators was denied entry because a CBP officer
became suspicious of the expired U.S. passport with substituted photo
offered as proof of citizenship.[Footnote 5]
Undercover Investigators Did Not Show Identification in All Cases:
For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request
identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of
entry in California. Our investigators' oral assertions that they were
U.S. citizens satisfied the INS inspectors and they were allowed to
enter the country. Later, while conducting our 2006 covert tests, we
found that CBP officers did not request identification during several
foot crossings from Mexico. For example, on February 23, 2006, two
investigators crossed the border from Mexico into Texas on foot. When
the first investigator arrived at the port of entry, he was waved
through without being asked to show identification. At this point, the
investigator asked the CBP officer whether he wished to see any
identification. The officer replied, "OK, that would be good." The
investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver's license
from his wallet when the officer said "That's fine, you can go." The
CBP officer never looked at the license. However, the CBP officer did
request identification from the investigator who was walking behind the
first investigator.
In another test on March 15, 2006, two investigators entered Arizona
from Mexico by foot. They had received a phone call in advance from
another investigator who had crossed the border earlier using genuine
identification. He said that the CBP officers on duty had swiped his
driver's license through a scanning machine. Because the counterfeit
drivers' licenses the other two investigators were carrying had fake
magnetic strips, the investigators realized they could be questioned by
CBP officers if their identification cards did not scan properly. When
the two investigators arrived at the port of entry, they engaged one of
the officers in conversation to distract him from scanning their
drivers' licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer asked the
investigators if they were both U.S. citizens. They said, "yes." He
then asked the investigators if they had purchased anything in Mexico,
and they responded, "no." The CBP officer then said, "Have a nice day"
and allowed them to enter the United States. He did not ask for any
identification.
Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border
Locations:
We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and
unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting
testing at U.S.-Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our
investigators was able to walk into the United States from Canada at a
park straddling the border. The investigator was not stopped or
questioned by law enforcement personnel from either Canada or the
United States. In our September 2007 testimony, we reported on similar
vulnerabilities at unmanned and unmonitored locations on the northern
and southern borders. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we
visited were defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned
presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring
equipment in place. Safety considerations prevented our investigators
from performing the same assessment work on the U.S.-Mexico border as
performed on the northern border.
We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security
assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that
appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from
Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of
entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were
unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment
was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to
stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a
barrier across the road that could be driven around. Finally,
investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement
presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. See table
3 for a summary of the vulnerabilities we found and the activity of
investigators at each location.
Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned, Unmonitored Locations:
Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
Location: 1;
Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
Canada;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* Suspicious activity was reported to the U.S. Border Patrol, but
responding agents were unable to locate investigators and their
simulated contraband.
Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
Location: 2;
Investigator activity: Took photographs of over half a dozen locations
where state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response despite suspicious activity;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* CBP stated that our activities would not be grounds for a formal
investigation.
Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
Location: 3;
Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
Canada;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment.
Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
Location: 4;
Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
Canada;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* Some surveillance cameras and law enforcement presence noted along
the road;
* Investigators crossed the border into the United States in a spot
that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, then returned to Canada.
Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
Location: 5;
Investigator activity: Approached the U.S.-Mexico border;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* Large law enforcement effort at this location, including U.S. Army
National Guard units and unmanned aerial vehicles;
* Investigator approached the border in a spot that appeared to be
unmanned and unmonitored;
* According to CBP, because our investigators did not approach from the
direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement
units to question these activities.
Security vulnerability: Ports of entry with posted hours;
Location: 6;
Investigator activity: Attempted to trigger a law enforcement response
by taking photographs of a port of entry that had closed for the night;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* A gate was placed across the road, but investigators observed it
would be possible to drive around the gate;
* U.S. Border Patrol responded 20 minutes after investigators were
caught on camera at the port of entry;
* Responding U.S. Border Patrol agent did not attempt to verify
identity of investigators or search their vehicle.
Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
Location: 7;
Investigator activity: Approached the U.S.-Mexico border;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* Investigators observed evidence of frequent border crossings into the
United States at this location.
Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
Location: 8;
Investigator activity: Stepped over a 4-foot-high border fence, entered
Mexico, and returned again to the United States;
Law enforcement response and additional observations:
* No visible law enforcement response;
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
* No observed law enforcement presence despite proximity to border.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below.
State Roads Close to the Border:
According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator
can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of
the crossing are critical factors in determining whether an area of the
border is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border
that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate
the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband
from Canada into the United States. For example, on October 31, 2006,
our investigators positioned themselves on opposite sides of the U.S.-
Canada border in an unmanned location. Our investigators selected this
location because roads on either side of the border would allow them to
quickly and easily exchange simulated contraband. After receiving a
signal by cell phone, the investigator in Canada left his vehicle and
walked approximately 25 feet to the border carrying a red duffel bag.
While investigators on the U.S. side took photographs and made a
digital video recording, the individual with the duffel bag proceeded
the remaining 50 feet, transferred the duffel bag to the investigators
on the U.S. side, and returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side. The
set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time
the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian and
U.S. sides of the border. According to CBP records of this incident, an
alert citizen notified the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious
activities of our investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently
attempted to search for a vehicle matching the description of the
rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol
was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even
though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the
port of entry.
See figure 1 for a photograph of our investigator crossing the northern
border at another unmanned, unmonitored location on the northern border
with simulated contraband.
Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States
in a Northern Border Location:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of GAO investigator crossing from Canada into the United
States in a Northern Border Location.
Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity.
[End of figure]
In contrast to our observations on the northern border, our
investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard
presence near a state road on the southern border, including unmanned
aerial vehicles. On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a
main U.S. route about a quarter mile from a U.S.-Mexico port of entry.
Traveling on a dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators
used a GPS system to get as close to the border as possible. Our
investigators passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National
Guard units. In addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial
vehicles and a helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point
where the dirt road ran closest to the U.S.-Mexico border, our
investigators spotted additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in
a covered position. About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles,
our investigators pulled off the road. One investigator exited the
vehicle and proceeded on foot through several gulches and gullies
toward the Mexican border. His intent was to find out whether he would
be questioned by law enforcement agents about his activities. He
returned to the vehicle after 15 minutes, at which time our
investigators returned to the main road. Our investigators did not
observe any public traffic on this road for the 1 hour that they were
in the area, but none of the law enforcement units attempted to stop
our investigators and find out what they were doing. According to CBP,
because our investigators did not approach from the direction of
Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement units to
question these activities.
Ports of Entry with Posted Hours:
We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in
one state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of
entry are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that
it relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt
to interdict illegal border crossing activity. For example, on November
14, 2006, at about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S.
side of one port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators
observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only
visible preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the
United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven
around. CBP provided us with records that confirmed our observations
about the barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one
occasion a cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to
illegally enter the United States. Although the violator was later
caught by state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S.
Border Patrol, we were concerned that these ports of entry were
unmanned overnight.
Federally Managed Lands:
Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on
federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the
time our investigators visited the sites. For example, on January 9,
2007, our investigators entered federally managed land adjacent to the
U.S.-Mexico border. The investigators had identified a road running
parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators were informed by
an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S. government was
building a fence, the road was closed to the public. However, our
investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was not
physically closed. While driving west along this road, our
investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law
enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the
movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of
the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at
one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion
alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico,
and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the
location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law
enforcement response to their activities.
In another example, on January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. In this
area, the Rio Grande River forms the southern border between the United
States and Mexico. After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks
of the Rio Grande, our investigators observed, in two locations,
evidence that frequent border crossings took place. In one location,
the investigators observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the
Mexican side of the river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S.
side of the Rio Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side.
Access to the boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn
footpaths and vehicle tracks. An individual who worked in this area
told our investigators that at several times during the year, the water
is so low that the river can easily be crossed on foot. Our
investigators were in this area for 1 hour and 30 minutes and observed
no surveillance equipment, intrusion alarm systems, or law enforcement
presence. Our investigators were not challenged regarding their
activities.
After performing our limited security assessment of these locations,
investigators learned that a memorandum of understanding exists between
DHS (of which CBP is a component), the Department of the Interior, and
the Department of Agriculture regarding the protection of federal lands
adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for
protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal,
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for
enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal
sovereignty rights.
Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions:
We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to
discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our
August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to
identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land
border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP
officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative and were working to implement it. This initiative has
several parts, the most recent of which went into effect on January 31,
2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP indicated that
resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from
investigating all instances of suspicious activity. CBP stated that the
northern border presents more of a challenge than the southern border
for several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the
existence of many antiquated ports of entry.
In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous
border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since
2003. To directly address vulnerabilities related to bogus
documentation, DHS stated that measures have been implemented to
enhance CBP officers' ability to detect fraudulent documents, such as:
* providing updated fraudulent document training modules to the CBP
Academy for inclusion in its curriculum,
* implementing mandatory refresher training in detecting fraudulent
documents, and:
* providing the 11 ports of entry that have the highest rate of
fraudulent document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist
with the examination and detection of fraudulent documents.
DHS also pointed out that, effective January 31, 2008, it has ended
verbal declarations of citizenship at border crossings and now requires
documents for U.S. citizens. If implemented effectively, this would
address some of the vulnerabilities we identified in our 2003 and 2006
testimonies. According to DHS, although the full implementation of its
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has been delayed, the
implementation will also address vulnerabilities cited in our
testimonies.
In addition, DHS indicated that it has taken a number of actions
related to the security of the northern border. In particular, DHS
states that, as of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the
Northern Border--a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified
in our 2007 report. Furthermore, DHS plans to double personnel staffing
levels over the next 2 years to over 2,000 agents by the end of fiscal
year 2010. DHS also indicates that CBP has established a field testing
division to perform covert tests that appear similar to our own tests,
with a particular focus on detecting and preventing illicit radioactive
material from entering the United States. We addressed DHS technical
and sensitivity comments as appropriate. We did not attempt to verify
the information provided by DHS, but have included its full response in
appendix I.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30
days from the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested
congressional committees and members. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://gao.gov].
Please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov if you or your
staffs have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report included John Cooney, Assistant Director; Andy
O'Connell, Assistant Director; Barbara Lewis, Andrew McIntosh, Sandra
Moore, and Barry Shillito.
Signed by:
Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
May 1, 2008:
Mr. Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director, Forensic Audits & Special Investigations:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Kutz:
Re: Draft Report GAO-08-757, Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests
and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance for 2003-
2007 (Job Code 192271).
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
report. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials
provided the following updates.
The report summarizes findings of the GAO's covert tests and security
assessment work performed and reported at hearings from 2003 through
2007. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Internal Affairs
conducts covert and overt testing of CBP operations through its
Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD). The division was established
to test and evaluate CBP's capabilities to detect and prevent illicit
radioactive material from entering the United States. The test
protocols focused on identifying potential technological
vulnerabilities and/or systemic procedural and policy weaknesses
related to the screening and detection of passengers and containers
entering the United States with illicit radioactive material.
As of April 23, 2008, OFTD reported that they successfully tested and
evaluated two CBP land border crossings on their capabilities to detect
and prevent terrorists and illicit radioactive material from entering
the United States. In addition, consistent with the Security and
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, OFTD covertly and
overtly tested and evaluated 21 of the Nation's top 22 busiest seaports
for radiation detection and the effectiveness of the non-intrusive
imaging radiation equipment deployed at the seaports.
Overall, it was noted that the test results underscored the
effectiveness of the radiation detection technology and the CBP
officers' compliance with national and local radiation detection
response protocols while calling attention to areas for improvement.
The OFTD also developed a testing protocol that will assess and
evaluate the CBP officers' capabilities to detect and prevent
terrorists and travelers using fraudulent travel documents from
entering the United States. The OFTD anticipates these tests will
commence before the end of the fiscal year.
The GAO report also focused on reported vulnerabilities on the northern
and southern borders. CBP believes that the right combination of
personnel, technology, tactical infrastructure and
intelligence/partnerships are being deployed to address southern and
northern border vulnerabilities.
On the northern border, CBP has deployed additional Border Patrol
agents from the southwest border to the northern border with 1,800
expected by September 2009. In addition, CBP conducts joint operations
with the Department of Defense's Joint Task Force - North, continues to
pilot maritime technology projects incorporating ground based radar and
proof of concept multi-sensor systems, and seeks increased liaisons
with our Canadian partners through Project North Star and the
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. CBP also is expanding Air and
Marine operations on the northern border, including the deployment of
Predator B Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
On the southern border, CBP is developing SBInet, a Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) program that will provide Border Patrol the
appropriate mixture of personnel, technology, and infrastructure,
combined into a common operational picture for the purpose of securing
both the northern and southern borders. SBInet personnel are charged
with designing, developing, and implementing a solution that
incorporates surveillance and detection, command and control,
intelligence, tactical infrastructure, communications and information
technology. SBInet will use the latest innovative technology - cameras,
biometrics, sensors, air assets, improved communications systems - to
provide Border Patrol agents what they need to execute the agency's
mission in the safest and most effective manner. Moving forward, CBP
intends to complete construction on the 370 miles of pedestrian fencing
and 300 miles of vehicle fencing along the southern border to enhance
border security. Currently CBP has almost 170 miles of primary
pedestrian fencing and 135 miles of vehicle fence in place. [Footnote
6] Plans are to complete construction of the full 670 miles of fencing
by the end of the calendar year.
CBP completed technology requirements assessments of the Yuma, Tucson,
and El Paso sectors and will look to fill those needs first as they
present the highest threat areas. CBP currently has 4 mobile
surveillance systems in operation and plans to deploy additional
systems this year to the southwest border to serve as primary detection
platforms. CBP also deployed over 7,500 unattended ground sensors (UGS)
that provide continuous, low-cost, and covert awareness of cross-border
activity. CBP is acquiring 2,500 additional UGS this fiscal year with
1,250 of those planned for deployment on the northern border and 1,250
on the southwest border.
Dovetailing with the efforts on the southern border, Congress directed
CBP to redirect $20 million of the Border Security, Fencing,
Infrastructure, and Technology appropriation "to begin addressing needs
and vulnerabilities along the northern border." Accordingly, CBP is
developing a SBInet prototype that will inform and demonstrate the
technology issues associated with the integration of air, land and
maritime assets into a common operating picture on the northern border.
Referring to both borders, the GAO report indicated that the GAO found
two types of security vulnerabilities in their covert testing at ports
of entry. The first vulnerability cited by the GAO is that some of the
counterfeit documents presented by their undercover investigators went
undetected by CBP officers. hi an effort to enhance fraudulent document
training, CBP inserted updated training into the CBP Academy curriculum
as well as implemented mandatory refresher training on detecting
fraudulent documents. In addition, CBP provided the ports of entry that
have the highest rate of fraudulent document interceptions with
advanced equipment to assist with the examination and detection of
fraudulent documents.
The second vulnerability cited by GAO in this report is that
investigators were not asked to provide identification. [Footnote 7]
The GAO acknowledged that asking for identification was not a
requirement at the time of the covert test however they concluded that
"this was a major vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other
criminals to easily enter the country." The full implementation of the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) will address this and other
vulnerabilities; however, the Congress has delayed its completion. In
the interim, DHS is exercising its preexisting authority to require
appropriate government documents at the border and end verbal
declarations of citizenship. It is important to clarify that the
implementation of WHTI is separate from the ending of verbal
declarations. While they both work to enhance border security they are
not interchangeable initiatives as the GAO report reflects.
Effective January 31, 2008, under the aforementioned authority, United
States, Canadian and Bermudian citizens are required to present one or
more government-issued documents to prove identity and citizenship.
Children ages 18 and under need only present a birth certificate. This
transition inhibits entry of individuals who cannot confirm their
identity and citizenship. Since the transition, changes in travel
document requirement have not caused discernable increases in wait
times at the border. Compliance rates are high and continue to
increase. United States and Canadian citizens are presenting the
requested documents when crossing the border.
High compliance rates have also been reported during the initial phase
of the WHTI. As of January 23, 2007, the WHTI Air Final Rule requires
all arriving air travelers, regardless of age, to present a passport or
other acceptable secure document for entry into the United States. In
the last seven months, CBP has reported a compliance rate of 99 percent
for citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda, and there has
been no interruption to air transportation. This is the result of close
coordination with federal government partners, private sector travel,
tourism industry and the air carriers. The high level of compliance
shows that Americans and foreign nationals alike are willing and able
to obtain the necessary documents to enter or re-enter the United
States once the requirements are known and enforced. On March 27, 2008,
DHS announced that full implementation of the land and sea provisions
of WHTI would begin July 1, 2009.
As reflected in the report, CBP officials are tasked with a very
complex, dangerous, and challenging job. They face those challenges
every day with vigilance, dedication to service, and integrity as they
work to strengthen national homeland security and protect America and
its citizens.
Attachment I "Recent and Planned Border Security Initiatives" provides
additional, detailed information on Department activities.
Technical and sensitivity comments have been provided under separate
cover. We request that the GAO make appropriate changes in the draft
report prior to releasing information that has been determined to be
sensitive. We expect GAO to accord this material the same level of
sensitivity as DHS. Any further disclosure only should occur with the
express permission of the Department.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Penelope G. McCormack:
Acting Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Attachment I: Recent and Planned Border Security Activities
Northern Border Overview:
Personnel:
Border Patrol agent staffing on the Northern Border has increased
significantly since September 11, 2001. Prior to 9-11, there were only
340 Border Patrol agents assigned to the Northern Border responsible
for securing nearly 4,000 miles of international border with Canada. As
of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the Northern Border,
a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified in the 2007 GAO
report. Furthermore, personnel staffing levels will be doubled over the
next two years to over 2,000 agents by the end of Fiscal Year 2010.
These additional agents will be deployed to traditional assignments
such as line watch but will also be assigned to liaison duties in the
following offices:
* Integrated Border Enforcement Teams;
- Border Enforcement and Security Teams (BEST) pilot locations.
* Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers.
* US Attorney's Offices.
* Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
* State Fusion Centers.
* Local Task Forces.
Technology:
The apparent lack of visibility of Border Patrol resources does not
mean that the border is "unmanned and unmonitored." The Border Patrol
currently employs a myriad of tactics to enforce border security along
the Northern Border. These include but are not limited to ground
surveillance sensors and cameras. Future technology includes:
* Three-Ground Surveillance Radars will be deployed along the Northern
Border.
* The total number of unattended ground sensors deployed will increase
and existing unattended ground sensors will be replaced with upgraded
sensors and strategically deployed along the Northern Border in FY 2008.
- The RCMP has deployed ground sensors in strategic locations in
coordination with the US Border Patrol.
* Improved mobile Infra-Red detection capability is being deployed to
every Northern Border Sector.
* The existing Remote Video Surveillance System in the Blaine
Washington Sector will be upgraded to provide enhanced coverage of the
border.
* The deployment of interim technology will continue in the form of
thermal night vision devices and G-2 Sentinel Systems which are
advanced game cameras with video/unattended ground sensor capabilities.
* SBInet Northern Demonstration Project: The demonstration will take
place along the Lower St. Clair River in the Detroit Sector Area of
Responsibility (AOR). The prototype will demonstrate how an integrated
air, land and maritime border security solution will improve operations
in an area of the Northern Border; improve situational awareness by
integrating national and tactical intelligence sources into a common
operating picture; and provide members of the border enforcement
community with the information necessary to support homeland security
strategies and plans for unity of effort.
* Additional DHS Science and Technology and CBP Office of Information
Technology pilot projects will be tested throughout the northern
border. These pilot projects will involve four sectors and include the:
- Use of bollards in the Blaine sector;
- Placement of acoustic sensors in the Spokane sector to detect low
flying aircraft incursions;
- Testing of gel-celled unattended ground sensors in the Grand Forks
sector; and;
- BorderNet proof-of-concept pilot program in the Swanton sector which
is designed to enhance current and future detection capabilities in a
Northern Border operational environment.
Partnerships:
Liaison and intelligence sharing have been improved and increased with
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as with
counterparts within the Canadian government.
* Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS);
- The IBETs are bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement teams that
enhance border integrity and security by identifying, investigating,
and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to
national security or are engaged in other organized criminal activity.
* Border Enforcement and Security Teams;
- Two Immigration and Customs Enforcement BEST pilots will begin in the
Buffalo and Blaine Sectors. These teams will provide investigative
support to IBETS.
* Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
- An RCMP Inspector has been detailed to the Border Patrol Headquarters
to serve as a liaison between the two agencies;
- Border Patrol is seeking to embed agents into the RCMP Divisions to
enhance the dissemination of actionable intelligence and to ensure
optimum information sharing with our Canadian partners.
* Project North Star;
- A bi-national forum that provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement
managers a mechanism to enhance existing communications, cooperation,
and partnership between agencies and personnel that operate within the
border area.
* Northern Border Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers
(IOCC);
- Multi-Component Intelligence Fusion Centers that facilitate the
communication, intelligence and flow of information throughout a
specific region to multiple law enforcement agencies.
* Airfields Initiative;
- The development of strong partnerships and liaison with the community
and law enforcement organizations to gather and develop intelligence
information on aircraft incursions.
* Radio Interoperability Pilot Project;
- Havre Border Patrol Sector and RCMP are participating in a pilot
program that uses techniques to measure interoperability of radio
systems.
Southern Border Updates:
Personnel:
Based on the operational needs of the Border Patrol, for Fiscal Year
2008, staffing will increase between 18 to 20 percent along the
Southern border. As of April 2008, there were 14,138 agents assigned to
the Southern border. That represents an increase of 18 percent from the
11,986 agents identified in the 2007 GAO report.
Technology:
The Border Patrol is working towards the deployment of technology
across the Southwest Border in an effort to gain operational control of
our nation's border.
* Ongoing delivery of 40 Mobile Surveillance Systems units to the
southern border is occurring.
* TUSCON-1 deployment: Will consist of the construction and placement
of sensor and communication towers in the Tucson Station area of
responsibility. The deployment will also add additional Unattended
Ground Sensors.
* AJO-1 deployment: Will consist of the construction and placement of
sensor and communication towers in the Ajo Station AOR. The deployment
will also add additional Unattended Ground Sensors.
* Deployment of the Common Operating Picture into the TUSCON-1 and AJO-
1 projects.
* Purchase and deployment of 1250 unattended ground sensors.
Tactical Infrastructure:
Tactical infrastructure deployments along the Southwest Border have
increased significantly during Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008.
* Over 70 miles of pedestrian fencing was deployed during Fiscal Year
2007.
* Over 55 miles of vehicle barriers were deployed during Fiscal Year
2007.
* End of Calendar Year 2008 goals include the deployment of
approximately 185 miles of additional vehicle fencing and 225 miles of
pedestrian fencing along the Southwest Border.
Partnerships:
On the Southern border, CBP's Border Patrol partners with other DHS
components, federal, state, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, and
the Government of Mexico, to bring together resources and fused
intelligence into a geographical area that has been heavily impacted by
illicit smuggling activity. By partnering, DHS continues to have a
significant positive effect combating the threat of domestic terrorism,
illegal cross-border migration, and all related crime in the border
environment.
* Operation Stonegarden;
- Operation Stonegarden is a DHS funded, Border Patrol led, operation
designed to incorporate the services of State, Local, and Tribal (SLT)
law enforcement agencies for the purpose of enhancing border security
and preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons of mass
effect while at the same time mitigating the conspicuous effects of
human trafficking organizations.
* Operation Jump Start;
- On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced his plan to deploy up to
6,000 National Guard personnel for the first year along the United
States border with Mexico in support of CBP's comprehensive strategy
for gaining control of our borders. The second year deployment is
currently 3000 troops. The intent of the operation is to provide CBP's
Border Patrol an immediate means to enhance border enforcement
operations while Border Patrol increased its own internal enforcement
resources through hiring additional Border Patrol agents, mission
support personnel, and procuring and applying new technology and
infrastructure. The result was Operation Jump Start, a sustained (2-
year) DHS and Department of Defense (DOD) collaborative effort to
increase border security while enhancing the Border Patrol's ability
and capacity to achieve its mission.
* Border Enforcement and Security Teams;
- The Border Patrol is an active partner with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and other Federal, state, and local agencies in the BEST
taskforces located throughout the southwestern border that were formed
specifically to combat cross-border criminal activity and violence.
Participation in the taskforces leverage Border Patrol knowledge of the
border area with other agencies' investigative expertise.
* Border Security Operations Center (BSOC);
- The BSOC is located in Austin, Texas. It acts as a fusion center for
the State of Texas Department of Public Safety regarding border
security issues. As a participating agency, the Border Patrol shares
and maintains intelligence and coordinates operational planning with
law enforcement agencies within the State of Texas. The BSOC identifies
trends and patterns to establish multi agency enforcement methodologies
aimed at disrupting alien smuggling organizations and drug trafficking
organizations operating in the region.
* Border Violence Protocols (BVP);
- BVP is a bi-national action plan to combat border violence and
improve public safety and was signed by Secretary Michael Chertoff and
Mexico's Secretary of the Interior, Carlos Maria Abascal Carranza. This
action plan sets forth goals and objectives to ensure that the
appropriate law enforcement agencies of the respective governments work
together to provide an effective, comprehensive joint response to
incidents of cross-border violence and crime.
* Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security
(OASISS);
- OASISS is a bilateral prosecutions program between the United States
Government and the Government of Mexico. The program targets and
prosecutes alien smugglers and human traffickers that smuggle aliens
into the United States.
* Operation Streamline;
- Operation Streamline is a collaborative effort of multiple agencies
(U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Marshal's Service, ICE) that utilizes
criminal prosecution to deter illegal entries and gain, maintain and
expand control of problematic areas;
- The Chief Patrol Agent identifies and designates a `zero tolerance
zone' for all illegal entries and directs that all prosecutable aliens,
regardless of nationality, apprehended within the geographic boundaries
be processed for criminal prosecution and removal proceedings.
Fraudulent Document Detection Updates:
CBP has implemented the following measures to enhance the CBP Officers
ability to detect fraudulent documents. With the exception of the
specialized equipment deployed in 2006 to the 11 Ports of Entry (POEs)
(bullet 5 below), all other actions noted below were intended for CBP
Officers at all POEs:
* 2004- Implemented mandatory 8 hours in fraudulent document detection
for all CBP Officers.
* 2004- Distributed packets with sample training documents and Driver's
License Identification Guides to all POEs.
* 2005- Printed and distributed the Pocket Guide Reference to Document
Security Features and Printing Techniques.
* 2005-2006 - Inserted Fraudulent Document Training into all relevant
cross training modules.
* 2006-Provided 11 POEs that have the highest rate of fraudulent
document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist with the
examination and detection of fraudulent documents.
1. San Ysidro POE;
2. Calexico POE;
3. John F. Kennedy International Airport;
4. Newark International Airport;
5. Laredo POE;
6. El Paso POE;
7. Miami International Airport;
8. Los Angeles International Airport;
9. Dulles International Airport;
10. Nogales POE;
11. Atlanta International Airport.
* 2006 - Inserted 12 hours of fraudulent document detection into the
Advanced Admissibility Secondary Processing Training program.
* 2007 - Provided updated fraudulent document training modules to the
CBP Academy for inclusion in their curriculum.
* 2007 - Provided Virtual Learning Center training on Machine Readable
Visas.
* 2007 - Implemented mandatory refresher fraudulent document training.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-438T] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003); GAO, Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in
Screening Entrants into the United States, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-976T] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
2, 2006); and GAO, Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at
Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-884T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
27, 2007).
[2] Because of safety concerns, we could not perform covert tests at
all unmanned and unmonitored border locations. For more information on
covert testing, see GAO, Investigative Operations: Use of Covert
Testing to Identify Security Vulnerabilities and Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-286T]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2007).
[3] In three cases, our undercover investigators were denied entry into
the United States by CBP officers. In the first case, a CBP officer at
the Canadian border noticed that our undercover investigator's U.S.
passport contained a substituted photo and would not allow him to
enter. We believe that the other two cases are linked to this single
incident because CBP became aware of our covert testing.
[4] DHS and the Department of State's effort to specify acceptable
documents and implement document requirements at 326 air, land, and sea
ports of entry is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.
[5] As a result of this incident, we believe CBP became aware of our
covert testing and denied entry to two undercover investigators when
they attempted to enter the country from Jamaica. Investigators were
admitted to the United States after revealing they were GAO employees
and providing real identification.
[6] Figures for miles of pedestrian fencing and vehicle fencing in
place include those miles that have been constructed since October
2007, toward the achievement of the calendar year 2008 goal of
deploying an additional 225 miles of pedestrian fencing and 185 miles
of vehicle fencing along the southwest border. When these goals are
achieved, CBP will have a total of 370 miles of pedestrian fencing and
300 miles of vehicle fencing.
[7] The GAO report implies that the failure of CBP officers and agents
to approach GAO investigators while inside the United States represents
a security vulnerability. However, GAO acknowledges that Border Patrol
agents and unmanned aerial vehicles were observed monitoring the border
during the October 2006 GAO investigation on the southern border. GAO
presents no evidence that investigators were not being monitored
appropriately by CBP during the entire time that investigators were
along the U.S./Mexico border. The report does not address the likely
possibility that Border Patrol agents would have approached the
investigators while on foot or in their vehicle as appropriate if there
was a suspicion of unlawful activity.
[End of section]
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